mirror of
https://github.com/DISARMFoundation/DISARMframeworks.git
synced 2024-12-25 07:19:44 -05:00
moved to datasets as CSVs
Changed from data held in excelfiles to data held in CSV files. This gives us a better view of what's changed in the datasets when we push them to git.
This commit is contained in:
Sara-Jayne Terp
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{
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||||
"cells": [
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||||
{
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"cell_type": "markdown",
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||||
"metadata": {},
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"source": [
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||||
"# Create counters summaries\n",
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"Create summaries of disinfo countermeasures for use in dataset cleaning etc."
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]
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},
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{
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||||
"cell_type": "code",
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||||
"execution_count": 1,
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||||
"metadata": {},
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||||
"outputs": [
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||||
{
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||||
"name": "stdout",
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||||
"output_type": "stream",
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||||
"text": [
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||||
"Writing ../counter_tactics/ALcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA01counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA02counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA03counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA04counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA05counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA06counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA07counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA08counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA09counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA10counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA11counters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_tactics/TA12counters.md\n",
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"updated ../counter_tactic_counts.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/cleaningcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/countermessagingcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/data pollutioncounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/daylightcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/dilutioncounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/diversioncounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/frictioncounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/metatechniquecounters.md\n",
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||||
"Writing ../counters_metatag/reduce resourcescounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/removalcounters.md\n",
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||||
"Writing ../counters_metatag/resiliencecounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/scoringcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/targetingcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counters_metatag/verificationcounters.md\n",
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"updated ../counter_metatag_counts.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/DHScounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/NGOcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/activistscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/adtechcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/civil_societycounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/community_groupscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/companiescounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/content_creatorscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/data_scientistcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/datastreamscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/developerscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/educatorscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/elvescounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/factcheckerscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/fundingcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/gamesdesignerscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/governmentcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/government:policymakerscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/influencerscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/influencers:trusted_authoritycounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/infoseccounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/librariescounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/mediacounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/militarycounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/moneycounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/platform_admincounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/platform_admin:adtechcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/platform_admin:fundingsitescounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/platform_admin:socialmediacounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/platform_algorithmscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/platform_outreachcounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/platformscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/publiccounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/public:account_ownerscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/religious_organisationscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/schoolscounters.md\n",
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"Writing ../counter_resource/server_admincounters.md\n",
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"updated ../counter_resource_counts.md\n"
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]
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},
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{
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"data": {
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"text/html": [
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||||
"<div>\n",
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||||
"<style scoped>\n",
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||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
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" vertical-align: middle;\n",
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" }\n",
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"\n",
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||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
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" vertical-align: top;\n",
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"\n",
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||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
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||||
" text-align: right;\n",
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" }\n",
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"</style>\n",
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||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
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" <thead>\n",
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||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
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" <th></th>\n",
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" <th>ID</th>\n",
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" <th>metatechnique</th>\n",
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" <th>Title</th>\n",
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" <th>Details</th>\n",
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" <th>Playbook(s)</th>\n",
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" <th>Resources needed</th>\n",
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" <th>How found</th>\n",
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" <th>References</th>\n",
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" <th>Incidents</th>\n",
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" <th>Tactic</th>\n",
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" <th>Response</th>\n",
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" <th>Techniques</th>\n",
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" <th>NOTES</th>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" </thead>\n",
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" <tbody>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>0</th>\n",
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" <td>C00043</td>\n",
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" <td>cleaning</td>\n",
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" <td>Detect hijacked accounts and reallocate them</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>In all playbooks the platform must force user ...</td>\n",
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" <td>platform_admin,activists,civil_society,money</td>\n",
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" <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>TA03 Develop People</td>\n",
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" <td>D3 Disrupt</td>\n",
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" <td>T0011 - Hijack accounts</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>1</th>\n",
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" <td>C00053</td>\n",
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" <td>cleaning</td>\n",
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" <td>Delete old accounts / Remove unused social med...</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>Social media companies remove inactive account...</td>\n",
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" <td>platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia,publ...</td>\n",
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" <td>2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>I00004</td>\n",
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" <td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>\n",
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" <td>D4 Degrade</td>\n",
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" <td>T0011 - Hijack accounts\\nTA06 - Develop Conten...</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>2</th>\n",
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" <td>C00074</td>\n",
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" <td>cleaning</td>\n",
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" <td>Identify identical content and mass deplatform</td>\n",
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" <td>\\n</td>\n",
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" <td>In all cases some checks need to prevent depla...</td>\n",
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" <td>platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia</td>\n",
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" <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>TA06 Develop Content</td>\n",
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" <td>D2 Deny</td>\n",
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" <td>T0022 - Conspiracy narratives\\nT0026 - Create ...</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>3</th>\n",
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" <td>C00026</td>\n",
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" <td>countermessaging</td>\n",
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" <td>Shore up democracy based messages (peace, free...</td>\n",
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" <td>Unsure</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>\n",
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" <td>D4 Degrade</td>\n",
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" <td>T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>4</th>\n",
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" <td>C00082</td>\n",
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" <td>countermessaging</td>\n",
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" <td>Ground truthing as automated response to pollu...</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>TA06 Develop Content</td>\n",
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" <td>D3 Disrupt</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>...</th>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" <td>...</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>181</th>\n",
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" <td>C00214</td>\n",
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" <td>metatechnique</td>\n",
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" <td>Create policy that makes social media police d...</td>\n",
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" <td>German model: facebook forced to police conten...</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>government:policymakers</td>\n",
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" <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>\n",
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" <td>D3 Disrupt</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>182</th>\n",
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" <td>C00215</td>\n",
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" <td>metatechnique</td>\n",
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" <td>Use fraud legislation to clean up social media</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>government:policymakers</td>\n",
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" <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>\n",
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" <td>D3 Disrupt</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>183</th>\n",
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" <td>C00217</td>\n",
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" <td>daylight</td>\n",
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" <td>Registries alert when large batches of newsy U...</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>platform_admin</td>\n",
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" <td>grugq</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>\n",
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" <td>D2 Deny</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>184</th>\n",
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" <td>C00218</td>\n",
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" <td>removal</td>\n",
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" <td>Censorship</td>\n",
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" <td>Alter and/or block the publication/disseminati...</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>platform_admin</td>\n",
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" <td>grugq</td>\n",
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" <td>Taylor81</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>TA09 Exposure</td>\n",
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" <td>D2 Deny</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" <tr>\n",
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" <th>185</th>\n",
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" <td>C00219</td>\n",
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" <td>daylight</td>\n",
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" <td>Add metadata to content - out of the control o...</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>Add date and source to images</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>grugq</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>TA06 Develop Content</td>\n",
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" <td>D3 Disrupt</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" <td>NaN</td>\n",
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" </tr>\n",
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" </tbody>\n",
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"</table>\n",
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"<p>186 rows × 13 columns</p>\n",
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"</div>"
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],
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"text/plain": [
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" ID metatechnique \\\n",
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"0 C00043 cleaning \n",
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"1 C00053 cleaning \n",
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"2 C00074 cleaning \n",
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"3 C00026 countermessaging \n",
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"4 C00082 countermessaging \n",
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".. ... ... \n",
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"181 C00214 metatechnique \n",
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"182 C00215 metatechnique \n",
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"183 C00217 daylight \n",
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"184 C00218 removal \n",
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"185 C00219 daylight \n",
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"\n",
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" Title \\\n",
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"0 Detect hijacked accounts and reallocate them \n",
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"1 Delete old accounts / Remove unused social med... \n",
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"2 Identify identical content and mass deplatform \n",
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"3 Shore up democracy based messages (peace, free... \n",
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"4 Ground truthing as automated response to pollu... \n",
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".. ... \n",
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"181 Create policy that makes social media police d... \n",
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"182 Use fraud legislation to clean up social media \n",
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"183 Registries alert when large batches of newsy U... \n",
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"184 Censorship \n",
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"185 Add metadata to content - out of the control o... \n",
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"\n",
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" Details \\\n",
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"0 NaN \n",
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"1 NaN \n",
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"2 \\n \n",
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"3 Unsure \n",
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"4 NaN \n",
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".. ... \n",
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"181 German model: facebook forced to police conten... \n",
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"182 NaN \n",
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"183 NaN \n",
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"184 Alter and/or block the publication/disseminati... \n",
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"185 NaN \n",
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"\n",
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" Playbook(s) \\\n",
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"0 In all playbooks the platform must force user ... \n",
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"1 Social media companies remove inactive account... \n",
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"2 In all cases some checks need to prevent depla... \n",
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"3 NaN \n",
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"4 NaN \n",
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".. ... \n",
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"181 NaN \n",
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"182 NaN \n",
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"183 NaN \n",
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"184 NaN \n",
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"185 Add date and source to images \n",
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"\n",
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" Resources needed \\\n",
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"0 platform_admin,activists,civil_society,money \n",
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"1 platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia,publ... \n",
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"2 platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia \n",
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"3 NaN \n",
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"4 NaN \n",
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".. ... \n",
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"181 government:policymakers \n",
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"182 government:policymakers \n",
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"183 platform_admin \n",
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"184 platform_admin \n",
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"185 NaN \n",
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"\n",
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" How found References Incidents \\\n",
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"0 2019-11-workshop NaN NaN \n",
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"1 2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search NaN I00004 \n",
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"2 2019-11-workshop NaN NaN \n",
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"3 2019-11-workshop NaN NaN \n",
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"4 2019-11-workshop NaN NaN \n",
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".. ... ... ... \n",
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"181 2019-11-workshop NaN NaN \n",
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"182 2019-11-workshop NaN NaN \n",
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"183 grugq NaN NaN \n",
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"184 grugq Taylor81 NaN \n",
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"185 grugq NaN NaN \n",
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"\n",
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" Tactic Response \\\n",
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"0 TA03 Develop People D3 Disrupt \n",
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"1 TA04 Develop Networks D4 Degrade \n",
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"2 TA06 Develop Content D2 Deny \n",
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"3 TA01 Strategic Planning D4 Degrade \n",
|
||||
"4 TA06 Develop Content D3 Disrupt \n",
|
||||
".. ... ... \n",
|
||||
"181 TA07 Channel Selection D3 Disrupt \n",
|
||||
"182 TA07 Channel Selection D3 Disrupt \n",
|
||||
"183 TA07 Channel Selection D2 Deny \n",
|
||||
"184 TA09 Exposure D2 Deny \n",
|
||||
"185 TA06 Develop Content D3 Disrupt \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" Techniques NOTES \n",
|
||||
"0 T0011 - Hijack accounts NaN \n",
|
||||
"1 T0011 - Hijack accounts\\nTA06 - Develop Conten... NaN \n",
|
||||
"2 T0022 - Conspiracy narratives\\nT0026 - Create ... NaN \n",
|
||||
"3 T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda NaN \n",
|
||||
"4 NaN NaN \n",
|
||||
".. ... ... \n",
|
||||
"181 NaN NaN \n",
|
||||
"182 NaN NaN \n",
|
||||
"183 NaN NaN \n",
|
||||
"184 NaN NaN \n",
|
||||
"185 NaN NaN \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"[186 rows x 13 columns]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 1,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import generate_amitt_counters\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"counter = generate_amitt_counters.Counter()\n",
|
||||
"counter.write_tactics_markdown()\n",
|
||||
"counter.write_metacounts_markdown()\n",
|
||||
"counter.write_resource_markdown()\n",
|
||||
"counter.dfcounters"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"kernelspec": {
|
||||
"display_name": "Python 3",
|
||||
"language": "python",
|
||||
"name": "python3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"language_info": {
|
||||
"codemirror_mode": {
|
||||
"name": "ipython",
|
||||
"version": 3
|
||||
},
|
||||
"file_extension": ".py",
|
||||
"mimetype": "text/x-python",
|
||||
"name": "python",
|
||||
"nbconvert_exporter": "python",
|
||||
"pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
|
||||
"version": "3.8.3"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nbformat": 4,
|
||||
"nbformat_minor": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,268 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cells": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "markdown",
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# Create AMITT incident visualisations\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"Many thanks to https://python-graph-gallery.com/91-customize-seaborn-heatmap/"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import seaborn as sns\n",
|
||||
"import pandas as pd\n",
|
||||
"import numpy as np\n",
|
||||
"import generate_amitt_ttps\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"# Check that heatmap works\n",
|
||||
"df = pd.DataFrame(np.random.random((10,12)), columns=[\"a\",\"b\",\"c\",\"d\",\"e\",\"f\",\"g\",\"h\",\"i\",\"j\",\"k\",\"l\"])\n",
|
||||
"sns.heatmap(df, annot=True, annot_kws={\"size\": 7})"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"amitt = generate_amitt_ttps.Amitt()\n",
|
||||
"redgrid = amitt.create_padded_framework_table('AMITT Red', 'technique_ids', False)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"techcounts = amitt.it[['id_incident','id_technique']].drop_duplicates().groupby('id_technique').count().to_dict()['id_incident']\n",
|
||||
"techlabels = redgrid[2:][:]\n",
|
||||
"nrows = len(techlabels)\n",
|
||||
"ncols = len(techlabels[0])\n",
|
||||
"techgrid = np.zeros([nrows, ncols], dtype = int)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"for row in range(nrows):\n",
|
||||
" for col in range(ncols):\n",
|
||||
" if techlabels[row][col] in techcounts:\n",
|
||||
" techgrid[row][col] = techcounts[techlabels[row][col]]\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"sns.heatmap(techgrid, annot=True, annot_kws={\"size\": 7})\n",
|
||||
"techgrid"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"amitt.df_tactics"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"amitt.it"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"ct = amitt.cross_counterid_techniqueid\n",
|
||||
"ct[ct['technique_id'] != '']"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"ct[(ct['id'] == 'C00197') & (ct['technique_id'].isin(['T0002', 'T0007']))]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"ct = ct[ct['technique_id'].isin(amitt.df_techniques['id'].to_list()) & ct['id'].isin(amitt.df_counters['id'].to_list())]\n",
|
||||
"ct"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"technique_id_list = ['T0007', 'T0008', 'T0022', 'T0023', 'T0043', 'T0052', 'T0036', 'T0037', 'T0038']\n",
|
||||
"counter_id_list = ['C00009', 'C00008', 'C00042', 'C00030', 'C00093', 'C00193', 'C00073', 'C000197', 'C00174', 'C00205']\n",
|
||||
"possible_counters_for_techniques = ct[ct['technique_id'].isin(technique_id_list)] \n",
|
||||
"possible_techniques_for_counters = ct[ct['id'].isin(counter_id_list)] \n",
|
||||
"coverage = ct[(ct['id'].isin(counter_id_list)) & (ct['technique_id'].isin(technique_id_list))]\n",
|
||||
"coverage"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"scrolled": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"possible_techniques_for_counters"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"scrolled": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"possible_counters_for_techniques"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 6,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "stdout",
|
||||
"output_type": "stream",
|
||||
"text": [
|
||||
"clicked button T0045 8 7\n",
|
||||
"clicked button T0046 9 7\n",
|
||||
"clicked button T0049 4 8\n",
|
||||
"clicked button T0057 2 9\n",
|
||||
"clicked button T0060 4 10\n",
|
||||
"clicked button T0029 2 6\n",
|
||||
"clicked button T0016 2 4\n"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import tkinter as Tk\n",
|
||||
"import numpy as np\n",
|
||||
"import generate_amitt_ttps\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"class Begueradj(Tk.Frame):\n",
|
||||
" def __init__(self,parent):\n",
|
||||
" amitt = generate_amitt_ttps.Amitt()\n",
|
||||
" self.redgrid = amitt.create_padded_framework_table('AMITT Red', 'technique_ids', False)\n",
|
||||
" self.bluegrid = amitt.create_padded_framework_table('AMITT Blue', 'counter_ids', False)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" Tk.Frame.__init__(self, parent)\n",
|
||||
" self.parent = parent\n",
|
||||
" self.button= ''\n",
|
||||
" self.initialize()\n",
|
||||
" \n",
|
||||
" def initialize(self):\n",
|
||||
" '''\n",
|
||||
" Draw the GUI\n",
|
||||
" '''\n",
|
||||
" self.parent.title(\"AMITT FRAMEWORK COVERAGE\") \n",
|
||||
" self.parent.grid_rowconfigure(1,weight=1)\n",
|
||||
" self.parent.grid_columnconfigure(1,weight=1)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" self.frame = Tk.Frame(self.parent) \n",
|
||||
" self.frame.pack(fill=Tk.X, padx=5, pady=5)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" # Create a 6x7 array of zeros as the one you used\n",
|
||||
" numrows = len(self.redgrid) - 1\n",
|
||||
" numcols = len(self.redgrid[0])\n",
|
||||
" self.buttons = {}\n",
|
||||
" for row in range(1,numrows):\n",
|
||||
" for col in range(0,numcols):\n",
|
||||
" button_id = self.redgrid[row][col]\n",
|
||||
" self.button = Tk.Button(self.frame, text = button_id, bg='blue', \n",
|
||||
" command= lambda bid=button_id, row=row, col=col: self.clicked(bid, row, col))\n",
|
||||
" self.button.grid(row=row, column=col)\n",
|
||||
" \n",
|
||||
" def clicked(self, bid, row, col):\n",
|
||||
" print('clicked button {} {} {}'.format(bid, row, col))\n",
|
||||
" self.find_in_grid(self.frame, row, col)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" def find_in_grid(self, frame, row, column):\n",
|
||||
" for children in frame.children.values():\n",
|
||||
" info = children.grid_info()\n",
|
||||
" #note that rows and column numbers are stored as string\n",
|
||||
" if info['row'] == str(row) and info['column'] == str(column):\n",
|
||||
" print('{}'.format(children.get()))\n",
|
||||
" return None\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"root=Tk.Tk()\n",
|
||||
"app = Begueradj(root) \n",
|
||||
"root.mainloop()"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"scrolled": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"redgrid"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"for row in range(2,len(redgrid)):\n",
|
||||
" print(len(redgrid[row]))"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"redgrid[1][2]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"kernelspec": {
|
||||
"display_name": "Python 3",
|
||||
"language": "python",
|
||||
"name": "python3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"language_info": {
|
||||
"codemirror_mode": {
|
||||
"name": "ipython",
|
||||
"version": 3
|
||||
},
|
||||
"file_extension": ".py",
|
||||
"mimetype": "text/x-python",
|
||||
"name": "python",
|
||||
"nbconvert_exporter": "python",
|
||||
"pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
|
||||
"version": "3.8.3"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nbformat": 4,
|
||||
"nbformat_minor": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -1,608 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cells": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "markdown",
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# Generate AMITT github files\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"Generate all the AMITT github files from the AMITT master spreadsheet, being careful to reatin any comments people have made below the \"don't write above this\" line in them. "
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 1,
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"scrolled": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "stdout",
|
||||
"output_type": "stream",
|
||||
"text": [
|
||||
"updated ../amitt_red_framework.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../amitt_red_framework_clickable.html\n",
|
||||
"updated ../amitt_blue_framework.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../amitt_blue_framework_clickable.html\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype phase\n",
|
||||
"updated ../phases_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype tactic\n",
|
||||
"updated ../tactics_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype technique\n",
|
||||
"updated ../techniques_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype task\n",
|
||||
"updated ../tasks_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype incident\n",
|
||||
"updated ../incidents_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype counter\n",
|
||||
"updated ../counters_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype metatechnique\n",
|
||||
"updated ../metatechniques_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype actortype\n",
|
||||
"updated ../actortypes_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A001.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A002.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A003.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A004.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A005.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A006.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A007.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A008.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A009.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A010.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A011.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A012.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A013.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A014.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A015.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A016.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A017.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A018.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A019.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A020.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A021.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A022.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A023.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A024.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A025.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A026.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A027.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A028.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A029.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A030.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A031.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A032.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../actortypes/A033.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../responsetype_index.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../detections_index.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../tactics_by_responsetype_table.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../metatechniques_by_responsetype_table.md\n"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import pandas as pd\n",
|
||||
"from generate_amitt_ttps import Amitt\n",
|
||||
"amitt = Amitt()\n",
|
||||
"amitt.generate_and_write_datafiles()"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"scrolled": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>amitt_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>name</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>summary</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>sector_ids</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>framework_ids</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>longname</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>data scientist</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Person who can wrangle data, implement machine...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW01, FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001 - data scientist</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>target</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Person being targeted by disinformation campaign</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A002 - target</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>2</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A003</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>trusted authority</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Influencer</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW01, FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A003 - trusted authority</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>3</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A004</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>activist</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A004 - activist</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>4</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A005</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>community group</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A005 - community group</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>5</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>educator</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A006 - educator</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>6</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A007</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>factchecker</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Someone with the skills to verify whether info...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A007 - factchecker</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>7</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>library</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A008 - library</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>8</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A009</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>NGO</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A009 - NGO</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>9</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A010</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>religious organisation</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A010 - religious organisation</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>10</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A011</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>school</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A011 - school</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>11</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A012</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>account owner</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Anyone who owns an account online</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW01\\nFW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A012 - account owner</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>12</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A013</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>content creator</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW01\\nFW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A013 - content creator</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>13</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A014</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>elves</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A014 - elves</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>14</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A015</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>general public</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A015 - general public</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>15</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A016</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>influencer</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW01\\nFW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A016 - influencer</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>16</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A017</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>coordinating body</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>For example the DHS</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S003</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A017 - coordinating body</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>17</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A018</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>government</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Government agencies</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S003</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW01\\nFW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A018 - government</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>18</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A019</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>military</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S003</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A019 - military</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>19</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A020</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>policy maker</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S003</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A020 - policy maker</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>20</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A021</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>media organisation</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S010</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW01\\nFW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A021 - media organisation</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>21</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>company</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S009</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A022 - company</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>22</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A023</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>adtech provider</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A023 - adtech provider</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>23</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A024</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>developer</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A024 - developer</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>24</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A025</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>funding_site_admin</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Funding site admin</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A025 - funding_site_admin</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>25</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A026</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>games designer</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW01, FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A026 - games designer</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>26</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A027</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>information security</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A027 - information security</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>27</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A028</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>platform administrator</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A028 - platform administrator</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>28</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A029</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>server admininistrator</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A029 - server admininistrator</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>29</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A030</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>platforms</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S007</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A030 - platforms</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>30</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A031</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>social media platform adminstrator</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Person with the authority to make changes to a...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S007</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A031 - social media platform adminstrator</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>31</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A032</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>social media platform outreach</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S007</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A032 - social media platform outreach</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>32</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A033</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>social media platform owner</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Person with authority to make changes to a soc...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>S007</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>FW02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A033 - social media platform owner</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" amitt_id name \\\n",
|
||||
"0 A001 data scientist \n",
|
||||
"1 A002 target \n",
|
||||
"2 A003 trusted authority \n",
|
||||
"3 A004 activist \n",
|
||||
"4 A005 community group \n",
|
||||
"5 A006 educator \n",
|
||||
"6 A007 factchecker \n",
|
||||
"7 A008 library \n",
|
||||
"8 A009 NGO \n",
|
||||
"9 A010 religious organisation \n",
|
||||
"10 A011 school \n",
|
||||
"11 A012 account owner \n",
|
||||
"12 A013 content creator \n",
|
||||
"13 A014 elves \n",
|
||||
"14 A015 general public \n",
|
||||
"15 A016 influencer \n",
|
||||
"16 A017 coordinating body \n",
|
||||
"17 A018 government \n",
|
||||
"18 A019 military \n",
|
||||
"19 A020 policy maker \n",
|
||||
"20 A021 media organisation \n",
|
||||
"21 A022 company \n",
|
||||
"22 A023 adtech provider \n",
|
||||
"23 A024 developer \n",
|
||||
"24 A025 funding_site_admin \n",
|
||||
"25 A026 games designer \n",
|
||||
"26 A027 information security \n",
|
||||
"27 A028 platform administrator \n",
|
||||
"28 A029 server admininistrator \n",
|
||||
"29 A030 platforms \n",
|
||||
"30 A031 social media platform adminstrator \n",
|
||||
"31 A032 social media platform outreach \n",
|
||||
"32 A033 social media platform owner \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" summary \\\n",
|
||||
"0 Person who can wrangle data, implement machine... \n",
|
||||
"1 Person being targeted by disinformation campaign \n",
|
||||
"2 Influencer \n",
|
||||
"3 \n",
|
||||
"4 \n",
|
||||
"5 \n",
|
||||
"6 Someone with the skills to verify whether info... \n",
|
||||
"7 \n",
|
||||
"8 \n",
|
||||
"9 \n",
|
||||
"10 \n",
|
||||
"11 Anyone who owns an account online \n",
|
||||
"12 \n",
|
||||
"13 \n",
|
||||
"14 \n",
|
||||
"15 \n",
|
||||
"16 For example the DHS \n",
|
||||
"17 Government agencies \n",
|
||||
"18 \n",
|
||||
"19 \n",
|
||||
"20 \n",
|
||||
"21 \n",
|
||||
"22 \n",
|
||||
"23 \n",
|
||||
"24 Funding site admin \n",
|
||||
"25 \n",
|
||||
"26 \n",
|
||||
"27 \n",
|
||||
"28 \n",
|
||||
"29 \n",
|
||||
"30 Person with the authority to make changes to a... \n",
|
||||
"31 \n",
|
||||
"32 Person with authority to make changes to a soc... \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" sector_ids framework_ids \\\n",
|
||||
"0 S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008... FW01, FW02 \n",
|
||||
"1 S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008... FW02 \n",
|
||||
"2 S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008... FW01, FW02 \n",
|
||||
"3 S002 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"4 S002 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"5 S002 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"6 S002 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"7 S002 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"8 S002 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"9 S002 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"10 S002 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"11 S006 FW01\\nFW02 \n",
|
||||
"12 S006 FW01\\nFW02 \n",
|
||||
"13 S006 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"14 S006 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"15 S006 FW01\\nFW02 \n",
|
||||
"16 S003 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"17 S003 FW01\\nFW02 \n",
|
||||
"18 S003 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"19 S003 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"20 S010 FW01\\nFW02 \n",
|
||||
"21 S009 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"22 S008 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"23 S008 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"24 S008 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"25 S008 FW01, FW02 \n",
|
||||
"26 S008 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"27 S008 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"28 S008 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"29 S007 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"30 S007 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"31 S007 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"32 S007 FW02 \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" longname \n",
|
||||
"0 A001 - data scientist \n",
|
||||
"1 A002 - target \n",
|
||||
"2 A003 - trusted authority \n",
|
||||
"3 A004 - activist \n",
|
||||
"4 A005 - community group \n",
|
||||
"5 A006 - educator \n",
|
||||
"6 A007 - factchecker \n",
|
||||
"7 A008 - library \n",
|
||||
"8 A009 - NGO \n",
|
||||
"9 A010 - religious organisation \n",
|
||||
"10 A011 - school \n",
|
||||
"11 A012 - account owner \n",
|
||||
"12 A013 - content creator \n",
|
||||
"13 A014 - elves \n",
|
||||
"14 A015 - general public \n",
|
||||
"15 A016 - influencer \n",
|
||||
"16 A017 - coordinating body \n",
|
||||
"17 A018 - government \n",
|
||||
"18 A019 - military \n",
|
||||
"19 A020 - policy maker \n",
|
||||
"20 A021 - media organisation \n",
|
||||
"21 A022 - company \n",
|
||||
"22 A023 - adtech provider \n",
|
||||
"23 A024 - developer \n",
|
||||
"24 A025 - funding_site_admin \n",
|
||||
"25 A026 - games designer \n",
|
||||
"26 A027 - information security \n",
|
||||
"27 A028 - platform administrator \n",
|
||||
"28 A029 - server admininistrator \n",
|
||||
"29 A030 - platforms \n",
|
||||
"30 A031 - social media platform adminstrator \n",
|
||||
"31 A032 - social media platform outreach \n",
|
||||
"32 A033 - social media platform owner "
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"amitt.df_actortypes"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"kernelspec": {
|
||||
"display_name": "Python 3",
|
||||
"language": "python",
|
||||
"name": "python3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"language_info": {
|
||||
"codemirror_mode": {
|
||||
"name": "ipython",
|
||||
"version": 3
|
||||
},
|
||||
"file_extension": ".py",
|
||||
"mimetype": "text/x-python",
|
||||
"name": "python",
|
||||
"nbconvert_exporter": "python",
|
||||
"pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
|
||||
"version": "3.8.3"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nbformat": 4,
|
||||
"nbformat_minor": 4
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,425 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cells": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "markdown",
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# Test area for DISARM code"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "stdout",
|
||||
"output_type": "stream",
|
||||
"text": [
|
||||
"dict_keys(['df_phases', 'df_frameworks', 'df_techniques', 'df_tasks', 'df_incidents', 'df_counters', 'df_detections', 'df_actortypes', 'df_resources', 'df_responsetypes', 'df_metatechniques', 'it', 'df_tactics', 'df_techniques_per_tactic', 'df_counters_per_tactic', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'counters', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'resources', 'num_tactics', 'cross_counterid_techniqueid', 'cross_counterid_resourceid', 'cross_counterid_actortypeid'])\n"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>amitt_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>technique_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0007</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0015</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0018</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0043</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0053</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>...</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0025</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>136</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00220</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>137</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00221</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>138</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00222</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>139</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00223</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"<p>898 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" amitt_id technique_id\n",
|
||||
"0 C00006 T0007\n",
|
||||
"0 C00006 T0015\n",
|
||||
"0 C00006 T0018\n",
|
||||
"0 C00006 T0043\n",
|
||||
"0 C00006 T0053\n",
|
||||
".. ... ...\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 T0025\n",
|
||||
"136 C00220 \n",
|
||||
"137 C00221 \n",
|
||||
"138 C00222 \n",
|
||||
"139 C00223 \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"[898 rows x 2 columns]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import pandas as pd\n",
|
||||
"import sqlite3 as sql\n",
|
||||
"from generate_DISARM_pages import Disarm\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"# Generate AMITT datasets\n",
|
||||
"disarm = Disarm()\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"# Check which amitt variables we can see from here\n",
|
||||
"print('{}'.format(vars(disarm).keys()))\n",
|
||||
"vars(disarm)['cross_counterid_techniqueid']"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 41,
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"scrolled": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>actor_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A033</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A007</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>2</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00009</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A016</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>2</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00009</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A006</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>3</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00010</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A020</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>...</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>136</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00220</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>137</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00221</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>138</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00222</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>139</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00223</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td></td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"<p>166 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" id actor_id\n",
|
||||
"0 C00006 A033\n",
|
||||
"1 C00008 A007\n",
|
||||
"2 C00009 A016\n",
|
||||
"2 C00009 A006\n",
|
||||
"3 C00010 A020\n",
|
||||
".. ... ...\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 \n",
|
||||
"136 C00220 \n",
|
||||
"137 C00221 \n",
|
||||
"138 C00222 \n",
|
||||
"139 C00223 \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"[166 rows x 2 columns]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 41,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"disarm.cross_counterid_actorid"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>technique_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>Weight</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA01</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>1</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA06</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>1</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA08</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>1</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>1</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0009</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>1</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>...</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>134</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00216</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0018</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>1</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>134</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00216</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0057</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>1</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0024</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>1</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0026</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>1</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0025</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>1</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"<p>717 rows × 3 columns</p>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" id technique_id Weight\n",
|
||||
"1 C00008 TA01 1\n",
|
||||
"1 C00008 TA06 1\n",
|
||||
"1 C00008 TA08 1\n",
|
||||
"1 C00008 T0006 1\n",
|
||||
"1 C00008 T0009 1\n",
|
||||
".. ... ... ...\n",
|
||||
"134 C00216 T0018 1\n",
|
||||
"134 C00216 T0057 1\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 T0024 1\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 T0026 1\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 T0025 1\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"[717 rows x 3 columns]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"ct = disarm.cross_counterid_techniqueid\n",
|
||||
"ct['Weight'] = 1\n",
|
||||
"ct = ct[ct['technique_id'].str.len() > 0]\n",
|
||||
"ct.to_csv('../visualisations/cross_counterid_techniqueid.csv', index=False, header=['Source','Target', 'Weight'])\n",
|
||||
"ct"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"kernelspec": {
|
||||
"display_name": "Python 3",
|
||||
"language": "python",
|
||||
"name": "python3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"language_info": {
|
||||
"codemirror_mode": {
|
||||
"name": "ipython",
|
||||
"version": 3
|
||||
},
|
||||
"file_extension": ".py",
|
||||
"mimetype": "text/x-python",
|
||||
"name": "python",
|
||||
"nbconvert_exporter": "python",
|
||||
"pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
|
||||
"version": "3.8.3"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nbformat": 4,
|
||||
"nbformat_minor": 4
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cells": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "markdown",
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# fix the problem with excelfile changes\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"Background: DISARM's master dataset is in an excelfile. Changes in this dont' show up in github, so it's difficult to tell what's changed between versions. Code below checks for those differences - use this repeatedly until versions align. "
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import pandas as pd\n",
|
||||
"import sqlite3 as sql\n",
|
||||
"from generate_DISARM_pages import Disarm\n",
|
||||
"import pandas as pd\n",
|
||||
"import numpy as np\n",
|
||||
"import os\n",
|
||||
"from sklearn.feature_extraction.text import CountVectorizer\n",
|
||||
"pd.set_option('display.max_rows', 1000)\n",
|
||||
"pd.set_option('display.max_colwidth', -1)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"newfile = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
|
||||
"oldfile = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_previous_version.xlsx'\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"# Load dfs from file\n",
|
||||
"newdfs = {}\n",
|
||||
"newxlsx = pd.ExcelFile(newfile)\n",
|
||||
"for sheetname in newxlsx.sheet_names:\n",
|
||||
" newdfs[sheetname] = newxlsx.parse(sheetname)\n",
|
||||
" newdfs[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"olddfs = {}\n",
|
||||
"oldxlsx = pd.ExcelFile(oldfile)\n",
|
||||
"for sheetname in oldxlsx.sheet_names:\n",
|
||||
" olddfs[sheetname] = oldxlsx.parse(sheetname)\n",
|
||||
" olddfs[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"addedtables = newdfs.keys() - olddfs.keys()\n",
|
||||
"losttables = olddfs.keys() - newdfs.keys()\n",
|
||||
"if len(addedtables) + len(losttables) > 0:\n",
|
||||
" print('Table changes: new tables are {}, lost tables are {}'.format(addedtables, losttables))\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"def investigate_table(table):\n",
|
||||
" print('\\n\\nTable {} is changed'.format(table))\n",
|
||||
" # Column headings\n",
|
||||
" coldiffs = set(newdfs[table].columns).symmetric_difference(set(olddfs[table].columns))\n",
|
||||
" if len(coldiffs) > 0:\n",
|
||||
" print('column differences: {}'.format(coldiffs))\n",
|
||||
" # length\n",
|
||||
" if len(newdfs[table]) != len(olddfs[table]):\n",
|
||||
" print('length differences: new {} old {}'.format(len(newdfs[table]), len(olddfs[table])))\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" # column by column\n",
|
||||
" for column in newdfs[table].columns:\n",
|
||||
" coldiffs = newdfs[table][column] != olddfs[table][column]\n",
|
||||
" if len(newdfs[table][coldiffs]) > 0:\n",
|
||||
" print('Differences in column {}'.format(column))\n",
|
||||
" return\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"for table in newdfs.keys():\n",
|
||||
" if newdfs[table].equals(olddfs[table]) == False:\n",
|
||||
" investigate_table(table)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# Look at individual table differences\n",
|
||||
"table = 'countermeasures'\n",
|
||||
"column = 'summary'\n",
|
||||
"coldiffs = newdfs[table][column] != olddfs[table][column]\n",
|
||||
"diffcols = pd.DataFrame()\n",
|
||||
"diffcols['amitt_id'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs]['amitt_id']\n",
|
||||
"diffcols['new'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
|
||||
"diffcols['old'] = olddfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
|
||||
"diffcols[diffcols['old'] != '']"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"kernelspec": {
|
||||
"display_name": "Python 3",
|
||||
"language": "python",
|
||||
"name": "python3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"language_info": {
|
||||
"codemirror_mode": {
|
||||
"name": "ipython",
|
||||
"version": 3
|
||||
},
|
||||
"file_extension": ".py",
|
||||
"mimetype": "text/x-python",
|
||||
"name": "python",
|
||||
"nbconvert_exporter": "python",
|
||||
"pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
|
||||
"version": "3.8.3"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nbformat": 4,
|
||||
"nbformat_minor": 4
|
||||
}
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -27,6 +27,36 @@
|
||||
"name": "stdout",
|
||||
"output_type": "stream",
|
||||
"text": [
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv ADMIN_DATA_README\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/detections.csv detections\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/actortypes.csv actortypes\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/responsetypes.csv responsetypes\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/phases.csv phases\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroupcounters.csv externalgroupcounters\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/metatechniques.csv metatechniques\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/techniques.csv techniques\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOP.csv MOP\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOE.csv MOE\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/narratives.csv narratives\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/forums.csv forums\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/playbooks.csv playbooks\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/resources.csv resources\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/suggested_externalgroups.csv suggested_externalgroups\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tasks.csv tasks\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidenttechniques.csv incidenttechniques\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/examples.csv examples\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools.csv tools\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/removed_externalgroups.csv removed_externalgroups\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/removed_tools.csv removed_tools\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/frameworks.csv frameworks\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups.csv externalgroups\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/countermeasures.csv countermeasures\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tactics.csv tactics\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/sectors.csv sectors\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidents.csv incidents\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/disarm_red_framework.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_files/disarm_red_framework_clickable.html\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/disarm_blue_framework.md\n",
|
||||
@ -35,248 +65,18 @@
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/phases_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype tactic\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/tactics_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA01.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA02.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA05.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA06.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA07.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA08.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA09.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA10.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA11.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA12.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA15.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype technique\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/techniques_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0002.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0003.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0004.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0007.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0009.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0010.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0011.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0013.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0014.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0015.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0016.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0017.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0018.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0019.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0020.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0022.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0023.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0029.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0040.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0042.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0043.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0044.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0045.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0046.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0047.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0048.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0049.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0057.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0059.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0060.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0061.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype task\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/tasks_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype incident\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/incidents_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00002.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00005.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00006.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00007.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00009.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00010.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00015.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00017.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00022.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00029.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00032.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00033.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00034.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00042.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00044.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00047.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00049.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00050.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00051.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00053.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00056.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00063.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype counter\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/counters_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00006.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00008.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00009.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00010.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00011.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00012.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00013.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00014.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00016.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00017.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00019.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00021.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00022.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00024.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00026.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00027.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00029.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00030.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00031.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00034.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00036.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00040.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00042.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00044.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00046.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00048.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00051.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00052.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00053.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00058.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00059.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00060.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00065.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00066.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00067.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00070.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00071.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00072.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00073.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00074.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00076.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00078.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00080.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00081.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00082.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00084.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00085.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00086.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00087.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00090.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00091.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00092.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00093.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00096.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00097.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00098.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00099.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00101.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00103.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00105.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00106.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00107.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00111.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00112.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00113.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00114.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00115.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00117.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00118.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00119.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00120.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00121.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00122.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00123.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00124.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00125.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00126.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00128.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00129.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00130.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00131.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00133.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00135.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00136.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00138.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00142.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00143.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00147.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00148.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00149.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00153.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00154.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00155.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00156.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00160.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00161.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00162.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00164.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00169.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00172.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00174.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00176.md\n"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "stdout",
|
||||
"output_type": "stream",
|
||||
"text": [
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00178.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00182.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00184.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00188.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00189.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00190.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00195.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00197.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00203.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00205.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00207.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00211.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00212.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00216.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype metatechnique\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/metatechniques_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M001.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M002.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M003.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M004.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M005.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M006.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M007.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M008.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M009.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M010.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M011.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M012.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M013.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M014.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype actortype\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/actortypes_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A001.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A003.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A004.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A005.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A006.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A007.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A008.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A009.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A010.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A012.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A013.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A014.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A015.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A016.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A017.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A018.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A019.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A020.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A021.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A023.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A024.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A025.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A026.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A027.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A028.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A029.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A031.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A032.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A033.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/responsetype_index.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/detections_index.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/tactics_by_responsetype_table.md\n",
|
||||
@ -300,31 +100,9 @@
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "stdout",
|
||||
"output_type": "stream",
|
||||
"text": [
|
||||
"'plan-strategy' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'plan-objectives' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'microtarget' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'select-channels-and-affordances' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'conduct-pump-priming' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'deliver-content' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'drive-offline-activity' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'persist-in-the-information-environment' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'assess-effectiveness' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'target-audience-analysis' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'develop-narratives' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'establish-social-assets' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'establish-legitimacy' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'maximize-exposure' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
|
||||
"'drive-online-harms' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import sys\n",
|
||||
"sys.path.insert(0, \"DISARM-STIX2\")\n",
|
||||
@ -342,7 +120,7 @@
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
@ -361,7 +139,7 @@
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 4,
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"scrolled": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
@ -908,7 +686,7 @@
|
||||
"32 "
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 4,
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cells": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "markdown",
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# one-shot code to generate crosstable files\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"Should only need to use this once. \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"Grabbing these objects: \n",
|
||||
"* cross_counterid_techniqueid\n",
|
||||
"* cross_counterid_resourceid\n",
|
||||
"* cross_counterid_actortypeid\n",
|
||||
"* cross_detectionid_techniqueid \n",
|
||||
"* cross_detectionid_resourceid\n",
|
||||
"* cross_detectionid_actortypeid "
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 1,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import pandas as pd\n",
|
||||
"from generate_DISARM_pages import Disarm\n",
|
||||
"MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"disarm = Disarm()"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"def grab_crosstable(df, column, outfile):\n",
|
||||
" df = df[df[column] != '']\n",
|
||||
" df.to_csv(MASTERDATA_DIR + outfile, index=False)\n",
|
||||
" return df"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>technique_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0002</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0003</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0006</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0027</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>...</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>134</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00216</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0018</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>134</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00216</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0057</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0024</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0026</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0025</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"<p>881 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id technique_id\n",
|
||||
"0 C00022 T0001\n",
|
||||
"0 C00022 T0002\n",
|
||||
"0 C00022 T0003\n",
|
||||
"0 C00022 T0006\n",
|
||||
"0 C00022 T0027\n",
|
||||
".. ... ...\n",
|
||||
"134 C00216 T0018\n",
|
||||
"134 C00216 T0057\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 T0024\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 T0026\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 T0025\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"[881 rows x 2 columns]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_techniqueid, \n",
|
||||
" 'technique_id', 'cross_counter_technique.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 4,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>resource_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>26</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00044</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>59</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00092</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>63</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00097</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>65</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00099</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>67</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00101</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>69</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00105</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R003</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>99</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00142</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>102</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00147</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>103</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00148</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>126</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00195</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R002</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>127</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00197</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R003</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id resource_id\n",
|
||||
"26 C00044 R004\n",
|
||||
"59 C00092 R001\n",
|
||||
"63 C00097 R004\n",
|
||||
"65 C00099 R004\n",
|
||||
"67 C00101 R004\n",
|
||||
"69 C00105 R003\n",
|
||||
"99 C00142 R004\n",
|
||||
"102 C00147 R004\n",
|
||||
"103 C00148 R004\n",
|
||||
"126 C00195 R002\n",
|
||||
"127 C00197 R003"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 4,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_resourceid, \n",
|
||||
" 'resource_id', 'cross_counter_resource.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 5,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>actortype_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A033</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>2</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A007</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>3</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00009</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A016</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>3</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00009</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A006</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>4</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00010</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A020</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>...</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>132</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00207</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A018</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>132</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00207</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A033</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>133</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00212</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A006</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>133</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00212</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A018</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>134</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00216</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A023</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"<p>79 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id actortype_id\n",
|
||||
"1 C00006 A033\n",
|
||||
"2 C00008 A007\n",
|
||||
"3 C00009 A016\n",
|
||||
"3 C00009 A006\n",
|
||||
"4 C00010 A020\n",
|
||||
".. ... ...\n",
|
||||
"132 C00207 A018\n",
|
||||
"132 C00207 A033\n",
|
||||
"133 C00212 A006\n",
|
||||
"133 C00212 A018\n",
|
||||
"134 C00216 A023\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"[79 rows x 2 columns]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 5,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_actortypeid, \n",
|
||||
" 'actortype_id', 'cross_counter_actortype.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 6,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>technique_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00001</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>All</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0049</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0052</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0053</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0054</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>...</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>82</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00083</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0012</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>82</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00083</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0021</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>92</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00093</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0011</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>93</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00094</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0013</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>93</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00094</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0008</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"<p>159 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id technique_id\n",
|
||||
"0 F00001 All\n",
|
||||
"1 F00002 T0049\n",
|
||||
"1 F00002 T0052\n",
|
||||
"1 F00002 T0053\n",
|
||||
"1 F00002 T0054\n",
|
||||
".. ... ...\n",
|
||||
"82 F00083 T0012\n",
|
||||
"82 F00083 T0021\n",
|
||||
"92 F00093 T0011\n",
|
||||
"93 F00094 T0013\n",
|
||||
"93 F00094 T0008\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"[159 rows x 2 columns]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 6,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_techniqueid, \n",
|
||||
" 'technique_id', 'cross_detection_technique.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 7,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>resource_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>19</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00020</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>81</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00082</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R005</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>91</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00092</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R006</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id resource_id\n",
|
||||
"19 F00020 R004\n",
|
||||
"81 F00082 R005\n",
|
||||
"91 F00092 R006"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 7,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_resourceid, \n",
|
||||
" 'resource_id', 'cross_detection_resource.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 8,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>actortype_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>19</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00020</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A015</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>19</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00020</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>19</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00020</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A031</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>42</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00043</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A031</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>42</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00043</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A015</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>66</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00067</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>69</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00070</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>70</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00071</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>71</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00072</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>78</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00079</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>79</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00080</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A015</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>81</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00082</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A028</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>90</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00091</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>90</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00091</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A024</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>91</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00092</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A015</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>93</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00094</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A028</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id actortype_id\n",
|
||||
"19 F00020 A015\n",
|
||||
"19 F00020 A001\n",
|
||||
"19 F00020 A031\n",
|
||||
"42 F00043 A031\n",
|
||||
"42 F00043 A015\n",
|
||||
"66 F00067 A001\n",
|
||||
"69 F00070 A001\n",
|
||||
"70 F00071 A001\n",
|
||||
"71 F00072 A001\n",
|
||||
"78 F00079 A001\n",
|
||||
"79 F00080 A015\n",
|
||||
"81 F00082 A028\n",
|
||||
"90 F00091 A001\n",
|
||||
"90 F00091 A024\n",
|
||||
"91 F00092 A015\n",
|
||||
"93 F00094 A028"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 8,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_actortypeid, \n",
|
||||
" 'actortype_id', 'cross_detection_actortype.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"kernelspec": {
|
||||
"display_name": "Python 3",
|
||||
"language": "python",
|
||||
"name": "python3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"language_info": {
|
||||
"codemirror_mode": {
|
||||
"name": "ipython",
|
||||
"version": 3
|
||||
},
|
||||
"file_extension": ".py",
|
||||
"mimetype": "text/x-python",
|
||||
"name": "python",
|
||||
"nbconvert_exporter": "python",
|
||||
"pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
|
||||
"version": "3.8.3"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nbformat": 4,
|
||||
"nbformat_minor": 4
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cells": [],
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"nbformat": 4,
|
||||
"nbformat_minor": 4
|
||||
}
|
||||
755
CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_crosstable_csvs.ipynb
Normal file
755
CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_crosstable_csvs.ipynb
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cells": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "markdown",
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# one-shot code to generate crosstable files\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"Should only need to use this once. \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"Grabbing these objects: \n",
|
||||
"* cross_counterid_techniqueid\n",
|
||||
"* cross_counterid_resourceid\n",
|
||||
"* cross_counterid_actortypeid\n",
|
||||
"* cross_detectionid_techniqueid \n",
|
||||
"* cross_detectionid_resourceid\n",
|
||||
"* cross_detectionid_actortypeid "
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 1,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import pandas as pd\n",
|
||||
"from generate_DISARM_pages import Disarm\n",
|
||||
"MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"disarm = Disarm()"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"def grab_crosstable(df, column, outfile):\n",
|
||||
" df = df[df[column] != '']\n",
|
||||
" df.to_csv(MASTERDATA_DIR + outfile, index=False)\n",
|
||||
" return df"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>technique_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0002</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0003</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0006</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0027</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>...</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>134</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00216</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0018</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>134</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00216</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0057</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0024</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0026</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>135</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00219</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0025</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"<p>881 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id technique_id\n",
|
||||
"0 C00022 T0001\n",
|
||||
"0 C00022 T0002\n",
|
||||
"0 C00022 T0003\n",
|
||||
"0 C00022 T0006\n",
|
||||
"0 C00022 T0027\n",
|
||||
".. ... ...\n",
|
||||
"134 C00216 T0018\n",
|
||||
"134 C00216 T0057\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 T0024\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 T0026\n",
|
||||
"135 C00219 T0025\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"[881 rows x 2 columns]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_techniqueid, \n",
|
||||
" 'technique_id', 'cross_counter_technique.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 4,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>resource_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>26</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00044</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>59</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00092</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>63</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00097</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>65</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00099</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>67</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00101</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>69</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00105</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R003</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>99</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00142</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>102</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00147</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>103</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00148</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>126</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00195</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R002</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>127</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00197</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R003</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id resource_id\n",
|
||||
"26 C00044 R004\n",
|
||||
"59 C00092 R001\n",
|
||||
"63 C00097 R004\n",
|
||||
"65 C00099 R004\n",
|
||||
"67 C00101 R004\n",
|
||||
"69 C00105 R003\n",
|
||||
"99 C00142 R004\n",
|
||||
"102 C00147 R004\n",
|
||||
"103 C00148 R004\n",
|
||||
"126 C00195 R002\n",
|
||||
"127 C00197 R003"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 4,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_resourceid, \n",
|
||||
" 'resource_id', 'cross_counter_resource.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 5,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>actortype_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00006</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A033</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>2</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00008</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A007</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>3</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00009</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A016</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>3</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00009</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A006</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>4</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00010</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A020</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>...</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>132</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00207</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A018</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>132</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00207</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A033</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>133</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00212</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A006</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>133</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00212</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A018</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>134</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>C00216</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A023</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"<p>79 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id actortype_id\n",
|
||||
"1 C00006 A033\n",
|
||||
"2 C00008 A007\n",
|
||||
"3 C00009 A016\n",
|
||||
"3 C00009 A006\n",
|
||||
"4 C00010 A020\n",
|
||||
".. ... ...\n",
|
||||
"132 C00207 A018\n",
|
||||
"132 C00207 A033\n",
|
||||
"133 C00212 A006\n",
|
||||
"133 C00212 A018\n",
|
||||
"134 C00216 A023\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"[79 rows x 2 columns]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 5,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_actortypeid, \n",
|
||||
" 'actortype_id', 'cross_counter_actortype.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 6,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>technique_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00001</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>All</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0049</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0052</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0053</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00002</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0054</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>...</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>...</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>82</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00083</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0012</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>82</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00083</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0021</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>92</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00093</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0011</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>93</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00094</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0013</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>93</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00094</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0008</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"<p>159 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id technique_id\n",
|
||||
"0 F00001 All\n",
|
||||
"1 F00002 T0049\n",
|
||||
"1 F00002 T0052\n",
|
||||
"1 F00002 T0053\n",
|
||||
"1 F00002 T0054\n",
|
||||
".. ... ...\n",
|
||||
"82 F00083 T0012\n",
|
||||
"82 F00083 T0021\n",
|
||||
"92 F00093 T0011\n",
|
||||
"93 F00094 T0013\n",
|
||||
"93 F00094 T0008\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"[159 rows x 2 columns]"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 6,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_techniqueid, \n",
|
||||
" 'technique_id', 'cross_detection_technique.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 7,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>resource_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>19</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00020</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R004</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>81</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00082</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R005</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>91</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00092</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>R006</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id resource_id\n",
|
||||
"19 F00020 R004\n",
|
||||
"81 F00082 R005\n",
|
||||
"91 F00092 R006"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 7,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_resourceid, \n",
|
||||
" 'resource_id', 'cross_detection_resource.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 8,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>actortype_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>19</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00020</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A015</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>19</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00020</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>19</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00020</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A031</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>42</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00043</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A031</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>42</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00043</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A015</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>66</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00067</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>69</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00070</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>70</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00071</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>71</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00072</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>78</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00079</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>79</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00080</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A015</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>81</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00082</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A028</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>90</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00091</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A001</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>90</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00091</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A024</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>91</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00092</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A015</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>93</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>F00094</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>A028</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id actortype_id\n",
|
||||
"19 F00020 A015\n",
|
||||
"19 F00020 A001\n",
|
||||
"19 F00020 A031\n",
|
||||
"42 F00043 A031\n",
|
||||
"42 F00043 A015\n",
|
||||
"66 F00067 A001\n",
|
||||
"69 F00070 A001\n",
|
||||
"70 F00071 A001\n",
|
||||
"71 F00072 A001\n",
|
||||
"78 F00079 A001\n",
|
||||
"79 F00080 A015\n",
|
||||
"81 F00082 A028\n",
|
||||
"90 F00091 A001\n",
|
||||
"90 F00091 A024\n",
|
||||
"91 F00092 A015\n",
|
||||
"93 F00094 A028"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 8,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_actortypeid, \n",
|
||||
" 'actortype_id', 'cross_detection_actortype.csv')"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"kernelspec": {
|
||||
"display_name": "Python 3",
|
||||
"language": "python",
|
||||
"name": "python3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"language_info": {
|
||||
"codemirror_mode": {
|
||||
"name": "ipython",
|
||||
"version": 3
|
||||
},
|
||||
"file_extension": ".py",
|
||||
"mimetype": "text/x-python",
|
||||
"name": "python",
|
||||
"nbconvert_exporter": "python",
|
||||
"pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
|
||||
"version": "3.8.3"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nbformat": 4,
|
||||
"nbformat_minor": 4
|
||||
}
|
||||
108
CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles.ipynb
Normal file
108
CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles.ipynb
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cells": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "markdown",
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# Generate CSV version of DISARM dataset\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"Generate CSV files to match older Excelfile versions of DISARM"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"import pandas as pd\n",
|
||||
"import os\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" \n",
|
||||
"frameworkfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx' \n",
|
||||
"datafile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
|
||||
"#commentsfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv'\n",
|
||||
" \n",
|
||||
"# Get basic datasets from files\n",
|
||||
"metadata = {}\n",
|
||||
"for filein in [frameworkfile, datafile]:\n",
|
||||
" xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(filein)\n",
|
||||
" for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:\n",
|
||||
" print('{} sheet {}'.format(filein, sheetname))\n",
|
||||
" metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)\n",
|
||||
" metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)\n",
|
||||
" metadata[sheetname].to_csv(MASTERDATA_DIR + sheetname + '.csv', index=False)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"# create cross tables using DISARM code\n",
|
||||
"def create_cross_table(df, col, newcol, divider=','):\n",
|
||||
" crosstable = df.join(df[col]\n",
|
||||
" .str.split(divider, expand=True).stack()\n",
|
||||
" .reset_index(drop=True,level=1)\n",
|
||||
" .rename(newcol)).drop(col, axis=1)\n",
|
||||
" crosstable = crosstable[crosstable[newcol].notnull()]\n",
|
||||
" crosstable[newcol+'_id'] = crosstable[newcol].str.split(' ').str[0]\n",
|
||||
" crosstable.drop(newcol, axis=1, inplace=True)\n",
|
||||
" return crosstable\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"def create_incident_technique_crosstable(it_metadata):\n",
|
||||
" # Generate full cross-table between incidents and techniques\n",
|
||||
" it = it_metadata\n",
|
||||
" it.index=it['disarm_id']\n",
|
||||
" it = it['technique_ids'].str.split(',').apply(lambda x: pd.Series(x)).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True).to_frame('technique_id').reset_index().merge(it.drop('disarm_id', axis=1).reset_index()).drop('technique_ids', axis=1)\n",
|
||||
" it = it.merge(self.df_incidents[['disarm_id','name']], \n",
|
||||
" left_on='incident_id', right_on='disarm_id',\n",
|
||||
" suffixes=['','_incident']).drop('incident_id', axis=1)\n",
|
||||
" it = it.merge(self.df_techniques[['disarm_id','name']], \n",
|
||||
" left_on='technique_id', right_on='disarm_id',\n",
|
||||
" suffixes=['','_technique']).drop('technique_id', axis=1)\n",
|
||||
" return(it)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"it = create_incident_technique_crosstable(metadata['incidenttechniques'])\n",
|
||||
"cross_counterid_techniqueid = create_cross_table(df_counters[['disarm_id', 'techniques']], \n",
|
||||
" 'techniques', 'technique', '\\n') \n",
|
||||
"cross_counterid_resourceid = create_cross_table(df_counters[['disarm_id', 'resources_needed']], \n",
|
||||
" 'resources_needed', 'resource', ',')\n",
|
||||
"cross_counterid_actortypeid = create_cross_table(self.df_counters[['disarm_id', 'actortypes']], \n",
|
||||
" 'actortypes', 'actortype', ',')\n",
|
||||
"cross_detectionid_techniqueid = create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'techniques']], \n",
|
||||
" 'techniques', 'technique', '\\n') \n",
|
||||
"cross_detectionid_resourceid = create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'resources_needed']], \n",
|
||||
" 'resources_needed', 'resource', ',')\n",
|
||||
"cross_detectionid_actortypeid = create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'actortypes']], \n",
|
||||
" 'actortypes', 'actortype', ',')\n",
|
||||
"\n"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"kernelspec": {
|
||||
"display_name": "Python 3",
|
||||
"language": "python",
|
||||
"name": "python3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"language_info": {
|
||||
"codemirror_mode": {
|
||||
"name": "ipython",
|
||||
"version": 3
|
||||
},
|
||||
"file_extension": ".py",
|
||||
"mimetype": "text/x-python",
|
||||
"name": "python",
|
||||
"nbconvert_exporter": "python",
|
||||
"pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
|
||||
"version": "3.8.3"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nbformat": 4,
|
||||
"nbformat_minor": 4
|
||||
}
|
||||
22
CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles.py
Normal file
22
CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles.py
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
|
||||
import pandas as pd
|
||||
import os
|
||||
|
||||
MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
frameworkfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'
|
||||
datafile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx'
|
||||
#commentsfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv'
|
||||
|
||||
# Get basic datasets from files
|
||||
metadata = {}
|
||||
for filein in [frameworkfile, datafile]:
|
||||
xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(filein)
|
||||
for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:
|
||||
print('{} sheet {}'.format(filein, sheetname))
|
||||
metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)
|
||||
metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)
|
||||
metadata[sheetname].to_csv(MASTERDATA_DIR + sheetname + '.csv', index=False)
|
||||
|
||||
# Then use existing code to create the crosstable files.
|
||||
Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -11,9 +11,36 @@
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"execution_count": 5,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "stderr",
|
||||
"output_type": "stream",
|
||||
"text": [
|
||||
"<ipython-input-5-7e799212f01e>:9: FutureWarning: Passing a negative integer is deprecated in version 1.0 and will not be supported in future version. Instead, use None to not limit the column width.\n",
|
||||
" pd.set_option('display.max_colwidth', -1)\n"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "stdout",
|
||||
"output_type": "stream",
|
||||
"text": [
|
||||
"table README is the same\n",
|
||||
"table examples is the same\n",
|
||||
"table incidents is the same\n",
|
||||
"table incidenttechniques is the same\n",
|
||||
"table narratives is the same\n",
|
||||
"table externalgroups is the same\n",
|
||||
"table externalgroupcounters is the same\n",
|
||||
"table suggested_externalgroups is the same\n",
|
||||
"table removed_externalgroups is the same\n",
|
||||
"table forums is the same\n",
|
||||
"table tools is the same\n",
|
||||
"table removed_tools is the same\n"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import pandas as pd\n",
|
||||
"import sqlite3 as sql\n",
|
||||
@ -25,8 +52,8 @@
|
||||
"pd.set_option('display.max_rows', 1000)\n",
|
||||
"pd.set_option('display.max_colwidth', -1)\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"newfile = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
|
||||
"oldfile = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_previous_version.xlsx'\n",
|
||||
"newfile = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
|
||||
"oldfile = '../../DISARMframeworks_2022_08_10/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"# Load dfs from file\n",
|
||||
"newdfs = {}\n",
|
||||
@ -65,7 +92,68 @@
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"for table in newdfs.keys():\n",
|
||||
" if newdfs[table].equals(olddfs[table]) == False:\n",
|
||||
" investigate_table(table)"
|
||||
" investigate_table(table)\n",
|
||||
" else:\n",
|
||||
" print('table {} is the same'.format(table))"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>new</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>old</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
"Empty DataFrame\n",
|
||||
"Columns: [disarm_id, new, old]\n",
|
||||
"Index: []"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# Look at individual table differences\n",
|
||||
"table = 'countermeasures'\n",
|
||||
"column = 'summary'\n",
|
||||
"coldiffs = newdfs[table][column] != olddfs[table][column]\n",
|
||||
"diffcols = pd.DataFrame()\n",
|
||||
"diffcols['disarm_id'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs]['disarm_id']\n",
|
||||
"diffcols['new'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
|
||||
"diffcols['old'] = olddfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
|
||||
"diffcols[diffcols['old'] != '']"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -73,17 +161,7 @@
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# Look at individual table differences\n",
|
||||
"table = 'countermeasures'\n",
|
||||
"column = 'summary'\n",
|
||||
"coldiffs = newdfs[table][column] != olddfs[table][column]\n",
|
||||
"diffcols = pd.DataFrame()\n",
|
||||
"diffcols['amitt_id'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs]['amitt_id']\n",
|
||||
"diffcols['new'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
|
||||
"diffcols['old'] = olddfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
|
||||
"diffcols[diffcols['old'] != '']"
|
||||
]
|
||||
"source": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
|
||||
814
CODE/compare_disarm_versions.ipynb
Normal file
814
CODE/compare_disarm_versions.ipynb
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,814 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cells": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "markdown",
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"# Compare disarm versions"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "stdout",
|
||||
"output_type": "stream",
|
||||
"text": [
|
||||
"Current keys: dict_keys(['FRAMEWORK_ADMIN_README', 'FRAMEWORK_ADMIN CODES', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'subtechniques', 'frameworks', 'tasks', 'detections', 'countermeasures', 'playbooks', 'responsetypes', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'sectors', 'resources', 'MOE', 'MOP'])\n",
|
||||
"Old keys: dict_keys(['ADMIN_README', 'ADMIN CODES', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'frameworks', 'tasks', 'detections', 'countermeasures', 'playbooks', 'responsetypes', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'sectors', 'resources', 'MOE', 'MOP'])\n"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"import pandas as pd\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'\n",
|
||||
"frameworkfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
|
||||
"oldframefile = MASTERDATA_DIR + '2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_0_1.xlsx'\n",
|
||||
"oldframefile = 'AMITT_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"def create_excel_metadata(frameworkfile):\n",
|
||||
" metadata = {}\n",
|
||||
" xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(frameworkfile)\n",
|
||||
" for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:\n",
|
||||
" metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)\n",
|
||||
" metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)\n",
|
||||
" metadata[sheetname].rename(columns={'amitt_id': 'disarm_id'}, inplace=True)\n",
|
||||
" return metadata\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"def check_version_descriptions(df1, df2):\n",
|
||||
" merge = df1.merge(df2, on='disarm_id')\n",
|
||||
" merge['name_changed'] = merge['name_x'] != merge['name_y']\n",
|
||||
" merge['summary_changed'] = merge['summary_x'] != merge['summary_y']\n",
|
||||
" return merge[(merge['name_changed']) | (merge['summary_changed'])][['disarm_id', 'name_changed', 'summary_changed', 'name_x', \n",
|
||||
" 'name_y', 'summary_x', 'summary_y']]\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
"metadata = create_excel_metadata(frameworkfile)\n",
|
||||
"oldmeta = create_excel_metadata(oldframefile)\n",
|
||||
"print('Current keys: {}'.format(metadata.keys()))\n",
|
||||
"print('Old keys: {}'.format(oldmeta.keys()))"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 7,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>name_changed</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>name_x</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>name_y</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>summary_x</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>summary_y</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>type</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>3</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>P04</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Assess</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Assess</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>phase</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id name_changed summary_changed name_x name_y \\\n",
|
||||
"3 P04 False True Assess Assess \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" summary_x \\\n",
|
||||
"3 Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f... \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" summary_y type \n",
|
||||
"3 Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f... phase "
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 7,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"dfchanges = pd.DataFrame([])\n",
|
||||
"changes = check_version_descriptions(metadata['phases'], oldmeta['phases'])\n",
|
||||
"changes['type'] = 'phase'\n",
|
||||
"dfchanges = changes\n",
|
||||
"changes"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 9,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>name_changed</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>name_x</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>name_y</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>summary_x</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>summary_y</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>type</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>0</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA01</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Plan Strategy</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Strategic Planning</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>tactic</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>1</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA02</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Plan Objectives</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Objective Planning</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>tactic</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>2</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA05</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Microtarget</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Microtargeting</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>tactic</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>3</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA06</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create or acquire text, images, and other content</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create and acquire content used in incident</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>tactic</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>4</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA07</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Select Channels and Affordances</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Channel Selection</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>tactic</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>5</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA08</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Conduct Pump Priming</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Pump Priming</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>tactic</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>6</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA09</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Deliver Content</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Exposure</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Release content to general public or larger po...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Release content to general public or push to l...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>tactic</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>7</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA10</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Go Physical</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Move incident/campaign from online to offline....</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Move incident into offline world</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>tactic</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>8</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA11</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Persist in the Information Environment</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Persistence</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>tactic</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>9</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>TA12</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Assess Effectiveness</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>tactic</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id name_changed summary_changed \\\n",
|
||||
"0 TA01 True False \n",
|
||||
"1 TA02 True True \n",
|
||||
"2 TA05 True False \n",
|
||||
"3 TA06 False True \n",
|
||||
"4 TA07 True True \n",
|
||||
"5 TA08 True True \n",
|
||||
"6 TA09 True True \n",
|
||||
"7 TA10 True True \n",
|
||||
"8 TA11 True True \n",
|
||||
"9 TA12 True True \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" name_x name_y \\\n",
|
||||
"0 Plan Strategy Strategic Planning \n",
|
||||
"1 Plan Objectives Objective Planning \n",
|
||||
"2 Microtarget Microtargeting \n",
|
||||
"3 Develop Content Develop Content \n",
|
||||
"4 Select Channels and Affordances Channel Selection \n",
|
||||
"5 Conduct Pump Priming Pump Priming \n",
|
||||
"6 Deliver Content Exposure \n",
|
||||
"7 Drive Offline Activity Go Physical \n",
|
||||
"8 Persist in the Information Environment Persistence \n",
|
||||
"9 Assess Effectiveness Measure Effectiveness \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" summary_x \\\n",
|
||||
"0 Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ... \n",
|
||||
"1 Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl... \n",
|
||||
"2 Target very specific populations of people \n",
|
||||
"3 Create or acquire text, images, and other content \n",
|
||||
"4 Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w... \n",
|
||||
"5 Release content on a targetted small scale, pr... \n",
|
||||
"6 Release content to general public or larger po... \n",
|
||||
"7 Move incident/campaign from online to offline.... \n",
|
||||
"8 Persist in the Information Space refers to tak... \n",
|
||||
"9 Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut... \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" summary_y type \n",
|
||||
"0 Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ... tactic \n",
|
||||
"1 Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl... tactic \n",
|
||||
"2 Target very specific populations of people tactic \n",
|
||||
"3 Create and acquire content used in incident tactic \n",
|
||||
"4 Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma... tactic \n",
|
||||
"5 Release content on a targetted small scale, pr... tactic \n",
|
||||
"6 Release content to general public or push to l... tactic \n",
|
||||
"7 Move incident into offline world tactic \n",
|
||||
"8 Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre... tactic \n",
|
||||
"9 Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ... tactic "
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 9,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"changes = check_version_descriptions(metadata['tactics'], oldmeta['tactics'])\n",
|
||||
"changes['type'] = 'tactic'\n",
|
||||
"dfchanges = pd.concat([dfchanges, changes])\n",
|
||||
"changes"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 10,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"text/html": [
|
||||
"<div>\n",
|
||||
"<style scoped>\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: middle;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
|
||||
" vertical-align: top;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" .dataframe thead th {\n",
|
||||
" text-align: right;\n",
|
||||
" }\n",
|
||||
"</style>\n",
|
||||
"<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
|
||||
" <thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
|
||||
" <th></th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>name_changed</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>name_x</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>name_y</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>summary_x</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>summary_y</th>\n",
|
||||
" <th>type</th>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </thead>\n",
|
||||
" <tbody>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>2</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0004</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Develop Competing Narratives</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Competing Narratives</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Advance competing narratives connected to same...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Advance competing narratives connected to same...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>3</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0007</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create key social engineering assets needed to...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create key social engineering assets needed to...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>6</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0011</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Compromise legitimate accounts</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Hijack legitimate account</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Hack or take over legimate accounts to distrib...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Hack or take over legimate accounts to distrib...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>7</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0013</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create inauthentic websites</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create fake websites</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create media assets to support inauthentic org...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create media assets to support fake organizati...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>8</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0014</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Prepare fundraising campaigns</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create funding campaigns</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence op...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Generate revenue through online funding campai...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>9</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0015</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create hashtags and search artifacts</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create hashtag</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag gro...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Many incident-based campaigns will create a ha...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>10</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0016</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create Clickbait</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Clickbait</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, ...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, ...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>11</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0017</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Conduct fundraising</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Promote online funding</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence op...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Drive traffic/engagement to funding campaign s...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>12</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0018</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Purchase Targeted Advertisements</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Paid targeted ads</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create or fund advertisements targeted at spec...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create or fund advertisements targeted at spec...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>15</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0022</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Conspiracy narratives</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>\"Conspiracy narratives\" appeal to the human de...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>\"Conspiracy narratives appeal to the human des...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>17</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0029</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Online polls</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Manipulate online polls</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create fake online polls, or manipulate existi...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Create fake online polls, or manipulate existi...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>18</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0040</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Demand insurmountable proof</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Demand unsurmountable proof</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Campaigns often leverage tactical and informat...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Campaigns often leverage tactical and informat...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>19</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0042</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Seed Kernel of truth</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Kernel of Truth</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Wrap lies or altered context/facts around trut...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Wrap lies or altered context/facts around trut...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>20</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0043</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Chat apps</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Direct messaging via encypted app is an increa...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>22</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0045</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Use fake experts</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Use fake experts</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Use the fake experts that were set up during E...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>23</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0046</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Use Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Red...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Red...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>24</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0047</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Censor social media as a political force</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Muzzle social media as a political force</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Use political influence or the power of state ...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Use political influence or the power of state ...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>25</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0048</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Harass</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Cow online opinion leaders</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Threatening or harassing believers of opposing...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Intimidate, coerce, threaten critics/dissident...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>26</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0049</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Flooding the Information Space</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Flooding</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels ...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels ...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>27</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0057</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Organize Events</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Organise remote rallies and events</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Coordinate and promote real-world events acros...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Coordinate and promote real-world events acros...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>28</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0059</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Play the long game</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Play the long game</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1....</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Play the long game can mean a couple of things...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>29</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0060</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>False</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Continue to Amplify</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Continue to amplify</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>continue narrative or message amplification af...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>continue narrative or message amplification af...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" <tr>\n",
|
||||
" <th>30</th>\n",
|
||||
" <td>T0061</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>True</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Sell Merchandise</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Sell merchandising</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Sell mechandise refers to getting the message ...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>Sell hats, t-shirts, flags and other branded c...</td>\n",
|
||||
" <td>technique</td>\n",
|
||||
" </tr>\n",
|
||||
" </tbody>\n",
|
||||
"</table>\n",
|
||||
"</div>"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"text/plain": [
|
||||
" disarm_id name_changed summary_changed \\\n",
|
||||
"2 T0004 True True \n",
|
||||
"3 T0007 True True \n",
|
||||
"6 T0011 True True \n",
|
||||
"7 T0013 True True \n",
|
||||
"8 T0014 True True \n",
|
||||
"9 T0015 True True \n",
|
||||
"10 T0016 True True \n",
|
||||
"11 T0017 True True \n",
|
||||
"12 T0018 True False \n",
|
||||
"15 T0022 True True \n",
|
||||
"17 T0029 True False \n",
|
||||
"18 T0040 True False \n",
|
||||
"19 T0042 True True \n",
|
||||
"20 T0043 True True \n",
|
||||
"22 T0045 False True \n",
|
||||
"23 T0046 True False \n",
|
||||
"24 T0047 True True \n",
|
||||
"25 T0048 True True \n",
|
||||
"26 T0049 True True \n",
|
||||
"27 T0057 True True \n",
|
||||
"28 T0059 False True \n",
|
||||
"29 T0060 True False \n",
|
||||
"30 T0061 True True \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" name_x \\\n",
|
||||
"2 Develop Competing Narratives \n",
|
||||
"3 Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups \n",
|
||||
"6 Compromise legitimate accounts \n",
|
||||
"7 Create inauthentic websites \n",
|
||||
"8 Prepare fundraising campaigns \n",
|
||||
"9 Create hashtags and search artifacts \n",
|
||||
"10 Create Clickbait \n",
|
||||
"11 Conduct fundraising \n",
|
||||
"12 Purchase Targeted Advertisements \n",
|
||||
"15 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives \n",
|
||||
"17 Online polls \n",
|
||||
"18 Demand insurmountable proof \n",
|
||||
"19 Seed Kernel of truth \n",
|
||||
"20 Chat apps \n",
|
||||
"22 Use fake experts \n",
|
||||
"23 Use Search Engine Optimization \n",
|
||||
"24 Censor social media as a political force \n",
|
||||
"25 Harass \n",
|
||||
"26 Flooding the Information Space \n",
|
||||
"27 Organize Events \n",
|
||||
"28 Play the long game \n",
|
||||
"29 Continue to Amplify \n",
|
||||
"30 Sell Merchandise \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" name_y \\\n",
|
||||
"2 Competing Narratives \n",
|
||||
"3 Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr... \n",
|
||||
"6 Hijack legitimate account \n",
|
||||
"7 Create fake websites \n",
|
||||
"8 Create funding campaigns \n",
|
||||
"9 Create hashtag \n",
|
||||
"10 Clickbait \n",
|
||||
"11 Promote online funding \n",
|
||||
"12 Paid targeted ads \n",
|
||||
"15 Conspiracy narratives \n",
|
||||
"17 Manipulate online polls \n",
|
||||
"18 Demand unsurmountable proof \n",
|
||||
"19 Kernel of Truth \n",
|
||||
"20 Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps \n",
|
||||
"22 Use fake experts \n",
|
||||
"23 Search Engine Optimization \n",
|
||||
"24 Muzzle social media as a political force \n",
|
||||
"25 Cow online opinion leaders \n",
|
||||
"26 Flooding \n",
|
||||
"27 Organise remote rallies and events \n",
|
||||
"28 Play the long game \n",
|
||||
"29 Continue to amplify \n",
|
||||
"30 Sell merchandising \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" summary_x \\\n",
|
||||
"2 Advance competing narratives connected to same... \n",
|
||||
"3 Create key social engineering assets needed to... \n",
|
||||
"6 Hack or take over legimate accounts to distrib... \n",
|
||||
"7 Create media assets to support inauthentic org... \n",
|
||||
"8 Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence op... \n",
|
||||
"9 Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag gro... \n",
|
||||
"10 Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, ... \n",
|
||||
"11 Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence op... \n",
|
||||
"12 Create or fund advertisements targeted at spec... \n",
|
||||
"15 \"Conspiracy narratives\" appeal to the human de... \n",
|
||||
"17 Create fake online polls, or manipulate existi... \n",
|
||||
"18 Campaigns often leverage tactical and informat... \n",
|
||||
"19 Wrap lies or altered context/facts around trut... \n",
|
||||
"20 Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing... \n",
|
||||
"22 Use the fake experts that were set up during E... \n",
|
||||
"23 Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Red... \n",
|
||||
"24 Use political influence or the power of state ... \n",
|
||||
"25 Threatening or harassing believers of opposing... \n",
|
||||
"26 Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels ... \n",
|
||||
"27 Coordinate and promote real-world events acros... \n",
|
||||
"28 Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1.... \n",
|
||||
"29 continue narrative or message amplification af... \n",
|
||||
"30 Sell mechandise refers to getting the message ... \n",
|
||||
"\n",
|
||||
" summary_y type \n",
|
||||
"2 Advance competing narratives connected to same... technique \n",
|
||||
"3 Create key social engineering assets needed to... technique \n",
|
||||
"6 Hack or take over legimate accounts to distrib... technique \n",
|
||||
"7 Create media assets to support fake organizati... technique \n",
|
||||
"8 Generate revenue through online funding campai... technique \n",
|
||||
"9 Many incident-based campaigns will create a ha... technique \n",
|
||||
"10 Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, ... technique \n",
|
||||
"11 Drive traffic/engagement to funding campaign s... technique \n",
|
||||
"12 Create or fund advertisements targeted at spec... technique \n",
|
||||
"15 \"Conspiracy narratives appeal to the human des... technique \n",
|
||||
"17 Create fake online polls, or manipulate existi... technique \n",
|
||||
"18 Campaigns often leverage tactical and informat... technique \n",
|
||||
"19 Wrap lies or altered context/facts around trut... technique \n",
|
||||
"20 Direct messaging via encypted app is an increa... technique \n",
|
||||
"22 Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009... technique \n",
|
||||
"23 Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Red... technique \n",
|
||||
"24 Use political influence or the power of state ... technique \n",
|
||||
"25 Intimidate, coerce, threaten critics/dissident... technique \n",
|
||||
"26 Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels ... technique \n",
|
||||
"27 Coordinate and promote real-world events acros... technique \n",
|
||||
"28 Play the long game can mean a couple of things... technique \n",
|
||||
"29 continue narrative or message amplification af... technique \n",
|
||||
"30 Sell hats, t-shirts, flags and other branded c... technique "
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 10,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"changes = check_version_descriptions(metadata['techniques'], oldmeta['techniques'])\n",
|
||||
"changes['type'] = 'technique'\n",
|
||||
"dfchanges = pd.concat([dfchanges, changes])\n",
|
||||
"changes"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 11,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
"dfchanges.to_csv('temp_versionchanges.csv', index=False)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"kernelspec": {
|
||||
"display_name": "Python 3",
|
||||
"language": "python",
|
||||
"name": "python3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"language_info": {
|
||||
"codemirror_mode": {
|
||||
"name": "ipython",
|
||||
"version": 3
|
||||
},
|
||||
"file_extension": ".py",
|
||||
"mimetype": "text/x-python",
|
||||
"name": "python",
|
||||
"nbconvert_exporter": "python",
|
||||
"pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
|
||||
"version": "3.8.3"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nbformat": 4,
|
||||
"nbformat_minor": 4
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -27,6 +27,36 @@
|
||||
"name": "stdout",
|
||||
"output_type": "stream",
|
||||
"text": [
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv ADMIN_DATA_README\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/detections.csv detections\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/actortypes.csv actortypes\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/responsetypes.csv responsetypes\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/phases.csv phases\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroupcounters.csv externalgroupcounters\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/metatechniques.csv metatechniques\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/techniques.csv techniques\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOP.csv MOP\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOE.csv MOE\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/narratives.csv narratives\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/forums.csv forums\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/playbooks.csv playbooks\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/resources.csv resources\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/suggested_externalgroups.csv suggested_externalgroups\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tasks.csv tasks\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidenttechniques.csv incidenttechniques\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/examples.csv examples\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools.csv tools\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/removed_externalgroups.csv removed_externalgroups\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/removed_tools.csv removed_tools\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/frameworks.csv frameworks\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups.csv externalgroups\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/countermeasures.csv countermeasures\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tactics.csv tactics\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/sectors.csv sectors\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES\n",
|
||||
"../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidents.csv incidents\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/disarm_red_framework.md\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_files/disarm_red_framework_clickable.html\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/disarm_blue_framework.md\n",
|
||||
@ -35,12 +65,8 @@
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/phases_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype tactic\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/tactics_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA10.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype technique\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/techniques_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0103.001.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0103.002.md\n",
|
||||
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0128.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype task\n",
|
||||
"updated ../generated_pages/tasks_index.md\n",
|
||||
"Temp: objecttype incident\n",
|
||||
@ -74,7 +100,7 @@
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
@ -94,7 +120,7 @@
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 3,
|
||||
"execution_count": null,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"outputs": [],
|
||||
"source": [
|
||||
@ -113,7 +139,7 @@
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cell_type": "code",
|
||||
"execution_count": 4,
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"scrolled": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
@ -660,7 +686,7 @@
|
||||
"32 "
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"execution_count": 4,
|
||||
"execution_count": 2,
|
||||
"metadata": {},
|
||||
"output_type": "execute_result"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ todo:
|
||||
import pandas as pd
|
||||
import numpy as np
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import glob
|
||||
from sklearn.feature_extraction.text import CountVectorizer
|
||||
|
||||
GENERATED_PAGES_DIR = '../generated_pages/'
|
||||
@ -84,22 +85,16 @@ MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'
|
||||
class Disarm:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self,
|
||||
frameworkfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx',
|
||||
datafile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx',
|
||||
commentsfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.xlsx'):
|
||||
def __init__(self):
|
||||
|
||||
# Load metadata from file
|
||||
# Load metadata from files
|
||||
# Older versions of DISARM are in excel files; newer ones in sets of CSV files
|
||||
metadata = {}
|
||||
xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(frameworkfile)
|
||||
for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:
|
||||
metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)
|
||||
for csvfile in glob.glob(MASTERDATA_DIR + '*.csv'):
|
||||
sheetname = csvfile[csvfile.rfind('/')+1:-4]
|
||||
metadata[sheetname] = pd.read_csv(csvfile)
|
||||
metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)
|
||||
|
||||
xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(datafile)
|
||||
for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:
|
||||
metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)
|
||||
metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)
|
||||
|
||||
# Create individual tables and dictionaries
|
||||
self.df_phases = metadata['phases']
|
||||
@ -120,9 +115,16 @@ class Disarm:
|
||||
self.df_resources = metadata['resources']
|
||||
self.df_responsetypes = metadata['responsetypes']
|
||||
self.df_metatechniques = metadata['metatechniques']
|
||||
self.it = self.create_incident_technique_crosstable(metadata['incidenttechniques'])
|
||||
self.it = self.refine_incident_technique_crosstable(metadata['cross_incident_technique'])
|
||||
self.df_tactics = metadata['tactics']
|
||||
self.df_playbooks = metadata['playbooks']
|
||||
self.cross_counterid_techniqueid = metadata['cross_counter_technique']
|
||||
self.cross_counterid_resourceid = metadata['cross_counter_resource']
|
||||
self.cross_counterid_actortypeid = metadata['cross_counter_actortype']
|
||||
self.cross_detectionid_techniqueid = metadata['cross_detection_technique']
|
||||
self.cross_detectionid_resourceid = metadata['cross_detection_resource']
|
||||
self.cross_detectionid_actortypeid = metadata['cross_detection_actortype']
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Add columns containing lists of techniques and counters to the tactics dataframe
|
||||
self.df_techniques_per_tactic = self.df_techniques.groupby('tactic_id')['disarm_id'].apply(list).reset_index().rename({'disarm_id':'technique_ids'}, axis=1)
|
||||
@ -142,22 +144,8 @@ class Disarm:
|
||||
# Create the data table for each framework file
|
||||
self.num_tactics = len(self.df_tactics)
|
||||
|
||||
# Create counters and detections cross-tables
|
||||
self.cross_counterid_techniqueid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_counters[['disarm_id', 'techniques']],
|
||||
'techniques', 'technique', '\n')
|
||||
self.cross_counterid_resourceid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_counters[['disarm_id', 'resources_needed']],
|
||||
'resources_needed', 'resource', ',')
|
||||
self.cross_counterid_actortypeid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_counters[['disarm_id', 'actortypes']],
|
||||
'actortypes', 'actortype', ',')
|
||||
self.cross_detectionid_techniqueid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'techniques']],
|
||||
'techniques', 'technique', '\n')
|
||||
self.cross_detectionid_resourceid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'resources_needed']],
|
||||
'resources_needed', 'resource', ',')
|
||||
self.cross_detectionid_actortypeid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'actortypes']],
|
||||
'actortypes', 'actortype', ',')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def create_incident_technique_crosstable(self, it_metadata):
|
||||
def refine_incident_technique_crosstable(self, it_metadata):
|
||||
# Generate full cross-table between incidents and techniques
|
||||
|
||||
it = it_metadata
|
||||
@ -176,21 +164,6 @@ class Disarm:
|
||||
return(pd.Series(df.name.values,index=df.disarm_id).to_dict())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def create_cross_table(self, df, col, newcol, divider=','):
|
||||
''' Convert a column with multiple values per cell into a crosstable
|
||||
|
||||
# Thanks https://stackoverflow.com/questions/17116814/pandas-how-do-i-split-text-in-a-column-into-multiple-rows?noredirect=1
|
||||
'''
|
||||
crosstable = df.join(df[col]
|
||||
.str.split(divider, expand=True).stack()
|
||||
.reset_index(drop=True,level=1)
|
||||
.rename(newcol)).drop(col, axis=1)
|
||||
crosstable = crosstable[crosstable[newcol].notnull()]
|
||||
crosstable[newcol+'_id'] = crosstable[newcol].str.split(' ').str[0]
|
||||
crosstable.drop(newcol, axis=1, inplace=True)
|
||||
return crosstable
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def create_technique_incidents_string(self, techniqueid):
|
||||
|
||||
incidentstr = '''
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/.DS_Store
vendored
BIN
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/.DS_Store
vendored
Binary file not shown.
BIN
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/.DS_Store
vendored
Normal file
BIN
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/.DS_Store
vendored
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
|
||||
Unnamed: 0,Unnamed: 1,Unnamed: 2,Unnamed: 3,Unnamed: 4,Unnamed: 5
|
||||
"Spreadsheet created by initially combining CredCo's CredWeb and the Carnegie Endowment lists of disinformation initiatives with CSC's Rolodex, Disinfo Cloud list and a list compiled by Jon B",,,,,
|
||||
Further work needed to assimilate addition data from the lists below...,,,,,
|
||||
,DATASETS,,No. of entries,Categorisation,
|
||||
,Carnegie post,https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/14/mapping-worldwide-initiatives-to-counter-influence-operations-pub-83435 ,Commentary on Carnegie list,,
|
||||
,"Carnegie list, created from credweb, rand, disinfocloud",https://ceip.knack.com/pcio-baseline-datasets#initiatives/ ,460,Added. See below,
|
||||
,CredCo's CredWeb catalogue:,https://credibilitycoalition.org/credcatalog/,252,Added. Theory; Practice; Content; Infrastructure,
|
||||
,Rand list of tools,https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/fighting-disinformation.html,90,Bot/spam detection; Codes and standards; Credibility scoring; Disinformation tracking; Education/training; Verification; Whitelisting,
|
||||
,Disinfocloud list of technologies:,https://disinfocloud.com/about-us,265,Need to sign in with org name - CSC has an account,
|
||||
,Disinfocloud has a useful list of tool categories:,https://disinfocloud.com/tools-overview/,,,
|
||||
,Facebook map of fact checkers,https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-checking/partner-map,,"I've checked Africa, South America, Central America. Everything else still to do",
|
||||
,WHO covid19 disinfo note,https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ucor7vU81HbBbxvre2QI5Rv08Ys1VvX2JrWtNSGk4XY/edit#,,NEED TO CHECK THROUGH THIS,
|
||||
,IRI list of european groups,https://dash-iribeaconproject.org/,,ADD TO LISTS,
|
||||
,"DCMS index of companies - safe-tech issues, incl disinfo",https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/directory-of-uk-safety-tech-providers,,ADD TO LISTS,
|
||||
,Duke Reporters Lab of Fact Checkers,https://reporterslab.org/fact-checking/,,ADD TO LISTS,
|
||||
,ISACs/ISAOs,https://www.nationalisacs.org/member-isacs-3,,ADD TO LISTS?,
|
||||
,Turing online hate research hub,https://www.turing.ac.uk/research/research-programmes/public-policy/online-hate-research-hub,,ADD TO LISTS?,
|
||||
,Internationl Fact Checking Network (Poynter),https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,,,
|
||||
,European Union report list,https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/624278/EPRS_STU(2019)624278_EN.pdf,,,ADD TO LISTS
|
||||
,Ryerson Uni covid19 factcheckers list ,https://covid19misinfo.org/fact-checking/covid-19-fact-checkers/ and https://dataverse.scholarsportal.info/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5683/SP2/IMISPE,,,
|
||||
,Countering Disinformation list,https://counteringdisinformation.org/interventions/,,TRIAGE LISTS,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
MAP,https://datastudio.google.com/u/2/reporting/a8491164-6aa8-45d0-b609-c70339689127/page/ierzB ,,597,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
QUESTIONS,,,,,
|
||||
,Suggested corrections in form:,https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScnjgJg2lGw3FB_xGaZPrZuKEZSY1OOy9-UosMS9T2yWAtm3A/viewform,,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
CODES,,,,,
|
||||
,Initiatives Studying Influence Operations Code Book,,,,
|
||||
,Field,Description,,,
|
||||
,Name,"Name of the initiative, with any larger host organization listed in brackets after the name. e.g.: Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project (American Press Institute)",,,
|
||||
,Organization Type,"Academia – initiative is housed at a university
|
||||
Civil Society – initiative is led by a think tank, non-governmental organization, non-profit or charity.
|
||||
Government & Intergovernmental – initiative is run by a single government or government-level international organization such as NATO, the UN or EU.
|
||||
Media – initiative is run by a media outlet
|
||||
Tech – initiative is led by a social media platform or technology company",,,
|
||||
,Initiative Focus,"Countermeasures – seeks to counter or disrupt influence operations.
|
||||
Democracy & Civil Liberties –aims to support the democratic process by identifying attempts to subvert or influence elections, factchecking political statements and/or engaging in cross-sector engagement to build understanding of the threat.
|
||||
Factchecking & Journalism –conducts fact checking (e.g., of media reporting or political statements), verifies videos and images, detects disinformation narratives, verifies the credibility of websites, or supports journalism more broadly;
|
||||
Investigations –conducts research into ongoing or recent influence operations to expose them, reveal hidden networks and nodes, highlight tactics, and make attributions, typically on tight deadlines.
|
||||
Public Policy – develops new policy and regulatory proposals and/or evaluates the effectiveness of existing ones
|
||||
Research – conducts longer-term academic-level research on influence operations, including campaigns, their effects and countermeasures.
|
||||
Societal Resilience – initiative aims to build public resilience to influence operations narratives and improve the information ecosystem through education, media literacy, and/or promoting responsible journalism
|
||||
Tools – provides tools to help researchers and end-users to understand or control their experience within the information environment",,,
|
||||
,Self- Description,Description of main activities as per the initiative’s publicly available information,,,
|
||||
,Location,"Geographic location by continent. Presence on 3 or more continents counts as global
|
||||
North America
|
||||
South America
|
||||
Europe
|
||||
Asia
|
||||
Africa
|
||||
Australia and Oceania
|
||||
Global",,,
|
||||
,URL,Link to the website of the initiative,,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
,76,on the tools sheet,,,
|
||||
,130,with 'tool provider' checked on the org sheet,,,
|
||||
,811,organisations,,,
|
||||
,297,contacts,,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
CRUNCHBASE,,,,,
|
||||
,Deb gives this as an example model,https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/lookup-2,,,
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
disarm_object,id_prefix,id_digits,next number on stack
|
||||
actortype,A,3,
|
||||
countermeasure,C,5,
|
||||
responsetype,D,2,
|
||||
example,E,6,
|
||||
detection,F,5,
|
||||
framework,FW,2,
|
||||
group,G,6,
|
||||
incident,I,5,
|
||||
metatechnique,M,3,
|
||||
moe,ME,5,
|
||||
mop,MP,5,
|
||||
narrative,N,5,
|
||||
phase,P,2,P05
|
||||
playbook,PB,5,
|
||||
resource,R,3,
|
||||
sector,S,3,
|
||||
technique,T,4,T0073
|
||||
tactic,TA,2,TA19
|
||||
task,TK,4,
|
||||
tool,TL,5,
|
||||
subtechnique,ST,4,
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
MASTER COPY OF DISARM TTPS,Unnamed: 1,Unnamed: 2,Unnamed: 3
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
HISTORY OF THIS SPREADSHEET,,,
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
Date,Who,Description,Comments
|
||||
2019-11-15 00:00:00,ALL,"""Blue Team"" workshop, Washington DC 15-16 Nov 2019",
|
||||
2019-12-05 00:00:00,SJT,copied all wall post-its into spreadsheet,
|
||||
2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,Took copy for cleaning,
|
||||
2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,Put notes here if you spot something unusual or do something you want crosschecking,
|
||||
2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,"First task: look for the techniques for each row in the spreadsheet, and add them to the ""techniques"" column. A list of Technique numbers is best; if it applies to all techniques in a tactic, put the tactic number; if it applies to all techniques, put “all”.",
|
||||
2019-12-21 00:00:00,Eric D.,"I am unsure to what extent content dissemination is included in the ""Develop"" phases or Channel Selection, compared to belonging more or less solely within Pump Priming, Exposure, Go Physical and Persistence.",
|
||||
2020-01-07 00:00:00,SJT,"Content dissemination is generally right of boom, but might be needed as part of eg. creating convincing sockpuppets or groups in a channel",
|
||||
2020-01-10 00:00:00,SJT,"New copy of spreadsheet. Going to put all counters in here, as a playbook",
|
||||
2020-01-12 00:00:00,SJT,"Included post-it notes from 2019-11 workshop. Included incident-counters from 2019-11 preparation worksheet. Included general-counters from 2019-11 preparation worksheet. Added References worksheet, to hold URLs to references (excel only allows 1 URL per cell, which wipes data if we're not careful)",
|
||||
2020-01-13 00:00:00,SJT,"Included counters and playbooks from teams 1,2,3,4,D",
|
||||
2020-01-14 00:00:00,SJT,"Took copy of spreadsheet, so we have a snapshot of all the inputs into it. Now it's time to get cleaning!",
|
||||
2020-01-20 00:00:00,SJT,"Started the cleanup. First, gave every counter an id. ",
|
||||
2020-01-31 00:00:00,SJT,"Split output report into two: ""finding ways to counter disinformation campaigns"" and ""Disinformation counters"" so we can publish the first part faster",
|
||||
2020-02-10 00:00:00,Roger J.,"Add ""Measure of Effectiveness"" and ""Measure of Performance"" sheet. This is a requirement for effective data pollution where the objective is to degrade the adversary's ability to measure their affect.",
|
||||
2020-05-14 00:00:00,SJT,"Clean up tactic and response names in countermeasures sheet, so they don’t mess up the generators",
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
SUGGESTED TASKS,,,
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
Date,Suggested by,Suggested Task,Comments
|
||||
,SJT,"Add links to references with each counter in, to the rows for those counters. Add each document to the REFERENCES tab, and its [ref] to the column ""References"" in the Countermeasures sheet. ",
|
||||
,SJT,"Check through spreadsheet for duplicate counters, and counters at the wrong level of details (e.g. work out what should be at the counter level, and what should be at the playbook level). Clean up accordingly.",
|
||||
,SJT,"Create code similar to the DISARM github code, that creates: a page for each technique, listing the counters relevant to that technique; a page for each tactic, listing the counters relevant to that tactic, by response type then alphabetically; a COA grid with the number of responses for each tactic/response combination ",done
|
||||
,SJT,"Create a chapter in the summary document for each tactic, describing the types of counter relevant at that tactic stage. ",Done
|
||||
,SJT,Write a document chapter on viewing disinformation as an ecosystem and potential solution space to be explored. ,
|
||||
2021-07-17 00:00:00,SJT,"Look at SG note for wording, counters we haven't listed https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-misinformation-advisory.pdf",
|
||||
REFERENCES USED,,,
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
ID,URL,Reference,Comments
|
||||
RAND2237,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2237.html,"Helmus et al, ""Russian Social Media Influence: understanding Russian propaganda in Eastern Europe"", Rand Corporation 2018",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
|
||||
Corker18,https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf,"Corker et al, ""Putin's asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: implications for US national security"", 2018",
|
||||
Hicks19,https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-i-campaigning-gray-zone,"Hicks et al, ""By other means part 1: campaigning in the gray zone"", 2019",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
|
||||
Dalton19,csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-ii-adapting-compete-gray-zone,"Dalton et al, ""By other means part 2: adapting to compete in the gray zone"", 2019",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
|
||||
Taylor81,http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2742/ToP.pdf,"Philip M. Taylor (1981): Techniques of persuasion: basic ground rules of British propaganda during the Second World War, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 1:1, 57 – 66",https://web.archive.org/web/20170226100346/http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2742/ToP.pdf
|
||||
,https://www.psywar.org/content/irdSpecialOperations,,
|
||||
|
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,info_category,info_type,meta,name,brainstorm,phase,tactic,counter,summary,longname
|
||||
ME00001,,,,,,TA06 - Develop Content,T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites,Identify affilliated imposter accounts,,ME00001
|
||||
ME00002,,,,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,T0009 - Create fake experts,Verify published research accreditation,,ME00002
|
||||
ME00003,,,,,"-measure credibility of expert, credibility of each media company, their amplification factor, as a metric of the value the expert provides.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
X media power, measure whether actor can be knocked off one class of ""credible media"" down to the next in the ladder",TA15 - Establish Social Assets,T0009 - Create fake experts,Publicly deplatform fake experts,,ME00003
|
||||
ME00004,,,,,-MOE = predictive value of differentiation by intent via other counters related to polls?,TA07 - Channel Selection,T0029 - Manipulate online polls,Categorize polls by intent,,ME00004
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,info_category,data_type,Unnamed: 3,name,Unnamed: 5,Unnamed: 6,summary,longname
|
||||
MP00001,,,social_media,Likes,,,,MP00001
|
||||
MP00002,,,social_media,Shares,,,,MP00002
|
||||
MP00003,,,social_media,Comments,,,,MP00003
|
||||
MP00004,,,social_media,Follows,,,,MP00004
|
||||
MP00005,,,social_media,Retweets,,,,MP00005
|
||||
MP00006,,,social_media,Clicks,,,,MP00006
|
||||
MP00007,,,social_media,Active Followers,,,,MP00007
|
||||
MP00008,,,social_media,Relevance Score,,,see: facebook relevance algo,MP00008
|
||||
MP00009,,,social_media,Follwers vs. Following Ratio,,,,MP00009
|
||||
MP00010,,,social_media,Inter-Community Posting ,,,4chan to Reddit,MP00010
|
||||
MP00011,,,social_media,Intra-Community Posting,,,crossposting between boards,MP00011
|
||||
MP00012,,,social_media,Reach vs. Impressions,,,,MP00012
|
||||
MP00013,,,social_media,Direct Messages,,,,MP00013
|
||||
MP00014,,,,,,,,MP00014
|
||||
MP00015,,,,Web Site Traffic Growth,,,,MP00015
|
||||
MP00016,,,,Search Engine Ranking,,,,MP00016
|
||||
MP00017,,,mobile,Mobile App Downloads,,,,MP00017
|
||||
MP00018,,,mobile,SMS/Push Notification List,,,,MP00018
|
||||
MP00019,,,,,,,,MP00019
|
||||
MP00020,,,target_audience,Audience Demographics,,,,MP00020
|
||||
MP00021,,,target_audience,Audience Mentions,,,,MP00021
|
||||
MP00022,,,,,,,,MP00022
|
||||
MP00023,,,,,,,,MP00023
|
||||
MP00024,,,,,,,,MP00024
|
||||
MP00025,,,adtech,Ad Conversions,,,,MP00025
|
||||
MP00026,,,,,,,,MP00026
|
||||
MP00027,,,,,,,,MP00027
|
||||
MP00028,,,,,,,,MP00028
|
||||
MP00029,,,,,,,,MP00029
|
||||
MP00030,,,,Adversary intelligence system fails to detect,,,,MP00030
|
||||
MP00031,,,,,,,,MP00031
|
||||
MP00032,,,email,Email List,,,,MP00032
|
||||
MP00033,,,email,Email Open Rate,,,,MP00033
|
||||
MP00034,,,email,Email Click-Through Rate,,,,MP00034
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,sector_ids,framework_ids,longname,Jon's comments/questions
|
||||
A001,data scientist ,"Person who can wrangle data, implement machine learning algorithms etc","S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010","FW01, FW02",A001 - data scientist ,"What actual actions do data scientists execute? Do we not need a clearer idea of this, to help up map ttps (actions) to actortypes (who execute the action)"
|
||||
A002,target,Person being targeted by disinformation campaign,"S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010",FW02,A002 - target,"Both red and blue framework users will refer to A002? So in FW01, as well as FW02?"
|
||||
A003,trusted authority ,Influencer,"S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010","FW01, FW02",A003 - trusted authority ,"Is A003 best summarised by the word ""Inluencer""? Is an influencer not a separate actortype?
|
||||
Just seen below, A016"
|
||||
A004,activist,,S002,FW02,A004 - activist,What does this actortype do?
|
||||
A005,community group,,S002,FW02,A005 - community group,What does this actortype do?
|
||||
A006,educator,,S002,FW02,A006 - educator,
|
||||
A007,factchecker,Someone with the skills to verify whether information posted is factual,S002,FW02,A007 - factchecker,
|
||||
A008,library,,S002,FW02,A008 - library,"Is this an actortype? A sub-sector, yes. But what is the 'action type' to help describe the 'actortype'?"
|
||||
A009,NGO,,S002,FW02,A009 - NGO,"This is a sector, not an actortype"
|
||||
A010,religious organisation ,,S002,FW02,A010 - religious organisation ,"""Faith communities"" are a sub-sector of the Civil Society sector. I think we need clear differentiation between the 'Sector' object (where an actor sits) vs 'Actortype' object (what an actor does)"
|
||||
A011,school ,,S002,FW02,A011 - school ,"This is a subsector of S004 - not an actortype, or is there a clear role for a school? If teaching, is this not A006"
|
||||
A012,account owner,Anyone who owns an account online,S006,"FW01
|
||||
FW02",A012 - account owner,
|
||||
A013,content creator ,,S006,"FW01
|
||||
FW02",A013 - content creator ,
|
||||
A014,elves,,S006,FW02,A014 - elves,"??? SJ, you have told me, but I've forgotten"
|
||||
A015,general public,,S006,FW02,A015 - general public,"Duplication of a field in the sector object. But I'm querying if this belongs under sector either. Aren't we talking here about ""individuals"". And, then again, what do these individuals do? They are a target. Or an influencer. Or something else. But being an individual doesn't seem to help describe their applicability to an action"
|
||||
A016,influencer,,S006,"FW01
|
||||
FW02",A016 - influencer,
|
||||
A017,coordinating body,For example the DHS,S003,FW02,A017 - coordinating body,"""Response coordinator""? Or just 'Coordinator"""
|
||||
A018,government ,Government agencies,S003,"FW01
|
||||
FW02",A018 - government ,"DHS (A017) is ""government"". Again, this is a field/value of the sector object"
|
||||
A019,military ,,S003,FW02,A019 - military ,"A019 is a sub-sector of ""government"". Again, this is a field/value of the sector object"
|
||||
A020,policy maker,,S003,FW02,A020 - policy maker,
|
||||
A021,media organisation,,S010,"FW01
|
||||
FW02",A021 - media organisation,"Not an actortype. The actor is perhaps as the owner, or the journalist, or the ad buyer, ad seller etc"
|
||||
A022,company,,S009,FW02,A022 - company,
|
||||
A023,adtech provider,,S008,FW02,A023 - adtech provider,"Should Adtech be a called-out subsector of S008? Separate question: is ""provider"" relevant? What action does it imply? Or what TTP does it map to?"
|
||||
A024,developer,,S008,FW02,A024 - developer,
|
||||
A025,funding_site_admin,Funding site admin,S008,FW02,A025 - funding_site_admin,What is this?
|
||||
A026,games designer,,S008,"FW01, FW02",A026 - games designer,"Just ""Designer""? Would the TTP context not make it clear the context was 'gaming'?"
|
||||
A027,information security,,S008,FW02,A027 - information security,
|
||||
A028,platform administrator,,S008,FW02,A028 - platform administrator,"Just ""Administrator""?"
|
||||
A029,server admininistrator ,,S008,FW02,A029 - server admininistrator ,"Just ""Administrator""? (de-duplicating A028)"
|
||||
A030,platforms ,,S007,FW02,A030 - platforms ,"The same as S007? If there is an action here, is it done by actortype = ""algorithm""? Maybe ""Platform"" is right"
|
||||
A031,social media platform adminstrator,"Person with the authority to make changes to algorithms, take down content etc. ",S007,FW02,A031 - social media platform adminstrator,"Not needed, given A028. The sector selection does the differentiation"
|
||||
A032,social media platform outreach ,,S007,FW02,A032 - social media platform outreach ,What does this do?
|
||||
A033,social media platform owner,Person with authority to make changes to a social media company’s business model,S007,FW02,A033 - social media platform owner,
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,923 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,metatechnique,summary,actortypes,resources_needed,how_found,references,incident_ids,tactic,responsetype,notes,tags,techniques,longname
|
||||
C00022,Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety,M001 - resilience,Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
",C00022 - Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety
|
||||
C00006,Charge for social media,M004 - friction,"Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information. There are examples of this not working, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc. ",A033 - social media platform owner,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,"T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0015 - Create hashtag
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
",C00006 - Charge for social media
|
||||
C00008,Create shared fact-checking database,M006 - scoring,"Share fact-checking resources - tips, responses, countermessages, across respose groups. ",A007 - factchecker,,"2019-11-workshop
|
||||
2019-11-search",,"I00049,I00050",TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,information,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0013 - Create fake websites
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaigns
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts",C00008 - Create shared fact-checking database
|
||||
C00009,Educate high profile influencers on best practices,M001 - resilience,"Find online influencers. Provide training in the mechanisms of disinformation, how to spot campaigns, and/or how to contribute to responses by countermessaging, boosting information sites etc. ","A016 - influencer,A006 - educator",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,education,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0042 - Kernel of truth
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00009 - Educate high profile influencers on best practices
|
||||
C00010,Enhanced privacy regulation for social media,M004 - friction,"Implement stronger privacy standards, to reduce the ability to microtarget community members. ",A020 - policy maker,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,regulation,"T0005 - Center of gravity analysis
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads",C00010 - Enhanced privacy regulation for social media
|
||||
C00011,Media literacy. Games to identify fake news,M001 - resilience,"Create and use games to show people the mechanics of disinformation, and how to counter them. ","A006 - educator,A026 - games designer,A024 - developer",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,education,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0013 - Create fake websites
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts",C00011 - Media literacy. Games to identify fake news
|
||||
C00012,Platform regulation,M007 - metatechnique,"Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy. Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media. The U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media","A020 - policy maker,A018 - government,A033 - social media platform owner",,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,regulation,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0013 - Create fake websites
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaigns
|
||||
T0015 - Create hashtag
|
||||
T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0046 - Search Engine Optimization
|
||||
T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00012 - Platform regulation
|
||||
C00013,Rating framework for news,M006 - scoring,"This is ""strategic innoculation"", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body. Include full transcripts, link source, add items. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,information,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news",C00013 - Rating framework for news
|
||||
C00014,Real-time updates to fact-checking database,M006 - scoring,Update fact-checking databases and resources in real time. Especially import for time-limited events like natural disasters. ,A007 - factcheckers,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0013 - Create fake websites
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaigns
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts",C00014 - Real-time updates to fact-checking database
|
||||
C00016,Censorship,M005 - removal,Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of information controlled by disinformation creators. Not recommended. ,A031 - social media platform administrator,,grugq,Taylor81,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0013 - Create fake websites
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaign
|
||||
T0015 - Create hashtag
|
||||
T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0043 - Use SMS/WhatsApp/ Chat apps
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0058 - Legacy web content
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
",C00016 - Censorship
|
||||
C00017,Repair broken social connections,M010 - countermessaging,"For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. ",A021 - media organisation,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts",C00017 - Repair broken social connections
|
||||
C00019,Reduce effect of division-enablers,M003 - daylight,"includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0052 - Teriary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channel disseminate information pollution",C00019 - Reduce effect of division-enablers
|
||||
C00021,Encourage in-person communication,M001 - resilience,Encourage offline communication,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
",C00021 - Encourage in-person communication
|
||||
C00024,Promote healthy narratives,M001 - resilience,"Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA). Includes promoting identity neutral narratives. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
",C00024 - Promote healthy narratives
|
||||
C00026,Shore up democracy based messages,M010 - countermessaging,"Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy",,,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda",C00026 - Shore up democracy based messages
|
||||
C00027,Create culture of civility,M001 - resilience,This is passive. Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,narrative,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers",C00027 - Create culture of civility
|
||||
C00029,Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise,M002 - diversion,Create websites in disinformation voids - spaces where people are looking for known disinformation. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,narrative,"T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives",C00029 - Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise
|
||||
C00028,Make information provenance available,M011 - verification,"Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments. Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted.
|
||||
|
||||
This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,information,"TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
TA08 - Pump Priming
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical",C00028 - Make information provenance available
|
||||
C00030,Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based),M002 - diversion,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,narrative,"T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives",C00030 - Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)
|
||||
C00031,"Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify",M009 - dilution,"Create competing narratives. Included ""Facilitate State Propaganda"" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,CAVEAT: some element of disinformation is simply filling the information space with so much data that it overwhelms people and they shutdown. Any swarm-counter-narrative needs to be cautious of this outcome.,narrative,"T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives","C00031 - Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify"
|
||||
C00042,Address truth contained in narratives,M010 - countermessaging,"Focus on and boost truths in misinformation narratives, removing misinformation from them. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,narrative,"T0004 - Competing Narratives
|
||||
T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0042 - Kernel of Truth
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0059 - Play the long game",C00042 - Address truth contained in narratives
|
||||
C00032,Hijack content and link to truth- based info,M002 - diversion,Link to platform,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,T0055 - Use hashtag,C00032 - Hijack content and link to truth- based info
|
||||
C00034,Create more friction at account creation,M004 - friction,Counters fake account,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,"T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0012 - Use concealment
|
||||
T0030 - Backstop personas",C00034 - Create more friction at account creation
|
||||
C00036,Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide),M013 - targeting,All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,"T0005 - Center of Gravity Analysis
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0012 - Use concealment
|
||||
T0030 - Backstop personas
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events",C00036 - Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)
|
||||
C00040,third party verification for people,M011 - verification,counters fake experts,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,"T0007 - Create fake social media profiles
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0012 - Use concealment",C00040 - third party verification for people
|
||||
C00067,Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding),M013 - targeting,Reduce the credibility of groups behind misinformation-linked funding campaigns. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,narrative,"T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00067 - Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)
|
||||
C00044,Keep people from posting to social media immediately,M004 - friction,"Platforms can introduce friction to slow down activities, force a small delay between posts, or replies to posts.",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channel disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops",C00044 - Keep people from posting to social media immediately
|
||||
C00046,Marginalise and discredit extremist groups,M013 - targeting,Reduce the credibility of extremist groups posting misinformation.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0052 - Teriary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channel disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00046 - Marginalise and discredit extremist groups
|
||||
C00047,Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics,M008 - data pollution,"Flood disinformation spaces with obviously fake content, to dilute core misinformation narratives in them. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D05,,action,"T0063 - Social Media engagement
|
||||
T0062 - Message reach",C00047 - Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics
|
||||
C00048,Name and Shame Influencers,M003 - daylight,"Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account. Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts. Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - ""Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.",,,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237 and Dalton19,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D07,,information,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0052 - Teriary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channel disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00048 - Name and Shame Influencers
|
||||
C00051,Counter social engineering training,M001 - resilience,"Includes anti-elicitation training, phishing prevention education. ",A006 - educator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,education,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0012 - Use concealment",C00051 - Counter social engineering training
|
||||
C00052,Infiltrate platforms,M013 - targeting,Detect and degrade,A004 - activist,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,"T0012 - Use concealment
|
||||
T0030 - Backstop personas",C00052 - Infiltrate platforms
|
||||
C00053,Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts,M012 - cleaning,"remove or remove access to (e.g. stop the ability to update) old social media accounts, to reduce the pool of accounts available for takeover, botnets etc. ","A031 - social media platform administrator,A028 - platform administrator,A012 - account owner",,"2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search",,I00004,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,"T0011 - Hijack legitimate accounts
|
||||
T0030 - Backstop personas",C00053 - Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts
|
||||
C00056,Encourage people to leave social media,M004 - friction,Encourage people to leave spcial media. We don't expect this to work,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,,C00056 - Encourage people to leave social media
|
||||
C00058,Report crowdfunder as violator,M005 - removal,counters crowdfunding. Includes ‘Expose online funding as fake”. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,"T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00058 - Report crowdfunder as violator
|
||||
C00059,Verification of project before posting fund requests,M011 - verification,third-party verification of projects posting funding campaigns before those campaigns can be posted. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,T0014 - Create funding campaigns,C00059 - Verification of project before posting fund requests
|
||||
C00060,Legal action against for-profit engagement factories,M013 - targeting,"Take legal action against for-profit ""factories"" creating misinformation. ",A020 - policy maker,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,regulation,"TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force",C00060 - Legal action against for-profit engagement factories
|
||||
C00062,Free open library sources worldwide,M010 - countermessaging,"Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as DISARM can be created to counter the adversarial efforts.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,information,"TA01 - Strategic planning
|
||||
TA02 - Objective planning
|
||||
TA15 - Establish Social Assets
|
||||
TA15 - develop networks
|
||||
TA05 - microtargeting
|
||||
TA06 - develop content
|
||||
TA07 - channel selection
|
||||
TA08 - pump priming
|
||||
TA09 - exposure
|
||||
TA10 - go physical
|
||||
TA11 - persistence
|
||||
TA12 - measure effectiveness",C00062 - Free open library sources worldwide
|
||||
C00065,Reduce political targeting,M005 - removal,Includes “ban political micro targeting” and “ban political ads”,A020 - policy maker,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D03,,action,T0018 - Paid targeted ads,C00065 - Reduce political targeting
|
||||
C00066,Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back),M009 - dilution,Flood a disinformation-related hashtag with other content. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D03,,information,"T0015 - Create hashtag
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag",C00066 - Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)
|
||||
C00080,Create competing narrative,M002 - diversion,"Create counternarratives, or narratives that compete in the same spaces as misinformation narratives. Could also be degrade",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,narrative,"T0003 - Leverate existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives ",C00080 - Create competing narrative
|
||||
C00070,Block access to disinformation resources,M005 - removal,"Resources = accounts, channels etc. Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker.
|
||||
|
||||
TA02*: DDOS at the critical time, to deny an adversary's time-bound objective.
|
||||
|
||||
T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy.
|
||||
|
||||
Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag.
|
||||
|
||||
T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as ""blocking access to a platform"".",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaigns
|
||||
T0015 - Create hashtag
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0046 - Search Engine Optimization
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0058 - Legacy web content",C00070 - Block access to disinformation resources
|
||||
C00071,Block source of pollution,M005 - removal,"Block websites, accounts, groups etc connected to misinformation and other information pollution. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,"T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00071 - Block source of pollution
|
||||
C00072,Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended,M005 - removal,"Check special-interest groups (e.g. medical, knitting) for unrelated and misinformation-linked content, and remove it. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,"T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
",C00072 - Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended
|
||||
C00073,Inoculate populations through media literacy training,M001 - resilience,"Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade. ","A006 - educator,A008 - library,A017 - coordinating body,A009 - NGO,A032 - social media platform outreach,A021 - media organization,A005 - community group,A010 - religious organisation",,"2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,education,"T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0040 - Deny insurmountable proof
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00073 - Inoculate populations through media literacy training
|
||||
C00074,Identify and delete or rate limit identical content,M012 - cleaning,C00000,"A031 - social media platform administrator,A028 - platform administrator",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,"T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0043 - Use SMS
|
||||
T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00074 - Identify and delete or rate limit identical content
|
||||
C00075,normalise language,M010 - countermessaging,normalise the language around disinformation and misinformation; give people the words for artifact and effect types. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,information,,C00075 - normalise language
|
||||
C00076,Prohibit images in political discourse channels,M005 - removal,Make political discussion channels text-only. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,"T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0021 - Memes",C00076 - Prohibit images in political discourse channels
|
||||
C00077,"Active defence: run TA15 ""develop people” - not recommended",M013 - targeting,Develop networks of communities and influencers around counter-misinformation. Match them to misinformation creators ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,,"C00077 - Active defence: run TA15 ""develop people” - not recommended"
|
||||
C00078,Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content,M002 - diversion,Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side”,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,action,"TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0046 - Search Engine Optimization
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00078 - Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content
|
||||
C00084,"Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them",M002 - diversion,"Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”. Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with ""far-up/down/left/right"" actors. ""Long Game"" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations. Can also replay technique T0003. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,narrative,"T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverate existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0059 - Play the long game","C00084 - Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them"
|
||||
C00081,"Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations",M003 - daylight,"Discredit by pointing out the ""noise"" and informing public that ""flooding"" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of ""noise""",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,"T0003 - Leverate existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution","C00081 - Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations"
|
||||
C00082,Ground truthing as automated response to pollution,M010 - countermessaging,Also inoculation.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,"T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverate existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00082 - Ground truthing as automated response to pollution
|
||||
C00087,Make more noise than the disinformation,M009 - dilution,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,narrative,"T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00087 - Make more noise than the disinformation
|
||||
C00085,Mute content,M003 - daylight,"Rate-limit disinformation content. Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns.
|
||||
|
||||
Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0051 - Fabcricate social media comment
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00085 - Mute content
|
||||
C00086,Distract from noise with addictive content,M002 - diversion,"Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a ""conversion rate"" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's ""information bubble"" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,"T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
",C00086 - Distract from noise with addictive content
|
||||
C00112,"""Prove they are not an op!""",M004 - friction,Challenge misinformation creators to prove they're not an information operation. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,narrative,"T0040 - Demand insurmontable proof
|
||||
T0042 - Kernel of truth","C00112 - ""Prove they are not an op!"""
|
||||
C00090,Fake engagement system,M002 - diversion,"Create honeypots for misinformation creators to engage with, and reduce the resources they have available for misinformation campaigns. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D05,,action,"T0020 - Trial content
|
||||
T0062 - Message reach
|
||||
T0063 - Social media engagement",C00090 - Fake engagement system
|
||||
C00091,Honeypot social community,M002 - diversion,"Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D05,,action,"T0062 - Message reach
|
||||
T0063 - Social media engagement
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding",C00091 - Honeypot social community
|
||||
C00092,Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers,M006 - scoring,"Includes ""Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”. Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers. ",A001 - data scientist,R001 - datastreams,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D07,,information,"TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
TA08 - Pump Priming
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00092 - Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers
|
||||
C00093,Influencer code of conduct,M001 - resilience,Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers. Can be platform code of conduct; can also be community code.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D07,,information,"TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate",C00093 - Influencer code of conduct
|
||||
C00094,Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research,M003 - daylight,Accountability move: make sure research is published with its funding sources. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,T0026 - Create fake research,C00094 - Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research
|
||||
C00096,Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers,M006 - scoring,"Increase credibility, visibility, and reach of positive influencers in the information space. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,information,"T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narrativies
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
",C00096 - Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers
|
||||
C00097,Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment,M004 - friction,Reduce poll flooding by online taking comments or poll entries from verified accounts. ,A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
|
||||
T0030 - Backstop personas
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate",C00097 - Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment
|
||||
C00098,"Revocation of allowlisted or ""verified"" status",M004 - friction,remove blue checkmarks etc from known misinformation accounts. ,A031 - social media platform administrator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,action,"T0038 - Twitter
|
||||
T0011 - Hijack legitimate account","C00098 - Revocation of allowlisted or ""verified"" status"
|
||||
C00099,Strengthen verification methods,M004 - friction,"Improve content veerification methods available to groups, individuals etc. ",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,"T0030 - Backstop personas
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups",C00099 - Strengthen verification methods
|
||||
C00100,Hashtag jacking,M002 - diversion,Post large volumes of unrelated content on known misinformation hashtags ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,information,T0055 - Use hashtag,C00100 - Hashtag jacking
|
||||
C00101,Create friction by rate-limiting engagement,M004 - friction,"Create participant friction. Includes Make repeat voting hard, and throttle number of forwards. ",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D04,,action,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify",C00101 - Create friction by rate-limiting engagement
|
||||
C00103,Create a bot that engages / distract trolls,M002 - diversion,"This is reactive, not active measure (honeypots are active). It's a platform controlled measure.",A024 - developer,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D05,,action,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
|
||||
T0062 - Message Reach
|
||||
T0063 - Social Media Engagement
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate",C00103 - Create a bot that engages / distract trolls
|
||||
C00105,Buy more advertising than misinformation creators,M009 - dilution,Shift influence and algorithms by posting more adverts into spaces than misinformation creators. ,A023 - adtech provider,R003 - money,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D03,,information,"T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads",C00105 - Buy more advertising than misinformation creators
|
||||
C00106,Click-bait centrist content,M002 - diversion,Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,T0016 - Clickbait,C00106 - Click-bait centrist content
|
||||
C00107,Content moderation,"M006 - scoring, M005 - removal","includes social media content take-downs, e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs",A031 - social media platform administrator,,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",,"I00005,I00009,I00056",TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,"T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0013 - Create fake websites
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaign
|
||||
T0015 - Create hashtag
|
||||
T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00107 - Content moderation
|
||||
C00109,Dampen Emotional Reaction,M001 - resilience,"Reduce emotional responses to misinformation through calming messages, etc. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,,C00109 - Dampen Emotional Reaction
|
||||
C00111,Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views,M001 - resilience,,"A021 - media organisation,A013 - content creator",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,information,T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents,C00111 - Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views
|
||||
C00118,Repurpose images with new text,M010 - countermessaging,Add countermessage text to iamges used in misinformation incidents. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,narrative,"T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images",C00118 - Repurpose images with new text
|
||||
C00113,Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.,M003 - daylight,"Debunk fake experts, their credentials, and potentially also their audience quality",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,T0045 - Use fake experts,C00113 - Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.
|
||||
C00114,Don't engage with payloads,M004 - friction,Stop passing on misinformation,A015 - general public,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,"T0039 - Bait legitimate inffluencers
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
",C00114 - Don't engage with payloads
|
||||
C00115,Expose actor and intentions,M003 - daylight,Debunk misinformation creators and posters. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,"T0041 - Deny involvement
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00115 - Expose actor and intentions
|
||||
C00116,Provide proof of involvement,M003 - daylight,Build and post information about groups etc's involvement in misinformation incidents. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,T0041 - Deny involvement,C00116 - Provide proof of involvement
|
||||
C00117,Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people,M010 - countermessaging,Label promote counter to disinformation,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,information,"T0046 - Search engine optimization
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify
|
||||
",C00117 - Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people
|
||||
C00125,Prebunking,M001 - resilience,"Produce material in advance of misinformation incidents, by anticipating the narratives used in them, and debunking them. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,narrative,"T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
",C00125 - Prebunking
|
||||
C00119,Engage payload and debunk.,M010 - countermessaging,debunk misinformation content. Provide link to facts. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,information,"T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00119 - Engage payload and debunk.
|
||||
C00120,Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes,M007 - metatechnique,Redesign platforms and algorithms to reduce the effectiveness of disinformation,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,action,"T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00120 - Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes
|
||||
C00121,Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. ,M001 - resilience,"Make algorithms in platforms explainable, and visible to people using those platforms. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,information,T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat app,C00121 - Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow.
|
||||
C00122,Content moderation,M004 - friction,Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship. ,A031 - social media platform administrator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaign
|
||||
T0015 - Create hashtag
|
||||
T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0051 - Fabcricate social media comment
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00122 - Content moderation
|
||||
C00123,Remove or rate limit botnets,M004 - friction,reduce the visibility of known botnets online. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00123 - Remove or rate limit botnets
|
||||
C00124,Don't feed the trolls,M004 - friction,Don't engage with individuals relaying misinformation. ,"A015 - general public,A021 - media organisation",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,"TA08 - Pump Priming
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0063 - Social media engagement",C00124 - Don't feed the trolls
|
||||
C00211,Use humorous counter-narratives,M010 - countermessaging,,,,2019-11-search,,I00004,TA09 Exposure,D03,,narrative,"T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0020 - Trial content
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events",C00211 - Use humorous counter-narratives
|
||||
C00126,Social media amber alert,M003 - daylight,"Create an alert system around disinformation and misinformation artifacts, narratives, and incidents ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,"T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events",C00126 - Social media amber alert
|
||||
C00128,"Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other ""decelerants""",M009 - dilution,"Repost or comment on misinformation artifacts, using ridicule or other content to reduce the likelihood of reposting. ",A003 - trusted authority,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,"T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising","C00128 - Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other ""decelerants"""
|
||||
C00129,Use banking to cut off access ,M014 - reduce resources,fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,"T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaign
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads",C00129 - Use banking to cut off access
|
||||
C00130,"Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.",M001 - resilience,Train local influencers in countering misinformation. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D07,,education,T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents,"C00130 - Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously."
|
||||
C00131,Seize and analyse botnet servers,M005 - removal,Take botnet servers offline by seizing them. ,A029 - server administrator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D02,,action,"T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00131 - Seize and analyse botnet servers
|
||||
C00133,Deplatform Account*,M005 - removal,Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left.,A031 - social media platform administrator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,"TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0045 - Use fale experts
|
||||
T0011 - Hijack legitimate account
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts",C00133 - Deplatform Account*
|
||||
C00135,Deplatform message groups and/or message boards,M005 - removal,Merged two rows here. ,A031 - social media platform administrator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,"TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps",C00135 - Deplatform message groups and/or message boards
|
||||
C00136,Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages,M010 - countermessaging,"Find communities likely to be targetted by misinformation campaigns, and send them countermessages or pointers to information sources. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,information,"TA08 - Pump Priming
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0020 - Trial content
|
||||
T0063 - Social media engagement",C00136 - Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages
|
||||
C00138,Spam domestic actors with lawsuits,M014 - reduce resources,"File multiple lawsuits against known misinformation creators and posters, to distract them from disinformation creation. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,regulation,"T0060 - Continue to amplify
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00138 - Spam domestic actors with lawsuits
|
||||
C00139,Weaponise youtube content matrices,M004 - friction,God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,information,,C00139 - Weaponise youtube content matrices
|
||||
C00140,"""Bomb"" link shorteners with lots of calls",M008 - data pollution,"Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except ""T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D03,,action,"TA05 - Microtargeting
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure*
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical","C00140 - ""Bomb"" link shorteners with lots of calls"
|
||||
C00142,Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content,M004 - friction,"Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “""Hey this story is old"" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice. Includes “mark clickbait visually”. ",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,"TA05 - Microtargeting
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical
|
||||
TA11 - Persistence
|
||||
T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
",C00142 - Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content
|
||||
C00143,(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time,M013 - targeting,Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc. ,"A015 - general public,A014 - elves",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D04,,regulation,"T0060 - Continue to amplify
|
||||
T0058 - Legacy web content
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images",C00143 - (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time
|
||||
C00144,Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs,M014 - reduce resources,Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days. Not recommended,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D04,,action,T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate,C00144 - Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs
|
||||
C00147,Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days),M004 - friction,"Stop new community activity (likes, comments) on old social media posts. ",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,T0060 - Continue to amplify,C00147 - Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)
|
||||
C00148,Add random links to network graphs,M008 - data pollution,"If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which DISARM techniques.",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D04,,action,"T0062 - Message reach
|
||||
T0063 - Social media engagement
|
||||
",C00148 - Add random links to network graphs
|
||||
C00149,Poison the monitoring & evaluation data,M008 - data pollution,Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D04,,action,"TA12 - Measure Effectiveness
|
||||
T0020 - Trial content
|
||||
T0046 - Search Engine Optimization
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0063 - Social media engagement",C00149 - Poison the monitoring & evaluation data
|
||||
C00153,Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure,M013 - targeting,"Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate.",A027 - information security,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0011 - Hijack legitimate account
|
||||
T0013 - Create fake websites
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaign
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0058 - Legacy web content
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00153 - Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure
|
||||
C00154,Ask media not to report false information,M005 - removal,"Train media to spot and respond to misinformation, and ask them not to post or transmit misinformation they've found. ",A021 - media organisation,,2019-11-search,,I00022,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,"T0039 - Bait legitimate inffluencers
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts",C00154 - Ask media not to report false information
|
||||
C00155,Ban incident actors from funding sites,M005 - removal,Ban misinformation creators and posters from funding sites,A025 - funding site admin,,2019-11-search,,I00002,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,"T0014 - Create funding campaign
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding",C00155 - Ban incident actors from funding sites
|
||||
C00156,Better tell your country or organization story,M010 - countermessaging,"Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. ","A018 - government,A019 - military",,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,information,"T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents",C00156 - Better tell your country or organization story
|
||||
C00159,Have a disinformation response plan,M007 - metatechnique,"e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict.",,,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,,C00159 - Have a disinformation response plan
|
||||
C00160,find and train influencers,M001 - resilience,"Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources.","A001 - data scientist,A016 - influencer",,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,education,"T0039 - Bait legitimate inffluencers
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders",C00160 - find and train influencers
|
||||
C00161,Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements,M007 - metatechnique,"Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad.",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,action,"T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives",C00161 - Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements
|
||||
C00162,Unravel/target the Potemkin villages,M013 - targeting,"Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year.",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,information,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate inffluencers
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminnate information pollution
|
||||
T0050 - Cheerleading domemstic social media ops",C00162 - Unravel/target the Potemkin villages
|
||||
C00164,compatriot policy,M013 - targeting,"protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,action,"T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives
|
||||
",C00164 - compatriot policy
|
||||
C00165,Ensure integrity of official documents,M004 - friction,"e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions",,,2019-11-search,,I00015,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,information,T0025 - leak altered documents,C00165 - Ensure integrity of official documents
|
||||
C00169,develop a creative content hub,M010 - countermessaging,"international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,action,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0004 - Competing narratives
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate inffluencers",C00169 - develop a creative content hub
|
||||
C00170,elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft,M007 - metatechnique,"Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly.",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,,C00170 - elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft
|
||||
C00172,social media source removal,M005 - removal,"Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal",A031 - social media platform administrator,,2019-11-search,,I00035,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0013 - Create fake websites
|
||||
",C00172 - social media source removal
|
||||
C00174,Create a healthier news environment,"M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion","Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle. includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.",A021 - media organisation,,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search","Hicks19, p143 of Corker18, Rand2237",,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions",C00174 - Create a healthier news environment
|
||||
C00176,Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private,M007 - metatechnique,"Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations. ",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,action,"T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0013 - Create fake websites
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaign
|
||||
T0015 - Create hashtag
|
||||
T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0021 - Memes
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0043 - Use SMS/WhatsApp/ Chat apps
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0058 - Legacy web content
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00176 - Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private
|
||||
C00178,Fill information voids with non-disinformation content,"M009 - dilution, M008 - data pollution","1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation. ",,,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA05 Microtargeting,D04,,information,"T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0020 - Trial content",C00178 - Fill information voids with non-disinformation content
|
||||
C00182,Redirection / malware detection/ remediation,M005 - removal,"Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete. ",A027 - information security,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,"T0011 - Hijack legitimate account
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify",C00182 - Redirection / malware detection/ remediation
|
||||
C00184,Media exposure,M003 - daylight,highlight misinformation activities and actors in media,,,2019-11-search,,"I00010,I00015,I00032,I00044",TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,information,"T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0041 - Deny involvement
|
||||
T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents",C00184 - Media exposure
|
||||
C00188,Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves,M001 - resilience,"Includes SEO influence. Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community. Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. ","A021 - media organisation,A006 - educator",,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,education,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0046 - Search Engine Optimization
|
||||
",C00188 - Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves
|
||||
C00189,Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts,M003 - daylight,"Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of ""flagged"" profiles. Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D06,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0011 - Hijack legitimate account
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaign
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts",C00189 - Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts
|
||||
C00190,open engagement with civil society,M001 - resilience,"Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.",A015 - general public,,2019-11-search,"Dalton19, Hicks19",,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents",C00190 - open engagement with civil society
|
||||
C00195,Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content ,M002 - diversion,Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or propaganda themes. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content. ,,R002 - funding,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0046 - Search engine optimization
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag",C00195 - Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content
|
||||
C00197,remove suspicious accounts,M005 - removal,"Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues). Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners. ","A031 - social media platform administrator,A004 activist",R003 - money,"2019-11-search, 2019-11-workshop",,I00022,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,"T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0011 - Hijack accounts",C00197 - remove suspicious accounts
|
||||
C00200,Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo,M010 - countermessaging,FIXIT: standardize language used for influencer/ respected figure. ,A016 - influencer,,2019-11-search,,I00044,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents",C00200 - Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo
|
||||
C00202,Set data 'honeytraps',M002 - diversion,Set honeytraps in content likely to be accessed for disinformation. ,,,2019-11-search,,"I00004,I00022",TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,T0025 - leak altered documents,C00202 - Set data 'honeytraps'
|
||||
C00203,Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets,M004 - friction,Remove access to official press events from known misinformation actors. ,A018 - government,,2019-11-search,,I00022,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0028 - Create competing narratives
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news",C00203 - Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets
|
||||
C00205,strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting,M007 - metatechnique,Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. ,"A018 - government,A033 - social media platform owner,",,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents
|
||||
T0027 - Adapt existing narratives",C00205 - strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting
|
||||
C00207,Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended,M013 - targeting,,"A018 - government,A033 - social media platform owner",,2019-11-search,,I00042,TA02 Objective Planning,D07,,action,,C00207 - Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended
|
||||
C00212,build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant,M001 - resilience,"Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education.","A006 - educator,A018 - government",,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0022 - Conspiracy narratives",C00212 - build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant
|
||||
C00216,Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors,M014 - reduce resources,Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains,A023 - adtech provider,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D02,,action,"T0014 - Create funding campaign
|
||||
T0016 - Clickbait
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events",C00216 - Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors
|
||||
C00219,Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators,M003 - daylight,"Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc. ",,,grugq,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,"T0024 - Create fake videos and images
|
||||
T0026 - Create fake research
|
||||
T0025 - Leak altered documents",C00219 - Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators
|
||||
C00220,Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan,M007 - metatechnique,"Create a plan for misinformation and disinformation response, before it's needed. Include connections / contacts needed, expected counteremessages etc. ",,,Counters cleanup,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,,C00220 - Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan
|
||||
C00221,"Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors",M007 - metatechnique,"Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency",,,Counters cleanup,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,,"C00221 - Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors"
|
||||
C00222,Tabletop simulations,M007 - metatechnique,"Simulate misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and responses to them, before campaigns happen. ",,,,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,education,,C00222 - Tabletop simulations
|
||||
C00223,Strengthen Trust in social media platforms,M001 - resilience,Improve trust in the misinformation responses from social media and other platforms. Examples include creating greater transparancy on their actions and algorithms. ,,,,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,,C00223 - Strengthen Trust in social media platforms
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,metatechnique,summary,actortypes,resources_needed,how_found,references,incidents,tactic,responsetype,notes,techniques,longname
|
||||
F00001,Analyse aborted / failed campaigns,,Examine failed campaigns. How did they fail? Can we create useful activities that increase these failures? ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,All,F00001 - Analyse aborted / failed campaigns
|
||||
F00002,Analyse viral fizzle,,We have no idea what this means. Is it something to do with the way a viral story spreads? ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,"T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0059 - Play the long game
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",F00002 - Analyse viral fizzle
|
||||
F00003,Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,"TA06 - Develop Content
|
||||
TA08 - Pump Priming
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
|
||||
T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0021 - Memes",F00003 - Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors
|
||||
F00004,"Recruit like-minded converts ""people who used to be in-group"" ",,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,"T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising (ie. source of identification)
|
||||
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers","F00004 - Recruit like-minded converts ""people who used to be in-group"" "
|
||||
F00005,SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups,,"Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis of groups and audience segments. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,All,F00005 - SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups
|
||||
F00006,SWOT analysis of tech platforms,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,"TA05 - Microtargeting
|
||||
TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
TA08 - Pump Priming
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical
|
||||
TA11 - Persistence
|
||||
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaigns
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0021 - Memes",F00006 - SWOT analysis of tech platforms
|
||||
F00007,Monitor account level activity in social networks,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D01,,All,F00007 - Monitor account level activity in social networks
|
||||
F00008,Detect abnormal amplification,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",F00008 - Detect abnormal amplification
|
||||
F00009,Detect abnormal events,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups,F00009 - Detect abnormal events
|
||||
F00010,Detect abnormal groups,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups,F00010 - Detect abnormal groups
|
||||
F00011,Detect abnormal pages,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups,F00011 - Detect abnormal pages
|
||||
F00012,"Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ people",,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups,"F00012 - Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ people"
|
||||
F00013,Identify fake news sites,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0008,F00013 - Identify fake news sites
|
||||
F00014,Trace connections,,for e.g. fake news sites,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0008,F00014 - Trace connections
|
||||
F00015,Detect anomalies in membership growth patterns,,I include Fake Experts as they may use funding campaigns such as Patreon to fund their operations and so these should be watched.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0015 - Create hashtag
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events",F00015 - Detect anomalies in membership growth patterns
|
||||
F00016,Identify fence-sitters,,"Note: In each case, depending on the platform there may be a way to identify a fence-sitter. For example, online polls may have a neutral option or a ""somewhat this-or-that"" option, and may reveal who voted for that to all visitors. This information could be of use to data analysts.
|
||||
|
||||
In TA08-11, the engagement level of victims could be identified to detect and respond to increasing engagement.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"TA08 - Pump Priming
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical
|
||||
TA11 - Persistence
|
||||
|
||||
T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0029 - Manipulate online polls
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders",F00016 - Identify fence-sitters
|
||||
F00017,Measure emotional valence,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate",F00017 - Measure emotional valence
|
||||
F00018,Follow the money,,track funding sources,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0009,F00018 - Follow the money
|
||||
F00019,Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated),,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0011 - Hijack accounts,F00019 - Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated)
|
||||
F00020,Detect anomalous activity,,,"A015 - general public,A001 - data scientist,A031 - social media platform administrator",R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0011 - Hijack accounts,F00020 - Detect anomalous activity
|
||||
F00021,AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planning,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,Automated Detection of Campaign,"TA15 - Establish Social Assets
|
||||
TA15 - Develop Networks
|
||||
TA05 - Microtargeting
|
||||
TA06 - Develop Content
|
||||
TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
TA08 - Pump Priming
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical
|
||||
TA11 - Persistence",F00021 - AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planning
|
||||
F00022,Digital authority - regulating body (united states),,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,,F00022 - Digital authority - regulating body (united states)
|
||||
F00023,Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account),,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0011 - Hijack accounts,F00023 - Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account)
|
||||
F00024,Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniors,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,,F00024 - Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniors
|
||||
F00025,Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detection,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,"TA01 - Strategic Planning
|
||||
TA02 - Objective Planning",F00025 - Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detection
|
||||
F00026,Language anomoly detection,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,,F00026 - Language anomoly detection
|
||||
F00027,Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topics,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,,F00027 - Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topics
|
||||
F00028,Associate a public key signature with government documents,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0025 - Leak altered documents,F00028 - Associate a public key signature with government documents
|
||||
F00029,"Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, Sputnik",,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"TA01 - Strategic Planning
|
||||
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution","F00029 - Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, Sputnik"
|
||||
F00030,Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect content,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"TA15 - Establish Social Assets
|
||||
TA15 - Develop Networks
|
||||
TA05 - Microtargeting
|
||||
TA06 - Develop Content
|
||||
TA08 - Pump Priming
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical",F00030 - Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect content
|
||||
F00031,Educate on how to identify information pollution,,Strategic planning included as innoculating population has strategic value.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"TA01 - Strategic Planning
|
||||
|
||||
T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",F00031 - Educate on how to identify information pollution
|
||||
F00032,Educate on how to identify to pollution,,DUPLICATE - DELETE ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,DUPLICATE - DELETE ,F00032 - Educate on how to identify to pollution
|
||||
F00033,Fake websites: add transparency on business model,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0013 - Create fake websites,F00033 - Fake websites: add transparency on business model
|
||||
F00034,Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effort,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0049 - Flooding,F00034 - Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effort
|
||||
F00035,Identify repeated narrative DNA,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"TA01 - Strategic Planning
|
||||
|
||||
T0006 - Create Master Narratives
|
||||
T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
|
||||
T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",F00035 - Identify repeated narrative DNA
|
||||
F00036,Looking for AB testing in unregulated channels,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0020 - Trial content,F00036 - Looking for AB testing in unregulated channels
|
||||
F00037,News content provenance certification. ,,"Original Comment: Shortcomings: intentional falsehood. Doesn't solve accuracy. Can't be mandatory.
|
||||
|
||||
Technique should be in terms of ""strategic innoculation"", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,TA01 - Strategic Planning* (non-existent technique),F00037 - News content provenance certification.
|
||||
F00038,Social capital as attack vector,,"Unsure I understood the original intention or what it applied to. Therefore the techniques listed (10, 39, 43, 57, 61) are under my interpretation - which is that we want to track ignorant agents who fall into the enemy's trap and show a cost to financing/reposting/helping the adversary via public shaming or other means.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps
|
||||
T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
T0061 - Sell merchandising",F00038 - Social capital as attack vector
|
||||
F00039,standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industry,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0024 - Create fake videos and images,F00039 - standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industry
|
||||
F00040,Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenance,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0024 - Create fake videos and images,F00040 - Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenance
|
||||
F00041,Bias detection,,Not technically left of boom,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,T00029,F00041 - Bias detection
|
||||
F00042,Categorize polls by intent,,"Use T00029, but against the creators",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,T00029,F00042 - Categorize polls by intent
|
||||
F00043,Monitor for creation of fake known personas,,Platform companies and some information security companies (e.g. ZeroFox) do this. ,"A031 - social media platform administrator,A015 - general public",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,T00030,F00043 - Monitor for creation of fake known personas
|
||||
F00044,Forensic analysis,,Can be used in all phases for all techniques.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,All,F00044 - Forensic analysis
|
||||
F00045,Forensic linguistic analysis,,Can be used in all phases for all techniques.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,All,F00045 - Forensic linguistic analysis
|
||||
F00046,Pump priming analytics,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,TA08 - Pump Priming,F00046 - Pump priming analytics
|
||||
F00047,trace involved parties,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,,F00047 - trace involved parties
|
||||
F00048,Trace known operations and connection,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,,F00048 - Trace known operations and connection
|
||||
F00049,trace money,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,,F00049 - trace money
|
||||
F00050,Web cache analytics,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,,F00050 - Web cache analytics
|
||||
F00051,Challenge expertise,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,"T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts",F00051 - Challenge expertise
|
||||
F00052,Discover sponsors,,"Discovering the sponsors behind a campaign, narrative, bot, a set of accounts, or a social media comment, or anything else is useful.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,All,F00052 - Discover sponsors
|
||||
F00053,Government rumour control office (what can we learn?),,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,"T0049
|
||||
T0050
|
||||
T0052
|
||||
T0053
|
||||
T0054
|
||||
T0055
|
||||
T0056",F00053 - Government rumour control office (what can we learn?)
|
||||
F00054,Restrict people who can @ you on social networks,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00054 - Restrict people who can @ you on social networks
|
||||
F00055,Verify credentials,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00055 - Verify credentials
|
||||
F00056,Verify organisation legitimacy,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00056 - Verify organisation legitimacy
|
||||
F00057,Verify personal credentials of experts,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00057 - Verify personal credentials of experts
|
||||
F00058,Deplatform (cancel culture),,"*Deplatform People: This technique needs to be a bit more specific to distinguish it from ""account removal"" or DDOS and other techniques that get more specific when applied to content.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, other ways of deplatforming people include attacking their sources of funds, their allies, their followers, etc.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,"TA07 - Channel Selection
|
||||
TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
TA10 - Go Physical
|
||||
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0011 - Hijack legitimate account
|
||||
T0014 - Create funding campaigns
|
||||
T0017 - Promote online funding
|
||||
T0018 - Paid targeted ads
|
||||
T0045 - Use fake experts",F00058 - Deplatform (cancel culture)
|
||||
F00059,Identify susceptible demographics,,"All techniques provide or are susceptible to being countered by, or leveraged for, knowledge about user demographics.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,All,F00059 - Identify susceptible demographics
|
||||
F00060,Identify susceptible influencers,,"I assume this was a transcript error. Otherwise, ""Identify Susceptible Influences"" as in the various methods of influences that may work against a victim could also be a technique. Nope, wasn't a transcript error: original note says influencers, as in find people of influence that might be targetted. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers,F00060 - Identify susceptible influencers
|
||||
F00061,Microtargeting,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,All,F00061 - Microtargeting
|
||||
F00062,Detect when Dormant account turns active,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,"TA09 - Exposure
|
||||
|
||||
T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
|
||||
T0011 - Hijack legitimate account",F00062 - Detect when Dormant account turns active
|
||||
F00063,Linguistic change analysis,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,,F00063 - Linguistic change analysis
|
||||
F00064,Monitor reports of account takeover,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,T0011 - Hijack legitimate account,F00064 - Monitor reports of account takeover
|
||||
F00065,Sentiment change analysis,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,,F00065 - Sentiment change analysis
|
||||
F00066,"Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilities",,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,,"F00066 - Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilities"
|
||||
F00067,Data forensics,,,A001 - data scientist,,2019-11-search,,"I00029,I00045",,D01,,,F00067 - Data forensics
|
||||
F00068,Resonance analysis,,"a developing methodology for identifying statistical differences in how social groups use language and quantifying how common those statistical differences are within a larger population. In essence, it hypothesizes how much affinity might exist for a specific group within a general population, based on the language its members employ",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00068 - Resonance analysis
|
||||
F00069,Track Russian media and develop analytic methods.,,"To effectively counter Russian propaganda, it will be critical to track Russian influence efforts. The information requirements are varied and include the following: • Identify fake-news stories and their sources. • Understand narrative themes and content that pervade various Russian media sources. • Understand the broader Russian strategy that underlies tactical propaganda messaging.",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00069 - Track Russian media and develop analytic methods.
|
||||
F00070,Full spectrum analytics,,,A001 - data scientist,,2019-11-workshop,,,ALL,D01,,,F00070 - Full spectrum analytics
|
||||
F00071,Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers,,"Local influencers detected via Twitter networks are likely local influencers in other online and off-line channels as well. In addition, the content and themes gleaned from Russia and Russia-supporting populations, as well as anti-Russia activists, likely swirl in other online and off-line mediums as well.",A001 - data scientist,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00071 - Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers
|
||||
F00072,network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community.,,It is possible that some of these are bots or trolls and could be flagged for suspension for violating Twitter’s terms of service.,A001 - data scientist,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00072 - network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community.
|
||||
F00073,collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators,,"Players at the level of covert attribution, referred to as “black” in the grayscale of deniability, produce content on user-generated media, such as YouTube, but also add fear-mongering commentary to and amplify content produced by others and supply exploitable content to data dump websites. These activities are conducted by a network of trolls, bots, honeypots, and hackers. ",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00073 - collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators
|
||||
F00074,identify relevant fence-sitter communities,,"brand ambassador programs could be used with influencers across a variety of social media channels. It could also target other prominent experts, such as academics, business leaders, and other potentially prominent people. Authorities must ultimately take care in implementing such a program given the risk that contact with U.S. or NATO authorities might damage influencer reputations. Engagements must consequently be made with care, and, if possible, government interlocutors should work through local NGOs.",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00074 - identify relevant fence-sitter communities
|
||||
F00075,leverage open-source information,,"significant amounts of quality open-source information are now available and should be leveraged to build products and analysis prior to problem prioritization in the areas of observation, attribution, and intent. Successfully distinguishing the gray zone campaign signal through the global noise requires action through the entirety of the national security community. Policy, process, and tools must all adapt and evolve to detect, discern, and act upon a new type of signal",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,D01,,,F00075 - leverage open-source information
|
||||
F00076,Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots”,,"Target audience connected to ""useful idiots rather than the specific profiles because - The active presence of such sources complicates targeting of Russian propaganda, given that it is often difficult to discriminate between authentic views and opinions on the internet and those disseminated by the Russian state.
|
||||
",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00076 - Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots”
|
||||
F00077,Model for bot account behavior,,"Bot account: action based, people. Unsure which DISARM techniques.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,,F00077 - Model for bot account behavior
|
||||
F00078,Monitor account level activity in social networks,,All techniques benefit from careful analysis and monitoring of activities on social network.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,All,F00078 - Monitor account level activity in social networks
|
||||
F00079,Network anomaly detection,,,A001 - data scientist,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
|
||||
T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force
|
||||
T0049 - Flooding
|
||||
T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
T0055 - Use hashtag
|
||||
T0060 - Continue to amplify",F00079 - Network anomaly detection
|
||||
F00080,Hack the polls/ content yourself,,"Two wrongs don't make a right? But if you hack your own polls, you do learn how it could be done, and learn what to look for",A015 - general public,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,T0029 - Manipulate online polls,F00080 - Hack the polls/ content yourself
|
||||
F00081,Need way for end user to report operations,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,"T0049
|
||||
T0050
|
||||
T0052
|
||||
T0053
|
||||
T0054
|
||||
T0055
|
||||
T0056",F00081 - Need way for end user to report operations
|
||||
F00082,"Control the US ""slang"" translation boards",,,A028 - platform administrator,R005 - slang translation,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,,"F00082 - Control the US ""slang"" translation boards"
|
||||
F00083,"Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contents",,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D05,,"T0012 - Use concealment
|
||||
T0021 - Memes","F00083 - Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contents"
|
||||
F00084,Track individual bad actors,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,,F00084 - Track individual bad actors
|
||||
F00085,detection of a weak signal through global noise,,"Gray zone threats are challenging given that warning requires detection of a weak signal through global noise and across threat vectors and regional boundaries.Three interconnected gray zone elements characterize the nature of the activity:
|
||||
Temporality: The nature of gray zone threats truly requires a “big picture view” over long timescales and across regions and functional topics.
|
||||
Attribution: requiring an “almost certain” or “nearly certain analytic assessment before acting costs time and analytic effort
|
||||
Intent: judgement of adversarial intent to conduct gray zone activity. Indeed, the purpose of countering gray zone threats is to deter adversaries from fulfilling their intent to act. While attribution is one piece of the puzzle, closing the space around intent often means synthesizing multiple relevant indicators and warnings, including the state’s geopolitical ambitions, military ties, trade and investment, level of corruption, and media landscape, among others.",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,,,,F00085 - detection of a weak signal through global noise
|
||||
F00086,Outpace Competitor Intelligence Capabilities,,"Develop an intelligence-based understanding of foreign actors’ motivations, psychologies, and societal and geopolitical contexts. Leverage artificial intelligence to identify patterns and infer competitors’ intent",,,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA02 Objective planning,D01,,,F00086 - Outpace Competitor Intelligence Capabilities
|
||||
F00087,Improve Indications and Warning,,"United States has not adequately adapted its information indicators and thresholds for warning policymakers to account for gray zone tactics. Competitors have undertaken a marked shift to slow-burn, deceptive, non-military, and indirect challenges to U.S. interests. Relative to traditional security indicators and warnings, these are more numerous and harder to detect and make it difficult for analysts to infer intent.",,,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,,D01,,,F00087 - Improve Indications and Warning
|
||||
F00088,"Revitalize an “active measures working group,”",,"Recognize campaigns from weak signals, including rivals’ intent, capability, impact, interactive effects, and impact on U.S. interests... focus on adversarial covert action aspects of campaigning.",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,D01,,,"F00088 - Revitalize an “active measures working group,”"
|
||||
F00089,"target/name/flag ""grey zone"" website content",,"""Gray zone"" is second level of content producers and circulators, composed of outlets with uncertain attribution. This category covers conspiracy websites, far-right or far-left websites, news aggregators, and data dump websites",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,,"F00089 - target/name/flag ""grey zone"" website content"
|
||||
F00090,Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements,,Bring private sector and civil society into accord on U.S. interests,,,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,,F00090 - Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements
|
||||
F00091,Partner to develop analytic methods & tools,,"This might include working with relevant technology firms to ensure that contracted analytic support is available. Contracted support is reportedly valuable because technology to monitor social media data is continually evolving, and such firms can provide the expertise to help identify and analyze trends, and they can more effectively stay abreast of the changing systems and develop new models as they are required","A001 data scientist,A024 developer",,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,,F00091 - Partner to develop analytic methods & tools
|
||||
F00092,daylight,,Warn social media companies about an ongoing campaign (e.g. antivax sites). Anyone with datasets or data summaries can help with this,A015 - general public,R006 - disinformation datasets,2019-11-search,,I00002,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00092 - daylight
|
||||
F00093,S4d detection and re-allocation approaches,M004 - friction,"S4D is a way to separate out different speakers in text, audio. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0011 - Hijack legitimate account,F00093 - S4d detection and re-allocation approaches
|
||||
F00094,Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together,M003 - daylight,,A028 - platform administrator,,grugq,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,"T0013 - Create fake websites
|
||||
T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites",F00094 - Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together
|
||||
F00095,Fact checking,,"Process suspicious artifacts, narratives, and incidents",,,SJ,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00095 - Fact checking
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,object_id,name,summary
|
||||
E000001,T0002,Diba Facebook Expedition,"2016 Diba Facebook Expedition, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall, to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message)."
|
||||
E000002,T0003,Narrative examples,"Midwesterners are generous, Russia is under attack from outside."
|
||||
E000003,T0004,MH17 competing narratives,"""Russian Foreign Ministry again claimed that “absolutely groundless accusations are put forward against the Russian side, which are aimed at discrediting Russia in the eyes of the international community"" (deny); ""The Dutch MH17 investigation is biased, anti-Russian and factually inaccurate"" (dismiss). "
|
||||
E000004,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers," ""Huawei is determined to build trustworthy networks"""
|
||||
E000005,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers,Russia is the victim of bullying by NATO powers
|
||||
E000006,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers,USA is guided by its founding principles of liberty and egalitarianism
|
||||
E000007,T0007,Paying for access to existing accounts,Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook’s new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages.
|
||||
E000008,T0007,Avaaz-reported pages and groups,EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe.
|
||||
E000009,T0007,Fakes listed in the US Mueller report,"Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami. "
|
||||
E000010,T0008,Denver Guardian,"A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton."
|
||||
E000011,T0009,Jade Helm fake experts,"For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a “Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME” and the other a “Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author”--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn."
|
||||
E000012,T0011,White House explosions,Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
|
||||
E000013,T0012,Ten_GOP,"2016 @TEN_GOP profile where the actual Tennessee Republican Party tried unsuccessfully for months to get Twitter to shut it down, and 2019 Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic personas and social media accounts that spreads falsehoods and amplifies narratives critical of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel."
|
||||
E000014,T0014,VaccinateUS gofundme,"2016: #VaccinateUS Gofundme campaigns to pay for Targetted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targetting Washington State mothers, $1,776 to boost posts over 9 months)."
|
||||
E000015,T0015,ColumbianChemicals hashtag,#ColumbianChemicals to promote a fake story about a chemical spill in Louisiana.
|
||||
E000016,T0016,Pope endorses Trump,"2016: “Pope Francis shocks world, endorses Donald Trump for president.” "
|
||||
E000017,T0016,FBI director rumours,"2016: ""FBI director received millions from Clinton Foundation, his brother’s law firm does Clinton’s taxes”."
|
||||
E000018,T0022,Qanon conspiracy,"Example: QAnon: conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful actors, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable """
|
||||
E000019,T0024,Slowed-down Pelosi video,Pelosi video (making her appear drunk)
|
||||
E000020,T0024,Shark on streets,Photoshopped shark on flooded streets of Houston TX.
|
||||
E000021,T0025,Sekondary Infektion,"2019: DFRLab report ""Secondary Infektion” highlights incident with key asset being a forged “letter” created by the operation to provide ammunition for far-right forces in Europe ahead of the election."
|
||||
E000022,T0029,FCC comments,Flooding FCC with comments
|
||||
E000023,T0029,fake engagement metrics,Creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of given issue.
|
||||
E000024,T0044,Canadians arrested for spying,"(2019) China formally arrests Canadians Spavor and Kovrig, accuses them of spying (in retaliation to detention of Hauwei CFO). "
|
||||
E000025,T0044,Rumour about syrian rebels gassing their own people,"(2018) The Russian ministry of defence put out a press release, claiming that they had intelligence Syrian rebel forces were about to gas their own people in Idlib province as part of a “false flag” operation to frame the Syrian government."
|
||||
E000026,T0047,Singapore act,"2019 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread ""false statements of fact"" in Singapore, where that information is ""prejudicial"" to Singapore's security or ""public tranquility."" "
|
||||
E000027,T0047,Social media cut off in Kashmir,"India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and ""anti-national"" purposes."
|
||||
E000028,T0048,Rappler,"Philippines, Maria Ressa and Rappler journalists targeted Duterte regime, lawsuits, trollings, banned from the presidential palace where press briefings take place. "
|
||||
E000029,T0048,ProPublica,2017 bot attack on five ProPublica Journalists.
|
||||
E000030,T0049,Saudi bots,2018: bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi’s death.
|
||||
E000031,T0050,50 Cent army,"popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the ""Great Firewall"") "
|
||||
E000032,T0050,Positive images of China,"technique used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China. "
|
||||
E000033,T0051,FCC comments,2017: the FCC was inundated with nearly 22 million public comments on net neutrality (many from fake accounts)
|
||||
E000034,T0052,Tertiary sites,"Examples of tertiary sites include Russia Insider, The Duran, geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca."
|
||||
E000035,T0052,Star News Digital Media,"2019, US Domestic news: Snopes reveals Star News Digital Media, Inc. may look like a media company that produces local news, but operates via undisclosed connections to political activism. "
|
||||
E000036,T0052,Iranian sites including Liberty Front Press,"(2018) FireEye reports on Iranian campaign that created between April 2018 and March 2019 sites used to spread inauthentic content from websites such as Liberty Front Press (LFP), US Journal, and Real Progressive Front during the 2018 US mid-terms."
|
||||
E000037,T0053,Issues that can be politicised,"BlackLivesMatter, MeToo"
|
||||
E000038,T0054,TrudeauMustGo,2019: #TrudeauMustGo
|
||||
E000039,T0055,PhosphorusDisaster hashtag,#PhosphorusDisaster
|
||||
E000040,T0056,RT/Sputnik,RT/Sputnik or antivax websites seeding stories.
|
||||
E000041,T0057,IRA organising US political rallies,"(Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 election"
|
||||
E000042,T0057,Facebook groups coordinating public space activities,Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and actvities into the public space.
|
||||
E000043,T0059,China messaging on Taiwan and Hong Kong,China constant messaging that Taiwan and Hong Kong are part of one China.
|
||||
E000044,C00008,Snopes,Snopes is best-known example of fact-checking sites.
|
||||
E000045,C00012,2018 EU regulations,"In 2018, the European Union created significant new regulations on the role of social media in media"
|
||||
E000046,C00012,German social media content regulations,German model: facebook forced to police content by law
|
||||
E000047,C00014,Buzzfeed rumour list,Buzzfeed real-time disaster rumour list
|
||||
E000048,C00014,FEMA rumour list,FEMA real-time disaster rumour list
|
||||
E000049,C00030,counter narrative handbook,Handbook at https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf
|
||||
E000050,C00030,Reality Team,Realityteam.org
|
||||
E000051,C00048,USAID programs,"USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations. Note that USAID operations were at a different level."
|
||||
E000052,C00066,kPop hashtag flooding,kPop stans flooding extremist hashtags with pop videos and images.
|
||||
E000053,C00070,2018 DDOS of troll farms,midterm-2018 elections DDOS against troll farms
|
||||
E000054,C00073,Learn to Discern,"The ""Learn to Discern"" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.” "
|
||||
E000055,C00073,Baltic Center for Media Excellence,"NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.”"
|
||||
E000056,C00082,Reality Team ground truthing,RealityTeam work that adds clear information to spaces with disinformation in.
|
||||
E000057,C00086,Reddit channels flooded with jokes,"This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes."
|
||||
E000058,C00087,kPop hashtag flooding,
|
||||
E000059,C00087,LGBT flooding of #proudboys,
|
||||
E000060,C00093,Pro-Truth Pledge,community code of conduct
|
||||
E000061,C00111,The Commons Project,The Commons Project from BuildUp.
|
||||
E000062,C00156,US Forces in Latvia,"In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.”"
|
||||
E000063,C00178,Current Time videos,"Using Current Time videos (viewed 40 million times online) to draw viewers away from Russian TV programming in RT and Sputnik. POtential content for this includes conventional entertainment programming (source: The conomist, “America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017)."
|
||||
E000064,C00182,Bedep Trojan,"(2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia"
|
||||
E000065,C00188,2014 Russian poll in France,"August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015)."
|
||||
E000066,C00188,Latvian newsrooms,"Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”"
|
||||
E000067,C00195,Using Adwords to redirect ISIS content readers,"Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Can apply this method to Russian propaganda. "
|
||||
E000068,C00200,India,Indian influencers and aunties countering misinformation.
|
||||
E000069,C00202,Macron election in France,Macron election team modified docs to spike a hack and leak.
|
||||
E000070,C00207,Saudi tit for tat campaign,
|
||||
E000071,C00211,Baltic Elves,"Baltic Elves.
|
||||
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/07/disinformation-nation-the-slovaks-fighting-in-defence-of-facts/ "
|
||||
E000072,C00211,Taiwan humor over rumor, Taiwan humor over rumor strategy.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/feb/17/humour-over-rumour-taiwan-fake-news and https://internews.org/story/using-comedy-and-social-media-educate-disinformation
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,824 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,externalgroup_id,activity_id,summary
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||||
GC000001,G000001,,
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GC000009,G000009,F00095,
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GC000010,G000010,F00095,
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GC000011,G000011,F00095,
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GC000012,G000012,F00095,
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GC000013,G000013,F00095,
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GC000019,G000019,C00205,
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GC000020,G000020,,
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GC000021,G000021,F00095,
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GC000025,G000025,C00073,
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GC000026,G000026,F00095,
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GC000029,G000029,,
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GC000042,G000042,F00095,
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GC000052,G000052,C00205,
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GC000085,G000085,F00095,
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GC000086,G000086,,
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GC000087,G000087,C00205,
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GC000088,G000088,,
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GC000089,G000089,,
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GC000090,G000090,,
|
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GC000092,G000092,,
|
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GC000093,G000093,C00205,
|
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GC000094,G000094,,
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|
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GC000096,G000096,C00205,
|
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|
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GC000101,G000101,C00205,
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GC000102,G000102,,
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|
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GC000107,G000107,F00095,
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GC000108,G000108,F00095,
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GC000109,G000109,,
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GC000111,G000111,F00095,
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GC000112,G000112,C00073,
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GC000113,G000113,F00095,
|
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GC000115,G000115,F00095,
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GC000116,G000116,,
|
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GC000117,G000117,C00073,
|
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GC000118,G000118,,
|
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GC000119,G000119,,
|
||||
GC000120,G000120,,
|
||||
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|
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GC000122,G000122,C00205,
|
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GC000124,G000124,C00205,
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|
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|
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|
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GC000129,G000129,F00095,
|
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GC000131,G000131,F00095,
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GC000141,G000141,F00095,
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GC000142,G000142,F00095,
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|
||||
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|
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||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
GC000159,G000159,,
|
||||
GC000160,G000160,,
|
||||
GC000161,G000161,C00188,
|
||||
GC000162,G000162,,
|
||||
GC000163,G000163,,
|
||||
GC000164,G000164,,
|
||||
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|
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GC000166,G000166,F00095,
|
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GC000167,G000167,,
|
||||
GC000168,G000168,,
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||||
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|
||||
GC000170,G000170,,
|
||||
GC000171,G000171,,
|
||||
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||||
GC000173,G000173,,
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||||
GC000174,G000174,,
|
||||
GC000175,G000175,F00095,
|
||||
GC000176,G000176,,
|
||||
GC000177,G000177,,
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||||
GC000178,G000178,,
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||||
GC000179,G000179,,
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||||
GC000180,G000180,,
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||||
GC000181,G000181,,
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||||
GC000182,G000182,,
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GC000183,G000183,,
|
||||
GC000184,G000184,,
|
||||
GC000185,G000185,F00095,
|
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GC000186,G000186,,
|
||||
GC000187,G000187,,
|
||||
GC000188,G000188,,
|
||||
GC000189,G000189,F00095,
|
||||
GC000190,G000190,F00095,
|
||||
GC000191,G000191,,
|
||||
GC000192,G000192,,
|
||||
GC000193,G000193,F00095,
|
||||
GC000194,G000194,F00095,
|
||||
GC000195,G000195,,
|
||||
GC000196,G000196,,
|
||||
GC000197,G000197,,
|
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GC000198,G000198,C00205,
|
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|
||||
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|
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|
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
GC000210,G000210,C00073,
|
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GC000211,G000211,F00095,
|
||||
GC000212,G000212,,
|
||||
GC000213,G000213,C00205,
|
||||
GC000214,G000214,,
|
||||
GC000215,G000215,F00095,
|
||||
GC000216,G000216,,
|
||||
GC000217,G000217,,
|
||||
GC000218,G000218,,
|
||||
GC000219,G000219,F00095,
|
||||
GC000220,G000220,,
|
||||
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|
||||
GC000222,G000222,,
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
GC000225,G000225,F00095,
|
||||
GC000226,G000226,,
|
||||
GC000227,G000227,F00095,
|
||||
GC000228,G000228,,
|
||||
GC000229,G000229,,
|
||||
GC000230,G000230,,
|
||||
GC000231,G000231,,
|
||||
GC000232,G000232,,
|
||||
GC000233,G000233,,
|
||||
GC000234,G000234,,
|
||||
GC000235,G000235,,
|
||||
GC000236,G000236,,
|
||||
GC000237,G000237,,
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||||
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|
||||
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|
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GC000240,G000240,,
|
||||
GC000241,G000241,,
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||||
GC000242,G000242,,
|
||||
GC000243,G000243,F00095,
|
||||
GC000244,G000244,,
|
||||
GC000245,G000245,,
|
||||
GC000246,G000246,,
|
||||
GC000247,G000247,,
|
||||
GC000248,G000248,,
|
||||
GC000249,G000249,,
|
||||
GC000250,G000250,,
|
||||
GC000251,G000251,F00095,
|
||||
GC000252,G000252,,
|
||||
GC000253,G000253,,
|
||||
GC000254,G000254,,
|
||||
GC000255,G000255,F00095,
|
||||
GC000256,G000256,,
|
||||
GC000257,G000257,F00095,
|
||||
GC000258,G000258,F00095,
|
||||
GC000259,G000259,F00095,
|
||||
GC000260,G000260,F00095,
|
||||
GC000261,G000261,F00095,
|
||||
GC000262,G000262,F00095,
|
||||
GC000263,G000263,,
|
||||
GC000264,G000264,F00095,
|
||||
GC000265,G000265,,
|
||||
GC000266,G000266,C00011,
|
||||
GC000267,G000267,F00095,
|
||||
GC000268,G000268,F00095,
|
||||
GC000269,G000269,F00095,
|
||||
GC000270,G000270,,
|
||||
GC000271,G000271,,
|
||||
GC000272,G000272,F00095,
|
||||
GC000273,G000273,F00095,
|
||||
GC000274,G000274,F00095,
|
||||
GC000275,G000275,,
|
||||
GC000276,G000276,,
|
||||
GC000277,G000277,F00095,
|
||||
GC000278,G000278,,
|
||||
GC000279,G000279,,
|
||||
GC000280,G000280,,
|
||||
GC000281,G000281,,
|
||||
GC000282,G000282,,
|
||||
GC000283,G000283,,
|
||||
GC000284,G000284,,
|
||||
GC000285,G000285,,
|
||||
GC000286,G000286,,
|
||||
GC000287,G000287,F00095,
|
||||
GC000288,G000288,F00095,
|
||||
GC000289,G000289,,
|
||||
GC000290,G000290,,
|
||||
GC000291,G000291,,
|
||||
GC000292,G000292,,
|
||||
GC000293,G000293,,
|
||||
GC000294,G000294,,
|
||||
GC000295,G000295,,
|
||||
GC000296,G000296,,
|
||||
GC000297,G000297,,
|
||||
GC000298,G000298,,
|
||||
GC000299,G000299,F00095,
|
||||
GC000300,G000300,,
|
||||
GC000301,G000301,F00095,
|
||||
GC000302,G000302,,
|
||||
GC000303,G000303,,
|
||||
GC000304,G000304,C00073,
|
||||
GC000305,G000305,,
|
||||
GC000306,G000306,,
|
||||
GC000307,G000307,,
|
||||
GC000308,G000308,,
|
||||
GC000309,G000309,,
|
||||
GC000310,G000310,C00205,
|
||||
GC000311,G000311,,
|
||||
GC000312,G000312,C00011,
|
||||
GC000313,G000313,,
|
||||
GC000314,G000314,,
|
||||
GC000315,G000315,,
|
||||
GC000316,G000316,,
|
||||
GC000317,G000317,F00095,
|
||||
GC000318,G000318,,
|
||||
GC000319,G000319,,
|
||||
GC000320,G000320,F00095,
|
||||
GC000321,G000321,,
|
||||
GC000322,G000322,F00095,
|
||||
GC000323,G000323,C00011,
|
||||
GC000324,G000324,,
|
||||
GC000325,G000325,,
|
||||
GC000326,G000326,F00095,
|
||||
GC000327,G000327,,
|
||||
GC000328,G000328,,
|
||||
GC000329,G000329,,
|
||||
GC000330,G000330,,
|
||||
GC000331,G000331,F00095,
|
||||
GC000332,G000332,,
|
||||
GC000333,G000333,,
|
||||
GC000334,G000334,,
|
||||
GC000335,G000335,,
|
||||
GC000336,G000336,,
|
||||
GC000337,G000337,,
|
||||
GC000338,G000338,,
|
||||
GC000339,G000339,,
|
||||
GC000340,G000340,,
|
||||
GC000341,G000341,,
|
||||
GC000342,G000342,,
|
||||
GC000343,G000343,,
|
||||
GC000344,G000344,,
|
||||
GC000345,G000345,,
|
||||
GC000346,G000346,,
|
||||
GC000347,G000347,,
|
||||
GC000348,G000348,,
|
||||
GC000349,G000349,,
|
||||
GC000350,G000350,,
|
||||
GC000351,G000351,,
|
||||
GC000352,G000352,F00095,
|
||||
GC000353,G000353,F00095,
|
||||
GC000354,G000354,,
|
||||
GC000355,G000355,F00095,
|
||||
GC000356,G000356,,
|
||||
GC000357,G000357,,
|
||||
GC000358,G000358,,
|
||||
GC000359,G000359,F00095,
|
||||
GC000360,G000360,,
|
||||
GC000361,G000361,,
|
||||
GC000362,G000362,,
|
||||
GC000363,G000363,,
|
||||
GC000364,G000364,,
|
||||
GC000365,G000365,,
|
||||
GC000366,G000366,,
|
||||
GC000367,G000367,,
|
||||
GC000368,G000368,F00095,
|
||||
GC000369,G000369,F00095,
|
||||
GC000370,G000370,,
|
||||
GC000371,G000371,,
|
||||
GC000372,G000372,,
|
||||
GC000373,G000373,,
|
||||
GC000374,G000374,,
|
||||
GC000375,G000375,,
|
||||
GC000376,G000376,,
|
||||
GC000377,G000377,,
|
||||
GC000378,G000378,,
|
||||
GC000379,G000379,,
|
||||
GC000380,G000380,,
|
||||
GC000381,G000381,,
|
||||
GC000382,G000382,C00205,
|
||||
GC000383,G000383,,
|
||||
GC000384,G000384,F00095,
|
||||
GC000385,G000385,,
|
||||
GC000386,G000386,C00205,
|
||||
GC000387,G000387,C00205,
|
||||
GC000388,G000388,,
|
||||
GC000389,G000389,,
|
||||
GC000390,G000390,,
|
||||
GC000391,G000391,,
|
||||
GC000392,G000392,,
|
||||
GC000393,G000393,F00095,
|
||||
GC000394,G000394,F00095,
|
||||
GC000395,G000395,,
|
||||
GC000396,G000396,F00095,
|
||||
GC000397,G000397,,
|
||||
GC000398,G000398,,
|
||||
GC000399,G000399,,
|
||||
GC000400,G000400,F00095,
|
||||
GC000401,G000401,F00095,
|
||||
GC000402,G000402,,
|
||||
GC000403,G000403,F00095,
|
||||
GC000404,G000404,C00205,
|
||||
GC000405,G000405,,
|
||||
GC000406,G000406,F00095,
|
||||
GC000407,G000407,,
|
||||
GC000408,G000408,,
|
||||
GC000409,G000409,,
|
||||
GC000410,G000410,,
|
||||
GC000411,G000411,,
|
||||
GC000412,G000412,,
|
||||
GC000413,G000413,,
|
||||
GC000414,G000414,,
|
||||
GC000415,G000415,,
|
||||
GC000416,G000416,,
|
||||
GC000417,G000417,F00095,
|
||||
GC000418,G000418,F00095,
|
||||
GC000419,G000419,F00095,
|
||||
GC000420,G000420,,
|
||||
GC000421,G000421,F00095,
|
||||
GC000422,G000422,,
|
||||
GC000423,G000423,,
|
||||
GC000424,G000424,F00095,
|
||||
GC000425,G000425,F00095,
|
||||
GC000426,G000426,,
|
||||
GC000427,G000427,F00095,
|
||||
GC000428,G000428,,
|
||||
GC000429,G000429,F00095,
|
||||
GC000430,G000430,C00073,
|
||||
GC000431,G000431,,
|
||||
GC000432,G000432,,
|
||||
GC000433,G000433,,
|
||||
GC000434,G000434,,
|
||||
GC000435,G000435,,
|
||||
GC000436,G000436,,
|
||||
GC000437,G000437,,
|
||||
GC000438,G000438,,
|
||||
GC000439,G000439,,
|
||||
GC000440,G000440,,
|
||||
GC000441,G000441,,
|
||||
GC000442,G000442,F00095,
|
||||
GC000443,G000443,,
|
||||
GC000444,G000444,F00095,
|
||||
GC000445,G000445,F00095,
|
||||
GC000446,G000446,,
|
||||
GC000447,G000447,,
|
||||
GC000448,G000448,C00011,
|
||||
GC000449,G000449,,
|
||||
GC000450,G000450,,
|
||||
GC000451,G000451,F00095,
|
||||
GC000452,G000452,C00205,
|
||||
GC000453,G000453,,
|
||||
GC000454,G000454,F00095,
|
||||
GC000455,G000455,,
|
||||
GC000456,G000456,,
|
||||
GC000457,G000457,F00095,
|
||||
GC000458,G000458,F00095,
|
||||
GC000459,G000459,,
|
||||
GC000460,G000460,,
|
||||
GC000461,G000461,,
|
||||
GC000462,G000462,F00095,
|
||||
GC000463,G000463,,
|
||||
GC000464,G000464,F00095,
|
||||
GC000465,G000465,,
|
||||
GC000466,G000466,,
|
||||
GC000467,G000467,,
|
||||
GC000468,G000468,F00095,
|
||||
GC000469,G000469,,
|
||||
GC000470,G000470,F00095,
|
||||
GC000471,G000471,,
|
||||
GC000472,G000472,,
|
||||
GC000473,G000473,,
|
||||
GC000474,G000474,F00095,
|
||||
GC000475,G000475,C00073,
|
||||
GC000476,G000476,,
|
||||
GC000477,G000477,,
|
||||
GC000478,G000478,,
|
||||
GC000479,G000479,,
|
||||
GC000480,G000480,,
|
||||
GC000481,G000481,,
|
||||
GC000482,G000482,,
|
||||
GC000483,G000483,,
|
||||
GC000484,G000484,,
|
||||
GC000485,G000485,,
|
||||
GC000486,G000486,F00095,
|
||||
GC000487,G000487,,
|
||||
GC000488,G000488,,
|
||||
GC000489,G000489,,
|
||||
GC000490,G000490,F00095,
|
||||
GC000491,G000491,,
|
||||
GC000492,G000492,,
|
||||
GC000493,G000493,,
|
||||
GC000494,G000494,,
|
||||
GC000495,G000495,,
|
||||
GC000496,G000496,,
|
||||
GC000497,G000497,,
|
||||
GC000498,G000498,,
|
||||
GC000499,G000499,,
|
||||
GC000500,G000500,C00205,
|
||||
GC000501,G000501,,
|
||||
GC000502,G000502,,
|
||||
GC000503,G000503,,
|
||||
GC000504,G000504,,
|
||||
GC000505,G000505,,
|
||||
GC000506,G000506,,
|
||||
GC000507,G000507,,
|
||||
GC000508,G000508,,
|
||||
GC000509,G000509,,
|
||||
GC000510,G000510,,
|
||||
GC000511,G000511,F00095,
|
||||
GC000512,G000512,F00095,
|
||||
GC000513,G000513,,
|
||||
GC000514,G000514,F00095,
|
||||
GC000515,G000515,,
|
||||
GC000516,G000516,F00095,
|
||||
GC000517,G000517,F00095,
|
||||
GC000518,G000518,,
|
||||
GC000519,G000519,,
|
||||
GC000520,G000520,,
|
||||
GC000521,G000521,F00095,
|
||||
GC000522,G000522,F00095,
|
||||
GC000523,G000523,,
|
||||
GC000524,G000524,,
|
||||
GC000525,G000525,F00095,
|
||||
GC000526,G000526,,
|
||||
GC000527,G000527,,
|
||||
GC000528,G000528,,
|
||||
GC000529,G000529,F00095,
|
||||
GC000530,G000530,,
|
||||
GC000531,G000531,,
|
||||
GC000532,G000532,F00095,
|
||||
GC000533,G000533,,
|
||||
GC000534,G000534,,
|
||||
GC000535,G000535,,
|
||||
GC000536,G000536,,
|
||||
GC000537,G000537,,
|
||||
GC000538,G000538,,
|
||||
GC000539,G000539,F00095,
|
||||
GC000540,G000540,,
|
||||
GC000541,G000541,F00095,
|
||||
GC000542,G000542,,
|
||||
GC000543,G000543,F00095,
|
||||
GC000544,G000544,,
|
||||
GC000545,G000545,F00095,
|
||||
GC000546,G000546,,
|
||||
GC000547,G000547,,
|
||||
GC000548,G000548,,
|
||||
GC000549,G000549,,
|
||||
GC000550,G000550,,
|
||||
GC000551,G000551,,
|
||||
GC000552,G000552,,
|
||||
GC000553,G000553,F00095,
|
||||
GC000554,G000554,F00095,
|
||||
GC000555,G000555,,
|
||||
GC000556,G000556,,
|
||||
GC000557,G000557,F00095,
|
||||
GC000558,G000558,,
|
||||
GC000559,G000559,,
|
||||
GC000560,G000560,,
|
||||
GC000561,G000561,,
|
||||
GC000562,G000562,F00095,
|
||||
GC000563,G000563,,
|
||||
GC000564,G000564,C00205,
|
||||
GC000565,G000565,,
|
||||
GC000566,G000566,F00095,
|
||||
GC000567,G000567,C00073,
|
||||
GC000568,G000568,,
|
||||
GC000569,G000569,F00095,
|
||||
GC000570,G000570,,
|
||||
GC000571,G000571,,
|
||||
GC000572,G000572,,
|
||||
GC000573,G000573,,
|
||||
GC000574,G000574,,
|
||||
GC000575,G000575,,
|
||||
GC000576,G000576,F00095,
|
||||
GC000577,G000577,,
|
||||
GC000578,G000578,F00095,
|
||||
GC000579,G000579,,
|
||||
GC000580,G000580,F00095,
|
||||
GC000581,G000581,C00011,
|
||||
GC000582,G000582,F00095,
|
||||
GC000583,G000583,,
|
||||
GC000584,G000584,,
|
||||
GC000585,G000585,,
|
||||
GC000586,G000586,,
|
||||
GC000587,G000587,,
|
||||
GC000588,G000588,C00073,
|
||||
GC000589,G000589,,
|
||||
GC000590,G000590,,
|
||||
GC000591,G000591,F00095,
|
||||
GC000592,G000592,,
|
||||
GC000593,G000593,,
|
||||
GC000594,G000594,,
|
||||
GC000595,G000595,,
|
||||
GC000596,G000596,,
|
||||
GC000597,G000597,,
|
||||
GC000598,G000598,,
|
||||
GC000599,G000599,F00095,
|
||||
GC000600,G000600,F00095,
|
||||
GC000601,G000601,F00095,
|
||||
GC000602,G000602,,
|
||||
GC000603,G000603,,
|
||||
GC000604,G000604,F00095,
|
||||
GC000605,G000605,C00080,
|
||||
GC000606,G000606,,
|
||||
GC000607,G000607,F00095,
|
||||
GC000608,G000608,,
|
||||
GC000609,G000609,F00095,
|
||||
GC000610,G000610,F00095,
|
||||
GC000611,G000611,F00095,
|
||||
GC000612,G000612,,
|
||||
GC000613,G000613,C00073,
|
||||
GC000614,G000614,,
|
||||
GC000615,G000615,,
|
||||
GC000616,G000616,,
|
||||
GC000617,G000617,F00095,
|
||||
GC000618,G000618,,
|
||||
GC000619,G000619,,
|
||||
GC000620,G000620,,
|
||||
GC000621,G000621,F00095,
|
||||
GC000622,G000622,,
|
||||
GC000623,G000623,,
|
||||
GC000624,G000624,,
|
||||
GC000625,G000625,,
|
||||
GC000626,G000626,,
|
||||
GC000627,G000627,,
|
||||
GC000628,G000628,F00095,
|
||||
GC000629,G000629,,
|
||||
GC000630,G000630,F00095,
|
||||
GC000631,G000631,,
|
||||
GC000632,G000632,F00095,
|
||||
GC000633,G000633,,
|
||||
GC000634,G000634,,
|
||||
GC000635,G000635,,
|
||||
GC000636,G000636,,
|
||||
GC000637,G000637,C00073,
|
||||
GC000638,G000638,,
|
||||
GC000639,G000639,,
|
||||
GC000640,G000640,,
|
||||
GC000641,G000641,,
|
||||
GC000642,G000642,F00095,
|
||||
GC000643,G000643,,
|
||||
GC000644,G000644,,
|
||||
GC000645,G000645,,
|
||||
GC000646,G000646,F00095,
|
||||
GC000647,G000647,,
|
||||
GC000648,G000648,F00095,
|
||||
GC000649,G000649,,
|
||||
GC000650,G000650,,
|
||||
GC000651,G000651,,
|
||||
GC000652,G000652,,
|
||||
GC000653,G000653,,
|
||||
GC000654,G000654,,
|
||||
GC000655,G000655,,
|
||||
GC000656,G000656,,
|
||||
GC000657,G000657,,
|
||||
GC000658,G000658,,
|
||||
GC000659,G000659,,
|
||||
GC000660,G000660,,
|
||||
GC000661,G000661,,
|
||||
GC000662,G000662,,
|
||||
GC000663,G000663,,
|
||||
GC000664,G000664,,
|
||||
GC000665,G000665,,
|
||||
GC000666,G000666,,
|
||||
GC000667,G000667,F00095,
|
||||
GC000668,G000668,,
|
||||
GC000669,G000669,,
|
||||
GC000670,G000670,C00073,
|
||||
GC000671,G000671,,
|
||||
GC000672,G000672,,
|
||||
GC000673,G000673,F00095,
|
||||
GC000674,G000674,,
|
||||
GC000675,G000675,,
|
||||
GC000676,G000676,,
|
||||
GC000677,G000677,,
|
||||
GC000678,G000678,F00095,
|
||||
GC000679,G000679,,
|
||||
GC000680,G000680,,
|
||||
GC000681,G000681,,
|
||||
GC000682,G000682,,
|
||||
GC000683,G000683,,
|
||||
GC000684,G000684,,
|
||||
GC000685,G000685,F00095,
|
||||
GC000686,G000686,,
|
||||
GC000687,G000687,,
|
||||
GC000688,G000688,,
|
||||
GC000689,G000689,F00095,
|
||||
GC000690,G000690,,
|
||||
GC000691,G000691,,
|
||||
GC000692,G000692,,
|
||||
GC000693,G000693,C00011,
|
||||
GC000694,G000694,C00205,
|
||||
GC000695,G000695,C00011,
|
||||
GC000696,G000696,,
|
||||
GC000697,G000697,,
|
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|
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|
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GC000700,G000700,,
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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GC000713,G000713,C00011,
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
||||
GC000750,G000750,,
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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GC000764,G000764,F00095,
|
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GC000765,G000765,,
|
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GC000766,G000766,,
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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GC000788,G000788,F00095,
|
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GC000789,G000789,F00095,
|
||||
GC000790,G000790,F00095,
|
||||
GC000791,G000791,F00095,
|
||||
GC000792,G000792,,
|
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|
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|
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GC000796,G000796,F00095,
|
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|
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GC000798,G000798,F00095,
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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GC000820,G000820,C00073,
|
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|
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|
@ -0,0 +1,832 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,url,summary,provides_tools,sector,primary_role,secondary_role,primary_subject,secondary_subject,volunteers,region,country,rand_list,credco_list,carnegie_list,twitter_handle,notes,Unnamed: 18
|
||||
G000001,5Rights,https://5rightsframework.com/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000002,AACC (Association des Agences Conseils en Communication),https://www.aacc.fr/,,,,,,,,,Europe,France,,,,,,
|
||||
G000003,ABT Shield by Edge NPD,https://abtshield.com,"ABT SHIELD technology is an AI-based tool, designed to limit the impact of bots and trolls on readers’ experience and limit the spread of online disinformation. ABT SHIELD is a product designed in close cooperation with publishers, advertisers, academic institutions, think tanks and EU institutions.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000004,Access Now,https://www.accessnow.org/,"Access Now is dedicated to protecting digital rights through a 24/7 Digital Security Helpline, legal support, advocacy campaigns and cross-sector partnerships, and policy analysis and recommendations. Access Now works on issues related to freedom of expression and has responded to proposals aimed at curbing disinformation online by stressing the need to develop evidence-based solutions that protect online users.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000005,Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project (American Press Institute),https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/category/fact-checking-project/,The American Press Institute’s Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project aims to increase and improve fact-checking and other accountability journalism practices.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000006,Ad Fontes Media,https://www.adfontesmedia.com/interactive-media-bias-chart-2/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000007,Ad Observer (New York University),https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ad-observer/enliecaalhkhhihcmnbjfmmjkljlcinl,Ad Observer is a crowdsourcing Chrome browser extension that will gather ads from a user's Facebook news feed—to enable investigative journalism and research.The project is run by the Online Political Ads Transparency Project at New York University.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000008,"Advertising Standards Authority (ASA, UK)",https://www.asa.org.uk/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000009,AFP Medialab,https://www.afp.com/en/agency/medialab,"The AFP Medialab is a multi-disciplinary team of journalists and engineers. Since the 1st of January 2016, the Medialab has participated in the InVID project (social media video content verification on social networks), funded by the European Union Horizon 2020 framework.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000010,Africa Check,https://africacheck.org/,Africa Check promotes accuracy in public debate and the media in Africa. The goal of their work is to raise the quality of information available to society across the continent.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000011,Agence France Presse (AFP),https://www.afp.com/en,"AFP is a global news agency that worked with First Draft to implement the CrossCheck Project during the 2017 French presidential elections. The organization has since started its own fact-checking blog and helped set up the Journalism Trust Initiative with Reporters Without Borders, the European Broadcasting Union, and the Global Editors Network. AFP is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers. AFP also runs a Medialab, where it develops innovative tools for verifying content and understanding information flows.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000012,Agência Lupa,https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/lupa,"Agência Lupa is a Brazilian fact-checking organization. A member of the Trust Project, the organization also provides training to students and professionals to contribute to the prevalence of fact-checking techniques and tools.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000013,Agência Pública (Truco Project),https://apublica.org/truco-antigo/,Agência Pública is an investigative journalism outfit that conducts fact-checking through its Truco project.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000014,AI Foundation,http://www.aifoundation.com,"Reality Defender is a browser extension that scans every piece of media content appearing in the browser to check for known fakes, and uses AI algorithms to check the content for signs of alterations. Reality Defender also allows for users to report media as fake, which builds their database of known fakes and improves the browser extension’s accuracy.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000015,Alethea Group,https://www.aletheagroup.com/,"We protect clients from the threat of disinformation that targets brands, reputations, employee safety, or financial bottom lines through our industry-leading investigation and remediation services.",,Other,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000016,Alion,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000017,Alliance for Europe: Social Media Intelligence Unit,https://www.alliance4europe.eu/digital-intelligence/,"The Social Media Intelligence Unit (SMIU) collects and analyses social media data from across Europe. The platform enables tracking disinformation and hate-speech, aiming to develop a predictive model of its spread.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,Europe,Belgium,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000018,Alliance for Securing Democracy (German Marshall Fund) (GMF),https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/,"Housed at GMF, the Alliance for Securing Democracy convenes policymakers and technical experts to provide analysis and policy recommendations concerning authoritarian interference in democracies. The Alliance for Securing Democracy runs an Authoritarian Interference Tracker and the Hamilton 2.0 interactive dashboard, which provides information on Russian state-funded narratives.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000019,Alliance of Democracies,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/transatlantic-commission-on-election-integrity/,"The Alliance of Democracies runs the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity (TCEI), which convenes individuals from media and government to prevent foreign interference in elections. TCEI advocates for campaigns to adopt its Pledge for Election Integrity, conducts monitoring in countries with upcoming elections, and promotes public policy solutions addressing deepfakes and other emerging technologies that threaten the integrity of elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000020,American Press Institute (API),https://www.americanpressinstitute.org,"Through its Fact-checking and Accountability Journalism Project, API provides research and training to help journalists and publishers improve their political fact-checking work. In collaboration with the Donald W. Reynolds Journalism Institute,",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000021,American Press Institute: Trusting News project,https://trustingnews.org,"API hosts the Trusting News project, which seeks to build trust in newsrooms through newsroom coaching and research on transparency, consumer news decisions, and social media.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000022,Amnesty International,https://www.amnesty.org,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000023,Amped Software,https://ampedsoftware.com/authenticate,"Amped Software offers image and video forensics and authentication tools that enable users to detect whether images or videos have been manipulated or altered. Amped uses peer-reviewed, scientific techniques for its product, and law enforcement agencies have used the tool for rigorous use cases such as discerning whether an image can be used in court.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000024,Analiziraj,https://analiziraj.ba/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000025,Antidote,https://antidote.ngo/,"""Exit counselors"" or ""de-radicalizers,"" Antidote helps people caught up in cultic ideologies to reconnect with reality",,Civil Society/NGO,Education (public),,Extremism/indoctrination,Societal resilience,,,USA,,,,,,
|
||||
G000026,Aos Fatos,https://www.aosfatos.org/,"Aos Fatos conducts fact-checking and provides technology and consulting services to organizations interested in automated fact-checking products and data verification. They also fconduct act-checking for internal reporting. Aos Fatos built Fátima, a fact-checking robot for Facebook messenger. Aos Fatos is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000027,AP Fact Check (Associated Press (AP)),https://www.apnews.com/APFactCheck,AP is an international news conglomerate which addresses global breaking news via quality journalism and reporting. AP Fact Check is the formal public fact-checking service of the organization and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000028,ARD-FaktenFinder,https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/,ARD-FaktenFinder is the fact-checking program of German media organization ARD's online news platform.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000029,Argonne National Laboratory: Decisions and Infrastructure Sciences Division,https://www.anl.gov/dis/gat,The Decisions and Infrastructure Sciences Division at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is currently applying predictive modeling to combat disinformation. They are capable of providing a deep access data analytics system.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000030,Arizona State University: Detecting Frames,http://www.public.asu.edu/~hdavulcu/IJSC16.pdf,"Detecting Frames is a research project at the School of Computing, Informatics and Decision Systems Engineering at Arizona State University. It outlines the utilization of computational power to understand the subliminal framing of topics in the media and within networks. Similar to the way that sentiment analysis understands attitudes based on keyword usage, “Detecting Frames” understands perspective and bias packaging based on sentence annotation.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000031,Article19,https://www.article19.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000032,Asociatia Presei Independente (API),http://api.md/,"API is a resource center and association of newsrooms dedicated to improving the quality of independent journalism in Moldova through advocacy and professional development. The organization is coordinating the ""STOP FALS!"" Campaign to educate news consumers and combat the spread of false or manipulative information.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Moldova,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000033,Aspen Institute,https://www.aspeninstitute.org/,"The Aspen Institute convenes leaders and thinkers to address challenges to global prosperity and peace. Through its work on communications and culture and security and global affairs, the Aspen Institute has published analysis and hosted events on election security, disinformation, and cybersecurity. It also hosts the Knight Commission Trust, Media and Democracy, which convenes academic, journalistic, technology, and advocacy experts to address the American media landscape.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000034,Assembler,https://jigsaw.google.com/assembler/,Assembler is an experimental platform advancing new detection technology to help fact-checkers and journalists identify manipulated media. The experiment is developed by Jigsaw and Google Research.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000035,Association for International Affairs (Asociace Pro Mezinárodní Otázky) (AMO),http://www.amo.cz/,"AMO conducts research and advocacy on issues in international relations through policy briefings and research papers, conferences and roundtables, educational projects, and collaboration with other public policy organizations. AMO runs a project on Strengthening Public Scrutiny in Ukrainian Regions, which works to address disinformation in Ukraine through research and training. Its partners on this project include the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of Mass Information, stopfake.org, and demagog.cz.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000036,Astroscreen,https://www.astroscreen.com/,Astroscreen counters disinformation and terrorist content spread via “astroturfing” by detecting fake social media accounts and networks of bots.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000037,Athens Technology Center (ATC),https://www.atc.gr/?page=news&ListID=3&RowID=348&Year=2021,Built TruthNest,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Greece,,,,,,
|
||||
G000038,Atlantic Council: Digital Forensics Research Lab (DFR Lab),https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/digital-forensic-research-lab/,"The Atlantic Council's Digital Forensics Research Lab (DFR Lab) documents and tracks foreign-backed influence operations and provides analysis on these incidents in order to aid the public in identifying and exposing such activities. DFR Lab also runs 360/OS, an annual conference providing training to journalists and activists on open source, social media, and digital forensic tools for identifying and documenting malign uses of digital technologies. The Atlantic Council also coordinated #ElectionWatch, an effort to monitor foreign influence in elections in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico in 2018.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,Research (primary/secondary),,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000039,Atlantic Council: Disinfo Portal (Eurasia Center),https://disinfoportal.org/about-disinfo-portal/,"The Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center has created Disinfo Portal, which aggregates information about ongoing efforts to counter disinformation and provides a database of partners and experts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000040,Attestiv Inc.,https://www.attestiv.com,"Attestiv provides authenticity for photos, videos and other media, limiting deepfake threats, data tampering, and helping to enable new media protection solutions for businesses and organizations.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000041,attribution.news,https://attribution.news,The attribution.news project is a joint initiative led by First Draft and the Stanford Internet Observatory. The website aims to provide more accessible background explanations to assist reporters in covering attribution.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000042,Australian Associated Press FactCheck,https://factcheck.aap.com.au/,FactCheck is the Australian Associated Press's fact-checking initiative. FactCheck is a signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000043,Australian Department of Home Affairs: Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce,https://www.aec.gov.au/elections/electoral-advertising/electoral-integrity.htm,"Led by the Australian Department of Home Affairs, the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce is composed of members of various government agencies and deals with foreign cyber-enabled threats to election integrity.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000044,Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI),https://www.aspi.org.au/program/international-cyber-policy-centre,"ASPI conducts research on issues in international peace and security and Australian foreign policy. Through its International Cyber Policy Centre, members of ASPI have published reports on the topics of disinformation, persuasion-based cyber warfare, and Chinese influence campaigns.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000045,Authoritarian Interference Tracker (Alliance for Securing Democracy),https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/toolbox/authoritarian-interference-tracker/,"The Authoritarian Interference Tracker exposes the Russian and Chinese governments’ foreign interference activities in more than 40 transatlantic countries from 2000 to the present across the five tools ASD tracks. These tools are: information manipulation, cyber operations, malign finance, civil society subversion, and economic coercion. The Tracker shines a light on the tactics and trends that define the Russian and Chinese governments’ interference efforts in democracies, and highlights the interconnectivity between different parts of the asymmetric toolkit. Forthcoming iterations of the Tracker will expand to catalog authoritarian interference by other regimes that adopt similar tactics to undermine democracies.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000046,Avaaz,https://secure.avaaz.org/,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000047,Balkan Investigative Reporting Network,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000048,Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (Centro de Barcelona para Asuntos Internacionales) (CIDOB),https://www.cidob.org/,"CIDOB conducts research and policy analysis on global issues in peace and security. As part of its work on security, CIDOB researchers have published on disinformation and EU responses, Russia's Spanish media efforts, and deepfakes. CIDOB works with the German Marshall Fund to organize the Mercator European Dialogue, which convenes members of European parliaments to discuss public policy issues. Through this program, the German Marshall Fund convened policymakers in May 2019 to discuss disinformation and fake news in European elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000049,BBC Media Action ,https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/our-work/covid-19,"Our dedicated teams moved rapidly to adapt our existing projects to address the knock-on effects of COVID-19 – from increased levels of violence against women, to children losing out on an education during lockdown. Through media, we’re helping people understand what they can do, individually and as a community, and how they can hold their leaders to account.We are committed to supporting the international response for the long haul – helping people to survive, cope and recover from COVID-19, meeting their diverse and changing needs, and supporting local media to keep their communities informed. As an independent charity, we are not funded by the BBC TV Licence Fee. We rely on the support of generous donors – governments, foundations, corporations and individuals – to make our work possible. Trusted and accurate information will save lives.",,Civil Society/NGO,Media,,,,,UK,Europe,,,,,,
|
||||
G000050,BBC Beyond Fake News,https://www.bbc.co.uk/beyondfakenews/,"BBC reporting, education and training to help you understand the challenges posed by misinformation and fake news",,Media,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000051,Be Internet Citizens (YouTube),https://internetcitizens.withyoutube.com/,"YouTube, a Google company, is addressing disinformation through media literacy. Be Internet Citizens has been designed to teach teenagers about media literacy, critical thinking and digital citizenship, with the aim of encouraging young people to have a positive voice online.",,Technology,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000052,Belgian Expert Group on Disinformation and Fake News,https://www.decroo.belgium.be/nl/expertengroep-formuleert-aanbevelingen-voor-aanpak-fake-news,"In 2018, Digital Agenda Minister Alexander De Croo called for the creation of an expert group composed of academics and journalists to formulate proposals for countering disinformation in Belgium. The expert group delivered its recommendations in July 2018.",,Government,Public Policy,,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000053,Bellingcat,https://www.bellingcat.com,"Bellingcat is an independent international collective of researchers, investigators and citizen journalists using open source and social media investigation to probe a variety of subjects, including online influence operations. It also runs training programs for investigative journalists and publishes training guides in its Online Investigation Toolkit.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,Fact checking,,,Yes,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000054,Berkman Klein Center,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000055,BeWorks,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000056,Bien Chequeado,https://www.tvn-2.com/bien-chequeado/,Bien Chequeado is TVN Noticias's fact-checking initiative.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Panama,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000057,BitPress,https://bitpress.news/,Bitpress is a nonpartisan fact-checking organization that uses technology solutions and trained analysts to identify misinformation and prevent its spread.,,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000058,Blackbird,https://www.blackbird.ai/,Blackbird.AI is a company that provides artificial intelligence tools to detect emerging propaganda campaigns and help clients respond.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000059,Bluescreen IT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000060,BOOM,https://www.boomlive.in/,"BOOM is an Indian fact-checking initiative that provides content in English, Hindi, and Bengali. The organization runs a WhatsApp helpline, and it is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000061,Bot Sentinel,https://botsentinel.com/,"Bot Sentinel is a free and open platform and browser plugin that detects likely bots on Twitter. A dashboard lets users explore trending topics, network connections, and data associated with suspicious accounts. The product also provides a “block list” that enables users to block likely bots from their own Twitter spheres.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,Y,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000062,Botometer,https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/faq,"Botometer is a web-based program that uses machine learning to classify Twitter accounts as bot or human by looking at features of a profile including friends, social network structure, temporal activity, language and sentiment. Botometer outputs an overall bot score (0-5) along with several other scores that provides a measure of the likelihood that the account is a bot.",Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,Y,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000063,Botslayer,https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/botslayer/,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000064,Brandpie,https://www.brandpie.com/people,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000065,Brave,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000066,Bridgit,Bridgit.io,,,,Influencer (on policy),,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000067,Brookings Institute: Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology,https://www.brookings.edu/experts/alina-polyakova/,The Brookings Institution's Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology addresses state and non-state technological threats and convenes technology and policy communities around these issues.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000068,Brookings Institution: Center for Technology Innovation,https://www.brookings.edu/center/center-for-technology-innovation/,"The Brookings Institution's Center for Technology Innovation provides research, policy analysis, and advocacy on global technology innovation. Part of its research agenda includes digital media, news, and entertainment. The Cybersecurity and Election Interference Project publishes analysis on election security, foreign interference in elections, and the potential for widespread disinformation and proliferation of deepfakes in electoral contexts. The Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology addresses state and non-state technological threats and convenes technology and policy communities around these issues.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000069,Brookings Institution: Cyber Security and Election Interference,https://www.brookings.edu/series/cybersecurity-and-election-interference/,"The Cyber Security and Election Interference is a series designed to be accessible to policymakers, journalists, and the general public, will explore digital threats to American democracy, cybersecurity risks, and ways to mitigate possible problems. It will also take a look at several examples of the problem, how other democracies are coping with the threats, and how Congress, state officials, political parties, and candidates can protect themselves from cybersecurity attacks.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000070,Brunswick,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000071,BT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000072,Cal State,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000073,Callsign,https://www.callsign.com,"Callsign leverages deep learning and technical/ behavioral forensics to differentiate between legitimate and fraudulent users, allowing companies to keep information secure by adding an additional layer of protection to logins, and potentially disallowing bad actors from accessing secure information and accounts. Callsign technology may ensure that bad actors are not able to hijack legitimate accounts to propagate disinformation. Furthermore, genuine identities could remain safe from account takeovers, account borrowing, and “first person fraud” used to spread adversarial propaganda and disinformation.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000074,Canada,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000075,Captain Fact,https://captainfact.io/,CaptainFact is a collaborative fact-checking project that relies on a browser extension to show fact-checked statements in YouTube videos.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000076,"Cardiff University: Open Source Communications, Analytics Research Development Centre",http://upsi.org.uk/oscar,"The Open Source Communications, Analytics Research (OSCAR) Development Centre is an innovative, multi-disciplinary Centre bringing together academics and police practitioners to develop a research evidence base around the use of open source information for policing and community safety services. Funded by the Home Office / HEFCE / and the College of Policing, the work of the centre will help to develop open source methodologies, technologies and insights that will shape the future of policing.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Investigations,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000077,Cardiff University: Social Data Science Lab,http://socialdatalab.net/ ,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000078,Carnegie Endowment: Partnership for Countering Influence Operations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace),https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/counteringinfluenceoperations,"The Partnership for Countering Influence Operations (PCIO) believes that little progress will be made without a spirit of partnership between governments, the tech industry, media, academia, and civil society. Such collaborations are challenging but necessary in order to accomplish the three aims that PCIO believes are vital: to answer difficult policy problems related to influence operations; to find ways to measure the effect of adversarial influence operations; and to develop methods for measurement and evaluation of countermeasures.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000079,Carnegie Mellon University: Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS),http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/index.php,"CASOS develops and applies computational tools for utilizing data to analyze social phenomena, to explain and predict social behavior using these tools, and to measure and evaluate the impact of policies and procedures affecting social behavior. CASOS has a project on the diffusion of false and misleading information and draws comparisons between community responses to key issues.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000080,Carnegie Mellon University: Center for Informed Democracy and Social Cyber-Security (CIDC / IDEAS),https://www.cmu.edu/ideas-social-cybersecurity/,CIDC studies online disinformation and its impact on democracy. The Center conducts research and connects individuals working on disinformation and related issues in order to educate journalists and policymakers. Its research and teaching focus on identifying disinformation and its sources and countering its spread.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000081,Carnegie Mellon University: Social Cybersecurity Project (Human-Computer Interaction Institute),https://socialcybersecurity.org/,The Social Cybersecurity Project leverages insights from social psychology and other fields to develop novel interventions and strategies for nudging adoption of expert-recommended tools and practices,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000082,Carnegie Trust (UK),https://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000083,CASM Digital Research Lab (Demos),https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,"A joint venture between UK-based Demos and the University of Sussex, the CASM Digital Research Lab is an initiative that utilizes machine learning to interpret natural language data and derive insights about technology policy. CASM has produced reports on information operations, Russian influence operations on Twitter, the future of political campaigning, social media and the 2017 British General Election, social media in Nigerian elections, and digital political advertising.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000084,Cato Institute,https://www.cato.org/,"The Cato Institute conducts research and analysis on American domestic and foreign policy issues. Its scholars have written on social media regulation in the face of disinformation, and the Institute hosts a Project on Emerging Technologies which works on issues at the intersection of new technologies and civil liberties.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000085,Cek Fakta,https://cekfakta.com,Cek Fakta is an Indonesian fact-checking initiative.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000086,"Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy of France (Centre d'analyse, de prévision et de stratégie) (CAPS)",https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/le-ministere-et-son-reseau/le-centre-d-analyse-de-prevision-et-de-strategie/,"CAPS is composed of academic experts and diplomats that provide research and analysis on medium- to long-term trends in international affairs and foreign policy. In partnership with the Institute for Strategic Research, CAPS produced a comprehensive report on influence operations and recommendations for governments, civil society organizations, and private actors for mitigating the impact of hostile influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000087,Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT),https://cdt.org/,CDT provides research and advocacy on public policies designed to preserve freedom and innovation online. CDT's experts provide analysis on legislation and social media platforms' efforts aimed at curbing disinformation and protecting the integrity of elections.,,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000088,Center for Democratic Transition (Centar za Demokratsku Tranziciju) (CDT),http://www.en.cdtmn.org/,"CDT is dedicated to promoting democratic accountability and transparency in Montenegro through advocacy, research, monitoring of institutions and policies. CDT worked with NATO's Public Diplomacy Division to run a project on countering disinformation and propaganda.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Montenegro,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000089,Center for East European Policy Studies (Austrumeiropas Politikas Pētījumu Centrs) (CEEPS),http://appc.lv/eng/,CEEPS conducts research and analysis on Latvian foreign policy with a focus on Russia's influence in European politics and security. Its scholars have contributed to research on resilience to disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe and participated in expert discussions on Russian influence operations organized by the European Center for Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. CEEPS is also part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Latvia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000090,Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (Centar za Evroatlantske Studije) (CEAS),https://www.ceas-serbia.org/,"CEAS conducts research and analysis on public policy, international cooperation, and global security with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe. CEAS is a partner of the Atlantic Council's Disinfo Portal.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000091,Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA),https://www.cepa.org/disinfonet,"The StratCom Program housed at CEPA is ""an innovative, on-the-ground effort to monitor, collate, analyze, rebut and expose Russian disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe."" The program seeks to create analytical toolkits for countering disinformation, host workshops, monitor the effectiveness of Russian propaganda, provide data on ongoing efforts, and provide policy guidance. CEPA also coordinates #DisinfoNet, a coalition of think tanks and organizations working to understand and combat Russia’s information operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000092,Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR),http://www.revealnews.org/,"Through its publishing platform Reveal, CIR seeks to empower the public and hold leaders accountable through investigative journalism. The organization has published an online guide to disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000093,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Defending Democratic Institutions (CSIS),https://www.csis.org/programs/international-security-program/defending-democratic-institutions,"This project seeks to counter Russia, and potentially other adversaries, in their efforts to disrupt democracy and cultivate a public distrust of democratic institutions. A key focus of this initiative is on understanding and countering adversary attacks on America’s justice system, to include courts, judges, prosecutors, and the rule of law. Improving cybersecurity of institutions and individuals is a crucial mechanism for strengthening America’s capacity to guard against threats to democracy. In addition, the initiative will focus on building national resilience against information operations that threaten to undermine public respect for democratic institutions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000094,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Gray Zone Project,https://www.csis.org/grayzone,"CSIS’s International Security Program has analyzes hybrid and Gray Zone threats and aims to identify how the United States can best deter, campaign in, and respond to gray zone approaches.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000095,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Transnational Threats Project (CSIS),https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project,"CSIS coordinates a Transnational Threats Project, which has addressed Russian interference in the U.S. context and U.S. strategies to combat Russian information warfare, within the context of a broader focus on terrorism, insurgency, and crime.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000096,Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD),https://csd.bg/,"CSD conducts research and advocacy on issues related to European integration, political institutions, and economic and political development. The organization's research agenda includes a focus on state capture and russian influence, especially in the Black Sea countries and the Western Balkans, and its experts have written on media capture, propaganda, and Russian economic influence.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Bulgaria,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000097,Central European Policy Institute,http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/anatomy-info-war-how-russias-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-counter-it,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000098,Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats (Czech Ministry of the Interior),https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/Default.aspx,"Operational since 2017, the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats is a division of the Czech Ministry of the Interior designed to monitor and respond to influence operations with public policies and awareness-raising efforts. The center also deals with terrorism, security aspects of migration, extremism, and other disruptions to public order and safety.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000099,Centre for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH),https://www.counterhate.com/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000100,Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy (CEID),https://www.ceid.hu,"CEID conducts research, publishes analysis, and holds roundtable discussions and conferences on how to strengthen transatlantic relationships. The CEID is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis’s #DisinfoNet and cooperated with Ukrainian Prism and the EAST Center in their work on the Disinformation Resilience Index, with the Centre for International Relations in their work on countering Kremlin-backed disinformation, and with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in their “Fog of Falsehood” report on Russian deception in Ukraine.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,Hungary,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000101,Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS),https://www.ceps.eu/,"CEPS conducts research and hosts events and discussions on a range of issues affecting European domestic policies. CEPS has produced a number of publications on EU strategies for understanding and countering disinformation and on content moderation strategies online, including a study commissioned by the European Parliament on possible EU actions to address fake news and emerging threats like deepfakes.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000102,Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI),https://www.cigionline.org/,"CIGI is dedicated to conducting research on Canadian and international public policy and security issues. In June 2019, CIGI partnered with the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity to produce an Election Risk Monitor that assesses threats and potential responses to disinformation in the context of Canada’s elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000103,Centre for International Relations (Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych) (CSM),http://www.csm.org.pl/en/,CSM conducts research and analysis on issues in Polish foreign policy and European policy and is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis’s #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000104,Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST),https://crestresearch.ac.uk/,CREST conducts behavioral and social science research to better understand threats to national security and develop strategies for countering them. The organization has addressed conspiracy theories and online behavior in its work.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000105,"Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA)",https://www.istinomer.rs,"CRTA is dedicated to promoting accountability and transparency in democratic politics. The organization runs a project called Istnomer, which conducts fact-checking and reporting in support of free media, institutional transparency, and political accountability.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000106,CEPS,https://www.ceps.eu/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000107,Certified Content Coalition,https://www.certifiedcontentcoalition.org/,The Certified Content Coalition grew out of CableLabs with the goal of developing standards for trustworthy publishers.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,Y,Y,Y,,Dead website?,
|
||||
G000108,Channel 4 FactCheck,https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/,FactCheck is the fact-checking initiative run by Channel 4 in the United Kingdom.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000109,Chatham House,https://www.chathamhouse.org/,"Chatham House conducts research and analysis on issues in public policy and international peace and security. Chatham House experts have published research and hosted discussions through the International Security Department on issues related to disinformation, information warfare, elections, and global cybersecurity.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000110,Check My Ads,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000111,Check Your Fact,https://checkyourfact.com/,"Check Your Fact is the fact-checking initiative of the Daily Caller. The site is known for its ties to white nationalists. It is one of six third-party organizations working together to fact-check content for American users. The partnership has already come under intense criticism from climate journalists (among others) who are concerned that the Daily Caller’s editorial stance on issues like climate change, will spread even more misinformation Facebook.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000112,Checkology,,,,,Education (public),Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000113,Chequeado,https://chequeado.com/,,,,Fact checking,Verification,,,,,Argentina,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000114,Chile Check,,,,,,,,,,,Chile,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000115,CirroLytix,https://www.cirrolytix.com/,"CirroLytix is a data analytics research company specializing in data ethics and machine learning technologies for social impact. Their tool, ""Troglodyte,"" provides online researchers, journalists and fact checkers with an extensive database for matching sources with information and exposing causal links, conspiracies, and associated disinformation agents.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000116,Cities on the Internet,https://mwi.pl/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Europe,Poland,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000117,Cities on the Internet Association (Stowarzyszenie Miasta w Internecie) (MWI),https://mwi.pl/,"MWI is dedicated to the development of digital competency and literacy in Polish citizens. Through the project Digital Poland of Equal Opportunities, MWI is addressing digital literacy among Polish adults with the help of volunteers that encourage individuals over the age of 50 to engage online. The organization also develops educational materials for and provides training to Polish citizens of all ages.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000118,Citizen Evidence Lab (Amnesty International),https://citizenevidence.org/,"Amnesty International's Citizen Evidence Lab provides resources for researchers, journalists, and activists documenting and exposing human rights abuses using content verification, data science, remote sensing, crowd-sourcing, and digital security tools. One of their projects, called Youtube DataViewer, helps extract information from Youtube videos.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000119,City University of New York: Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism,https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/,The Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism runs the Quality Project in partnership with the World Economic Forum to aggregate efforts to assess the quality of online information and allow users to select a personalized weighting of quality indicators.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000120,Civic online reasoning,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000121,Civil,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000122,Civil Liberties Union for Europe,https://www.liberties.eu/en,"Civil Liberties Union for Europe is network of civil liberties watchdogs that carries out public advocacy and campaigning and that provides research and analysis to policymakers on how to advance civil liberties in law and public policy. Its recent campaigns have concerned censorship, data privacy, the protection of civil society, and migration. The organization has written on efforts to curb disinformation within the European Union and its member states.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000123,ClaimBuster,https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/,ClaimBuster is a tool developed by researchers at the University of Arlington to provide automated live fact-checking.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000124,Clean Up The Internet,https://www.cleanuptheinternet.org.uk,"Clean up the internet is an independent, UK-based organisation concerned about the degradation in online discourse and its implications for democracy. They campaign for evidence-based action to increase civility and respect online, and to reduce online bullying, trolling, intimidation, and misinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000125,Climate Feedback,,,,,Credible content,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000126,Cloudflare,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000127,CNA,https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/cip/information-environment,"Recent CNA work on disinformation topics includes understanding state and non-state malign influence on partners and allies in Europe; identifying and analyzing the range of tools available to state and non-state actors in Africa and the Middle East; examining the use of the cyber domain to conduct information warfare; and analyses of messages, themes, and audiences in the Indo-Pacific region.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000128,Co-inform EU,https://coinform.eu/,Co-Inform brings together universities and small and medium enterprises in Europe to collaborate on tools for digital literacy with the aim of addressing disinformation. The project has put together a glossary on terms related to disinformation and will produce additional tools to be tested in three European countries by 2021.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000129,Cocuyo Chequea,https://efectococuyo.com/category/cocuyo-chequea/,Cucuyo Chequea is the fact-checking arm of Venezuelan media organization Efecto Cucuyo.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Venezuela,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000130,CogSecCollab,http://cogsec-collab.org/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,North America,Global,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000131,Colombia Check,https://colombiacheck.com/,Colombiacheck is a Colombian fact-checking project and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Colombia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000132,Columbia Journalism Review,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000133,Columbia University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000134,"Columbia University: Craig Newmark Center for Journalism, Ethics and Security (Graduate School of Journalism)",https://journalism.columbia.edu/craig-newmark-center,"Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism houses the Craig Newmark Center for Journalism Ethics and Security, which received funding in 2019 and will address journalism ethics in the digital age.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000135,Columbia University: Tow Center for Digital Journalism (Graduate School of Journalism),https://towcenter.columbia.edu,"The Tow Center examines digital journalism's industry-wide economic trends, its cultural shifts, and its relationship with the broader, constantly changing world of technology, and houses the Emergent research project.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000136,Combating Russian Disinformation,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000137,Commerce,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000138,Common Cause social media monitoring,https://www.commoncause.org/our-work/voting-and-elections/election-protection/stopping-cyber-suppression-and-voting-disinformation/,"The national, nonpartisan Election Protection coalition works so all voters have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. Made up of more than 100 local, state and national partners, Election Protection works year-round to advance and defend your right to vote",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000139,Competition and Markets Authority (CMA UK),https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority,"The CMA is an independent non-ministerial department which leads the Government’s Digital Markets Taskforce, and seeks to regulate the digital sphere by: enabling disruptors to challenge incumbents; empowering consumers through choice and control; supporting quality services and content online and providing industry, especially SMEs, with fair access to digital markets to be able grow their businesses.",,Government,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000140,Comprobado CNN CHV (Chile Check),https://www.cnnchile.com/chilecheck/,Comprobado CNN is the fact-checking initiative of CNN Chile.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Chile,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000141,Comprova,https://projetocomprova.com.br,"Comprova is a collaborative fact-checking organization in Brazil that unites journalism partners to investigate, contextualize, and clarify fake news.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000142,Congo Check,http://www.congocheck.net/,Congo Check is a fact-checking and image verification organization based in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,DRC,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000143,CONNECT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000144,ConPruebas,http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/conpruebas,"ConPruebas is a fact-checking project run by Plaza Pública at Rafael Landívar University, inspired by Chequeado.",,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Guatemala,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000145,Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000146,Content blockchain project,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000147,Correctiv,https://correctiv.org/en/,Correctiv is an investigative journalism outfit that provides training for citizens and journalists aimed at reducing the impact of disinformation. The organization also coordinates an annual Campfire Festival to foster conversation around the future of digital journalism and is developing a hub for nonprofit journalists in Europe. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000148,Cortico,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000149,Council on Foreign Relations (CFR),https://cfr.org,"The CFR provides research and analysis on issues related to international public policy, law, and security. Under the mantle of programs like the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program, National Security and Defense Program, U.S. Foreign Policy Program, and Europe Program, CFR scholars have authored reports on containing and countering Russia’s foreign interference efforts, defending American elections from foreign interference, botnets, and deepfakes, among other topics.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000150,Council on Foreign Relations: Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program,https://cfr.org,"The Digital and Cyberspace Policy program addresses one of the most challenging issues facing the country in the twenty-first century: keeping the global internet open, secure, and resilient in the face of unprecedented threats. Digital technologies have become ubiquitous; nearly five billion people use a cell phone, and approximately 4.5 billion are on the internet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000151,Countering Disinfo,https://counteringdisinformation.org/,A guide to promoting information integrity. This resource combines the collective wisdom of organizations on the front lines of combatting disinformation globally. This living project provides an outline of what’s being done to address the challenge in key areas and provides a searchable database of the organizations around the world engaged in making the digital landscape safe for democracy,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000152,Craig Newmark Philanthropies,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000153,Credibility Coalition,https://credibilitycoalition.org/,The Credibility Coalition brings people together to develop common standards for information credibility.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,Y,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000154,Credibility Coalition: Misinfosec Working Group (MisinfosecWG),https://misinfocon.com/misinformation-has-stages-7e00bd917108,"The Credibility Coalition’s Misinfosec Working Group (“MisinfosecWG”) maps information security principles onto misinformation. Their current work is to develop a tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) based framework that gives misinformation researchers and responders a common language to discuss and disrupt misinformation incidents.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000155,CREST,crestresearch.ac.uk,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000156,CrowdTangle,https://www.crowdtangle.com/,"CrowdTangle is owned by Facebook and offers digital strategic communications services. Among many of its services, CrowdTangle provides platform access which allows users to report false news.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000157,CS-ISAO,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000158,CTI League Disinformation Team,https://cti-league.com/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,Global,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000159,CUNY,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000160,CUNY,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000161,CUNY: News Integrity Initiative,https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/centers/tow-knight-center-entrepreneurial-journalism/news-integrity-initiative/,The News Integrity Initiative (NII) at the Newmark J-School was launched in 2017 to advance media literacy and increase trust in journalism.,,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000162,Cyabra,www.cyabra.com,"Cyabra has developed AI-based technologies to identify bots, sockpuppets and trolls in social media platforms, as well as Deep Learning tech against visual manipulations (Deepfakes and GANs) in real-time. Using this technology, Cyabra is able to outline the scope of a disinformation attack within a day rather than the several days it may take human analysts working manually. This elevated timeline provides valuable early detection; an attack identified in real-time offers an opportunity for counter-action or counter-narratives.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000163,Cyan Forensics,https://www.cyanforensics.com,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000164,Czech Elves,https://www.facebook.com/cestielfoveofficial/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000165,Czech Pirate Party (Greens/EFA),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000166,Dagens Nyheter (Faktist),https://www.dn.se/,"Faktist is the fact-checking project of Dagens Nyheter, a Swedish newspaper and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000167,DARPA,,,,Defence/military,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000168,Darwin AI,https://www.darwinai.com,"The Darwin AI team has developed an “Automatic Disinformation Assessment” engine. It is a large scale, bidirectional language model that can detect the stance of an article. The project had an accuracy of 90.01%, which surpasses general benchmarks in the industry. The tool was able to determine whether or not a document agrees, disagrees, or takes no stance towards a specific claim.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000169,Data & Society,https://datasociety.net/research/media-manipulation/,"Data & Society’s Media Manipulation & Disinformation research examines how different groups use the participatory culture of the internet to turn the strengths of a free society into vulnerabilities, ultimately threatening expressive freedoms and civil rights. Efforts to exploit technical, social, economic, and institutional configurations of media can catalyze social change, sow dissent, and challenge the stability of social institutions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000170,Data & Society Research Institute: Disinformation Action Lab,https://datasociety.net/research/disinformation-action-lab/,The Disinformation Action Lab (DAL) at Data & Society forges new approaches to address the complex dynamics underpinning the spread of propaganda and disinformation.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000171,Data & Society Research Institute: Media Manipulation Initiative,https://datasociety.net/research/media-manipulation/,"Data & Society's Media Manipulation Initiative looks at how various qualities of media environments and technologies can be exploited to destabilize democratic, social, and economic institutions. The initiative has produced reports on algorithmic accountability, source hacking, weaponized advertising technology, the amplification of extremist content, and alternative facts, among other topics. Its affiliates have also produced a report on deepfakes and the history of audiovisual manipulation.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000172,Datalyrics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000173,dBunk(r),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000174,DCMS,,,,Government,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000175,Debunk EU,http://debunk.eu/,"DEBUNK is a Lithuanian initiative composed of media organizations, strategic communications professionals, researchers, and technologists that have developed an artificial intelligence tool to identify disinformation within 2 minutes.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000176,Deep Freeze,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000177,Deep Trust Alliance,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000178,Deepnews.ai,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000179,DeepSeer,https://deepseer.ai,DeepSeer provides a platform for social media data analysis and visualization by tracking and mapping online influencers. Their toolset can help identify and track the spread of disinformation on the web. DeepSeer offers measurement tools for the impact of online communications and messaging; enabling assessment of the impact and efficacy of counter disinformation campaigns.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000180,Deeptrace,www.Deeptracelabs.com,Deeptrace is a company developing technologies to detect and monitor synethic or manipulated media (deepfakes).,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000181,DeFacto,https://defacto.space,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000182,Defending Democracy,https://defending-democracy.org,"Defending Democracy is an independent, nonpartisan, transatlantic initiative. that works to support and defend basic values and fundamental freedoms and rights. Regarding internal threats, Defending Democracy focuses on defending democracy, rule of law and human rights. Regarding external threats, Defending Democracy focuses on deterring disinformation, cyber-attacks and political warfare.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000183,Delfi Melo Detekto,https://www.delfi.lt/news/melo-detektorius/,,,,,,disinformation,,,,Lithuania,,,,,,
|
||||
G000184,Demagog Poland,https://demagog.org.pl/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,disinformation,,,Europe,Poland,,,,,,
|
||||
G000185,Demagog.cz,https://demagog.cz/,Demagog.cz conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in the Czech Republic. The project is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000186,Demaskuok,https://demaskuok.lt/en/main-page/,"Demaskuok searches the information ecosystem of the Baltic states for disinformation and propaganda, utilizing an AI tool to flag suspected disinformation, and a network of human fact checkers to verify or discredit flagged content.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000187,Democracy Fund,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000188,Demos - Centre for the Analysis of Social Media,https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000189,Detecteur Rumeurs,https://www.sciencepresse.qc.ca/detecteur-rumeurs,Detecteur Rumeurs is the fact-checking arm of the Montreal-based media company Agence Science Presse.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,Canada,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000190,Detector de Mentiras,https://lasillavacia.com/,Detector de Mentiras (Lie Detector) is a Colombian fact-checking project run by La Silla Vacía and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Colombia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000191,DFID,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000192,DHS,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000193,Digit Eye India,https://digiteye.in/,Digiteye India is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000194,Digital Polarization Initiative,https://www.aascu.org/AcademicAffairs/ADP/DigiPo/,"The Digital Polarization Initiative, or “DigiPo”, is AASCU American Democracy Project's national effort to build student civic, information and web literacy by having students participate in a broad, cross-institutional project to fact-check, annotate, and provide context to the different news stories that show up in Twitter and Facebook feeds.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000195,Digital Sisters; Stop Online Violence Against Women (SOVAW),https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shireen_Mitchell,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000196,Dirt Protocol,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000197,Disinfo Cloud,https://disinfocloud.com,"Disinfo Cloud is an open source platform funded and supported by the U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) and maintained by Park Capital Investment Group LLC (Park Advisors), an implementing partner of the GEC. Disinfo Cloud aims to provide relevant stakeholders an overview of the tools and technologies available to help push back against foreign propaganda and disinformation.",Yes,Government,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000198,Disinformation Tracker,https://www.disinformationtracker.org,"Disinformation Tracker is an interactive map that seeks to support human rights defenders in Sub-Saharan Africa by tracking and analysing all laws, policies and other government actions on disinformation across Sub-Saharan Africa.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Africa,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000199,Dispute Finder,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000200,Doğruluk Payı,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000201,DoubleVerify,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000202,dpa-Faktencheck,https://www.dpa.com/de/unternehmen/faktencheck/,dpa-Faktencheck is the fact-checking arm of the German news organization Deutsche Presse-Agentur GmbH.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Germany,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000203,DQ Institute,https://www.dqinstitute.org/,"With the support of the World Economic Forum, DQ Institute develops global standards for digital intelligence and literacy and develops strategies for education and outreach on these issues. DQI has developed a framework for thinking about digital intelligence and is conducting impact and research assessments to understand the impact of digital technologies and to assess digital intelligence skills around the world.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000204,DROG,https://aboutbadnews.com/,"DROG is a nonprofit that fosters awareness and builds resilience against disinformation through its Bad News game, workshops, and lectures. Bad News is a social impact game that allows individuals to experience the spread of disinformation and see its impact on society.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000205,Dubawa,https://www.dubawa.org/,DUBAWA is a Nigerian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Nigeria,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000206,Duke Reporters Lab / Jigsaw,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000207,Duke Share the Facts Widget,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000208,Duke Tech & Check Cooperative,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000209,Duke University: DeWitt Wallace Center for Media & Democracy,https://reporterslab.org/,"The DeWitt Wallace CMD runs the Duke Reporters' Lab, which conducts research on fact-checking and technological tools to aid fact-checkers. The lab maintains a comprehensive list of fact-checking organizations around the world and runs the Duke Tech & Check Cooperative, which aims to automate fact-checking.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000210,e-Enfance (e-E),https://www.e-enfance.org/,"e-E offers training on risks and threats in cyberspace and best practices for navigating digital spaces to kids in school, their parents, and professionals in the workforce. The platform also offers a free and confidential hotline and message service on Net Ecoute where the public can call in to receive assistance and counseling in the face of cyber threats.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000211,East STRATCOM Task Force: EUvsDisinfo,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/,"The East StratCom Task Force was established to respond to Russian influence operations in Eastern Europe. The task force's flagship project, EUvsDisinfo, monitors and catalogues cases of pro-Russian disinformation and conducts research and analysis on the methods and practices of disinformation and emerging technologies like deepfakes. The task force also trains EU and member state institutions and civil society organizations on disinformation and raises awareness about disinformation in the context of European elections.",,Government,Fact checking,Research (primary/secondary),,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000212,Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC),http://www.eesc.lt/en/,EESC conducts research and analysis on policy issues affecting Eastern Europe and engages the policy community in trainings and seminars on democratic transition. EESC administers a Democracy and Development Assistance Fund to support individuals and organizations in Eastern Europe working to support democracy. Its experts have written on Russian influence operations in Eastern European countries. EESC is also part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000213,EastWest Institute: Global Cooperation in Cyberspace (EWI),https://www.eastwest.ngo/,"EWI is a network of experts that engage in conflict resolution and prevention and provide research and analysis on global challenges to peace and security. EWI’s program on Global Cooperation in Cyberspace ""seeks to reduce conflict, crime and other disruptions in cyberspace and promote stability, innovation and inclusion"" by convening multistakeholder summits, organizing collaborative working groups, and mobilizing around the adoption of global norms in cyberspace.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000214,EC,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000215,Ecuador Chequea,http://www.ecuadorchequea.com/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Ecuador,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000216,EDPS-EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000217,Ekspress Meedia / Eesti Päevaleht,https://epl.delfi.ee/kategooria/86056905/faktikontroll-1,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,disinformation,,,Europe,Estonia,,,,,,
|
||||
G000218,El poder de elegir,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000219,El Sabueso,https://www.animalpolitico.com/elsabueso-rss,"El Sabueso is the fact-checking section of Animal Político, a Mexican media organization, and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Mexico,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000220,Election Integrity Partnership,https://www.eipartnership.net/,"The Election Integrity Partnership is a coalition of research entities focused on supporting real-time information exchange between the research community, election officials, government agencies, civil society organizations, and social media platforms.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000221,Electoral Commission (UK),https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/,"The Electoral Commission is an independent body which regulates the funding of political parties, individual party members, and candidates, as well as organisations campaigning in referenda. It is distinct from other regulators for being answerable to Parliament. It also enforces inclusion of imprints of printed election material under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.",,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000222,Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),https://www.eff.org/,"EFF is dedicated to advancing digital civil liberties through litigation, policy analysis, activism, and technology development. One of EFF’s issue areas is free speech online, and the organization has produced analysis on the need to balance content moderation strategies aimed at combating misinformation with freedom of expression and on how the United States should think about regulating deepfakes.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000223,Ellinika Hoaxes,https://www.ellinikahoaxes.gr/,"Ellinika Hoaxes conducts fact-checking of Greek online content and has created a web tool to inform users when they visit sites that are likely to be satirical, conspiratorial, or otherwise false and misleading. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Greece,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000224,Emergent,http://www.emergent.info/about,Emergent is a real-time rumor tracker and part of a research project with the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University. It focuses on how unverified information and rumor are reported in the media. It aims to develop best practices for debunking misinformation.,Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000225,Estadão Verifica,https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/estadao-verifica,Estadão Verifica is a Brazilian fact-checking initiative housed at Estadão and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000226,Estonia,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000227,Ethical Journalism Network (EJN),https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/supporters/african-media-initiative,"EJN provides training and education to journalists to advance quality media and trust in media institutions. Through its series ""Saving the News: Ethics and the fight for the future of journalism,"" EJN has written on challenges to journalism in an era of declining trust, deepfakes, and journalistic self-regulation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000228,EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000229,EU Disinfo Lab,https://www.disinfo.eu,"EU DisinfoLab is an independent non-profit organisation focused on tackling sophisticated disinformation campaigns targeting the EU, its member states, core institutions, and core values.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000230,EU External Action Service,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000231,EU vs Disinformation,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000232,Eurasia Partnership Foundation,https://epfarmenia.am,,,,,,,,,,Armena,,,,,,Armenia/Eurasia
|
||||
G000233,Eurasian States in Transition Research Center (EAST Center),http://east-center.org/,"EAST Center provides research and analysis on influence operations in Central and Eastern European countries and coordinates the Disinformation Resilience Index. Implemented with regional partners, the Disinformation Resilience Index assesses the vulnerability and resilience of fourteen Central and Eastern European countries to foreign (namely, Russian) disinformation campaigns.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000234,Europe fit for the Digital Age,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000235,European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE),https://www.hybridcoe.fi/,"The Hybrid CoE is a platform for EU and NATO member states to coordinate and share best practices on defending against hybrid threats, including influence operations. The Hybrid CoE engages in research to better understand and respond to threats, identify vulnerabilities, and build resilience, and it provides training and education for governments.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000236,European Conservatives and Reformist Group,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000237,European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR),https://www.ecfr.eu/,"ECFR focuses on European foreign policy and security issues and provides research and analysis, convenes experts and leaders, and engages with national country governments on policy development. ECFR has published a paper on European strategic sovereignty that covers hybrid threats, and its scholars have offered commentary on countering online radicalization, strategies for fighting fake news, Russian cyber threats (including disinformation), and information manipulation in Europe.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000238,European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),https://edmo.eu,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000239,European Digital Rights (EDRi),https://edri.org/,"EDRi is a coalition of European digital human rights groups that seeks to provide public policy research and defend the importance of civil and human rights in the digital environment. To this end, EDRi has addressed influence operations through its work with Civil Liberties Union for Europe and Access Now to produce a joint report on the disinformation debate and policy responses in the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000240,European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS),https://epthinktank.eu/,"EPRS is the in-house research arm of the European Parliament. Through the European Parliament Think Tank, EPRS produces reports, briefings, and in-depth analyses meant to drive legislative development. The think tank has produced a number of reports and briefings on disinformation, information warfare, and hybrid threats that examine topics like artificial intelligence's impact on disinformation, the functioning of the rule of law, the EU and the Western Balkans, NATO strategic communications, influence operations in the EU.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000241,European People's Party (Christian Democrats),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000242,European Union: European External Action Service,https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en,"The EEAS is the EU's diplomatic service. Countering disinformation is one of its key focus areas. The Commission put forward a European approach for tackling online disinformation in its Communication of April 2018, seeking to promote a more transparent, trustworthy and accountable online environment. The Communication proposed measures to tackle disinformation online, including a self-regulatory EU-wide Code of Practice on Disinformation, signed by large online platforms and the advertising industry, as well as support for an independent network of fact-checkers.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000243,European Values (Kremlin Watch),https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/,"European Values runs Kremlin Watch, a program designed to provide monitoring and analysis of Kremlin-backed influence operations. Kremlin Watch provides weekly briefings and other opportunities for information-sharing, policy development advice to national governments, and educational activities for members of the public. European Values is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000244,European Values Center for Security Policy,https://www.europeanvalues.net/data/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000245,eWitness Media Inc,https://ewitness.commons.gc.cuny.edu/,"eWitness provides a digital alibi for images and videos. In today’s digitized world, eWitness helps companies stand by their content, to confidently attest to the time, geolocation and content of the media that appears on their platform . This attestation then eliminates questions against the validity of the media, allowing audiences to focus on the truth and context that surround the media.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,no site found,
|
||||
G000246,Executive round table on digital journalism ethics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000247,Fabula AI,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fabula_AI,"Fabula AI, was acquired by Twitter in June 2019. The tool evaluates the veracity of an article based on the way it spreads online. This means that it can detect a fake news story within 2-20 hours of publishing.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000248,Facebook,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000249,Facebook (UK),,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000250,Facebook Flagging Fake,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000251,Facebook Third-Party Fact-Check,https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536,"Facebook support the use of both technology and human review to remove fake accounts, promote news literacy and disrupt the financial incentives of spammers. In certain countries, they also work with third-party fact-checkers who are certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network to help identify and review false news.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000252,FacktenFinder,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000253,Fact Check - the journal.ie,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000254,Fact Check EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000255,Fact Checking Chile,http://factchecking.cl/,Fact Checking Chile is a fact-checking initiative based at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile that trains students as fact-checkers and content verifiers.,,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Chile,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000256,Factba.se,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000257,FactCheck (The Conversation),https://theconversation.com/us,The Conversation is an online news platform for academics and researchers to share information and evidence in support of sound policy. The organization has a dedicated fact-checking team dedicated to ensuring information integrity.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000258,FactCheck Georgia,https://factcheck.ge/en,FactCheck is an online fact-checking platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Georgian politicians and public figures.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Georgia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000259,FactCheck.kz,http://factcheck.kz/,FactCheck.kz is a fact-checking initiative based in Kazakhstan and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Kazakhstan,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000260,FactChecker.in,https://factchecker.in/,FactChecker.in is an Indian fact-checking initiative run by the Spending & Policy Research Foundation and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000261,Factcheckers,http://factcheckers.it/,Factcheckers is an Italian media literacy organization that provides resources and training to high schools and universities around the world on fact-checking and critical evaluation of information.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000262,FactCrescendo,https://www.factcrescendo.com/,FactCrescendo is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000263,FactLink,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000264,Factly,https://factly.in/,Factly is an Indian organization that conducts fact-checking and helps make government data and information accessible to citizens. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000265,Factmata,https://factmata.com/,"Factmata is building an API to identify, classify, and build trust scores for online content to help users rate the trustworthiness of a source. The company also provides moderation services to help flag potentially harmful content for trust and safety teams at major online platforms, and they organize a blacklist to help clients know which platforms or websites to avoid entirely.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000266,Fake it to Make it,http://www.fakeittomakeitgame.com,"Fake It To Make It gamifies the experience of spreading false news for public consumption, deepening players’ understanding of the process and motives behind false news dissemination.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000267,Fake News Tracker,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000268,Fake Off (20 Minutes),https://www.20minutes.fr/,"Through its Fake Off section, 20 minutes conducts fact-checking, particularly on stories that have gained significant online attention. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000269,FakeHunter,https://fakehunter.pap.pl/en/,"FakeHunter is a community-based project for verifying content published on the Internet, launched by the Polish Press Agency (PAP) together with GovTech Polska. It aims to demystify and refute false information related to the SARS-CoV-2 virus.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000270,FakerFact,https://www.fakerfact.org/,"FakerFact has built an artificial intelligence tool called ""Walt"" to help readers assess the potential biases in news sources, rather than just determining the veracity of the content.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000271,Faking News: Fraudulent News and the Fight for the Truth,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000272,Faktabaari,https://faktabaari.fi/in-english/,Faktabaari is a Finnish fact-checking organization that provides media literacy resources to EU schools.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Finland,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000273,Faktisk,https://www.faktisk.no/,Faktisk is a Norweigan fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network. They also run a school project called Think that aims to educate young students about critical thinking.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Norway,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000274,Faktograf,https://faktograf.hr/,Faktograf conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in Croatia. The organization is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Croatia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000275,Faktograf.hr,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000276,Fandango,https://fandango-project.eu/,"The FANDANGO (Fake news discovery and propagation from big Data Analysis and artificial intelligence operations) project aggregates a large array of media sources so that big data/Machine Learning tools can analyze data to understand patterns within the ecosystem and provide insight to analysts. This technology can support government stakeholders’ mission by facilitating a high-level overview of the disinformation ecosystem, helping to map out and highlight patterns, connections and detection criteria.",Yes,Government,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000277,Fatabyyano,https://fatabyyano.net/,,,,Fact checking,,,,,Africa,North Africa,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000278,Fatima,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000279,FCO,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000280,Federation of American Scientists,https://fas.org/ncov/disinformation-reports/,"Upon recognition of the threat that false information poses to science, the Federation of American Scientists established the Disinformation Research Group (FAS DRG). FAS DRG is composed of scientists, communications experts, data-scientists, and technologists with the intended purpose of detecting, understanding, and effectively exposing disinformation and false narratives surrounding COVID-19. FAS DRG uses multiple methods, technologies, and resources to execute the mission.",,,,,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000281,FeedReflect,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/feedreflect/bigmeipgaifggglelcnpnpbaefimpooc?hl=en-US,FeedReflect is a browser extension for Google Chrome that urges users to consider the quality of the news content they consume on Twitter,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000282,FiB,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000283,Field guide to fake news,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000284,Finding the truth amongst fakes,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000285,Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA),https://www.fiia.fi/,"FIIA conducts research and policy analysis on international relations and the European Union. The institute has research programs on the European Union, Eastern European countries and their relationship with Russia, and global security, and it has published a number of reports on information warfare, hybrid threats, disinformation, and related concepts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000286,FireEye: Information Operations Intelligence Analysis,https://www.fireeye.com/,,,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000287,First Draft News,https://firstdraftnews.org,"First Draft is a nonprofit that aims to provide practical and ethical guidance for journalists and publishers in the digital age. The organization coordinates an international fact-checking initiative, trains journalists and fact-checkers in countries with upcoming elections, and conducts and disseminates research on best practices for producers and consumers of digital news. The organization recently published a series of guides on responsible reporting, including one on reporting on deepfakes.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000288,Fiskkit,http://fiskkit.com/,"Fiskkit is an online platform where users can assess the credibility of news articles, and the organization has also created a tool designed to help schoolchildren evaluate sources.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000289,Ford Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000290,Fortis AI,https://www.alionscience.com,"Fortis is an information operations (IO) platform that takes data from multiple sources and distills it into insights and actionable results. The system aims to alert analysts to adversarial IO, and to provide meaningful analytics, theme and narrative detections, and support for conducting information operations.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000291,FotoForensics,http://fotoforensics.com,"Fotoforensics displays the underlying forensics data of any image uploaded to their platform, thereby providing a user with visual and other data to help determine whether the image has been altered. Fotoforensics’ underlying tools are integrated with other social media intelligence platforms or by social media platforms themselves to improve content moderation and disinformation identification efforts.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000292,Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS),https://www.feps-europe.eu/,"FEPS conducts research and advocacy on European democracy and public policy. Its experts have been involved in studies on foreign state propaganda and Russian hybrid warfare. FEPS also collaborates with the Istituto Affari Internazionali on the EU Global Strategy Watch, which tracks developments in EU Global Strategy implementation.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000293,France 24 - les Observateurs,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000294,Fraunhofer Institute,https://www.aisec.fraunhofer.de/en/fields-of-expertise/cognitivesecurity.html,,,,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000295,Freedom and Solidarity Foundation (Brīvības un Solidaritātes Fonds) (BSF),http://bsf-latvija.lv/,BSF conducts research and advocacy on issues in Latvian public policy and democracy and international peace and security. Its scholars have written on Russian propaganda and work with other organizations to provide opportunities for discussion and collaboration on these issues.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Latvia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000296,Freedom on the Net,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000297,Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES),https://www.fes.de/,"FES conducts advocacy and research on issues related to democracy in Germany and across the world. Through its German headquarters and regional offices, FES has addressed media quality and resilience in Africa, disinformation and propaganda in Ukraine, and disinformation in debates about migration within the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000298,Fsecure,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000299,Full Fact,https://fullfact.org/,Full Fact conducts fact-checking and verification and provides research and training on fact-checking efforts. Full Fact also works with the British government to make government data more available to citizens and to enhance transparency in communication.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000300,Fundação Getúlio Vargas Department of Public Policy Analysis (FGV DAPP),https://observa2018.com.br/,"During the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, FGV DAPP coordinated the Digital Democracy Room to monitor public debate and potential threats to its integrity. Through this initiative, FGV DAPP provided research and analysis on issues related to misinformation online, bot networks, and foreign influence in public discourse and worked with the Consultative Council on Internet and Elections of the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court. FGV has also joined the Atlantic Council's #ElectionWatch project, which monitored foreign influence in Brazilian, Colombian, and Mexican elections in 2018.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Investigations,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000301,Fundación La Voz Pública,https://chequeado.com/,"Fundación La Voz Pública is dedicated to strengthening the quality of public debate in Argentina. The organization runs an initiative called Chequeado, which conducts fact-checking and trains fact-checkers and journalists. The organization also creates innovative tools for improving fact-checking and the dissemination of knowledge.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Research (primary/secondary),,,,South America,Argentina,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000302,Fundamedios,http://54.85.84.127/,"Fundamedios is an organization committed to promoting freedom of expression, monitor aggressions and risks faced by journalists, and uphold human rights in Latin America. The organization has experience in monitoring, promoting and protecting freedom of expression and freedom of the press; boosting high-quality reporting; training journalists; carrying out studies and research, and promoting open discussion about journalism, media, and democracy in Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, and the USA. Fundamedios also runs Ecuador Chequea, which is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000303,Future Digital Threats to Democracy (Technology for Global Security),https://www.tech4gs.org/future-digital-threats-to-democracy.html,"Tech4GS is a new type of non-profit: part think tank, part incubator, and purely nonpartisan. As part of a two-year, multi-disciplinary effort to address the ways in which democracies and open societies combat high-tech illiberalism, they have partnered with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) to launch the joint project “Future Digital Threats to Democracy.”",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000304,"Gallup/Knight Foundation Survey on Trust, Media and Democracy (2017)",https://knightfoundation.org/reports/american-views-trust-media-and-democracy/,,,,Education (public),Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000305,GeoPoll,https://www.geopoll.com/,GeoPoll specializes in global and emerging market research. Their work focuses on two main areas: Monitoring and evaluation; and counter-narratives. Their work on counternarratives aims to counter or expose disinformation through targeted messaging as well as gathering information on fake news and identifying the most effective channels to disseminate counter messages.,,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),Credible content,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,Also Kenya,
|
||||
G000306,"George Washington University: Institute for Data, Democracy, and Politics",https://iddp.gwu.edu,"The Institute for Data, Democracy & Politics (IDDP)’s mission is to help the public, journalists, and policymakers understand digital media’s influence on public dialogue and opinion, and to develop solutions to disinformation and other challenges that arise in these spaces.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000307,Georgetown University: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,https://isd.georgetown.edu,"SD sponsors working groups in collaboration with other elements of the School and the University as well as non-academic groups that bring together high-level, experienced practitioners and eminent scholars to examine emerging international and statecraft issues and recommend policy solutions. In October 2020, ISD released a report titled ""The New Weapon of Choice: Technology and Information Operations Today""",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000308,Georgetown University: Law School Center on Privacy and Technology (CPT),https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/,"CPT studies the impact of government surveillance and commercial data practices on vulnerable communities, provides intellectual and legal foundations for reforms to U.S. consumer privacy laws, and offers technology-intensive courses that prepare students to be leaders in privacy practice, policy making, and advocacy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000309,German Council on Foreign Relations (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik) (DGAP),https://dgap.org/,DGAP conducts research and advocacy on issues in German public policy and international relations. The organization's experts have published on Russian propaganda efforts in German politics.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000310,German Marshall Fund: Digital Innovation & Democracy Initiative (GMF),https://www.gmfus.org/digital-innovation-and-democracy-initiative,"The German Marshall Fund runs a Digital Innovation & Democracy Initiative, which focuses more broadly on the relationship between technological developments and democratic values.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000311,German Marshall Fund: Mercator European Dialogue (GMF),https://www.gmfus.org/forum/mercator-european-dialogue,"GMF organizes the Mercator European Dialogue, a network of European members of parliaments that meets to discuss public policy issues, in cooperation with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, the Istituto Affari Internazionali, and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Through this program, GMF convened European policymakers in May 2019 to discuss disinformation in European elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000312,Get Bad News (DROG),https://getbadnews.com/#intro,"DROG develops programs and courses and conducts research aimed at recognizing disinformation, especially online. In Get Bad News, you take on the role of fake news-monger. Drop all pretense of ethics and choose a path that builds your persona as an unscrupulous media magnate. But keep an eye on your ‘followers’ and ‘credibility’ meters. Your task is to get as many followers as you can while slowly building up fake credibility as a news site. But watch out: you lose if you tell obvious lies or disappoint your supporters!",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000313,Giant Language Model Test Room (GLTR),http://gltr.io,The Giant Language Model Test Room offers a forensic analysis of and rates the likelihood that a snippet of text was generated by an automated system or written by a human. GLTR can be used to analyze and detect fake text or as an educational tool to allow the public to check the likelihood of whether a piece of content is human-written or machine-generated and demonstrate the capabilities of AI to generate fake news.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000314,GIZ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000315,Global Alliance for Responsible Media (GARM),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000316,Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC),https://cyberstability.org/,"GCSC was created with the goal of promoting mutual awareness and understanding among the various communities addressing international cybersecurity. GCSC has pursued research on the development of global norms in cyberspace, defining the public core of the Internet, and protection of electoral infrastructure, among other issues.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000317,Global Council to Build Trust in Media and Fight Misinformation,https://www.globalmis.info/,"In 2018, the Ethical Journalism Network, European Broadcasting Union, Global Editors Network, Global Forum for Media Development, Online News Association, and World Editor's Forum launched the Global Council to Build Trust in Media and Fight Misinformation. The council's mission is to create a repository of resources and information, connect key stakeholders, identify and implement innovative solutions for newsrooms, and serve as a voice for the media industry in addressing the problem of misinformation and declining trust in newsrooms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,World,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000318,Global Disinformation Index (GDI),https://disinformationindex.org/,GDI is developing an artificial intelligence tool to create automated disinformation ratings for news organizations to assess the likelihood that they carry disinformation.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000319,Global Focus,http://www.global-focus.eu/,"Global Focus conducts advocacy, research, and analysis around Romanian public policy issues and international peace and security. The organization has launched an international initiative to combat disinformation and influence operations and has convened a seminar in Bucharest to address ways to build resilience and respond to threats. Global Focus is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Romania,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000320,Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD),https://gfmd.info,"GFMD is a network of journalism support and media assistance groups committed to advancing free, independent, sustainable and pluralistic news ecosystems. Its Internet Governance Working Group has developed a focus on disinformation and misinformation and focuses its advocacy efforts on how the underlying mechanisms of the digital economy enable the manipulation of online spaces and the proliferation of dis/misinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000321,GLOBSEC Policy Institute,https://www.globsec.org/,"GLOBSEC conducts research and analysis of issues in public policy and international peace and security. The organization runs a program on strategic communication, through which it publishes analysis on disinformation in Europe and resiliency to influence operations. In 2018, GLOBSEC announced a project on hybrid threats meant to support the development of public policies, monitoring threats, and capacity-building within the Slovakian government.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000322,Go Think Initiative,https://www.facebook.com/GoThinkInitiative/,"Go Think Initiative is dedicated to convening European organizations and experts to address changes in the media landscape and cultivate an awareness of the media's role in politics. The organization has held professional media literacy workshops as part of its V4 Think Media project, and it develops games to help citizens understand media, propaganda, and the importance of civic participation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000323,Good of All,http://goodofall.org,"In collaboration with Kansas State University, Good of All has created a modification to a popular video game, Grand Theft Auto, to explore topics of censorship, protection of democracies, and freedom of speech. This modified version of the game, called Grand Theft Democracy, simulates a fictional nation’s presidential election and requires players to strategize to steer a population into voting for a certain candidate. They have stated that this approach could raise awareness of how disinformation/ propaganda may be employed by adversaries.",,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000324,Google,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000325,Google Cloud,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000326,Google News Initiative,https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com,The Google News Initiative works with the news industry to help journalism thrive in the digital age.,,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000327,Google News Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000328,Google/YouTube,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000329,GovLab-NYU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000330,Graphika,https://graphika.com/,"Graphika provides companies with tools to analyze online conversations and detect disinformation campaigns. Its lab division partners with academic institutions to advance its social network analysis, machine learning, and artificial intelligence capabilities.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,Research (primary/secondary),,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000331,Ground News,https://www.ground.news/,"Ground news is a news comparison platform to help the public make sense of stories across the political spectrum. With the rise of mis/disinformation and increasingly polarized news sources, Ground News provides an app that shows side by side comparisons of different sources’ coverage of a story, along with tools for users to analyze and draw their own conclusions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000332,Group M,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000333,Group of the European People's Party: Christian Democrats,,,,,,,,,,Europe,Latvia,,,,,,
|
||||
G000334,Grover,https://grover.allenai.org/,"Grover technology works by generating its own ‘neural fake news’, which is then used to detect similar articles. The Grover model can generate an article against a specific news source, author, and date. Users of the tool also give the articles a headline that the content is then based off of.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,not accessible,
|
||||
G000335,GTRI,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000336,Guardian,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000337,Hacked off,https://hackinginquiry.org,,,Civil Society/NGO,Influencer (on policy),,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000338,Hacker Factory,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000339,Hacks Hackers,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000340,Hamilton68 dashboard,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000341,Hanns Seidel Stiftung,https://www.hss.de/en/,"Hanns Seidel Stiftung conducts research and training and promotes international cooperation in public policy. Its researchers have published analysis on social media and bots, disinformation, and political campaigning.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000342,Harvard,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000343,Harvard Shorenstein Center,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000344,Harvard University: Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society,https://cyber.harvard.edu,"The Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University is dedicated to exploring, understanding, and shaping the development of the digitally-networked environment. A diverse, interdisciplinary community of scholars, practitioners, technologists, policy experts, and advocates, it seeks to tackle the most important challenges of the digital age while keeping a focus on tangible real-world impact in the public interest. The faculty conducts research, builds tools and platforms, educates others and facilitates dialogue across and among diverse communities.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000345,Harvard University: Defending Digital Democracy (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs),https://www.belfercenter.org/,"Defending Digital Democracy develops solutions to share threat information with technology providers, governments and political organizations. It also provides election administrators, election infrastructure providers, and campaign organizations with practical “playbooks” to improve their cybersecurity. Other activities include develoing strategies for how democracies can credibly deter hostile actors from engaging in cyber and information operations, assessing emerging technologies that may improve the integrity of systems and processes vital to elections and democracy and Convening civic, technology, and media leaders to develop best practices that can shield public discourse from adversarial information operations.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000346,Harvard University: Nieman Foundation for Journalism,https://nieman.harvard.edu/,"The Nieman Foundation for Journalism provides fellowships, publications, and training opportunities around developments in journalism. Through Nieman Lab, the foundation is reporting on how newsrooms are adapting to the digital landscape, including to the threat of disinformation, declining trust in news media, and the proliferation of deepfakes.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000347,"Harvard University: Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy",https://shorensteincenter.org/,"Harvard University's Technology and Social Change Research Project at the Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy investigates the impact of new media on truth and trust. Its researchers have created the Global Media Manipulation Case Book, and the center also publishes the Misinformation Review to track academic research on the topic. The Shorenstein Center also hosts a Digital Platforms & Democracy project that focuses on the ways in which digital platforms shape public debate and regulatory tools for addressing them.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000348,Health Feedback,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000349,Henry Jackson Society (HJS),https://henryjacksonsociety.org/,HJS conducts research and analysis on issues related to international peace and security and democracy promotion abroad. HJS personnel have recently addressed issues of Russian disinformation and fake news as threats to Western democracy.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000350,Hercule,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000351,Heritage Foundation,https://www.heritage.org,"The Heritage Foundation provides research and advocacy on U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Scholars at the Heritage Foundation have authored reports and commentary on Russian disinformation, and the organization has hosted events around this issue. Researchers at Heritage have also written on Chinese psychological warfare.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000352,HO@X,http://hoax.cz/cze/,"HO@X aims to inform the public about digital hoaxes, i.e. widely spread email chain messages that pose some kind of threat to users. HO@X offers a public database that catalogs emails and news stories known to be fraudulent.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000353,Hoaks Atau Fakta?,https://www.kompas.com/,"Hoaks Atau Fakta? Is the fact-checking initiative of Kompas.com, an Indonesian media platform, and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000354,Hoover Institution,https://www.hoover.org/,"The Hoover Institution ""seeks to improve the human condition by advancing ideas that promote economic opportunity and prosperity, while securing and safeguarding peace for America and all mankind."" Scholars affiliated with the institution have published on disinformation, content moderation, information operations, and information warfare, both in academic contexts and in informal commentaries.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000355,Hypothes.is,https://web.hypothes.is/,The Hypothesis Project is an effort to create an open source software that allows users to annotate online content and fact-check the news.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000356,IAB Europe/ OPA Europe,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000357,iAgents Lab,https://iagentntu.github.io/,"Affiliated with National Taiwan University, Intelligent Agents Laboratory (iAgents Lab) is developing technical applications for improving people's lives and proposing available solutions on social problems. Social media users can use iAgents Lab's algorithm to identify disinformation in real time.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000358,IBM Consulting,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000359,IBM CPD Explorer,https://www.ibm.com/watson,The IBM Counter Propaganda and Disinformation (CPD) Explorer retrieves thousands of news articles and social media posts in real-time and analyzes each post to quickly determine instances of disinformation and propaganda and visualizes the results of the analysis and classification within a dynamic cloud-based dashboard.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000360,Identifact,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000361,IDS-Sussex University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000362,IFEX,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000363,Iffy Quotient (University of Michigan),https://csmr.umich.edu/platform-health-metrics/,"The Iffy Quotient is a web-based tool that queries Facebook and Twitter and identifies URLs that are known to be biased or to be frequent reporters of false information. The tool then calculates the percentage of URLs on each site that are ""iffy,"" or known for reporting false or misleading information.",Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000364,Image Verification Assistant (Reveal),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000365,IMPRESS,https://www.impress.press,UK press regulator,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000366,Independent,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000367,Index on Censorship,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000368,India Today Fact Check,https://www.indiatoday.in/fact-check,India Today Fact Check is the fact-checking arm of India Today's website.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000369,Indiana University: Observatory on Social Media (OSoMe),https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/,"OSoMe uses social media data to develop tools for visualizing the diffusion of information and misinformation online. OSoMe's goal is that individuals and journalists will use these tools to make their own assessments about the trustworthiness of news sources and to contribute to the growing field of data journalism. OSoMe also houses Hoaxy, a web-based tool that visualizes the spread of articles online. Hoaxy searches for claims and fact-checking going back to 2016. It tracks the sharing of links to stories from low-credibility sources and independent fact-checking organizations. It also calculates a bot score, which is a measure of the likely level of automation.",Yes,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000370,Individual - Adam Shostack,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000371,Individual - Dominic Dodd,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000372,Influence Apps,https://startinfluence.com/,"Influence Apps, Inc. is a strategic communications tool that simplifies complex technologies and techniques to help governments counter bad actors online. Powered by ad tech industry and government communications experts, Influence offers a suite of services that provide government operators tools for real-time sentiment analysis and communication campaign management.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000373,Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO UK),,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000374,Information Disorder Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000375,Information Operations Archive,https://www.io-archive.org/#/,The Information Operation Archive hosts publicly available and rigorously attributed datapoints from known Information Operations on social media platforms.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000376,Institute for Public Relations (IPR),https://instituteforpr.org/,"IPR provides research and advocacy around marketing and communications. Its current strategic priorities include restoring reputation in an environment of low trust, and the organization has launched a ""Disinformation in Society"" report in 2019 with plans to release future editions annually.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000377,Institute for Statecraft (Integrity Initiative),https://www.statecraft.org.uk,"The Institute for Statecraft is an independent, Scottish, charitable body whose work seeks to improve governance and enhance national security. They launched the Integrity Initiative in 2015 to defend democracy against disinformation. Its website was temporarily taken down, pending an investigation into the theft of data from the Institute.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000378,Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD),https://isdglobal.org,"ISD provides research, education and advocacy, and policy advising on issues concerning far-right radicalization, Islamist extremism, disinformation, and polarization. The Institute also partners with governments, civil society organizations, and private companies to develop policies and best practices for countering violent extremism both on- and off-line, and provide training to governments and citizens for countering violent extremism.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Education (public),,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000379,Institute for Strategic Research of France (Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire) (IRSEM),https://www.irsem.fr/,"IRSEM is the research arm of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces and provides analysis on issues in defense and security. IRSEM, in partnership with the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, has produced a comprehensive report on influence operations and recommendations for governments, civil society organizations, and private actors for mitigating the impact of hostile influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000380,Institute for the Future: Digital Intelligence Lab,http://www.iftf.org/partner-with-iftf/research-labs/digital-intelligence-lab/,"The Institute for the Future’s Digital Intelligence Lab conducts research on disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of American politics. Its publications include The Human Consequences of Computational Propaganda, a series of eight case studies from the 2018 U.S. midterm elections; Digital Propaganda and the News, a series of three reports concerning how disinformation affects journalism; Principles and Policies to Counter Deceptive Digital Politics; State-Sponsored Trolling; and The Biology of Disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000381,Instituto Igarapé,https://igarape.org.br/,Instituto Igarapé conducts research and analysis on Brazilian and international security and development with a thematic focus on cybersecurity. The organization's experts have written on the role of bots in Brazilian political discourse and disinformation in Latin America more generally. Its researchers also create data visualization tools to help address problems in security and development.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000382,Inter-American Dialogue,https://www.thedialogue.org/,"The Inter-American Dialogue is dedicated to research and analysis on issues of public policy and international affairs affecting North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean. It conducts research and advocacy on issues related to media, elections, and potential foreign influence through its Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000383,International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS),https://icds.ee/,"The ICDS research program on Security and Resilience addresses hostile influence strategies and operations and information warfare through research and advocacy. The organization collaborated on the Disinformation Resilience Index to assess Estonia's resilience to influence operations, and it hosted a development cooperation program supported by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs titled ""Resilient Ukraine: civil society support for strengthening national resilience and security in Ukraine.""",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,Estonia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000384,International Fact Checking Network (IFCN),https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,The International Fact-Checking Network is a unit of the Poynter Institute dedicated to bringing together fact-checkers worldwide. The IFCN was launched in September 2015 to support a booming crop of fact-checking initiatives by promoting best practices and exchanges in this field.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,Y,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000385,International Forum for Democratic Studies (National Endowment for Democracy),https://www.ned.org/international-forum-for-democratic-studies/,The NED's International Forum for Democratic Studies is a leading center for analysis and discussion of the theory and practice of democracy around the world. The forum's areas of focus include authoritarian influence and the information space.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000386,International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA),https://www.idea.int/,"International IDEA conducts research and builds capacity in electoral processes, constitution-building, political participation, and political representation. Through its work on ICT, Elections and Democracy, International IDEA has developed guidance on appropriate uses of social media in electoral contexts and has convened experts to discuss the spread of misinformation about voting registration and practices.",,Government,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000387,International Republican Institute: Beacon Project (IRI),https://www.iribeaconproject.org/,"IRI has established the Beacon Project to address state-sponsored influence operations, particularly those emanating from Russia. The project identifies and exposes false or misleading information and helps facilitate a response with its local partners. The organization has also developed a media monitoring tool called >versus< that it shares with local media partners in Central and Eastern Europe. The Beacon Project is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000388,International Standard Content Code,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000389,Internet Archive TV News Archive,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000390,Internet Association,https://internetassociation.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000391,Internet Health Report,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000392,INTERNETLAB: Law and Technology Research Center,http://www.internetlab.org.br/en/,"Through its project on Electoral Rights in the Digital Era, INTERNETLAB has convened experts in electoral law and experts on the digital environment to address issues like digital propaganda and the use of bots in elections. INTERNETLAB has also produced a guidebook for citizens navigating technology platforms titled ""Surviving on the Networks,"" and it runs a project titled Você na mira meant to empower citizens in the face of digital microtargeting during elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000393,Internews Ukraine,https://internews.org/,"Internews Ukraine supports the development of free and independent media in Ukraine through advocacy, legislative efforts, training for journalists, and countering propaganda and misinformation online. The organization has created a communication strategy for advocating Ukraine's integration in the European Union and countering propaganda created by pro-Russian forces.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Ukraine,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000394,InVid,https://www.invid-project.eu/,InVid is an EU-funded project dedicated to building a platform for assessing the reliability and authenticity of online video content.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000395,IP2 Location,https://ip2location.com,"P2 Location’s software identifies the geolocation of IP addresses, as well as whether the IP address is an anonymous proxy, VPN, or TOR IP address. It retrieves geolocation information with no explicit permission required from users.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000396,IREX,https://www.irex.org/,"IREX works globally to promote inclusive and democratic societies by creating informed, educated, and civically active citizenries. IREX has partner organizations located around the world to aid in developing capacity for independent media. IREX has implemented a Learn to Discern program for educating citizens in Ukraine about the threat of manipulative information and building digital literacy skills.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000397,ISAO,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000398,ISBA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000399,ISOC,https://www.internetsociety.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000400,Istinomer,https://www.istinomer.rs/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000401,Istinomjer,https://istinomjer.ba/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000402,Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI),https://www.iai.it/,"IAI provides research and analysis on issues in Italian public policy, international peace and security, and European integration. The organization's experts have published analysis on social media, truth, and European politics. IAI works with the German Marshall Fund to organize the Mercator European Dialogue, a network of members of European parliaments that meets to discuss public policy issues. Through the program, the German Marshall Fund and its partners convened policymakers to discuss disinformation and fake news in European elections in May 2019.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Italy,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000403,Italian Postal and Communications Police Service (Polizia Postale e delle Comunicazioni),https://www.commissariatodips.it/,"In advance of elections in 2018, the Italian government established an online platform where citizens can report false or misleading information and request verification. The platform is managed by the Postal and Communications Police Service, which is responsible for information and communications technology-related crimes.",,Government,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000404,İzlemedeyiz,http://izlemedeyiz.org/en/#intro,"İzlemedeyiz is dedicated to increasing transparency and accountability in the Turkish government through providing information for private sector entities about government activities. The organization also runs Doğruluk Payı, which conducts fact-checking.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Asia,Turkey,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000405,Jigsaw,https://jigsaw.google.com/,"Jigsaw employs scientists, engineers, researchers, designers, and policy experts to create online tools and platforms dedicated to addressing repressive censorship, online harassment, violent extremism, and injustice and corruption. Jigsaw has contributed data and conducted research on the topic of disinformation, deepfakes, and fake news. They have also partnered with the Duke Reporters' Lab to develop the ""Share the Facts"" widget to help Internet users share fact-checked information.",Yes,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000406,Jordanian Media Credibility Monitor (AKEED),https://akeed.jo/en,The Jordanian Media Credibility Monitor is a project of the Jordan Media Institute that aims to support the development of quality media in Jordan.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Jordan,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000407,Journalist,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000408,Keyhole,https://keyhole.co/,"Keyhole provides a platform of tools to measure the impact of social campaigns. The company tracks, measures, and reports on the success of social campaigns. The company offers a real-time dashboard of metrics and analysis points. The solution focuses on hashtag and influencer data, and measures metrics such as reach, impressions, engagement and followers. Using this tool, users can set goals and calculate the impact and success of a social campaign on Twitter, Youtube, Instagram or Facebook.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000409,Kharon,https://www.kharon.com,Kharon is a research and analytics firm that generates insight about sanctions-related risk intelligence. Kharon works with financial services firms and other multinational institutions. Kharon utilizes a proprietary technology and a staff of expert analysts to identify and map connections between individuals and entities that have been sanctioned by different governments and international bodies and their associates.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000410,Kings College London: Centre for Strategic Communications,https://www.centreforstrat.com/,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000411,"Knight commission on trust, media and democracy",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000412,Knight Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000413,Knight Prototype Fund,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000414,Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,https://www.kas.de/,"Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung is a political foundation that provides research and advocacy on German public policy issues. Its researchers have written on influence operations in Europe, fact-checking in Africa, and extremism online, among other topics related to disinformation and foreign interference.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000415,Kosh Archive (Tattle),https://tattle.co.in/products/kosh,"Main archive that contains content scraped from all the different sources- the Tattle Jod telegram bot, Fact-checking sites, social media and chat apps.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,India,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000416,Kremlin Watch,https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000417,KRIK,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000418,Krik,https://www.krik.rs/,"OCCRP's Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK) is dedicated to supporting Serbian investigative journalism. Comprised of both non-profit journalism centers and for-profit media organizations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, OCCRP aims to use investigative reporting and fact-checking to expose and deter corruption.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000419,Krypometri,https://kallxo.com/krypometer/,"Krypometri is the fact-checking arm of Kallxo.com, an online platform edicated to reporting on corruption, organized crime, fraud, and abuse in Kosovo. The organization is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Kosovo,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000420,La Chistera,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000421,La Voce,https://www.lavoce.info/,La Voce is an Italian online news platform and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000422,Labor of Love,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000423,Latvia,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000424,Le Monde (Les Décodeurs),https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/,Le Monde's Les Décodeurs is the French newspaper's fact-checking platform and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000425,Lead Stories,https://leadstories.com/,Lead Stories is an online platform that tracks trending news stories to identify and debunk false or misleading information as quickly as possible. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000426,Les Decrypteurs,https://ici.radio-canada.ca/decrypteurs,,,,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000427,Les Observateurs (France 24),https://observers.france24.com/en/,Les Observateurs is a project of France 24 that is dedicated to empowering citizen journalists by verifying and publishing eyewitness accounts of news stories. The platform is part of the International Fact-Checking Network and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000428,Leviathan,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000429,Libération (Check News),"https://www.liberation.fr/desintox,99721",Libération's CheckNews is the current fact-checking platform for the French newspaper and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000430,Lie Detectors,https://lie-detectors.org,"Lie Detectors' news literacy project aims to turn schoolchildren in Europe aged 10-15 into powerful lie detectors and critical thinkers, empowering them to understand news media, make informed choices and resist peer pressure as they assemble their worldview.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000431,Linterna Verde,https://linternaverde.co/,"Linterna Verde provides research and analysis on issues concerning information and debate online, private and public regulation of the online information space, and civil rights and liberties. One of its ongoing projects concerns the dynamics of political messaging on WhatsApp.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,South America,Colombia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000432,Logically,https://www.logically.ai/,"Logically builds products and services to meet modern challenges in combating misinformation, disinformation, propaganda campaigns and identifying problematic content in the digital domain space.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000433,London Institute for Contemporary Christianity (LICC),https://licc.org.uk/,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000434,London School of Economics (LSE),,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000435,London School of Economics: Arena (Institute of Global Affairs),http://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/arena,"Housed at the Institute of Global Affairs, Arena is a programme dedicated to overcoming the challenges of disinformation. The aim of the Arena programme is to use high-quality research, analysis and evaluation to create effective best practices that can then be disseminated to journalists, public diplomacy teams and civic groups.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000436,London School of Economics: Department of Media and Communications,http://www.lse.ac.uk/media-and-communications/truth-trust-and-technology-commission,"The LSE Truth, Trust and Technology (T3) Commission deals with the crisis in public information. They work with experts, practitioners and the public to identify structural causes of media misinformation and set out a new framework for strategic policy in a report. T3 is funded by the LSE Knowledge Exchange & Impact Fund.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000437,"London School of Economics: Truth, Trust and Technology (T3) Commission",,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000438,Loughborough University,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000439,Lui President,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000440,Luminate,,,,,Funders,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000441,Lund University: Department of Strategic Communication (Lunds Universitet Strategisk Kommunikation),https://www.isk.lu.se/en/research/research-projects/countering-disinformation-protecting-elections,"Lund University's Department of Strategic Communication has been commissioned by more than a dozen organizations including the UK Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), EU-NATO Hybrid Centre of Excellence and NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence to produce hands-on guidance, processes and training to counter influence operations.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000442,Mafindo,https://www.mafindo.or.id/,Mafindo is an organization dedicated to fact-checking and exposing hoaxes in Indonesian media and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000443,Main Street One,https://mainstreet.one/,Main Street One is a technology company dedicated to identifying online narratives and producing countermessaging on behalf of clients.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000444,Maldito Bulo,https://maldita.es/malditobulo/,Maldito Bulo conducts fact-checking of stories circulating online and creates web-based tools to help news consumers identify false or misleading information. Maldito Bulo is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network. The organization also runs training programs at universities and other public and private institutions.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000445,Manipulátoři,https://manipulatori.cz/,"Manipulátoři provides perspective and insights on politics and strategic communications at a time of rampant disinformation, misinformation, and fake news.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000446,Markkula Center for Applied Ethics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000447,Marvelous AI,https://marvelous.ai/,Marvelous AI is a technology company that is dedicated to identifying and analyzing online narratives and their imapct on public discourse.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000448,Masaryk University: Department of Political Science (Masarykova Univerzita Katedra Politologie),https://www.fakescape.cz/en,"Masaryk University developed Fakescape, an escape game for high school students designed to teach media literacy and critical thinking skills.",Yes,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000449,McKinsey,,Mike Chui,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000450,Media Cloud,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000451,Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI),https://www.mediadefence.org/,"MLDI is an organization dedicated to providing legal defense in support of freedom of the press around the world. Alongside the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the International Fact-Checking Network, MLDI helped set up the Fact-checkers Legal Support Initiative. MLDI also partners with organizations around the world dedicating to advancing legal protection for journalists and developing independent media organizations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000452,Media Literacy for Citizenship (EAVI),https://eavi.eu/,"EAVI is an organization that conducts research and advocacy on media literacy in Europe. EAVI has conducted research to define and measure media literacy in Europe and provided policy recommendations for advancing media literacy in the bloc, and the organization creates curriculum and online tools for educating young people about media literacy.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Education (public),,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000453,Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000454,Media Monitoring Africa (MMA),"
|
||||
https://mediamonitoringafrica.org/","MMA promotes access to media and media freedom and conducts monitoring and evaluation of media quality in South Africa, especially during elections. The organization also provides monitoring assistance to other organizations, media literacy training, training for journalists covering human rights issues, and online tools for citizens seeking to improve media literacy and strengthen journalistic accountability.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,South Africa,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000455,Media Ownership Monitor,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000456,Media Well,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000457,MediaBias Fact Check,https://mediabiasfactcheck.com,"Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC), founded in 2015, is an independent online media outlet. MBFC is dedicated to educating the public on media bias and deceptive news practices.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000458,MediaLab (Agence France Presse),https://www.afp.com/en/agency/medialab,"AFP is a leading global news agency providing fast, comprehensive and verified coverage of the events shaping our world and of the issues affecting our daily lives. Drawing from an unparalleled news gathering network across 151 countries, AFP is also a world leader in digital verification. With 2,400 staff representing 100 different nationalities, AFP covers the world in six languages, with a unique quality of multimedia storytelling spanning video, text, photos and graphics.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000459,MediaMath,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000460,Medium,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000461,Meedan,https://meedan.com,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000462,Meedan.org,https://meedan.com/,"Meedan.org is a nonprofit that creates tools for journalists and translators. One of its projects, Check, has focused on providing online tools and training resources for journalists to combat the spread of false or misleading information. The organization also runs a Credibility Coalition, aimed at creating a holistic framework for assessing credibility in the media context, and a Content Moderation Project, which addresses technical and theoretical issues related to the practice of content moderation online.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000463,Memex,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000464,Memo 98,http://memo98.sk/,"MEMO 98 is an organization that monitors media, largely during elections, and provides monitoring reports and recommendations on media legislation to international institutions and civil society groups. The organization also provides training and capacity-building support to national organizations conducting media evaluation. Memo 98 works with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on their international election observation efforts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000465,Mention,https://mention.com/en/,"Mention is a social media and web monitoring tool offering real-time alerts for keywords and allowing users to monitor millions of sources.
|
||||
The company monitors popular sites such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Pinterest in order to alert users when keywords are used.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000466,MentionMapp Analytics,https://mentionmapp.com/,"Mentionmapp technology enables visualization of the spread of Twitter trends, including identification of influencers. They also offer services to aid analysis of bot activity.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000467,Metafact,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000468,Metro (Viralgranskaren),https://www.metro.se/viralgranskaren,"Through its Viralgranskaren (Viral Reviewer), Metro conducts fact-checking and organizes a list of sites that produce satirical news that is sometimes mistaken for true information or that produce deliberately false and misleading information. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000469,Mexico,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000470,MGP Fact Check,http://www.mygopen.com,"MGP Fact Check is an independent organization based in Hsinchu, Taiwan. Since 2015, they have been offering free fact checking services to users of Line, a popular messaging app in Taiwan.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000471,Microsoft Belgium: cybersecurity,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000472,Microsoft: Defending Democracy Program,https://news.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/topic/defending-democracy-program/,"The Defending Democracy Program will work with stakeholders including governments, non-government organizations, academics and industry all in democratic countries globally to protect campaigns from hacking; increase political advertising transparency online; explore technological solutions to preserve and protect electoral processes; and defend against disinformation campaigns.",,Technology,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000473,Midstream Technology,http://midstream.us,"Midstream Technology's ""Aletheia"" algorithm is a method for identifying specific patterns and behaviors exhibited by networks of accounts in social media. The Aletheia platform can identify global behaviors indicative of astroturf campaigns. Then, using metadata and account posting patterns, identify which accounts are malicious bots gaming recommendation algorithms and which are genuine human run accounts. It can also pick up on rhetorical cues common in disinformation, such as sensationalization of information or pick up on behaviors from the network pushing the disinformation.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000474,Mimikama,https://www.mimikama.at/,Mimikama conducts fact-checking and provides media literacy resources.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Austria,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000475,Mind Over Media,https://propaganda.mediaeducationlab.com/node/1,"Mind Over Media: Analyzing Contemporary Propaganda is an online crowdsourced learning platform with over 3,500 examples of current propaganda from more than 40 countries, along with a suite of 9 lesson plans suitable for use in high school, college and with adult learners. The program is fully translated into Polish, Romanian, Croatian, Finnish, Swedish, French and Dutch.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000476,Minnesota,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000477,Misinfocon,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000478,Misinformation Solutions Forum,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000479,MIT: Center for Civic Media,https://civic.mit.edu,"Working at the intersection of participatory media and civic engagement, the Center for Civic Media's mission is to design, create, deploy, and assess tools and processes that support and foster civic participation and the flow of information between and within communities.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000480,MIT: Ethics & Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative (Media Lab),https://aiethicsinitiative.org,"The MIT Media Lab runs the Ethics & Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative in partnership with the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society. The initiative has addressed artificial intelligence's impact on the quality of media and the ethical, political, and technical questions associated with its impact. Through the Ethics & Governance of AI Initiative, MIT has provided financial support to projects at the intersection of media and technology, including a project to develop better tools for detecting deepfakes and a project for detecting misinformation on WhatsApp.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000481,MIT: Laboratory for Social Machines (Media Lab),https://www.media.mit.edu/groups/social-machines/overview/,"The MIT Media Lab's Laboratory for Social Machines conducts research on human networks, natural language processing, network science, and machine learning.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000482,MIT: Viral Communications Research Group (Media Lab),https://www.media.mit.edu/,"The Viral Communication Research Group invents personal devices that contain your data and the rules for its use, and conducts video analysis based on machine learning to understand the subcarriers of information in the news and bottom-up civic mobilization tools that are locally and culturally responsive.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000483,MITRE,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000484,Moat,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000485,Moat/Oracle,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000486,MOST,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Macedonia,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000487,Mozilla,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000488,Mozilla Foundation,https://foundation.mozilla.org/en/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000489,Mozilla information trust initiative,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000490,Myth Detector (Media Development Foundation) (MDF),http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/home,"Through its Myth Detector website, MDF conducts fact-checking and provides quality information and teaching and training opportunities for Georgian youth. Through the Media & Information Literacy Lab, MDF provides media literacy games, curriculum, and training in support of anti-propaganda efforts. MDF also partners with European Values to build civil society capacity to respond to Kremlin-backed disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Georgia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000491,Mythos Labs,http://www.mythoslabs.org/,"Mythos Labs provides a tool called MIDAC to detect disinformation campaigns on social media, measure their impact, and then auto-generate counter narratives.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000492,MyWOT,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000493,National Autonomous University of Mexico: Civic Innovation Lab (UNAM),https://unamcivic.com/index.html,"The UNAM Civic Innovation Lab is a research laboratory at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) that studies real world problems involving citizens, governments, and NGOs; and uses human centered design to create novel computational systems that address these problems to construct improved societies. Their civic tech research involves the areas of crowdsourcing, disinformation, and machine learning.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,Mexico,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000494,National Chengchi University: Election Study Center,https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/PageFront,"Elections are central to democratic politics. They offer citizens an opportunity to choose representatives and government officials, and provide governments with a legitimate basis for exercising power. The quality of elections has a direct effect on the nature of democracy itself. In recent years, Taiwan's political system has undergone a dramatic transition and has nearly completed the transition from authoritarianism to consolidated democracy. Since elections have played and will continue to play a key role in this process of democratization, it is essential to undertake continuous and systematic research into election practices in order to both strengthen the foundations of democracy and also to raise the quality of elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000495,National Democratic Institute (NDI),https://www.ndi.org/infotegrity,"NDI's INFO/tegrity project provides research on disinformation vulnerability and resilience and emerging technologies, monitors disinformation and computational propaganda in elections, assists social media platforms and tech platforms, shares tools to detect and disrupt disinformation, and rebuilds trust in institutions and processes. In support of these efforts, NDI organized a Digital Disinformation Forum with academic and think tank partners in 2018. NDI has also released guidance for its elections programs concerning disinformation and electoral integrity and an awareness-raising document for staff and local partners.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000496,NATO Stratcom,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000497,NATO: Strategic Communications Center of Excellence (StratCom COE),https://stratcomcoe.org/,"A part of NATO, the StratCom COE provides analysis, practical support, and conducts research and experimentation in communication to support member countries and NATO’s overall aims. This includes, for example, recent reports on disinformation in Sweden, measurement of the Russian Internet Research Agency’s impact in online conversations, strategic communication in the context of elections, a comprehensive study on hybrid threats, and the black market for social media manipulation, among other publications.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000498,NESTA,,UK,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000499,New America: Open Technology Institute,https://www.newamerica.org/oti/,"Through its Open Technology Institute, New America created the Ranking Digital Rights Project, which creates a corporate accountability index to assess technology companies and their commitments to human rights online, including freedom of expression.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000500,New America: Public Interest Technology Initiative,https://www.newamerica.org/public-interest-technology/,New America's Public Interest Technology Initiative published a policy paper in 2018 on digital advertising and its relationship to precision propaganda.,,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000501,New Context,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000502,New Eastern Europe (NEE),http://neweasterneurope.eu/,"NEE is interested in political and policy issues in Eastern European states that were at one time a part of the Soviet Union or a member of the Eastern Bloc. While not a formal scholarly journal, the periodical makes use of journalistic style to provide and explore expert commentary from experts, scholars, historians, and politicians in pertinent areas. NEE authors have increasingly written on the topic of disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000503,New York Times,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000504,New York Times: News Provenance Project,https://www.newsprovenanceproject.com/,The News Provenance Project is dedicated to researching and developing ways to ensure that the context of visual content travels with that content.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000505,New York University,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000506,New York University: Center for Social Media and Politics (CSMaP),https://csmapnyu.org/,CSMaP studies the impact of social media on politics and develops new methods and technology tools to analyze the impact of social media on democracy. The organization houses the Social Media and Political Participation Lab and provides open-source data and tools for other researchers.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000507,New York University: The 100 Questions (GovLab),https://the100questions.org/about.html,"The 100 Questions Initiative seeks to map the world’s 100 most pressing, high-impact questions that could be answered if relevant datasets were leveraged in a responsible manner. The initiative's fifth domain focuses on identifying the top 10 questions related to disinformation:
|
||||
1) understanding the impact of disinformation on society,
|
||||
2) understanding disinformation as a social (engineering) phenomenon,
|
||||
3) improving information quality online and offline and
|
||||
4) evaluating the efficacy of different types of interventions against it.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000508,Newmark Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000509,News Co/Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000510,News Cube,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000511,News Lab (Google News Initiative),https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com/intl/en_gb/google-news-lab/,"Through the News Lab, the Google News Initiative is developing partnerships and providing training on contemporary issues in journalism. Trust and misinformation are News Lab priorities, and the organization provides support for initiatives like the Trust Project, First Draft, and Cross Check. Through the Digital News Innovation Fund, the Google News Initiative is providing support for European projects tackling challenges in the digital news environment, including a project called Digger, which aims to create audio forensic technologies that can assist in detecting deepfakes. Google is also integrating tagging strategies into Google News articles in some countries and modifying its algorithm to punish hate speech and disinformation in search results.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000512,News Literacy Project (NLP),https://newslit.org/,NLP creates digital media literacy curriculum for American middle and high school students. NLP also provides professional development programming for educators and journalists aimed at improving news literacy education.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000513,News UK,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000514,NewsCheck,https://www.newscheck.com/,NewsCheck is an organization analyzing existing journalistic ethics codes and building an artificial intelligence-enhanced system for reviewing and scoring online content.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000515,NewsFrames at Global Voices,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000516,NewsGuard,https://www.newsguardtech.com/,"Based on the input of journalists and editors, NewsGuard has developed a rating system for assessing the trustworthiness of websites based on nine journalistic criteria. The company also provides a ""nutrition label,"" detailing how websites perform against the criteria. NewsGuard's website also includes free news literacy resources for educators, libraries, and parents.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000517,NewsMobile Fact Checker,http://newsmobile.in/articles/category/nm-fact-checker/,"Fact Checker is the fact-checking arm of NewsMobile, an Indian media organization. Fact Checker is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000518,NewsQ,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000519,NewsTracker,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000520,NewsWhip,https://www.newswhip.com/,"NewsWhip is a social media engagement tracking firm that tracks content by amount and location of user engagement, as well as audience interests and changes in interest over time. NewsWhip specializes in monitoring real-time information about the spread of information and the actors behind it, and can help NGOs, news organizations, universities, and other civil society members to address the challenges of misinformation.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000521,Newtral,https://www.newtral.es/zona-verificacion/fact-check/,,,Civil Society,Factchecking & Journalism,,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000522,Newtral para Atresmedia Televisión,https://www.lasexta.com/programas/el-objetivo/,Newtral conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in Spain. The organization is one Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers. El Objetivo de Ana Pastor is a fact checking and data journalism driven television program broadcast on laSexta every Sunday evening.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000523,NewYork Times,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000524,Nisos,https://www.nisos.com,"Nisos offers managed intelligence solutions to help companies mitigate advanced threat actors, stop platform abuse, counter disinformation, mitigate insider threats and conduct due diligence.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000525,Nobias,https://nobias.com/,Nobias is a broswer extension that assesses the potential biases and credibility of news articles.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000526,Nobl Media,https://www.wearenobl.com/,"Formerly Trustium. Trustium is a software-as-a-service company that uses artificial intelligence tools to help advertisers ensure that their ads are placed on trustworthy, credible sites.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000527,Northeastern University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000528,Northeastern University: Network Science Institute (NetSI),https://www.networkscienceinstitute.org/,"NetSI is dedicated to measuring and modeling network properties to better understand physical, social, informational, and technical systems. NetSI received a grant to launch the Center for an Informed Society, which will apply computational social science methods to study Google and Twitter's impact on the online information landscape.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000529,Northern Ireland Foundation: FactCheckNI (NIF),https://factcheckni.org/,"NIF runs FactCheck Northern Ireland (FactCheckNI), an online platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Irish politicians and public figures. FactCheckNI provides interactive training on fact-checking for citizens. FactCheckNI is also part of Co-inform, EU's consortium of experts working to address digital literacy in the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000530,Novetta,https://www.novetta.com/,"Novetta offer cyber analytics to preemptively identify threats, entity analytics to identify bad actors/ influencers, and mission and media analytics to monitor social media and news to identify key patterns and issues in the operating environment. Analysts can use Novetta’s analytics to uncover insights into the dissemination of disinformation on social media platforms and messaging forums. Social platforms can use Novetta’s analytics to identify suspicious posts and accounts associated with disinformation to support their content moderation efforts.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000531,NSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000532,NU.nl,https://www.nu.nl/nucheckt,Nu.nl conducts fact-checking of online content through its NUCheckt page. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000533,NuCheckt,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000534,NuzzleRank,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000535,NYC: Media Lab,https://nycmedialab.org/,"NYC Media Lab is a consortium of private companies and New York universities dedicated to advancing innovation in media and technology. NYC Media Lab runs an annual Machines + Media event and convenes a Machines + Media AI Working Group to address issues like automated content moderation, deepfakes, privacy, and AI-driven publishing and distribution.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000536,NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights,,,,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000537,O Truco,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000538,ObserLatInf,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000539,Observador,https://observador.pt/,Observador is an online news platform that conducts fact-checking and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Portugal,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000540,OFCOM,https://www.ofcom.org.uk,"Ofcom oversees telecommunications, post, broadcast TV and radio (including the BBC’s output), has duties in relation to broadcast advertising and regulates certain online video services. It has a statutory duty to promote media literacy, under which it carries out research into people’s use of online services such as social media and video sharing platforms. In February 2020 the Government announced it was “minded” to grant new powers to Ofcom as the regulator for online harms.",,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000541,Ojo Bionico,https://ojo-publico.com/ojobionico,"Ojo Biónico is the fact-checking section of Ojo Público, a Peruvian investigative journalism outfit.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Peru,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000542,Omelas,https://www.omelas.io/,"Omelas works to prevent violence, terrorism recruitment, and the spread of online propaganda by studying behavioral patterns, applying analytics and strategy, and identifying instances and entities who generate content. Omelas is working to map the online information environment as it pertains to disinformation and propaganda.",,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000543,Online News Association (ONA),https://journalists.org/,"ONA is currently the largest digital journalism association in the world. They seek to support high quality digital journalism through developing best practices for incorporating technology into journalism and reporting, collecting metrics, and developing new revenue models. Recently, ONA has made efforts to grow their efforts to tackle misinformation and fake news. Its 2019 conference featured a session on ""Preparing for the Future of Deepfakes"" alongside other discussions on local news, misinformation, and digital journalism.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000544,Open Government Partnership,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000545,Open Information Partnership,https://www.openinformationpartnership.org,"The Open Information Partnership is a network of organisations and individuals across Europe working in open, independent, fact-based reporting.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000546,Open Society,https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000547,Open Society European Policy Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000548,OpenFacto,https://openfacto.fr/2021/02/14/la-detection-de-la-desinformation-sans-coder/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000549,OpenSources,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000550,OpenX,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000551,Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),https://www.occrp.org/en/about-us,,,,,,,,,Europe,Serbia,,,,,,
|
||||
G000552,OSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000553,Oštro,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Slovenia,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000554,Our.News,https://our.news/,"Our.News has created a browser extension that provides users with ""nutrition labels"" for news consumption to help them better assess the quality of information.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000555,Oxford University: Computational Propaganda Project (Internet Institute),https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Computational Propaganda Project conducts research on algorithms, bots, and social media applications and their impacts on the spread of propaganda, the manipulation of conversations online, trust in media institutions, and political campaigns and elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000556,Oxford University: Internet and Society; Public Policy Programme at The Alan Turing Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000557,Oxford University: Junk News Aggregator,https://newsaggregator.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Junk News Aggregator compiles posts by news outlets that have failed to meet a set of criteria, and are thus not deemed to be trustworthy by the technology. It provides users with an overview of such information trending on Facebook and related engagement statistics.",Yes,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000558,Oxford University: Oxford Internet Institute,https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Oxford Internet Institute is a multidisciplinary research and teaching department of the University of Oxford, dedicated to the social science of the Internet.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000559,Oxford University: Oxford Technology and Elections Commission (OxTEC),https://oxtec.oii.ox.ac.uk/,"The Oxford Technology and Elections Commission, (OxTEC) is uniting experts on politics, technology, security and human rights to re-envision what constitutes trusted guidelines for managing a modern election. With the help of policy makers, elections administrators, and both computer and social scientists, OxTEC is exploring how democracies can integrate democratic norms and practices into the use of information technologies, social media, and big data during campaigns, with the goal of protecting the integrity of elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000560,Oxford University: Reuters Institute for Journalism Studies (RIJS),https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/,"RIJS conducts research and provides fellowships to advance high-quality journalism. In support of its Digital News Project, RIJS researchers investigate topics related to journalism and technology, including social media and online news, citizen trust in media institutions, and the spread of false or misleading information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000561,PageFair,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000562,Pagella Politica,https://pagellapolitica.it/,Pagella Politica is an online fact-checking platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Italian politicians. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000563,Palantir,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000564,Park Advisors,https://www.park-advisors.com/,"Park Advisors uses technology and strategic partnerships to advocate for the rights of vulnerable and at-risk populations. In 2019, Park Advisors published the Disinformation Report, in fulfillment of a commissioned request on the part of the U.S. Department of State's Global Engagement Center (GEC). Park Advisors have also partners with GEC to run DisinfoCloud, and online database that evaluates tools that aim to research or counter online disinformation.",,Other,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000565,Park Associates/GEC advisor,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000566,Patikrinta (15min),https://www.15min.lt/tema/patikrinta-15min-62531,"Patikrinta (Lithuanian for ""Checked Out"") is the fact-checking arm of Lithuanian media organization 15min. 15min is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and is a Facebook Third-Party Fact-Checker.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000567,PEN America,https://pen.org/pen_tags/misinformation/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000568,People-centered Internet,https://peoplecentered.net/pci-home-2/about/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000569,Pesa Check,https://pesacheck.org/,"PesaCheck is an African fact-checking organization that concentrates on financial and statistical information reported and promises made by public figures in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. PesaCheck is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Ethiopia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000570,Pew Research Center,https://www.pewresearch.org/topics/trust-facts-and-democracy/,"The Pew Research Center conducts social science research on American attitudes and trends related to politics and public policy, journalism and media, and technology, among other issues. Recently, Pew has devoted additional resources to its research around trust, facts, and democracy in order to inform conversations about the role of information in society.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000571,PGP Stronger,https://stronger.org/,,,,,,,,Y,,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000572,Ping Digital Network,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000573,Poland,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000574,Poletika,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000575,Policy Change Index,https://policychangeindex.org/,"The Policy Change Index (PCI) is an AI-assisted tool for propaganda analysis. The PCI project is open-source with two key features: It automates the content analysis of propaganda, and it delineates the boundaries between analysts’ objective assessment and subjective judgment.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000576,Polígrafo,https://poligrafo.sapo.pt/,Polígrafo is a Portuguese fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Portugal,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000577,Political Capital,https://www.politicalcapital.hu/introduction.php,"Political Capital has been involved in the fight against conspiracy theories, fake news, disinformation and the post-truth phenomenon since 2010. They work to counter the spread of fake news and conspiracy theories. They also raise awareness about the problem and create guidelines on recognising and arguing against manipulative articles, information.",,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Europe,Hungary,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000578,PolitiFact,https://www.politifact.com,Politifact conducts fact-checking journalism. They aim to give citizens the information they need to govern themselves in a democracy.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000579,Polygraph (BBG),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000580,Pop-Up Newsroom,https://popup.news/,"Pop-Up Newsroom is a media organization that produces innovative reporting to address specific contexts like elections. Pop-Up Newsroom was responsible for Verificado 2018, an anti-misinformation initiative focused on Mexico's 2018 elections and for Riksdagsvalet, a misinformation-tracking initiative focused on Sweden's general elections.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,"Link dead, and there's another, earlier, popup newsroom",
|
||||
G000581,Post Facto,https://www.postfactogame.com/,Post Facto is an online game that teaches players to recognize and flag indicators that an article may contain misinformation. The goal of this solution is to educate the public about how to recognize false information.,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000582,Poynter Institute for Media Studies,https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,"Through its International Fact-Checking Network, the Poynter Institute for Media Studies provides research on trends, best practices, and developments in international fact-checking efforts and supports fact-checking initiatives worldwide. The network provides fellowships, grants, and training for fact-checkers. The Poynter Institute is also the parent organization of PolitiFact, which conducts fact-checking in the United States.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000583,Prague Security Studies Institute (Pražský Institut Bezpečnostních Studií) (PSSI),http://www.pssi.cz/russia-s-influence-activities-in-cee,"PSSI conducts research on international peace and security in European states and provides training to students and professionals through conferences, workshops, and its Security Scholars Program. Part of its research agenda centers around Russian influence activities in Central and Eastern Europe, and PSSI has published analysis and sought to raise awareness about influence operations related to NATO, vaccinations, elections, and other topics. PSSI is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000584,Predata,https://predata.com,"Predata parses open-source data to generate quantitative indicators of risk via machine-learning algorithms that can describe & predict trends. Government agencies can partner with Predata to build a predictive model to notify stakeholders when disinformation activity occurs. Analysts can use Predata algorithms to understand which topics and which actors are most active in spreading online disinformation, as well as better understand and predict disinformation trends and tactics.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000585,Pressland,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000586,Primer.ai,https://primer.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000587,Princeton University: Empirical Studies of Conflict Project,https://esoc.princeton.edu/,"The Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) launched in 2009 to support research on insurgency, civil war, and other politically motivated violence, worldwide. Today, ESOC identifies and compiles a wide range of micro-level data to empower scholarship and to help address pressing security threats. Beyond supporting research, we are committed to enabling policy responses to challenges related to political violence, ranging from civil war to economic development to misinformation campaigns.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000588,Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000589,ProFact Moldova,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000590,Project Domino,https://github.com/TheDataRideAlongs/ProjectDomino,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000591,Propastop,https://www.propastop.org/eng/,Propastop is an independent blog dedicated to exposing propaganda and falsehoods circulating in Estonian media. The organization has also created a monitoring robot called Propamon that searches for mentions of Estonian in Russian media. Propastop is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Estonia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000592,Protected Voices Initiative (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation),https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence/protected-voices,"The FBI’s Protected Voices initiative provides tools and resources to political campaigns, companies, and individuals to protect against online foreign influence operations and cybersecurity threats.",Yes,Government,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000593,Public Editor,,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000594,Quantcast,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000595,Quod,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000596,R Street Institute,https://www.rstreet.org/,"R Street engages in policy work to solve often-under addressed social issues. The recipient of a Madison Initiative Grant, they have used the support to sponsor their Governance Project, which aims to bolster the processes of U.S. democracy and institutions, namely the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, in the face of growing political polarization. The organization also runs an Election Security Initiative to help build capacity for state and federal efforts to share information about threats to elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000597,Radware Bot Manager,https://www.radwarebotmanager.com/,Formerly Shieldsquare. Shieldsquare can be used to protect a website or to prevent bots from interfering with a web application by analyzing their behavior and taking actions to thwart the bot.,,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000598,RAND Corporation,https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html,"RAND Corporation provides public policy research and analysis, and its experts have written on influence operations in the context of ""gray zone"" operations below the threshold of war, media literacy, and Russian propaganda and social media influence, among other topics.",Yes,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000599,Rappler,https://www.rappler.com/,Rappler is a news agency based in the Philippines that provides fact-checking services through its Rappler IQ subsection and supports the development of quality journalism worldwide. Rappler also organizes a Move.PH chat series to engage citizens around the issue of responsible and ethical journalism in the digital age. Rappler is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000600,Raskrinkavanje,https://raskrinkavanje.ba/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000601,Raskrinkavanje Montenegro,https://www.raskrinkavanje.me/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Montenegro,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000602,rbutr,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000603,Real Instituto Elcano,http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en,"Real Instituto Elcano runs a project called MINDb4ACT, which is a multi-stakeholder effort to combat radicalization and violent extremism in Europe. Part of this work is aimed at countering propaganda and hate speech online and better understanding how online radicalization occurs.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000604,Reality Check,https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cp7r8vgl2rgt/reality-check,Reality Check is the BBC's fact-checking section.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000605,Reality Team,http://realityteam.org/,"Reality Team is powered by a team of communications professionals, technologists, cybersecurity and disinformation analysts from the private and public sector who are committed to pushing back against disinformation. Our content is entirely independent, and non-partisan, focused on dispelling myths, rumors and disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000606,Recorded Future,https://www.recordedfuture.com,"Recorded Future uses machine learning and natural language processing to identify the source of dark web content to enable further investigation. Analysts can use Recorded Future to identify if disinformation is being shared on dark web chat forums, or identify an increase in the dissemination of cyberhacking tools and data that enable the spread of disinformation.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000607,Redacción Fáctica,https://nomada.gt/author/factica/,Redacción Fáctica is a Guatemalan fact-checking project created by Agencia Ocote and Nómada.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Guatemala,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000608,Renew Europe Group,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000609,Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press (RCFP),https://factcheckerlegalsupport.org/,"RCFP provides legal resources in support of the U.S. First Amendment. Through its Fact-checkers Legal Support Initiative, developed with the International Fact-Checking Network and the Media Legal Defence Initiative, RCFP has created legal guides for fact-checkers. The organization also supports transparency in journalism and has written about the need to protect journalists from potential unintended consequences of laws aimed at curbing influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000610,Reporters Without Borders: Information & Democracy Commission,https://rsf.org/en,RSF gathered an International Commission on Information & Democracy in 2018 and is working to implement the principles outlined in the resulting International Declaration on Information & Democracy that support Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and efforts to protect freedom of expression online.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000611,Reporters Without Borders: Journalism Trust Initiative (RSF),https://rsf.org/en,"Through its Journalism Trust Initiative (in partnership with Agence France Presse, the European Broadcasting Union, and the Global Editors Network), Reporters without Borders (RSF) is developing a set of trust and transparency standards for journalism outlets with input from stakeholders in media, policy, technology, and academia. RSF also gathered an International Commission on Information & Democracy in 2018 and is working to implement the principles outlined in the resulting International Declaration on Information & Democracy that support Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and efforts to protect freedom of expression online.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,France,Y,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000612,Research Innovations,http://www.researchinnovations.com/,"Research Innovations develops a variety of software for government and military clients. Their expertise includes AI, big data, machine learning and analytics. Users can monitor messaging, disinformation campaigns, and malign influence tactics.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000613,Research Institutes of Sweden (Sveriges Forskningsinstitut) (RISE),https://www.ri.se/en/what-we-do/projects/skilled-online-understanding-disinformation,RISE's Skilled Online project develops and tests curriculum and teaching tools related to disinformation online. Students participate in a workshop where they navigate online interactions based on their personal identities and vulnerabilities and learn skills for identifying and responding to false or misleading information.,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000614,Reuters Digital News Institute,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000615,Reuters Fact Check Team,,US; UK,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000616,Reuters Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000617,REVEAL,https://revealproject.eu/,"REVEAL is an EU-funded project to develop technologies for verification of content online. The company will focus on social media analysis, understanding information flows, and generating an effective picture of how content travels online.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000618,Reveal (Media Verification Assistant),http://reveal-mklab.iti.gr/reveal/index.html,"The Media Verification Assistant is an online tool for assessing the source and veracity of images, developed by CERTH-ITI and Deutsche Welle.",Yes,Media,,,,,,Global,Greece,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000619,Riddle,https://www.ridl.io/en/,"Riddle offers neutral and objective analysis on Russian domestic and foreign engagement. The organization also provides this in-depth analysis in both English and Russian. Recently, Riddle authors have written on topics of fake news and propaganda efforts linked to Russia and the Kremlin.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000620,Right Wing Watch - Muck Rack ,https://muckrack.com/jared-l-holt/articles,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000621,RMIT ABC Fact Check,https://www.abc.net.au/news/factcheck/,"In partnership with RMIT University, ABC has a dedicated fact-checking team called RMIT ABC Fact Check to help assess claims made by politicians, public figures, and others engaged in public debate.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000622,RoBhat Labs,https://www.robhat.com/,"RoBhat Lab's products include Botcheck, which is used to detect and track Twitter propaganda, and SurfSafe, which is a fake news browser extension for Chrome.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000623,Rocket Technology,https://www.rocket-technology.com,"Rocket Technology's solution set, SocioTrust enables analysis of social media disinformation in platforms with text, audio, pictures, photos, and video to determine what individual, corporate, or state actors are injecting into societies and how. It can also create counter-propaganda programs.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000624,Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),https://rusi.org/,RUSI provides research and analysis on influence operations through the lens of defense and security and has published analysis on issues like Russia's influence operations in Central and Eastern Europe and how democracies should respond to influence operations.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000625,RSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000626,Ryerson University: Social Media Lab,https://socialmedialab.ca/,"The Social Media Lab is a multi- and interdisciplinary research laboratory at Ted Rogers School of Management at Ryerson University. The lab studies how social media is changing the way people and organizations communicate, share information, conduct business and form communities online, and how these changes impact society. The lab’s research seeks to advance the public’s understanding of the benefits and pitfalls of social media adoption.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000627,SaferNet,https://new.safernet.org.br/#mobile,SaferNet is a Brazilian non-governmental organization that combats Internet crime in partnership with the Federal Public Ministry. It facilitates anonymous reporting and provides information and training about Internet safety and security.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000628,Schema Claim Review,https://schema.org/ClaimReview,"Schema.org is a website dedicated to the vocabulary of structured data on the internet. If a web page contains content that reviews claims, ClaimReview structured data can enable a summarized version of the fact check to be displayed in search engine results.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000629,Schema.org,https://schema.org,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,,,,,
|
||||
G000630,Science Feedback,http://sciencefeedback.co/,"Science Feedback is a community of scientists that provide context and commentary for scientific information reported in the news. The project has specific sections dedicated to health issues and to climate change issues, called Health Feedback and Climate Feedback.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,World,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000631,Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force,https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/protecting-democracy/security-task-force.html,"Leading up to the 2019 election, the Canadian government established a Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force to outline the responsibilities of various government agencies in monitoring, investigating, and responding to foreign threats to the integrity of Canadian elections.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000632,SEEcheck,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000633,Sensity,https://sensity.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000634,Serelay,https://www.serelay.com/,Serelay has created a product called Trusted Media Capture that conducts point-of-capture verification to enable customers that rely on photographs and videos to authenticate their content.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000635,Servicio de Information Publica,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000636,Sheffield University Natural Language Processing,https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/dcs,,Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000637,Shout Out UK,https://www.shoutoutuk.org/,Shout Out UK creates and sells curriculum on political and media literacy to schools with the goal of empowering students to engage in the political process.,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000638,SIDA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000639,Signal,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000640,Sleeping Giants,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000641,Slovak Foreign Policy Association (Slovenská Asociácia Zahraničnej Politiky) (SFPA),http://www.sfpa.sk/en/,"SFPA provides a space for discussion of foreign policy issues affecting Slovakia and the European Union. SFPA has organized projects on information warfare on the Internet and Russian information warfare and Ukraine, and it hosts the Slovak Forum Against Propaganda to create a space for discussion about influence operations and their impact on the European Union and NATO.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000642,Snopes,https://www.snopes.com/,Snopes.com utilizes high quality and reliable investigative reporting to provide a documented fact-checking service that allows their readers to become informed and draw their own independent conclusions.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000643,SNV,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000644,Social Cyber-Security Working Group (Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems),https://sites.google.com/view/social-cybersec/home?authuser=0,"The Social Cyber-Security Working Group develops new metrics, technologies and algorithms for analyzing human socio-cultural behavior given vast quantities of data. It forecasts and explains changes in the socio-cultural behavior using agent-based model and network science and assesses the impact of, and provides support for, the development of new social and organizational policies and procedures.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000645,Social Media Guide,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000646,Social Media Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA),https://www.disinfobservatory.org/,"SOMA is a European Union-funded project aimed at creating a network of experts in disinformation, providing media literacy training program, and developing tools and standards for evaluating the impact of media programs and the quality of information sources.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Greece,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000647,Social Science One,https://socialscience.one/,"Social Science One is running an inaugural project on ""the effects of social media on democracy and elections"" that will make data from Facebook available to researchers to study the interaction of media, technology, and democracy that can inform future policy recommendations.",,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000648,South Asia Check,http://southasiacheck.org/,South Asia Check is a fact-checking organization that covers South Asian news and the promises of public officials. South Asia Check is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Nepal,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000649,Spanish news,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000650,Sparks & Honey,https://www.sparksandhoney.com/,sparks & honey employs big data and human expertise to develop cultural intelligence. Their proprietary technology inputs data from a wide variety of sources and couples these with expert analysis to create structured data that highlights large-scale cultural trends.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000651,Squint,https://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/squint-sharpens-officials-perspective-to-combat-election-distortion,"SQUINT by MITRE, also known as “Social See Something, Say Something”, is a mobile app and browser plugin that enables crowdsourced reporting of disinformation. The tool allows a user (among the crowd) to quickly and easily submit a screenshot and page metadata of supposed disinformation to state and local officials with the click of an icon.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000652,SSRC Social Media Democracy Research Grants,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000653,"SSRC: Disinformation Research Initiative (Media & Democracy Network, Social Science Research Council)",https://www.ssrc.org/programs/component/media-democracy/the-media-democracy-network/#overview,"SSRC hosts a Program on Media & Democracy that promotes research on the relationship between media technologies and democratic practices. The program conducts the Disinformation Research Initiative to track scholarly research on the topic and manages the Media & Democracy Network as a place to share information and collaborate on scholarly projects related to misinformation/disinformation, polarization, hate speech, media consolidation, and other topics. Through its Social Data Initiative, SSRC also provides grants to organizations working with Social Science One on projects concerning social media and the flow of information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000654,SSRC: Program on Media & Democracy (Social Science Research Council),https://www.ssrc.org/programs/view/media-democracy/,"SSRC hosts a Program on Media & Democracy that promotes research on the relationship between media technologies and democratic practices. The program conducts the Disinformation Research Initiative to track scholarly research on the topic and manages the Media & Democracy Network as a place to share information and collaborate on scholarly projects related to misinformation/disinformation, polarization, hate speech, media consolidation, and other topics.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000655,SSRC: Social Data Initiative (Social Science Research Council),https://www.ssrc.org/programs/view/social-data-initiative/,"Through its Social Data Initiative, SSRC also provides grants to organizations working with Social Science One on projects concerning social media and the flow of information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000656,Stanford,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000657,Stanford University: Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC),https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Housed at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs, CISAC coordinates an Information Warfare Working Group and runs the Project on Russian Power and Purpose, which addresses Russian influence operations in the broader context of Russia's strategic aims and their impact on democracies worldwide.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000658,"Stanford University: Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)",https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs, CDDRL is dedicated to studying the interaction of the political, economic, social, and legal dimensions of democratic development. The center studies and teaches on poverty, instability, abusive rule, authoritarian resurgence, technology, populism, and globalization.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000659,Stanford University: Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society (PACS),https://pacscenter.stanford.edu/research/program-on-democracy-and-the-internet/,"PACS runs the Program on Democracy and the Internet, which conducts multidisciplinary research on ways to maximize the benefits of the Internet while minimizing the threats it poses to democratic processes. Its scholars focus on social media and democracy, algorithmic bias and automated social engineering, the deterioration of digital information ecosystems, and political framing in media.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000660,Stanford University: Cyber Policy Center,https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Cyber Policy Center houses the Global Digital Policy Incubator, a forum for multi-stakeholder collaboration on policies concerning the application of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in an increasingly digital ecosystem.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000661,Stanford University: Information Warfare Working Group; European Security Initiative (Center for International Security and Cooperation) ,https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/information-warfare-working-group,The Information Warfare Working Group is housed at The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. It is a multidisciplinary group of Stanford University scholars that meet quarterly to discuss the issue of cyber-enabled information warfare.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000662,Stanford University: Internet Observatory,https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/about,"Stanford University's Internet Observatory is a program of the Cyber Policy Center. It is a cross-disciplinary program of research, teaching and policy engagement for the study of abuse in current information technologies, with a focus on social media.",,Education/academia,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000663,Stanford University: Journalism and Democracy Initiative (JDI),https://jdi.stanford.edu,"JDI seeks to improve journalism with the use of data and algorithms; combat misinformation; address challenges in reporting, storytelling, news distribution and consumption; and launch a ""Trust and Verify"" project to focus on defending against manipulated photos and videos.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000664,Stanford University: Program on Democracy and the Internet,https://pacscenter.stanford.edu,"The Program on Democracy and the Internet (PDI) is housed at Stanford University. PDI creates and shares original empirical research around how digital technologies are impacting democracy to inform and educate decision-makers in the field, including the next generation of technologists, business leaders, and policymakers. This effort is intended to bring together scholars from a diverse set of disciplines to study the challenges and opportunities the Internet poses for democracies. The project also benefits from existing relationships with technology companies that serve as the new information intermediaries and the platforms for the new public square for modern democracy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000665,State Department,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000666,Stiftung Neue Verantwortung (SNV),https://www.stiftung-nv.de/en/project/strengthening-digital-public-sphere,"Through its ""Strengthening the Digital Public Sphere"" project, SNV is working with the German Federal Foreign Office to build government capacity to deal with disinformation. SNV also conducts research to better understand the spread of disinformation in society, levels of news literacy, and public policy solutions for addressing contemporary information environments.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000667,StopFake,https://www.stopfake.org/ru/glavnaya-2/,StopFake conducts fact-checking and research on influence operations in Central and Eastern European countries. It also provides resources to inform the public about verifying information and conducts trainings for interested parties upon request.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000668,"Study: trust, facts and democracy: public attitudes about the role of information in society",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000669,Sussex University CASM,https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000670,Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap) (MSB),https://www.msb.se/en/,"MSB is the agency of the Swedish government charged with helping prepare for accidents, crises, and the consequences of war. In the area of influence operations, MSB commissioned Lund University researchers to put together a research report and a handbook on countering information influence activities, and the organization has integrated countermeasures into its preparations for Swedish elections and its educational efforts.",,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000671,Tadaweb,https://www.tadaweb.com/,"Tadaweb is a platform for discovering and analyzing information on the web, which allows users to perform analysis of a specific topic to retrospectively derive insights about the spread of propaganda and disinformation. Analysts can monitor specific, suspicious online activity to address and counter disinformation in real-time.",Yes,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Europe,Luxembourg,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000672,Taiwan AI Labs,https://ailabs.tw/,"Taiwan AI Labs’ technology is the “Islander System,” which takes a three-pronged approach to analyzing news and social media content: news content monitoring; news source inspection; and social media user behavioral analysis. The multidimensional analysis of news content will be available online so that users can see how different news outlets report the same story.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000673,Taiwan FactCheck Center,https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/,Taiwan FactCheck Center is a Taiwanese fact-checking organization run by the Association for Quality Journalism and the Taiwan Media Watch and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000674,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/faq/,Tattle is a project that aims to address misinformation on chat apps and encrypted messaging platforms.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000675,Team Defence,,,,Defence/military,,,,,Yes,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000676,Tech Media & Democracy (new york city universities partnership),https://www.techmediademocracy.nyc,"A partnership of New York City universities, Tech Media & Democracy aims to strengthen journalism in the digital environment and support democracy through research, teaching and training for individuals in journalism, design, and engineering.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000677,Terbium Labs,https://terbiumlabs.com/,Terbium Lab’s Matchlight dark web crawler provides visibility into information that has been exposed on the dark web. An API can connect Terbium’s data pipeline with analysis tools.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000678,Teyit.org,https://teyit.org/,Teyit.org conducts fact-checking and hosts fact-checking workshops to promote media literacy. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network and is a Facebook Third-Party Fact-Checker.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Turkey,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000679,The Advertising Association,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000680,The Alan Turing Institute - Public Policy Programme,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000681,The Center for Humane Technology,https://www.humanetech.com/,,,,,,,,,,US,,,,,,
|
||||
G000682,The Conversation Australia,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000683,The Democracy Labs,https://thedemlabs.org/,"Democracy Labs is a hub for ongoing technology and creative innovation in service of a healthy democracy at the national, state, and local levels. We focus on long term, sustainable and affordable solutions. An approach that is longer than an election cycle, and isn’t purely dependent on volunteers, can enable more qualified candidates to run for office and for more issue groups to bring about positive social change with little funds.",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000684,The Engine Room,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000685,The Factual,https://www.thefactual.com/static/about.html,"The Factual is a technology company that assesses the partisanship, bias, and credibility of online news articles.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000686,The Hague Center for Strategic Studies (HCSS),https://hcss.nl,"HCSS conducts research on issues in defense and security and provides policy recommendations, surveys, analyses, risk assessments, and other products to both public and private sector organizations, including the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. Its research has included analysis of hybrid conflict and Russian influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000687,The IndiaSpend Foundation,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000688,The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,icij.org,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000689,The Journal,http://thejournal.ie,The Journal is an Irish online news source that conducts fact-checking. The organization is one Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000690,The Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000691,The Media Bias Chart,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000692,The Nevada Independent Fact Checks,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000693,The News Hero,https://www.thenewshero.org/,The News Hero game gamifies the experience of discerning false news for public consumption. The goal of this solution is to educate the public on how to recognize disinformation.,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000694,The Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,The Pro-Truth Pledge is an initiative that aims to encourage public figures to be truthful in their communications and citizens to hold one another accountable for sharing truthful information.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Global,USA,Y,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000695,The Propaganda Game,https://propagandagame.org,"The Propaganda Game is a free, publicly accessible social media literacy tool that aims to educate players on disinformation and its spread. It features the ability to upload and explore instances of propaganda found online, as well as functionality to facilitate teachers using the game in their classrooms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000696,The Thinkin Project,https://www.thethinkinproject.com/,"A global movement to increase resilience to disinformation, and help QAnon believers find a way out",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000697,The Trade Desk,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000698,The Trust Project,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,Y,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000699,The Trusting News Project,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000700,The Verification Handbook (EJC),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000701,The Washington Post Fact-Checker,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000702,The Washington Post: Fact Checker,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/,The Washington Post's Fact Checker is the official fact-checking service of the U.S. newspaper.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000703,The Whistle,https://www.thewhistle.co.il/feed,The Whistle is an Israeli media monitoring and fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Israel,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000704,Thompson Reuters Special Services,https://www.trssllc.com/,Thomson Reuters Special Services offers data-driven consulting in national security intelligence; the group has created a visualization tool capable of mapping a group or government's influence as it pertains to foreign investments and disinformation.,,Media,Investigations,,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000705,Thomson Reuters,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000706,Thomson Reuters Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000707,TinEye,https://tineye.com/,"TinEye offers a suite of computer vision-based tools that support image search, reverse image search, duplicate/modified image finding, image tracking alerts, and image verification. TinEye also offers an API that enables developers to integrate reverse search functionality into their own platforms or products.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000708,TopNet,http://eng.thu.edu.tw/,TopNet is a tool to identify fake social media accounts developed by Tunghai University in Taiwan.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000709,Transatlantic Council on Election Integrity (TCEI) Alliance of Democracies,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/transatlantic-commission-on-election-integrity/,"The Alliance of Democracies runs the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity (TCEI), which convenes individuals from media and government to prevent foreign interference in elections. TCEI advocates for campaigns to adopt its Pledge for Election Integrity, conducts monitoring in countries with upcoming elections, and promotes public policy solutions addressing deepfakes and other emerging technologies that threaten the integrity of elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000710,Transparency Map,https://www.transparentjournalism.org/journalist/,"A project of Spanish media organization Público, Transparency Map has designed the TJ Tool, a software that allows users to trace news information based on eight editorial indicators.",Yes,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000711,Transparency Task Force,https://www.transparencytaskforce.org/what-does-the-ttf-do/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000712,Trive,https://trive.news/,Trive is a browser extension designed to alert users visiting sites that are not sufficiently credible.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000713,Troll Factory,https://trollfactory.yle.fi/,"Troll factory is a free, publicly accessible social media literacy tool that aims to educate players on disinformation and its spread by asking players to choose which in-game inflammatory content to share as a “troll.”",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000714,Truepic,https://www.truepic.com,"Truepic's technology verifies that an image or video hasn’t been altered or edited, and watermarks it with a time-stamp, geocode, and other metadata. Truepic stores a version of the photo in its digital vault and assigns it a six-digit code and URL for retrieving it. Truepic also immediately logs the image or video onto the Bitcoin blockchain.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000715,Trust & Safety Professional Association,https://www.tspa.info,"The Trust & Safety Professional Association curates a collection of links, which trust and safety professionals may find useful in efforts such as developing policies, supporting moderators, and building systems to detect platform violations.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000716,Trust Metrics,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000717,Trust Project,thetrustproject.org,"The Trust Project offers a set of ""Trust Indicators"" to help audiences better understand an organization's ethics, fairness, accuracy, background, and reporting processes. The project also offers ""Trust Marks"" for any organization that works with the project to meet the standards outlined by the Trust Indicators.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000718,Trusted News,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000719,Trusted Times,https://trustedtimes.org,"Trusted Times uses a browser extension to identify fake and unreliable news and presents additional analysis through machine learning of any news article to show a reporter’s and news source’s bias, if any. Trusted Times screens thousands of news websites in the United States.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000720,TrustServista,https://www.trustservista.com/,"TrustServista provides artificial intelligence-based software to help media organizations and content creators determine the trustworthiness of news sources, analyze text, and track online information flows.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Romania,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000721,Truth and Trust Online,truthandtrustonline.com,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000722,Truth Nest,https://www.truthnest.com,"TruthNest offers an accessible, user-friendly dashboard for Twitter analytics to discern an account’s credibility based on their activity, network, and influence. Additionally, TruthNest offers a score of likelihood that the account is a bot.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Greece,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000723,Truth or Fiction,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000724,Truth Tests,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000725,"Truth, Trust and Technology Commission - London School of Economics",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000726,TruthBuzz by IFCJ,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000727,Trutheum,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000728,Tsek,https://tsek.ph/,,,,,,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000729,Tufts University: Edward R. Murrow Center for a Digital World,https://sites.tufts.edu/murrowcenter/,"Housed at the Fletcher School of International Affairs, the Edward R. Murrow Center for a Digital World was established to examine the role that news media, multinational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations play in international relations. The Center focuses on international media, public diplomacy, and the political and cultural impact of the digital media sphere.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000730,Twitter,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000731,Twitter Elections Integrity Archive,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000732,Twitter Trails,http://twittertrails.com/,TwitterTrails is an online tool used to track the spread of stories on Twitter and measure how users perceive the veracity of the stories.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000733,Twitter UK,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000734,U.S. Department of Justice: Cyber-Digital Task Force (DOJ),https://www.ojp.gov/,"In 2018, DOJ established a Cyber-Digital Task Force to address global cyber threats. The task force produced a report categorizing types of malign foreign influence operations and describing DOJ's responses to these threats.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000735,U.S. Department of State: Global Engagement Center,https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/,"DOS oversees the Global Engagement Center, which leads the U.S. government's efforts to identify and counter foreign and non-state influence operations. The center works with allied governments, civil society and nongovernmental organizations, and private companies to develop best practices, and it oversees the Information Access Fund, intended to provide grant support to organizations countering disinformation. The center's Technology Engagement Team works with stakeholders to develop, test, and demonstrate technological solutions to the problem of foreign influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000736,U.S. Department of State: Technology Engagement Team,https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/,"The Technology Engagement Team directs, leads, synchronizes, integrates, and coordinates efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States and its allies and partner nations",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000737,U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation: Foreign Influence Task Force,https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence,"In 2017, FBI established a Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) to identify and combat foreign influence operations in the United States. FITF collects and shares information about ongoing influence operations and works with field offices on countermeasures.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000738,UCLA,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000739,UK Cabinet office,https://sharechecklist.gov.uk/ ,,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000740,UK Government - DCMS - Online harms,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000741,UK Government: DCMS subcommittee on online harms and disinformation,https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/438/digital-culture-media-and-sport-subcommittee-on-online-harms-and-disinformation/,,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000742,UK Parliament - House of Lords,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000743,UK Safer Internet Centre,https://www.saferinternet.org.uk/safer-internet-day/2021,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000744,Ukraine Crisis Media Center (UCMC),http://ucmc.org.ua/,"UCMC is dedicated to defending Ukraine's sovereignty in the face of Russian influence and serving as a hub for strategic communications within the country. UCMC houses a Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group that convenes experts to provide research and analysis in support of the Ukrainian government's efforts to counter Russian influence, and the organization has also developed a program on Strategic Communication to reassert control over the information space. UCMC is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000745,Ukrainian Prism,http://prismua.org,"Ukrainian Prism provides research and analysis on defense and security policy issues. The organization runs a Russian Disinformation Resilience Index in partnership with EAST Center, meant to assess the strength of Central and Eastern European countries in resisting Russian influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000746,UMass,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000747,UN Verified project,https://shareverified.com/en,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Global,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000748,Uni Arkansas at Little Rock,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000749,Uni Maryland,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000750,Unilever,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000751,Unisys,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000752,Unitary,https://www.unitary.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000753,United for News,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000754,"United Kingdom Parliamentary Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport",https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/sub-committee-on-disinformation/,"The UK Parliamentary Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport hosts a Sub-Committee on Disinformation to explore legislative solutions to the issue of disinformation in the United Kingdom. The sub-committee grew out of an initial inquiry on disinformation and fake news that began in 2018 and conclusion in February 2019 with the publication of a formal report on the landscape of disinformation, political advertising, foreign influence, media literacy programs, and potential solutions.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000755,University of Arkansas at Little Rock: COSMOS,http://cosmos.ualr.edu/,"The Collaboratorium for Social Media and Online Behavioral Studies (COSMOS) Lab uses analytic methodologies to study online behaviors and sentiments, such as network reactions to certain types of content, and how false information spreads through a network.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000756,University of Cambridge,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000757,University of Florida: Consortium on Trust in Media & Technology (CTMT),https://www.jou.ufl.edu/consortium-on-trust-in-media-and-technology/,"The CTMT is a multidisciplinary research initiative centered around ""the crisis of trust affecting the nation and world."" The consortium creates a space for researchers at the university to collaborate, develop insights into how media and technology can become more trustworthy, and explore potential new policies and laws.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000758,University of Indiana,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000759,University of Liverpool,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000760,University of Michigan,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000761,University of Munich: Center for Applied Policy Research (Universität München Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung) (CAP),https://www.cap-lmu.de/,"CAP conducts research on issues in public policy and international peace and security with the goal of bridging the gap between politicians and academics. CAP has addressed issues concerning cybersecurity, online campaigning, and other technological developments impacting democracy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000762,"University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Center for Information, Technology, and Public Life (CITAP)",https://citap.unc.edu/,"CITAP is dedicated to creating a foundational understanding of information environments in order to conduct research on misinformation, partisanship, polarization, propaganda, and political institutions. The group plans to make its data publicly available to inform additional research on the topic.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000763,University of Pennsylvania: Center for Media at Risk (Annenberg School for Communication),https://www.ascmediarisk.org/about/,The Center for Media at Risk strategizes in response to threatening political conditions. Knowing how media practitioners work under authoritarian regimes and circumstances of creeping authoritarianism can help free/defend/empower/protect/save the media.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000764,University of Pennsylvania: FactCheck.org (Annenberg Public Policy Center) (APPC),https://www.factcheck.org/,"Housed at APPC, Factcheck.org fact-checks statements made by American politicians during election cycles. Factcheck.org is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000765,University of Texas at Arlington,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000766,University of Texas at Austin: Propaganda Program (Center for Media Engagement),https://mediaengagement.org/propaganda-2/,"Under the direction of Dr. Samuel Woolley, the propaganda program at the Center for Media Engagement focuses on how emergent technologies are used in and around global political communication. Woolley’s work on computational propaganda—the use of social media and other digital tools in attempts to manipulate public opinion—has revealed the ways in which a wide variety of political groups in the United States and abroad have leveraged tech such as bots and trending algorithms and tactics of disinformation and trolling in efforts to control information flows online.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000767,University of Texas: Center for Media Engagement (CME),https://mediaengagement.org/,"The Center for Media Engagement conducts research on journalism, media ethics, and science communication to develop strategies for more effective engagement with the public. The Center’s signature approach is one of “connective democracy,” which ""unites newsrooms, scholars, platforms, and public policy entities in a methodical approach toward bridging gaps in our society."" Their research has covered content moderation, building trust in news organizations, mitigating polarization, the ethics of deepfakes, and clickbait, among other topics.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000768,University of Toronto: Citizen Lab,https://citizenlab.ca,"The Citizen Lab conducts research and policy engagement at the intersection of technology and international peace and security. Part of this agenda concerns ""targeted threats,"" or ""investigations into the prevalence and impact of digital espionage operations against civil society groups.""",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000769,University of Virginia: Democracy Initiative (DI),http://democracyinitiative.virginia.edu/,"The Democracy Initiative (DI) is dedicated to the study of democracy and challenges to democracy, both past and present. In 2019, DI announced two new labs: The Deliberative Media Initiative Lab will address the factionalism in the current media ecosystem and the undermining of norms and trust in institutions, and the Democratic Statecraft Lab will address growing authoritarianism around the world and its challenges to democratic institutions.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000770,University of Washington,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000771,University of Washington: Center for an Informed Public,https://ischool.uw.edu/research/center-informed-public,"The CIP is an interdisciplinary, non-partisan effort to convene industry, government, nonprofit, and academic stakeholders around developing strategies to resist misinformation and support an informed public in order to strengthen democracy. The Center is supported by the University of Washington Information School, Human Centered Design and Engineering Program, School of Law, and Communication Leadership Program.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000772,University of Washington: Cybersecurity Initiative (International Policy Institute),https://jsis.washington.edu/research/ipi/ipi-cybersecurity/,"The Cybersecurity Initiative produces written research, cultivates a network of professionals for the exchange of expertise, hosts events on cybersecurity policy, develops and teaches courses on cybersecurity and mentors students interested in cybersecurity policy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000773,University of Washington: Emerging Capacities of Mass Participation Lab (emCOMP) (Human Centered Design and Engineering),https://depts.washington.edu/emcomp/people/,"Housed at the School of Human-Centered Design & Engineering at the University of Washington, the Emerging Capacities of Mass Participation (emCOMP) Lab conducts research on new and social media and the changing dynamics of interaction in digital environments. With a particular focus on crisis events, emCOMP is investigating the spread of rumors and false or misleading information on social media platforms.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000774,University of Washington: International Policy Institute (IPI),https://jsis.washington.edu/research/ipi/ipi-cybersecurity/,"IPI's Cybersecurity Initiative provides research and teaching on international cybersecurity politics and policy. The initiative produces written research, cultivates a network of professionals for the exchange of expertise, and develops and teaches courses on cybersecurity policy. The faculty and fellows affiliated with the Cybersecurity Initiative have addressed disinformation in their research on elections integrity, deepfakes, and Russia’s cyber strategy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000775,University of Wisconsin-Madison: Center for Communication and Civic Renewal (CCCR),https://mcrc.journalism.wisc.edu/groups/cccr/,"CCCR convenes faculty from multiple disciplines to study how state and regional communication systems affect political polarization. Its affiliates utilize public opinion research, computational content analysis, and qualitative interviews to conduct comparative studies of Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina in order to help local media combat political polarization.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000776,US Congress,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8rOMntep8w,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000777,US DOD,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000778,US DoS GEC,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000779,Userfeeds,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000780,VERA Files Fact Check,http://verafiles.org/specials/fact-check,"VERA Files Fact Check is a Filipino fact-checking organization, a member of the International Fact-Checking Network, and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000781,Verifica,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000782,Verificado 2018,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000783,Verificador,https://larepublica.pe/verificador,,,,Fact checking,,,,,South America,Peru,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000784,Verificalo,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000785,Verity,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000786,Vilnius Institute of Policy Analysis (VIPA),http://www.vilniusinstitute.lt/,"VIPA conducts research and analysis on political institutions and public policy in Lithuania. The organization hosts scholars that study disinformation, information security, and media literacy, and it runs the #PackOfLies project, dedicated to revealing specific instances of disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000787,Vinesight,https://www.vinesight.com/,Vinesight fights misinformation on social media channels by detecting trending campaigns and providing analytics and alerts about viral misinformation.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,Israel,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000788,Viralgranskaren,https://www.facebook.com/viralgranskaren/,"Metro's Viral Reviewer helps you find out if the story spread on social media is true. Let's review before you share. viralgranskaren@metro.se
|
||||
You probably do not think about it, but every time you share a link, write a status or instagram a picture, you tell a little story. About yourself, about your contemporaries, about Sweden. Thanks to the internet, today we tell more stories than ever before. We tell about our world, and thereby we shape it.
|
||||
Not infrequently, these stories are widely disseminated. A Facebook status that is starting to be shared can suddenly have reached thousands of people, leading to leaflets and hot debates. But since over 4.7 million Swedes have Facebook, texts can be shared tens of thousands of times without ever passing a journalist's feed. And that's a problem. Because when a story about something sensitive or important, something that places itself in the middle of contemporary currents, is read by many people, they often shape their picture of reality after it. Whether it's true.",,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000789,Vishvas News,http://www.vishvasnews.com/,Vishvas News is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000790,Vistinomer,http://vistinomer.mk/,Vistinomer is a Macedonian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Macedonia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000791,Voice of San Diego - Fact Check,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000792,W3C,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000793,W3C Credible Web Community Group,https://www.w3.org/community/credibility/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,World,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000794,Watchdog Sri Lanka,https://watchdog.team/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,Asia,Sri Lanka,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000795,WatchDog.md,https://watchdog.md,WatchDog.md conducts research and analysis on public policy in Moldova with the goal of strengthening democratic development within the country. Its experts have published on Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe and the integrity of Moldovan elections in the face of potential foreign influence. WatchDog.md is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Moldova,,N,Y,teamwatchdog,,
|
||||
G000796,We Verify,https://weverify.eu/about/,"WeVerify is an EU-funded project designed to create a platform for collaborative content verification. InVID, a video content verification tool, is one product developed by the initiative.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000797,Web Literacy for Student Fact Checkers,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000798,WebQoof,https://www.thequint.com/news/webqoof,WebQoof is the fact-checking section of Indian media outlet The Quint and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000799,WFA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000800,WhiteOps,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000801,Who Targets Me?,https://whotargets.me/en/about-who-targets-me/,"Who Targets Me? is a browser extension that scrapes the ads from a user’s Facebook account in order to observe what political advertisements they receive. These ads are added to a database, where they are stored and analyzed. After continued use, the technology provides the user with a breakdown of posts and information about why the user was targeted with specific political content. Ads within the database can be studied for insights.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000802,Wikimedia Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000803,Wikimedia Germany,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000804,Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies,https://martenscentre.eu,"The official think tank of the European People's Party, the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Policy produces research and analysis on European Union policy. Scholars affiliated with the center have published policy papers and reports on influence operations in relation to social media, content moderation, and European Parliament elections, among other topics.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000805,Wilson Center,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000806,Wilson Center: Digital Futures Project,https://www.wilsoncenter.org,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000807,Wilson Center: Science & Technology Innovation Program,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/science-and-technology-innovation-program,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000808,WITNESS,https://www.witness.org/,"WITNESS is dedicated to helping individuals use media to document human rights abuses. WITNESS has developed technological tools for verifying the authenticity of content, and through its Media Lab, the organization focuses on deepfakes and the need to develop strategies to verify the authenticity of content in order to secure freedom of expression.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000809,Witness,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000810,World Economic Forum: Center for Cybersecurity,https://www.weforum.org/platforms/the-centre-for-cybersecurity,"The Center for Cybersecurity convenes experts around issues including cyber warfare, law, and norms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000811,World Economic Forum: Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution,https://www.weforum.org/,"Through the Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, WEF develops policy frameworks for emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning, and the Center for Cybersecurity convenes experts around issues including cyber warfare, law, and norms. The Strategic Intelligence Center offers insights and contextual intelligence in the areas of AI, behavioral psychology, civic participation, cybersecurity, digital communications, digital identity, geopolitics, and global governance.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000812,"World Economic Forum: Shaping the Future of Media, Entertainment and Culture",https://www.weforum.org/platforms/shaping-the-future-of-media-entertainment-and-sport,"Through its Shaping the Future of Media, Entertainment and Culture Project, WEF is working to rebuild trust in media institutions. Its Quality Project is creating a tool that aggregates data from other initiatives assessing media quality and allows users to make personalized decisions about how to weight factors of media quality in their own assessments. Additionally, Project Meridio aims at creating an open-source tool to empower users to manage their personal data. WEF is also supporting local independent news through its United for News program and helped launch the DQ Institute, which seeks to improve digital literacy.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000813,World Economic Forum: Strategic Intelligence Center,https://www.weforum.org/strategic-intelligence,"The Strategic Intelligence Center offers insights and contextual intelligence in the areas of AI, behavioral psychology, civic participation, cybersecurity, digital communications, digital identity, geopolitics, and global governance.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000814,Xandr,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000815,Yale University: Information Society Project (Law School),https://law.yale.edu/isp,"Based at Yale Law School, the Information Society Project is an interdisciplinary research center dedicated to exploring issues at the intersection of technology and law. It houses the Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere, and the Knight Law and Media Program and the Media Freedom & Information Access Clinic, which trains students interested in careers in media law and provides free legal services to defend freedom of speech, freedom of the press and access to information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000816,Yale University: Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere,https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/balkin-receives-funding-knight-foundation-study-digital-public-sphere,The Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere will produce legal and policy recommendations to improve the functioning of the digital public sphere. The initiative studies topics from antitrust and privacy to content moderation and digital propaganda.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000817,Yonder,https://www.yonder-ai.com,"Yonder provides artificial intelligence tools to detect, monitor, and mitigate online influence operations. The company also publishes research on information integrity and digital influence operations. Was New Knowledge",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000818,YOTI,https://www.yoti.com,,Yes,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000819,YouTube data viewer (Amnesty International),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000820,Zašto ne (Why Not),https://zastone.ba/en/,"Zašto ne (Why Not) is an organization that works on the creation of a safe, secure, healthy, active, efficient and accountable BiH society through increasing civic participation, influencing government accountability, use of new technology tools and promotion of socially engaged culture on the whole territory of BiH together with other interested groups, organizations, institutions and individuals.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000821,ZeroFox,https://www.zerofox.com/,"ZeroFox has developed a social media risk management platform. It claims to manage risk on social networks, the dark web, and external channels. It also claims to offer protection from fraud and hacking; and provides alerts of physical attacks on specific people, locations, and assets.",Yes,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000822,Zignal Labs,https://zignallabs.com/,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000823,ZimFact,http://zimfact.org/,ZimFact is a Zimbabwean fact-checking organization.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Zimbabwe,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
||||
name,externalgroup,focus,accessibility,url,summary,notes
|
||||
CogSecCollab incubator,CogSecCollab,,private slack,,,
|
||||
Memetics: hacking belief systems,,,public facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/memetics.hacking,,
|
||||
Strategic communication engineering,,,public facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/949960748352854,,
|
||||
Digital investigations for journalists,Knight Foundation,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/328713905036655,course group,
|
||||
Computational social science,,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/523771471380181,,
|
||||
Political depolarization at the Commons,BuildUp,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/thecommonspolitics,,
|
||||
r/DisinformationWatch,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/DisinformationWatch/,,
|
||||
r/ActiveMeasures,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/ActiveMeasures/,,
|
||||
r/DigitalManipulation,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/Digital_Manipulation/,,
|
||||
r/TrollFare,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/trollfare/,,
|
||||
r/Propaganda,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/propaganda/,,
|
||||
CMU IDEAS slack,,,private slack,https://cmuideas.slack.com/,,
|
||||
ArtIntoScience slack,,,private slack,https://artintoscience.slack.com/,,
|
||||
TTO Slack,,,private slack,https://tto-conference.slack.com/,,
|
||||
Misinfocon slack,,,private slack,https://misinfocon.slack.com/,,
|
||||
Fake News Challenge slack,,,private slack,https://fakenewschallenge.slack.com/,,
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,name_DE,summary,summary_DE,longname
|
||||
FW01,DISARM Red,,"incident creation framework. All the things that an incident creator will need to do to create, run, and assess the effectiveness of a disinformation incident.",,FW01 - DISARM Red
|
||||
FW02,DISARM Blue,,"incident counters framework. All the things that a response team, people outside the team, and organisations outside the team, will need to do to mitigate the effects of an incident, slow down an incident, stop an incident etc.",,FW02 - DISARM Blue
|
||||
FW03,DISARM Green,,"counter counters framework. All the things that an incident creation team might do to reduce the effectiveness of mitigations, counters, and responders to an incident. This framework doesn't officially exist yet: this id is for future work. ",,FW03 - DISARM Green
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,objecttype,summary,year_started,attributions_seen,found_in_country,urls,notes,when_added,found_via,longname
|
||||
I00001,Blacktivists facebook group,incident,Internet Research Agency created fake @blacktivists facebook group and twitter account. ,2016,Russia,USA,https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/media/blacktivist-russia-facebook-twitter/index.html,,2019-02-24,,I00001 - Blacktivists facebook group
|
||||
I00002,#VaccinateUS,campaign,use both pro- and anti- topic messaging to create an artificial argument online. ,2014,Russia,World,https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/08/23/russian-trolls-twitter-bots-exploit-vaccine-controversy/,,2019-02-24,,I00002 - #VaccinateUS
|
||||
I00003,Beyonce protest rallies,incident,use both pro- and anti- topic messaging to create an artificial argument in real life. ,2016,Russia,USA,https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/10/russia-facebook-ads-us-elections-congress,,2019-02-24,,I00003 - Beyonce protest rallies
|
||||
I00004,#Macrongate,incident,amplified document dump failed because France was prepared for it.,2017,Russia,France,http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/,,2019-02-24,,I00004 - #Macrongate
|
||||
I00005,Brexit vote,campaign,"In early 2014, then UK PM David Cameron outlined the changes he aimed to bring about in the EU and in the UK's relationship with it. These were: additional immigration controls, especially for citizens of new EU member states; tougher immigration rules for present EU citizens; new powers for national parliaments collectively to veto proposed EU laws; new free-trade agreements and a reduction in bureaucracy for businesses; a lessening of the influence of the European Court of Human Rights on British police and courts; more power for individual member states, and less for the central EU; and abandonment of the EU notion of ""ever closer union"".He intended to bring these about during a series of negotiations with other EU leaders and then, if re-elected, to announce a referendum.
|
||||
European Union Referendum Act was passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It extended to include and take legislative effect in Gibraltar,and received royal assent on 17 December 2015.
|
||||
|
||||
Conservative-led Department for Culture, Media and Sport select committee concluded (2018) Russia engaged in ‘unconventional warfare’ during the Brexit campaign. This included ‘156,252 Russian accounts tweeting about #Brexit’ and posting ‘over 45,000 Brexit messages in the last 48 hours of the campaign.’ As it said, Kremlin-controlled media, ‘RT and Sputnik had more reach on Twitter for anti-EU content than either Vote Leave or Leave.EU, during the referendum campaign’.
|
||||
|
||||
The report by Democrats on the Senate foreign relations committee, titled Putin’s asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: implications for US national security, pinpoints the way in which UK campaign finance laws do not require disclosure of political donations if they are from “the beneficial owners of non-British companies that are incorporated in the EU and carry out business in the UK”.
|
||||
|
||||
The senators point out that Ukip and its then-leader, Nigel Farage, did not just fan anti-EU sentiment but also “criticised European sanctions on Russia, and provided flattering assessments of Russian President Putin”.
|
||||
|
||||
The report adds that although officially the Russian government asserted its neutrality on Brexit, its English-language media outlets RT and Sputnik covered the referendum campaign extensively and offered ‘’systematically one-sided coverage’’.",2016,Russia,UK,https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2018/11/01/russian-trolls-used-islamophobia-to-whip-up-support-for-brexit/#1369afb665f2,,2019-02-24,,I00005 - Brexit vote
|
||||
I00006,Columbian Chemicals,incident,Early Russian (IRA) “fake news” stories. Completely fabricated; very short lifespan. ,2014,Russia,USA,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbian_Chemicals_Plant_explosion_hoax,,2019-02-24,,I00006 - Columbian Chemicals
|
||||
I00007,Incirlik terrorists,incident,Fake story transmitted from Russian media to Trump campaign,2016,Russia,USA,https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/16/paul-manafort/trump-campaign-chair-misquotes-russian-media-makes/,,2019-02-24,,I00007 - Incirlik terrorists
|
||||
I00008,Bujic,incident,,2017,Russia,Serbia,https://www.stopfake.org/en/vencislav-the-virgin-hostile-operation-by-vencislav-bujic-seas-foundation-and-its-network-of-collaborators/,Serbia pro-Kremlin disinfo campaign by Vencislav Bujic,2019-02-24,,I00008 - Bujic
|
||||
I00009,PhilippinesExpert,incident,"President of the Philippine visited Moscow and forged ties on information strategy in 2017, and afterwards a series of disinformation campaign was noted in Philippine social media and mainstream media, mostly in favor of Philippine president and promoting Russian propaganda. Among this is the appearance of an unknown-before expert on global affairs who was cited frequently in Russian IRA-connected outlets. ",2017,Russia,Philippines,https://codastory.com/disinformation/how-a-little-known-pro-kremlin-analyst-became-a-philippine-expert-overnight/,Philippines Social Media: Russian Disinformation by fake “expert”,2019-02-24,,I00009 - PhilippinesExpert
|
||||
I00010,ParklandTeens,incident,IRA trolls amplified the far right messaging around the attack. Most notably they amplified social media speculation that many of the teens involved were “crisis actors” nefariously injected into the conversation by outside actors with an anti-gun poltical agenda. Other amplifications included ongoing harassment of survivors and claims that the event is a hoax from the right; and fatalist cynicism about gun reform from the left.,2018,Unknown,USA,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/us/parkland-students-hogg-gonzalez.html,Parkland survivors,2019-02-01,,I00010 - ParklandTeens
|
||||
I00011,CovingtonTeen,incident,,2019,Unknown,USA,https://www.wcpo.com/news/national/fact-check-viral-misinformation-about-covington-catholic-nathan-phillips-infects-the-internet,MAGA kid (Covington),2019-02-01,,I00011 - CovingtonTeen
|
||||
I00012,ChinaSmog,incident,,2011,China,China,https://www.cjr.org/innovations/memes-pollution-censorship-china-beijing.php,"China smog (not an attack, but a counter to disinformation)",2019-02-24,,I00012 - ChinaSmog
|
||||
I00013,FranceBlacktivists,incident,,2014,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-glimpse-into-a-french-operation-f78dcae78924,France blacktivists,2019-02-24,,I00013 - FranceBlacktivists
|
||||
I00014,GiletsJaunePileon,incident,,2018,Russia,France,https://www.wired.com/story/co-opting-french-unrest-spread-disinformation/,Russian pile-onto #GiletsJaune (and expansion to other countries),2019-02-24,,I00014 - GiletsJaunePileon
|
||||
I00015,ConcordDiscovery,incident,"The Office of Special Counsel accused Concord Management (an IRA funder/handler) and its counsel of abusing the discovery process by leaking discovery materials under false pretences: the documents were altered; the documents were portrayed as material obtained by hacking, rather than legal process; the released documents are selected to maximize exposure targets and methods. ",2019,Russia,USA,https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/02/new-mueller-filing-shows-how-russia-misuses-us-courts/581884/,,2019-02-01,,I00015 - ConcordDiscovery
|
||||
I00016,LithuanianElves,campaign,,2014,Russia,Lithuania,https://www.ft.com/content/b3701b12-2544-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf,,2019-02-01,,I00016 - LithuanianElves
|
||||
I00017,US presidential elections,campaign,"Make Clinton look bad or unpopular, and Trump look good over a long period, to change individuals’ voting intentions. ",2016,Russia,USA,https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf,,2019-02-24,OII,I00017 - US presidential elections
|
||||
I00018,DNC email leak incident,tactic,,2016,Russia,USA,,"Channels: RU domestic, RU multilingual (RT/Sputnik), trolls. OII",2019-02-24,OII,I00018 - DNC email leak incident
|
||||
I00019,MacronTiphaine,incident,Far-right trolls on 4chan and Twitter spreading misinformation about French candidate Macron and spur support for rival candidate Le Pen.,2017,,France,https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/heres-how-far-right-trolls-are-spreading-hoaxes-about,Trolls OII,2019-02-24,OII,I00019 - MacronTiphaine
|
||||
I00020,3000 tanks,incident,,2017,Russia,World,https://medium.com/@DFRLab/three-thousand-fake-tanks-575410c4f64d,,2019-02-24,OII,I00020 - 3000 tanks
|
||||
I00021,Armenia elections,campaign,,2017,Russia,Armenia,https://medium.com/dfrlab/fakes-bots-and-blockings-in-armenia-44a4c87ebc46,,2019-02-24,OII,I00021 - Armenia elections
|
||||
I00022,#Macronleaks,incident,"Countering the spreading of an alleged 9GB of “leaked”, fake documents of Macron campaign",2017,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/hashtag-campaign-macronleaks-4a3fb870c4e8,,2019-02-24,OII,I00022 - #Macronleaks
|
||||
I00023,#dislikemacron,incident,,2017,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/russian-and-french-twitter-mobs-in-election-push-bca327aa41a5,unsuccessful,2019-02-24,OII,I00023 - #dislikemacron
|
||||
I00024,#syriahoax,incident,,2017,Syria,USA,https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-the-alt-right-brought-syriahoax-to-america-47745118d1c9,,2019-02-24,OII,I00024 - #syriahoax
|
||||
I00025,EU Army,incident,"Traces back to 2016: Guardian “Is there a secret plan to create an EU army?” French President Emmanuel Macron has warned that Europeans cannot be protected without a ""true, European army"", as he marks the centenary of the World War One Armistice. On a visit to the former Western Front in Verdun, he said Russia had shown it could be a threat and Europe had to be able ""to defend itself better alone"". German Chancellor Angela Merkel backed the idea of an intervention force in June, but said it would have to be part of ""the structure of defence co-operation"".
|
||||
|
||||
Verdict: “An EU army marching out to war under Brussels’ command is a fantasy shared by Eurosceptics and a small number of federalists. Europe will continue down the road of defence cooperation in a halting way, but an EU army is only for armchair generals.”",2018,Russia,EU,https://medium.com/dfrlab/spread-it-on-reddit-3170a463e787,,2019-02-24,OII,I00025 - EU Army
|
||||
I00026,Netherlands referendum on Ukraine,incident,,2016,Russia,Netherlands,https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russias-influence-in-western-elections/2016/04/08/b427602a-fcf1-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00026 - Netherlands referendum on Ukraine
|
||||
I00027,crucifiedboy,incident,,2014,Russia,Ukraine,https://helda.helsinki.fi//bitstream/handle/10138/233374/KhaldarovaPanttiFakeNews.pdf?sequence=1,,2019-02-24,OII,I00027 - crucifiedboy
|
||||
I00028,mh17 downed,incident,,2014,Russia,Ukraine,https://www.stopfake.org/en/lies-spanish-flight-operations-officer-from-kiev-informed-about-ukrainian-planes-involved-in-boeing-tragedy/%20https:/globalvoices.org/2014/07/20/the-russian-governments-7000-wikipedia-edits/%20https:/foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/29/how-mh17-gave-birth-to-the-modern-russian-spin-machine-putin-ukraine/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00028 - mh17 downed
|
||||
I00029,MH17 investigation,campaign,"Since the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur on 17 July 2014 while flying over eastern Ukraine, killing all 283 passengers and 15 crew on board… wreckage of the aircraft fell near Hrabove in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, 40 km (25 mi) from the border.The shoot-down occurred in the War in Donbass, during the Battle of Shakhtarsk, in an area controlled by pro-Russian rebels. This has proven to be an ongoing example of Russia and their proxies ability to wage a disinformation campaign, and exemplify the use of the 4 D’s (dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay) ",2016,Russia,Ukraine,https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/05/07/112052-facebook-zablokiroval-sergeya-parhomenko-za-kommentariy-doklada-o-sbitom-171-boinge-187%20 https://news.online.ua/754036/v-sotssetyah-na-paltsah-pokazali-kak-rabotayut-boty-kremlya-opublikovany-foto/ https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/ukraine-involved-mh17-downing-claims-14184413,"Changed to campaign (still in the news, and still Russia accusing Ukraine... TASS 03/25/19 and UK Daily Mirror (see URL's). It's links to overall campaign directed against Ukraine",2019-02-24,OII,I00029 - MH17 investigation
|
||||
I00030,LastJedi,incident,,2018,Russia,World,https://slate.com/culture/2018/10/last-jedi-star-wars-twitter-backlash-russia-trolls.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00030 - LastJedi
|
||||
I00031,antivax,apt,,2018,Russia,World,https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304567,,2019-02-24,OII,I00031 - antivax
|
||||
I00032,Kavanaugh,incident,"Before the Senate SCOTUS confirmation hearings of Brett Kavanaugh, professor Christine Blasey Ford--first anonymously, then publicly--accused Kavanaugh of inappropriate or criminal sexual behavior. Amplified by Russian trolls Right wing operatives first tried to doxx Ford, then to discredit her. Many observers suggest that the Kavanaugh hearings were the largest anti-US Russian online operation for months. ",2018,Russia,USA,https://qz.com/1409102/russian-trolls-and-bots-are-flooding-twitter-with-ford-kavanaugh-disinformation/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00032 - Kavanaugh
|
||||
I00033,China 50cent Army,apt,"50cent Army is a CCP “tool” - “massive secret operation” in China pumping out an estimated 488 million fabricated social media posts per year, part of an effort to “regularly distract the public and change the subject” from any policy-related issues that threaten to anger citizens enough to turn them out onto the streets. But the research finds no evidence these 50-centers are, in fact, paid 50 cents, nor does it find they engage in direct and angry argument with their opponents. Instead, they are mostly bureaucrats already on the public payroll, responding to government directives at a time of heightened tension to flood social media with pro-government cheerleading.",2014,China,China,https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/how_the_chinese_government_fabricates_social_media_posts_for_strategic_distraction_not_engaged_argument.pdf https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-that-chinese-troll/3540663.html,"campaign (multiple incidents, e.g. Shanshan riots)",2019-02-24,OII,I00033 - China 50cent Army
|
||||
I00034,DibaFacebookExpedition,incident,"In the Expedition, Diba engaged in a highly organized cyber-attack of a Taiwanese political leader. On January 20, 2016 (the day of President Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration) featuring the posting of an overwhelming number of social media comments in support of a PRC-sanctioned message. Netizens from one of the largest discussion forums in China, known as Diba, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message, a cyberattack referred to as the “Diba Expedition to Facebook.”
|
||||
|
||||
Unique for taking place outside of the Chinese Internet system, both transgressing technical and political norms while exposing their actions to an international audience. In spite of the transgressive nature of the action, “Diba Expedition” was highly praised by Chinese official media, in contrast to comparable activities in the past that lacked its explicit pro-government ideology. Yet—reflecting the complexity of Diba’s relationship with the PRC government—the Expedition was shut down after a few days.",2016,China,Taiwan,https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/96746 https://qz.com/598812/an-army-of-chinese-trolls-has-jumped-the-great-firewall-to-attack-taiwanese-independence-on-facebook/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00034 - DibaFacebookExpedition
|
||||
I00035,Brazilelections,campaign,Bot activity in Brazil elections,2014,Brazil,Brazil,https://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/politicalbots/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Brazil-1.pdf,,2019-02-24,OII,I00035 - Brazilelections
|
||||
I00036,BrazilPresDebate,incident,,2014,Brazil,Brazil,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/bots-brazil-the-activity-social-media-bots-brazilian-elections,,2019-02-24,OII,I00036 - BrazilPresDebate
|
||||
I00037,Rioelections,incident,,2016,Brazil,Brazil,https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/eleicoes-2016/2016/10/1823713-eleicao-no-rio-tem-tatica-antiboato-e-suspeita-de-uso-de-robos.shtml,,2019-02-24,OII,I00037 - Rioelections
|
||||
I00038,Brazilimpeachment,incident,,2016,Brazil,Brazil,http://www.labic.net/cartografia/a-rede-das-imagens-da-vaiadilma-novas-relacoes/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300415619_The_Influence_of_Retweeting_Robots_During_Brazilian_Protests,,2019-02-24,OII,I00038 - Brazilimpeachment
|
||||
I00039,MerkelFacebook,incident,"Top stories about Merkel in both German and English were negative and misleading, most published from fake news sites.",2017,Unknown,Germany,https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/hyperpartisan-sites-and-facebook-pages-are-publishing-false,,2019-02-24,OII,I00039 - MerkelFacebook
|
||||
I00040,modamaniSelfie,incident,,2015,Unknown,Germany,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/syria-refugee-anas-modamani-germany-facebook.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00040 - modamaniSelfie
|
||||
I00041,Refugee crime map,incident,,2017,Unknown,Germany,https://uebermedien.de/11488/kartenlegen-mit-kriminellen-auslaendern/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00041 - Refugee crime map
|
||||
I00042,Saudi/Qatar bot dispute,incident,"In the summer of 2017, Twitter bots—automated accounts—were deployed to boost messaging on both sides of the diplomatic dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.” Calling this a “diplomatic dispute” understates the complexity of regional dynamics, at the center is an alleged report that Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, had made an astonishing speech, and alleged “hack” of Qatar’s official news agency, and further woven into concerns Saudi Arabia has about the influence of public perception, the role of Al Jazeera. ",2017,SaudiArabia,Qatar,https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/robot-wars-how-bots-joined-battle-gulf,"robot wars how bots joined battle in the gulf""",2019-02-24,MIS,I00042 - Saudi/Qatar bot dispute
|
||||
I00043,FCC comments,incident,,2017,Unknown,USA,https://gizmodo.com/how-an-investigation-of-fake-fcc-comments-snared-a-prom-1832788658,"does this count as an incident, or is it just hacking as usual?",2019-02-24,MIS,I00043 - FCC comments
|
||||
I00044,JadeHelm exercise,incident,"In the summer of 2015, thousands of troops from the US Army Special Operations command conducted and multi-state, weeks-long training operation across the southwest. Russian trolls amplified conspiracy theories promoted by far right media operatives such as Alex Jones, specifically: the Jade Helm 15 exercise was a precursor to domestic invasion and subsequent martial law by the Obama Administration in coordination with China. Some versions have deus ex machina such as an asteroid strike. Ultimately the Governor of Texas, Greg Abbot, was forced to speak out on the conspiracy theory, but he hedged on Obama’s motives.",2015,Russia,USA,https://www.politifact.com/texas/article/2018/may/03/jade-helm-15-greg-abbott-texas-state-guard-hayden-/,,2019-02-25,MIS,I00044 - JadeHelm exercise
|
||||
I00045,Skripal,incident,"On 4 March 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and double agent for the UK's intelligence services, and his daughter Yulia Skripal were poisoned in Salisbury, England, with a Novichok nerve agent known as A-234, according to official UK sources and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)",2018,Russia,UK,https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/skripal/ https://euvsdisinfo.eu/conspiracy-mania-marks-one-year-anniversary-of-the-skripal-poisoning/,This is Beliingcat's full library of Skirpal related reporting,2019-03-20,,I00045 - Skripal
|
||||
I00046,North Macedonia,incident,,2018,Russia,Macedonia,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/16/world/europe/macedonia-referendum-russia-nato.html https://www.polygraph.info/a/disinfo-analysis-macedonia-nato-russia/29770631.html,disinformation directed by Russian-backed groups trying to stoke fears and depress turnout in a vote that could put this Balkan nation on a path to join NATO.,2019-03-20,,I00046 - North Macedonia
|
||||
I00047,Sea of Azov,incident,"An international incident occurred on 25 November 2018 when the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coast guard fired upon and captured three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to pass from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait on their way to the port of Mariupol. In 2014, Russia had annexed the nearby Crimean Peninsula, which is dominantly internationally recognised as Ukrainian territory. It later constructed the Crimean Bridge across the strait. Under a 2003 treaty, the strait and the Azov Sea are intended to be the shared territorial waters of both countries, and freely accessible.
|
||||
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is also responsible for border protection, claims that the ships illegally entered Russian waters. The FSB alleges that crews did not comply with demands to stop. In the scuffle, a Russian border patrol ship rammed and damaged a Ukrainian Navy tugboat. Russian forces later seized all three Ukrainian ships, confiscating them for violating Russia's border. Six Ukrainian navy soldiers were injured, the Ukrainian navy reported. ",2018,Russia,World,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/wave-of-disinformation-from-the-azov-sea/,,2019-03-20,,I00047 - Sea of Azov
|
||||
I00048,White Helmets,campaign,,2015,Russia,World,https://thesyriacampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/KillingtheTruth.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/syria-white-helmets-conspiracy-theories,,2019-03-20,,I00048 - White Helmets
|
||||
I00049,White Helmets: Chemical Weapons,incident,"On 7 April 2018, a high number of civilians were killed in the besieged Syrian city of Douma, with evidence pointing towards another chemical attack by the regime, according to the EU. Subsequent to this event, a series of images ""prove"" that the White Helmets ""staged"" the chemical attack in Syria.",2017,Russia,World,http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingghouta/disinformation-2/ https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/12/18/chemical-weapons-and-absurdity-the-disinformation-campaign-against-the-white-helmets/ https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/10/16/why-assad-and-russia-target-the-white-helmets/,,2019-03-20,,I00049 - White Helmets: Chemical Weapons
|
||||
I00050,#HandsOffVenezuela,incident,"Venezuela has been thrown into turmoil after Guaidó declared himself interim president Jan. 23. The 35-year-old president of the National Assembly says Venezuela's constitution grants him power to take control of the government because Maduro was re-elected last year by fraud. Guaidó has called for Maduro to leave office and call new elections.
|
||||
|
||||
More than 50 nations, including the United States and most of Latin America, concluded that Maduro's re-election last year was a fraud. They have recognized Juan Guaidó, president of the opposition-led National Assembly, as Venezuela's legitimate head of state, endorsing his mission to establish a transitional government and hold fresh elections.
|
||||
Maduro has remained defiant in the face of domestic and international pressure, securing the support of the governments of Iran and Russia, as well as the loyalty of the Venezuelan military.",2019,Russia,World,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/twitter-as-an-information-battlefield-venezuela-a-case-study/,,2019-03-20,,I00050 - #HandsOffVenezuela
|
||||
I00051,Integrity Initiative,incident,"The UK Foreign Office has accused Russian state media of trying to discredit a government-funded body that works to counter Kremlin disinformation. A spokesperson said the Institute for Statecraft was hacked several weeks ago and documents were ""published and amplified by Kremlin news channels"".
|
||||
The FCO comments on the IfS were issued after a news report said the group had retweeted stories critical of Labour. Western officials believe the group involved in the hack is linked to the Russian state. Since then internal documents have been leaked to the Russian media about the organisation's activities, including lists of journalists it had contacted. The Foreign Office has provided £2.2m in funding to the institute over the last two years supported its work to counter disinformation overseas and not in the UK",2018,Russia,World,https://eaworldview.com/2019/01/counter-russia-disinformation-integrity-initiative/ https://www.stopfake.org/en/kremlin-watch-briefing-the-eu-has-to-start-taking-pro-kremlin-disinformation-seriously/,"This is an excellent example of the tables getting turned, and how we need to carefully work through offensive measures",2019-03-20,,I00051 - Integrity Initiative
|
||||
I00052,China overiew,campaign,,2015,China,World,https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/,"global strategic goals for China different from those President Vladimir Putin has for Russia; as a result, the social media influence techniques used by China are different from those used by Russia.",2019-03-20,,I00052 - China overiew
|
||||
I00053,China Huawei CFO Arrest,incident,"Dec. 1: Canadian authorities arrest Huawei's chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou at Vancouver’s airport while she is en route from Hong Kong to Mexico, after an extradition request from the Americans. The news becomes public on Dec. 5. Dec. 7: In Vancouver, Meng appears in court, where allegations of fraud are laid out. The U.S. alleges Meng misled American banks in a bid to get around American sanctions on Iran.
|
||||
Geopolitically complex issue combines US/China trade; Security concerns/issues related to Huawei’s 5G wireless equipment; diplomacy between Canada & China as Chinese subsequently arrest Canadian citizens.",2018,China,World,https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/czech-zeman-babis-huawei-xi-trump/584158/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-chinas-envoy-says-white-supremacy-played-part-in-canadas-arrest-of/,"“The Chinese have been very active here,” said General Andor Šándor, a former chief of the Czech military-intelligence service who is now a security consultant. “They don’t want to undermine our relationship with NATO, or the EU, unlike the Russians. What they are really keen on is to squeeze as much technological information from us as possible.”",2019-03-20,,I00053 - China Huawei CFO Arrest
|
||||
I00054,China Muslims,incident,,2018,China,World,https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/china-says-foreign-concerns-over-muslim-rights-unwarranted-1.4178042 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/,"China rejects the allegations that it has locked up large numbers of Muslims in re-education camps. The facilities, it says, are vocational training centers that emphasize “rehabilitation and redemption” and are part of its efforts to combat terrorism and religious extremism.",2019-03-20,,I00054 - China Muslims
|
||||
I00055,50 Cent Army,campaign,,2008,China,World,https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-that-chinese-troll/3540663.html,,2019-03-20,,I00055 - 50 Cent Army
|
||||
I00056,Iran Influence Operations,campaign,"Iranian interference in the politics of Arab countries has become more self-evident since the Arab Spring of 2011. Iran has been trying to widen its influence in the region in a political confrontation with Saudi Arabia. Factor long-held hostility to US (Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil”) & Isreal; it’s funding of proxies (Hezbolla) and Shia militia’s in Iraq; and most recently having the Revolutionary Guard being designated a terror organization; the seeming collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (nuclear programme) and expanding economic sanctions all add up to an increased likihood of Iran expanding their information operations.
|
||||
While there is history to Iran’s information/influence operations, starting with FireEye’s report about Iranian “fake news” websites, and subsequent reports by DFRLab (Jan 31, 2019 and March 26, 2019) we have strong document proof and assets that highlight Iran’s activities.",2012,Iran,World,https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/suspected-iranian-influence-operation.html https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/08/irans-disinformation-campaigns.html https://medium.com/dfrlab/takedown-details-of-the-iranian-propaganda-network-d1fad32fdf30 https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8dhttps://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/04/Iran-Memo.pdf,"FireEye has identified a suspected influence operation that appears to originate from Iran aimed at audiences in the U.S., U.K., Latin America, and the Middle East.",2019-03-20,,I00056 - Iran Influence Operations
|
||||
I00057,Mexico Election,incident,,2018,"Russia,Mexico",Mexico,https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/misinformation-seeded-by-bots-and-trolls-invades-mexico-s-election-20180502-p4zctx.html https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-russian-bots-in-mexico-46003fcab4,,2019-03-20,,I00057 - Mexico Election
|
||||
I00058,Chemnitz,incident,,2018,Russia,Germany,https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2018-09-04/chemnitz-far-right-alternative-news http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-facing-turbulence-after-right-wing-unrest-a-1228121.html,,2019-03-20,,I00058 - Chemnitz
|
||||
I00059,Myanmar - Rohingya ,campaign,,2014,Myanmar,Myanmar,https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/ https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-role-genocide-myanmar-new-reporting-complicates-narrative,Personal note (see Reuters side bar... end of article) JFG contributed research re: Twitter,2019-03-20,,I00059 - Myanmar - Rohingya
|
||||
I00060,White Genocide,campaign,,2018,Russia,World,https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/the-high-price-of-white-genocide-politics-for-australia-20180724-p4zt9k.html https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/trump-white-nationalism/568393/ https://www.iafrikan.com/2018/11/20/social-media-usa-south-africa-fake-news-disinformation/,Personal note (see Reuters side bar... end of article) JFG contributed research re: Twitter,2019-03-20,,I00060 - White Genocide
|
||||
I00061,Military veterans Targetting,campaign,,2017,Russia,US,https://www.stripes.com/congressmen-urge-fbi-to-investigate-bots-targeting-veterans-with-fake-news-1.573284 https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-influence-operations-taking-aim-at-us-military/4640751.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/09/russian-operatives-used-twitter-and-facebook-to-target-veterans-and-military-personnel-study-says/?utm_term=.d6fa34d4819c https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/working-papers/vetops/,,2019-03-20,,I00061 - Military veterans Targetting
|
||||
I00062,Brexit/UK ongoing,campaign,,2015,"Russia,UK",UK,https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-nationalist-dark-web-populism-tommy-robinson/? http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2019)634414,"This is current, and offers very good ""Anatomy of an ecosystem"" / EuroParl Think tank study... this is good CASE STUDY I: THE BREXIT CAMPAIGN and this Polarisation by manipulation",2019-03-20,,I00062 - Brexit/UK ongoing
|
||||
I00063,Olympic Doping Scandal,campaign,"On 18 July 2016, Richard McLaren, a Canadian attorney retained by WADA to investigate Grigor Rodchenkov (the former head of Russia's national anti-doping laboratory, the Anti-Doping Center, which was suspended by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in November 2015 for facilitating Russia's elaborate state-sponsored doping program. Rodchenkov helped develop and distribute banned performance-enhancing substances for thousands of Russian Olympians from 2005 to 2015. He made headlines in 2016 as a whistleblower, helping expose the complex and extensive nature of Russia's doping program. His revelations lead to Russia's partial ban from the 2016 Summer Olympics and total ban from the 2018 Winter Olympics.). These allegations led to a 97-page report covering significant state-sponsored doping in Russia.
|
||||
|
||||
The investigation found corroborating evidence after conducting witness interviews, reviewing thousands of documents, analysis of hard drives, forensic analysis of urine sample collection bottles, and laboratory analysis of individual athlete samples, with ""more evidence becoming available by the day."" The report concluded that it was shown ""beyond a reasonable doubt"" that Russia's Ministry of Sport, the Centre of Sports Preparation of the National Teams of Russia, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the WADA-accredited laboratory in Moscow had ""operated for the protection of doped Russian athletes"" within a ""state-directed failsafe system"" using ""the disappearing positive [test] methodology"" (DPM) after the country's poor medal count during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver. McLaren stated that urine samples were opened in Sochi in order to swap them ""without any evidence to the untrained eye"". The official producer of BEREG-KIT security bottles used for anti-doping tests, Berlinger Group, stated, ""We have no knowledge of the specifications, the methods or the procedures involved in the tests and experiments conducted by the McLaren Commission.""",2016,Russia,World,https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html?module=inline,,2019-04-06,,I00063 - Olympic Doping Scandal
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,incident_id,technique_ids,summary
|
||||
IT00000001,buy FB targeted ads,I00002,T0018,
|
||||
IT00000002,"Promote ""funding"" campaign",I00002,T0017,
|
||||
IT00000003,create web-site - information pollution,I00002,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000004,create web-site - information pollution,I00002,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000005,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00002,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000006,legacy web content,I00002,T0058,
|
||||
IT00000007,hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit TOS,I00002,T0058,
|
||||
IT00000008,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00005,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000009,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00005,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000010,Targeted FB paid ads,I00005,T0018,
|
||||
IT00000011,Fake FB groups + dark content,I00005,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000012,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events?",I00005,T0057,
|
||||
IT00000013,"manipulate social media ""online polls""? ",I00005,T0029,
|
||||
IT00000014,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00005,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000015,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00005,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000016,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00005,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000017,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000018,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000019,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0034,
|
||||
IT00000020,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0035,
|
||||
IT00000021,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0036,
|
||||
IT00000022,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00005,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000023,"Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fear, outrage, conspiracy narratives",I00005,T0021,Meme that ISIS was responsible for a local chemical explosion.
|
||||
IT00000024,Backstop personas,I00005,T0030,"Wikipedia fake persona ""AmandaGray91"". "
|
||||
IT00000025,Use SMS/text messages,I00006,T0043,SMS messages sent to local residents
|
||||
IT00000026,Fake video/images,I00006,T0024,Fake youtube video of ISIS claiming responsibility for the chemical attack. Faked screenshot of local newspaper website article on the explosion.
|
||||
IT00000027,Create and use hashtag,I00006,T0015,Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals
|
||||
IT00000028,Create and use hashtag,I00006,T0055,Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals
|
||||
IT00000029,Fake twitter profiles to amplify,I00006,T0007,Twitter bots used to drive visbility
|
||||
IT00000030,bait journalists/media/politicians,I00006,T0039,
|
||||
IT00000031,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (report an unreported false story/event),I00007,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000032,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (report an unreported false story/event),I00007,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000033,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (in the case Paul Manafort)",I00007,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000034,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00007,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000035,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00007,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000036,"Using ""expert""",I00009,T0045,
|
||||
IT00000037,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution ,I00009,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000038,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution ,I00009,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000039,FB pages,I00009,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000040,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00009,T0052,
|
||||
IT00000041,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00010,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000042,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00010,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000043,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00010,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000044,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories; false flags, crisis actors)",I00010,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000045,FB pages/groups/profiles,I00010,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000046,YouTube; Reddit,I00010,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000047,YouTube; Reddit,I00010,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000048,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00010,T0020,
|
||||
IT00000049,journalist/media baiting,I00010,T0039,
|
||||
IT00000050,Forge ('release' altered hacked documents),I00015,T0025,
|
||||
IT00000051,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00015,T0025,
|
||||
IT00000052,"Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly",I00015,T0044,
|
||||
IT00000053,journalist/media baiting,I00015,T0039,
|
||||
IT00000054,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00017,T0025,
|
||||
IT00000055,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00017,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000056,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00017,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000057,Targeted FB paid ads,I00017,T0018,
|
||||
IT00000058,Fake FB groups + dark content,I00017,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000059,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events",I00017,T0057,
|
||||
IT00000060,"manipulate social media ""online polls""? ",I00017,T0029,
|
||||
IT00000061,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00017,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000062,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00017,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000063,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00017,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000064,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000065,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000066,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0033,
|
||||
IT00000067,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0034,
|
||||
IT00000068,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0035,
|
||||
IT00000069,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0036,
|
||||
IT00000070,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00017,T0020,
|
||||
IT00000071,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00017,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000072,"Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fear, outrage, conspiracy narratives",I00017,T0021,
|
||||
IT00000073,Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (ie: Denver Guardian; Macedonian teens),I00017,T0016,
|
||||
IT00000074,Backstop personas,I00017,T0030,
|
||||
IT00000075,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00022,T0025,
|
||||
IT00000076,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00022,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000077,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00022,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000078,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content,I00022,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000079,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00029,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000080,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00029,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000081,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00029,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000082,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00029,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000083,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00029,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000084,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00029,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000085,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00029,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000086,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00029,T0052,
|
||||
IT00000087,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00029,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000088,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00029,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000089,Demand insurmountable proof,I00029,T0040,
|
||||
IT00000090,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00032,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000091,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00032,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000092,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles ,I00032,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000093,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events?",I00032,T0057,
|
||||
IT00000094,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00032,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000095,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00032,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000096,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000097,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000098,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0033,
|
||||
IT00000099,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0034,
|
||||
IT00000100,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0035,
|
||||
IT00000101,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0036,
|
||||
IT00000102,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00032,T0020,
|
||||
IT00000103,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00032,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000104,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories)",I00032,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000105,"2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/sponsored astroturfing",I00033,T0049,
|
||||
IT00000106,fabricated social media comment,I00033,T0051,
|
||||
IT00000107,domestic social media influence operations focus primarily on “cheerleading” or presenting or furthering a positive narrative about the Chinese state,I00033,T0050,
|
||||
IT00000108,"cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force",I00033,T0047,
|
||||
IT00000109,"cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force",I00033,T0048,
|
||||
IT00000110,facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises,I00033,T0002,
|
||||
IT00000111,"Netizens from one of the largest discussion forums in China, known as Diba, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall",I00034,T0002,
|
||||
IT00000112,flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message,I00034,T0049,
|
||||
IT00000113,"Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted nearly 40,000 Facebook comments in just eight hours.",I00034,T0049,
|
||||
IT00000114,“hack” of Qatar’s official news agency,I00042,T0011,
|
||||
IT00000115,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00042,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000116,photoshopped/fake images,I00042,T0024,
|
||||
IT00000117,memes,I00042,T0021,
|
||||
IT00000118,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00044,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000119,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00044,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000120,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00044,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000121,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00044,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000122,YouTube; Reddit,I00044,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000123,YouTube; Reddit,I00044,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000124,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00044,T0020,
|
||||
IT00000125,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00044,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000126,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories)",I00044,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000127,Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and scary) titles,I00044,T0009,
|
||||
IT00000128,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00047,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000129,"Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine for sparking the clashes, saying their ""irrefutable"" evidence would ""soon be made public",I00047,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000130,(Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov suggesting that Ukraine deliberately provoked Russia in hopes of gaining additional support from the United States and Europe.,I00047,T0023,
|
||||
IT00000131,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00047,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000132,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00047,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000133,Demand insurmountable proof,I00047,T0040,
|
||||
IT00000134,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00049,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000135,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00049,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000136,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00049,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000137,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00049,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000138,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00049,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000139,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Roger Waters; Venessa Beeley...)",I00049,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000140,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00049,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000141,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00049,T0052,
|
||||
IT00000142,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00049,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000143,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00049,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000144,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00050,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000145,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00050,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000146,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00050,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000147,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00050,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000148,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Roger Waters)",I00050,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000149,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00050,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000150,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mint Press News, globalresearch.ca)",I00050,T0052,
|
||||
IT00000151,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00050,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000152,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00050,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000153,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00051,T0025,
|
||||
IT00000154,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00051,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000155,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00051,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000156,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00051,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000157,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00051,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000158,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00051,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000159,YouTube; Reddit,I00051,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000160,YouTube; Reddit,I00051,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000161,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00051,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000162,State-run media seeds foreign influence environment,I00053,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000163,"Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese State and Party",I00053,T0023,
|
||||
IT00000164,Events coordinated and promoted across media platforms,I00053,T0057,
|
||||
IT00000165,Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ie: support for Meng outside courthouse,I00053,T0050,
|
||||
IT00000166,Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ie: support for Meng outside courthouse,I00053,T0057,
|
||||
IT00000167,"China also plays victim, innocence, plays by rules, misunderstood narrative",I00053,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000168,"Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of applying a double standard, and has decried what he sees as “Western egotism and white supremacy” in the treatment of detained Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou.” ",I00053,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000169,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00056,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000170,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00056,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000171,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (non-paid advertising),I00056,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000172,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00056,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000173,"Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narratives",I00056,T0021,
|
||||
IT00000174,"Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narratives",I00056,T0022,
|
||||
IT00000175,Fake news/synthetic web-sites,I00056,T0008,
|
||||
IT00000176,legacy web content,I00056,T0058,
|
||||
IT00000177,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00063,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000178,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00063,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000179,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Putin himself; Embassies & Sports Ministry; TASS",I00063,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000180,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00063,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000181,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00063,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000182,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots ",I00063,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000183,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00063,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000184,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00063,T0052,
|
||||
IT00000185,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00063,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000186,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00063,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000187,,I00002,C00155,
|
||||
IT00000188,,I00004,C00053,
|
||||
IT00000189,,I00004,C00211,
|
||||
IT00000190,,I00004,C00202,
|
||||
IT00000191,,I00022,C00202,
|
||||
IT00000192,,I00005,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000193,,I00009,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000194,,I00056,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000195,,I00005,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000196,,I00009,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000197,,I00056,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000198,,I00010,C00184,
|
||||
IT00000199,,I00015,C00184,
|
||||
IT00000200,,I00032,C00184,
|
||||
IT00000201,,I00044,C00184,
|
||||
IT00000202,,I00015,C00165,
|
||||
IT00000203,,I00022,C00154,
|
||||
IT00000204,,I00022,C00197,
|
||||
IT00000205,,I00022,C00203,
|
||||
IT00000206,,I00035,C00172,
|
||||
IT00000207,,I00042,C00207,
|
||||
IT00000208,,I00044,C00200,
|
||||
IT00000209,,I00049,C00008,
|
||||
IT00000210,,I00050,C00008,
|
||||
IT00000211,,I00029,F00067,
|
||||
IT00000212,,I00045,F00067,
|
||||
IT00000213,,I00002,F00092,
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,longname
|
||||
M001,resilience,Increase the resilience to disinformation of the end subjects or other parts of the underlying system,M001 - resilience
|
||||
M002,diversion,"Create alternative channels, messages etc in disinformation-prone systems",M002 - diversion
|
||||
M003,daylight,"Make disinformation objects, mechanisms, messaging etc visible",M003 - daylight
|
||||
M004,friction,"Slow down transmission or uptake of disinformation objects, messaging etc",M004 - friction
|
||||
M005,removal,Remove disinformation objects from the system,M005 - removal
|
||||
M006,scoring,Use a rating system,M006 - scoring
|
||||
M007,metatechnique,,M007 - metatechnique
|
||||
M008,data pollution,Add artefacts to the underlying system that deliberately confound disinformation monitoring,M008 - data pollution
|
||||
M009,dilution,Dilute disinformation artefacts and messaging with other content (kittens!),M009 - dilution
|
||||
M010,countermessaging,Create and distribute alternative messages to disinformation,M010 - countermessaging
|
||||
M011,verification,"Verify objects, content, connections etc. Includes fact-checking",M011 - verification
|
||||
M012,cleaning,Clean unneeded resources (accounts etc) from the underlying system so they can't be used in disinformation,M012 - cleaning
|
||||
M013,targeting,Target the components of a disinformation campaign,M013 - targeting
|
||||
M014,reduce resources,Reduce the resources available to disinformation creators,M014 - reduce resources
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,main topic,subtopic,notes
|
||||
N00001,gargling with bleach will prevent/cure – also appears as satire,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00002,drinking corona beer will prevent/cure – also appears as satire,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00003,taking acetic acid will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00004,taking steroids will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00005,taking colloidal silver will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00006,taking MMS (which contains chlorine dioxide) can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00007,using essential oils will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00008,gargling with salt water will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00009,gargling with ethanol will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00010,eating raw garlic will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00011,garlic will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00012,spraying normal drinking alcohol on body will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00013,spraying chlorine on body prevents coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00014,drinking or washing in sesame oil prevents coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00015,using a hand dryer will kill corona virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00016,drinking water every 15 minutes will wash virus to the stomach where it will die,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00017,drinking hot water will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00018,avoiding eating ice cream will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00019,rinsing your nose with saline will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00020,aspirating boiling water vapor for five minutes deactivates the coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00021,having a pneumonia shot will prevent you from getting the disease,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00022,having a flu shot will prevent you from getting the disease,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00023,using cocaine prevents/cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00024,Asians are more likely to get Covid 19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00025,Wearing more than one mask will help prevent the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00026,It is dangerous to receive packages from china,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00027,It is dangerous to eat in a Chinese restaurant (more so than other restaurants),,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00028,Cold weather and snow can kill off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00029,Warmer weather will kill off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00030,Taking a hot bath prevents COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00031,Hand dryers are effective in killing off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00032,Antibiotics are effective in preventing and treating the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00033,Vinegar is more effective than hand sanitizer,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00034,Gargling with Vinegar prevents covid-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00035,Hand sanitizer does not work,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00036,Shuanghuanglian (Chinese medical herb) can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00037,drinking cow urine and applying cow dung on the body can cure coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00038,there is no risk to mass public gatherings as the virus is impossible to contract outdoors,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00039,drinking water every 15 minutes will prevent coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00040,Miracle Mineral Supplement cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00041,silver-infused toothpaste will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00042,Kenneth Copeland can cure the virus directly from his tv studio,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00043,you have to be with someone for 10 minutes to catch the virus from them,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00044,"taking ibuprofen makes COVID-19 worse, especially in new patients",,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00045,reading the Quran will make you immune,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00046,you can kill the virus by holding a blow dryer up to your nose,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00047,Sheep head’s soup is a preventative,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00048,Lemon and bicarbonate kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00049,Lemon juice with salt is a cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00050,Lemon juice with Chinese mesona is a cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00051,Lemon juice with turmeric prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00052,Consuming alcoholic beverages may help reduce the risk of infection by the novel coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00053,Coronavirus will be cured after 14 hours of curfew,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00054,Bitter gourd juice can cure coronavirus in two hours,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00055,“Gale of the wind” and neem tree leaves can prevent corona virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00056,Sitting in the sunlight will cure COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00057,Coronavirus can be cured by sniffing clove and camphor,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00058,Green chiretta can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00059,Eating bananas will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00060,15 minutes in Sauna will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00061,Morel mushrooms increase risk by 200%,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00062,Eating onions with salt will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00063,Propolis cures COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00064,Arsenic album-30 homeopathic medicine can prevent coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00065,Drinking boiled garlic water cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00066,A bovine vaccine can be used to inoculate people against coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00067,Shaving your beard prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00068,Turkish raki prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00069,Constant sex kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00070,An alkaline diet prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00071,Volcanic ash kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00072,Ketamine can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00073,Putting an opinion in your room can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00074,Black tea can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00075,Pu’er tea can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00076,Environmental enzymes can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00077,Cocaine kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00078,Corona virus is just a cold,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00079,Covid 19 is a normal flu and is no more dangerous than that,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00080,Children cannot catch corona virus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00081,SARS-CoV-2 is mutating faster than normal viruses,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00082,Pregnant women who have Covid 19 can pass the virus through the placenta to the unborn child,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00083,Covid 19 only affects the elderly,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00084,The SARS-CoV-2 virus can be transmitted through mosquito bite,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00085,Africans are immune,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00086,Vegetarians are immune,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00087,People in India can resist the coronavirus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00088,People with type-A blood are more prone to get coronavirus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00089,Everyone with Covid 19 dies,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00090,There is no corona (virus),,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00091,This is “fake news” invented by Trump to strengthen the dollar,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00092,Chloroquine in any amount can cure Covid 19,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00093,The outbreak of covid 19 is not real,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00094,COVID-19 breeds rapidly in toilet paper,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00095,Turks area immune to covid-19,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00096,Coronavirus is caused by snakes,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00097,Coronavirus activates all bacterias and viruses in your body,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00098,It was created in a lab,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00099,It is a US/CIA created bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00100,It is a Chinese bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00101,It is a Russian bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00102,It leaked from a bio-weapons lab in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00103,It leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00104,It was caused by an infected rat biting a student in the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00105,"March 12, Ayatollah Khamenei falsely claimed that there is evidence that COVID-19 might be a “biological attack.”",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00106,Electromagnetic fields and the introduction of 5G wireless technologies led to Covid 19 outbreaks,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00107,Washing hands is propaganda by soap companies,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00108,This was a plan from Gate Foundation to increase the Gate’s wealth,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00109,Qatar knew abut Covid-19 since 2015 and Doha paid billions to China to “grow the virus”,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00110,Corona virus is being spread by Coca-Cola,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00111,US military brought the virus to Wuhan on October 2019,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00112,Bill Gates and Vatican have a plan to depopulate world with coronavirus vaccine,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00113,Saddam Hussein in 90s told his cabinet that US threatened to spread coronavirus if he didn’t follow US commands,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00114,Cuba gave a vaccine to China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00115,Cuba has a vaccine called Interferon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00116,Israel found the cure,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00117,China finds a vaccine 3/17,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00118,Institut Pasteur in France invented COVID-19,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00119,"COVID-19 is no worse than other outbreaks, it is just being hyped to hurt Trump",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00120,COVID-19 is a scripted narrative to justify closed borders,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00121,COVID-19 is a scripted narrative to force people to stay at home,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00122,Egypt developed cure (doctor developed a fluid),,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00123,Egypt gave China the vaccine,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00124,US has 40 thousands troops immune to COVID-19 conducting an invasion of Europe,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00125,CDC admits coronavirus originated in the US,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00126,Cow urine and feces can cure,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00127,COVID-19 was created in 2014 by an English Institute,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00128,Ecuadorean doctor develops vaccine 3/3,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00129,Filipino student develops vaccine and gets 5million US from Alibaba founder Jack Ma,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00130,"Raúl Rodolfo Abhduz Khan, biochemical engineer from Karmalah Laboratories, is the creator of coronavirus.",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00131,If you can hold your breath for 10 seconds you don’t have Covid 19,,covid19,False Diagnostic Procedures,
|
||||
N00132,NYC is under martial law 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00133,Only people who have tested positive need to stay home and isolate themselves,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00134,Only large gatherings have to be stopped,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00135,All human interaction needs to be stopped,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00136,Coronavirus is spread only by coughing and sneezing,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00137,Social distancing will lead to dramatic immediate results,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00138,1 month of social distancing will stop the epidemic permanently,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00139,Friend/relative at Pentagon said the US is going on total lockdown,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00140,Friend/relative at White House said the US is going on total lockdown,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00141,Russia has unleashed over 500 lions to ensure that people stay inside their homes amid the coronavirus outbreak,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00142,In Spain – free internet during 60 days due to quarantine,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00143,Polish telecommunications company used quarantine as a cover up to put 100 5G antennas in Gdynia,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00144,Riots in London due to unavailability of food leading to lockdown and martial law 3/22,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00145,In USA Helicopters are spraying disinfectants to try to eradicate coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00146,Bangalore Municipal body will be spraying medicine in the air to kill coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00147,Homeland Security is mobilizing the national guard to combat coronavirus 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00148,Janta curfew in India will break the chain of transmission,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00149,Elderly people in Brazil who are caught wandering outside with have their pensions cancelled by the government,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00150,People in Spain are committing suicide due to quarantine 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00151,Parks in Adra Spain are being fumigated with poison,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00152,Spanish helicopters are spreading medicines against coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00153,Oman helicopters are spraying pesticides to eliminate coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00154,Venezuela helicopters are going to spread chemicals against coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00155,Trump will impose a nationwide mandatory quarantine in 38 to 72 hours 3/16,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00156,Military in Philadelphia are preparing to invoke martial law and bring citizens to FEMA camps,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00157,Supermarkets are recalling coronavirus-infected toilet paper,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00158,Pence urges people with coronavirus to go to police 3/2,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00159,Police in China kill covid-19 patients 3/2,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00160,Chinese coronavirus patients are being cremated alive 2/25,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00161,Pandemic caused Venice’s water to be clear so the swans returned,,covid19,Good News Stories,
|
||||
N00162,Pandemic caused Venice’s water to be clear so the dolphins returned,,covid19,Good News Stories,
|
||||
N00163,Elephants break into a village due to social distancing and get drunk on corn wine,,covid19,Good News Stories,
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,name_DE,rank,summary,summary_DE,longname
|
||||
P01,Plan,Planung,1,"Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effective ways of achieving it. Communicate the vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on expected results.",,P01 - Plan
|
||||
P02,Prepare,Vorbereitung,2,"Activities conducted before execution to improve the ability to conduct the action. Examples include: development of the ecosystem needed to support the action: people, network, channels, content etc.",,P02 - Prepare
|
||||
P03,Execute,Durchführung,3,"Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-up and/or maintaining presence etc.",,P03 - Execute
|
||||
P04,Assess,Auswertung,4,"Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in future plans ",,P04 - Assess
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,object_id,name,summary
|
||||
PB00001,C00011,Game Mechanics: show examples of fake news and train the user to identify them on the basis of various types of indicators,
|
||||
PB00002,C00011,Game mechanics: use a crowd-sourced mechanism so that the public can categorize newly spreading news sources or articles a la Re-Captcha,
|
||||
PB00003,C00012,Develop a regulatory body like the CFPB to regulate and enforce regulation for digital organizations. ,
|
||||
PB00004,C00012,Government regulation,
|
||||
PB00005,C00012,Government shutdown. ,
|
||||
PB00006,C00017,Use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . ,
|
||||
PB00007,C00019,"Spread Infographics & Training Material teaching ways to identify and counter divisive rhetorical techniques and content, by stimulating their sense of outrage at being manipulated. Show them how to address the rhetorical technique rather than the content",
|
||||
PB00008,C00019,Twitter hashtags & paid advertising,
|
||||
PB00009,C00019,Teach people to identify non-civil/unconstructive conversations and call them out,
|
||||
PB00010,C00019,"Popularize (via memes, infographics) and get the centrists demographic who are tired of polarization to identify such messaging, call it out and display their outrage on the basis of divisive rhetorical techniques rather than merely arguing about the content",
|
||||
PB00011,C00027,Recruit respected thought leaders to model behavior,
|
||||
PB00012,C00027,Feature established respected thought leaders to model behavior,
|
||||
PB00013,C00027,Promote dialog from communities with disparate viewpoints,
|
||||
PB00014,C00027,"Establish facilitation guidelines for ""civil"" interaction.",
|
||||
PB00015,C00029,Identify ignorant agents (ex: anti-vaxx people willing to pay money to advertise their cause),
|
||||
PB00016,C00029,Sell physical merchandise that has instructive counter-effect,
|
||||
PB00017,C00029,"Secondary Objective: Obtain real-life identity of ignorant agents, to further disrupt their influence activities",
|
||||
PB00018,C00031,Create multiple versions of the narrative and amplify. ,
|
||||
PB00019,C00031,"Dissect narrative, piecemeal the components and then amplify",
|
||||
PB00020,C00032,Hijack hashtag and redirect conversation to truth based content. ,
|
||||
PB00021,C00032,Hijack (man in the middle) redirect from bad content to good content,
|
||||
PB00022,C00036,-Discredit via backstopped blogs/websites showing their past activity and opinions as being opposite to their current ingroup,
|
||||
PB00023,C00036,Create a trail of commentary about their idea of infiltrating the enemy (current in-group),
|
||||
PB00024,C00036,Publicize this by targeting their in-group competitors (ignorant agents),
|
||||
PB00025,C00040,Verify personal credentials ,
|
||||
PB00026,C00040,Syndicated reputation management (fact-checking syndication),
|
||||
PB00027,C00040,Academia ISAO,
|
||||
PB00028,C00044,Rate restrict via regulation posting above a statistical threshold,
|
||||
PB00029,C00044,Unless account is de-anonymized and advertised as automated messaging,
|
||||
PB00030,C00048,"Identify the accounts, the real person's name and shame them on social media.",
|
||||
PB00031,C00053,Social media companies remove inactive accounts,
|
||||
PB00032,C00053,Account holders remove accounts they're no longer using. ,
|
||||
PB00033,C00053,"Influencers encourage people to remove their inactive accounts ""Do you really need that old account"" campaign, world-war-two poster-style. ",
|
||||
PB00034,C00053,"Create alternative memorial websites for accounts of deceased people, so their accounts can't be reactivated on 'live' sites. ",
|
||||
PB00035,C00053,Educate/scare users on the risks of losing control over a dormant account (would their employer be forgiving if an account associated with the user suddenly starting posting extremist content?).,
|
||||
PB00036,C00074,Platform adds a hash of the post to the post metadata and make it publicly available (content addressing). Scrape for duplicate content and deplatform the content/users across affected. In all cases some checks need to prevent deplatforming of highly correlated organic traffic such as a community group copy/pasting their bake sale advert. ,
|
||||
PB00037,C00074,Platform adds plagiarism score metadata to a post and makes it publicly available. Scrape for duplicate content and deplatform the content/users across affected platforms.,
|
||||
PB00038,C00074,Use message hashing and fuzzy hashing to detect identical/similar content.,
|
||||
PB00039,C00074,Use plagiarism algorithm to detect similar blog posts.,
|
||||
PB00040,C00074,"Use basic web scraping techniques, Google dorks, etc to identify similar head lines, uniques phrases, authorship, embedded links and any other correlating data point.",
|
||||
PB00041,C00098,Affected person contacts platform for action,
|
||||
PB00042,C00136,"Work with platform to identify active target audiences through finanical data and messaging.
|
||||
",
|
||||
PB00043,C00136,Use a platform's publicly available advertising/targeting capabilities to enumerate a list of possible microtargeted demographics. Compare these to known TAs of past/ongoing influence ops to identify the vulnerable demographics. ,
|
||||
PB00044,C00140,"DDoS adversary link shorteners by spamming real links.
|
||||
",
|
||||
PB00045,C00140,Compromise service and reroute links to benign content or counter messaging.,
|
||||
PB00046,C00148,Degrade TA engagement using bots; direct the adversary to engage insular bot communities-within-communities rather than the authentic target audience.,
|
||||
PB00047,C00148,Degrade MOEs/MOPs by faking inter-community sharing.,
|
||||
PB00048,C00149,"Distort TA demographics by posting irrelevant content, misleading demogaphic data, etc.",
|
||||
PB00049,C00149,"Work with the media platform to distort publicly available metrics. Can we work with Twitter to get crappy off-brand memes artificially bumped without needing to create fake accounts, etc.?",
|
||||
PB00050,C00149,"Use adtech to promote content inconsistent with TA demographics. If the adversary is reverse engineering a groups demographics by analyzing ads placed on the platform/group, by spamming ads for out-group stuff it may distort analysis of the group.",
|
||||
PB00051,C00149,"Distort Google Trends and other publicly available source of metrics using bots, cyborgs, adtech.",
|
||||
PB00052,C00149,Distort TA emotional response to content/narratives.,
|
||||
PB00053,C00149,Promote damp squibs. Within a known TA promote/inflate crappy off-brand memes which are unlikley to resonate.,
|
||||
PB00054,C00149,"Detect early trending/engagement and undermine the content by responding with 5Ds, toxic community behaviour, satirical responses, etc.",
|
||||
PB00055,C00149,"If adtech is used, fake clicks and engagements on the content.",
|
||||
PB00056,C00174,Elected officials lead return to First Amendment norms that embrace free and fair media as central to democracy.,
|
||||
PB00057,C00188,"TechCamp bringing together local journalists, with a several-day training program that includes a sponsored yearlong investigative project",
|
||||
PB00058,C00197,"Create a standard reporting format and method for social platforms for reporting false accounts.
|
||||
",
|
||||
PB00059,C00197,Determine whether account might be compromised,"Questions: - Is the account compromised?
|
||||
- Is it known to be associated with threat actors
|
||||
- common/random name
|
||||
- Names violate terms of service
|
||||
- Dormant account
|
||||
- Change of country IP
|
||||
- Social network growth patterns (number of friends etc)
|
||||
- Evidence of linguistic artifacts (multiple fingerprints, terms/idiosyncrasies )
|
||||
- Community vs. narrative vs. individuals "
|
||||
PB00060,C00197,Report suspected bots.,
|
||||
PB00061,C00197,"Report ToS violations. In all playbooks the platform must force user verification, credential reset and enable MFA. Suspend the account if it cannot be verified.",
|
||||
PB00062,C00197,Use sites like https://haveibeenpwned.com to detect compromised and at risk user accounts. ,
|
||||
PB00063,C00197,"Monitor for unusual account usage (use of VPN, new geographic location, unusual usage hours, etc). ",
|
||||
PB00064,C00197,Detect sudden deviation in user sentiment such as suddenly dropping hashtags linked to extremist content.,
|
||||
PB00065,C00197,"Purchase ""likes"", ""retweets"" and other vehicles which identify a bot and/or hijacked account. Ban the account.",
|
||||
PB00066,C00197,"Detect hijacked account and spam their posts. ""OP is a known disinformation bot. http://link.to.proof[.]com""",
|
||||
PB00067,C00219,Add date and source to images,
|
||||
PB00068,F00002,"Develop a baseline virality per platform, monitor trends, trigger alert for anomalies.",
|
||||
PB00069,F00003,"Destroy Desire to Work for Propaganda Businesses
|
||||
","-Identify non-committed actors (ie. IRA 2$/h employees)
|
||||
-Identify where they reside (ie. postal code level)
|
||||
-Send a viral message that clarifies the risk of working in influence ops. "
|
||||
PB00070,F00003,"Hack personal accounts
|
||||
-Send inflammatory messages on their behalf",
|
||||
PB00071,F00004,Identify target and entice individual to reveal insider information,
|
||||
PB00072,F00005,"-Model communities on the basis of behavior and identity, etc
|
||||
-Model different online behaviors in terms of how these groups interact with propaganda
|
||||
-Model how these group-based behaviors are affected by the tech platform they are using
|
||||
-This research can feed into later-stage playbooks to adapt them to communities/platforms",
|
||||
PB00073,F00006,Model each major platform,"Determine:
|
||||
a) Moderation Method (global, subcommunity level, none -ie. twitter, reddit, 8chan)
|
||||
b) Access Model (friend request, open, real-life identity)
|
||||
c) Communication Model (global, friends only, subcommunity, hybrid)
|
||||
Determine how the combination of the above (and other characteristics) allow different technical methods to communicate and influence various audiences
|
||||
This will allow to adapt playbooks to specific platforms"
|
||||
PB00074,F00013,"- Trace money and financing
|
||||
- Trace connections to known operations",
|
||||
PB00075,F00014,"- Hashes
|
||||
- Data voids
|
||||
- User handles
|
||||
- Domains + link shortener
|
||||
- TinEye For video (visual artifact)",
|
||||
PB00076,F00017,Create standard scoring for emptional content,
|
||||
PB00077,F00018,"Ad tech
|
||||
- De-platform funding sites
|
||||
- Blockchain transaction
|
||||
- Sell items
|
||||
- Identify manufacturers
|
||||
- Pay to play meetings ",
|
||||
PB00078,F00018,"Identify ad tech on platforms
|
||||
- Selling merch?
|
||||
- Financial platform
|
||||
- Bitcoin etc.. .",
|
||||
PB00079,F00018,"Identify re-use of ads
|
||||
","Look at Ad trackers, Tracking ids, Tracking ads, Re-use of as features (language, name, themes, plug-in, re-use/versions)"
|
||||
PB00080,F00018,track funding sources,
|
||||
PB00081,F00077,Build and update a model bot behaviour. ,
|
||||
PB00082,F00077,Build network of companies that model / rate bots. Build standards around data sharing and exchange,
|
||||
PB00083,F00092,"Build a reporting system for the public, so they can report disinformation artefacts and have them available to channels etc for action. ",
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
name,url,description,provides_tools,sector,primary_role,secondary_role,primary_subject,secondary_subject,volunteers,region,country,rand_list,credco_list,carnegie_list,twitter_handle
|
||||
4Facts,,,,,,,"Blockchain, Media",,,,,,Y,N,
|
||||
BS Detector,https://www.producthunt.com/alternatives/b-s-detector,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
|
||||
Buscador: an OSINT linux virtual machine,https://inteltechniques.com/buscador/,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
|
||||
Remarrk,twitter.com/remarrk,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
|
||||
WikiTribune,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiTribune,,,,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,N,
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
Active,name,externalgroup,artifacts,automation,function,platform,accessibility,url,code_url,description,notes
|
||||
retired,BotCheck.me,RoBhat,accounts,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
|
||||
retired,FactCheck.me,RoBhat,,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
|
||||
retired,NewsBotAI,RoBhat,,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
|
||||
retired,SurfState.me,RoBhat,,,,browser extension,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,resource_type,longname
|
||||
R001,datastreams ,Access to streaming data,data,R001 - datastreams
|
||||
R002,funding ,"Money to keep the lights on: for resources, time etc",money,R002 - funding
|
||||
R003,money ,Money for specific resources,money,R003 - money
|
||||
R004,platform algorithms ,Access to the algorithms used in a platform.,algorithms,R004 - platform algorithms
|
||||
R005,slang translation,Translations of slang terms,knowledge,R005 - slang translation
|
||||
R006,disinformation datasets,Access to datasets containing disinformation,data,R006 - disinformation datasets
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,longname
|
||||
D01,Detect,"Discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems.",D01 - Detect
|
||||
D02,Deny,"Prevent disinformation creators from accessing and using critical information, systems, and services. Deny is for an indefinite time period. ",D02 - Deny
|
||||
D03,Disrupt,"Completely break or interrupt the flow of information, for a fixed amount of time. (Deny, for a limited time period). Not allowing any efficacy, for a short amount of time. ",D03 - Disrupt
|
||||
D04,Degrade,"Reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of disinformation creators’ command and control or communications systems, and information collection efforts or means, either indefinitely, or for a limited time period. ",D04 - Degrade
|
||||
D05,Deceive,Cause a person to believe what is not true. military deception seeks to mislead adversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality.,D05 - Deceive
|
||||
D06,Destroy,"Damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. Destroy is permanent, e.g. you can rebuild a website, but it’s not the same website. ",D06 - Destroy
|
||||
D07,Deter,Discourage.,D07 - Deter
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,longname,Jon's comments
|
||||
S001,Nonprofit,,S001 - Nonprofit,"Nonprofit and civil society are not mutually exclusive - in fact, to many, they are the same"
|
||||
S002,Civil Society,,S002 - Civil Society,"Nonprofit and civil society are not mutually exclusive - in fact, to many, they are the same"
|
||||
S003,Government,,S003 - Government,agree
|
||||
S004,Academic,,S004 - Academic,"""Education"" is more the sector - academic is more the term for an individual"
|
||||
S005,Activist,,S005 - Activist,Not a sector
|
||||
S006,General Public,,S006 - General Public,Not a sector
|
||||
S007,Social Media Company,,S007 - Social Media Company,"Social media (delete unecessary ""company"")"
|
||||
S008,Other Tech Company,,S008 - Other Tech Company,Technology (excluding social media)
|
||||
S009,Other Company,,S009 - Other Company,"Other (delete unecessary ""company"")"
|
||||
S010,Media,,S010 - Media,Media (excluding social media)
|
||||
,,,,"There are so many industry sectors
|
||||
Do we need to just highlight those most relevant to red/blue ttps?
|
||||
If so, what about journalism? Fact checking?
|
||||
Sub-sectors of government: Law enforcement? Defence?"
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
||||
Added?,Name,URL,Has volunteers?,Their description,Notes,Country,Source,Unnamed: 8,Unnamed: 9,Unnamed: 10,Unnamed: 11,Unnamed: 12,Unnamed: 13
|
||||
y,Federation of American Scientists,https://fas.org/ncov/disinformation-reports/,y,"Upon recognition of the threat that false information poses to science, the Federation of American Scientists established the Disinformation Research Group (FAS DRG). FAS DRG is composed of scientists, communications experts, data-scientists, and technologists with the intended purpose of detecting, understanding, and effectively exposing disinformation and false narratives surrounding COVID-19. FAS DRG uses multiple methods, technologies, and resources to execute the mission.",,USA,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,RealityTeam,http://realityteam.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,CogSecCollab,http://cogsec-collab.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,CTI League Disinformation Team,https://cti-league.com/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,Bellingcat,https://www.bellingcat.com/author/bellingcat/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,Credibility Coalition,https://credibilitycoalition.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,AVAAZ,https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/disinfo_volunteer_231/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,UN Verified project,https://shareverified.com/en,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,Cities on the Internet,https://mwi.pl/,y,,,Poland,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,PGP Stronger,https://stronger.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,Czech Elves,https://www.facebook.com/cestielfoveofficial/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Iffy News,https://iffy.news/fact-check-search/,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
cloudflare/circl: CIRCL: Cloudflare Interoperable ... - GitHub,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
"https://github.com/cloudflare/circlCIRCL (Cloudflare Interoperable, Reusable Cryptographic Library) is a collection of cryptographic primitives written in Go. The goal of this library is to be used as ...",,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
CIRCL – The Center for Innovative Research in Cyberlearning,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
https://circlcenter.org/Please visit the new Center for Integrative Research in Computing and Learning Sciences (CIRCLS) website to learn about the new Research on Emerging ...,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,name,url,country,operates_in,description,focus,sector,primary_role,notes,provides_tools,volunteers,region,noideawhatthisis
|
||||
,Balkan Investigative Reporting Network,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Baltic Internet Policy Initiative,,,,Check this,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,BBC Media Action ,https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/our-work/covid-19,UK,Global ,"In a crisis, people need the right information to help keep themselves and their families safe. When the COVID-19 outbreak began, we responded quickly – training and working with partners to produce trusted, accurate and timely content for social media, radio and television, to help slow the spread of the novel coronavirus and counter harmful mis- and dis-information...In a crisis, people need the right information to help keep themselves and their families safe. When the COVID-19 outbreak began, we responded quickly – training and working with partners to produce trusted, accurate and timely content for social media, radio and television, to help slow the spread of the novel coronavirus and counter harmful mis- and dis-information.",Disinformation,Charity,,"Our dedicated teams moved rapidly to adapt our existing projects to address the knock-on effects of COVID-19 – from increased levels of violence against women, to children losing out on an education during lockdown. Through media, we’re helping people understand what they can do, individually and as a community, and how they can hold their leaders to account.",,,Europe,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,"We are committed to supporting the international response for the long haul – helping people to survive, cope and recover from COVID-19, meeting their diverse and changing needs, and supporting local media to keep their communities informed.",,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,"As an independent charity, we are not funded by the BBC TV Licence Fee. We rely on the support of generous donors – governments, foundations, corporations and individuals – to make our work possible.",,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,Trusted and accurate information will save lives.,,,,
|
||||
,Delfi Melo Detekto,https://www.delfi.lt/news/melo-detektorius/,Lithuania,,,disinformation,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Demagog Poland,https://demagog.org.pl/,Poland,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,DPA,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,ECDC,,,Europe,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Ekspress Meedia / Eesti Päevaleht,https://epl.delfi.ee/kategooria/86056905/faktikontroll-1,Estonia,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Eurasia Partnership Foundation,https://epfarmenia.am,Armena,Armenia/Eurasia,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,European External Action Service,https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en,EU,EU,,Disinformation,,;Public policy;,"""Disinformation is 'verifiably false or misleading information created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public'. Misinformation is verifiably false information that is spread without the intention to mislead, and often shared because the user believes it to be true."" -(action plan):https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54866/action-plan-against-disinformation_en",,,Europe,
|
||||
,Fact and Furious ,https://factandfurious.com,France,Europe,recently reported on paid influencers campaigns to descredit AZ vaccine,Disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Journalism;Fact checking;,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Facta,https://facta.news/,Italy,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Factcheck Vlaanderen,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Factchecking Finland,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Faktoje.al,https://faktoje.al/,Albania,Albania,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Freedom of Information Center of Armenia ,http://www.foi.am/en/,Armenia,Armenia,"online fact-checking courses, capacity building in media literacy for range of audiences",,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Georgia's Reforms Associates (GRASS),https://factcheck.ge/ka,Georgia,Georgia,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Influence,https://startinfluence.com/,USA,USA,"Influence Apps, Inc. is a strategic communications tool that simplifies complex technologies and techniques to help governments counter bad actors online. Powered by ad tech industry and government communications experts, Influence offers a suite of services that provide government operators tools for real-time sentiment analysis and communication campaign management.",,Technology,,,,,North America,Yes
|
||||
,Internews,,,,,,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Maldita,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Media Checker,https://www.mediachecker.ge/,Georgia,Georgia,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Media Development Foundation,http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/home,Georgia,Georgia,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Media Initiatives Centre,https://mediainitiatives.am/,Armenia,Armenia,Training. Runs the “Verified” section of the media.am website,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,MisInfoCon,https://misinfocon.com/about,,Global ,"MisinfoCon is a global movement focused on building solutions to online trust, verification, fact checking, and reader experience in the interest of addressing misinformation in all of its forms. MisinfoCon started as a large gathering at MIT in February 2017. That conference brought together ambassadors from technology platforms, news organizations, as well as experts in social science, media literacy, policy, advocacy and cybersecurity. Ever since then, MisinfoCon has focused on bringing people together in similar meetups, while facilitating online community and resource sharing.",Disinformation,NGO,;Network;,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,OECD,https://disinformation.the100questions.org,France ?,Global ,"100 questions initiative ""bilinguals"" (people with expertise in topical field and data science) to ID the 10 most pertinent disinformation questions to then be addressed",Disinformation,civil Society/NGO,Disinformation;Research (primary/secondary);,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,On the other side of the news,https://coronafakes.com,Ukraine,Ukraine,,disinformation,civil society,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Ostro,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Pledge to Pause,https://www.takecarebeforeyoushare.org/,,,Not checked yet,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Raskrikavanje,https://www.raskrikavanje.rs/,Serbia,Serbia,Site run by Krik,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking; journalism,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Reuters Fact Check,,UK,Global ,"Reuters Fact Check monitors digital platforms for misinformation that is linked to news events and to subjects that are being discussed by the communities we serve. We actively seek out groups and accounts that represent opposing viewpoints and apply the same standards of assessment to all content. Our choice of material to fact check is broad, and is based on the following criteria: [Could the material potentially cause real-world harm, if it is inaccurate?; Editorial value: is the topic timely and of public interest?; Reach: how far has the claim travelled? We examine the level of interactions on individual posts, as well as the visibility of the claim across different platforms.; Potential reach: is the information likely to be shared further? We examine how quickly the post is generating interaction and consider whether it may be repeated by others.; Balance of fact vs opinion: is it possible to isolate certain claims from the material?; After we have identified the content we aim to fact-check, we will first identify and summarize the key claims made in the content.; ",Disinformation,,;Fact checking ;,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA),https://www.disinfobservatory.org/about-us/,Belgium,EU (members of the Observatory),"Offer fact checking tools, collaboartive investigation ",Disinformation,,;Disinformation monitoring ;,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Stanford University: Information Warfare Working Group; European Security Initiative (Center for International Security and Cooperation),https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/information-warfare-working-group,USA,USA,The Information Warfare Working Group is housed at The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. It is a multidisciplinary group of Stanford University scholars that meet quarterly to discuss the issue of cyber-enabled information warfare.,,Education/academia,,,,,North America,
|
||||
,Stop Fake ,https://www.stopfake.org/en/main/,Ukraine,Russia/Ukraine,,Disinformation,NGO,;fact checking ;,Member of International Fact-Checking Network,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Stop Fals,https://stopfals.md/,Moldova,Moldova,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Teyit,https://teyit.org/,Turkey,Turkey,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,The Goethe insititut with International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA),https://www.goethe.de/en/kul/bib/ser/lib/eiv.html,Germany ,Global ,,Disinformation,civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Tjek det,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Translators without Borders,,World,World,,,,,,,,World,
|
||||
,Trolless,https://www.facebook.com/trolless/,Moldova,Moldova,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,UNDP,https://www1.undp.org/content/oslo-governance-centre/en/home/our-focus/Information-Integrity.html,,Regional/Global,,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);","""Information integrity""",,,Europe,
|
||||
,UNESCO,,World,World,,,,,,,,World,
|
||||
,UNICEF/ECARO,https://www.unicef.org/eca/,Geneva,Regional,no IDM page available,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);",Main focus on Vaccine Confidence Project (VCP). https://worldhealthorg.sharepoint.com/:w:/r/sites/WHERegionalOfficeforEurope/_layouts/15/Doc.aspx?sourcedoc=%7B3176E00E-9252-4DAB-946E-895288D3071B%7D&file=UNICEF%20-%20Social%20Listening%20Capacity%20Building%20Plan%202021.docx&action=default&mobileredirect=true,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Valent Projects,,UK,,Not checked yet. Analyses misinformation for UK govt. ,,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,VoxCheck,https://voxukraine.org/uk/voxcheck/,Ukraine,Ukraine,,disinformation,civil society,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,VoxUkraine,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,WHO Epidemic and Pandemic Intelligence Hub,,Germany,Global ,,Disinformation,WHO,;disinformation;,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,WHO-EPI WiN,https://www.who.int/teams/risk-communication/infodemic-management,Geneva,,,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);",,,,Europe,
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,name_DE,phase_id,rank,summary,summary_DE,changes from v0.1,longname
|
||||
TA01,Plan Strategy,,P01,1,"Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all objectives.",,no change,TA01 - Plan Strategy
|
||||
TA02,Plan Objectives,,P01,2,"Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievable objectives. Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the desired end state. There are four primary considerations:
|
||||
- Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives
|
||||
- The effect should be measurable
|
||||
- The objective statement should not specify the way and means of accomplishment
|
||||
- The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task.",,no change,TA02 - Plan Objectives
|
||||
TA05,Microtarget,,P02,8,Target very specific populations of people,,no change,TA05 - Microtarget
|
||||
TA06,Develop Content,,P02,5,"Create or acquire text, images, and other content",,no change,TA06 - Develop Content
|
||||
TA07,Select Channels and Affordances,,P02,9,"Selecting platforms and affordances assesses which online or offline platforms and their associated affordances maximize an influence operation’s ability to reach its target audience. To select the most appropriate platform(s), an operation may assess the technological affordances including platform algorithms, terms of service, permitted content types, or other attributes that determine platform usability and accessibility. Selecting platforms includes both choosing platforms on which the operation will publish its own content and platforms on which the operation will attempt to restrict adversarial content.",,no change,TA07 - Select Channels and Affordances
|
||||
TA08,Conduct Pump Priming,,P03,10,"Release content on a targetted small scale, prior to general release, including releasing seed. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. ",,no change,TA08 - Conduct Pump Priming
|
||||
TA09,Deliver Content,,P03,11,Release content to general public or larger population,,no change,TA09 - Deliver Content
|
||||
TA10,Drive Offline Activity,,P03,14,"Move incident/campaign from online to offline. Encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage in the physical information space or offline world. This may include operation-aligned rallies or protests, radio, newspaper, or billboards. An influence operation may drive to physical forums to diversify its information channels and facilitate spaces where the target audience can engage with both operation content and like-minded individuals offline. ",,no change,TA10 - Drive Offline Activity
|
||||
TA11,Persist in the Information Environment,,P03,15,Persist in the Information Space refers to taking measures that allow an operation to maintain its presence and avoid takedown by an external entity. Techniques in Persist in the Information Space help campaigns operate without detection and appear legitimate to the target audience and platform monitoring services. Influence operations on social media often persist online by varying the type of information assets and platforms used throughout the campaign.,,no change,TA11 - Persist in the Information Environment
|
||||
TA12,Assess Effectiveness,,P04,16,"Assess effectiveness of action, for use in future plans ",,no change,TA12 - Assess Effectiveness
|
||||
TA13,Target Audience Analysis,,P01,3,"Identifying and analyzing the target audience examines target audience member locations, political affiliations, financial situations, and other attributes that an influence operation may incorporate into its messaging strategy. During this tactic, influence operations may also identify existing similarities and differences between target audience members to unite like groups and divide opposing groups. Identifying and analyzing target audience members allows influence operations to tailor operation strategy and content to their analysis. ",,no change,TA13 - Target Audience Analysis
|
||||
TA14,Develop Narratives,,P02,4,"The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a """"whole of society"""" perspective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion constitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level. Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline.",,new,TA14 - Develop Narratives
|
||||
TA15,Establish Social Assets,,P02,6,"Establishing information assets generates messaging tools, including social media accounts, operation personnel, and organizations, including directly and indirectly managed assets. For assets under their direct control, the operation can add, change, or remove these assets at will.
|
||||
Establishing information assets allows an influence operation to promote messaging directly to the target audience without navigating through external entities. Many online influence operations create or compromise social media accounts as a primary vector of information dissemination.",,new,TA15 - Establish Social Assets
|
||||
TA16,Establish Legitimacy,,P02,7,Establish assets that create trust,,new,TA16 - Establish Legitimacy
|
||||
TA17,Maximize Exposure,,P03,12,"Maximize exposure of the target audience to incident/campaign content via flooding, amplifying, and cross-posting.",,new,TA17 - Maximize Exposure
|
||||
TA18,Drive Online Harms,,P03,13,"Actions taken by an influence operation to harm their opponents in online spaces through harassment, suppression, releasing private information, and controlling the information space through offensive cyberspace operations. ",,new,TA18 - Drive Online Harms
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,name_DE,tactic_id,summary,summary_DE,framework_id,longname
|
||||
TK0001,Goal setting,,TA01,Set the goals for this incident. ,,FW01,TK0001 - Goal setting
|
||||
TK0002,Population research / audience analysis (centre of gravity),,TA01,"Research intended audience. Includes audience segmentation, hot-button issues etc. ",,FW01,TK0002 - Population research / audience analysis (centre of gravity)
|
||||
TK0003,Campaign design (objective design),,TA01,Design the campaign(s) needed to meet the incident goals,,FW01,TK0003 - Campaign design (objective design)
|
||||
TK0031,OPSEC for TA01,,TA01,OPSEC for TA01,,FW02,TK0031 - OPSEC for TA01
|
||||
TK0004,Identify target subgroups,,TA02,Identify groups that can best be used to meet incident goals,,FW01,TK0004 - Identify target subgroups
|
||||
TK0005,Analyse subgroups,,TA02,Analyse subgroups,,FW01,TK0005 - Analyse subgroups
|
||||
TK0006,create master narratives,,TA02,create master narratives,,FW01,TK0006 - create master narratives
|
||||
TK0007,Decide on techniques (4Ds etc),,TA02,Decide on techniques (4Ds etc),,FW01,TK0007 - Decide on techniques (4Ds etc)
|
||||
TK0008,Create subnarratives,,TA02,Create subnarratives,,FW01,TK0008 - Create subnarratives
|
||||
TK0009,4chan/8chan coordinating content,,TA02,4chan/8chan coordinating content,,FW01,TK0009 - 4chan/8chan coordinating content
|
||||
TK0032,OPSEC for TA02,,TA02,OPSEC for TA02,,FW02,TK0032 - OPSEC for TA02
|
||||
TK0010,Create personas,,TA15,Create personas,,FW01,TK0010 - Create personas
|
||||
TK0011,Recruit contractors,,TA15,Recruit contractors,,FW01,TK0011 - Recruit contractors
|
||||
TK0012,Recruit partisans,,TA15,Recruit partisans,,FW01,TK0012 - Recruit partisans
|
||||
TK0013,find influencers,,TA15,find influencers,,FW01,TK0013 - find influencers
|
||||
TK0033,OPSEC for TA15,,TA15,OPSEC for TA15,,FW02,TK0033 - OPSEC for TA15
|
||||
TK0014,Network building,,TA15,Network building,,FW01,TK0014 - Network building
|
||||
TK0015,Network infiltration,,TA15,Network infiltration,,FW01,TK0015 - Network infiltration
|
||||
TK0016,identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks,,TA15,identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks,,FW01,TK0016 - identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks
|
||||
TK0034,OPSEC for TA15,,TA15,OPSEC for TA15,,FW02,TK0034 - OPSEC for TA15
|
||||
TK0035,OPSEC for TA05,,TA05,OPSEC for TA05,,FW02,TK0035 - OPSEC for TA05
|
||||
TK0017,content creation,,TA06,content creation,,FW01,TK0017 - content creation
|
||||
TK0018,content appropriation,,TA06,content appropriation,,FW01,TK0018 - content appropriation
|
||||
TK0036,OPSEC for TA06,,TA06,OPSEC for TA06,,FW02,TK0036 - OPSEC for TA06
|
||||
TK0037,OPSEC for TA07,,TA07,OPSEC for TA07,,FW02,TK0037 - OPSEC for TA07
|
||||
TK0019,anchor trust / credibility,,TA08,anchor trust / credibility,,FW01,TK0019 - anchor trust / credibility
|
||||
TK0020,insert themes,,TA08,insert themes,,FW01,TK0020 - insert themes
|
||||
TK0038,OPSEC for TA08,,TA08,OPSEC for TA08,,FW02,TK0038 - OPSEC for TA08
|
||||
TK0021,"deamplification (suppression, censoring)",,TA09,"deamplification (suppression, censoring)",,FW01,"TK0021 - deamplification (suppression, censoring)"
|
||||
TK0022,amplification,,TA09,amplification,,FW01,TK0022 - amplification
|
||||
TK0039,OPSEC for TA09,,TA09,OPSEC for TA09,,FW02,TK0039 - OPSEC for TA09
|
||||
TK0040,OPSEC for TA10,,TA10,OPSEC for TA10,,FW02,TK0040 - OPSEC for TA10
|
||||
TK0023,retention,,TA11,retention,,FW01,TK0023 - retention
|
||||
TK0024,customer relationship,,TA11,customer relationship,,FW01,TK0024 - customer relationship
|
||||
TK0025,advocacy/ zealotry,,TA11,advocacy/ zealotry,,FW01,TK0025 - advocacy/ zealotry
|
||||
TK0026,conversion,,TA11,conversion,,FW01,TK0026 - conversion
|
||||
TK0027,keep recruiting/prospecting,,TA11,keep recruiting/prospecting,,FW01,TK0027 - keep recruiting/prospecting
|
||||
TK0041,OPSEC for TA11,,TA11,OPSEC for TA11,,FW02,TK0041 - OPSEC for TA11
|
||||
TK0028,evaluation,,TA12,evaluation,,FW01,TK0028 - evaluation
|
||||
TK0029,post-mortem,,TA12,post-mortem,,FW01,TK0029 - post-mortem
|
||||
TK0030,after-action analysis,,TA12,after-action analysis,,FW01,TK0030 - after-action analysis
|
||||
TK0042,OPSEC for TA12,,TA12,OPSEC for TA12,,FW02,TK0042 - OPSEC for TA12
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,name_DE,tactic_id,summary,summary_DE,changes from v0.1,longname
|
||||
T0002,Facilitate State Propaganda,,TA02,Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.,,no change,T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003,Leverage Existing Narratives,,TA14,"Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. ",,no change,T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0004,Develop Competing Narratives,,TA14,"Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the ""firehose of misinformation"" approach.",,no change,T0004 - Develop Competing Narratives
|
||||
T0007,Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups,,TA15,"Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.",,no change,T0007 - Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups
|
||||
T0009,Create fake experts,,TA16,"Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. ",,no change,T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0009.001,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications,,TA16,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications,,no change,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications -
|
||||
T0010,Cultivate ignorant agents,,TA15,"Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as ""useful idiots"" or ""unwitting agents"".",,no change,T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0011,Compromise legitimate accounts,,TA16,Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.,,no change,T0011 - Compromise legitimate accounts
|
||||
T0013,Create inauthentic websites,,TA15,"Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.",,no change,T0013 - Create inauthentic websites
|
||||
T0014,Prepare fundraising campaigns,,TA15,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",,no change,T0014 - Prepare fundraising campaigns
|
||||
T0014.001,Raise funds from malign actors,,TA15,"Raising funds from malign actors may include contributions from foreign agents, cutouts or proxies, shell companies, dark money groups, etc. ",,no change,Raise funds from malign actors -
|
||||
T0014.002,Raise funds from ignorant agents,,TA15,"Raising funds from ignorant agents may include scams, donations intended for one stated purpose but then used for another, etc. ",,no change,Raise funds from ignorant agents -
|
||||
T0015,Create hashtags and search artifacts,,TA06,"Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only ""real"" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage ""conversation"" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). ",,no change,T0015 - Create hashtags and search artifacts
|
||||
T0016,Create Clickbait,,TA05,"Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.",,no change,T0016 - Create Clickbait
|
||||
T0017,Conduct fundraising,,TA10,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",,no change,T0017 - Conduct fundraising
|
||||
T0017.001,Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns,,TA10,"An influence operation may Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns on platforms such as GoFundMe, GiveSendGo, Tipeee, Patreon, etc.",,no change,Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns -
|
||||
T0018,Purchase Targeted Advertisements,,TA05,Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations,,no change,T0018 - Purchase Targeted Advertisements
|
||||
T0019,Generate information pollution,,TA06,"Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. ""Nothing is true, but everything is possible."" Akin to astroturfing campaign.",,no change,T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0019.001,Create fake research,,TA06,"Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx",,no change,Create fake research -
|
||||
T0019.002,Hijack Hashtags,,TA06,"Hashtag hijacking occurs when users “[use] a trending hashtag to promote topics that are substantially different from its recent context” (VanDam and Tan, 2016) or “to promote one’s own social media agenda” (Darius and Stephany, 2019).",,no change,Hijack Hashtags -
|
||||
T0020,Trial content,,TA08,"Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates",,no change,T0020 - Trial content
|
||||
T0022,Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"""Conspiracy narratives"" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model. ",,no change,T0022 - Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
|
||||
T0022.001,Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"An influence operation may amplify an existing conspiracy theory narrative that aligns with its incident or campaign goals. By amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, operators can leverage the power of the existing communities that support and propagate those theories without needing to expend resources creating new narratives or building momentum and buy in around new narratives. ",,no change,Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives -
|
||||
T0022.002,Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"While this requires more resources than amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, an influence operation may develop original conspiracy theory narratives in order to achieve greater control and alignment over the narrative and their campaign goals. Prominent examples include the USSR's Operation INFEKTION disinformation campaign run by the KGB in the 1980s to plant the idea that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as part of a biological weapons research project at Fort Detrick, Maryland. More recently, Fort Detrick featured prominently in a new conspiracy theory narratives around the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic. ",,no change,Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives -
|
||||
T0023,Distort facts,,TA06,"Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content",,no change,T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0023.001,Reframe Context,,TA06,"Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions. ",,no change,Reframe Context -
|
||||
T0023.002,Edit Open-Source Content,,TA06,"An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets. ",,no change,Edit Open-Source Content -
|
||||
T0029,Online polls,,TA07,"Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well",,no change,T0029 - Online polls
|
||||
T0039 ,Bait legitimate influencers,,TA08,"Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. ""Influencers"" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.",,no change,T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0040,Demand insurmountable proof,,TA14,"Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the ""firehose of misinformation"". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of ""questions"" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.",,no change,T0040 - Demand insurmountable proof
|
||||
T0042,Seed Kernel of truth,,TA08,"Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.",,no change,T0042 - Seed Kernel of truth
|
||||
T0043,Chat apps,,TA07,"Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.",,no change,T0043 - Chat apps
|
||||
T0043.001,Use Encrypted Chat Apps,,TA07,"Examples include Signal, WhatsApp, Discord, Wire, etc.",,no change,Use Encrypted Chat Apps -
|
||||
T0043.002,Use Unencrypted Chats Apps,,TA07,"Examples include SMS, etc.",,no change,Use Unencrypted Chats Apps -
|
||||
T0044,Seed distortions,,TA08,"Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. ",,no change,T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0045,Use fake experts,,TA08,"Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give ""credility"" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias",,no change,T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0046,Use Search Engine Optimization,,TA08,"Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka ""Black-hat SEO"" ",,no change,T0046 - Use Search Engine Optimization
|
||||
T0047,Censor social media as a political force,,TA18,Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).,,no change,T0047 - Censor social media as a political force
|
||||
T0048,Harass,,TA18,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",,no change,T0048 - Harass
|
||||
T0048.001,"Boycott/""Cancel"" Opponents",,TA18,"Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organization, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasizing an adversary’s problematic or disputed behavior and presenting its own content as an alternative. ",,no change,"Boycott/""Cancel"" Opponents - "
|
||||
T0048.002,Harass People Based on Identities,,TA18,"Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.",,no change,Harass People Based on Identities -
|
||||
T0048.003,Threaten to Dox,,TA18,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",,no change,Threaten to Dox -
|
||||
T0048.004,Dox,,TA18,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",,no change,Dox -
|
||||
T0049,Flooding the Information Space,,TA17,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,,no change,T0049 - Flooding the Information Space
|
||||
T0049.001,Trolls amplify and manipulate,,TA17,"Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).",,no change,Trolls amplify and manipulate -
|
||||
T0049.002,Hijack existing hashtag,,TA17,Take over an existing hashtag to drive exposure.,,no change,Hijack existing hashtag -
|
||||
T0049.003,Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting,,TA17,"Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content.
|
||||
Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more ""popular"" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.",,no change,Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting -
|
||||
T0049.004,Utilize Spamoflauge,,TA17,"Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, ""you've w0n our jackp0t!"". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging. ",,no change,Utilize Spamoflauge -
|
||||
T0049.005,Conduct Swarming,,TA17,"Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centers exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach. ",,no change,Conduct Swarming -
|
||||
T0049.006,Conduct Keyword Squatting,,TA17,"Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term. ",,no change,Conduct Keyword Squatting -
|
||||
T0049.007,Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives,,TA17,"Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.",,no change,Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives -
|
||||
T0057,Organize Events,,TA10,"Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.",,no change,T0057 - Organize Events
|
||||
T0057.001,Pay for Physical Action,,TA10,"Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest. ",,no change,Pay for Physical Action -
|
||||
T0057.002,Conduct Symbolic Action,,TA10,"Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signaling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space. ",,no change,Conduct Symbolic Action -
|
||||
T0059,Play the long game,,TA11,Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.,,no change,T0059 - Play the long game
|
||||
T0060,Continue to Amplify,,TA11,continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished,,no change,T0060 - Continue to Amplify
|
||||
T0061,Sell Merchandise,,TA10,Sell mechandise refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world while making money,,no change,T0061 - Sell Merchandise
|
||||
T0065,Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities,,TA15,"Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).",,no change,T0065 - Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities
|
||||
T0066,Degrade Adversary,,TA02,Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.,,no change,T0066 - Degrade Adversary
|
||||
T0068,Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis,,TA14,"Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. ",,no change,T0068 - Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis
|
||||
T0072,Segment Audiences,,TA13,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",,no change,T0072 - Segment Audiences
|
||||
T0072.001,Geographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localized Content (see: Establish Legitimacy). ",,no change,Geographic Segmentation -
|
||||
T0072.002,Demographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age. ",,no change,Demographic Segmentation -
|
||||
T0072.003,Economic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division. ",,no change,Economic Segmentation -
|
||||
T0072.004,Psychographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes. ",,no change,Psychographic Segmentation -
|
||||
T0072.005,Political Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.",,no change,Political Segmentation -
|
||||
T0073,Determine Target Audiences,,TA01,Determining the target audiences (segments of the population) who will receive campaign narratives and artifacts intended to achieve the strategic ends.,,new,T0073 - Determine Target Audiences
|
||||
T0074,Determine Strategic Ends,,TA01,"Determining the campaigns goals or objectives. Examples include achieving achieving geopolitical advantage like undermining trust in an adversary, gaining domestic political advantage, achieving financial gain, or attaining a policy change, ",,new,T0074 - Determine Strategic Ends
|
||||
T0075,Dismiss,,TA02,Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.,,Split from T0001,T0075 - Dismiss
|
||||
T0075.001,Discredit Credible Sources,,TA02,"Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.",,no change,Discredit Credible Sources -
|
||||
T0076,Distort,,TA02,"Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.",,Split from T0001,T0076 - Distort
|
||||
T0077,Distract,,TA02,"Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).",,Split from T0001,T0077 - Distract
|
||||
T0078,Dismay,,TA02,"Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.",,Split from T0001,T0078 - Dismay
|
||||
T0079,Divide,,TA02,"Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community",,Split from T0001,T0079 - Divide
|
||||
T0080,Map Target Audience Information Environment,,TA13,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
|
||||
Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",,new,T0080 - Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
T0080.001,Monitor Social Media Analytics,,TA13,"An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics. ",,no change,Monitor Social Media Analytics -
|
||||
T0080.002,Evaluate Media Surveys,,TA13,"An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.",,no change,Evaluate Media Surveys -
|
||||
T0080.003,Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags,,TA13,An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralized page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity. ,,no change,Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags -
|
||||
T0080.004,Conduct Web Traffic Analysis,,TA13,"An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.",,no change,Conduct Web Traffic Analysis -
|
||||
T0080.005,Assess Degree/Type of Media Access,,TA13,"An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties. ",,no change,Assess Degree/Type of Media Access -
|
||||
T0081,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,,TA13,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
|
||||
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",,new,T0081 - Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
T0081.001,Find Echo Chambers,,TA13,"Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with. ",,no change,Find Echo Chambers -
|
||||
T0081.002,Identify Data Voids,,TA13,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.
|
||||
A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ",,no change,Identify Data Voids -
|
||||
T0081.003,Identify Existing Prejudices,,TA13,"An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarize its target audience from the rest of the public.",,no change,Identify Existing Prejudices -
|
||||
T0081.004,Identify Existing Fissures,,TA13,"An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer"" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides.",,no change,Identify Existing Fissures -
|
||||
T0081.005,Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions,,TA13,An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives. ,,no change,Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions -
|
||||
T0081.006,Identify Wedge Issues,,TA13,"A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarizing the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions.",,no change,Identify Wedge Issues -
|
||||
T0081.007,Identify Target Audience Adversaries,,TA13,"An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to center operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view. ",,no change,Identify Target Audience Adversaries -
|
||||
T0081.008,Identify Media System Vulnerabilities,,TA13,"An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content. ",,no change,Identify Media System Vulnerabilities -
|
||||
T0082,Develop New Narratives,,TA14,"Actors may develop new narratives to further strategic or tactical goals, especially when existing narratives adequately align with the campaign goals. New narratives provide more control in terms of crafting the message to achieve specific goals. However, new narratives may require more effort to disseminate than adapting or adopting existing narratives. ",,new,T0082 - Develop New Narratives
|
||||
T0083,Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative,,TA14,"An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.",,new,T0083 - Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative
|
||||
T0084,Reuse Existing Content,,TA06,When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,,new,T0084 - Reuse Existing Content
|
||||
T0084.001,Use Copypasta,,TA06,"Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text. ",,no change,Use Copypasta -
|
||||
T0084.002,Plagiarize Content,,TA06,An influence operation may take content from other sources without proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources. ,,no change,Plagiarize Content -
|
||||
T0084.003,Deceptively Labeled or Translated,,TA06,An influence operation may take authentic content from other sources and add deceptive labels or deceptively translate the content into other langauges. ,,no change,Deceptively Labeled or Translated -
|
||||
T0084.004,Appropriate Content,,TA06,An influence operation may take content from other sources with proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources. Examples include the appropriation of content from one inauthentic news site to another inauthentic news site or network in ways that align with the originators licensing or terms of service.,,no change,Appropriate Content -
|
||||
T0085,Develop Text-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading text-based artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign.",,new,T0085 - Develop Text-based Content
|
||||
T0085.001,Develop AI-Generated Text,,TA06,"AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Text -
|
||||
T0085.002,Develop False or Altered Documents,,TA06,Develop False or Altered Documents,,no change,Develop False or Altered Documents -
|
||||
T0085.003,Develop Inauthentic News Articles,,TA06,An influence operation may develop false or misleading news articles aligned to their campaign goals or narratives. ,,no change,Develop Inauthentic News Articles -
|
||||
T0086,Develop Image-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading visual artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include photographing staged real-life situations, repurposing existing digital images, or using image creation and editing technologies.",,new,T0086 - Develop Image-based Content
|
||||
T0086.001,Develop Memes,,TA06,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",,no change,Develop Memes -
|
||||
T0086.002,Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes) -
|
||||
T0086.003,Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap fakes) -
|
||||
T0086.004,Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages,,TA06,Image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan),,no change,Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages -
|
||||
T0087,Develop Video-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading video artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include staging videos of purportedly real situations, repurposing existing video artifacts, or using AI-generated video creation and editing technologies (including deepfakes).",,new,T0087 - Develop Video-based Content
|
||||
T0087.001,Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes) -
|
||||
T0087.002,Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes) -
|
||||
T0088,Develop Audio-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading audio artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include creating completely new audio content, repurposing existing audio artifacts (including cheap fakes), or using AI-generated audio creation and editing technologies (including deepfakes).",,new,T0088 - Develop Audio-based Content
|
||||
T0088.001,Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes) -
|
||||
T0088.002,Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes) -
|
||||
T0089,Obtain Private Documents,,TA06,"Procuring documents that are not publicly available, by whatever means -- whether legal or illegal, highly-resourced or less so. These documents can include authentic non-public documents, authentic non-public documents have been altered, or inauthentic documents intended to appear as if they are authentic non-public documents. All of these types of documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,new,T0089 - Obtain Private Documents
|
||||
T0089.001,Obtain Authentic Documents,,TA06,"Procure authentic documents that are not publicly available, by whatever means -- whether legal or illegal, highly-resourced or less so. These documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Obtain Authentic Documents -
|
||||
T0089.002,Create Inauthentic Documents,,TA06,"Create inauthentic documents intended to appear as if they are authentic non-public documents. These documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Create Inauthentic Documents -
|
||||
T0089.003,Alter Authentic Documents,,TA06,"Alter authentic documents (public or non-public) to achieve campaign goals. The altered documents are intended to appear as if they are authentic can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Alter Authentic Documents -
|
||||
T0090,Create Inauthentic Accounts,,TA15,"Inauthentic accounts include bot accounts, cyborg accounts, sockpuppet accounts, and anonymous accounts.",,new,T0090 - Create Inauthentic Accounts
|
||||
T0090.001,Create Anonymous Accounts,,TA15,Anonymous accounts or anonymous users refer to users that access network resources without providing a username or password. An influence operation may use anonymous accounts to spread content without direct attribution to the operation. ,,no change,Create Anonymous Accounts -
|
||||
T0090.002,Create Cyborg Accounts,,TA15,"Cyborg accounts refer to partly manned, partly automated social media accounts. Cyborg accounts primarily act as bots, but a human operator periodically takes control of the account to engage with real social media users by responding to comments and posting original content. Influence operations may use cyborg accounts to reduce the amount of direct human input required to maintain a regular account but increase the apparent legitimacy of the cyborg account by occasionally breaking its bot-like behavior with human interaction. ",,no change,Create Cyborg Accounts -
|
||||
T0090.003,Create Bot Accounts,,TA15,"Bots refer to autonomous internet users that interact with systems or other users while imitating traditional human behavior. Bots use a variety of tools to stay active without direct human operation, including artificial intelligence and big data analytics. For example, an individual may program a Twitter bot to retweet a tweet every time it contains a certain keyword or hashtag. An influence operation may use bots to increase its exposure and artificially promote its content across the internet without dedicating additional time or human resources.
|
||||
Amplifier bots promote operation content through reposts, shares, and likes to increase the content’s online popularity. Hacker bots are traditionally covert bots running on computer scripts that rarely engage with users and work primarily as agents of larger cyberattacks, such as a Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Spammer bots are programmed to post content on social media or in comment sections, usually as a supplementary tool. Impersonator bots102 pose as real people by mimicking human behavior, complicating their detection. ",,no change,Create Bot Accounts -
|
||||
T0090.004,Create Sockpuppet Accounts,,TA15,Sockpuppet accounts refer to falsified accounts that either promote the influence operation’s own material or attack critics of the material online. Individuals who control sockpuppet accounts also man at least one other user account.67 Sockpuppet accounts help legitimize operation narratives by providing an appearance of external support for the material and discrediting opponents of the operation. ,,no change,Create Sockpuppet Accounts -
|
||||
T0091,Recruit malign actors,,TA15,"Operators recruit bad actors paying recruiting, or exerting control over individuals includes trolls, partisans, and contractors.",,new,T0091 - Recruit malign actors
|
||||
T0091.001,Recruit Contractors,,TA15,Operators recruit paid contractor to support the campaign.,,no change,Recruit Contractors -
|
||||
T0091.002,Recruit Partisans,,TA15,Operators recruit partisans (ideologically-aligned individuals) to support the campaign.,,no change,Recruit Partisans -
|
||||
T0091.003,Enlist Troll Accounts,,TA15,"An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate.
|
||||
Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organization, and post content with a specific ideological goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalized or less organized and work for a single individual. ",,no change,Enlist Troll Accounts -
|
||||
T0092,Build Network,,TA15,"Operators build their own network, creating links between accounts -- whether authentic or inauthentic -- in order amplify and promote narratives and artifacts, and encourage further growth of ther network, as well as the ongoing sharing and engagement with operational content.",,new,T0092 - Build Network
|
||||
T0092.001,Create Organizations,,TA15,"Influence operations may establish organizations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities.",,no change,Create Organizations -
|
||||
T0092.002,Use Follow Trains,,TA15,"A follow train is a group of people who follow each other on a social media platform, often as a way for an individual or campaign to grow its social media following. Follow trains may be a violation of platform Terms of Service. They are also known as follow-for-follow groups. ",,no change,Use Follow Trains -
|
||||
T0092.003,Create Community or Sub-group,,TA15,"When there is not an existing community or sub-group that meets a campaign's goals, an influence operation may seek to create a community or sub-group. ",,no change,Create Community or Sub-group -
|
||||
T0093,Acquire/Recruit Network,,TA15,"Operators acquire an existing network by paying, recruiting, or exerting control over the leaders of the existing network. ",,new,T0093 - Acquire/Recruit Network
|
||||
T0093.001,Fund Proxies,,TA15,"An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including:
|
||||
- Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution
|
||||
- Reducing the workload for direct operation assets ",,no change,Fund Proxies -
|
||||
T0093.002,Acquire Botnets,,TA15,A botnet is a group of bots that can function in coordination with each other. ,,no change,Acquire Botnets -
|
||||
T0094,Infiltrate Existing Networks,,TA15,Operators deceptively insert social assets into existing networks as group members in order to influence the members of the network and the wider information environment that the network impacts.,,new,T0094 - Infiltrate Existing Networks
|
||||
T0094.001,Identify susceptible targets in networks,,TA15,"When seeking to infiltrate an existing network, an influence operation may identify individuals and groups that might be susceptible to being co-opted or influenced.",,no change,Identify susceptible targets in networks -
|
||||
T0094.002,Utilize Butterfly Attacks,,TA15,"Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organizations, and media campaigns. ",,no change,Utilize Butterfly Attacks -
|
||||
T0095,Develop Owned Media Assets,,TA15,"An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites, blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and organization of content.",,new,T0095 - Develop Owned Media Assets
|
||||
T0096,Leverage Content Farms,,TA15,Using the services of large-scale content providers for creating and amplifying campaign artifacts at scale.,,new,T0096 - Leverage Content Farms
|
||||
T0096.001,Create Content Farms,,TA15,An influence operation may create an organization for creating and amplifying campaign artifacts at scale.,,no change,Create Content Farms -
|
||||
T0096.002,Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations,,TA15,"An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organization that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed organizations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content farms for high volumes of targeted media. ",,no change,Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations -
|
||||
T0097,Create personas,,TA16,"Creating fake people, often with accounts across multiple platforms. These personas can be as simple as a name, can contain slightly more background like location, profile pictures, backstory, or can be effectively backstopped with indicators like fake identity documents. ",,new,T0097 - Create personas
|
||||
T0097.001,Backstop personas ,,TA16,"Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability",,no change,Backstop personas -
|
||||
T0098,Establish Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,"Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.",,new,T0098 - Establish Inauthentic News Sites
|
||||
T0098.001,Create Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,Create Inauthentic News Sites,,no change,Create Inauthentic News Sites -
|
||||
T0098.002,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites,,no change,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites -
|
||||
T0099,Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,,TA16,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities.
|
||||
An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ",,new,T0099 - Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities
|
||||
T0099.001,Astroturfing,,TA16,"Astroturfing occurs when an influence operation disguises itself as grassroots movement or organization that supports operation narratives. Unlike butterfly attacks, astroturfing aims to increase the appearance of popular support for the operation cause and does not infiltrate existing groups to discredit their objectives. ",,no change,Astroturfing -
|
||||
T0099.002,Spoof/parody account/site,,TA16,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. ",,no change,Spoof/parody account/site -
|
||||
T0100,Co-opt Trusted Sources,,TA16,"An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include:
|
||||
- National or local new outlets
|
||||
- Research or academic publications
|
||||
- Online blogs or websites ",,new,T0100 - Co-opt Trusted Sources
|
||||
T0100.001,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals,,TA16,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals,,no change,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals -
|
||||
T0100.002,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups,,TA16,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups,,no change,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups -
|
||||
T0100.003,Co-opt Influencers,,TA16,Co-opt Influencers,,no change,Co-opt Influencers -
|
||||
T0101,Create Localized Content,,TA05,"Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.",,new,T0101 - Create Localized Content
|
||||
T0102,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,"An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. ",,new,T0102 - Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles
|
||||
T0102.001,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,no change,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles -
|
||||
T0102.002,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,no change,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles -
|
||||
T0102.003,Exploit Data Voids,,TA05,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.
|
||||
A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ",,no change,Exploit Data Voids -
|
||||
T0103,Livestream,,TA07,A livestream refers to an online broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,new,T0103 - Livestream
|
||||
T0103.001,Video Livestream,,TA07,A video livestream refers to an online video broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,no change,Video Livestream -
|
||||
T0103.002,Audio Livestream,,TA07,An audio livestream refers to an online audio broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,no change,Audio Livestream -
|
||||
T0104,Social Networks,,TA07,"Social media are interactive digital channels that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, interests, and other forms of expression through virtual communities and networks.",,new,T0104 - Social Networks
|
||||
T0104.001,Mainstream Social Networks,,TA07,"Examples include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.",,no change,Mainstream Social Networks -
|
||||
T0104.002,Dating Apps,,TA07,"A video livestream refers to an online video broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks. Examples include Facebook Live, Instagram, Youtube, Tik Tok, and Twitter. ",,no change,Dating Apps -
|
||||
T0104.003,Private/Closed Social Networks,,TA07,"An audio livestream refers to an online audio broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks. Examples include Twitter Spaces, ",,no change,Private/Closed Social Networks -
|
||||
T0104.004,Interest-Based Networks,,TA07,"Examples include smaller and niche networks including Gettr, Truth Social, Parler, etc.",,no change,Interest-Based Networks -
|
||||
T0104.005,Use hashtags,,TA07,"Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident.",,no change,Use hashtags -
|
||||
T0104.006,Create dedicated hashtag,,TA07,Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag.,,no change,Create dedicated hashtag -
|
||||
T0105,Media Sharing Networks,,TA07,"Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.",,new,T0105 - Media Sharing Networks
|
||||
T0105.001,Photo Sharing,,TA07,"Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, Flickr, etc",,no change,Photo Sharing -
|
||||
T0105.002,Video Sharing,,TA07,"Examples include Youtube, TikTok, ShareChat, Rumble, etc",,no change,Video Sharing -
|
||||
T0105.003,Audio sharing,,TA07,"Examples include podcasting apps, Soundcloud, etc.",,no change,Audio sharing -
|
||||
T0106,Discussion Forums,,TA07,"Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.",,new,T0106 - Discussion Forums
|
||||
T0106.001,Anonymous Message Boards,,TA07,Examples include the Chans,,no change,Anonymous Message Boards -
|
||||
T0107,Bookmarking and Content Curation,,TA07,"Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc.",,new,T0107 - Bookmarking and Content Curation
|
||||
T0108,Blogging and Publishing Networks,,TA07,"Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. ",,new,T0108 - Blogging and Publishing Networks
|
||||
T0109,Consumer Review Networks,,TA07,"Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc. Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.",,new,T0109 - Consumer Review Networks
|
||||
T0110,Formal Diplomatic Channels,,TA07,"Leveraging formal, traditional, diplomatic channels to communicate with foreign governments (written documents, meetings, summits, diplomatic visits, etc). This type of diplomacy is conducted by diplomats of one nation with diplomats and other officials of another nation or international organization.",,new,T0110 - Formal Diplomatic Channels
|
||||
T0111,Traditional Media,,TA07,"Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.",,new,T0111 - Traditional Media
|
||||
T0111.001,TV,,TA07,TV,,no change,TV -
|
||||
T0111.002,Newspaper,,TA07,Newspaper,,no change,Newspaper -
|
||||
T0111.003,Radio,,TA07,Radio,,no change,Radio -
|
||||
T0112,Email,,TA07,Delivering content and narratives via email. This can include using list management or high-value individually targeted messaging.,,new,T0112 - Email
|
||||
T0113,Employ Commercial Analytic Firms,,TA08,"Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences. ",,new,T0113 - Employ Commercial Analytic Firms
|
||||
T0114,Deliver Ads,,TA09,Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.,,new,T0114 - Deliver Ads
|
||||
T0114.001,Social media,,TA09,Social Media,,no change,Social media -
|
||||
T0114.002,Traditional Media,,TA09,"Examples include TV, Radio, Newspaper, billboards",,no change,Traditional Media -
|
||||
T0115,Post Content,,TA09,Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,,new,T0115 - Post Content
|
||||
T0115.001,Share Memes,,TA09,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",,no change,Share Memes -
|
||||
T0115.002,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash,,TA09,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash.,,no change,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash -
|
||||
T0115.003,One-Way Direct Posting,,TA09,"Direct posting refers to a method of posting content via a one-way messaging service, where the recipient cannot directly respond to the poster’s messaging. An influence operation may post directly to promote operation narratives to the target audience without allowing opportunities for fact-checking or disagreement, creating a false sense of support for the narrative. ",,no change,One-Way Direct Posting -
|
||||
T0116,Comment or Reply on Content,,TA09,Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,,new,T0116 - Comment or Reply on Content
|
||||
T0116.001,Post inauthentic social media comment,,TA09,"Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums.",,no change,Post inauthentic social media comment -
|
||||
T0117,Attract Traditional Media,,TA09,Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media).,,new,T0117 - Attract Traditional Media
|
||||
T0118,Amplify Existing Narrative,,TA17,An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. ,,new,T0118 - Amplify Existing Narrative
|
||||
T0119,Cross-Posting,,TA17,"Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. ",,new,T0119 - Cross-Posting
|
||||
T0119.001,Post Across Groups,,TA17,An influence operation may post content across groups to spread narratives and content to new communities within the target audiences or to new target audiences. ,,no change,Post Across Groups -
|
||||
T0119.002,Post Across Platform,,TA17,"An influence operation may post content across platforms to spread narratives and content to new communities within the target audiences or to new target audiences. Posting across platforms can also remove opposition and context, helping the narrative spread with less opposition on the cross-posted platform. ",,no change,Post Across Platform -
|
||||
T0119.003,Post Across Disciplines,,TA17,Post Across Disciplines,,no change,Post Across Disciplines -
|
||||
T0120,Incentivize Sharing,,TA17,"Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.",,new,T0120 - Incentivize Sharing
|
||||
T0120.001,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs,,TA17,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs,,no change,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs -
|
||||
T0120.002,Use Contests and Prizes,,TA17,Use Contests and Prizes,,no change,Use Contests and Prizes -
|
||||
T0121,Manipulate Platform Algorithm,,TA17,"Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines. ",,new,T0121 - Manipulate Platform Algorithm
|
||||
T0121.001,Bypass Content Blocking,,TA17,"Bypassing content blocking refers to actions taken to circumvent network security measures that prevent users from accessing certain servers, resources, or other online spheres. An influence operation may bypass content blocking to proliferate its content on restricted areas of the internet. Common strategies for bypassing content blocking include:
|
||||
- Altering IP addresses to avoid IP filtering
|
||||
- Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to avoid IP filtering
|
||||
- Using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to avoid IP filtering
|
||||
- Enabling encryption to bypass packet inspection blocking
|
||||
- Manipulating text to avoid filtering by keywords
|
||||
- Posting content on multiple platforms to avoid platform-specific removals - Using local facilities or modified DNS servers to avoid DNS filtering ",,no change,Bypass Content Blocking -
|
||||
T0122,Direct Users to Alternative Platforms,,TA17,"Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content. ",,new,T0122 - Direct Users to Alternative Platforms
|
||||
T0123,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,,TA18,Controlling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,,new,T0123 - Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations
|
||||
T0123.001,Delete Opposing Content,,TA18,"Deleting opposing content refers to the removal of content that conflicts with operational narratives from selected platforms. An influence operation may delete opposing content to censor contradictory information from the target audience, allowing operation narratives to take priority in the information space.",,no change,Delete Opposing Content -
|
||||
T0123.002,Block Content,,TA18,Content blocking refers to actions taken to restrict internet access or render certain areas of the internet inaccessible. An influence operation may restrict content based on both network and content attributes. ,,no change,Block Content -
|
||||
T0123.003,Destroy Information Generation Capabilities,,TA18,"Destroying information generation capabilities refers to actions taken to limit, degrade, or otherwise incapacitate an actor’s ability to generate conflicting information. An influence operation may destroy an actor’s information generation capabilities by physically dismantling the information infrastructure, disconnecting resources needed for information generation, or redirecting information generation personnel. An operation may destroy an adversary’s information generation capabilities to limit conflicting content exposure to the target audience and crowd the information space with its own narratives. ",,no change,Destroy Information Generation Capabilities -
|
||||
T0123.004,Conduct Server Redirect,,TA18,"A server redirect, also known as a URL redirect, occurs when a server automatically forwards a user from one URL to another using server-side scripting languages. An influence operation may conduct a server redirect to divert target audience members from one website to another without their knowledge. The redirected website may pose as a legitimate source, host malware, or otherwise aid operation objectives.",,no change,Conduct Server Redirect -
|
||||
T0124,Suppress Opposition,,TA18,Operators can suppress the opposition by exploiting platform content moderation tools and processes like reporting non-violative content to platforms for takedown and goading opposition actors into taking actions that result in platform action or target audience disapproval. ,,new,T0124 - Suppress Opposition
|
||||
T0124.001,Report Non-Violative Opposing Content,,TA18,"Reporting opposing content refers to notifying and providing an instance of a violation of a platform’s guidelines and policies for conduct on the platform. In addition to simply reporting the content, an operation may leverage copyright regulations to trick social media and web platforms into removing opposing content by manipulating the content to appear in violation of copyright laws. Reporting opposing content facilitates the suppression of contradictory information and allows operation narratives to take priority in the information space. ",,no change,Report Non-Violative Opposing Content -
|
||||
T0124.002,Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself),,TA18,Goad people into actions that violate terms of service or will lead to having their content or accounts taken down. ,,no change,Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself) -
|
||||
T0124.003,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation,,TA18,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation,,no change,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation -
|
||||
T0125,Platform Filtering,,TA18,Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation),,new,T0125 - Platform Filtering
|
||||
T0126,Encourage Attendance at Events,,TA10,Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.,,new,T0126 - Encourage Attendance at Events
|
||||
T0126.001,Call to action to attend ,,TA10,Call to action to attend an event,,no change,Call to action to attend -
|
||||
T0126.002,Facilitate logistics or support for attendance,,TA10,"Facilitate logistics or support for travel, food, housing, etc.",,no change,Facilitate logistics or support for attendance -
|
||||
T0127,Physical Violence,,TA10,"Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. ",,new,T0127 - Physical Violence
|
||||
T0127.001,Conduct Physical Violence,,TA10,An influence operation may directly Conduct Physical Violence to achieve campaign goals. ,,no change,Conduct Physical Violence -
|
||||
T0127.002,Encourage Physical Violence,,TA10,An influence operation may Encourage others to engage in Physical Violence to achieve campaign goals. ,,no change,Encourage Physical Violence -
|
||||
T0128,Conceal People,,TA11,Conceal the identity or provenance of a campaign account and people assets to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0128 - Conceal People
|
||||
T0128.001,Use Pseudonyms,,TA11,"An operation may use pseudonyms, or fake names, to mask the identity of operation accounts, publish anonymous content, or otherwise use falsified personas to conceal identity of the operation. An operation may coordinate pseudonyms across multiple platforms, for example, by writing an article under a pseudonym and then posting a link to the article on social media on an account with the same falsified name. ",,no change,Use Pseudonyms -
|
||||
T0128.002,Conceal Network Identity,,TA11,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ",,no change,Conceal Network Identity -
|
||||
T0128.003,Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation,,TA11,"Distancing reputable individuals from the operation occurs when enlisted individuals, such as celebrities or subject matter experts, actively disengage themselves from operation activities and messaging. Individuals may distance themselves from the operation by deleting old posts or statements, unfollowing operation information assets, or otherwise detaching themselves from the operation’s timeline. An influence operation may want reputable individuals to distance themselves from the operation to reduce operation exposure, particularly if the operation aims to remove all evidence.",,no change,Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation -
|
||||
T0128.004,Launder Accounts,,TA11,Account laundering occurs when an influence operation acquires control of previously legitimate online accounts from third parties through sale or exchange and often in contravention of terms of use. Influence operations use laundered accounts to reach target audience members from an existing information channel and complicate attribution. ,,no change,Launder Accounts -
|
||||
T0128.005,Change Names of Accounts,,TA11,Changing names of accounts occurs when an operation changes the name of an existing social media account. An operation may change the names of its accounts throughout an operation to avoid detection or alter the names of newly acquired or repurposed accounts to fit operational narratives. ,,no change,Change Names of Accounts -
|
||||
T0129,Conceal Operational Activity,,TA11,Conceal the campaign's operational activity to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0129 - Conceal Operational Activity
|
||||
T0129.001,Conceal Network Identity,,TA11,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ",,no change,Conceal Network Identity -
|
||||
T0129.002,Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative,,TA11,"An influence operation may mix its own operation content with legitimate news or external unrelated content to disguise operational objectives, narratives, or existence. For example, an operation may generate ""lifestyle"" or ""cuisine"" content alongside regular operation content. ",,no change,Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative -
|
||||
T0129.003,Break Association with Content,,TA11,"Breaking association with content occurs when an influence operation actively separates itself from its own content. An influence operation may break association with content by unfollowing, unliking, or unsharing its content, removing attribution from its content, or otherwise taking actions that distance the operation from its messaging. An influence operation may break association with its content to complicate attribution or regain credibility for a new operation. ",,no change,Break Association with Content -
|
||||
T0129.004,Delete URLs,,TA11,"URL deletion occurs when an influence operation completely removes its website registration, rendering the URL inaccessible. An influence operation may delete its URLs to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred.",,no change,Delete URLs -
|
||||
T0129.005,Coordinate on encrypted/closed networks,,TA11,Coordinate on encrypted/ closed networks,,no change,Coordinate on encrypted/closed networks -
|
||||
T0129.006,Deny involvement,,TA11,"Without ""smoking gun"" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in ""Demand insurmountable proof"", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a ""firehose of misinformation"" environment.",,no change,Deny involvement -
|
||||
T0129.007,Delete Accounts/Account Activity,,TA11,"Deleting accounts and account activity occurs when an influence operation removes its online social media assets, including social media accounts, posts, likes, comments, and other online artifacts. An influence operation may delete its accounts and account activity to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred. ",,no change,Delete Accounts/Account Activity -
|
||||
T0129.008,Redirect URLs,,TA11,"An influence operation may redirect its falsified or typosquatted URLs to legitimate websites to increase the operation's appearance of legitimacy, complicate attribution, and avoid detection. ",,no change,Redirect URLs -
|
||||
T0129.009,Remove Post Origins,,TA11,"Removing post origins refers to the elimination of evidence that indicates the initial source of operation content, often to complicate attribution. An influence operation may remove post origins by deleting watermarks, renaming files, or removing embedded links in its content. ",,no change,Remove Post Origins -
|
||||
T0129.010,Misattribute Activity,,TA11,"Misattributed activity refers to incorrectly attributed operation activity. For example, a state sponsored influence operation may conduct operation activity in a way that mimics another state so that external entities misattribute activity to the incorrect state. An operation may misattribute their activities to complicate attribution, avoid detection, or frame an adversary for negative behavior. ",,no change,Misattribute Activity -
|
||||
T0130,Conceal Infrastructure,,TA11,Conceal the campaign's infrastructure to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0130 - Conceal Infrastructure
|
||||
T0130.001,Conceal Sponsorship,,TA11,"Concealing sponsorship aims to mislead or obscure the identity of the hidden sponsor behind an operation rather than entity publicly running the operation. Operations that conceal sponsorship may maintain visible falsified groups, news outlets, non-profits, or other organizations, but seek to mislead or obscure the identity sponsoring, funding, or otherwise supporting these entities.
|
||||
Influence operations may use a variety of techniques to mask the location of their social media accounts to complicate attribution and conceal evidence of foreign interference. Operation accounts may set their location to a false place, often the location of the operation’s target audience, and post in the region’s language",,no change,Conceal Sponsorship -
|
||||
T0130.002,Utilize Bulletproof Hosting,,TA11,"Hosting refers to services through which storage and computing resources are provided to an individual or organization for the accommodation and maintenance of one or more websites and related services. Services may include web hosting, file sharing, and email distribution. Bulletproof hosting refers to services provided by an entity, such as a domain hosting or web hosting firm, that allows its customer considerable leniency in use of the service. An influence operation may utilize bulletproof hosting to maintain continuity of service for suspicious, illegal, or disruptive operation activities that stricter hosting services would limit, report, or suspend. ",,no change,Utilize Bulletproof Hosting -
|
||||
T0130.003,Use Shell Organizations,,TA11,Use Shell Organizations to conceal sponsorship.,,no change,Use Shell Organizations -
|
||||
T0130.004,Use Cryptocurrency,,TA11,"Use Cryptocurrency to conceal sponsorship. Examples include Bitcoin, Monero, and Etherium. ",,no change,Use Cryptocurrency -
|
||||
T0130.005,Obfuscate Payment,,TA11,Obfuscate Payment,,no change,Obfuscate Payment -
|
||||
T0131,Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,,TA11,Exploiting weaknesses in platforms' terms of service and content moderation policies to avoid takedowns and platform actions.,,new,T0131 - Exploit TOS/Content Moderation
|
||||
T0131.001,Legacy web content,,TA11,"Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.",,no change,Legacy web content -
|
||||
T0131.002,Post Borderline Content,,TA11,Post Borderline Content,,no change,Post Borderline Content -
|
||||
T0132,Measure Performance,,TA12,A metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions. “Are the actions being executed as planned?”,,new,T0132 - Measure Performance
|
||||
T0132.001,People Focused,,TA12,Measure the performance individuals in achieving campaign goals,,no change,People Focused -
|
||||
T0132.002,Content Focused,,TA12,Measure the performance of campaign content,,no change,Content Focused -
|
||||
T0132.003,View Focused,,TA12,View Focused,,no change,View Focused -
|
||||
T0133,Measure Effectiveness,,TA12,A metric used to measure a current system state. “Are we on track to achieve the intended new system state within the planned timescale?”,,new,T0133 - Measure Effectiveness
|
||||
T0133.001,Behavior changes,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from misinformation incidents. ,,no change,Behavior changes -
|
||||
T0133.002,Content,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of campaign content. ,,no change,Content -
|
||||
T0133.003,Awareness,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing awareness. ,,no change,Awareness -
|
||||
T0133.004,Knowledge,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing knowledge. ,,no change,Knowledge -
|
||||
T0133.005,Action/attitude,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing action/attitude. ,,no change,Action/attitude -
|
||||
T0134,Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),,TA12,"Ensuring that Key Performace Indicators are identified and tracked, so that the performance and effectivess of campaigns, and elements of campaigns, can be measured, during and after their execution",,new,T0134 - Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)
|
||||
T0134.001,Message reach,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinformation incidents. ,,no change,Message reach -
|
||||
T0134.002,Social media engagement,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate social media engagement in misinformation incidents.,,no change,Social media engagement -
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,externalgroup,url,category,disinformation_use,cogseccollab_use,function,summary,notes,code_url,artifacts,automation,platform,accessibility
|
||||
TL00002,Ad Observer,New York University,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ad-observer/enliecaalhkhhihcmnbjfmmjkljlcinl,Advertising Analysis,Designed for disinfo,,Collect and share ads,,,,ads,human,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00035,Exodus,Exodus tool,https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/,Advertising Analysis,,,Exodus tool to evaluate a mobile app’s permissions and ad trackers,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00036,Facebook political/issue ads database,Facebook,https://www.facebook.com/ads/archive/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US,Advertising Analysis,,,Facebook political/issue ads database,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00054,Google political ads database,Google,http://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/home,Advertising Analysis,,,Google political ads database,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00080,Moat,Moat,https://moat.com/,Advertising Analysis,,,Moat ad analytics tool,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00093,Pathmatics,Pathmatics,https://www.pathmatics.com/,Advertising Analysis,,,Pathmatics display and Facebook ads tracking tool (paid),,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00148,Who Targets Me,,https://whotargets.me/en/about-who-targets-me/,Advertising Analysis,,,political ad scraper,,,https://github.com/WhoTargetsMe/,ads,,browser extension,open source
|
||||
TL00019,Check My Ads,Check My Ads,https://www.checkmyads.org/,Advertising Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00010,Bot Sentinel,,https://botsentinel.com/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,yes,,,,,accounts,,,
|
||||
TL00011,Botometer,University of Indiana,https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,,,,Was BotOrNot,,accounts,,,
|
||||
TL00012,Botslayer,University of Indiana,https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/botslayer/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,accounts,,,
|
||||
TL00052,Ghostery,Ghostery,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ghostery-%E2%80%93-privacy-ad-blo/mlomiejdfkolichcflejclcbmpeaniij,Browser Plugin,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00144,WayBack Machine,WayBack Machine,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/wayback-machine/fpnmgdkabkmnadcjpehmlllkndpkmiak,Browser Plugin,Commonly used,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00022,Corporate registrars list,Kanton St.Gallen,https://www.commercial-register.sg.ch/home/worldwide.html,Corporate/Business Tools,,,List of corporate registrars around the world,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00023,Corporation Wiki,Corporation Wiki,https://www.corporationwiki.com/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00062,ICIJ Offshoreleaks Database,The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00066,Investigative Dashboard,Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),https://investigativedashboard.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00075,Little Sis database,Little Sis database,https://littlesis.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,"Relationships between people, companies etc.",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00089,Open Corporates,Open Corporates,https://opencorporates.com/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00090,Opensanctions,Opensanctions,https://www.opensanctions.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,"Global database of persons and companies of political, criminal, or economic interest. It combines the most important sanctions lists, databases of politically exposed persons etc",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00091,Orbis directory,Orbis,https://orbisdirectory.bvdinfo.com/version-2018619/OrbisDirectory/Companies,Corporate/Business Tools,,,Paid corporate search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00060,Hooyu,Hooyu Business,https://hooyubusiness.com,Finding People,,,Hooyu is a great paid tool for identifying connections between people and entities in the UK,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00081,Name2email,Name2email,https://name2email.com/,Finding People,,,Name2email browser extension that helps you find a person’s correct email,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00095,Pipl,Pipl,https://pipl.com/,Finding People,,,Pipl people Search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00111,Skopenow,Skopenow,https://www.skopenow.com/,Finding People,,,Skopenow (an excellent paid tool),,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00115,Spokeo,Spokeo,http://www.spokeo.com/,Finding People,,,Spokeo people search (good for the US only),,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00120,Thats Them,Thats Them,https://thatsthem.com/,Finding People,,,Thats Them people search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00007,Assembler,,https://projectassembler.org/,Image analysis,Designed for disinfo,,image analysis,,,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00033,e-witness,CUNY,https://ewitness.commons.gc.cuny.edu/,Image analysis,Potentially useful,,image provenance,"eWitness uses blockchain to establish provenance of images and videos taken from a smart phone camera. eWitness can be used to gather evidence of crime, human rights violation, domestic violence, corruption, traffic violations and more. An eWitness user is protected behind a pseudo-identity which is hidden even from the eWitness backend, until the user is ready to reveal themselves or to quietly pass the evidence on to their case-worker, trusted friend or sponsor. The purpose of eWitness is to create images and videos that can be trusted. The technology behind eWitness, provides the proof of location and time the media was taken and the proof that the media was not altered to misinform or deform the fact in any manner.",,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00041,FindClone,FindClone,https://findclone.ru/,Image analysis,,,Reverse image/facial recognition,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00046,Foto Forensics,Hacker Factory,http://fotoforensics.com,Image analysis,Useful,,image forensics,,,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00047,FotoForensics,FotoForensics,http://fotoforensics.com/,Image analysis,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00048,Free Online OCR,NewOCR,https://www.newocr.com/,Image analysis,,,Take an image and convert characters to text,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00067,InVid,InVid,https://www.invid-project.eu/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,image and video verification,,,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00068,Jeffrey Friedl's Image Metadata Viewer,EXIF Reader,http://exif.regex.info/,Image analysis,Useful,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00101,Reality Defender,AI Foundation,https://rd2020.org/,Image analysis,,,detect synthetic media,,,,images,,,request access
|
||||
TL00104,Remove.bg,Remove,https://www.remove.bg/,Image analysis,,,"Free tool that helps remove background images from a photo, to help with reverse image search",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00105,Reverse image search,Karmadecay,http://karmadecay.com/,Image analysis,,,Reverse image search tool for Reddit,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00106,Reverse image search,Yandex,https://yandex.com/images/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00108,Sensity tool for detecting GAN generated faces,Sensity,https://platform.sensity.ai/deepfake-detection,Image analysis,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00124,TinEye,TinEye,https://tineye.com/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,reverse image search,,,,images,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00125,TinEye,,tineye.com,Image analysis,,,search for images,,,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00129,Truepic,,https://www.truepic.com,Image analysis,,,image verification,,,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00153,YouTube Data Viewer,Citizen Evidence Lab (Amnesty International),https://citizenevidence.org/2014/07/01/youtube-dataviewer/,Image analysis,,,Extract hidden data from videos hosted on YouTube. Useful for tracking down original content,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00003,Aletheia,Midstream Technology,http://midstream.us,Network analysis,Designed for disinfo,,social network analysis; astroturf,,,,accounts,,,
|
||||
TL00050,Gephi,,https://gephi.org/users/install/,Network analysis,Commonly used,,network visualisation,,,,,,Install on PC,
|
||||
TL00077,MentionMapp,MentionMapp Analytics,https://mentionmapp.com/,Network analysis,Commonly used,,social network visualisation,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00063,Iffy Quotient,University of Michigan,https://csmr.umich.edu/platform-health-metrics/,Ratings,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00132,Trustium,,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/trustium/fkcccoomlgbfmhcgcepbdfjmofckejgo?hl=en,Ratings,Designed for disinfo,,site rating for advertisers,,,,webpages,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00001,Account Analysis,Account Analysis,https://accountanalysis.app/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Account Analysis is another great Twitter account analysis tool,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00015,Buzzweb,,https://buzzweb.pro/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Buzzweb Instagram analysis tool,,,,instagram,,,
|
||||
TL00038,FakeSpot,,https://www.fakespot.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Tool to analyze whether reviews on amazon/Yelp/TripAdvisor etc. are fake,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00039,FBstalker,,https://fbstalker.thao.pw/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Facebook profile investigator,,,,facebook,,,
|
||||
TL00043,Foller.me ,,https://foller.me/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Foller.me Analytics for Twitter,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00044,Followerwonk ,,https://followerwonk.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Followerwonk Twitter tool for searching bios, user analysis etc.",,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00056,Gramspy,,http://gramspy.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Gramspy Instagram analysis tool,,,,instagram,,,
|
||||
TL00057,Graph.tips,,http://graph.tips/beta,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,Facebook Graph search interface,,,,facebook,,,
|
||||
TL00082,NameChk,,https://namechk.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Tool to see if a username is used across different online services,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00107,SearchUsers,,https://searchusers.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,A tool to search for Instagram users by name or username without having to login,,,,instagram,,,
|
||||
TL00113,SocialBlade,,https://socialblade.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"SocialBlade tool for analyzing YouTube, Twitter, Insta, Twitch accounts",,,,"youtube,twitter,instagram,twitch,facebook,tiktok,dailymotion,odysee,trovo,mixer,dlive,storyfire",,,
|
||||
TL00119,TGStat,Telegram Analytics,http://tgstat.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,A tool for analyzing a Telegram account/channel,,,,telegram,,,
|
||||
TL00126,Tinfoleak,Tinfoleak,https://tinfoleak.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Get useful overview related to a Twitter account,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00134,TweetBeaver,TweetBeaver,https://tweetbeaver.com/index.php,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,TweetBeaver account tools,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00135,Twiangulate,,http://twiangulate.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Twiangulate.com for mapping connections between accounts,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00136,Twitonomy,Twitonomy,https://www.twitonomy.com/go-premium.php,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Analyzing a twitter account, hashtags, etc.",,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00137,Twitter advanced search,,https://twitter.com/search-advanced,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Twitter advanced search,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00139,Twren,,https://twren.ch/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Tool that lists the accounts that retweeted a specific account, with lots of sorting and filtering options",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00145,Webmii,,http://webmii.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Webmii social media profile search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00147,WhatsMyName,,https://whatsmyname.app/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,An even more comprehensive tool for searching a username across platforms,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00150,WhoPostedWhat,,http://whopostedwhat.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,Search for dates and date ranges on Facebook,,,,facebook,,,
|
||||
TL00025,Crowdtangle (chrome extension),Facebook,https://apps.crowdtangle.com/chrome-extension,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Commonly used,yes,,,,,socialmedia,,browser extension,Free
|
||||
TL00026,Crowdtangle (full),Facebook,https://www.crowdtangle.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Commonly used,,,,,,socialmedia,,,request access
|
||||
TL00069,Jod Bot,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/jod-bot,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Telegram archiver,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,telegram,,,open source
|
||||
TL00073,Khoj,Tattle,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,message verification,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,telegram,,,open source
|
||||
TL00074,Kosh,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/kosh/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,archive,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/kosh,messageapps,,,open source
|
||||
TL00102,Reaper,,https://reaper.social/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,,,,https://github.com/ScriptSmith/reaper,,,,
|
||||
TL00112,Social Media Analysis Toolkit (SMAT),,https://www.smat-app.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,trends,,,,"gab,parler,4chan,8kun,win,poal,telegram,gettr,rumble,bitchute,lbry,mewe,wimkin,minds,Vkontakte",,,
|
||||
TL00133,TruthNest,Athens Technology Centre (ATC),https://www.truthnest.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Designed for disinfo,,twitter analytics,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00138,Twitter Trails,,http://twittertrails.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,twitter tracking,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00146,WhatsApp archiver,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/whatsapp-archiver,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,WhatsApp archiver,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/whatsapp-scraper/tree/master/python_scraper,whatsapp,,,open source
|
||||
TL00117,Squint,MITRE,https://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/squint-sharpens-officials-perspective-to-combat-election-distortion,Tipline,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,browser extension;mobile app,
|
||||
TL00029,Disinformation Diaries,,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/initiatives/the-campaign/the-disinformation-diaries/,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00051,Get Bad News,DROG,https://getbadnews.com/#intro,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00121,The News Hero,NATO Stratcom,https://www.thenewshero.org/,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00122,The propaganda game,,https://propagandagame.org,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00004,Alexa,Alexa,https://www.alexa.com,Web Traffic Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00008,Backlink Watch,Backlink Watch,http://www.backlinkwatch.com/,Web Traffic Analysis,,,Backlink checker,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00110,SimilarWeb,SimilarWeb,http://similarweb.com/,Web Traffic Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00005,AnalyzeID,,http://analyzeid.com/,Website Analysis,Useful,,AnalyzeID find related websites through ad codes,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00006,Archive.is,,http://archive.is/,Website Analysis,,,Archive.is often used for social media profiles as well,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00016,Carbon Date,,http://carbondate.cs.odu.edu/,Website Analysis,,,A tool that tries to guess when a webpage first went online,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00027,Deep Duck Dive,,https://deepdiveduck.com,Website Analysis,,,Paid tool to monitor changes to specific webpages,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00030,DNSlytics,,https://dnslytics.com/,Website Analysis,,,"DNSlytics is another great tool for connecting websites together via AdSense, Google Analytics, IP etc. Reasonably-priced paid verison, too",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00031,Domain Big Data,,https://domainbigdata.com/,Website Analysis,,,Domain Big Data free whois/domain name search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00032,DomainTools,,https://whois.domaintools.com/,Website Analysis,,,DomainTools paid whois search and investigations tool,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00042,FOCA,,https://www.elevenpaths.com/labstools/foca/index.html,Website Analysis,,,FOCA tool for analyzing metadata in documents on the web (Windows only),,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00065,Internet Archive,Internet Archive,https://archive.org/web/,Website Analysis,,,Internet Archive/Wayback Machine,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00083,NerdyData,NerdyData,https://nerdydata.com/search,Website Analysis,,,NerdyData source code search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00099,Publicwww,,https://publicwww.com/,Website Analysis,,,"Publicwww, search to see how many websites have the same source code or snippet of text (looks in HTML, JS and CSS code as well as webpages)",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00116,Spy On Web,,http://www.spyonweb.com/,Website Analysis,,,Spy On Web search for tracking Google Analytics and AdSense,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00140,URLScan,,https://urlscan.io/,Website Analysis,,,"URLScan is a free tool that gives an overview of a site, the tools used to build it, and other useful info",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00141,Viewcached.com,,http://viewcached.com/,Website Analysis,,,Viewcached.com tool for retrieving cached pages from multiple search engines,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00142,ViewDNS,,https://viewdns.info/reverseip/,Website Analysis,,,ViewDNS is another useful tool for analyzing domain names.,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00149,Whoisology,,https://whoisology.com/,Website Analysis,,,Whoisology whois-domain search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00009,Blackbird Constellation Engine,Blackbird,https://www.blackbird.ai/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,paid
|
||||
TL00013,Builtwith,,Builtwith.com,Website Analysis,Designed for disinfo,yes,"website details, links to other websites",,,,webpages,,,Freemium
|
||||
TL00014,Buzzsumo,,https://buzzsumo.com/,,Commonly used,,trends; social listening,,,,,,,paid
|
||||
TL00017,Check,Meedan,https://meedan.com/check,Analysis tracking and support,Designed for disinfo,,,,,https://github.com/meedan/check,,human,,open source
|
||||
TL00018,Check browser add-on,Meedan,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/check/pjfgpbclkfjkfiljlcfehjmpafeoafdi?hl=en,Analysis tracking and support,Designed for disinfo,,,"Browse the internet, and find a Tweet, YouTube video, Facebook post or an Instagram photo that you want your team to fact-check and investigate. Click the Check icon, choose one of the projects you want to add this item to, and save it",,,artifacts,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00020,Claim Review,Schema.org,https://schema.org/ClaimReview,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00021,ClaimBuster,University of Texas at Arlington,https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00024,Counter propaganda and disinformation explorer (CPD),IBM,https://www.ibm.com/watson,,Designed for disinfo,,summarisation?,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00028,Disinfo Busters,,http://disinfobusters.eu,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00034,Emergent,Columbia University: Tow Center,http://www.emergent.info/about,,Designed for disinfo,,rumor tracker,Emergent is a real-time rumor tracker. It's part of a research project with the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University that focuses on how unverified information and rumor are reported in the media. It aims to develop best practices for debunking misinformation.,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00037,Fakebook Experiment,Avaaz,https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/disinfo_volunteer_231/,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00040,Feed Reflect (browser extension),,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/feedreflect/bigmeipgaifggglelcnpnpbaefimpooc?hl=en-US,,Potentially useful,,,Browser extension designed to promote awareness when reading news on Twitter. This browser extension changes twitter feed by making posts more or less visible and help users distinguish news with differing level of reliability. ,,,,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00045,Fortis AI,Alion,https://www.alionscience.com,,Potentially useful,,IO platform,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00049,GenSynth,Darwin AI,https://www.darwinai.com,,Potentially useful,,explainable AI - relevant?,,I think they're talking about the tool in here: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.11951,,,,,
|
||||
TL00053,Giant Language Model Test Room (GLTR),,http://gltr.io,,Designed for disinfo,,text forensics,"The aim of GLTR is to take the same models that are used to generated fake text as a tool for detection. GLTR has access to the GPT-2 117M language model from OpenAI, one of the largest publicly available models. It can use any textual input and analyze what GPT-2 would have predicted at each position. Since the output is a ranking of all of the words that the model knows, we can compute how the observed following word ranks. We use this positional information to overlay a colored mask over the text that corresponds to the position in the ranking. A word that ranks within the most likely words is highlighted in green (top 10), yellow (top 100), red (top 1,000), and the rest of the words in purple. Thus, we can get a direct visual indication of how likely each word was under the model.",,,text,,,
|
||||
TL00055,Google Trends,,https://trends.google.com/trends,,Commonly used,,trends,,,,,,,free
|
||||
TL00058,Ground News,Ground News,https://www.ground.news/about,,,,bias tags on news articles,,,,,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00059,Hoaxy,University of Indiana,https://hoaxy.osome.iu.edu/,,Designed for disinfo,,network analysis of twitter data,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00061,Hypothes.is,Hypothes.is,https://web.hypothes.is/,Analysis tracking and support,Commonly used,,webpage markup,,,,webpages,human,,
|
||||
TL00064,Influence apps,Influence,https://startinfluence.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,paid
|
||||
TL00071,KeyHole,KeyHole,https://keyhole.co/,,,,impact measurement,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00072,Kharon,Kharon,https://www.kharon.com,,,,data and analytics tools,,Not sure this is in area?,,,,,
|
||||
TL00076,Meltwater Explore,,https://www.meltwater.com/en/solutions/social-listening,,,,trends; social listening,,,,,,,paid
|
||||
TL00078,MIDAC,Mythos Labs,http://www.mythoslabs.org/,,Designed for disinfo,,countering with humour,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00079,Misp,,https://www.misp-project.org/,,Useful,,,,,,,,,open source
|
||||
TL00084,NewsCheck,NewsCheck,https://www.newscheck.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00085,NewsGuard,NewsGuard,https://www.newsguardtech.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,trust rating system for urls,,,,webpages,,,
|
||||
TL00086,NewsWhip,NewsWhip,https://www.newswhip.com/,,,,soclal media analytics,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00087,Nobias,Nobias,https://nobias.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00092,Our.News,Our.News,https://our.news/,,,,,,,,,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00094,PimEyes: Face Recognition Search Engine and Reverse Image Search,PimEyes,https://pimeyes.com/en,,,,"Advanced face recognition search engine, a reverse image search tool, and a photo search mechanism used to find out where your face appears online",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00096,Policy Change Index,Policy Change Index,https://policychangeindex.org/,,,,automated content analysis,,,https://github.com/PSLmodels,,,,open source
|
||||
TL00097,PR Aegis,Cosmetheus,https://cosmetheus.com/,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00098,Predata Platform,Predata,https://predata.com,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00100,Q,Sparks&Honey,https://www.sparksandhoney.com/,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00103,Recorded Future,Recorded Future,https://www.recordedfuture.com,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00109,Share The Facts,Duke Reporters Lab / Jigsaw,,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00114,SocialReaper,,,,,,,"scrapes Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Youtube, Pinterest, Tumblr APIs",,https://github.com/ScriptSmith/socialreaper,,,,
|
||||
TL00118,Tattle,Labor of Love,https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=studio.laboroflove.tattle&hl=en_GB&gl=US,,,,WhatsApp message forwarding,,,,messageapps,,,
|
||||
TL00123,TIES,Facebook,https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/facebook-outlines-new-system-for-detecting-fake-accounts-and-misinformation/584228/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,closed
|
||||
TL00127,Trendolizer,,http://get.trendolizer.com/,,,,trending stories,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00128,Trive,Trive,https://trive.news/,,,,"""human swarming""",,,,,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00130,Truly Media,Athens Technology Centre (ATC),https://www.truly.media/,,Designed for disinfo,,crowdsourced verification,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00131,Trusted Times,,https://trustedtimes.org,,,,news article analysis,,,,webpages,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00143,Vortimo,,,Analysis tracking and support,Useful,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00151,Wolf Totem,Omelas,https://www.omelas.io/wolf-totem-product,,Designed for disinfo,,dashboard,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00152,Yonder,Yonder,https://www.yonder-ai.com,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
|
64
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv
Normal file
64
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
|
||||
Unnamed: 0,Unnamed: 1,Unnamed: 2,Unnamed: 3,Unnamed: 4,Unnamed: 5
|
||||
"Spreadsheet created by initially combining CredCo's CredWeb and the Carnegie Endowment lists of disinformation initiatives with CSC's Rolodex, Disinfo Cloud list and a list compiled by Jon B",,,,,
|
||||
Further work needed to assimilate addition data from the lists below...,,,,,
|
||||
,DATASETS,,No. of entries,Categorisation,
|
||||
,Carnegie post,https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/14/mapping-worldwide-initiatives-to-counter-influence-operations-pub-83435 ,Commentary on Carnegie list,,
|
||||
,"Carnegie list, created from credweb, rand, disinfocloud",https://ceip.knack.com/pcio-baseline-datasets#initiatives/ ,460,Added. See below,
|
||||
,CredCo's CredWeb catalogue:,https://credibilitycoalition.org/credcatalog/,252,Added. Theory; Practice; Content; Infrastructure,
|
||||
,Rand list of tools,https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/fighting-disinformation.html,90,Bot/spam detection; Codes and standards; Credibility scoring; Disinformation tracking; Education/training; Verification; Whitelisting,
|
||||
,Disinfocloud list of technologies:,https://disinfocloud.com/about-us,265,Need to sign in with org name - CSC has an account,
|
||||
,Disinfocloud has a useful list of tool categories:,https://disinfocloud.com/tools-overview/,,,
|
||||
,Facebook map of fact checkers,https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-checking/partner-map,,"I've checked Africa, South America, Central America. Everything else still to do",
|
||||
,WHO covid19 disinfo note,https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ucor7vU81HbBbxvre2QI5Rv08Ys1VvX2JrWtNSGk4XY/edit#,,NEED TO CHECK THROUGH THIS,
|
||||
,IRI list of european groups,https://dash-iribeaconproject.org/,,ADD TO LISTS,
|
||||
,"DCMS index of companies - safe-tech issues, incl disinfo",https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/directory-of-uk-safety-tech-providers,,ADD TO LISTS,
|
||||
,Duke Reporters Lab of Fact Checkers,https://reporterslab.org/fact-checking/,,ADD TO LISTS,
|
||||
,ISACs/ISAOs,https://www.nationalisacs.org/member-isacs-3,,ADD TO LISTS?,
|
||||
,Turing online hate research hub,https://www.turing.ac.uk/research/research-programmes/public-policy/online-hate-research-hub,,ADD TO LISTS?,
|
||||
,Internationl Fact Checking Network (Poynter),https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,,,
|
||||
,European Union report list,https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/624278/EPRS_STU(2019)624278_EN.pdf,,,ADD TO LISTS
|
||||
,Ryerson Uni covid19 factcheckers list ,https://covid19misinfo.org/fact-checking/covid-19-fact-checkers/ and https://dataverse.scholarsportal.info/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5683/SP2/IMISPE,,,
|
||||
,Countering Disinformation list,https://counteringdisinformation.org/interventions/,,TRIAGE LISTS,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
MAP,https://datastudio.google.com/u/2/reporting/a8491164-6aa8-45d0-b609-c70339689127/page/ierzB ,,597,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
QUESTIONS,,,,,
|
||||
,Suggested corrections in form:,https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScnjgJg2lGw3FB_xGaZPrZuKEZSY1OOy9-UosMS9T2yWAtm3A/viewform,,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
CODES,,,,,
|
||||
,Initiatives Studying Influence Operations Code Book,,,,
|
||||
,Field,Description,,,
|
||||
,Name,"Name of the initiative, with any larger host organization listed in brackets after the name. e.g.: Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project (American Press Institute)",,,
|
||||
,Organization Type,"Academia – initiative is housed at a university
|
||||
Civil Society – initiative is led by a think tank, non-governmental organization, non-profit or charity.
|
||||
Government & Intergovernmental – initiative is run by a single government or government-level international organization such as NATO, the UN or EU.
|
||||
Media – initiative is run by a media outlet
|
||||
Tech – initiative is led by a social media platform or technology company",,,
|
||||
,Initiative Focus,"Countermeasures – seeks to counter or disrupt influence operations.
|
||||
Democracy & Civil Liberties –aims to support the democratic process by identifying attempts to subvert or influence elections, factchecking political statements and/or engaging in cross-sector engagement to build understanding of the threat.
|
||||
Factchecking & Journalism –conducts fact checking (e.g., of media reporting or political statements), verifies videos and images, detects disinformation narratives, verifies the credibility of websites, or supports journalism more broadly;
|
||||
Investigations –conducts research into ongoing or recent influence operations to expose them, reveal hidden networks and nodes, highlight tactics, and make attributions, typically on tight deadlines.
|
||||
Public Policy – develops new policy and regulatory proposals and/or evaluates the effectiveness of existing ones
|
||||
Research – conducts longer-term academic-level research on influence operations, including campaigns, their effects and countermeasures.
|
||||
Societal Resilience – initiative aims to build public resilience to influence operations narratives and improve the information ecosystem through education, media literacy, and/or promoting responsible journalism
|
||||
Tools – provides tools to help researchers and end-users to understand or control their experience within the information environment",,,
|
||||
,Self- Description,Description of main activities as per the initiative’s publicly available information,,,
|
||||
,Location,"Geographic location by continent. Presence on 3 or more continents counts as global
|
||||
North America
|
||||
South America
|
||||
Europe
|
||||
Asia
|
||||
Africa
|
||||
Australia and Oceania
|
||||
Global",,,
|
||||
,URL,Link to the website of the initiative,,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
,76,on the tools sheet,,,
|
||||
,130,with 'tool provider' checked on the org sheet,,,
|
||||
,811,organisations,,,
|
||||
,297,contacts,,,
|
||||
,,,,,
|
||||
CRUNCHBASE,,,,,
|
||||
,Deb gives this as an example model,https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/lookup-2,,,
|
||||
|
22
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv
Normal file
22
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
disarm_object,id_prefix,id_digits,next number on stack
|
||||
actortype,A,3,
|
||||
countermeasure,C,5,
|
||||
responsetype,D,2,
|
||||
example,E,6,
|
||||
detection,F,5,
|
||||
framework,FW,2,
|
||||
group,G,6,
|
||||
incident,I,5,
|
||||
metatechnique,M,3,
|
||||
moe,ME,5,
|
||||
mop,MP,5,
|
||||
narrative,N,5,
|
||||
phase,P,2,P05
|
||||
playbook,PB,5,
|
||||
resource,R,3,
|
||||
sector,S,3,
|
||||
technique,T,4,T0073
|
||||
tactic,TA,2,TA19
|
||||
task,TK,4,
|
||||
tool,TL,5,
|
||||
subtechnique,ST,4,
|
||||
|
40
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv
Normal file
40
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
MASTER COPY OF DISARM TTPS,Unnamed: 1,Unnamed: 2,Unnamed: 3
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
HISTORY OF THIS SPREADSHEET,,,
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
Date,Who,Description,Comments
|
||||
2019-11-15 00:00:00,ALL,"""Blue Team"" workshop, Washington DC 15-16 Nov 2019",
|
||||
2019-12-05 00:00:00,SJT,copied all wall post-its into spreadsheet,
|
||||
2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,Took copy for cleaning,
|
||||
2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,Put notes here if you spot something unusual or do something you want crosschecking,
|
||||
2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,"First task: look for the techniques for each row in the spreadsheet, and add them to the ""techniques"" column. A list of Technique numbers is best; if it applies to all techniques in a tactic, put the tactic number; if it applies to all techniques, put “all”.",
|
||||
2019-12-21 00:00:00,Eric D.,"I am unsure to what extent content dissemination is included in the ""Develop"" phases or Channel Selection, compared to belonging more or less solely within Pump Priming, Exposure, Go Physical and Persistence.",
|
||||
2020-01-07 00:00:00,SJT,"Content dissemination is generally right of boom, but might be needed as part of eg. creating convincing sockpuppets or groups in a channel",
|
||||
2020-01-10 00:00:00,SJT,"New copy of spreadsheet. Going to put all counters in here, as a playbook",
|
||||
2020-01-12 00:00:00,SJT,"Included post-it notes from 2019-11 workshop. Included incident-counters from 2019-11 preparation worksheet. Included general-counters from 2019-11 preparation worksheet. Added References worksheet, to hold URLs to references (excel only allows 1 URL per cell, which wipes data if we're not careful)",
|
||||
2020-01-13 00:00:00,SJT,"Included counters and playbooks from teams 1,2,3,4,D",
|
||||
2020-01-14 00:00:00,SJT,"Took copy of spreadsheet, so we have a snapshot of all the inputs into it. Now it's time to get cleaning!",
|
||||
2020-01-20 00:00:00,SJT,"Started the cleanup. First, gave every counter an id. ",
|
||||
2020-01-31 00:00:00,SJT,"Split output report into two: ""finding ways to counter disinformation campaigns"" and ""Disinformation counters"" so we can publish the first part faster",
|
||||
2020-02-10 00:00:00,Roger J.,"Add ""Measure of Effectiveness"" and ""Measure of Performance"" sheet. This is a requirement for effective data pollution where the objective is to degrade the adversary's ability to measure their affect.",
|
||||
2020-05-14 00:00:00,SJT,"Clean up tactic and response names in countermeasures sheet, so they don’t mess up the generators",
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
SUGGESTED TASKS,,,
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
Date,Suggested by,Suggested Task,Comments
|
||||
,SJT,"Add links to references with each counter in, to the rows for those counters. Add each document to the REFERENCES tab, and its [ref] to the column ""References"" in the Countermeasures sheet. ",
|
||||
,SJT,"Check through spreadsheet for duplicate counters, and counters at the wrong level of details (e.g. work out what should be at the counter level, and what should be at the playbook level). Clean up accordingly.",
|
||||
,SJT,"Create code similar to the DISARM github code, that creates: a page for each technique, listing the counters relevant to that technique; a page for each tactic, listing the counters relevant to that tactic, by response type then alphabetically; a COA grid with the number of responses for each tactic/response combination ",done
|
||||
,SJT,"Create a chapter in the summary document for each tactic, describing the types of counter relevant at that tactic stage. ",Done
|
||||
,SJT,Write a document chapter on viewing disinformation as an ecosystem and potential solution space to be explored. ,
|
||||
2021-07-17 00:00:00,SJT,"Look at SG note for wording, counters we haven't listed https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-misinformation-advisory.pdf",
|
||||
REFERENCES USED,,,
|
||||
,,,
|
||||
ID,URL,Reference,Comments
|
||||
RAND2237,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2237.html,"Helmus et al, ""Russian Social Media Influence: understanding Russian propaganda in Eastern Europe"", Rand Corporation 2018",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
|
||||
Corker18,https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf,"Corker et al, ""Putin's asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: implications for US national security"", 2018",
|
||||
Hicks19,https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-i-campaigning-gray-zone,"Hicks et al, ""By other means part 1: campaigning in the gray zone"", 2019",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
|
||||
Dalton19,csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-ii-adapting-compete-gray-zone,"Dalton et al, ""By other means part 2: adapting to compete in the gray zone"", 2019",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
|
||||
Taylor81,http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2742/ToP.pdf,"Philip M. Taylor (1981): Techniques of persuasion: basic ground rules of British propaganda during the Second World War, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 1:1, 57 – 66",https://web.archive.org/web/20170226100346/http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2742/ToP.pdf
|
||||
,https://www.psywar.org/content/irdSpecialOperations,,
|
||||
|
9
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOE.csv
Normal file
9
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOE.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,info_category,info_type,meta,name,brainstorm,phase,tactic,counter,summary,longname
|
||||
ME00001,,,,,,TA06 - Develop Content,T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites,Identify affilliated imposter accounts,,ME00001
|
||||
ME00002,,,,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,T0009 - Create fake experts,Verify published research accreditation,,ME00002
|
||||
ME00003,,,,,"-measure credibility of expert, credibility of each media company, their amplification factor, as a metric of the value the expert provides.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
X media power, measure whether actor can be knocked off one class of ""credible media"" down to the next in the ladder",TA15 - Establish Social Assets,T0009 - Create fake experts,Publicly deplatform fake experts,,ME00003
|
||||
ME00004,,,,,-MOE = predictive value of differentiation by intent via other counters related to polls?,TA07 - Channel Selection,T0029 - Manipulate online polls,Categorize polls by intent,,ME00004
|
||||
|
35
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOP.csv
Normal file
35
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOP.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,info_category,data_type,Unnamed: 3,name,Unnamed: 5,Unnamed: 6,summary,longname
|
||||
MP00001,,,social_media,Likes,,,,MP00001
|
||||
MP00002,,,social_media,Shares,,,,MP00002
|
||||
MP00003,,,social_media,Comments,,,,MP00003
|
||||
MP00004,,,social_media,Follows,,,,MP00004
|
||||
MP00005,,,social_media,Retweets,,,,MP00005
|
||||
MP00006,,,social_media,Clicks,,,,MP00006
|
||||
MP00007,,,social_media,Active Followers,,,,MP00007
|
||||
MP00008,,,social_media,Relevance Score,,,see: facebook relevance algo,MP00008
|
||||
MP00009,,,social_media,Follwers vs. Following Ratio,,,,MP00009
|
||||
MP00010,,,social_media,Inter-Community Posting ,,,4chan to Reddit,MP00010
|
||||
MP00011,,,social_media,Intra-Community Posting,,,crossposting between boards,MP00011
|
||||
MP00012,,,social_media,Reach vs. Impressions,,,,MP00012
|
||||
MP00013,,,social_media,Direct Messages,,,,MP00013
|
||||
MP00014,,,,,,,,MP00014
|
||||
MP00015,,,,Web Site Traffic Growth,,,,MP00015
|
||||
MP00016,,,,Search Engine Ranking,,,,MP00016
|
||||
MP00017,,,mobile,Mobile App Downloads,,,,MP00017
|
||||
MP00018,,,mobile,SMS/Push Notification List,,,,MP00018
|
||||
MP00019,,,,,,,,MP00019
|
||||
MP00020,,,target_audience,Audience Demographics,,,,MP00020
|
||||
MP00021,,,target_audience,Audience Mentions,,,,MP00021
|
||||
MP00022,,,,,,,,MP00022
|
||||
MP00023,,,,,,,,MP00023
|
||||
MP00024,,,,,,,,MP00024
|
||||
MP00025,,,adtech,Ad Conversions,,,,MP00025
|
||||
MP00026,,,,,,,,MP00026
|
||||
MP00027,,,,,,,,MP00027
|
||||
MP00028,,,,,,,,MP00028
|
||||
MP00029,,,,,,,,MP00029
|
||||
MP00030,,,,Adversary intelligence system fails to detect,,,,MP00030
|
||||
MP00031,,,,,,,,MP00031
|
||||
MP00032,,,email,Email List,,,,MP00032
|
||||
MP00033,,,email,Email Open Rate,,,,MP00033
|
||||
MP00034,,,email,Email Click-Through Rate,,,,MP00034
|
||||
|
40
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/actortypes.csv
Normal file
40
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/actortypes.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,sector_ids,framework_ids,longname,Jon's comments/questions
|
||||
A001,data scientist ,"Person who can wrangle data, implement machine learning algorithms etc","S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010","FW01, FW02",A001 - data scientist ,"What actual actions do data scientists execute? Do we not need a clearer idea of this, to help up map ttps (actions) to actortypes (who execute the action)"
|
||||
A002,target,Person being targeted by disinformation campaign,"S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010",FW02,A002 - target,"Both red and blue framework users will refer to A002? So in FW01, as well as FW02?"
|
||||
A003,trusted authority ,Influencer,"S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010","FW01, FW02",A003 - trusted authority ,"Is A003 best summarised by the word ""Inluencer""? Is an influencer not a separate actortype?
|
||||
Just seen below, A016"
|
||||
A004,activist,,S002,FW02,A004 - activist,What does this actortype do?
|
||||
A005,community group,,S002,FW02,A005 - community group,What does this actortype do?
|
||||
A006,educator,,S002,FW02,A006 - educator,
|
||||
A007,factchecker,Someone with the skills to verify whether information posted is factual,S002,FW02,A007 - factchecker,
|
||||
A008,library,,S002,FW02,A008 - library,"Is this an actortype? A sub-sector, yes. But what is the 'action type' to help describe the 'actortype'?"
|
||||
A009,NGO,,S002,FW02,A009 - NGO,"This is a sector, not an actortype"
|
||||
A010,religious organisation ,,S002,FW02,A010 - religious organisation ,"""Faith communities"" are a sub-sector of the Civil Society sector. I think we need clear differentiation between the 'Sector' object (where an actor sits) vs 'Actortype' object (what an actor does)"
|
||||
A011,school ,,S002,FW02,A011 - school ,"This is a subsector of S004 - not an actortype, or is there a clear role for a school? If teaching, is this not A006"
|
||||
A012,account owner,Anyone who owns an account online,S006,"FW01
|
||||
FW02",A012 - account owner,
|
||||
A013,content creator ,,S006,"FW01
|
||||
FW02",A013 - content creator ,
|
||||
A014,elves,,S006,FW02,A014 - elves,"??? SJ, you have told me, but I've forgotten"
|
||||
A015,general public,,S006,FW02,A015 - general public,"Duplication of a field in the sector object. But I'm querying if this belongs under sector either. Aren't we talking here about ""individuals"". And, then again, what do these individuals do? They are a target. Or an influencer. Or something else. But being an individual doesn't seem to help describe their applicability to an action"
|
||||
A016,influencer,,S006,"FW01
|
||||
FW02",A016 - influencer,
|
||||
A017,coordinating body,For example the DHS,S003,FW02,A017 - coordinating body,"""Response coordinator""? Or just 'Coordinator"""
|
||||
A018,government ,Government agencies,S003,"FW01
|
||||
FW02",A018 - government ,"DHS (A017) is ""government"". Again, this is a field/value of the sector object"
|
||||
A019,military ,,S003,FW02,A019 - military ,"A019 is a sub-sector of ""government"". Again, this is a field/value of the sector object"
|
||||
A020,policy maker,,S003,FW02,A020 - policy maker,
|
||||
A021,media organisation,,S010,"FW01
|
||||
FW02",A021 - media organisation,"Not an actortype. The actor is perhaps as the owner, or the journalist, or the ad buyer, ad seller etc"
|
||||
A022,company,,S009,FW02,A022 - company,
|
||||
A023,adtech provider,,S008,FW02,A023 - adtech provider,"Should Adtech be a called-out subsector of S008? Separate question: is ""provider"" relevant? What action does it imply? Or what TTP does it map to?"
|
||||
A024,developer,,S008,FW02,A024 - developer,
|
||||
A025,funding_site_admin,Funding site admin,S008,FW02,A025 - funding_site_admin,What is this?
|
||||
A026,games designer,,S008,"FW01, FW02",A026 - games designer,"Just ""Designer""? Would the TTP context not make it clear the context was 'gaming'?"
|
||||
A027,information security,,S008,FW02,A027 - information security,
|
||||
A028,platform administrator,,S008,FW02,A028 - platform administrator,"Just ""Administrator""?"
|
||||
A029,server admininistrator ,,S008,FW02,A029 - server admininistrator ,"Just ""Administrator""? (de-duplicating A028)"
|
||||
A030,platforms ,,S007,FW02,A030 - platforms ,"The same as S007? If there is an action here, is it done by actortype = ""algorithm""? Maybe ""Platform"" is right"
|
||||
A031,social media platform adminstrator,"Person with the authority to make changes to algorithms, take down content etc. ",S007,FW02,A031 - social media platform adminstrator,"Not needed, given A028. The sector selection does the differentiation"
|
||||
A032,social media platform outreach ,,S007,FW02,A032 - social media platform outreach ,What does this do?
|
||||
A033,social media platform owner,Person with authority to make changes to a social media company’s business model,S007,FW02,A033 - social media platform owner,
|
||||
|
1755
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/comments.csv
Normal file
1755
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/comments.csv
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
154
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/countermeasures.csv
Normal file
154
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/countermeasures.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,metatechnique,summary,how_found,references,incident_ids,tactic,responsetype,notes,tags,longname
|
||||
C00022,Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety,M001 - resilience,Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,C00022 - Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety
|
||||
C00006,Charge for social media,M004 - friction,"Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information. There are examples of this not working, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,C00006 - Charge for social media
|
||||
C00008,Create shared fact-checking database,M006 - scoring,"Share fact-checking resources - tips, responses, countermessages, across respose groups. ","2019-11-workshop
|
||||
2019-11-search",,"I00049,I00050",TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,information,C00008 - Create shared fact-checking database
|
||||
C00009,Educate high profile influencers on best practices,M001 - resilience,"Find online influencers. Provide training in the mechanisms of disinformation, how to spot campaigns, and/or how to contribute to responses by countermessaging, boosting information sites etc. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,education,C00009 - Educate high profile influencers on best practices
|
||||
C00010,Enhanced privacy regulation for social media,M004 - friction,"Implement stronger privacy standards, to reduce the ability to microtarget community members. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,regulation,C00010 - Enhanced privacy regulation for social media
|
||||
C00011,Media literacy. Games to identify fake news,M001 - resilience,"Create and use games to show people the mechanics of disinformation, and how to counter them. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,education,C00011 - Media literacy. Games to identify fake news
|
||||
C00012,Platform regulation,M007 - metatechnique,"Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy. Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media. The U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,regulation,C00012 - Platform regulation
|
||||
C00013,Rating framework for news,M006 - scoring,"This is ""strategic innoculation"", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body. Include full transcripts, link source, add items. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,information,C00013 - Rating framework for news
|
||||
C00014,Real-time updates to fact-checking database,M006 - scoring,Update fact-checking databases and resources in real time. Especially import for time-limited events like natural disasters. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,C00014 - Real-time updates to fact-checking database
|
||||
C00016,Censorship,M005 - removal,Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of information controlled by disinformation creators. Not recommended. ,grugq,Taylor81,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,C00016 - Censorship
|
||||
C00017,Repair broken social connections,M010 - countermessaging,"For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00017 - Repair broken social connections
|
||||
C00019,Reduce effect of division-enablers,M003 - daylight,"includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00019 - Reduce effect of division-enablers
|
||||
C00021,Encourage in-person communication,M001 - resilience,Encourage offline communication,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,action,C00021 - Encourage in-person communication
|
||||
C00024,Promote healthy narratives,M001 - resilience,"Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA). Includes promoting identity neutral narratives. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,C00024 - Promote healthy narratives
|
||||
C00026,Shore up democracy based messages,M010 - countermessaging,"Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,C00026 - Shore up democracy based messages
|
||||
C00027,Create culture of civility,M001 - resilience,This is passive. Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,narrative,C00027 - Create culture of civility
|
||||
C00029,Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise,M002 - diversion,Create websites in disinformation voids - spaces where people are looking for known disinformation. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,narrative,C00029 - Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise
|
||||
C00028,Make information provenance available,M011 - verification,"Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments. Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted.
|
||||
|
||||
This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,information,C00028 - Make information provenance available
|
||||
C00030,Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based),M002 - diversion,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,narrative,C00030 - Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)
|
||||
C00031,"Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify",M009 - dilution,"Create competing narratives. Included ""Facilitate State Propaganda"" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,CAVEAT: some element of disinformation is simply filling the information space with so much data that it overwhelms people and they shutdown. Any swarm-counter-narrative needs to be cautious of this outcome.,narrative,"C00031 - Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify"
|
||||
C00042,Address truth contained in narratives,M010 - countermessaging,"Focus on and boost truths in misinformation narratives, removing misinformation from them. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,narrative,C00042 - Address truth contained in narratives
|
||||
C00032,Hijack content and link to truth- based info,M002 - diversion,Link to platform,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,C00032 - Hijack content and link to truth- based info
|
||||
C00034,Create more friction at account creation,M004 - friction,Counters fake account,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,C00034 - Create more friction at account creation
|
||||
C00036,Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide),M013 - targeting,All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,C00036 - Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)
|
||||
C00040,third party verification for people,M011 - verification,counters fake experts,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,C00040 - third party verification for people
|
||||
C00067,Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding),M013 - targeting,Reduce the credibility of groups behind misinformation-linked funding campaigns. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,narrative,C00067 - Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)
|
||||
C00044,Keep people from posting to social media immediately,M004 - friction,"Platforms can introduce friction to slow down activities, force a small delay between posts, or replies to posts.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,C00044 - Keep people from posting to social media immediately
|
||||
C00046,Marginalise and discredit extremist groups,M013 - targeting,Reduce the credibility of extremist groups posting misinformation.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,C00046 - Marginalise and discredit extremist groups
|
||||
C00047,Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics,M008 - data pollution,"Flood disinformation spaces with obviously fake content, to dilute core misinformation narratives in them. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D05,,action,C00047 - Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics
|
||||
C00048,Name and Shame Influencers,M003 - daylight,"Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account. Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts. Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - ""Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237 and Dalton19,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D07,,information,C00048 - Name and Shame Influencers
|
||||
C00051,Counter social engineering training,M001 - resilience,"Includes anti-elicitation training, phishing prevention education. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,education,C00051 - Counter social engineering training
|
||||
C00052,Infiltrate platforms,M013 - targeting,Detect and degrade,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,C00052 - Infiltrate platforms
|
||||
C00053,Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts,M012 - cleaning,"remove or remove access to (e.g. stop the ability to update) old social media accounts, to reduce the pool of accounts available for takeover, botnets etc. ","2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search",,I00004,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,C00053 - Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts
|
||||
C00056,Encourage people to leave social media,M004 - friction,Encourage people to leave spcial media. We don't expect this to work,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,C00056 - Encourage people to leave social media
|
||||
C00058,Report crowdfunder as violator,M005 - removal,counters crowdfunding. Includes ‘Expose online funding as fake”. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,C00058 - Report crowdfunder as violator
|
||||
C00059,Verification of project before posting fund requests,M011 - verification,third-party verification of projects posting funding campaigns before those campaigns can be posted. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,C00059 - Verification of project before posting fund requests
|
||||
C00060,Legal action against for-profit engagement factories,M013 - targeting,"Take legal action against for-profit ""factories"" creating misinformation. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,regulation,C00060 - Legal action against for-profit engagement factories
|
||||
C00062,Free open library sources worldwide,M010 - countermessaging,"Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as DISARM can be created to counter the adversarial efforts.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,information,C00062 - Free open library sources worldwide
|
||||
C00065,Reduce political targeting,M005 - removal,Includes “ban political micro targeting” and “ban political ads”,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D03,,action,C00065 - Reduce political targeting
|
||||
C00066,Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back),M009 - dilution,Flood a disinformation-related hashtag with other content. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D03,,information,C00066 - Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)
|
||||
C00080,Create competing narrative,M002 - diversion,"Create counternarratives, or narratives that compete in the same spaces as misinformation narratives. Could also be degrade",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,narrative,C00080 - Create competing narrative
|
||||
C00070,Block access to disinformation resources,M005 - removal,"Resources = accounts, channels etc. Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker.
|
||||
|
||||
TA02*: DDOS at the critical time, to deny an adversary's time-bound objective.
|
||||
|
||||
T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy.
|
||||
|
||||
Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag.
|
||||
|
||||
T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as ""blocking access to a platform"".",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,action,C00070 - Block access to disinformation resources
|
||||
C00071,Block source of pollution,M005 - removal,"Block websites, accounts, groups etc connected to misinformation and other information pollution. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00071 - Block source of pollution
|
||||
C00072,Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended,M005 - removal,"Check special-interest groups (e.g. medical, knitting) for unrelated and misinformation-linked content, and remove it. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00072 - Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended
|
||||
C00073,Inoculate populations through media literacy training,M001 - resilience,"Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade. ","2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,education,C00073 - Inoculate populations through media literacy training
|
||||
C00074,Identify and delete or rate limit identical content,M012 - cleaning,C00000,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00074 - Identify and delete or rate limit identical content
|
||||
C00075,normalise language,M010 - countermessaging,normalise the language around disinformation and misinformation; give people the words for artifact and effect types. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,information,C00075 - normalise language
|
||||
C00076,Prohibit images in political discourse channels,M005 - removal,Make political discussion channels text-only. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00076 - Prohibit images in political discourse channels
|
||||
C00077,"Active defence: run TA15 ""develop people” - not recommended",M013 - targeting,Develop networks of communities and influencers around counter-misinformation. Match them to misinformation creators ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,"C00077 - Active defence: run TA15 ""develop people” - not recommended"
|
||||
C00078,Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content,M002 - diversion,Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side”,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,action,C00078 - Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content
|
||||
C00084,"Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them",M002 - diversion,"Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”. Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with ""far-up/down/left/right"" actors. ""Long Game"" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations. Can also replay technique T0003. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,narrative,"C00084 - Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them"
|
||||
C00081,"Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations",M003 - daylight,"Discredit by pointing out the ""noise"" and informing public that ""flooding"" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of ""noise""",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,"C00081 - Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations"
|
||||
C00082,Ground truthing as automated response to pollution,M010 - countermessaging,Also inoculation.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,C00082 - Ground truthing as automated response to pollution
|
||||
C00087,Make more noise than the disinformation,M009 - dilution,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,narrative,C00087 - Make more noise than the disinformation
|
||||
C00085,Mute content,M003 - daylight,"Rate-limit disinformation content. Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns.
|
||||
|
||||
Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,action,C00085 - Mute content
|
||||
C00086,Distract from noise with addictive content,M002 - diversion,"Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a ""conversion rate"" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's ""information bubble"" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,C00086 - Distract from noise with addictive content
|
||||
C00112,"""Prove they are not an op!""",M004 - friction,Challenge misinformation creators to prove they're not an information operation. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,narrative,"C00112 - ""Prove they are not an op!"""
|
||||
C00090,Fake engagement system,M002 - diversion,"Create honeypots for misinformation creators to engage with, and reduce the resources they have available for misinformation campaigns. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D05,,action,C00090 - Fake engagement system
|
||||
C00091,Honeypot social community,M002 - diversion,"Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D05,,action,C00091 - Honeypot social community
|
||||
C00092,Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers,M006 - scoring,"Includes ""Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”. Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D07,,information,C00092 - Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers
|
||||
C00093,Influencer code of conduct,M001 - resilience,Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers. Can be platform code of conduct; can also be community code.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D07,,information,C00093 - Influencer code of conduct
|
||||
C00094,Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research,M003 - daylight,Accountability move: make sure research is published with its funding sources. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,C00094 - Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research
|
||||
C00096,Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers,M006 - scoring,"Increase credibility, visibility, and reach of positive influencers in the information space. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,information,C00096 - Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers
|
||||
C00097,Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment,M004 - friction,Reduce poll flooding by online taking comments or poll entries from verified accounts. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,C00097 - Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment
|
||||
C00098,"Revocation of allowlisted or ""verified"" status",M004 - friction,remove blue checkmarks etc from known misinformation accounts. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,action,"C00098 - Revocation of allowlisted or ""verified"" status"
|
||||
C00099,Strengthen verification methods,M004 - friction,"Improve content veerification methods available to groups, individuals etc. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,C00099 - Strengthen verification methods
|
||||
C00100,Hashtag jacking,M002 - diversion,Post large volumes of unrelated content on known misinformation hashtags ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,information,C00100 - Hashtag jacking
|
||||
C00101,Create friction by rate-limiting engagement,M004 - friction,"Create participant friction. Includes Make repeat voting hard, and throttle number of forwards. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D04,,action,C00101 - Create friction by rate-limiting engagement
|
||||
C00103,Create a bot that engages / distract trolls,M002 - diversion,"This is reactive, not active measure (honeypots are active). It's a platform controlled measure.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D05,,action,C00103 - Create a bot that engages / distract trolls
|
||||
C00105,Buy more advertising than misinformation creators,M009 - dilution,Shift influence and algorithms by posting more adverts into spaces than misinformation creators. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D03,,information,C00105 - Buy more advertising than misinformation creators
|
||||
C00106,Click-bait centrist content,M002 - diversion,Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,C00106 - Click-bait centrist content
|
||||
C00107,Content moderation,"M006 - scoring, M005 - removal","includes social media content take-downs, e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",,"I00005,I00009,I00056",TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00107 - Content moderation
|
||||
C00109,Dampen Emotional Reaction,M001 - resilience,"Reduce emotional responses to misinformation through calming messages, etc. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,C00109 - Dampen Emotional Reaction
|
||||
C00111,Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views,M001 - resilience,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,information,C00111 - Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views
|
||||
C00118,Repurpose images with new text,M010 - countermessaging,Add countermessage text to iamges used in misinformation incidents. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,narrative,C00118 - Repurpose images with new text
|
||||
C00113,Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.,M003 - daylight,"Debunk fake experts, their credentials, and potentially also their audience quality",2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,C00113 - Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.
|
||||
C00114,Don't engage with payloads,M004 - friction,Stop passing on misinformation,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,C00114 - Don't engage with payloads
|
||||
C00115,Expose actor and intentions,M003 - daylight,Debunk misinformation creators and posters. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,C00115 - Expose actor and intentions
|
||||
C00116,Provide proof of involvement,M003 - daylight,Build and post information about groups etc's involvement in misinformation incidents. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,C00116 - Provide proof of involvement
|
||||
C00117,Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people,M010 - countermessaging,Label promote counter to disinformation,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,information,C00117 - Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people
|
||||
C00125,Prebunking,M001 - resilience,"Produce material in advance of misinformation incidents, by anticipating the narratives used in them, and debunking them. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,narrative,C00125 - Prebunking
|
||||
C00119,Engage payload and debunk.,M010 - countermessaging,debunk misinformation content. Provide link to facts. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,information,C00119 - Engage payload and debunk.
|
||||
C00120,Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes,M007 - metatechnique,Redesign platforms and algorithms to reduce the effectiveness of disinformation,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,action,C00120 - Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes
|
||||
C00121,Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. ,M001 - resilience,"Make algorithms in platforms explainable, and visible to people using those platforms. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,information,C00121 - Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow.
|
||||
C00122,Content moderation,M004 - friction,Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,C00122 - Content moderation
|
||||
C00123,Remove or rate limit botnets,M004 - friction,reduce the visibility of known botnets online. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,C00123 - Remove or rate limit botnets
|
||||
C00124,Don't feed the trolls,M004 - friction,Don't engage with individuals relaying misinformation. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,C00124 - Don't feed the trolls
|
||||
C00211,Use humorous counter-narratives,M010 - countermessaging,,2019-11-search,,I00004,TA09 Exposure,D03,,narrative,C00211 - Use humorous counter-narratives
|
||||
C00126,Social media amber alert,M003 - daylight,"Create an alert system around disinformation and misinformation artifacts, narratives, and incidents ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,C00126 - Social media amber alert
|
||||
C00128,"Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other ""decelerants""",M009 - dilution,"Repost or comment on misinformation artifacts, using ridicule or other content to reduce the likelihood of reposting. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,"C00128 - Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other ""decelerants"""
|
||||
C00129,Use banking to cut off access ,M014 - reduce resources,fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,C00129 - Use banking to cut off access
|
||||
C00130,"Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.",M001 - resilience,Train local influencers in countering misinformation. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D07,,education,"C00130 - Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously."
|
||||
C00131,Seize and analyse botnet servers,M005 - removal,Take botnet servers offline by seizing them. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D02,,action,C00131 - Seize and analyse botnet servers
|
||||
C00133,Deplatform Account*,M005 - removal,Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,C00133 - Deplatform Account*
|
||||
C00135,Deplatform message groups and/or message boards,M005 - removal,Merged two rows here. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,C00135 - Deplatform message groups and/or message boards
|
||||
C00136,Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages,M010 - countermessaging,"Find communities likely to be targetted by misinformation campaigns, and send them countermessages or pointers to information sources. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,information,C00136 - Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages
|
||||
C00138,Spam domestic actors with lawsuits,M014 - reduce resources,"File multiple lawsuits against known misinformation creators and posters, to distract them from disinformation creation. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,regulation,C00138 - Spam domestic actors with lawsuits
|
||||
C00139,Weaponise youtube content matrices,M004 - friction,God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,information,C00139 - Weaponise youtube content matrices
|
||||
C00140,"""Bomb"" link shorteners with lots of calls",M008 - data pollution,"Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except ""T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics",2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D03,,action,"C00140 - ""Bomb"" link shorteners with lots of calls"
|
||||
C00142,Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content,M004 - friction,"Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “""Hey this story is old"" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice. Includes “mark clickbait visually”. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,C00142 - Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content
|
||||
C00143,(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time,M013 - targeting,Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D04,,regulation,C00143 - (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time
|
||||
C00144,Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs,M014 - reduce resources,Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days. Not recommended,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D04,,action,C00144 - Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs
|
||||
C00147,Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days),M004 - friction,"Stop new community activity (likes, comments) on old social media posts. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,C00147 - Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)
|
||||
C00148,Add random links to network graphs,M008 - data pollution,"If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which DISARM techniques.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D04,,action,C00148 - Add random links to network graphs
|
||||
C00149,Poison the monitoring & evaluation data,M008 - data pollution,Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D04,,action,C00149 - Poison the monitoring & evaluation data
|
||||
C00153,Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure,M013 - targeting,"Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate.",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00153 - Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure
|
||||
C00154,Ask media not to report false information,M005 - removal,"Train media to spot and respond to misinformation, and ask them not to post or transmit misinformation they've found. ",2019-11-search,,I00022,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,C00154 - Ask media not to report false information
|
||||
C00155,Ban incident actors from funding sites,M005 - removal,Ban misinformation creators and posters from funding sites,2019-11-search,,I00002,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,C00155 - Ban incident actors from funding sites
|
||||
C00156,Better tell your country or organization story,M010 - countermessaging,"Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. ",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,information,C00156 - Better tell your country or organization story
|
||||
C00159,Have a disinformation response plan,M007 - metatechnique,"e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict.",2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00159 - Have a disinformation response plan
|
||||
C00160,find and train influencers,M001 - resilience,"Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,education,C00160 - find and train influencers
|
||||
C00161,Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements,M007 - metatechnique,"Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad.",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,action,C00161 - Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements
|
||||
C00162,Unravel/target the Potemkin villages,M013 - targeting,"Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,information,C00162 - Unravel/target the Potemkin villages
|
||||
C00164,compatriot policy,M013 - targeting,"protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,action,C00164 - compatriot policy
|
||||
C00165,Ensure integrity of official documents,M004 - friction,"e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions",2019-11-search,,I00015,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,information,C00165 - Ensure integrity of official documents
|
||||
C00169,develop a creative content hub,M010 - countermessaging,"international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,action,C00169 - develop a creative content hub
|
||||
C00170,elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft,M007 - metatechnique,"Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly.",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00170 - elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft
|
||||
C00172,social media source removal,M005 - removal,"Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal",2019-11-search,,I00035,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,C00172 - social media source removal
|
||||
C00174,Create a healthier news environment,"M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion","Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle. includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search","Hicks19, p143 of Corker18, Rand2237",,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,C00174 - Create a healthier news environment
|
||||
C00176,Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private,M007 - metatechnique,"Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations. ",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,action,C00176 - Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private
|
||||
C00178,Fill information voids with non-disinformation content,"M009 - dilution, M008 - data pollution","1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation. ","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA05 Microtargeting,D04,,information,C00178 - Fill information voids with non-disinformation content
|
||||
C00182,Redirection / malware detection/ remediation,M005 - removal,"Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete. ",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,C00182 - Redirection / malware detection/ remediation
|
||||
C00184,Media exposure,M003 - daylight,highlight misinformation activities and actors in media,2019-11-search,,"I00010,I00015,I00032,I00044",TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,information,C00184 - Media exposure
|
||||
C00188,Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves,M001 - resilience,"Includes SEO influence. Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community. Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. ",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,education,C00188 - Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves
|
||||
C00189,Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts,M003 - daylight,"Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of ""flagged"" profiles. Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D06,,action,C00189 - Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts
|
||||
C00190,open engagement with civil society,M001 - resilience,"Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.",2019-11-search,"Dalton19, Hicks19",,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00190 - open engagement with civil society
|
||||
C00195,Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content ,M002 - diversion,Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or propaganda themes. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content. ,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,C00195 - Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content
|
||||
C00197,remove suspicious accounts,M005 - removal,"Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues). Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners. ","2019-11-search, 2019-11-workshop",,I00022,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,C00197 - remove suspicious accounts
|
||||
C00200,Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo,M010 - countermessaging,FIXIT: standardize language used for influencer/ respected figure. ,2019-11-search,,I00044,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,C00200 - Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo
|
||||
C00202,Set data 'honeytraps',M002 - diversion,Set honeytraps in content likely to be accessed for disinformation. ,2019-11-search,,"I00004,I00022",TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00202 - Set data 'honeytraps'
|
||||
C00203,Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets,M004 - friction,Remove access to official press events from known misinformation actors. ,2019-11-search,,I00022,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,C00203 - Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets
|
||||
C00205,strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting,M007 - metatechnique,Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. ,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00205 - strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting
|
||||
C00207,Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended,M013 - targeting,,2019-11-search,,I00042,TA02 Objective Planning,D07,,action,C00207 - Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended
|
||||
C00212,build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant,M001 - resilience,"Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education.",2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00212 - build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant
|
||||
C00216,Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors,M014 - reduce resources,Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D02,,action,C00216 - Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors
|
||||
C00219,Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators,M003 - daylight,"Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc. ",grugq,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,C00219 - Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators
|
||||
C00220,Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan,M007 - metatechnique,"Create a plan for misinformation and disinformation response, before it's needed. Include connections / contacts needed, expected counteremessages etc. ",Counters cleanup,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00220 - Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan
|
||||
C00221,"Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors",M007 - metatechnique,"Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency",Counters cleanup,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"C00221 - Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors"
|
||||
C00222,Tabletop simulations,M007 - metatechnique,"Simulate misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and responses to them, before campaigns happen. ",,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,education,C00222 - Tabletop simulations
|
||||
C00223,Strengthen Trust in social media platforms,M001 - resilience,Improve trust in the misinformation responses from social media and other platforms. Examples include creating greater transparancy on their actions and algorithms. ,,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00223 - Strengthen Trust in social media platforms
|
||||
|
80
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_actortype.csv
Normal file
80
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_actortype.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,actortype_id
|
||||
C00006,A033
|
||||
C00008,A007
|
||||
C00009,A016
|
||||
C00009,A006
|
||||
C00010,A020
|
||||
C00011,A006
|
||||
C00011,A026
|
||||
C00011,A024
|
||||
C00012,A020
|
||||
C00012,A018
|
||||
C00012,A033
|
||||
C00014,A007
|
||||
C00016,A031
|
||||
C00017,A021
|
||||
C00044,A031
|
||||
C00051,A006
|
||||
C00052,A004
|
||||
C00053,A031
|
||||
C00053,A028
|
||||
C00053,A012
|
||||
C00060,A020
|
||||
C00065,A020
|
||||
C00073,A006
|
||||
C00073,A008
|
||||
C00073,A017
|
||||
C00073,A009
|
||||
C00073,A032
|
||||
C00073,A021
|
||||
C00073,A005
|
||||
C00073,A010
|
||||
C00074,A031
|
||||
C00074,A028
|
||||
C00092,A001
|
||||
C00097,A031
|
||||
C00098,A031
|
||||
C00099,A031
|
||||
C00101,A031
|
||||
C00103,A024
|
||||
C00105,A023
|
||||
C00107,A031
|
||||
C00111,A021
|
||||
C00111,A013
|
||||
C00114,A015
|
||||
C00122,A031
|
||||
C00124,A015
|
||||
C00124,A021
|
||||
C00128,A003
|
||||
C00131,A029
|
||||
C00133,A031
|
||||
C00135,A031
|
||||
C00142,A031
|
||||
C00143,A015
|
||||
C00143,A014
|
||||
C00147,A031
|
||||
C00148,A031
|
||||
C00153,A027
|
||||
C00154,A021
|
||||
C00155,A025
|
||||
C00156,A018
|
||||
C00156,A019
|
||||
C00160,A001
|
||||
C00160,A016
|
||||
C00172,A031
|
||||
C00174,A021
|
||||
C00182,A027
|
||||
C00188,A021
|
||||
C00188,A006
|
||||
C00190,A015
|
||||
C00197,A031
|
||||
C00197,A004
|
||||
C00200,A016
|
||||
C00203,A018
|
||||
C00205,A018
|
||||
C00205,A033
|
||||
C00207,A018
|
||||
C00207,A033
|
||||
C00212,A006
|
||||
C00212,A018
|
||||
C00216,A023
|
||||
|
12
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_resource.csv
Normal file
12
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_resource.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,resource_id
|
||||
C00044,R004
|
||||
C00092,R001
|
||||
C00097,R004
|
||||
C00099,R004
|
||||
C00101,R004
|
||||
C00105,R003
|
||||
C00142,R004
|
||||
C00147,R004
|
||||
C00148,R004
|
||||
C00195,R002
|
||||
C00197,R003
|
||||
|
882
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_technique.csv
Normal file
882
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_technique.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,882 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,technique_id
|
||||
C00022,T0001
|
||||
C00022,T0002
|
||||
C00022,T0003
|
||||
C00022,T0006
|
||||
C00022,T0027
|
||||
C00022,T0028
|
||||
C00022,T0022
|
||||
C00022,T0023
|
||||
C00022,T0053
|
||||
C00022,T0044
|
||||
C00006,T0007
|
||||
C00006,T0015
|
||||
C00006,T0018
|
||||
C00006,T0043
|
||||
C00006,T0053
|
||||
C00006,T0054
|
||||
C00008,T0001
|
||||
C00008,T0002
|
||||
C00008,T0003
|
||||
C00008,T0027
|
||||
C00008,T0028
|
||||
C00008,T0006
|
||||
C00008,T0009
|
||||
C00008,T0008
|
||||
C00008,T0013
|
||||
C00008,T0014
|
||||
C00008,T0021
|
||||
C00008,T0025
|
||||
C00008,T0024
|
||||
C00008,T0026
|
||||
C00008,T0056
|
||||
C00008,T0051
|
||||
C00008,T0044
|
||||
C00008,T0045
|
||||
C00009,T0010
|
||||
C00009,T0039
|
||||
C00009,T0044
|
||||
C00009,T0042
|
||||
C00009,T0048
|
||||
C00009,T0052
|
||||
C00009,T0053
|
||||
C00009,T0055
|
||||
C00009,T0056
|
||||
C00010,T0005
|
||||
C00010,T0018
|
||||
C00011,T0001
|
||||
C00011,T0002
|
||||
C00011,T0003
|
||||
C00011,T0027
|
||||
C00011,T0028
|
||||
C00011,T0006
|
||||
C00011,T0009
|
||||
C00011,T0008
|
||||
C00011,T0013
|
||||
C00011,T0021
|
||||
C00011,T0025
|
||||
C00011,T0024
|
||||
C00011,T0026
|
||||
C00011,T0056
|
||||
C00011,T0051
|
||||
C00011,T0044
|
||||
C00011,T0045
|
||||
C00012,T0001
|
||||
C00012,T0002
|
||||
C00012,T0003
|
||||
C00012,T0007
|
||||
C00012,T0008
|
||||
C00012,T0009
|
||||
C00012,T0013
|
||||
C00012,T0014
|
||||
C00012,T0015
|
||||
C00012,T0016
|
||||
C00012,T0017
|
||||
C00012,T0018
|
||||
C00012,T0021
|
||||
C00012,T0022
|
||||
C00012,T0024
|
||||
C00012,T0025
|
||||
C00012,T0026
|
||||
C00012,T0043
|
||||
C00012,T0045
|
||||
C00012,T0046
|
||||
C00012,T0047
|
||||
C00012,T0048
|
||||
C00012,T0049
|
||||
C00012,T0050
|
||||
C00012,T0051
|
||||
C00012,T0052
|
||||
C00012,T0053
|
||||
C00012,T0054
|
||||
C00012,T0055
|
||||
C00012,T0056
|
||||
C00012,T0057
|
||||
C00012,T0061
|
||||
C00013,T0001
|
||||
C00013,T0002
|
||||
C00013,T0003
|
||||
C00013,T0027
|
||||
C00013,T0028
|
||||
C00013,T0056
|
||||
C00013,T0052
|
||||
C00014,T0001
|
||||
C00014,T0002
|
||||
C00014,T0003
|
||||
C00014,T0027
|
||||
C00014,T0028
|
||||
C00014,T0006
|
||||
C00014,T0009
|
||||
C00014,T0008
|
||||
C00014,T0013
|
||||
C00014,T0014
|
||||
C00014,T0021
|
||||
C00014,T0025
|
||||
C00014,T0024
|
||||
C00014,T0026
|
||||
C00014,T0056
|
||||
C00014,T0051
|
||||
C00014,T0044
|
||||
C00014,T0045
|
||||
C00016,T0001
|
||||
C00016,T0002
|
||||
C00016,T0003
|
||||
C00016,T0027
|
||||
C00016,T0028
|
||||
C00016,T0009
|
||||
C00016,T0008
|
||||
C00016,T0007
|
||||
C00016,T0013
|
||||
C00016,T0014
|
||||
C00016,T0015
|
||||
C00016,T0016
|
||||
C00016,T0017
|
||||
C00016,T0018
|
||||
C00016,T0022
|
||||
C00016,T0021
|
||||
C00016,T0025
|
||||
C00016,T0024
|
||||
C00016,T0026
|
||||
C00016,T0044
|
||||
C00016,T0045
|
||||
C00016,T0043
|
||||
C00016,T0056
|
||||
C00016,T0051
|
||||
C00016,T0049
|
||||
C00016,T0052
|
||||
C00016,T0054
|
||||
C00016,T0053
|
||||
C00016,T0055
|
||||
C00016,T0058
|
||||
C00016,T0057
|
||||
C00017,T0001
|
||||
C00017,T0002
|
||||
C00017,T0003
|
||||
C00017,T0027
|
||||
C00017,T0028
|
||||
C00017,T0022
|
||||
C00017,T0023
|
||||
C00019,T0001
|
||||
C00019,T0002
|
||||
C00019,T0003
|
||||
C00019,T0027
|
||||
C00019,T0028
|
||||
C00019,T0022
|
||||
C00019,T0023
|
||||
C00019,T0053
|
||||
C00019,T0044
|
||||
C00019,T0052
|
||||
C00019,T0056
|
||||
C00021,T0001
|
||||
C00021,T0002
|
||||
C00021,T0003
|
||||
C00021,T0006
|
||||
C00021,T0027
|
||||
C00021,T0028
|
||||
C00021,T0022
|
||||
C00021,T0023
|
||||
C00021,T0053
|
||||
C00021,T0044
|
||||
C00024,T0001
|
||||
C00024,T0002
|
||||
C00024,T0003
|
||||
C00024,T0006
|
||||
C00024,T0027
|
||||
C00024,T0028
|
||||
C00024,T0022
|
||||
C00024,T0023
|
||||
C00024,T0053
|
||||
C00024,T0044
|
||||
C00026,T0001
|
||||
C00026,T0002
|
||||
C00027,T0001
|
||||
C00027,T0002
|
||||
C00027,T0003
|
||||
C00027,T0006
|
||||
C00027,T0027
|
||||
C00027,T0028
|
||||
C00027,T0022
|
||||
C00027,T0021
|
||||
C00027,T0023
|
||||
C00027,T0048
|
||||
C00027,T0053
|
||||
C00027,T0044
|
||||
C00027,T0039
|
||||
C00029,T0002
|
||||
C00029,T0003
|
||||
C00029,T0006
|
||||
C00029,T0027
|
||||
C00029,T0028
|
||||
C00029,T0022
|
||||
C00028,TA07
|
||||
C00028,TA08
|
||||
C00028,TA09
|
||||
C00028,TA10
|
||||
C00030,T0002
|
||||
C00030,T0003
|
||||
C00030,T0006
|
||||
C00030,T0027
|
||||
C00030,T0028
|
||||
C00030,T0022
|
||||
C00031,T0002
|
||||
C00031,T0003
|
||||
C00031,T0006
|
||||
C00031,T0027
|
||||
C00031,T0028
|
||||
C00042,T0004
|
||||
C00042,T0019
|
||||
C00042,T0022
|
||||
C00042,T0027
|
||||
C00042,T0028
|
||||
C00042,T0042
|
||||
C00042,T0044
|
||||
C00042,T0056
|
||||
C00042,T0059
|
||||
C00032,T0055
|
||||
C00034,T0009
|
||||
C00034,T0007
|
||||
C00034,T0012
|
||||
C00034,T0030
|
||||
C00036,T0005
|
||||
C00036,T0007
|
||||
C00036,T0010
|
||||
C00036,T0012
|
||||
C00036,T0030
|
||||
C00036,T0045
|
||||
C00036,T0056
|
||||
C00036,T0057
|
||||
C00040,T0007
|
||||
C00040,T0009
|
||||
C00040,T0012
|
||||
C00067,T0017
|
||||
C00067,T0061
|
||||
C00044,T0029
|
||||
C00044,T0049
|
||||
C00044,T0054
|
||||
C00044,T0053
|
||||
C00044,T0055
|
||||
C00044,T0056
|
||||
C00044,T0051
|
||||
C00044,T0050
|
||||
C00046,T0010
|
||||
C00046,T0044
|
||||
C00046,T0021
|
||||
C00046,T0022
|
||||
C00046,T0023
|
||||
C00046,T0027
|
||||
C00046,T0039
|
||||
C00046,T0045
|
||||
C00046,T0048
|
||||
C00046,T0051
|
||||
C00046,T0052
|
||||
C00046,T0053
|
||||
C00046,T0054
|
||||
C00046,T0056
|
||||
C00046,T0057
|
||||
C00046,T0060
|
||||
C00046,T0061
|
||||
C00047,T0063
|
||||
C00047,T0062
|
||||
C00048,T0010
|
||||
C00048,T0045
|
||||
C00048,T0048
|
||||
C00048,T0051
|
||||
C00048,T0052
|
||||
C00048,T0053
|
||||
C00048,T0054
|
||||
C00048,T0056
|
||||
C00048,T0057
|
||||
C00048,T0060
|
||||
C00048,T0061
|
||||
C00051,T0010
|
||||
C00051,T0012
|
||||
C00052,T0012
|
||||
C00052,T0030
|
||||
C00053,T0011
|
||||
C00053,T0030
|
||||
C00058,T0017
|
||||
C00058,T0061
|
||||
C00059,T0014
|
||||
C00060,TA07
|
||||
C00060,T0047
|
||||
C00062,TA01
|
||||
C00062,TA02
|
||||
C00062,TA15
|
||||
C00062,TA15
|
||||
C00062,TA05
|
||||
C00062,TA06
|
||||
C00062,TA07
|
||||
C00062,TA08
|
||||
C00062,TA09
|
||||
C00062,TA10
|
||||
C00062,TA11
|
||||
C00062,TA12
|
||||
C00065,T0018
|
||||
C00066,T0015
|
||||
C00066,T0055
|
||||
C00080,T0003
|
||||
C00080,T0004
|
||||
C00080,T0028
|
||||
C00080,T0022
|
||||
C00080,T0027
|
||||
C00070,T0008
|
||||
C00070,T0014
|
||||
C00070,T0015
|
||||
C00070,T0017
|
||||
C00070,T0046
|
||||
C00070,T0052
|
||||
C00070,T0055
|
||||
C00070,T0057
|
||||
C00070,T0056
|
||||
C00070,T0058
|
||||
C00071,T0019
|
||||
C00071,T0056
|
||||
C00072,T0019
|
||||
C00072,T0010
|
||||
C00072,T0044
|
||||
C00072,T0021
|
||||
C00072,T0022
|
||||
C00072,T0023
|
||||
C00072,T0027
|
||||
C00072,T0039
|
||||
C00072,T0055
|
||||
C00072,T0049
|
||||
C00073,T0016
|
||||
C00073,T0019
|
||||
C00073,T0056
|
||||
C00073,T0010
|
||||
C00073,T0021
|
||||
C00073,T0022
|
||||
C00073,T0023
|
||||
C00073,T0026
|
||||
C00073,T0025
|
||||
C00073,T0027
|
||||
C00073,T0039
|
||||
C00073,T0040
|
||||
C00073,T0044
|
||||
C00073,T0045
|
||||
C00073,T0048
|
||||
C00073,T0053
|
||||
C00073,T0056
|
||||
C00073,T0060
|
||||
C00074,T0019
|
||||
C00074,T0021
|
||||
C00074,T0022
|
||||
C00074,T0026
|
||||
C00074,T0025
|
||||
C00074,T0043
|
||||
C00074,T0050
|
||||
C00074,T0051
|
||||
C00074,T0049
|
||||
C00074,T0052
|
||||
C00074,T0053
|
||||
C00074,T0054
|
||||
C00074,T0055
|
||||
C00074,T0057
|
||||
C00074,T0061
|
||||
C00074,T0060
|
||||
C00076,T0016
|
||||
C00076,T0018
|
||||
C00076,T0039
|
||||
C00076,T0044
|
||||
C00076,T0021
|
||||
C00078,TA07
|
||||
C00078,T0044
|
||||
C00078,T0046
|
||||
C00078,T0056
|
||||
C00078,T0052
|
||||
C00078,T0060
|
||||
C00084,T0002
|
||||
C00084,T0003
|
||||
C00084,T0004
|
||||
C00084,T0028
|
||||
C00084,T0006
|
||||
C00084,T0022
|
||||
C00084,T0027
|
||||
C00084,T0059
|
||||
C00081,T0003
|
||||
C00081,T0004
|
||||
C00081,T0028
|
||||
C00081,T0006
|
||||
C00081,T0022
|
||||
C00081,T0023
|
||||
C00081,T0026
|
||||
C00081,T0027
|
||||
C00081,T0044
|
||||
C00081,T0053
|
||||
C00081,T0054
|
||||
C00081,T0055
|
||||
C00081,T0056
|
||||
C00082,T0002
|
||||
C00082,T0003
|
||||
C00082,T0004
|
||||
C00082,T0028
|
||||
C00082,T0006
|
||||
C00082,T0022
|
||||
C00082,T0023
|
||||
C00082,T0025
|
||||
C00082,T0026
|
||||
C00082,T0027
|
||||
C00082,T0044
|
||||
C00082,T0053
|
||||
C00082,T0054
|
||||
C00082,T0055
|
||||
C00082,T0056
|
||||
C00087,T0039
|
||||
C00087,T0044
|
||||
C00087,T0048
|
||||
C00087,T0050
|
||||
C00087,T0051
|
||||
C00087,T0049
|
||||
C00087,T0052
|
||||
C00087,T0054
|
||||
C00087,T0053
|
||||
C00087,T0055
|
||||
C00087,T0056
|
||||
C00085,T0008
|
||||
C00085,T0007
|
||||
C00085,T0017
|
||||
C00085,T0022
|
||||
C00085,T0021
|
||||
C00085,T0025
|
||||
C00085,T0024
|
||||
C00085,T0026
|
||||
C00085,T0045
|
||||
C00085,T0044
|
||||
C00085,T0049
|
||||
C00085,T0051
|
||||
C00085,T0052
|
||||
C00085,T0053
|
||||
C00085,T0054
|
||||
C00085,T0055
|
||||
C00085,T0056
|
||||
C00085,T0057
|
||||
C00085,T0061
|
||||
C00085,T0060
|
||||
C00086,T0044
|
||||
C00086,T0050
|
||||
C00086,T0051
|
||||
C00086,T0049
|
||||
C00086,T0054
|
||||
C00086,T0053
|
||||
C00086,T0055
|
||||
C00112,T0040
|
||||
C00112,T0042
|
||||
C00090,T0020
|
||||
C00090,T0062
|
||||
C00090,T0063
|
||||
C00091,T0062
|
||||
C00091,T0063
|
||||
C00091,T0054
|
||||
C00091,T0053
|
||||
C00091,T0049
|
||||
C00092,TA07
|
||||
C00092,TA08
|
||||
C00092,T0010
|
||||
C00092,T0023
|
||||
C00092,T0039
|
||||
C00092,T0045
|
||||
C00092,T0044
|
||||
C00092,T0054
|
||||
C00092,T0053
|
||||
C00092,T0056
|
||||
C00093,TA07
|
||||
C00093,T0010
|
||||
C00093,T0017
|
||||
C00093,T0039
|
||||
C00093,T0047
|
||||
C00093,T0048
|
||||
C00093,T0053
|
||||
C00094,T0026
|
||||
C00096,T0022
|
||||
C00096,T0027
|
||||
C00096,T0026
|
||||
C00096,T0024
|
||||
C00096,T0023
|
||||
C00096,T0025
|
||||
C00097,T0029
|
||||
C00097,T0030
|
||||
C00097,T0045
|
||||
C00097,T0009
|
||||
C00097,T0007
|
||||
C00097,T0054
|
||||
C00097,T0053
|
||||
C00098,T0038
|
||||
C00098,T0011
|
||||
C00099,T0030
|
||||
C00099,T0045
|
||||
C00099,T0009
|
||||
C00099,T0008
|
||||
C00099,T0007
|
||||
C00100,T0055
|
||||
C00101,T0029
|
||||
C00101,T0049
|
||||
C00101,T0053
|
||||
C00101,T0054
|
||||
C00103,T0029
|
||||
C00103,T0062
|
||||
C00103,T0063
|
||||
C00103,T0053
|
||||
C00105,T0016
|
||||
C00105,T0018
|
||||
C00106,T0016
|
||||
C00107,T0009
|
||||
C00107,T0008
|
||||
C00107,T0007
|
||||
C00107,T0013
|
||||
C00107,T0014
|
||||
C00107,T0015
|
||||
C00107,T0016
|
||||
C00107,T0017
|
||||
C00107,T0018
|
||||
C00107,T0021
|
||||
C00107,T0025
|
||||
C00107,T0024
|
||||
C00107,T0026
|
||||
C00107,T0045
|
||||
C00107,T0055
|
||||
C00107,T0057
|
||||
C00107,T0001
|
||||
C00107,T0022
|
||||
C00107,T0027
|
||||
C00107,T0061
|
||||
C00111,T0010
|
||||
C00118,T0044
|
||||
C00118,T0021
|
||||
C00118,T0024
|
||||
C00113,T0045
|
||||
C00114,T0039
|
||||
C00114,T0048
|
||||
C00115,T0041
|
||||
C00115,T0048
|
||||
C00115,T0052
|
||||
C00115,T0053
|
||||
C00115,T0056
|
||||
C00116,T0041
|
||||
C00117,T0046
|
||||
C00117,T0022
|
||||
C00117,T0021
|
||||
C00117,T0025
|
||||
C00117,T0024
|
||||
C00117,T0026
|
||||
C00117,T0045
|
||||
C00117,T0044
|
||||
C00117,T0060
|
||||
C00125,T0056
|
||||
C00125,T0052
|
||||
C00125,T0054
|
||||
C00125,T0053
|
||||
C00125,T0055
|
||||
C00125,T0045
|
||||
C00125,T0022
|
||||
C00125,T0027
|
||||
C00125,T0002
|
||||
C00125,T0003
|
||||
C00125,T0004
|
||||
C00125,T0010
|
||||
C00119,T0022
|
||||
C00119,T0021
|
||||
C00119,T0025
|
||||
C00119,T0024
|
||||
C00119,T0026
|
||||
C00119,T0045
|
||||
C00119,T0044
|
||||
C00119,T0060
|
||||
C00120,T0047
|
||||
C00120,T0052
|
||||
C00120,T0053
|
||||
C00120,T0054
|
||||
C00120,T0055
|
||||
C00120,T0056
|
||||
C00121,T0043
|
||||
C00122,T0008
|
||||
C00122,T0007
|
||||
C00122,T0014
|
||||
C00122,T0015
|
||||
C00122,T0016
|
||||
C00122,T0017
|
||||
C00122,T0018
|
||||
C00122,T0022
|
||||
C00122,T0021
|
||||
C00122,T0025
|
||||
C00122,T0024
|
||||
C00122,T0026
|
||||
C00122,T0045
|
||||
C00122,T0044
|
||||
C00122,T0049
|
||||
C00122,T0051
|
||||
C00122,T0052
|
||||
C00122,T0053
|
||||
C00122,T0054
|
||||
C00122,T0055
|
||||
C00122,T0056
|
||||
C00122,T0057
|
||||
C00122,T0061
|
||||
C00122,T0060
|
||||
C00123,T0029
|
||||
C00123,T0049
|
||||
C00123,T0054
|
||||
C00123,T0060
|
||||
C00124,TA08
|
||||
C00124,TA09
|
||||
C00124,T0053
|
||||
C00124,T0063
|
||||
C00211,T0027
|
||||
C00211,T0022
|
||||
C00211,T0028
|
||||
C00211,T0026
|
||||
C00211,T0021
|
||||
C00211,T0020
|
||||
C00211,T0025
|
||||
C00211,T0024
|
||||
C00211,T0026
|
||||
C00211,T0045
|
||||
C00211,T0055
|
||||
C00211,T0057
|
||||
C00126,T0056
|
||||
C00126,T0052
|
||||
C00126,T0054
|
||||
C00126,T0053
|
||||
C00126,T0055
|
||||
C00126,T0045
|
||||
C00126,T0022
|
||||
C00126,T0027
|
||||
C00126,T0002
|
||||
C00126,T0003
|
||||
C00126,T0004
|
||||
C00126,T0010
|
||||
C00126,T0057
|
||||
C00128,T0050
|
||||
C00128,T0056
|
||||
C00128,T0049
|
||||
C00128,T0052
|
||||
C00128,T0054
|
||||
C00128,T0053
|
||||
C00128,T0055
|
||||
C00128,T0057
|
||||
C00128,T0061
|
||||
C00129,T0057
|
||||
C00129,T0061
|
||||
C00129,T0014
|
||||
C00129,T0017
|
||||
C00129,T0018
|
||||
C00130,T0010
|
||||
C00131,T0049
|
||||
C00131,T0054
|
||||
C00131,T0060
|
||||
C00133,TA07
|
||||
C00133,TA09
|
||||
C00133,TA10
|
||||
C00133,T0007
|
||||
C00133,T0009
|
||||
C00133,T0045
|
||||
C00133,T0011
|
||||
C00133,T0045
|
||||
C00135,TA07
|
||||
C00135,TA09
|
||||
C00135,TA10
|
||||
C00135,T0007
|
||||
C00135,T0043
|
||||
C00136,TA08
|
||||
C00136,TA09
|
||||
C00136,TA10
|
||||
C00136,T0010
|
||||
C00136,T0020
|
||||
C00136,T0063
|
||||
C00138,T0060
|
||||
C00138,T0056
|
||||
C00140,TA05
|
||||
C00140,TA09
|
||||
C00140,TA10
|
||||
C00142,TA05
|
||||
C00142,TA09
|
||||
C00142,TA10
|
||||
C00142,TA11
|
||||
C00142,T0016
|
||||
C00143,T0060
|
||||
C00143,T0058
|
||||
C00143,T0024
|
||||
C00144,T0053
|
||||
C00147,T0060
|
||||
C00148,T0062
|
||||
C00148,T0063
|
||||
C00149,TA12
|
||||
C00149,T0020
|
||||
C00149,T0046
|
||||
C00149,T0057
|
||||
C00149,T0063
|
||||
C00153,T0008
|
||||
C00153,T0007
|
||||
C00153,T0011
|
||||
C00153,T0013
|
||||
C00153,T0014
|
||||
C00153,T0017
|
||||
C00153,T0018
|
||||
C00153,T0056
|
||||
C00153,T0049
|
||||
C00153,T0052
|
||||
C00153,T0054
|
||||
C00153,T0053
|
||||
C00153,T0058
|
||||
C00153,T0057
|
||||
C00153,T0061
|
||||
C00154,T0039
|
||||
C00154,T0048
|
||||
C00154,T0045
|
||||
C00155,T0014
|
||||
C00155,T0017
|
||||
C00156,T0022
|
||||
C00156,T0027
|
||||
C00156,T0002
|
||||
C00156,T0003
|
||||
C00156,T0004
|
||||
C00156,T0010
|
||||
C00160,T0039
|
||||
C00160,T0010
|
||||
C00160,T0048
|
||||
C00161,T0022
|
||||
C00161,T0027
|
||||
C00161,T0002
|
||||
C00161,T0003
|
||||
C00161,T0004
|
||||
C00162,T0010
|
||||
C00162,T0022
|
||||
C00162,T0027
|
||||
C00162,T0002
|
||||
C00162,T0003
|
||||
C00162,T0004
|
||||
C00162,T0039
|
||||
C00162,T0052
|
||||
C00162,T0056
|
||||
C00162,T0050
|
||||
C00164,T0022
|
||||
C00164,T0027
|
||||
C00164,T0002
|
||||
C00164,T0003
|
||||
C00164,T0004
|
||||
C00165,T0025
|
||||
C00169,T0010
|
||||
C00169,T0022
|
||||
C00169,T0027
|
||||
C00169,T0002
|
||||
C00169,T0003
|
||||
C00169,T0004
|
||||
C00169,T0039
|
||||
C00172,T0008
|
||||
C00172,T0007
|
||||
C00172,T0013
|
||||
C00174,T0001
|
||||
C00174,T0045
|
||||
C00174,T0010
|
||||
C00174,T0022
|
||||
C00174,T0027
|
||||
C00174,T0044
|
||||
C00176,T0009
|
||||
C00176,T0008
|
||||
C00176,T0007
|
||||
C00176,T0013
|
||||
C00176,T0014
|
||||
C00176,T0015
|
||||
C00176,T0016
|
||||
C00176,T0017
|
||||
C00176,T0018
|
||||
C00176,T0021
|
||||
C00176,T0025
|
||||
C00176,T0024
|
||||
C00176,T0026
|
||||
C00176,T0045
|
||||
C00176,T0043
|
||||
C00176,T0056
|
||||
C00176,T0051
|
||||
C00176,T0049
|
||||
C00176,T0052
|
||||
C00176,T0054
|
||||
C00176,T0053
|
||||
C00176,T0055
|
||||
C00176,T0058
|
||||
C00176,T0057
|
||||
C00176,T0001
|
||||
C00176,T0003
|
||||
C00176,T0010
|
||||
C00176,T0022
|
||||
C00176,T0027
|
||||
C00176,T0061
|
||||
C00178,T0016
|
||||
C00178,T0017
|
||||
C00178,T0018
|
||||
C00178,T0020
|
||||
C00182,T0011
|
||||
C00182,T0054
|
||||
C00184,T0045
|
||||
C00184,T0055
|
||||
C00184,T0039
|
||||
C00184,T0041
|
||||
C00184,T0044
|
||||
C00184,T0045
|
||||
C00184,T0010
|
||||
C00188,T0001
|
||||
C00188,T0003
|
||||
C00188,T0022
|
||||
C00188,T0027
|
||||
C00188,T0045
|
||||
C00188,T0008
|
||||
C00188,T0010
|
||||
C00188,T0039
|
||||
C00188,T0046
|
||||
C00189,T0008
|
||||
C00189,T0007
|
||||
C00189,T0011
|
||||
C00189,T0014
|
||||
C00189,T0009
|
||||
C00190,T0001
|
||||
C00190,T0003
|
||||
C00190,T0010
|
||||
C00190,T0022
|
||||
C00190,T0027
|
||||
C00190,T0025
|
||||
C00195,T0010
|
||||
C00195,T0016
|
||||
C00195,T0018
|
||||
C00195,T0022
|
||||
C00195,T0027
|
||||
C00195,T0025
|
||||
C00195,T0024
|
||||
C00195,T0026
|
||||
C00195,T0045
|
||||
C00195,T0046
|
||||
C00195,T0055
|
||||
C00197,T0009
|
||||
C00197,T0007
|
||||
C00197,T0011
|
||||
C00200,T0010
|
||||
C00200,T0027
|
||||
C00200,T0022
|
||||
C00200,T0045
|
||||
C00200,T0025
|
||||
C00202,T0025
|
||||
C00203,T0010
|
||||
C00203,T0027
|
||||
C00203,T0022
|
||||
C00203,T0028
|
||||
C00203,T0039
|
||||
C00203,T0045
|
||||
C00203,T0056
|
||||
C00203,T0052
|
||||
C00205,T0001
|
||||
C00205,T0003
|
||||
C00205,T0022
|
||||
C00205,T0025
|
||||
C00205,T0027
|
||||
C00212,T0001
|
||||
C00212,T0003
|
||||
C00212,T0010
|
||||
C00212,T0022
|
||||
C00216,T0014
|
||||
C00216,T0016
|
||||
C00216,T0017
|
||||
C00216,T0061
|
||||
C00216,T0018
|
||||
C00216,T0057
|
||||
C00219,T0024
|
||||
C00219,T0026
|
||||
C00219,T0025
|
||||
|
17
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_actortype.csv
Normal file
17
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_actortype.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,actortype_id
|
||||
F00020,A015
|
||||
F00020,A001
|
||||
F00020,A031
|
||||
F00043,A031
|
||||
F00043,A015
|
||||
F00067,A001
|
||||
F00070,A001
|
||||
F00071,A001
|
||||
F00072,A001
|
||||
F00079,A001
|
||||
F00080,A015
|
||||
F00082,A028
|
||||
F00091,A001
|
||||
F00091,A024
|
||||
F00092,A015
|
||||
F00094,A028
|
||||
|
4
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_resource.csv
Normal file
4
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_resource.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,resource_id
|
||||
F00020,R004
|
||||
F00082,R005
|
||||
F00092,R006
|
||||
|
160
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_technique.csv
Normal file
160
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_technique.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,technique_id
|
||||
F00001,All
|
||||
F00002,T0049
|
||||
F00002,T0052
|
||||
F00002,T0053
|
||||
F00002,T0054
|
||||
F00002,T0059
|
||||
F00002,T0060
|
||||
F00003,TA06
|
||||
F00003,TA08
|
||||
F00003,TA09
|
||||
F00003,T0019
|
||||
F00003,T0021
|
||||
F00004,T0057
|
||||
F00004,T0061
|
||||
F00004,T0010
|
||||
F00004,T0039
|
||||
F00005,All
|
||||
F00006,TA05
|
||||
F00006,TA07
|
||||
F00006,TA08
|
||||
F00006,TA09
|
||||
F00006,TA10
|
||||
F00006,TA11
|
||||
F00006,T0007
|
||||
F00006,T0014
|
||||
F00006,T0010
|
||||
F00006,T0019
|
||||
F00006,T0021
|
||||
F00007,All
|
||||
F00008,T0052
|
||||
F00008,T0053
|
||||
F00008,T0054
|
||||
F00008,T0060
|
||||
F00009,T0007
|
||||
F00010,T0007
|
||||
F00011,T0007
|
||||
F00012,T0007
|
||||
F00013,T0008
|
||||
F00014,T0008
|
||||
F00015,TA07
|
||||
F00015,T0007
|
||||
F00015,T0009
|
||||
F00015,T0015
|
||||
F00015,T0045
|
||||
F00015,T0057
|
||||
F00016,TA08
|
||||
F00016,TA09
|
||||
F00016,TA10
|
||||
F00016,TA11
|
||||
F00016,T0010
|
||||
F00016,T0017
|
||||
F00016,T0018
|
||||
F00016,T0029
|
||||
F00016,T0039
|
||||
F00016,T0048
|
||||
F00017,T0001
|
||||
F00017,T0039
|
||||
F00017,T0053
|
||||
F00018,T0009
|
||||
F00019,T0011
|
||||
F00020,T0011
|
||||
F00021,TA15
|
||||
F00021,TA15
|
||||
F00021,TA05
|
||||
F00021,TA06
|
||||
F00021,TA07
|
||||
F00021,TA08
|
||||
F00021,TA09
|
||||
F00021,TA10
|
||||
F00021,TA11
|
||||
F00023,T0011
|
||||
F00025,TA01
|
||||
F00025,TA02
|
||||
F00028,T0025
|
||||
F00029,TA01
|
||||
F00029,T0006
|
||||
F00029,T0019
|
||||
F00029,T0050
|
||||
F00029,T0056
|
||||
F00030,TA15
|
||||
F00030,TA15
|
||||
F00030,TA05
|
||||
F00030,TA06
|
||||
F00030,TA08
|
||||
F00030,TA09
|
||||
F00030,TA10
|
||||
F00031,TA01
|
||||
F00031,T0019
|
||||
F00031,T0056
|
||||
F00032,DUPLICATE
|
||||
F00033,T0013
|
||||
F00034,T0049
|
||||
F00035,TA01
|
||||
F00035,T0006
|
||||
F00035,T0019
|
||||
F00035,T0050
|
||||
F00035,T0056
|
||||
F00036,T0020
|
||||
F00037,TA01
|
||||
F00038,T0010
|
||||
F00038,T0039
|
||||
F00038,T0043
|
||||
F00038,T0057
|
||||
F00038,T0061
|
||||
F00039,T0024
|
||||
F00040,T0024
|
||||
F00041,T00029
|
||||
F00042,T00029
|
||||
F00043,T00030
|
||||
F00044,All
|
||||
F00045,All
|
||||
F00046,TA08
|
||||
F00051,T0009
|
||||
F00051,T0045
|
||||
F00052,All
|
||||
F00053,T0049
|
||||
F00053,T0050
|
||||
F00053,T0052
|
||||
F00053,T0053
|
||||
F00053,T0054
|
||||
F00053,T0055
|
||||
F00053,T0056
|
||||
F00058,TA07
|
||||
F00058,TA09
|
||||
F00058,TA10
|
||||
F00058,T0007
|
||||
F00058,T0009
|
||||
F00058,T0011
|
||||
F00058,T0014
|
||||
F00058,T0017
|
||||
F00058,T0018
|
||||
F00058,T0045
|
||||
F00059,All
|
||||
F00060,T0039
|
||||
F00061,All
|
||||
F00062,TA09
|
||||
F00062,T0007
|
||||
F00062,T0011
|
||||
F00064,T0011
|
||||
F00078,All
|
||||
F00079,T0029
|
||||
F00079,T0047
|
||||
F00079,T0049
|
||||
F00079,T0054
|
||||
F00079,T0055
|
||||
F00079,T0060
|
||||
F00080,T0029
|
||||
F00081,T0049
|
||||
F00081,T0050
|
||||
F00081,T0052
|
||||
F00081,T0053
|
||||
F00081,T0054
|
||||
F00081,T0055
|
||||
F00081,T0056
|
||||
F00083,T0012
|
||||
F00083,T0021
|
||||
F00093,T0011
|
||||
F00094,T0013
|
||||
F00094,T0008
|
||||
|
824
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_externalgroup_counter.csv
Normal file
824
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_externalgroup_counter.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,824 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,externalgroup_id,activity_id,summary
|
||||
GC000001,G000001,,
|
||||
GC000002,G000002,,
|
||||
GC000003,G000003,,
|
||||
GC000004,G000004,,
|
||||
GC000005,G000005,F00095,
|
||||
GC000006,G000006,,
|
||||
GC000007,G000007,,
|
||||
GC000008,G000008,,
|
||||
GC000009,G000009,F00095,
|
||||
GC000010,G000010,F00095,
|
||||
GC000011,G000011,F00095,
|
||||
GC000012,G000012,F00095,
|
||||
GC000013,G000013,F00095,
|
||||
GC000014,G000014,,
|
||||
GC000015,G000015,,
|
||||
GC000016,G000016,,
|
||||
GC000017,G000017,F00095,
|
||||
GC000018,G000018,C00205,
|
||||
GC000019,G000019,C00205,
|
||||
GC000020,G000020,,
|
||||
GC000021,G000021,F00095,
|
||||
GC000022,G000022,,
|
||||
GC000023,G000023,,
|
||||
GC000024,G000024,F00095,
|
||||
GC000025,G000025,C00073,
|
||||
GC000026,G000026,F00095,
|
||||
GC000027,G000027,F00095,
|
||||
GC000028,G000028,F00095,
|
||||
GC000029,G000029,,
|
||||
GC000030,G000030,,
|
||||
GC000031,G000031,,
|
||||
GC000032,G000032,F00095,
|
||||
GC000033,G000033,,
|
||||
GC000034,G000034,,
|
||||
GC000035,G000035,C00205,
|
||||
GC000036,G000036,,
|
||||
GC000037,G000037,,
|
||||
GC000038,G000038,,
|
||||
GC000039,G000039,,
|
||||
GC000040,G000040,,
|
||||
GC000041,G000041,F00095,
|
||||
GC000042,G000042,F00095,
|
||||
GC000043,G000043,,
|
||||
GC000044,G000044,,
|
||||
GC000045,G000045,,
|
||||
GC000046,G000046,,
|
||||
GC000047,G000047,,
|
||||
GC000048,G000048,,
|
||||
GC000049,G000049,,
|
||||
GC000050,G000050,C00073,
|
||||
GC000051,G000051,C00073,
|
||||
GC000052,G000052,C00205,
|
||||
GC000053,G000053,,
|
||||
GC000054,G000054,,
|
||||
GC000055,G000055,,
|
||||
GC000056,G000056,F00095,
|
||||
GC000057,G000057,F00095,
|
||||
GC000058,G000058,,
|
||||
GC000059,G000059,,
|
||||
GC000060,G000060,F00095,
|
||||
GC000061,G000061,,
|
||||
GC000062,G000062,,
|
||||
GC000063,G000063,,
|
||||
GC000064,G000064,,
|
||||
GC000065,G000065,,
|
||||
GC000066,G000066,,
|
||||
GC000067,G000067,,
|
||||
GC000068,G000068,,
|
||||
GC000069,G000069,C00205,
|
||||
GC000070,G000070,,
|
||||
GC000071,G000071,,
|
||||
GC000072,G000072,,
|
||||
GC000073,G000073,,
|
||||
GC000074,G000074,,
|
||||
GC000075,G000075,F00095,
|
||||
GC000076,G000076,,
|
||||
GC000077,G000077,,
|
||||
GC000078,G000078,,
|
||||
GC000079,G000079,,
|
||||
GC000080,G000080,,
|
||||
GC000081,G000081,,
|
||||
GC000082,G000082,,
|
||||
GC000083,G000083,,
|
||||
GC000084,G000084,,
|
||||
GC000085,G000085,F00095,
|
||||
GC000086,G000086,,
|
||||
GC000087,G000087,C00205,
|
||||
GC000088,G000088,,
|
||||
GC000089,G000089,,
|
||||
GC000090,G000090,,
|
||||
GC000091,G000091,,
|
||||
GC000092,G000092,,
|
||||
GC000093,G000093,C00205,
|
||||
GC000094,G000094,,
|
||||
GC000095,G000095,,
|
||||
GC000096,G000096,C00205,
|
||||
GC000097,G000097,,
|
||||
GC000098,G000098,,
|
||||
GC000099,G000099,,
|
||||
GC000100,G000100,,
|
||||
GC000101,G000101,C00205,
|
||||
GC000102,G000102,,
|
||||
GC000103,G000103,,
|
||||
GC000104,G000104,,
|
||||
GC000105,G000105,F00095,
|
||||
GC000106,G000106,,
|
||||
GC000107,G000107,F00095,
|
||||
GC000108,G000108,F00095,
|
||||
GC000109,G000109,,
|
||||
GC000110,G000110,,
|
||||
GC000111,G000111,F00095,
|
||||
GC000112,G000112,C00073,
|
||||
GC000113,G000113,F00095,
|
||||
GC000114,G000114,,
|
||||
GC000115,G000115,F00095,
|
||||
GC000116,G000116,,
|
||||
GC000117,G000117,C00073,
|
||||
GC000118,G000118,,
|
||||
GC000119,G000119,,
|
||||
GC000120,G000120,,
|
||||
GC000121,G000121,,
|
||||
GC000122,G000122,C00205,
|
||||
GC000123,G000123,,
|
||||
GC000124,G000124,C00205,
|
||||
GC000125,G000125,,
|
||||
GC000126,G000126,,
|
||||
GC000127,G000127,,
|
||||
GC000128,G000128,C00073,
|
||||
GC000129,G000129,F00095,
|
||||
GC000130,G000130,,
|
||||
GC000131,G000131,F00095,
|
||||
GC000132,G000132,,
|
||||
GC000133,G000133,,
|
||||
GC000134,G000134,,
|
||||
GC000135,G000135,,
|
||||
GC000136,G000136,,
|
||||
GC000137,G000137,,
|
||||
GC000138,G000138,F00095,
|
||||
GC000139,G000139,,
|
||||
GC000140,G000140,F00095,
|
||||
GC000141,G000141,F00095,
|
||||
GC000142,G000142,F00095,
|
||||
GC000143,G000143,,
|
||||
GC000144,G000144,F00095,
|
||||
GC000145,G000145,,
|
||||
GC000146,G000146,,
|
||||
GC000147,G000147,F00095,
|
||||
GC000148,G000148,,
|
||||
GC000149,G000149,,
|
||||
GC000150,G000150,,
|
||||
GC000151,G000151,,
|
||||
GC000152,G000152,,
|
||||
GC000153,G000153,,
|
||||
GC000154,G000154,,
|
||||
GC000155,G000155,,
|
||||
GC000156,G000156,,
|
||||
GC000157,G000157,,
|
||||
GC000158,G000158,,
|
||||
GC000159,G000159,,
|
||||
GC000160,G000160,,
|
||||
GC000161,G000161,C00188,
|
||||
GC000162,G000162,,
|
||||
GC000163,G000163,,
|
||||
GC000164,G000164,,
|
||||
GC000165,G000165,,
|
||||
GC000166,G000166,F00095,
|
||||
GC000167,G000167,,
|
||||
GC000168,G000168,,
|
||||
GC000169,G000169,,
|
||||
GC000170,G000170,,
|
||||
GC000171,G000171,,
|
||||
GC000172,G000172,,
|
||||
GC000173,G000173,,
|
||||
GC000174,G000174,,
|
||||
GC000175,G000175,F00095,
|
||||
GC000176,G000176,,
|
||||
GC000177,G000177,,
|
||||
GC000178,G000178,,
|
||||
GC000179,G000179,,
|
||||
GC000180,G000180,,
|
||||
GC000181,G000181,,
|
||||
GC000182,G000182,,
|
||||
GC000183,G000183,,
|
||||
GC000184,G000184,,
|
||||
GC000185,G000185,F00095,
|
||||
GC000186,G000186,,
|
||||
GC000187,G000187,,
|
||||
GC000188,G000188,,
|
||||
GC000189,G000189,F00095,
|
||||
GC000190,G000190,F00095,
|
||||
GC000191,G000191,,
|
||||
GC000192,G000192,,
|
||||
GC000193,G000193,F00095,
|
||||
GC000194,G000194,F00095,
|
||||
GC000195,G000195,,
|
||||
GC000196,G000196,,
|
||||
GC000197,G000197,,
|
||||
GC000198,G000198,C00205,
|
||||
GC000199,G000199,,
|
||||
GC000200,G000200,,
|
||||
GC000201,G000201,,
|
||||
GC000202,G000202,F00095,
|
||||
GC000203,G000203,C00073,
|
||||
GC000204,G000204,C00011,
|
||||
GC000205,G000205,F00095,
|
||||
GC000206,G000206,,
|
||||
GC000207,G000207,,
|
||||
GC000208,G000208,,
|
||||
GC000209,G000209,,
|
||||
GC000210,G000210,C00073,
|
||||
GC000211,G000211,F00095,
|
||||
GC000212,G000212,,
|
||||
GC000213,G000213,C00205,
|
||||
GC000214,G000214,,
|
||||
GC000215,G000215,F00095,
|
||||
GC000216,G000216,,
|
||||
GC000217,G000217,,
|
||||
GC000218,G000218,,
|
||||
GC000219,G000219,F00095,
|
||||
GC000220,G000220,,
|
||||
GC000221,G000221,,
|
||||
GC000222,G000222,,
|
||||
GC000223,G000223,F00095,
|
||||
GC000224,G000224,,
|
||||
GC000225,G000225,F00095,
|
||||
GC000226,G000226,,
|
||||
GC000227,G000227,F00095,
|
||||
GC000228,G000228,,
|
||||
GC000229,G000229,,
|
||||
GC000230,G000230,,
|
||||
GC000231,G000231,,
|
||||
GC000232,G000232,,
|
||||
GC000233,G000233,,
|
||||
GC000234,G000234,,
|
||||
GC000235,G000235,,
|
||||
GC000236,G000236,,
|
||||
GC000237,G000237,,
|
||||
GC000238,G000238,,
|
||||
GC000239,G000239,,
|
||||
GC000240,G000240,,
|
||||
GC000241,G000241,,
|
||||
GC000242,G000242,,
|
||||
GC000243,G000243,F00095,
|
||||
GC000244,G000244,,
|
||||
GC000245,G000245,,
|
||||
GC000246,G000246,,
|
||||
GC000247,G000247,,
|
||||
GC000248,G000248,,
|
||||
GC000249,G000249,,
|
||||
GC000250,G000250,,
|
||||
GC000251,G000251,F00095,
|
||||
GC000252,G000252,,
|
||||
GC000253,G000253,,
|
||||
GC000254,G000254,,
|
||||
GC000255,G000255,F00095,
|
||||
GC000256,G000256,,
|
||||
GC000257,G000257,F00095,
|
||||
GC000258,G000258,F00095,
|
||||
GC000259,G000259,F00095,
|
||||
GC000260,G000260,F00095,
|
||||
GC000261,G000261,F00095,
|
||||
GC000262,G000262,F00095,
|
||||
GC000263,G000263,,
|
||||
GC000264,G000264,F00095,
|
||||
GC000265,G000265,,
|
||||
GC000266,G000266,C00011,
|
||||
GC000267,G000267,F00095,
|
||||
GC000268,G000268,F00095,
|
||||
GC000269,G000269,F00095,
|
||||
GC000270,G000270,,
|
||||
GC000271,G000271,,
|
||||
GC000272,G000272,F00095,
|
||||
GC000273,G000273,F00095,
|
||||
GC000274,G000274,F00095,
|
||||
GC000275,G000275,,
|
||||
GC000276,G000276,,
|
||||
GC000277,G000277,F00095,
|
||||
GC000278,G000278,,
|
||||
GC000279,G000279,,
|
||||
GC000280,G000280,,
|
||||
GC000281,G000281,,
|
||||
GC000282,G000282,,
|
||||
GC000283,G000283,,
|
||||
GC000284,G000284,,
|
||||
GC000285,G000285,,
|
||||
GC000286,G000286,,
|
||||
GC000287,G000287,F00095,
|
||||
GC000288,G000288,F00095,
|
||||
GC000289,G000289,,
|
||||
GC000290,G000290,,
|
||||
GC000291,G000291,,
|
||||
GC000292,G000292,,
|
||||
GC000293,G000293,,
|
||||
GC000294,G000294,,
|
||||
GC000295,G000295,,
|
||||
GC000296,G000296,,
|
||||
GC000297,G000297,,
|
||||
GC000298,G000298,,
|
||||
GC000299,G000299,F00095,
|
||||
GC000300,G000300,,
|
||||
GC000301,G000301,F00095,
|
||||
GC000302,G000302,,
|
||||
GC000303,G000303,,
|
||||
GC000304,G000304,C00073,
|
||||
GC000305,G000305,,
|
||||
GC000306,G000306,,
|
||||
GC000307,G000307,,
|
||||
GC000308,G000308,,
|
||||
GC000309,G000309,,
|
||||
GC000310,G000310,C00205,
|
||||
GC000311,G000311,,
|
||||
GC000312,G000312,C00011,
|
||||
GC000313,G000313,,
|
||||
GC000314,G000314,,
|
||||
GC000315,G000315,,
|
||||
GC000316,G000316,,
|
||||
GC000317,G000317,F00095,
|
||||
GC000318,G000318,,
|
||||
GC000319,G000319,,
|
||||
GC000320,G000320,F00095,
|
||||
GC000321,G000321,,
|
||||
GC000322,G000322,F00095,
|
||||
GC000323,G000323,C00011,
|
||||
GC000324,G000324,,
|
||||
GC000325,G000325,,
|
||||
GC000326,G000326,F00095,
|
||||
GC000327,G000327,,
|
||||
GC000328,G000328,,
|
||||
GC000329,G000329,,
|
||||
GC000330,G000330,,
|
||||
GC000331,G000331,F00095,
|
||||
GC000332,G000332,,
|
||||
GC000333,G000333,,
|
||||
GC000334,G000334,,
|
||||
GC000335,G000335,,
|
||||
GC000336,G000336,,
|
||||
GC000337,G000337,,
|
||||
GC000338,G000338,,
|
||||
GC000339,G000339,,
|
||||
GC000340,G000340,,
|
||||
GC000341,G000341,,
|
||||
GC000342,G000342,,
|
||||
GC000343,G000343,,
|
||||
GC000344,G000344,,
|
||||
GC000345,G000345,,
|
||||
GC000346,G000346,,
|
||||
GC000347,G000347,,
|
||||
GC000348,G000348,,
|
||||
GC000349,G000349,,
|
||||
GC000350,G000350,,
|
||||
GC000351,G000351,,
|
||||
GC000352,G000352,F00095,
|
||||
GC000353,G000353,F00095,
|
||||
GC000354,G000354,,
|
||||
GC000355,G000355,F00095,
|
||||
GC000356,G000356,,
|
||||
GC000357,G000357,,
|
||||
GC000358,G000358,,
|
||||
GC000359,G000359,F00095,
|
||||
GC000360,G000360,,
|
||||
GC000361,G000361,,
|
||||
GC000362,G000362,,
|
||||
GC000363,G000363,,
|
||||
GC000364,G000364,,
|
||||
GC000365,G000365,,
|
||||
GC000366,G000366,,
|
||||
GC000367,G000367,,
|
||||
GC000368,G000368,F00095,
|
||||
GC000369,G000369,F00095,
|
||||
GC000370,G000370,,
|
||||
GC000371,G000371,,
|
||||
GC000372,G000372,,
|
||||
GC000373,G000373,,
|
||||
GC000374,G000374,,
|
||||
GC000375,G000375,,
|
||||
GC000376,G000376,,
|
||||
GC000377,G000377,,
|
||||
GC000378,G000378,,
|
||||
GC000379,G000379,,
|
||||
GC000380,G000380,,
|
||||
GC000381,G000381,,
|
||||
GC000382,G000382,C00205,
|
||||
GC000383,G000383,,
|
||||
GC000384,G000384,F00095,
|
||||
GC000385,G000385,,
|
||||
GC000386,G000386,C00205,
|
||||
GC000387,G000387,C00205,
|
||||
GC000388,G000388,,
|
||||
GC000389,G000389,,
|
||||
GC000390,G000390,,
|
||||
GC000391,G000391,,
|
||||
GC000392,G000392,,
|
||||
GC000393,G000393,F00095,
|
||||
GC000394,G000394,F00095,
|
||||
GC000395,G000395,,
|
||||
GC000396,G000396,F00095,
|
||||
GC000397,G000397,,
|
||||
GC000398,G000398,,
|
||||
GC000399,G000399,,
|
||||
GC000400,G000400,F00095,
|
||||
GC000401,G000401,F00095,
|
||||
GC000402,G000402,,
|
||||
GC000403,G000403,F00095,
|
||||
GC000404,G000404,C00205,
|
||||
GC000405,G000405,,
|
||||
GC000406,G000406,F00095,
|
||||
GC000407,G000407,,
|
||||
GC000408,G000408,,
|
||||
GC000409,G000409,,
|
||||
GC000410,G000410,,
|
||||
GC000411,G000411,,
|
||||
GC000412,G000412,,
|
||||
GC000413,G000413,,
|
||||
GC000414,G000414,,
|
||||
GC000415,G000415,,
|
||||
GC000416,G000416,,
|
||||
GC000417,G000417,F00095,
|
||||
GC000418,G000418,F00095,
|
||||
GC000419,G000419,F00095,
|
||||
GC000420,G000420,,
|
||||
GC000421,G000421,F00095,
|
||||
GC000422,G000422,,
|
||||
GC000423,G000423,,
|
||||
GC000424,G000424,F00095,
|
||||
GC000425,G000425,F00095,
|
||||
GC000426,G000426,,
|
||||
GC000427,G000427,F00095,
|
||||
GC000428,G000428,,
|
||||
GC000429,G000429,F00095,
|
||||
GC000430,G000430,C00073,
|
||||
GC000431,G000431,,
|
||||
GC000432,G000432,,
|
||||
GC000433,G000433,,
|
||||
GC000434,G000434,,
|
||||
GC000435,G000435,,
|
||||
GC000436,G000436,,
|
||||
GC000437,G000437,,
|
||||
GC000438,G000438,,
|
||||
GC000439,G000439,,
|
||||
GC000440,G000440,,
|
||||
GC000441,G000441,,
|
||||
GC000442,G000442,F00095,
|
||||
GC000443,G000443,,
|
||||
GC000444,G000444,F00095,
|
||||
GC000445,G000445,F00095,
|
||||
GC000446,G000446,,
|
||||
GC000447,G000447,,
|
||||
GC000448,G000448,C00011,
|
||||
GC000449,G000449,,
|
||||
GC000450,G000450,,
|
||||
GC000451,G000451,F00095,
|
||||
GC000452,G000452,C00205,
|
||||
GC000453,G000453,,
|
||||
GC000454,G000454,F00095,
|
||||
GC000455,G000455,,
|
||||
GC000456,G000456,,
|
||||
GC000457,G000457,F00095,
|
||||
GC000458,G000458,F00095,
|
||||
GC000459,G000459,,
|
||||
GC000460,G000460,,
|
||||
GC000461,G000461,,
|
||||
GC000462,G000462,F00095,
|
||||
GC000463,G000463,,
|
||||
GC000464,G000464,F00095,
|
||||
GC000465,G000465,,
|
||||
GC000466,G000466,,
|
||||
GC000467,G000467,,
|
||||
GC000468,G000468,F00095,
|
||||
GC000469,G000469,,
|
||||
GC000470,G000470,F00095,
|
||||
GC000471,G000471,,
|
||||
GC000472,G000472,,
|
||||
GC000473,G000473,,
|
||||
GC000474,G000474,F00095,
|
||||
GC000475,G000475,C00073,
|
||||
GC000476,G000476,,
|
||||
GC000477,G000477,,
|
||||
GC000478,G000478,,
|
||||
GC000479,G000479,,
|
||||
GC000480,G000480,,
|
||||
GC000481,G000481,,
|
||||
GC000482,G000482,,
|
||||
GC000483,G000483,,
|
||||
GC000484,G000484,,
|
||||
GC000485,G000485,,
|
||||
GC000486,G000486,F00095,
|
||||
GC000487,G000487,,
|
||||
GC000488,G000488,,
|
||||
GC000489,G000489,,
|
||||
GC000490,G000490,F00095,
|
||||
GC000491,G000491,,
|
||||
GC000492,G000492,,
|
||||
GC000493,G000493,,
|
||||
GC000494,G000494,,
|
||||
GC000495,G000495,,
|
||||
GC000496,G000496,,
|
||||
GC000497,G000497,,
|
||||
GC000498,G000498,,
|
||||
GC000499,G000499,,
|
||||
GC000500,G000500,C00205,
|
||||
GC000501,G000501,,
|
||||
GC000502,G000502,,
|
||||
GC000503,G000503,,
|
||||
GC000504,G000504,,
|
||||
GC000505,G000505,,
|
||||
GC000506,G000506,,
|
||||
GC000507,G000507,,
|
||||
GC000508,G000508,,
|
||||
GC000509,G000509,,
|
||||
GC000510,G000510,,
|
||||
GC000511,G000511,F00095,
|
||||
GC000512,G000512,F00095,
|
||||
GC000513,G000513,,
|
||||
GC000514,G000514,F00095,
|
||||
GC000515,G000515,,
|
||||
GC000516,G000516,F00095,
|
||||
GC000517,G000517,F00095,
|
||||
GC000518,G000518,,
|
||||
GC000519,G000519,,
|
||||
GC000520,G000520,,
|
||||
GC000521,G000521,F00095,
|
||||
GC000522,G000522,F00095,
|
||||
GC000523,G000523,,
|
||||
GC000524,G000524,,
|
||||
GC000525,G000525,F00095,
|
||||
GC000526,G000526,,
|
||||
GC000527,G000527,,
|
||||
GC000528,G000528,,
|
||||
GC000529,G000529,F00095,
|
||||
GC000530,G000530,,
|
||||
GC000531,G000531,,
|
||||
GC000532,G000532,F00095,
|
||||
GC000533,G000533,,
|
||||
GC000534,G000534,,
|
||||
GC000535,G000535,,
|
||||
GC000536,G000536,,
|
||||
GC000537,G000537,,
|
||||
GC000538,G000538,,
|
||||
GC000539,G000539,F00095,
|
||||
GC000540,G000540,,
|
||||
GC000541,G000541,F00095,
|
||||
GC000542,G000542,,
|
||||
GC000543,G000543,F00095,
|
||||
GC000544,G000544,,
|
||||
GC000545,G000545,F00095,
|
||||
GC000546,G000546,,
|
||||
GC000547,G000547,,
|
||||
GC000548,G000548,,
|
||||
GC000549,G000549,,
|
||||
GC000550,G000550,,
|
||||
GC000551,G000551,,
|
||||
GC000552,G000552,,
|
||||
GC000553,G000553,F00095,
|
||||
GC000554,G000554,F00095,
|
||||
GC000555,G000555,,
|
||||
GC000556,G000556,,
|
||||
GC000557,G000557,F00095,
|
||||
GC000558,G000558,,
|
||||
GC000559,G000559,,
|
||||
GC000560,G000560,,
|
||||
GC000561,G000561,,
|
||||
GC000562,G000562,F00095,
|
||||
GC000563,G000563,,
|
||||
GC000564,G000564,C00205,
|
||||
GC000565,G000565,,
|
||||
GC000566,G000566,F00095,
|
||||
GC000567,G000567,C00073,
|
||||
GC000568,G000568,,
|
||||
GC000569,G000569,F00095,
|
||||
GC000570,G000570,,
|
||||
GC000571,G000571,,
|
||||
GC000572,G000572,,
|
||||
GC000573,G000573,,
|
||||
GC000574,G000574,,
|
||||
GC000575,G000575,,
|
||||
GC000576,G000576,F00095,
|
||||
GC000577,G000577,,
|
||||
GC000578,G000578,F00095,
|
||||
GC000579,G000579,,
|
||||
GC000580,G000580,F00095,
|
||||
GC000581,G000581,C00011,
|
||||
GC000582,G000582,F00095,
|
||||
GC000583,G000583,,
|
||||
GC000584,G000584,,
|
||||
GC000585,G000585,,
|
||||
GC000586,G000586,,
|
||||
GC000587,G000587,,
|
||||
GC000588,G000588,C00073,
|
||||
GC000589,G000589,,
|
||||
GC000590,G000590,,
|
||||
GC000591,G000591,F00095,
|
||||
GC000592,G000592,,
|
||||
GC000593,G000593,,
|
||||
GC000594,G000594,,
|
||||
GC000595,G000595,,
|
||||
GC000596,G000596,,
|
||||
GC000597,G000597,,
|
||||
GC000598,G000598,,
|
||||
GC000599,G000599,F00095,
|
||||
GC000600,G000600,F00095,
|
||||
GC000601,G000601,F00095,
|
||||
GC000602,G000602,,
|
||||
GC000603,G000603,,
|
||||
GC000604,G000604,F00095,
|
||||
GC000605,G000605,C00080,
|
||||
GC000606,G000606,,
|
||||
GC000607,G000607,F00095,
|
||||
GC000608,G000608,,
|
||||
GC000609,G000609,F00095,
|
||||
GC000610,G000610,F00095,
|
||||
GC000611,G000611,F00095,
|
||||
GC000612,G000612,,
|
||||
GC000613,G000613,C00073,
|
||||
GC000614,G000614,,
|
||||
GC000615,G000615,,
|
||||
GC000616,G000616,,
|
||||
GC000617,G000617,F00095,
|
||||
GC000618,G000618,,
|
||||
GC000619,G000619,,
|
||||
GC000620,G000620,,
|
||||
GC000621,G000621,F00095,
|
||||
GC000622,G000622,,
|
||||
GC000623,G000623,,
|
||||
GC000624,G000624,,
|
||||
GC000625,G000625,,
|
||||
GC000626,G000626,,
|
||||
GC000627,G000627,,
|
||||
GC000628,G000628,F00095,
|
||||
GC000629,G000629,,
|
||||
GC000630,G000630,F00095,
|
||||
GC000631,G000631,,
|
||||
GC000632,G000632,F00095,
|
||||
GC000633,G000633,,
|
||||
GC000634,G000634,,
|
||||
GC000635,G000635,,
|
||||
GC000636,G000636,,
|
||||
GC000637,G000637,C00073,
|
||||
GC000638,G000638,,
|
||||
GC000639,G000639,,
|
||||
GC000640,G000640,,
|
||||
GC000641,G000641,,
|
||||
GC000642,G000642,F00095,
|
||||
GC000643,G000643,,
|
||||
GC000644,G000644,,
|
||||
GC000645,G000645,,
|
||||
GC000646,G000646,F00095,
|
||||
GC000647,G000647,,
|
||||
GC000648,G000648,F00095,
|
||||
GC000649,G000649,,
|
||||
GC000650,G000650,,
|
||||
GC000651,G000651,,
|
||||
GC000652,G000652,,
|
||||
GC000653,G000653,,
|
||||
GC000654,G000654,,
|
||||
GC000655,G000655,,
|
||||
GC000656,G000656,,
|
||||
GC000657,G000657,,
|
||||
GC000658,G000658,,
|
||||
GC000659,G000659,,
|
||||
GC000660,G000660,,
|
||||
GC000661,G000661,,
|
||||
GC000662,G000662,,
|
||||
GC000663,G000663,,
|
||||
GC000664,G000664,,
|
||||
GC000665,G000665,,
|
||||
GC000666,G000666,,
|
||||
GC000667,G000667,F00095,
|
||||
GC000668,G000668,,
|
||||
GC000669,G000669,,
|
||||
GC000670,G000670,C00073,
|
||||
GC000671,G000671,,
|
||||
GC000672,G000672,,
|
||||
GC000673,G000673,F00095,
|
||||
GC000674,G000674,,
|
||||
GC000675,G000675,,
|
||||
GC000676,G000676,,
|
||||
GC000677,G000677,,
|
||||
GC000678,G000678,F00095,
|
||||
GC000679,G000679,,
|
||||
GC000680,G000680,,
|
||||
GC000681,G000681,,
|
||||
GC000682,G000682,,
|
||||
GC000683,G000683,,
|
||||
GC000684,G000684,,
|
||||
GC000685,G000685,F00095,
|
||||
GC000686,G000686,,
|
||||
GC000687,G000687,,
|
||||
GC000688,G000688,,
|
||||
GC000689,G000689,F00095,
|
||||
GC000690,G000690,,
|
||||
GC000691,G000691,,
|
||||
GC000692,G000692,,
|
||||
GC000693,G000693,C00011,
|
||||
GC000694,G000694,C00205,
|
||||
GC000695,G000695,C00011,
|
||||
GC000696,G000696,,
|
||||
GC000697,G000697,,
|
||||
GC000698,G000698,,
|
||||
GC000699,G000699,,
|
||||
GC000700,G000700,,
|
||||
GC000701,G000701,,
|
||||
GC000702,G000702,F00095,
|
||||
GC000703,G000703,F00095,
|
||||
GC000704,G000704,,
|
||||
GC000705,G000705,,
|
||||
GC000706,G000706,,
|
||||
GC000707,G000707,,
|
||||
GC000708,G000708,,
|
||||
GC000709,G000709,,
|
||||
GC000710,G000710,F00095,
|
||||
GC000711,G000711,,
|
||||
GC000712,G000712,,
|
||||
GC000713,G000713,C00011,
|
||||
GC000714,G000714,,
|
||||
GC000715,G000715,,
|
||||
GC000716,G000716,,
|
||||
GC000717,G000717,F00095,
|
||||
GC000718,G000718,,
|
||||
GC000719,G000719,,
|
||||
GC000720,G000720,F00095,
|
||||
GC000721,G000721,,
|
||||
GC000722,G000722,,
|
||||
GC000723,G000723,,
|
||||
GC000724,G000724,,
|
||||
GC000725,G000725,,
|
||||
GC000726,G000726,,
|
||||
GC000727,G000727,,
|
||||
GC000728,G000728,,
|
||||
GC000729,G000729,,
|
||||
GC000730,G000730,,
|
||||
GC000731,G000731,,
|
||||
GC000732,G000732,,
|
||||
GC000733,G000733,,
|
||||
GC000734,G000734,,
|
||||
GC000735,G000735,,
|
||||
GC000736,G000736,,
|
||||
GC000737,G000737,,
|
||||
GC000738,G000738,,
|
||||
GC000739,G000739,,
|
||||
GC000740,G000740,,
|
||||
GC000741,G000741,,
|
||||
GC000742,G000742,,
|
||||
GC000743,G000743,,
|
||||
GC000744,G000744,,
|
||||
GC000745,G000745,,
|
||||
GC000746,G000746,,
|
||||
GC000747,G000747,,
|
||||
GC000748,G000748,,
|
||||
GC000749,G000749,,
|
||||
GC000750,G000750,,
|
||||
GC000751,G000751,,
|
||||
GC000752,G000752,,
|
||||
GC000753,G000753,,
|
||||
GC000754,G000754,,
|
||||
GC000755,G000755,,
|
||||
GC000756,G000756,,
|
||||
GC000757,G000757,,
|
||||
GC000758,G000758,,
|
||||
GC000759,G000759,,
|
||||
GC000760,G000760,,
|
||||
GC000761,G000761,,
|
||||
GC000762,G000762,,
|
||||
GC000763,G000763,,
|
||||
GC000764,G000764,F00095,
|
||||
GC000765,G000765,,
|
||||
GC000766,G000766,,
|
||||
GC000767,G000767,,
|
||||
GC000768,G000768,,
|
||||
GC000769,G000769,,
|
||||
GC000770,G000770,,
|
||||
GC000771,G000771,,
|
||||
GC000772,G000772,,
|
||||
GC000773,G000773,,
|
||||
GC000774,G000774,,
|
||||
GC000775,G000775,,
|
||||
GC000776,G000776,,
|
||||
GC000777,G000777,,
|
||||
GC000778,G000778,,
|
||||
GC000779,G000779,,
|
||||
GC000780,G000780,F00095,
|
||||
GC000781,G000781,,
|
||||
GC000782,G000782,,
|
||||
GC000783,G000783,F00095,
|
||||
GC000784,G000784,,
|
||||
GC000785,G000785,,
|
||||
GC000786,G000786,,
|
||||
GC000787,G000787,,
|
||||
GC000788,G000788,F00095,
|
||||
GC000789,G000789,F00095,
|
||||
GC000790,G000790,F00095,
|
||||
GC000791,G000791,F00095,
|
||||
GC000792,G000792,,
|
||||
GC000793,G000793,,
|
||||
GC000794,G000794,F00095,
|
||||
GC000795,G000795,,
|
||||
GC000796,G000796,F00095,
|
||||
GC000797,G000797,,
|
||||
GC000798,G000798,F00095,
|
||||
GC000799,G000799,,
|
||||
GC000800,G000800,,
|
||||
GC000801,G000801,,
|
||||
GC000802,G000802,,
|
||||
GC000803,G000803,,
|
||||
GC000804,G000804,,
|
||||
GC000805,G000805,,
|
||||
GC000806,G000806,,
|
||||
GC000807,G000807,,
|
||||
GC000808,G000808,,
|
||||
GC000809,G000809,,
|
||||
GC000810,G000810,,
|
||||
GC000811,G000811,,
|
||||
GC000812,G000812,F00095,
|
||||
GC000813,G000813,,
|
||||
GC000814,G000814,,
|
||||
GC000815,G000815,,
|
||||
GC000816,G000816,,
|
||||
GC000817,G000817,,
|
||||
GC000818,G000818,,
|
||||
GC000819,G000819,,
|
||||
GC000820,G000820,C00073,
|
||||
GC000821,G000821,,
|
||||
GC000822,G000822,,
|
||||
GC000823,G000823,F00095,
|
||||
|
214
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_incident_technique.csv
Normal file
214
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_incident_technique.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,incident_id,technique_ids,summary
|
||||
IT00000001,buy FB targeted ads,I00002,T0018,
|
||||
IT00000002,"Promote ""funding"" campaign",I00002,T0017,
|
||||
IT00000003,create web-site - information pollution,I00002,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000004,create web-site - information pollution,I00002,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000005,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00002,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000006,legacy web content,I00002,T0058,
|
||||
IT00000007,hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit TOS,I00002,T0058,
|
||||
IT00000008,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00005,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000009,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00005,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000010,Targeted FB paid ads,I00005,T0018,
|
||||
IT00000011,Fake FB groups + dark content,I00005,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000012,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events?",I00005,T0057,
|
||||
IT00000013,"manipulate social media ""online polls""? ",I00005,T0029,
|
||||
IT00000014,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00005,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000015,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00005,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000016,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00005,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000017,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000018,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000019,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0034,
|
||||
IT00000020,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0035,
|
||||
IT00000021,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0036,
|
||||
IT00000022,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00005,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000023,"Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fear, outrage, conspiracy narratives",I00005,T0021,Meme that ISIS was responsible for a local chemical explosion.
|
||||
IT00000024,Backstop personas,I00005,T0030,"Wikipedia fake persona ""AmandaGray91"". "
|
||||
IT00000025,Use SMS/text messages,I00006,T0043,SMS messages sent to local residents
|
||||
IT00000026,Fake video/images,I00006,T0024,Fake youtube video of ISIS claiming responsibility for the chemical attack. Faked screenshot of local newspaper website article on the explosion.
|
||||
IT00000027,Create and use hashtag,I00006,T0015,Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals
|
||||
IT00000028,Create and use hashtag,I00006,T0055,Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals
|
||||
IT00000029,Fake twitter profiles to amplify,I00006,T0007,Twitter bots used to drive visbility
|
||||
IT00000030,bait journalists/media/politicians,I00006,T0039,
|
||||
IT00000031,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (report an unreported false story/event),I00007,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000032,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (report an unreported false story/event),I00007,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000033,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (in the case Paul Manafort)",I00007,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000034,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00007,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000035,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00007,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000036,"Using ""expert""",I00009,T0045,
|
||||
IT00000037,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution ,I00009,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000038,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution ,I00009,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000039,FB pages,I00009,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000040,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00009,T0052,
|
||||
IT00000041,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00010,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000042,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00010,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000043,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00010,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000044,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories; false flags, crisis actors)",I00010,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000045,FB pages/groups/profiles,I00010,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000046,YouTube; Reddit,I00010,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000047,YouTube; Reddit,I00010,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000048,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00010,T0020,
|
||||
IT00000049,journalist/media baiting,I00010,T0039,
|
||||
IT00000050,Forge ('release' altered hacked documents),I00015,T0025,
|
||||
IT00000051,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00015,T0025,
|
||||
IT00000052,"Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly",I00015,T0044,
|
||||
IT00000053,journalist/media baiting,I00015,T0039,
|
||||
IT00000054,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00017,T0025,
|
||||
IT00000055,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00017,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000056,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00017,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000057,Targeted FB paid ads,I00017,T0018,
|
||||
IT00000058,Fake FB groups + dark content,I00017,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000059,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events",I00017,T0057,
|
||||
IT00000060,"manipulate social media ""online polls""? ",I00017,T0029,
|
||||
IT00000061,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00017,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000062,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00017,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000063,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00017,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000064,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000065,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000066,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0033,
|
||||
IT00000067,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0034,
|
||||
IT00000068,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0035,
|
||||
IT00000069,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0036,
|
||||
IT00000070,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00017,T0020,
|
||||
IT00000071,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00017,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000072,"Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fear, outrage, conspiracy narratives",I00017,T0021,
|
||||
IT00000073,Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (ie: Denver Guardian; Macedonian teens),I00017,T0016,
|
||||
IT00000074,Backstop personas,I00017,T0030,
|
||||
IT00000075,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00022,T0025,
|
||||
IT00000076,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00022,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000077,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00022,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000078,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content,I00022,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000079,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00029,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000080,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00029,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000081,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00029,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000082,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00029,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000083,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00029,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000084,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00029,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000085,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00029,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000086,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00029,T0052,
|
||||
IT00000087,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00029,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000088,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00029,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000089,Demand insurmountable proof,I00029,T0040,
|
||||
IT00000090,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00032,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000091,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00032,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000092,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles ,I00032,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000093,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events?",I00032,T0057,
|
||||
IT00000094,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00032,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000095,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00032,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000096,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000097,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000098,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0033,
|
||||
IT00000099,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0034,
|
||||
IT00000100,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0035,
|
||||
IT00000101,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0036,
|
||||
IT00000102,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00032,T0020,
|
||||
IT00000103,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00032,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000104,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories)",I00032,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000105,"2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/sponsored astroturfing",I00033,T0049,
|
||||
IT00000106,fabricated social media comment,I00033,T0051,
|
||||
IT00000107,domestic social media influence operations focus primarily on “cheerleading” or presenting or furthering a positive narrative about the Chinese state,I00033,T0050,
|
||||
IT00000108,"cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force",I00033,T0047,
|
||||
IT00000109,"cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force",I00033,T0048,
|
||||
IT00000110,facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises,I00033,T0002,
|
||||
IT00000111,"Netizens from one of the largest discussion forums in China, known as Diba, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall",I00034,T0002,
|
||||
IT00000112,flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message,I00034,T0049,
|
||||
IT00000113,"Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted nearly 40,000 Facebook comments in just eight hours.",I00034,T0049,
|
||||
IT00000114,“hack” of Qatar’s official news agency,I00042,T0011,
|
||||
IT00000115,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00042,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000116,photoshopped/fake images,I00042,T0024,
|
||||
IT00000117,memes,I00042,T0021,
|
||||
IT00000118,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00044,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000119,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00044,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000120,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00044,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000121,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00044,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000122,YouTube; Reddit,I00044,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000123,YouTube; Reddit,I00044,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000124,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00044,T0020,
|
||||
IT00000125,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00044,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000126,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories)",I00044,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000127,Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and scary) titles,I00044,T0009,
|
||||
IT00000128,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00047,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000129,"Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine for sparking the clashes, saying their ""irrefutable"" evidence would ""soon be made public",I00047,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000130,(Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov suggesting that Ukraine deliberately provoked Russia in hopes of gaining additional support from the United States and Europe.,I00047,T0023,
|
||||
IT00000131,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00047,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000132,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00047,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000133,Demand insurmountable proof,I00047,T0040,
|
||||
IT00000134,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00049,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000135,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00049,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000136,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00049,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000137,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00049,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000138,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00049,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000139,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Roger Waters; Venessa Beeley...)",I00049,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000140,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00049,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000141,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00049,T0052,
|
||||
IT00000142,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00049,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000143,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00049,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000144,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00050,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000145,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00050,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000146,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00050,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000147,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00050,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000148,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Roger Waters)",I00050,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000149,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00050,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000150,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mint Press News, globalresearch.ca)",I00050,T0052,
|
||||
IT00000151,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00050,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000152,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00050,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000153,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00051,T0025,
|
||||
IT00000154,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00051,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000155,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00051,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000156,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00051,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000157,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00051,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000158,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00051,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000159,YouTube; Reddit,I00051,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000160,YouTube; Reddit,I00051,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000161,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00051,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000162,State-run media seeds foreign influence environment,I00053,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000163,"Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese State and Party",I00053,T0023,
|
||||
IT00000164,Events coordinated and promoted across media platforms,I00053,T0057,
|
||||
IT00000165,Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ie: support for Meng outside courthouse,I00053,T0050,
|
||||
IT00000166,Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ie: support for Meng outside courthouse,I00053,T0057,
|
||||
IT00000167,"China also plays victim, innocence, plays by rules, misunderstood narrative",I00053,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000168,"Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of applying a double standard, and has decried what he sees as “Western egotism and white supremacy” in the treatment of detained Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou.” ",I00053,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000169,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00056,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000170,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00056,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000171,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (non-paid advertising),I00056,T0007,
|
||||
IT00000172,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00056,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000173,"Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narratives",I00056,T0021,
|
||||
IT00000174,"Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narratives",I00056,T0022,
|
||||
IT00000175,Fake news/synthetic web-sites,I00056,T0008,
|
||||
IT00000176,legacy web content,I00056,T0058,
|
||||
IT00000177,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00063,T0054,
|
||||
IT00000178,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00063,T0053,
|
||||
IT00000179,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Putin himself; Embassies & Sports Ministry; TASS",I00063,T0001,
|
||||
IT00000180,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00063,T0019,
|
||||
IT00000181,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00063,T0056,
|
||||
IT00000182,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots ",I00063,T0010,
|
||||
IT00000183,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00063,T0046,
|
||||
IT00000184,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00063,T0052,
|
||||
IT00000185,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00063,T0031,
|
||||
IT00000186,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00063,T0032,
|
||||
IT00000187,,I00002,C00155,
|
||||
IT00000188,,I00004,C00053,
|
||||
IT00000189,,I00004,C00211,
|
||||
IT00000190,,I00004,C00202,
|
||||
IT00000191,,I00022,C00202,
|
||||
IT00000192,,I00005,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000193,,I00009,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000194,,I00056,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000195,,I00005,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000196,,I00009,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000197,,I00056,C00107,
|
||||
IT00000198,,I00010,C00184,
|
||||
IT00000199,,I00015,C00184,
|
||||
IT00000200,,I00032,C00184,
|
||||
IT00000201,,I00044,C00184,
|
||||
IT00000202,,I00015,C00165,
|
||||
IT00000203,,I00022,C00154,
|
||||
IT00000204,,I00022,C00197,
|
||||
IT00000205,,I00022,C00203,
|
||||
IT00000206,,I00035,C00172,
|
||||
IT00000207,,I00042,C00207,
|
||||
IT00000208,,I00044,C00200,
|
||||
IT00000209,,I00049,C00008,
|
||||
IT00000210,,I00050,C00008,
|
||||
IT00000211,,I00029,F00067,
|
||||
IT00000212,,I00045,F00067,
|
||||
IT00000213,,I00002,F00092,
|
||||
|
106
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/detections.csv
Normal file
106
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/detections.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,metatechnique,summary,how_found,references,incidents,tactic,responsetype,notes,longname
|
||||
F00001,Analyse aborted / failed campaigns,,Examine failed campaigns. How did they fail? Can we create useful activities that increase these failures? ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00001 - Analyse aborted / failed campaigns
|
||||
F00002,Analyse viral fizzle,,We have no idea what this means. Is it something to do with the way a viral story spreads? ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00002 - Analyse viral fizzle
|
||||
F00003,Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00003 - Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors
|
||||
F00004,"Recruit like-minded converts ""people who used to be in-group"" ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,"F00004 - Recruit like-minded converts ""people who used to be in-group"" "
|
||||
F00005,SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups,,"Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis of groups and audience segments. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00005 - SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups
|
||||
F00006,SWOT analysis of tech platforms,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00006 - SWOT analysis of tech platforms
|
||||
F00007,Monitor account level activity in social networks,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D01,,F00007 - Monitor account level activity in social networks
|
||||
F00008,Detect abnormal amplification,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00008 - Detect abnormal amplification
|
||||
F00009,Detect abnormal events,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00009 - Detect abnormal events
|
||||
F00010,Detect abnormal groups,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00010 - Detect abnormal groups
|
||||
F00011,Detect abnormal pages,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00011 - Detect abnormal pages
|
||||
F00012,"Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ people",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"F00012 - Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ people"
|
||||
F00013,Identify fake news sites,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00013 - Identify fake news sites
|
||||
F00014,Trace connections,,for e.g. fake news sites,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00014 - Trace connections
|
||||
F00015,Detect anomalies in membership growth patterns,,I include Fake Experts as they may use funding campaigns such as Patreon to fund their operations and so these should be watched.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00015 - Detect anomalies in membership growth patterns
|
||||
F00016,Identify fence-sitters,,"Note: In each case, depending on the platform there may be a way to identify a fence-sitter. For example, online polls may have a neutral option or a ""somewhat this-or-that"" option, and may reveal who voted for that to all visitors. This information could be of use to data analysts.
|
||||
|
||||
In TA08-11, the engagement level of victims could be identified to detect and respond to increasing engagement.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00016 - Identify fence-sitters
|
||||
F00017,Measure emotional valence,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00017 - Measure emotional valence
|
||||
F00018,Follow the money,,track funding sources,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00018 - Follow the money
|
||||
F00019,Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated),,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00019 - Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated)
|
||||
F00020,Detect anomalous activity,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00020 - Detect anomalous activity
|
||||
F00021,AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planning,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,Automated Detection of Campaign,F00021 - AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planning
|
||||
F00022,Digital authority - regulating body (united states),,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00022 - Digital authority - regulating body (united states)
|
||||
F00023,Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account),,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00023 - Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account)
|
||||
F00024,Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniors,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00024 - Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniors
|
||||
F00025,Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detection,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,F00025 - Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detection
|
||||
F00026,Language anomoly detection,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,F00026 - Language anomoly detection
|
||||
F00027,Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topics,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,F00027 - Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topics
|
||||
F00028,Associate a public key signature with government documents,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00028 - Associate a public key signature with government documents
|
||||
F00029,"Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, Sputnik",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"F00029 - Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, Sputnik"
|
||||
F00030,Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect content,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00030 - Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect content
|
||||
F00031,Educate on how to identify information pollution,,Strategic planning included as innoculating population has strategic value.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00031 - Educate on how to identify information pollution
|
||||
F00032,Educate on how to identify to pollution,,DUPLICATE - DELETE ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00032 - Educate on how to identify to pollution
|
||||
F00033,Fake websites: add transparency on business model,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00033 - Fake websites: add transparency on business model
|
||||
F00034,Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effort,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00034 - Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effort
|
||||
F00035,Identify repeated narrative DNA,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00035 - Identify repeated narrative DNA
|
||||
F00036,Looking for AB testing in unregulated channels,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00036 - Looking for AB testing in unregulated channels
|
||||
F00037,News content provenance certification. ,,"Original Comment: Shortcomings: intentional falsehood. Doesn't solve accuracy. Can't be mandatory.
|
||||
|
||||
Technique should be in terms of ""strategic innoculation"", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00037 - News content provenance certification.
|
||||
F00038,Social capital as attack vector,,"Unsure I understood the original intention or what it applied to. Therefore the techniques listed (10, 39, 43, 57, 61) are under my interpretation - which is that we want to track ignorant agents who fall into the enemy's trap and show a cost to financing/reposting/helping the adversary via public shaming or other means.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00038 - Social capital as attack vector
|
||||
F00039,standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industry,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00039 - standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industry
|
||||
F00040,Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenance,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00040 - Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenance
|
||||
F00041,Bias detection,,Not technically left of boom,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,F00041 - Bias detection
|
||||
F00042,Categorize polls by intent,,"Use T00029, but against the creators",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,F00042 - Categorize polls by intent
|
||||
F00043,Monitor for creation of fake known personas,,Platform companies and some information security companies (e.g. ZeroFox) do this. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,F00043 - Monitor for creation of fake known personas
|
||||
F00044,Forensic analysis,,Can be used in all phases for all techniques.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00044 - Forensic analysis
|
||||
F00045,Forensic linguistic analysis,,Can be used in all phases for all techniques.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00045 - Forensic linguistic analysis
|
||||
F00046,Pump priming analytics,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00046 - Pump priming analytics
|
||||
F00047,trace involved parties,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00047 - trace involved parties
|
||||
F00048,Trace known operations and connection,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00048 - Trace known operations and connection
|
||||
F00049,trace money,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00049 - trace money
|
||||
F00050,Web cache analytics,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00050 - Web cache analytics
|
||||
F00051,Challenge expertise,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00051 - Challenge expertise
|
||||
F00052,Discover sponsors,,"Discovering the sponsors behind a campaign, narrative, bot, a set of accounts, or a social media comment, or anything else is useful.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00052 - Discover sponsors
|
||||
F00053,Government rumour control office (what can we learn?),,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00053 - Government rumour control office (what can we learn?)
|
||||
F00054,Restrict people who can @ you on social networks,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00054 - Restrict people who can @ you on social networks
|
||||
F00055,Verify credentials,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00055 - Verify credentials
|
||||
F00056,Verify organisation legitimacy,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00056 - Verify organisation legitimacy
|
||||
F00057,Verify personal credentials of experts,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00057 - Verify personal credentials of experts
|
||||
F00058,Deplatform (cancel culture),,"*Deplatform People: This technique needs to be a bit more specific to distinguish it from ""account removal"" or DDOS and other techniques that get more specific when applied to content.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, other ways of deplatforming people include attacking their sources of funds, their allies, their followers, etc.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,F00058 - Deplatform (cancel culture)
|
||||
F00059,Identify susceptible demographics,,"All techniques provide or are susceptible to being countered by, or leveraged for, knowledge about user demographics.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,F00059 - Identify susceptible demographics
|
||||
F00060,Identify susceptible influencers,,"I assume this was a transcript error. Otherwise, ""Identify Susceptible Influences"" as in the various methods of influences that may work against a victim could also be a technique. Nope, wasn't a transcript error: original note says influencers, as in find people of influence that might be targetted. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,F00060 - Identify susceptible influencers
|
||||
F00061,Microtargeting,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,F00061 - Microtargeting
|
||||
F00062,Detect when Dormant account turns active,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,F00062 - Detect when Dormant account turns active
|
||||
F00063,Linguistic change analysis,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,F00063 - Linguistic change analysis
|
||||
F00064,Monitor reports of account takeover,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,F00064 - Monitor reports of account takeover
|
||||
F00065,Sentiment change analysis,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,F00065 - Sentiment change analysis
|
||||
F00066,"Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilities",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,"F00066 - Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilities"
|
||||
F00067,Data forensics,,,2019-11-search,,"I00029,I00045",,D01,,F00067 - Data forensics
|
||||
F00068,Resonance analysis,,"a developing methodology for identifying statistical differences in how social groups use language and quantifying how common those statistical differences are within a larger population. In essence, it hypothesizes how much affinity might exist for a specific group within a general population, based on the language its members employ",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00068 - Resonance analysis
|
||||
F00069,Track Russian media and develop analytic methods.,,"To effectively counter Russian propaganda, it will be critical to track Russian influence efforts. The information requirements are varied and include the following: • Identify fake-news stories and their sources. • Understand narrative themes and content that pervade various Russian media sources. • Understand the broader Russian strategy that underlies tactical propaganda messaging.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00069 - Track Russian media and develop analytic methods.
|
||||
F00070,Full spectrum analytics,,,2019-11-workshop,,,ALL,D01,,F00070 - Full spectrum analytics
|
||||
F00071,Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers,,"Local influencers detected via Twitter networks are likely local influencers in other online and off-line channels as well. In addition, the content and themes gleaned from Russia and Russia-supporting populations, as well as anti-Russia activists, likely swirl in other online and off-line mediums as well.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00071 - Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers
|
||||
F00072,network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community.,,It is possible that some of these are bots or trolls and could be flagged for suspension for violating Twitter’s terms of service.,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00072 - network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community.
|
||||
F00073,collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators,,"Players at the level of covert attribution, referred to as “black” in the grayscale of deniability, produce content on user-generated media, such as YouTube, but also add fear-mongering commentary to and amplify content produced by others and supply exploitable content to data dump websites. These activities are conducted by a network of trolls, bots, honeypots, and hackers. ",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00073 - collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators
|
||||
F00074,identify relevant fence-sitter communities,,"brand ambassador programs could be used with influencers across a variety of social media channels. It could also target other prominent experts, such as academics, business leaders, and other potentially prominent people. Authorities must ultimately take care in implementing such a program given the risk that contact with U.S. or NATO authorities might damage influencer reputations. Engagements must consequently be made with care, and, if possible, government interlocutors should work through local NGOs.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00074 - identify relevant fence-sitter communities
|
||||
F00075,leverage open-source information,,"significant amounts of quality open-source information are now available and should be leveraged to build products and analysis prior to problem prioritization in the areas of observation, attribution, and intent. Successfully distinguishing the gray zone campaign signal through the global noise requires action through the entirety of the national security community. Policy, process, and tools must all adapt and evolve to detect, discern, and act upon a new type of signal",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,D01,,F00075 - leverage open-source information
|
||||
F00076,Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots”,,"Target audience connected to ""useful idiots rather than the specific profiles because - The active presence of such sources complicates targeting of Russian propaganda, given that it is often difficult to discriminate between authentic views and opinions on the internet and those disseminated by the Russian state.
|
||||
",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00076 - Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots”
|
||||
F00077,Model for bot account behavior,,"Bot account: action based, people. Unsure which DISARM techniques.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00077 - Model for bot account behavior
|
||||
F00078,Monitor account level activity in social networks,,All techniques benefit from careful analysis and monitoring of activities on social network.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00078 - Monitor account level activity in social networks
|
||||
F00079,Network anomaly detection,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,F00079 - Network anomaly detection
|
||||
F00080,Hack the polls/ content yourself,,"Two wrongs don't make a right? But if you hack your own polls, you do learn how it could be done, and learn what to look for",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,F00080 - Hack the polls/ content yourself
|
||||
F00081,Need way for end user to report operations,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00081 - Need way for end user to report operations
|
||||
F00082,"Control the US ""slang"" translation boards",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,"F00082 - Control the US ""slang"" translation boards"
|
||||
F00083,"Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contents",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D05,,"F00083 - Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contents"
|
||||
F00084,Track individual bad actors,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00084 - Track individual bad actors
|
||||
F00085,detection of a weak signal through global noise,,"Gray zone threats are challenging given that warning requires detection of a weak signal through global noise and across threat vectors and regional boundaries.Three interconnected gray zone elements characterize the nature of the activity:
|
||||
Temporality: The nature of gray zone threats truly requires a “big picture view” over long timescales and across regions and functional topics.
|
||||
Attribution: requiring an “almost certain” or “nearly certain analytic assessment before acting costs time and analytic effort
|
||||
Intent: judgement of adversarial intent to conduct gray zone activity. Indeed, the purpose of countering gray zone threats is to deter adversaries from fulfilling their intent to act. While attribution is one piece of the puzzle, closing the space around intent often means synthesizing multiple relevant indicators and warnings, including the state’s geopolitical ambitions, military ties, trade and investment, level of corruption, and media landscape, among others.",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,,,F00085 - detection of a weak signal through global noise
|
||||
F00086,Outpace Competitor Intelligence Capabilities,,"Develop an intelligence-based understanding of foreign actors’ motivations, psychologies, and societal and geopolitical contexts. Leverage artificial intelligence to identify patterns and infer competitors’ intent",2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA02 Objective planning,D01,,F00086 - Outpace Competitor Intelligence Capabilities
|
||||
F00087,Improve Indications and Warning,,"United States has not adequately adapted its information indicators and thresholds for warning policymakers to account for gray zone tactics. Competitors have undertaken a marked shift to slow-burn, deceptive, non-military, and indirect challenges to U.S. interests. Relative to traditional security indicators and warnings, these are more numerous and harder to detect and make it difficult for analysts to infer intent.",2019-11-search,Hicks19,,,D01,,F00087 - Improve Indications and Warning
|
||||
F00088,"Revitalize an “active measures working group,”",,"Recognize campaigns from weak signals, including rivals’ intent, capability, impact, interactive effects, and impact on U.S. interests... focus on adversarial covert action aspects of campaigning.",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,D01,,"F00088 - Revitalize an “active measures working group,”"
|
||||
F00089,"target/name/flag ""grey zone"" website content",,"""Gray zone"" is second level of content producers and circulators, composed of outlets with uncertain attribution. This category covers conspiracy websites, far-right or far-left websites, news aggregators, and data dump websites",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"F00089 - target/name/flag ""grey zone"" website content"
|
||||
F00090,Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements,,Bring private sector and civil society into accord on U.S. interests,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00090 - Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements
|
||||
F00091,Partner to develop analytic methods & tools,,"This might include working with relevant technology firms to ensure that contracted analytic support is available. Contracted support is reportedly valuable because technology to monitor social media data is continually evolving, and such firms can provide the expertise to help identify and analyze trends, and they can more effectively stay abreast of the changing systems and develop new models as they are required",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00091 - Partner to develop analytic methods & tools
|
||||
F00092,daylight,,Warn social media companies about an ongoing campaign (e.g. antivax sites). Anyone with datasets or data summaries can help with this,2019-11-search,,I00002,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00092 - daylight
|
||||
F00093,S4d detection and re-allocation approaches,M004 - friction,"S4D is a way to separate out different speakers in text, audio. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00093 - S4d detection and re-allocation approaches
|
||||
F00094,Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together,M003 - daylight,,grugq,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,F00094 - Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together
|
||||
F00095,Fact checking,,"Process suspicious artifacts, narratives, and incidents",SJ,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00095 - Fact checking
|
||||
|
74
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/examples.csv
Normal file
74
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/examples.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,object_id,name,summary
|
||||
E000001,T0002,Diba Facebook Expedition,"2016 Diba Facebook Expedition, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall, to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message)."
|
||||
E000002,T0003,Narrative examples,"Midwesterners are generous, Russia is under attack from outside."
|
||||
E000003,T0004,MH17 competing narratives,"""Russian Foreign Ministry again claimed that “absolutely groundless accusations are put forward against the Russian side, which are aimed at discrediting Russia in the eyes of the international community"" (deny); ""The Dutch MH17 investigation is biased, anti-Russian and factually inaccurate"" (dismiss). "
|
||||
E000004,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers," ""Huawei is determined to build trustworthy networks"""
|
||||
E000005,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers,Russia is the victim of bullying by NATO powers
|
||||
E000006,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers,USA is guided by its founding principles of liberty and egalitarianism
|
||||
E000007,T0007,Paying for access to existing accounts,Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook’s new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages.
|
||||
E000008,T0007,Avaaz-reported pages and groups,EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe.
|
||||
E000009,T0007,Fakes listed in the US Mueller report,"Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami. "
|
||||
E000010,T0008,Denver Guardian,"A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton."
|
||||
E000011,T0009,Jade Helm fake experts,"For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a “Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME” and the other a “Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author”--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn."
|
||||
E000012,T0011,White House explosions,Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
|
||||
E000013,T0012,Ten_GOP,"2016 @TEN_GOP profile where the actual Tennessee Republican Party tried unsuccessfully for months to get Twitter to shut it down, and 2019 Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic personas and social media accounts that spreads falsehoods and amplifies narratives critical of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel."
|
||||
E000014,T0014,VaccinateUS gofundme,"2016: #VaccinateUS Gofundme campaigns to pay for Targetted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targetting Washington State mothers, $1,776 to boost posts over 9 months)."
|
||||
E000015,T0015,ColumbianChemicals hashtag,#ColumbianChemicals to promote a fake story about a chemical spill in Louisiana.
|
||||
E000016,T0016,Pope endorses Trump,"2016: “Pope Francis shocks world, endorses Donald Trump for president.” "
|
||||
E000017,T0016,FBI director rumours,"2016: ""FBI director received millions from Clinton Foundation, his brother’s law firm does Clinton’s taxes”."
|
||||
E000018,T0022,Qanon conspiracy,"Example: QAnon: conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful actors, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable """
|
||||
E000019,T0024,Slowed-down Pelosi video,Pelosi video (making her appear drunk)
|
||||
E000020,T0024,Shark on streets,Photoshopped shark on flooded streets of Houston TX.
|
||||
E000021,T0025,Sekondary Infektion,"2019: DFRLab report ""Secondary Infektion” highlights incident with key asset being a forged “letter” created by the operation to provide ammunition for far-right forces in Europe ahead of the election."
|
||||
E000022,T0029,FCC comments,Flooding FCC with comments
|
||||
E000023,T0029,fake engagement metrics,Creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of given issue.
|
||||
E000024,T0044,Canadians arrested for spying,"(2019) China formally arrests Canadians Spavor and Kovrig, accuses them of spying (in retaliation to detention of Hauwei CFO). "
|
||||
E000025,T0044,Rumour about syrian rebels gassing their own people,"(2018) The Russian ministry of defence put out a press release, claiming that they had intelligence Syrian rebel forces were about to gas their own people in Idlib province as part of a “false flag” operation to frame the Syrian government."
|
||||
E000026,T0047,Singapore act,"2019 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread ""false statements of fact"" in Singapore, where that information is ""prejudicial"" to Singapore's security or ""public tranquility."" "
|
||||
E000027,T0047,Social media cut off in Kashmir,"India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and ""anti-national"" purposes."
|
||||
E000028,T0048,Rappler,"Philippines, Maria Ressa and Rappler journalists targeted Duterte regime, lawsuits, trollings, banned from the presidential palace where press briefings take place. "
|
||||
E000029,T0048,ProPublica,2017 bot attack on five ProPublica Journalists.
|
||||
E000030,T0049,Saudi bots,2018: bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi’s death.
|
||||
E000031,T0050,50 Cent army,"popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the ""Great Firewall"") "
|
||||
E000032,T0050,Positive images of China,"technique used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China. "
|
||||
E000033,T0051,FCC comments,2017: the FCC was inundated with nearly 22 million public comments on net neutrality (many from fake accounts)
|
||||
E000034,T0052,Tertiary sites,"Examples of tertiary sites include Russia Insider, The Duran, geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca."
|
||||
E000035,T0052,Star News Digital Media,"2019, US Domestic news: Snopes reveals Star News Digital Media, Inc. may look like a media company that produces local news, but operates via undisclosed connections to political activism. "
|
||||
E000036,T0052,Iranian sites including Liberty Front Press,"(2018) FireEye reports on Iranian campaign that created between April 2018 and March 2019 sites used to spread inauthentic content from websites such as Liberty Front Press (LFP), US Journal, and Real Progressive Front during the 2018 US mid-terms."
|
||||
E000037,T0053,Issues that can be politicised,"BlackLivesMatter, MeToo"
|
||||
E000038,T0054,TrudeauMustGo,2019: #TrudeauMustGo
|
||||
E000039,T0055,PhosphorusDisaster hashtag,#PhosphorusDisaster
|
||||
E000040,T0056,RT/Sputnik,RT/Sputnik or antivax websites seeding stories.
|
||||
E000041,T0057,IRA organising US political rallies,"(Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 election"
|
||||
E000042,T0057,Facebook groups coordinating public space activities,Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and actvities into the public space.
|
||||
E000043,T0059,China messaging on Taiwan and Hong Kong,China constant messaging that Taiwan and Hong Kong are part of one China.
|
||||
E000044,C00008,Snopes,Snopes is best-known example of fact-checking sites.
|
||||
E000045,C00012,2018 EU regulations,"In 2018, the European Union created significant new regulations on the role of social media in media"
|
||||
E000046,C00012,German social media content regulations,German model: facebook forced to police content by law
|
||||
E000047,C00014,Buzzfeed rumour list,Buzzfeed real-time disaster rumour list
|
||||
E000048,C00014,FEMA rumour list,FEMA real-time disaster rumour list
|
||||
E000049,C00030,counter narrative handbook,Handbook at https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf
|
||||
E000050,C00030,Reality Team,Realityteam.org
|
||||
E000051,C00048,USAID programs,"USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations. Note that USAID operations were at a different level."
|
||||
E000052,C00066,kPop hashtag flooding,kPop stans flooding extremist hashtags with pop videos and images.
|
||||
E000053,C00070,2018 DDOS of troll farms,midterm-2018 elections DDOS against troll farms
|
||||
E000054,C00073,Learn to Discern,"The ""Learn to Discern"" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.” "
|
||||
E000055,C00073,Baltic Center for Media Excellence,"NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.”"
|
||||
E000056,C00082,Reality Team ground truthing,RealityTeam work that adds clear information to spaces with disinformation in.
|
||||
E000057,C00086,Reddit channels flooded with jokes,"This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes."
|
||||
E000058,C00087,kPop hashtag flooding,
|
||||
E000059,C00087,LGBT flooding of #proudboys,
|
||||
E000060,C00093,Pro-Truth Pledge,community code of conduct
|
||||
E000061,C00111,The Commons Project,The Commons Project from BuildUp.
|
||||
E000062,C00156,US Forces in Latvia,"In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.”"
|
||||
E000063,C00178,Current Time videos,"Using Current Time videos (viewed 40 million times online) to draw viewers away from Russian TV programming in RT and Sputnik. POtential content for this includes conventional entertainment programming (source: The conomist, “America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017)."
|
||||
E000064,C00182,Bedep Trojan,"(2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia"
|
||||
E000065,C00188,2014 Russian poll in France,"August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015)."
|
||||
E000066,C00188,Latvian newsrooms,"Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”"
|
||||
E000067,C00195,Using Adwords to redirect ISIS content readers,"Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Can apply this method to Russian propaganda. "
|
||||
E000068,C00200,India,Indian influencers and aunties countering misinformation.
|
||||
E000069,C00202,Macron election in France,Macron election team modified docs to spike a hack and leak.
|
||||
E000070,C00207,Saudi tit for tat campaign,
|
||||
E000071,C00211,Baltic Elves,"Baltic Elves.
|
||||
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/07/disinformation-nation-the-slovaks-fighting-in-defence-of-facts/ "
|
||||
E000072,C00211,Taiwan humor over rumor, Taiwan humor over rumor strategy.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/feb/17/humour-over-rumour-taiwan-fake-news and https://internews.org/story/using-comedy-and-social-media-educate-disinformation
|
||||
|
832
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups.csv
Normal file
832
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,832 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,url,summary,provides_tools,sector,primary_role,secondary_role,primary_subject,secondary_subject,volunteers,region,country,rand_list,credco_list,carnegie_list,twitter_handle,notes,Unnamed: 18
|
||||
G000001,5Rights,https://5rightsframework.com/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000002,AACC (Association des Agences Conseils en Communication),https://www.aacc.fr/,,,,,,,,,Europe,France,,,,,,
|
||||
G000003,ABT Shield by Edge NPD,https://abtshield.com,"ABT SHIELD technology is an AI-based tool, designed to limit the impact of bots and trolls on readers’ experience and limit the spread of online disinformation. ABT SHIELD is a product designed in close cooperation with publishers, advertisers, academic institutions, think tanks and EU institutions.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000004,Access Now,https://www.accessnow.org/,"Access Now is dedicated to protecting digital rights through a 24/7 Digital Security Helpline, legal support, advocacy campaigns and cross-sector partnerships, and policy analysis and recommendations. Access Now works on issues related to freedom of expression and has responded to proposals aimed at curbing disinformation online by stressing the need to develop evidence-based solutions that protect online users.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000005,Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project (American Press Institute),https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/category/fact-checking-project/,The American Press Institute’s Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project aims to increase and improve fact-checking and other accountability journalism practices.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000006,Ad Fontes Media,https://www.adfontesmedia.com/interactive-media-bias-chart-2/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000007,Ad Observer (New York University),https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ad-observer/enliecaalhkhhihcmnbjfmmjkljlcinl,Ad Observer is a crowdsourcing Chrome browser extension that will gather ads from a user's Facebook news feed—to enable investigative journalism and research.The project is run by the Online Political Ads Transparency Project at New York University.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000008,"Advertising Standards Authority (ASA, UK)",https://www.asa.org.uk/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000009,AFP Medialab,https://www.afp.com/en/agency/medialab,"The AFP Medialab is a multi-disciplinary team of journalists and engineers. Since the 1st of January 2016, the Medialab has participated in the InVID project (social media video content verification on social networks), funded by the European Union Horizon 2020 framework.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000010,Africa Check,https://africacheck.org/,Africa Check promotes accuracy in public debate and the media in Africa. The goal of their work is to raise the quality of information available to society across the continent.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000011,Agence France Presse (AFP),https://www.afp.com/en,"AFP is a global news agency that worked with First Draft to implement the CrossCheck Project during the 2017 French presidential elections. The organization has since started its own fact-checking blog and helped set up the Journalism Trust Initiative with Reporters Without Borders, the European Broadcasting Union, and the Global Editors Network. AFP is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers. AFP also runs a Medialab, where it develops innovative tools for verifying content and understanding information flows.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000012,Agência Lupa,https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/lupa,"Agência Lupa is a Brazilian fact-checking organization. A member of the Trust Project, the organization also provides training to students and professionals to contribute to the prevalence of fact-checking techniques and tools.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000013,Agência Pública (Truco Project),https://apublica.org/truco-antigo/,Agência Pública is an investigative journalism outfit that conducts fact-checking through its Truco project.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000014,AI Foundation,http://www.aifoundation.com,"Reality Defender is a browser extension that scans every piece of media content appearing in the browser to check for known fakes, and uses AI algorithms to check the content for signs of alterations. Reality Defender also allows for users to report media as fake, which builds their database of known fakes and improves the browser extension’s accuracy.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000015,Alethea Group,https://www.aletheagroup.com/,"We protect clients from the threat of disinformation that targets brands, reputations, employee safety, or financial bottom lines through our industry-leading investigation and remediation services.",,Other,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000016,Alion,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000017,Alliance for Europe: Social Media Intelligence Unit,https://www.alliance4europe.eu/digital-intelligence/,"The Social Media Intelligence Unit (SMIU) collects and analyses social media data from across Europe. The platform enables tracking disinformation and hate-speech, aiming to develop a predictive model of its spread.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,Europe,Belgium,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000018,Alliance for Securing Democracy (German Marshall Fund) (GMF),https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/,"Housed at GMF, the Alliance for Securing Democracy convenes policymakers and technical experts to provide analysis and policy recommendations concerning authoritarian interference in democracies. The Alliance for Securing Democracy runs an Authoritarian Interference Tracker and the Hamilton 2.0 interactive dashboard, which provides information on Russian state-funded narratives.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000019,Alliance of Democracies,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/transatlantic-commission-on-election-integrity/,"The Alliance of Democracies runs the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity (TCEI), which convenes individuals from media and government to prevent foreign interference in elections. TCEI advocates for campaigns to adopt its Pledge for Election Integrity, conducts monitoring in countries with upcoming elections, and promotes public policy solutions addressing deepfakes and other emerging technologies that threaten the integrity of elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000020,American Press Institute (API),https://www.americanpressinstitute.org,"Through its Fact-checking and Accountability Journalism Project, API provides research and training to help journalists and publishers improve their political fact-checking work. In collaboration with the Donald W. Reynolds Journalism Institute,",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000021,American Press Institute: Trusting News project,https://trustingnews.org,"API hosts the Trusting News project, which seeks to build trust in newsrooms through newsroom coaching and research on transparency, consumer news decisions, and social media.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000022,Amnesty International,https://www.amnesty.org,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000023,Amped Software,https://ampedsoftware.com/authenticate,"Amped Software offers image and video forensics and authentication tools that enable users to detect whether images or videos have been manipulated or altered. Amped uses peer-reviewed, scientific techniques for its product, and law enforcement agencies have used the tool for rigorous use cases such as discerning whether an image can be used in court.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000024,Analiziraj,https://analiziraj.ba/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000025,Antidote,https://antidote.ngo/,"""Exit counselors"" or ""de-radicalizers,"" Antidote helps people caught up in cultic ideologies to reconnect with reality",,Civil Society/NGO,Education (public),,Extremism/indoctrination,Societal resilience,,,USA,,,,,,
|
||||
G000026,Aos Fatos,https://www.aosfatos.org/,"Aos Fatos conducts fact-checking and provides technology and consulting services to organizations interested in automated fact-checking products and data verification. They also fconduct act-checking for internal reporting. Aos Fatos built Fátima, a fact-checking robot for Facebook messenger. Aos Fatos is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000027,AP Fact Check (Associated Press (AP)),https://www.apnews.com/APFactCheck,AP is an international news conglomerate which addresses global breaking news via quality journalism and reporting. AP Fact Check is the formal public fact-checking service of the organization and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000028,ARD-FaktenFinder,https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/,ARD-FaktenFinder is the fact-checking program of German media organization ARD's online news platform.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000029,Argonne National Laboratory: Decisions and Infrastructure Sciences Division,https://www.anl.gov/dis/gat,The Decisions and Infrastructure Sciences Division at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is currently applying predictive modeling to combat disinformation. They are capable of providing a deep access data analytics system.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000030,Arizona State University: Detecting Frames,http://www.public.asu.edu/~hdavulcu/IJSC16.pdf,"Detecting Frames is a research project at the School of Computing, Informatics and Decision Systems Engineering at Arizona State University. It outlines the utilization of computational power to understand the subliminal framing of topics in the media and within networks. Similar to the way that sentiment analysis understands attitudes based on keyword usage, “Detecting Frames” understands perspective and bias packaging based on sentence annotation.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000031,Article19,https://www.article19.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000032,Asociatia Presei Independente (API),http://api.md/,"API is a resource center and association of newsrooms dedicated to improving the quality of independent journalism in Moldova through advocacy and professional development. The organization is coordinating the ""STOP FALS!"" Campaign to educate news consumers and combat the spread of false or manipulative information.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Moldova,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000033,Aspen Institute,https://www.aspeninstitute.org/,"The Aspen Institute convenes leaders and thinkers to address challenges to global prosperity and peace. Through its work on communications and culture and security and global affairs, the Aspen Institute has published analysis and hosted events on election security, disinformation, and cybersecurity. It also hosts the Knight Commission Trust, Media and Democracy, which convenes academic, journalistic, technology, and advocacy experts to address the American media landscape.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000034,Assembler,https://jigsaw.google.com/assembler/,Assembler is an experimental platform advancing new detection technology to help fact-checkers and journalists identify manipulated media. The experiment is developed by Jigsaw and Google Research.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000035,Association for International Affairs (Asociace Pro Mezinárodní Otázky) (AMO),http://www.amo.cz/,"AMO conducts research and advocacy on issues in international relations through policy briefings and research papers, conferences and roundtables, educational projects, and collaboration with other public policy organizations. AMO runs a project on Strengthening Public Scrutiny in Ukrainian Regions, which works to address disinformation in Ukraine through research and training. Its partners on this project include the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of Mass Information, stopfake.org, and demagog.cz.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000036,Astroscreen,https://www.astroscreen.com/,Astroscreen counters disinformation and terrorist content spread via “astroturfing” by detecting fake social media accounts and networks of bots.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000037,Athens Technology Center (ATC),https://www.atc.gr/?page=news&ListID=3&RowID=348&Year=2021,Built TruthNest,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Greece,,,,,,
|
||||
G000038,Atlantic Council: Digital Forensics Research Lab (DFR Lab),https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/digital-forensic-research-lab/,"The Atlantic Council's Digital Forensics Research Lab (DFR Lab) documents and tracks foreign-backed influence operations and provides analysis on these incidents in order to aid the public in identifying and exposing such activities. DFR Lab also runs 360/OS, an annual conference providing training to journalists and activists on open source, social media, and digital forensic tools for identifying and documenting malign uses of digital technologies. The Atlantic Council also coordinated #ElectionWatch, an effort to monitor foreign influence in elections in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico in 2018.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,Research (primary/secondary),,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000039,Atlantic Council: Disinfo Portal (Eurasia Center),https://disinfoportal.org/about-disinfo-portal/,"The Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center has created Disinfo Portal, which aggregates information about ongoing efforts to counter disinformation and provides a database of partners and experts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000040,Attestiv Inc.,https://www.attestiv.com,"Attestiv provides authenticity for photos, videos and other media, limiting deepfake threats, data tampering, and helping to enable new media protection solutions for businesses and organizations.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000041,attribution.news,https://attribution.news,The attribution.news project is a joint initiative led by First Draft and the Stanford Internet Observatory. The website aims to provide more accessible background explanations to assist reporters in covering attribution.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000042,Australian Associated Press FactCheck,https://factcheck.aap.com.au/,FactCheck is the Australian Associated Press's fact-checking initiative. FactCheck is a signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000043,Australian Department of Home Affairs: Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce,https://www.aec.gov.au/elections/electoral-advertising/electoral-integrity.htm,"Led by the Australian Department of Home Affairs, the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce is composed of members of various government agencies and deals with foreign cyber-enabled threats to election integrity.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000044,Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI),https://www.aspi.org.au/program/international-cyber-policy-centre,"ASPI conducts research on issues in international peace and security and Australian foreign policy. Through its International Cyber Policy Centre, members of ASPI have published reports on the topics of disinformation, persuasion-based cyber warfare, and Chinese influence campaigns.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000045,Authoritarian Interference Tracker (Alliance for Securing Democracy),https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/toolbox/authoritarian-interference-tracker/,"The Authoritarian Interference Tracker exposes the Russian and Chinese governments’ foreign interference activities in more than 40 transatlantic countries from 2000 to the present across the five tools ASD tracks. These tools are: information manipulation, cyber operations, malign finance, civil society subversion, and economic coercion. The Tracker shines a light on the tactics and trends that define the Russian and Chinese governments’ interference efforts in democracies, and highlights the interconnectivity between different parts of the asymmetric toolkit. Forthcoming iterations of the Tracker will expand to catalog authoritarian interference by other regimes that adopt similar tactics to undermine democracies.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000046,Avaaz,https://secure.avaaz.org/,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000047,Balkan Investigative Reporting Network,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000048,Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (Centro de Barcelona para Asuntos Internacionales) (CIDOB),https://www.cidob.org/,"CIDOB conducts research and policy analysis on global issues in peace and security. As part of its work on security, CIDOB researchers have published on disinformation and EU responses, Russia's Spanish media efforts, and deepfakes. CIDOB works with the German Marshall Fund to organize the Mercator European Dialogue, which convenes members of European parliaments to discuss public policy issues. Through this program, the German Marshall Fund convened policymakers in May 2019 to discuss disinformation and fake news in European elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000049,BBC Media Action ,https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/our-work/covid-19,"Our dedicated teams moved rapidly to adapt our existing projects to address the knock-on effects of COVID-19 – from increased levels of violence against women, to children losing out on an education during lockdown. Through media, we’re helping people understand what they can do, individually and as a community, and how they can hold their leaders to account.We are committed to supporting the international response for the long haul – helping people to survive, cope and recover from COVID-19, meeting their diverse and changing needs, and supporting local media to keep their communities informed. As an independent charity, we are not funded by the BBC TV Licence Fee. We rely on the support of generous donors – governments, foundations, corporations and individuals – to make our work possible. Trusted and accurate information will save lives.",,Civil Society/NGO,Media,,,,,UK,Europe,,,,,,
|
||||
G000050,BBC Beyond Fake News,https://www.bbc.co.uk/beyondfakenews/,"BBC reporting, education and training to help you understand the challenges posed by misinformation and fake news",,Media,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000051,Be Internet Citizens (YouTube),https://internetcitizens.withyoutube.com/,"YouTube, a Google company, is addressing disinformation through media literacy. Be Internet Citizens has been designed to teach teenagers about media literacy, critical thinking and digital citizenship, with the aim of encouraging young people to have a positive voice online.",,Technology,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000052,Belgian Expert Group on Disinformation and Fake News,https://www.decroo.belgium.be/nl/expertengroep-formuleert-aanbevelingen-voor-aanpak-fake-news,"In 2018, Digital Agenda Minister Alexander De Croo called for the creation of an expert group composed of academics and journalists to formulate proposals for countering disinformation in Belgium. The expert group delivered its recommendations in July 2018.",,Government,Public Policy,,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000053,Bellingcat,https://www.bellingcat.com,"Bellingcat is an independent international collective of researchers, investigators and citizen journalists using open source and social media investigation to probe a variety of subjects, including online influence operations. It also runs training programs for investigative journalists and publishes training guides in its Online Investigation Toolkit.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,Fact checking,,,Yes,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000054,Berkman Klein Center,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000055,BeWorks,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000056,Bien Chequeado,https://www.tvn-2.com/bien-chequeado/,Bien Chequeado is TVN Noticias's fact-checking initiative.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Panama,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000057,BitPress,https://bitpress.news/,Bitpress is a nonpartisan fact-checking organization that uses technology solutions and trained analysts to identify misinformation and prevent its spread.,,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000058,Blackbird,https://www.blackbird.ai/,Blackbird.AI is a company that provides artificial intelligence tools to detect emerging propaganda campaigns and help clients respond.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000059,Bluescreen IT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000060,BOOM,https://www.boomlive.in/,"BOOM is an Indian fact-checking initiative that provides content in English, Hindi, and Bengali. The organization runs a WhatsApp helpline, and it is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000061,Bot Sentinel,https://botsentinel.com/,"Bot Sentinel is a free and open platform and browser plugin that detects likely bots on Twitter. A dashboard lets users explore trending topics, network connections, and data associated with suspicious accounts. The product also provides a “block list” that enables users to block likely bots from their own Twitter spheres.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,Y,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000062,Botometer,https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/faq,"Botometer is a web-based program that uses machine learning to classify Twitter accounts as bot or human by looking at features of a profile including friends, social network structure, temporal activity, language and sentiment. Botometer outputs an overall bot score (0-5) along with several other scores that provides a measure of the likelihood that the account is a bot.",Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,Y,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000063,Botslayer,https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/botslayer/,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000064,Brandpie,https://www.brandpie.com/people,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000065,Brave,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000066,Bridgit,Bridgit.io,,,,Influencer (on policy),,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000067,Brookings Institute: Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology,https://www.brookings.edu/experts/alina-polyakova/,The Brookings Institution's Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology addresses state and non-state technological threats and convenes technology and policy communities around these issues.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000068,Brookings Institution: Center for Technology Innovation,https://www.brookings.edu/center/center-for-technology-innovation/,"The Brookings Institution's Center for Technology Innovation provides research, policy analysis, and advocacy on global technology innovation. Part of its research agenda includes digital media, news, and entertainment. The Cybersecurity and Election Interference Project publishes analysis on election security, foreign interference in elections, and the potential for widespread disinformation and proliferation of deepfakes in electoral contexts. The Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology addresses state and non-state technological threats and convenes technology and policy communities around these issues.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000069,Brookings Institution: Cyber Security and Election Interference,https://www.brookings.edu/series/cybersecurity-and-election-interference/,"The Cyber Security and Election Interference is a series designed to be accessible to policymakers, journalists, and the general public, will explore digital threats to American democracy, cybersecurity risks, and ways to mitigate possible problems. It will also take a look at several examples of the problem, how other democracies are coping with the threats, and how Congress, state officials, political parties, and candidates can protect themselves from cybersecurity attacks.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000070,Brunswick,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000071,BT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000072,Cal State,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000073,Callsign,https://www.callsign.com,"Callsign leverages deep learning and technical/ behavioral forensics to differentiate between legitimate and fraudulent users, allowing companies to keep information secure by adding an additional layer of protection to logins, and potentially disallowing bad actors from accessing secure information and accounts. Callsign technology may ensure that bad actors are not able to hijack legitimate accounts to propagate disinformation. Furthermore, genuine identities could remain safe from account takeovers, account borrowing, and “first person fraud” used to spread adversarial propaganda and disinformation.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000074,Canada,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000075,Captain Fact,https://captainfact.io/,CaptainFact is a collaborative fact-checking project that relies on a browser extension to show fact-checked statements in YouTube videos.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000076,"Cardiff University: Open Source Communications, Analytics Research Development Centre",http://upsi.org.uk/oscar,"The Open Source Communications, Analytics Research (OSCAR) Development Centre is an innovative, multi-disciplinary Centre bringing together academics and police practitioners to develop a research evidence base around the use of open source information for policing and community safety services. Funded by the Home Office / HEFCE / and the College of Policing, the work of the centre will help to develop open source methodologies, technologies and insights that will shape the future of policing.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Investigations,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000077,Cardiff University: Social Data Science Lab,http://socialdatalab.net/ ,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000078,Carnegie Endowment: Partnership for Countering Influence Operations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace),https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/counteringinfluenceoperations,"The Partnership for Countering Influence Operations (PCIO) believes that little progress will be made without a spirit of partnership between governments, the tech industry, media, academia, and civil society. Such collaborations are challenging but necessary in order to accomplish the three aims that PCIO believes are vital: to answer difficult policy problems related to influence operations; to find ways to measure the effect of adversarial influence operations; and to develop methods for measurement and evaluation of countermeasures.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000079,Carnegie Mellon University: Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS),http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/index.php,"CASOS develops and applies computational tools for utilizing data to analyze social phenomena, to explain and predict social behavior using these tools, and to measure and evaluate the impact of policies and procedures affecting social behavior. CASOS has a project on the diffusion of false and misleading information and draws comparisons between community responses to key issues.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000080,Carnegie Mellon University: Center for Informed Democracy and Social Cyber-Security (CIDC / IDEAS),https://www.cmu.edu/ideas-social-cybersecurity/,CIDC studies online disinformation and its impact on democracy. The Center conducts research and connects individuals working on disinformation and related issues in order to educate journalists and policymakers. Its research and teaching focus on identifying disinformation and its sources and countering its spread.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000081,Carnegie Mellon University: Social Cybersecurity Project (Human-Computer Interaction Institute),https://socialcybersecurity.org/,The Social Cybersecurity Project leverages insights from social psychology and other fields to develop novel interventions and strategies for nudging adoption of expert-recommended tools and practices,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000082,Carnegie Trust (UK),https://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000083,CASM Digital Research Lab (Demos),https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,"A joint venture between UK-based Demos and the University of Sussex, the CASM Digital Research Lab is an initiative that utilizes machine learning to interpret natural language data and derive insights about technology policy. CASM has produced reports on information operations, Russian influence operations on Twitter, the future of political campaigning, social media and the 2017 British General Election, social media in Nigerian elections, and digital political advertising.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000084,Cato Institute,https://www.cato.org/,"The Cato Institute conducts research and analysis on American domestic and foreign policy issues. Its scholars have written on social media regulation in the face of disinformation, and the Institute hosts a Project on Emerging Technologies which works on issues at the intersection of new technologies and civil liberties.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000085,Cek Fakta,https://cekfakta.com,Cek Fakta is an Indonesian fact-checking initiative.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000086,"Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy of France (Centre d'analyse, de prévision et de stratégie) (CAPS)",https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/le-ministere-et-son-reseau/le-centre-d-analyse-de-prevision-et-de-strategie/,"CAPS is composed of academic experts and diplomats that provide research and analysis on medium- to long-term trends in international affairs and foreign policy. In partnership with the Institute for Strategic Research, CAPS produced a comprehensive report on influence operations and recommendations for governments, civil society organizations, and private actors for mitigating the impact of hostile influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000087,Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT),https://cdt.org/,CDT provides research and advocacy on public policies designed to preserve freedom and innovation online. CDT's experts provide analysis on legislation and social media platforms' efforts aimed at curbing disinformation and protecting the integrity of elections.,,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000088,Center for Democratic Transition (Centar za Demokratsku Tranziciju) (CDT),http://www.en.cdtmn.org/,"CDT is dedicated to promoting democratic accountability and transparency in Montenegro through advocacy, research, monitoring of institutions and policies. CDT worked with NATO's Public Diplomacy Division to run a project on countering disinformation and propaganda.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Montenegro,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000089,Center for East European Policy Studies (Austrumeiropas Politikas Pētījumu Centrs) (CEEPS),http://appc.lv/eng/,CEEPS conducts research and analysis on Latvian foreign policy with a focus on Russia's influence in European politics and security. Its scholars have contributed to research on resilience to disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe and participated in expert discussions on Russian influence operations organized by the European Center for Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. CEEPS is also part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Latvia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000090,Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (Centar za Evroatlantske Studije) (CEAS),https://www.ceas-serbia.org/,"CEAS conducts research and analysis on public policy, international cooperation, and global security with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe. CEAS is a partner of the Atlantic Council's Disinfo Portal.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000091,Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA),https://www.cepa.org/disinfonet,"The StratCom Program housed at CEPA is ""an innovative, on-the-ground effort to monitor, collate, analyze, rebut and expose Russian disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe."" The program seeks to create analytical toolkits for countering disinformation, host workshops, monitor the effectiveness of Russian propaganda, provide data on ongoing efforts, and provide policy guidance. CEPA also coordinates #DisinfoNet, a coalition of think tanks and organizations working to understand and combat Russia’s information operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000092,Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR),http://www.revealnews.org/,"Through its publishing platform Reveal, CIR seeks to empower the public and hold leaders accountable through investigative journalism. The organization has published an online guide to disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000093,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Defending Democratic Institutions (CSIS),https://www.csis.org/programs/international-security-program/defending-democratic-institutions,"This project seeks to counter Russia, and potentially other adversaries, in their efforts to disrupt democracy and cultivate a public distrust of democratic institutions. A key focus of this initiative is on understanding and countering adversary attacks on America’s justice system, to include courts, judges, prosecutors, and the rule of law. Improving cybersecurity of institutions and individuals is a crucial mechanism for strengthening America’s capacity to guard against threats to democracy. In addition, the initiative will focus on building national resilience against information operations that threaten to undermine public respect for democratic institutions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000094,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Gray Zone Project,https://www.csis.org/grayzone,"CSIS’s International Security Program has analyzes hybrid and Gray Zone threats and aims to identify how the United States can best deter, campaign in, and respond to gray zone approaches.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000095,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Transnational Threats Project (CSIS),https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project,"CSIS coordinates a Transnational Threats Project, which has addressed Russian interference in the U.S. context and U.S. strategies to combat Russian information warfare, within the context of a broader focus on terrorism, insurgency, and crime.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000096,Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD),https://csd.bg/,"CSD conducts research and advocacy on issues related to European integration, political institutions, and economic and political development. The organization's research agenda includes a focus on state capture and russian influence, especially in the Black Sea countries and the Western Balkans, and its experts have written on media capture, propaganda, and Russian economic influence.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Bulgaria,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000097,Central European Policy Institute,http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/anatomy-info-war-how-russias-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-counter-it,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000098,Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats (Czech Ministry of the Interior),https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/Default.aspx,"Operational since 2017, the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats is a division of the Czech Ministry of the Interior designed to monitor and respond to influence operations with public policies and awareness-raising efforts. The center also deals with terrorism, security aspects of migration, extremism, and other disruptions to public order and safety.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000099,Centre for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH),https://www.counterhate.com/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000100,Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy (CEID),https://www.ceid.hu,"CEID conducts research, publishes analysis, and holds roundtable discussions and conferences on how to strengthen transatlantic relationships. The CEID is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis’s #DisinfoNet and cooperated with Ukrainian Prism and the EAST Center in their work on the Disinformation Resilience Index, with the Centre for International Relations in their work on countering Kremlin-backed disinformation, and with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in their “Fog of Falsehood” report on Russian deception in Ukraine.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,Hungary,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000101,Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS),https://www.ceps.eu/,"CEPS conducts research and hosts events and discussions on a range of issues affecting European domestic policies. CEPS has produced a number of publications on EU strategies for understanding and countering disinformation and on content moderation strategies online, including a study commissioned by the European Parliament on possible EU actions to address fake news and emerging threats like deepfakes.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000102,Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI),https://www.cigionline.org/,"CIGI is dedicated to conducting research on Canadian and international public policy and security issues. In June 2019, CIGI partnered with the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity to produce an Election Risk Monitor that assesses threats and potential responses to disinformation in the context of Canada’s elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000103,Centre for International Relations (Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych) (CSM),http://www.csm.org.pl/en/,CSM conducts research and analysis on issues in Polish foreign policy and European policy and is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis’s #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000104,Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST),https://crestresearch.ac.uk/,CREST conducts behavioral and social science research to better understand threats to national security and develop strategies for countering them. The organization has addressed conspiracy theories and online behavior in its work.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000105,"Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA)",https://www.istinomer.rs,"CRTA is dedicated to promoting accountability and transparency in democratic politics. The organization runs a project called Istnomer, which conducts fact-checking and reporting in support of free media, institutional transparency, and political accountability.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000106,CEPS,https://www.ceps.eu/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000107,Certified Content Coalition,https://www.certifiedcontentcoalition.org/,The Certified Content Coalition grew out of CableLabs with the goal of developing standards for trustworthy publishers.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,Y,Y,Y,,Dead website?,
|
||||
G000108,Channel 4 FactCheck,https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/,FactCheck is the fact-checking initiative run by Channel 4 in the United Kingdom.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000109,Chatham House,https://www.chathamhouse.org/,"Chatham House conducts research and analysis on issues in public policy and international peace and security. Chatham House experts have published research and hosted discussions through the International Security Department on issues related to disinformation, information warfare, elections, and global cybersecurity.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000110,Check My Ads,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000111,Check Your Fact,https://checkyourfact.com/,"Check Your Fact is the fact-checking initiative of the Daily Caller. The site is known for its ties to white nationalists. It is one of six third-party organizations working together to fact-check content for American users. The partnership has already come under intense criticism from climate journalists (among others) who are concerned that the Daily Caller’s editorial stance on issues like climate change, will spread even more misinformation Facebook.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000112,Checkology,,,,,Education (public),Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000113,Chequeado,https://chequeado.com/,,,,Fact checking,Verification,,,,,Argentina,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000114,Chile Check,,,,,,,,,,,Chile,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000115,CirroLytix,https://www.cirrolytix.com/,"CirroLytix is a data analytics research company specializing in data ethics and machine learning technologies for social impact. Their tool, ""Troglodyte,"" provides online researchers, journalists and fact checkers with an extensive database for matching sources with information and exposing causal links, conspiracies, and associated disinformation agents.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000116,Cities on the Internet,https://mwi.pl/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Europe,Poland,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000117,Cities on the Internet Association (Stowarzyszenie Miasta w Internecie) (MWI),https://mwi.pl/,"MWI is dedicated to the development of digital competency and literacy in Polish citizens. Through the project Digital Poland of Equal Opportunities, MWI is addressing digital literacy among Polish adults with the help of volunteers that encourage individuals over the age of 50 to engage online. The organization also develops educational materials for and provides training to Polish citizens of all ages.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000118,Citizen Evidence Lab (Amnesty International),https://citizenevidence.org/,"Amnesty International's Citizen Evidence Lab provides resources for researchers, journalists, and activists documenting and exposing human rights abuses using content verification, data science, remote sensing, crowd-sourcing, and digital security tools. One of their projects, called Youtube DataViewer, helps extract information from Youtube videos.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000119,City University of New York: Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism,https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/,The Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism runs the Quality Project in partnership with the World Economic Forum to aggregate efforts to assess the quality of online information and allow users to select a personalized weighting of quality indicators.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000120,Civic online reasoning,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000121,Civil,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000122,Civil Liberties Union for Europe,https://www.liberties.eu/en,"Civil Liberties Union for Europe is network of civil liberties watchdogs that carries out public advocacy and campaigning and that provides research and analysis to policymakers on how to advance civil liberties in law and public policy. Its recent campaigns have concerned censorship, data privacy, the protection of civil society, and migration. The organization has written on efforts to curb disinformation within the European Union and its member states.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000123,ClaimBuster,https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/,ClaimBuster is a tool developed by researchers at the University of Arlington to provide automated live fact-checking.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000124,Clean Up The Internet,https://www.cleanuptheinternet.org.uk,"Clean up the internet is an independent, UK-based organisation concerned about the degradation in online discourse and its implications for democracy. They campaign for evidence-based action to increase civility and respect online, and to reduce online bullying, trolling, intimidation, and misinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000125,Climate Feedback,,,,,Credible content,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000126,Cloudflare,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000127,CNA,https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/cip/information-environment,"Recent CNA work on disinformation topics includes understanding state and non-state malign influence on partners and allies in Europe; identifying and analyzing the range of tools available to state and non-state actors in Africa and the Middle East; examining the use of the cyber domain to conduct information warfare; and analyses of messages, themes, and audiences in the Indo-Pacific region.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000128,Co-inform EU,https://coinform.eu/,Co-Inform brings together universities and small and medium enterprises in Europe to collaborate on tools for digital literacy with the aim of addressing disinformation. The project has put together a glossary on terms related to disinformation and will produce additional tools to be tested in three European countries by 2021.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000129,Cocuyo Chequea,https://efectococuyo.com/category/cocuyo-chequea/,Cucuyo Chequea is the fact-checking arm of Venezuelan media organization Efecto Cucuyo.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Venezuela,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000130,CogSecCollab,http://cogsec-collab.org/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,North America,Global,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000131,Colombia Check,https://colombiacheck.com/,Colombiacheck is a Colombian fact-checking project and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Colombia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000132,Columbia Journalism Review,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000133,Columbia University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000134,"Columbia University: Craig Newmark Center for Journalism, Ethics and Security (Graduate School of Journalism)",https://journalism.columbia.edu/craig-newmark-center,"Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism houses the Craig Newmark Center for Journalism Ethics and Security, which received funding in 2019 and will address journalism ethics in the digital age.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000135,Columbia University: Tow Center for Digital Journalism (Graduate School of Journalism),https://towcenter.columbia.edu,"The Tow Center examines digital journalism's industry-wide economic trends, its cultural shifts, and its relationship with the broader, constantly changing world of technology, and houses the Emergent research project.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000136,Combating Russian Disinformation,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000137,Commerce,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000138,Common Cause social media monitoring,https://www.commoncause.org/our-work/voting-and-elections/election-protection/stopping-cyber-suppression-and-voting-disinformation/,"The national, nonpartisan Election Protection coalition works so all voters have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. Made up of more than 100 local, state and national partners, Election Protection works year-round to advance and defend your right to vote",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000139,Competition and Markets Authority (CMA UK),https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority,"The CMA is an independent non-ministerial department which leads the Government’s Digital Markets Taskforce, and seeks to regulate the digital sphere by: enabling disruptors to challenge incumbents; empowering consumers through choice and control; supporting quality services and content online and providing industry, especially SMEs, with fair access to digital markets to be able grow their businesses.",,Government,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000140,Comprobado CNN CHV (Chile Check),https://www.cnnchile.com/chilecheck/,Comprobado CNN is the fact-checking initiative of CNN Chile.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Chile,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000141,Comprova,https://projetocomprova.com.br,"Comprova is a collaborative fact-checking organization in Brazil that unites journalism partners to investigate, contextualize, and clarify fake news.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000142,Congo Check,http://www.congocheck.net/,Congo Check is a fact-checking and image verification organization based in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,DRC,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000143,CONNECT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000144,ConPruebas,http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/conpruebas,"ConPruebas is a fact-checking project run by Plaza Pública at Rafael Landívar University, inspired by Chequeado.",,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Guatemala,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000145,Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000146,Content blockchain project,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000147,Correctiv,https://correctiv.org/en/,Correctiv is an investigative journalism outfit that provides training for citizens and journalists aimed at reducing the impact of disinformation. The organization also coordinates an annual Campfire Festival to foster conversation around the future of digital journalism and is developing a hub for nonprofit journalists in Europe. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000148,Cortico,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000149,Council on Foreign Relations (CFR),https://cfr.org,"The CFR provides research and analysis on issues related to international public policy, law, and security. Under the mantle of programs like the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program, National Security and Defense Program, U.S. Foreign Policy Program, and Europe Program, CFR scholars have authored reports on containing and countering Russia’s foreign interference efforts, defending American elections from foreign interference, botnets, and deepfakes, among other topics.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000150,Council on Foreign Relations: Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program,https://cfr.org,"The Digital and Cyberspace Policy program addresses one of the most challenging issues facing the country in the twenty-first century: keeping the global internet open, secure, and resilient in the face of unprecedented threats. Digital technologies have become ubiquitous; nearly five billion people use a cell phone, and approximately 4.5 billion are on the internet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000151,Countering Disinfo,https://counteringdisinformation.org/,A guide to promoting information integrity. This resource combines the collective wisdom of organizations on the front lines of combatting disinformation globally. This living project provides an outline of what’s being done to address the challenge in key areas and provides a searchable database of the organizations around the world engaged in making the digital landscape safe for democracy,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000152,Craig Newmark Philanthropies,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000153,Credibility Coalition,https://credibilitycoalition.org/,The Credibility Coalition brings people together to develop common standards for information credibility.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,Y,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000154,Credibility Coalition: Misinfosec Working Group (MisinfosecWG),https://misinfocon.com/misinformation-has-stages-7e00bd917108,"The Credibility Coalition’s Misinfosec Working Group (“MisinfosecWG”) maps information security principles onto misinformation. Their current work is to develop a tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) based framework that gives misinformation researchers and responders a common language to discuss and disrupt misinformation incidents.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000155,CREST,crestresearch.ac.uk,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000156,CrowdTangle,https://www.crowdtangle.com/,"CrowdTangle is owned by Facebook and offers digital strategic communications services. Among many of its services, CrowdTangle provides platform access which allows users to report false news.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000157,CS-ISAO,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000158,CTI League Disinformation Team,https://cti-league.com/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,Global,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000159,CUNY,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000160,CUNY,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000161,CUNY: News Integrity Initiative,https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/centers/tow-knight-center-entrepreneurial-journalism/news-integrity-initiative/,The News Integrity Initiative (NII) at the Newmark J-School was launched in 2017 to advance media literacy and increase trust in journalism.,,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000162,Cyabra,www.cyabra.com,"Cyabra has developed AI-based technologies to identify bots, sockpuppets and trolls in social media platforms, as well as Deep Learning tech against visual manipulations (Deepfakes and GANs) in real-time. Using this technology, Cyabra is able to outline the scope of a disinformation attack within a day rather than the several days it may take human analysts working manually. This elevated timeline provides valuable early detection; an attack identified in real-time offers an opportunity for counter-action or counter-narratives.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000163,Cyan Forensics,https://www.cyanforensics.com,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000164,Czech Elves,https://www.facebook.com/cestielfoveofficial/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000165,Czech Pirate Party (Greens/EFA),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000166,Dagens Nyheter (Faktist),https://www.dn.se/,"Faktist is the fact-checking project of Dagens Nyheter, a Swedish newspaper and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000167,DARPA,,,,Defence/military,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000168,Darwin AI,https://www.darwinai.com,"The Darwin AI team has developed an “Automatic Disinformation Assessment” engine. It is a large scale, bidirectional language model that can detect the stance of an article. The project had an accuracy of 90.01%, which surpasses general benchmarks in the industry. The tool was able to determine whether or not a document agrees, disagrees, or takes no stance towards a specific claim.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000169,Data & Society,https://datasociety.net/research/media-manipulation/,"Data & Society’s Media Manipulation & Disinformation research examines how different groups use the participatory culture of the internet to turn the strengths of a free society into vulnerabilities, ultimately threatening expressive freedoms and civil rights. Efforts to exploit technical, social, economic, and institutional configurations of media can catalyze social change, sow dissent, and challenge the stability of social institutions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000170,Data & Society Research Institute: Disinformation Action Lab,https://datasociety.net/research/disinformation-action-lab/,The Disinformation Action Lab (DAL) at Data & Society forges new approaches to address the complex dynamics underpinning the spread of propaganda and disinformation.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000171,Data & Society Research Institute: Media Manipulation Initiative,https://datasociety.net/research/media-manipulation/,"Data & Society's Media Manipulation Initiative looks at how various qualities of media environments and technologies can be exploited to destabilize democratic, social, and economic institutions. The initiative has produced reports on algorithmic accountability, source hacking, weaponized advertising technology, the amplification of extremist content, and alternative facts, among other topics. Its affiliates have also produced a report on deepfakes and the history of audiovisual manipulation.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000172,Datalyrics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000173,dBunk(r),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000174,DCMS,,,,Government,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000175,Debunk EU,http://debunk.eu/,"DEBUNK is a Lithuanian initiative composed of media organizations, strategic communications professionals, researchers, and technologists that have developed an artificial intelligence tool to identify disinformation within 2 minutes.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000176,Deep Freeze,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000177,Deep Trust Alliance,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000178,Deepnews.ai,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000179,DeepSeer,https://deepseer.ai,DeepSeer provides a platform for social media data analysis and visualization by tracking and mapping online influencers. Their toolset can help identify and track the spread of disinformation on the web. DeepSeer offers measurement tools for the impact of online communications and messaging; enabling assessment of the impact and efficacy of counter disinformation campaigns.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000180,Deeptrace,www.Deeptracelabs.com,Deeptrace is a company developing technologies to detect and monitor synethic or manipulated media (deepfakes).,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000181,DeFacto,https://defacto.space,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000182,Defending Democracy,https://defending-democracy.org,"Defending Democracy is an independent, nonpartisan, transatlantic initiative. that works to support and defend basic values and fundamental freedoms and rights. Regarding internal threats, Defending Democracy focuses on defending democracy, rule of law and human rights. Regarding external threats, Defending Democracy focuses on deterring disinformation, cyber-attacks and political warfare.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000183,Delfi Melo Detekto,https://www.delfi.lt/news/melo-detektorius/,,,,,,disinformation,,,,Lithuania,,,,,,
|
||||
G000184,Demagog Poland,https://demagog.org.pl/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,disinformation,,,Europe,Poland,,,,,,
|
||||
G000185,Demagog.cz,https://demagog.cz/,Demagog.cz conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in the Czech Republic. The project is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000186,Demaskuok,https://demaskuok.lt/en/main-page/,"Demaskuok searches the information ecosystem of the Baltic states for disinformation and propaganda, utilizing an AI tool to flag suspected disinformation, and a network of human fact checkers to verify or discredit flagged content.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000187,Democracy Fund,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000188,Demos - Centre for the Analysis of Social Media,https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000189,Detecteur Rumeurs,https://www.sciencepresse.qc.ca/detecteur-rumeurs,Detecteur Rumeurs is the fact-checking arm of the Montreal-based media company Agence Science Presse.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,Canada,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000190,Detector de Mentiras,https://lasillavacia.com/,Detector de Mentiras (Lie Detector) is a Colombian fact-checking project run by La Silla Vacía and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Colombia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000191,DFID,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000192,DHS,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000193,Digit Eye India,https://digiteye.in/,Digiteye India is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000194,Digital Polarization Initiative,https://www.aascu.org/AcademicAffairs/ADP/DigiPo/,"The Digital Polarization Initiative, or “DigiPo”, is AASCU American Democracy Project's national effort to build student civic, information and web literacy by having students participate in a broad, cross-institutional project to fact-check, annotate, and provide context to the different news stories that show up in Twitter and Facebook feeds.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000195,Digital Sisters; Stop Online Violence Against Women (SOVAW),https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shireen_Mitchell,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000196,Dirt Protocol,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000197,Disinfo Cloud,https://disinfocloud.com,"Disinfo Cloud is an open source platform funded and supported by the U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) and maintained by Park Capital Investment Group LLC (Park Advisors), an implementing partner of the GEC. Disinfo Cloud aims to provide relevant stakeholders an overview of the tools and technologies available to help push back against foreign propaganda and disinformation.",Yes,Government,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000198,Disinformation Tracker,https://www.disinformationtracker.org,"Disinformation Tracker is an interactive map that seeks to support human rights defenders in Sub-Saharan Africa by tracking and analysing all laws, policies and other government actions on disinformation across Sub-Saharan Africa.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Africa,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000199,Dispute Finder,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000200,Doğruluk Payı,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000201,DoubleVerify,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000202,dpa-Faktencheck,https://www.dpa.com/de/unternehmen/faktencheck/,dpa-Faktencheck is the fact-checking arm of the German news organization Deutsche Presse-Agentur GmbH.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Germany,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000203,DQ Institute,https://www.dqinstitute.org/,"With the support of the World Economic Forum, DQ Institute develops global standards for digital intelligence and literacy and develops strategies for education and outreach on these issues. DQI has developed a framework for thinking about digital intelligence and is conducting impact and research assessments to understand the impact of digital technologies and to assess digital intelligence skills around the world.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000204,DROG,https://aboutbadnews.com/,"DROG is a nonprofit that fosters awareness and builds resilience against disinformation through its Bad News game, workshops, and lectures. Bad News is a social impact game that allows individuals to experience the spread of disinformation and see its impact on society.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000205,Dubawa,https://www.dubawa.org/,DUBAWA is a Nigerian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Nigeria,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000206,Duke Reporters Lab / Jigsaw,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000207,Duke Share the Facts Widget,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000208,Duke Tech & Check Cooperative,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000209,Duke University: DeWitt Wallace Center for Media & Democracy,https://reporterslab.org/,"The DeWitt Wallace CMD runs the Duke Reporters' Lab, which conducts research on fact-checking and technological tools to aid fact-checkers. The lab maintains a comprehensive list of fact-checking organizations around the world and runs the Duke Tech & Check Cooperative, which aims to automate fact-checking.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000210,e-Enfance (e-E),https://www.e-enfance.org/,"e-E offers training on risks and threats in cyberspace and best practices for navigating digital spaces to kids in school, their parents, and professionals in the workforce. The platform also offers a free and confidential hotline and message service on Net Ecoute where the public can call in to receive assistance and counseling in the face of cyber threats.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000211,East STRATCOM Task Force: EUvsDisinfo,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/,"The East StratCom Task Force was established to respond to Russian influence operations in Eastern Europe. The task force's flagship project, EUvsDisinfo, monitors and catalogues cases of pro-Russian disinformation and conducts research and analysis on the methods and practices of disinformation and emerging technologies like deepfakes. The task force also trains EU and member state institutions and civil society organizations on disinformation and raises awareness about disinformation in the context of European elections.",,Government,Fact checking,Research (primary/secondary),,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000212,Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC),http://www.eesc.lt/en/,EESC conducts research and analysis on policy issues affecting Eastern Europe and engages the policy community in trainings and seminars on democratic transition. EESC administers a Democracy and Development Assistance Fund to support individuals and organizations in Eastern Europe working to support democracy. Its experts have written on Russian influence operations in Eastern European countries. EESC is also part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000213,EastWest Institute: Global Cooperation in Cyberspace (EWI),https://www.eastwest.ngo/,"EWI is a network of experts that engage in conflict resolution and prevention and provide research and analysis on global challenges to peace and security. EWI’s program on Global Cooperation in Cyberspace ""seeks to reduce conflict, crime and other disruptions in cyberspace and promote stability, innovation and inclusion"" by convening multistakeholder summits, organizing collaborative working groups, and mobilizing around the adoption of global norms in cyberspace.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000214,EC,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000215,Ecuador Chequea,http://www.ecuadorchequea.com/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Ecuador,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000216,EDPS-EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000217,Ekspress Meedia / Eesti Päevaleht,https://epl.delfi.ee/kategooria/86056905/faktikontroll-1,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,disinformation,,,Europe,Estonia,,,,,,
|
||||
G000218,El poder de elegir,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000219,El Sabueso,https://www.animalpolitico.com/elsabueso-rss,"El Sabueso is the fact-checking section of Animal Político, a Mexican media organization, and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Mexico,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000220,Election Integrity Partnership,https://www.eipartnership.net/,"The Election Integrity Partnership is a coalition of research entities focused on supporting real-time information exchange between the research community, election officials, government agencies, civil society organizations, and social media platforms.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000221,Electoral Commission (UK),https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/,"The Electoral Commission is an independent body which regulates the funding of political parties, individual party members, and candidates, as well as organisations campaigning in referenda. It is distinct from other regulators for being answerable to Parliament. It also enforces inclusion of imprints of printed election material under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.",,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000222,Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),https://www.eff.org/,"EFF is dedicated to advancing digital civil liberties through litigation, policy analysis, activism, and technology development. One of EFF’s issue areas is free speech online, and the organization has produced analysis on the need to balance content moderation strategies aimed at combating misinformation with freedom of expression and on how the United States should think about regulating deepfakes.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000223,Ellinika Hoaxes,https://www.ellinikahoaxes.gr/,"Ellinika Hoaxes conducts fact-checking of Greek online content and has created a web tool to inform users when they visit sites that are likely to be satirical, conspiratorial, or otherwise false and misleading. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Greece,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000224,Emergent,http://www.emergent.info/about,Emergent is a real-time rumor tracker and part of a research project with the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University. It focuses on how unverified information and rumor are reported in the media. It aims to develop best practices for debunking misinformation.,Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000225,Estadão Verifica,https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/estadao-verifica,Estadão Verifica is a Brazilian fact-checking initiative housed at Estadão and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000226,Estonia,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000227,Ethical Journalism Network (EJN),https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/supporters/african-media-initiative,"EJN provides training and education to journalists to advance quality media and trust in media institutions. Through its series ""Saving the News: Ethics and the fight for the future of journalism,"" EJN has written on challenges to journalism in an era of declining trust, deepfakes, and journalistic self-regulation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000228,EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000229,EU Disinfo Lab,https://www.disinfo.eu,"EU DisinfoLab is an independent non-profit organisation focused on tackling sophisticated disinformation campaigns targeting the EU, its member states, core institutions, and core values.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000230,EU External Action Service,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000231,EU vs Disinformation,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000232,Eurasia Partnership Foundation,https://epfarmenia.am,,,,,,,,,,Armena,,,,,,Armenia/Eurasia
|
||||
G000233,Eurasian States in Transition Research Center (EAST Center),http://east-center.org/,"EAST Center provides research and analysis on influence operations in Central and Eastern European countries and coordinates the Disinformation Resilience Index. Implemented with regional partners, the Disinformation Resilience Index assesses the vulnerability and resilience of fourteen Central and Eastern European countries to foreign (namely, Russian) disinformation campaigns.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000234,Europe fit for the Digital Age,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000235,European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE),https://www.hybridcoe.fi/,"The Hybrid CoE is a platform for EU and NATO member states to coordinate and share best practices on defending against hybrid threats, including influence operations. The Hybrid CoE engages in research to better understand and respond to threats, identify vulnerabilities, and build resilience, and it provides training and education for governments.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000236,European Conservatives and Reformist Group,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000237,European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR),https://www.ecfr.eu/,"ECFR focuses on European foreign policy and security issues and provides research and analysis, convenes experts and leaders, and engages with national country governments on policy development. ECFR has published a paper on European strategic sovereignty that covers hybrid threats, and its scholars have offered commentary on countering online radicalization, strategies for fighting fake news, Russian cyber threats (including disinformation), and information manipulation in Europe.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000238,European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),https://edmo.eu,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000239,European Digital Rights (EDRi),https://edri.org/,"EDRi is a coalition of European digital human rights groups that seeks to provide public policy research and defend the importance of civil and human rights in the digital environment. To this end, EDRi has addressed influence operations through its work with Civil Liberties Union for Europe and Access Now to produce a joint report on the disinformation debate and policy responses in the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000240,European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS),https://epthinktank.eu/,"EPRS is the in-house research arm of the European Parliament. Through the European Parliament Think Tank, EPRS produces reports, briefings, and in-depth analyses meant to drive legislative development. The think tank has produced a number of reports and briefings on disinformation, information warfare, and hybrid threats that examine topics like artificial intelligence's impact on disinformation, the functioning of the rule of law, the EU and the Western Balkans, NATO strategic communications, influence operations in the EU.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000241,European People's Party (Christian Democrats),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000242,European Union: European External Action Service,https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en,"The EEAS is the EU's diplomatic service. Countering disinformation is one of its key focus areas. The Commission put forward a European approach for tackling online disinformation in its Communication of April 2018, seeking to promote a more transparent, trustworthy and accountable online environment. The Communication proposed measures to tackle disinformation online, including a self-regulatory EU-wide Code of Practice on Disinformation, signed by large online platforms and the advertising industry, as well as support for an independent network of fact-checkers.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000243,European Values (Kremlin Watch),https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/,"European Values runs Kremlin Watch, a program designed to provide monitoring and analysis of Kremlin-backed influence operations. Kremlin Watch provides weekly briefings and other opportunities for information-sharing, policy development advice to national governments, and educational activities for members of the public. European Values is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000244,European Values Center for Security Policy,https://www.europeanvalues.net/data/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000245,eWitness Media Inc,https://ewitness.commons.gc.cuny.edu/,"eWitness provides a digital alibi for images and videos. In today’s digitized world, eWitness helps companies stand by their content, to confidently attest to the time, geolocation and content of the media that appears on their platform . This attestation then eliminates questions against the validity of the media, allowing audiences to focus on the truth and context that surround the media.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,no site found,
|
||||
G000246,Executive round table on digital journalism ethics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000247,Fabula AI,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fabula_AI,"Fabula AI, was acquired by Twitter in June 2019. The tool evaluates the veracity of an article based on the way it spreads online. This means that it can detect a fake news story within 2-20 hours of publishing.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000248,Facebook,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000249,Facebook (UK),,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000250,Facebook Flagging Fake,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000251,Facebook Third-Party Fact-Check,https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536,"Facebook support the use of both technology and human review to remove fake accounts, promote news literacy and disrupt the financial incentives of spammers. In certain countries, they also work with third-party fact-checkers who are certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network to help identify and review false news.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000252,FacktenFinder,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000253,Fact Check - the journal.ie,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000254,Fact Check EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000255,Fact Checking Chile,http://factchecking.cl/,Fact Checking Chile is a fact-checking initiative based at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile that trains students as fact-checkers and content verifiers.,,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Chile,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000256,Factba.se,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000257,FactCheck (The Conversation),https://theconversation.com/us,The Conversation is an online news platform for academics and researchers to share information and evidence in support of sound policy. The organization has a dedicated fact-checking team dedicated to ensuring information integrity.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000258,FactCheck Georgia,https://factcheck.ge/en,FactCheck is an online fact-checking platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Georgian politicians and public figures.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Georgia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000259,FactCheck.kz,http://factcheck.kz/,FactCheck.kz is a fact-checking initiative based in Kazakhstan and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Kazakhstan,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000260,FactChecker.in,https://factchecker.in/,FactChecker.in is an Indian fact-checking initiative run by the Spending & Policy Research Foundation and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000261,Factcheckers,http://factcheckers.it/,Factcheckers is an Italian media literacy organization that provides resources and training to high schools and universities around the world on fact-checking and critical evaluation of information.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000262,FactCrescendo,https://www.factcrescendo.com/,FactCrescendo is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000263,FactLink,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000264,Factly,https://factly.in/,Factly is an Indian organization that conducts fact-checking and helps make government data and information accessible to citizens. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000265,Factmata,https://factmata.com/,"Factmata is building an API to identify, classify, and build trust scores for online content to help users rate the trustworthiness of a source. The company also provides moderation services to help flag potentially harmful content for trust and safety teams at major online platforms, and they organize a blacklist to help clients know which platforms or websites to avoid entirely.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000266,Fake it to Make it,http://www.fakeittomakeitgame.com,"Fake It To Make It gamifies the experience of spreading false news for public consumption, deepening players’ understanding of the process and motives behind false news dissemination.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000267,Fake News Tracker,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000268,Fake Off (20 Minutes),https://www.20minutes.fr/,"Through its Fake Off section, 20 minutes conducts fact-checking, particularly on stories that have gained significant online attention. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000269,FakeHunter,https://fakehunter.pap.pl/en/,"FakeHunter is a community-based project for verifying content published on the Internet, launched by the Polish Press Agency (PAP) together with GovTech Polska. It aims to demystify and refute false information related to the SARS-CoV-2 virus.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000270,FakerFact,https://www.fakerfact.org/,"FakerFact has built an artificial intelligence tool called ""Walt"" to help readers assess the potential biases in news sources, rather than just determining the veracity of the content.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000271,Faking News: Fraudulent News and the Fight for the Truth,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000272,Faktabaari,https://faktabaari.fi/in-english/,Faktabaari is a Finnish fact-checking organization that provides media literacy resources to EU schools.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Finland,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000273,Faktisk,https://www.faktisk.no/,Faktisk is a Norweigan fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network. They also run a school project called Think that aims to educate young students about critical thinking.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Norway,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000274,Faktograf,https://faktograf.hr/,Faktograf conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in Croatia. The organization is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Croatia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000275,Faktograf.hr,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000276,Fandango,https://fandango-project.eu/,"The FANDANGO (Fake news discovery and propagation from big Data Analysis and artificial intelligence operations) project aggregates a large array of media sources so that big data/Machine Learning tools can analyze data to understand patterns within the ecosystem and provide insight to analysts. This technology can support government stakeholders’ mission by facilitating a high-level overview of the disinformation ecosystem, helping to map out and highlight patterns, connections and detection criteria.",Yes,Government,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000277,Fatabyyano,https://fatabyyano.net/,,,,Fact checking,,,,,Africa,North Africa,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000278,Fatima,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000279,FCO,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000280,Federation of American Scientists,https://fas.org/ncov/disinformation-reports/,"Upon recognition of the threat that false information poses to science, the Federation of American Scientists established the Disinformation Research Group (FAS DRG). FAS DRG is composed of scientists, communications experts, data-scientists, and technologists with the intended purpose of detecting, understanding, and effectively exposing disinformation and false narratives surrounding COVID-19. FAS DRG uses multiple methods, technologies, and resources to execute the mission.",,,,,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000281,FeedReflect,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/feedreflect/bigmeipgaifggglelcnpnpbaefimpooc?hl=en-US,FeedReflect is a browser extension for Google Chrome that urges users to consider the quality of the news content they consume on Twitter,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000282,FiB,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000283,Field guide to fake news,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000284,Finding the truth amongst fakes,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000285,Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA),https://www.fiia.fi/,"FIIA conducts research and policy analysis on international relations and the European Union. The institute has research programs on the European Union, Eastern European countries and their relationship with Russia, and global security, and it has published a number of reports on information warfare, hybrid threats, disinformation, and related concepts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000286,FireEye: Information Operations Intelligence Analysis,https://www.fireeye.com/,,,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000287,First Draft News,https://firstdraftnews.org,"First Draft is a nonprofit that aims to provide practical and ethical guidance for journalists and publishers in the digital age. The organization coordinates an international fact-checking initiative, trains journalists and fact-checkers in countries with upcoming elections, and conducts and disseminates research on best practices for producers and consumers of digital news. The organization recently published a series of guides on responsible reporting, including one on reporting on deepfakes.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000288,Fiskkit,http://fiskkit.com/,"Fiskkit is an online platform where users can assess the credibility of news articles, and the organization has also created a tool designed to help schoolchildren evaluate sources.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000289,Ford Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000290,Fortis AI,https://www.alionscience.com,"Fortis is an information operations (IO) platform that takes data from multiple sources and distills it into insights and actionable results. The system aims to alert analysts to adversarial IO, and to provide meaningful analytics, theme and narrative detections, and support for conducting information operations.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000291,FotoForensics,http://fotoforensics.com,"Fotoforensics displays the underlying forensics data of any image uploaded to their platform, thereby providing a user with visual and other data to help determine whether the image has been altered. Fotoforensics’ underlying tools are integrated with other social media intelligence platforms or by social media platforms themselves to improve content moderation and disinformation identification efforts.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000292,Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS),https://www.feps-europe.eu/,"FEPS conducts research and advocacy on European democracy and public policy. Its experts have been involved in studies on foreign state propaganda and Russian hybrid warfare. FEPS also collaborates with the Istituto Affari Internazionali on the EU Global Strategy Watch, which tracks developments in EU Global Strategy implementation.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000293,France 24 - les Observateurs,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000294,Fraunhofer Institute,https://www.aisec.fraunhofer.de/en/fields-of-expertise/cognitivesecurity.html,,,,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000295,Freedom and Solidarity Foundation (Brīvības un Solidaritātes Fonds) (BSF),http://bsf-latvija.lv/,BSF conducts research and advocacy on issues in Latvian public policy and democracy and international peace and security. Its scholars have written on Russian propaganda and work with other organizations to provide opportunities for discussion and collaboration on these issues.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Latvia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000296,Freedom on the Net,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000297,Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES),https://www.fes.de/,"FES conducts advocacy and research on issues related to democracy in Germany and across the world. Through its German headquarters and regional offices, FES has addressed media quality and resilience in Africa, disinformation and propaganda in Ukraine, and disinformation in debates about migration within the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000298,Fsecure,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000299,Full Fact,https://fullfact.org/,Full Fact conducts fact-checking and verification and provides research and training on fact-checking efforts. Full Fact also works with the British government to make government data more available to citizens and to enhance transparency in communication.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000300,Fundação Getúlio Vargas Department of Public Policy Analysis (FGV DAPP),https://observa2018.com.br/,"During the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, FGV DAPP coordinated the Digital Democracy Room to monitor public debate and potential threats to its integrity. Through this initiative, FGV DAPP provided research and analysis on issues related to misinformation online, bot networks, and foreign influence in public discourse and worked with the Consultative Council on Internet and Elections of the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court. FGV has also joined the Atlantic Council's #ElectionWatch project, which monitored foreign influence in Brazilian, Colombian, and Mexican elections in 2018.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Investigations,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000301,Fundación La Voz Pública,https://chequeado.com/,"Fundación La Voz Pública is dedicated to strengthening the quality of public debate in Argentina. The organization runs an initiative called Chequeado, which conducts fact-checking and trains fact-checkers and journalists. The organization also creates innovative tools for improving fact-checking and the dissemination of knowledge.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Research (primary/secondary),,,,South America,Argentina,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000302,Fundamedios,http://54.85.84.127/,"Fundamedios is an organization committed to promoting freedom of expression, monitor aggressions and risks faced by journalists, and uphold human rights in Latin America. The organization has experience in monitoring, promoting and protecting freedom of expression and freedom of the press; boosting high-quality reporting; training journalists; carrying out studies and research, and promoting open discussion about journalism, media, and democracy in Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, and the USA. Fundamedios also runs Ecuador Chequea, which is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000303,Future Digital Threats to Democracy (Technology for Global Security),https://www.tech4gs.org/future-digital-threats-to-democracy.html,"Tech4GS is a new type of non-profit: part think tank, part incubator, and purely nonpartisan. As part of a two-year, multi-disciplinary effort to address the ways in which democracies and open societies combat high-tech illiberalism, they have partnered with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) to launch the joint project “Future Digital Threats to Democracy.”",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000304,"Gallup/Knight Foundation Survey on Trust, Media and Democracy (2017)",https://knightfoundation.org/reports/american-views-trust-media-and-democracy/,,,,Education (public),Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000305,GeoPoll,https://www.geopoll.com/,GeoPoll specializes in global and emerging market research. Their work focuses on two main areas: Monitoring and evaluation; and counter-narratives. Their work on counternarratives aims to counter or expose disinformation through targeted messaging as well as gathering information on fake news and identifying the most effective channels to disseminate counter messages.,,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),Credible content,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,Also Kenya,
|
||||
G000306,"George Washington University: Institute for Data, Democracy, and Politics",https://iddp.gwu.edu,"The Institute for Data, Democracy & Politics (IDDP)’s mission is to help the public, journalists, and policymakers understand digital media’s influence on public dialogue and opinion, and to develop solutions to disinformation and other challenges that arise in these spaces.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000307,Georgetown University: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,https://isd.georgetown.edu,"SD sponsors working groups in collaboration with other elements of the School and the University as well as non-academic groups that bring together high-level, experienced practitioners and eminent scholars to examine emerging international and statecraft issues and recommend policy solutions. In October 2020, ISD released a report titled ""The New Weapon of Choice: Technology and Information Operations Today""",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000308,Georgetown University: Law School Center on Privacy and Technology (CPT),https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/,"CPT studies the impact of government surveillance and commercial data practices on vulnerable communities, provides intellectual and legal foundations for reforms to U.S. consumer privacy laws, and offers technology-intensive courses that prepare students to be leaders in privacy practice, policy making, and advocacy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000309,German Council on Foreign Relations (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik) (DGAP),https://dgap.org/,DGAP conducts research and advocacy on issues in German public policy and international relations. The organization's experts have published on Russian propaganda efforts in German politics.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000310,German Marshall Fund: Digital Innovation & Democracy Initiative (GMF),https://www.gmfus.org/digital-innovation-and-democracy-initiative,"The German Marshall Fund runs a Digital Innovation & Democracy Initiative, which focuses more broadly on the relationship between technological developments and democratic values.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000311,German Marshall Fund: Mercator European Dialogue (GMF),https://www.gmfus.org/forum/mercator-european-dialogue,"GMF organizes the Mercator European Dialogue, a network of European members of parliaments that meets to discuss public policy issues, in cooperation with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, the Istituto Affari Internazionali, and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Through this program, GMF convened European policymakers in May 2019 to discuss disinformation in European elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000312,Get Bad News (DROG),https://getbadnews.com/#intro,"DROG develops programs and courses and conducts research aimed at recognizing disinformation, especially online. In Get Bad News, you take on the role of fake news-monger. Drop all pretense of ethics and choose a path that builds your persona as an unscrupulous media magnate. But keep an eye on your ‘followers’ and ‘credibility’ meters. Your task is to get as many followers as you can while slowly building up fake credibility as a news site. But watch out: you lose if you tell obvious lies or disappoint your supporters!",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000313,Giant Language Model Test Room (GLTR),http://gltr.io,The Giant Language Model Test Room offers a forensic analysis of and rates the likelihood that a snippet of text was generated by an automated system or written by a human. GLTR can be used to analyze and detect fake text or as an educational tool to allow the public to check the likelihood of whether a piece of content is human-written or machine-generated and demonstrate the capabilities of AI to generate fake news.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000314,GIZ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000315,Global Alliance for Responsible Media (GARM),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000316,Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC),https://cyberstability.org/,"GCSC was created with the goal of promoting mutual awareness and understanding among the various communities addressing international cybersecurity. GCSC has pursued research on the development of global norms in cyberspace, defining the public core of the Internet, and protection of electoral infrastructure, among other issues.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000317,Global Council to Build Trust in Media and Fight Misinformation,https://www.globalmis.info/,"In 2018, the Ethical Journalism Network, European Broadcasting Union, Global Editors Network, Global Forum for Media Development, Online News Association, and World Editor's Forum launched the Global Council to Build Trust in Media and Fight Misinformation. The council's mission is to create a repository of resources and information, connect key stakeholders, identify and implement innovative solutions for newsrooms, and serve as a voice for the media industry in addressing the problem of misinformation and declining trust in newsrooms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,World,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000318,Global Disinformation Index (GDI),https://disinformationindex.org/,GDI is developing an artificial intelligence tool to create automated disinformation ratings for news organizations to assess the likelihood that they carry disinformation.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000319,Global Focus,http://www.global-focus.eu/,"Global Focus conducts advocacy, research, and analysis around Romanian public policy issues and international peace and security. The organization has launched an international initiative to combat disinformation and influence operations and has convened a seminar in Bucharest to address ways to build resilience and respond to threats. Global Focus is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Romania,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000320,Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD),https://gfmd.info,"GFMD is a network of journalism support and media assistance groups committed to advancing free, independent, sustainable and pluralistic news ecosystems. Its Internet Governance Working Group has developed a focus on disinformation and misinformation and focuses its advocacy efforts on how the underlying mechanisms of the digital economy enable the manipulation of online spaces and the proliferation of dis/misinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000321,GLOBSEC Policy Institute,https://www.globsec.org/,"GLOBSEC conducts research and analysis of issues in public policy and international peace and security. The organization runs a program on strategic communication, through which it publishes analysis on disinformation in Europe and resiliency to influence operations. In 2018, GLOBSEC announced a project on hybrid threats meant to support the development of public policies, monitoring threats, and capacity-building within the Slovakian government.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000322,Go Think Initiative,https://www.facebook.com/GoThinkInitiative/,"Go Think Initiative is dedicated to convening European organizations and experts to address changes in the media landscape and cultivate an awareness of the media's role in politics. The organization has held professional media literacy workshops as part of its V4 Think Media project, and it develops games to help citizens understand media, propaganda, and the importance of civic participation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000323,Good of All,http://goodofall.org,"In collaboration with Kansas State University, Good of All has created a modification to a popular video game, Grand Theft Auto, to explore topics of censorship, protection of democracies, and freedom of speech. This modified version of the game, called Grand Theft Democracy, simulates a fictional nation’s presidential election and requires players to strategize to steer a population into voting for a certain candidate. They have stated that this approach could raise awareness of how disinformation/ propaganda may be employed by adversaries.",,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000324,Google,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000325,Google Cloud,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000326,Google News Initiative,https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com,The Google News Initiative works with the news industry to help journalism thrive in the digital age.,,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000327,Google News Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000328,Google/YouTube,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000329,GovLab-NYU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000330,Graphika,https://graphika.com/,"Graphika provides companies with tools to analyze online conversations and detect disinformation campaigns. Its lab division partners with academic institutions to advance its social network analysis, machine learning, and artificial intelligence capabilities.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,Research (primary/secondary),,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000331,Ground News,https://www.ground.news/,"Ground news is a news comparison platform to help the public make sense of stories across the political spectrum. With the rise of mis/disinformation and increasingly polarized news sources, Ground News provides an app that shows side by side comparisons of different sources’ coverage of a story, along with tools for users to analyze and draw their own conclusions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000332,Group M,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000333,Group of the European People's Party: Christian Democrats,,,,,,,,,,Europe,Latvia,,,,,,
|
||||
G000334,Grover,https://grover.allenai.org/,"Grover technology works by generating its own ‘neural fake news’, which is then used to detect similar articles. The Grover model can generate an article against a specific news source, author, and date. Users of the tool also give the articles a headline that the content is then based off of.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,not accessible,
|
||||
G000335,GTRI,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000336,Guardian,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000337,Hacked off,https://hackinginquiry.org,,,Civil Society/NGO,Influencer (on policy),,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000338,Hacker Factory,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000339,Hacks Hackers,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000340,Hamilton68 dashboard,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000341,Hanns Seidel Stiftung,https://www.hss.de/en/,"Hanns Seidel Stiftung conducts research and training and promotes international cooperation in public policy. Its researchers have published analysis on social media and bots, disinformation, and political campaigning.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000342,Harvard,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000343,Harvard Shorenstein Center,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000344,Harvard University: Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society,https://cyber.harvard.edu,"The Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University is dedicated to exploring, understanding, and shaping the development of the digitally-networked environment. A diverse, interdisciplinary community of scholars, practitioners, technologists, policy experts, and advocates, it seeks to tackle the most important challenges of the digital age while keeping a focus on tangible real-world impact in the public interest. The faculty conducts research, builds tools and platforms, educates others and facilitates dialogue across and among diverse communities.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000345,Harvard University: Defending Digital Democracy (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs),https://www.belfercenter.org/,"Defending Digital Democracy develops solutions to share threat information with technology providers, governments and political organizations. It also provides election administrators, election infrastructure providers, and campaign organizations with practical “playbooks” to improve their cybersecurity. Other activities include develoing strategies for how democracies can credibly deter hostile actors from engaging in cyber and information operations, assessing emerging technologies that may improve the integrity of systems and processes vital to elections and democracy and Convening civic, technology, and media leaders to develop best practices that can shield public discourse from adversarial information operations.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000346,Harvard University: Nieman Foundation for Journalism,https://nieman.harvard.edu/,"The Nieman Foundation for Journalism provides fellowships, publications, and training opportunities around developments in journalism. Through Nieman Lab, the foundation is reporting on how newsrooms are adapting to the digital landscape, including to the threat of disinformation, declining trust in news media, and the proliferation of deepfakes.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000347,"Harvard University: Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy",https://shorensteincenter.org/,"Harvard University's Technology and Social Change Research Project at the Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy investigates the impact of new media on truth and trust. Its researchers have created the Global Media Manipulation Case Book, and the center also publishes the Misinformation Review to track academic research on the topic. The Shorenstein Center also hosts a Digital Platforms & Democracy project that focuses on the ways in which digital platforms shape public debate and regulatory tools for addressing them.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000348,Health Feedback,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000349,Henry Jackson Society (HJS),https://henryjacksonsociety.org/,HJS conducts research and analysis on issues related to international peace and security and democracy promotion abroad. HJS personnel have recently addressed issues of Russian disinformation and fake news as threats to Western democracy.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000350,Hercule,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000351,Heritage Foundation,https://www.heritage.org,"The Heritage Foundation provides research and advocacy on U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Scholars at the Heritage Foundation have authored reports and commentary on Russian disinformation, and the organization has hosted events around this issue. Researchers at Heritage have also written on Chinese psychological warfare.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000352,HO@X,http://hoax.cz/cze/,"HO@X aims to inform the public about digital hoaxes, i.e. widely spread email chain messages that pose some kind of threat to users. HO@X offers a public database that catalogs emails and news stories known to be fraudulent.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000353,Hoaks Atau Fakta?,https://www.kompas.com/,"Hoaks Atau Fakta? Is the fact-checking initiative of Kompas.com, an Indonesian media platform, and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000354,Hoover Institution,https://www.hoover.org/,"The Hoover Institution ""seeks to improve the human condition by advancing ideas that promote economic opportunity and prosperity, while securing and safeguarding peace for America and all mankind."" Scholars affiliated with the institution have published on disinformation, content moderation, information operations, and information warfare, both in academic contexts and in informal commentaries.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000355,Hypothes.is,https://web.hypothes.is/,The Hypothesis Project is an effort to create an open source software that allows users to annotate online content and fact-check the news.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000356,IAB Europe/ OPA Europe,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000357,iAgents Lab,https://iagentntu.github.io/,"Affiliated with National Taiwan University, Intelligent Agents Laboratory (iAgents Lab) is developing technical applications for improving people's lives and proposing available solutions on social problems. Social media users can use iAgents Lab's algorithm to identify disinformation in real time.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000358,IBM Consulting,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000359,IBM CPD Explorer,https://www.ibm.com/watson,The IBM Counter Propaganda and Disinformation (CPD) Explorer retrieves thousands of news articles and social media posts in real-time and analyzes each post to quickly determine instances of disinformation and propaganda and visualizes the results of the analysis and classification within a dynamic cloud-based dashboard.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000360,Identifact,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000361,IDS-Sussex University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000362,IFEX,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000363,Iffy Quotient (University of Michigan),https://csmr.umich.edu/platform-health-metrics/,"The Iffy Quotient is a web-based tool that queries Facebook and Twitter and identifies URLs that are known to be biased or to be frequent reporters of false information. The tool then calculates the percentage of URLs on each site that are ""iffy,"" or known for reporting false or misleading information.",Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000364,Image Verification Assistant (Reveal),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000365,IMPRESS,https://www.impress.press,UK press regulator,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000366,Independent,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000367,Index on Censorship,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000368,India Today Fact Check,https://www.indiatoday.in/fact-check,India Today Fact Check is the fact-checking arm of India Today's website.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000369,Indiana University: Observatory on Social Media (OSoMe),https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/,"OSoMe uses social media data to develop tools for visualizing the diffusion of information and misinformation online. OSoMe's goal is that individuals and journalists will use these tools to make their own assessments about the trustworthiness of news sources and to contribute to the growing field of data journalism. OSoMe also houses Hoaxy, a web-based tool that visualizes the spread of articles online. Hoaxy searches for claims and fact-checking going back to 2016. It tracks the sharing of links to stories from low-credibility sources and independent fact-checking organizations. It also calculates a bot score, which is a measure of the likely level of automation.",Yes,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000370,Individual - Adam Shostack,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000371,Individual - Dominic Dodd,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000372,Influence Apps,https://startinfluence.com/,"Influence Apps, Inc. is a strategic communications tool that simplifies complex technologies and techniques to help governments counter bad actors online. Powered by ad tech industry and government communications experts, Influence offers a suite of services that provide government operators tools for real-time sentiment analysis and communication campaign management.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000373,Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO UK),,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000374,Information Disorder Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000375,Information Operations Archive,https://www.io-archive.org/#/,The Information Operation Archive hosts publicly available and rigorously attributed datapoints from known Information Operations on social media platforms.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000376,Institute for Public Relations (IPR),https://instituteforpr.org/,"IPR provides research and advocacy around marketing and communications. Its current strategic priorities include restoring reputation in an environment of low trust, and the organization has launched a ""Disinformation in Society"" report in 2019 with plans to release future editions annually.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000377,Institute for Statecraft (Integrity Initiative),https://www.statecraft.org.uk,"The Institute for Statecraft is an independent, Scottish, charitable body whose work seeks to improve governance and enhance national security. They launched the Integrity Initiative in 2015 to defend democracy against disinformation. Its website was temporarily taken down, pending an investigation into the theft of data from the Institute.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000378,Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD),https://isdglobal.org,"ISD provides research, education and advocacy, and policy advising on issues concerning far-right radicalization, Islamist extremism, disinformation, and polarization. The Institute also partners with governments, civil society organizations, and private companies to develop policies and best practices for countering violent extremism both on- and off-line, and provide training to governments and citizens for countering violent extremism.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Education (public),,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000379,Institute for Strategic Research of France (Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire) (IRSEM),https://www.irsem.fr/,"IRSEM is the research arm of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces and provides analysis on issues in defense and security. IRSEM, in partnership with the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, has produced a comprehensive report on influence operations and recommendations for governments, civil society organizations, and private actors for mitigating the impact of hostile influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000380,Institute for the Future: Digital Intelligence Lab,http://www.iftf.org/partner-with-iftf/research-labs/digital-intelligence-lab/,"The Institute for the Future’s Digital Intelligence Lab conducts research on disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of American politics. Its publications include The Human Consequences of Computational Propaganda, a series of eight case studies from the 2018 U.S. midterm elections; Digital Propaganda and the News, a series of three reports concerning how disinformation affects journalism; Principles and Policies to Counter Deceptive Digital Politics; State-Sponsored Trolling; and The Biology of Disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000381,Instituto Igarapé,https://igarape.org.br/,Instituto Igarapé conducts research and analysis on Brazilian and international security and development with a thematic focus on cybersecurity. The organization's experts have written on the role of bots in Brazilian political discourse and disinformation in Latin America more generally. Its researchers also create data visualization tools to help address problems in security and development.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000382,Inter-American Dialogue,https://www.thedialogue.org/,"The Inter-American Dialogue is dedicated to research and analysis on issues of public policy and international affairs affecting North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean. It conducts research and advocacy on issues related to media, elections, and potential foreign influence through its Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000383,International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS),https://icds.ee/,"The ICDS research program on Security and Resilience addresses hostile influence strategies and operations and information warfare through research and advocacy. The organization collaborated on the Disinformation Resilience Index to assess Estonia's resilience to influence operations, and it hosted a development cooperation program supported by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs titled ""Resilient Ukraine: civil society support for strengthening national resilience and security in Ukraine.""",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,Estonia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000384,International Fact Checking Network (IFCN),https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,The International Fact-Checking Network is a unit of the Poynter Institute dedicated to bringing together fact-checkers worldwide. The IFCN was launched in September 2015 to support a booming crop of fact-checking initiatives by promoting best practices and exchanges in this field.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,Y,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000385,International Forum for Democratic Studies (National Endowment for Democracy),https://www.ned.org/international-forum-for-democratic-studies/,The NED's International Forum for Democratic Studies is a leading center for analysis and discussion of the theory and practice of democracy around the world. The forum's areas of focus include authoritarian influence and the information space.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000386,International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA),https://www.idea.int/,"International IDEA conducts research and builds capacity in electoral processes, constitution-building, political participation, and political representation. Through its work on ICT, Elections and Democracy, International IDEA has developed guidance on appropriate uses of social media in electoral contexts and has convened experts to discuss the spread of misinformation about voting registration and practices.",,Government,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000387,International Republican Institute: Beacon Project (IRI),https://www.iribeaconproject.org/,"IRI has established the Beacon Project to address state-sponsored influence operations, particularly those emanating from Russia. The project identifies and exposes false or misleading information and helps facilitate a response with its local partners. The organization has also developed a media monitoring tool called >versus< that it shares with local media partners in Central and Eastern Europe. The Beacon Project is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000388,International Standard Content Code,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000389,Internet Archive TV News Archive,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000390,Internet Association,https://internetassociation.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000391,Internet Health Report,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000392,INTERNETLAB: Law and Technology Research Center,http://www.internetlab.org.br/en/,"Through its project on Electoral Rights in the Digital Era, INTERNETLAB has convened experts in electoral law and experts on the digital environment to address issues like digital propaganda and the use of bots in elections. INTERNETLAB has also produced a guidebook for citizens navigating technology platforms titled ""Surviving on the Networks,"" and it runs a project titled Você na mira meant to empower citizens in the face of digital microtargeting during elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000393,Internews Ukraine,https://internews.org/,"Internews Ukraine supports the development of free and independent media in Ukraine through advocacy, legislative efforts, training for journalists, and countering propaganda and misinformation online. The organization has created a communication strategy for advocating Ukraine's integration in the European Union and countering propaganda created by pro-Russian forces.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Ukraine,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000394,InVid,https://www.invid-project.eu/,InVid is an EU-funded project dedicated to building a platform for assessing the reliability and authenticity of online video content.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000395,IP2 Location,https://ip2location.com,"P2 Location’s software identifies the geolocation of IP addresses, as well as whether the IP address is an anonymous proxy, VPN, or TOR IP address. It retrieves geolocation information with no explicit permission required from users.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000396,IREX,https://www.irex.org/,"IREX works globally to promote inclusive and democratic societies by creating informed, educated, and civically active citizenries. IREX has partner organizations located around the world to aid in developing capacity for independent media. IREX has implemented a Learn to Discern program for educating citizens in Ukraine about the threat of manipulative information and building digital literacy skills.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000397,ISAO,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000398,ISBA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000399,ISOC,https://www.internetsociety.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000400,Istinomer,https://www.istinomer.rs/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000401,Istinomjer,https://istinomjer.ba/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000402,Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI),https://www.iai.it/,"IAI provides research and analysis on issues in Italian public policy, international peace and security, and European integration. The organization's experts have published analysis on social media, truth, and European politics. IAI works with the German Marshall Fund to organize the Mercator European Dialogue, a network of members of European parliaments that meets to discuss public policy issues. Through the program, the German Marshall Fund and its partners convened policymakers to discuss disinformation and fake news in European elections in May 2019.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Italy,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000403,Italian Postal and Communications Police Service (Polizia Postale e delle Comunicazioni),https://www.commissariatodips.it/,"In advance of elections in 2018, the Italian government established an online platform where citizens can report false or misleading information and request verification. The platform is managed by the Postal and Communications Police Service, which is responsible for information and communications technology-related crimes.",,Government,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000404,İzlemedeyiz,http://izlemedeyiz.org/en/#intro,"İzlemedeyiz is dedicated to increasing transparency and accountability in the Turkish government through providing information for private sector entities about government activities. The organization also runs Doğruluk Payı, which conducts fact-checking.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Asia,Turkey,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000405,Jigsaw,https://jigsaw.google.com/,"Jigsaw employs scientists, engineers, researchers, designers, and policy experts to create online tools and platforms dedicated to addressing repressive censorship, online harassment, violent extremism, and injustice and corruption. Jigsaw has contributed data and conducted research on the topic of disinformation, deepfakes, and fake news. They have also partnered with the Duke Reporters' Lab to develop the ""Share the Facts"" widget to help Internet users share fact-checked information.",Yes,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000406,Jordanian Media Credibility Monitor (AKEED),https://akeed.jo/en,The Jordanian Media Credibility Monitor is a project of the Jordan Media Institute that aims to support the development of quality media in Jordan.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Jordan,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000407,Journalist,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000408,Keyhole,https://keyhole.co/,"Keyhole provides a platform of tools to measure the impact of social campaigns. The company tracks, measures, and reports on the success of social campaigns. The company offers a real-time dashboard of metrics and analysis points. The solution focuses on hashtag and influencer data, and measures metrics such as reach, impressions, engagement and followers. Using this tool, users can set goals and calculate the impact and success of a social campaign on Twitter, Youtube, Instagram or Facebook.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000409,Kharon,https://www.kharon.com,Kharon is a research and analytics firm that generates insight about sanctions-related risk intelligence. Kharon works with financial services firms and other multinational institutions. Kharon utilizes a proprietary technology and a staff of expert analysts to identify and map connections between individuals and entities that have been sanctioned by different governments and international bodies and their associates.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000410,Kings College London: Centre for Strategic Communications,https://www.centreforstrat.com/,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000411,"Knight commission on trust, media and democracy",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000412,Knight Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000413,Knight Prototype Fund,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000414,Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,https://www.kas.de/,"Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung is a political foundation that provides research and advocacy on German public policy issues. Its researchers have written on influence operations in Europe, fact-checking in Africa, and extremism online, among other topics related to disinformation and foreign interference.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000415,Kosh Archive (Tattle),https://tattle.co.in/products/kosh,"Main archive that contains content scraped from all the different sources- the Tattle Jod telegram bot, Fact-checking sites, social media and chat apps.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,India,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000416,Kremlin Watch,https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000417,KRIK,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000418,Krik,https://www.krik.rs/,"OCCRP's Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK) is dedicated to supporting Serbian investigative journalism. Comprised of both non-profit journalism centers and for-profit media organizations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, OCCRP aims to use investigative reporting and fact-checking to expose and deter corruption.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000419,Krypometri,https://kallxo.com/krypometer/,"Krypometri is the fact-checking arm of Kallxo.com, an online platform edicated to reporting on corruption, organized crime, fraud, and abuse in Kosovo. The organization is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Kosovo,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000420,La Chistera,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000421,La Voce,https://www.lavoce.info/,La Voce is an Italian online news platform and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000422,Labor of Love,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000423,Latvia,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000424,Le Monde (Les Décodeurs),https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/,Le Monde's Les Décodeurs is the French newspaper's fact-checking platform and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000425,Lead Stories,https://leadstories.com/,Lead Stories is an online platform that tracks trending news stories to identify and debunk false or misleading information as quickly as possible. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000426,Les Decrypteurs,https://ici.radio-canada.ca/decrypteurs,,,,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000427,Les Observateurs (France 24),https://observers.france24.com/en/,Les Observateurs is a project of France 24 that is dedicated to empowering citizen journalists by verifying and publishing eyewitness accounts of news stories. The platform is part of the International Fact-Checking Network and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000428,Leviathan,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000429,Libération (Check News),"https://www.liberation.fr/desintox,99721",Libération's CheckNews is the current fact-checking platform for the French newspaper and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000430,Lie Detectors,https://lie-detectors.org,"Lie Detectors' news literacy project aims to turn schoolchildren in Europe aged 10-15 into powerful lie detectors and critical thinkers, empowering them to understand news media, make informed choices and resist peer pressure as they assemble their worldview.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000431,Linterna Verde,https://linternaverde.co/,"Linterna Verde provides research and analysis on issues concerning information and debate online, private and public regulation of the online information space, and civil rights and liberties. One of its ongoing projects concerns the dynamics of political messaging on WhatsApp.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,South America,Colombia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000432,Logically,https://www.logically.ai/,"Logically builds products and services to meet modern challenges in combating misinformation, disinformation, propaganda campaigns and identifying problematic content in the digital domain space.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000433,London Institute for Contemporary Christianity (LICC),https://licc.org.uk/,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000434,London School of Economics (LSE),,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000435,London School of Economics: Arena (Institute of Global Affairs),http://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/arena,"Housed at the Institute of Global Affairs, Arena is a programme dedicated to overcoming the challenges of disinformation. The aim of the Arena programme is to use high-quality research, analysis and evaluation to create effective best practices that can then be disseminated to journalists, public diplomacy teams and civic groups.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000436,London School of Economics: Department of Media and Communications,http://www.lse.ac.uk/media-and-communications/truth-trust-and-technology-commission,"The LSE Truth, Trust and Technology (T3) Commission deals with the crisis in public information. They work with experts, practitioners and the public to identify structural causes of media misinformation and set out a new framework for strategic policy in a report. T3 is funded by the LSE Knowledge Exchange & Impact Fund.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000437,"London School of Economics: Truth, Trust and Technology (T3) Commission",,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000438,Loughborough University,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000439,Lui President,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000440,Luminate,,,,,Funders,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000441,Lund University: Department of Strategic Communication (Lunds Universitet Strategisk Kommunikation),https://www.isk.lu.se/en/research/research-projects/countering-disinformation-protecting-elections,"Lund University's Department of Strategic Communication has been commissioned by more than a dozen organizations including the UK Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), EU-NATO Hybrid Centre of Excellence and NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence to produce hands-on guidance, processes and training to counter influence operations.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000442,Mafindo,https://www.mafindo.or.id/,Mafindo is an organization dedicated to fact-checking and exposing hoaxes in Indonesian media and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000443,Main Street One,https://mainstreet.one/,Main Street One is a technology company dedicated to identifying online narratives and producing countermessaging on behalf of clients.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000444,Maldito Bulo,https://maldita.es/malditobulo/,Maldito Bulo conducts fact-checking of stories circulating online and creates web-based tools to help news consumers identify false or misleading information. Maldito Bulo is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network. The organization also runs training programs at universities and other public and private institutions.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000445,Manipulátoři,https://manipulatori.cz/,"Manipulátoři provides perspective and insights on politics and strategic communications at a time of rampant disinformation, misinformation, and fake news.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000446,Markkula Center for Applied Ethics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000447,Marvelous AI,https://marvelous.ai/,Marvelous AI is a technology company that is dedicated to identifying and analyzing online narratives and their imapct on public discourse.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000448,Masaryk University: Department of Political Science (Masarykova Univerzita Katedra Politologie),https://www.fakescape.cz/en,"Masaryk University developed Fakescape, an escape game for high school students designed to teach media literacy and critical thinking skills.",Yes,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000449,McKinsey,,Mike Chui,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000450,Media Cloud,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000451,Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI),https://www.mediadefence.org/,"MLDI is an organization dedicated to providing legal defense in support of freedom of the press around the world. Alongside the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the International Fact-Checking Network, MLDI helped set up the Fact-checkers Legal Support Initiative. MLDI also partners with organizations around the world dedicating to advancing legal protection for journalists and developing independent media organizations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000452,Media Literacy for Citizenship (EAVI),https://eavi.eu/,"EAVI is an organization that conducts research and advocacy on media literacy in Europe. EAVI has conducted research to define and measure media literacy in Europe and provided policy recommendations for advancing media literacy in the bloc, and the organization creates curriculum and online tools for educating young people about media literacy.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Education (public),,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000453,Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000454,Media Monitoring Africa (MMA),"
|
||||
https://mediamonitoringafrica.org/","MMA promotes access to media and media freedom and conducts monitoring and evaluation of media quality in South Africa, especially during elections. The organization also provides monitoring assistance to other organizations, media literacy training, training for journalists covering human rights issues, and online tools for citizens seeking to improve media literacy and strengthen journalistic accountability.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,South Africa,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000455,Media Ownership Monitor,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000456,Media Well,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000457,MediaBias Fact Check,https://mediabiasfactcheck.com,"Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC), founded in 2015, is an independent online media outlet. MBFC is dedicated to educating the public on media bias and deceptive news practices.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000458,MediaLab (Agence France Presse),https://www.afp.com/en/agency/medialab,"AFP is a leading global news agency providing fast, comprehensive and verified coverage of the events shaping our world and of the issues affecting our daily lives. Drawing from an unparalleled news gathering network across 151 countries, AFP is also a world leader in digital verification. With 2,400 staff representing 100 different nationalities, AFP covers the world in six languages, with a unique quality of multimedia storytelling spanning video, text, photos and graphics.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000459,MediaMath,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000460,Medium,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000461,Meedan,https://meedan.com,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000462,Meedan.org,https://meedan.com/,"Meedan.org is a nonprofit that creates tools for journalists and translators. One of its projects, Check, has focused on providing online tools and training resources for journalists to combat the spread of false or misleading information. The organization also runs a Credibility Coalition, aimed at creating a holistic framework for assessing credibility in the media context, and a Content Moderation Project, which addresses technical and theoretical issues related to the practice of content moderation online.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000463,Memex,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000464,Memo 98,http://memo98.sk/,"MEMO 98 is an organization that monitors media, largely during elections, and provides monitoring reports and recommendations on media legislation to international institutions and civil society groups. The organization also provides training and capacity-building support to national organizations conducting media evaluation. Memo 98 works with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on their international election observation efforts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000465,Mention,https://mention.com/en/,"Mention is a social media and web monitoring tool offering real-time alerts for keywords and allowing users to monitor millions of sources.
|
||||
The company monitors popular sites such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Pinterest in order to alert users when keywords are used.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000466,MentionMapp Analytics,https://mentionmapp.com/,"Mentionmapp technology enables visualization of the spread of Twitter trends, including identification of influencers. They also offer services to aid analysis of bot activity.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000467,Metafact,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000468,Metro (Viralgranskaren),https://www.metro.se/viralgranskaren,"Through its Viralgranskaren (Viral Reviewer), Metro conducts fact-checking and organizes a list of sites that produce satirical news that is sometimes mistaken for true information or that produce deliberately false and misleading information. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000469,Mexico,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000470,MGP Fact Check,http://www.mygopen.com,"MGP Fact Check is an independent organization based in Hsinchu, Taiwan. Since 2015, they have been offering free fact checking services to users of Line, a popular messaging app in Taiwan.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000471,Microsoft Belgium: cybersecurity,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000472,Microsoft: Defending Democracy Program,https://news.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/topic/defending-democracy-program/,"The Defending Democracy Program will work with stakeholders including governments, non-government organizations, academics and industry all in democratic countries globally to protect campaigns from hacking; increase political advertising transparency online; explore technological solutions to preserve and protect electoral processes; and defend against disinformation campaigns.",,Technology,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000473,Midstream Technology,http://midstream.us,"Midstream Technology's ""Aletheia"" algorithm is a method for identifying specific patterns and behaviors exhibited by networks of accounts in social media. The Aletheia platform can identify global behaviors indicative of astroturf campaigns. Then, using metadata and account posting patterns, identify which accounts are malicious bots gaming recommendation algorithms and which are genuine human run accounts. It can also pick up on rhetorical cues common in disinformation, such as sensationalization of information or pick up on behaviors from the network pushing the disinformation.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000474,Mimikama,https://www.mimikama.at/,Mimikama conducts fact-checking and provides media literacy resources.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Austria,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000475,Mind Over Media,https://propaganda.mediaeducationlab.com/node/1,"Mind Over Media: Analyzing Contemporary Propaganda is an online crowdsourced learning platform with over 3,500 examples of current propaganda from more than 40 countries, along with a suite of 9 lesson plans suitable for use in high school, college and with adult learners. The program is fully translated into Polish, Romanian, Croatian, Finnish, Swedish, French and Dutch.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000476,Minnesota,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000477,Misinfocon,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000478,Misinformation Solutions Forum,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000479,MIT: Center for Civic Media,https://civic.mit.edu,"Working at the intersection of participatory media and civic engagement, the Center for Civic Media's mission is to design, create, deploy, and assess tools and processes that support and foster civic participation and the flow of information between and within communities.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000480,MIT: Ethics & Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative (Media Lab),https://aiethicsinitiative.org,"The MIT Media Lab runs the Ethics & Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative in partnership with the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society. The initiative has addressed artificial intelligence's impact on the quality of media and the ethical, political, and technical questions associated with its impact. Through the Ethics & Governance of AI Initiative, MIT has provided financial support to projects at the intersection of media and technology, including a project to develop better tools for detecting deepfakes and a project for detecting misinformation on WhatsApp.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000481,MIT: Laboratory for Social Machines (Media Lab),https://www.media.mit.edu/groups/social-machines/overview/,"The MIT Media Lab's Laboratory for Social Machines conducts research on human networks, natural language processing, network science, and machine learning.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000482,MIT: Viral Communications Research Group (Media Lab),https://www.media.mit.edu/,"The Viral Communication Research Group invents personal devices that contain your data and the rules for its use, and conducts video analysis based on machine learning to understand the subcarriers of information in the news and bottom-up civic mobilization tools that are locally and culturally responsive.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000483,MITRE,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000484,Moat,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000485,Moat/Oracle,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000486,MOST,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Macedonia,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000487,Mozilla,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000488,Mozilla Foundation,https://foundation.mozilla.org/en/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000489,Mozilla information trust initiative,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000490,Myth Detector (Media Development Foundation) (MDF),http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/home,"Through its Myth Detector website, MDF conducts fact-checking and provides quality information and teaching and training opportunities for Georgian youth. Through the Media & Information Literacy Lab, MDF provides media literacy games, curriculum, and training in support of anti-propaganda efforts. MDF also partners with European Values to build civil society capacity to respond to Kremlin-backed disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Georgia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000491,Mythos Labs,http://www.mythoslabs.org/,"Mythos Labs provides a tool called MIDAC to detect disinformation campaigns on social media, measure their impact, and then auto-generate counter narratives.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000492,MyWOT,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000493,National Autonomous University of Mexico: Civic Innovation Lab (UNAM),https://unamcivic.com/index.html,"The UNAM Civic Innovation Lab is a research laboratory at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) that studies real world problems involving citizens, governments, and NGOs; and uses human centered design to create novel computational systems that address these problems to construct improved societies. Their civic tech research involves the areas of crowdsourcing, disinformation, and machine learning.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,Mexico,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000494,National Chengchi University: Election Study Center,https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/PageFront,"Elections are central to democratic politics. They offer citizens an opportunity to choose representatives and government officials, and provide governments with a legitimate basis for exercising power. The quality of elections has a direct effect on the nature of democracy itself. In recent years, Taiwan's political system has undergone a dramatic transition and has nearly completed the transition from authoritarianism to consolidated democracy. Since elections have played and will continue to play a key role in this process of democratization, it is essential to undertake continuous and systematic research into election practices in order to both strengthen the foundations of democracy and also to raise the quality of elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000495,National Democratic Institute (NDI),https://www.ndi.org/infotegrity,"NDI's INFO/tegrity project provides research on disinformation vulnerability and resilience and emerging technologies, monitors disinformation and computational propaganda in elections, assists social media platforms and tech platforms, shares tools to detect and disrupt disinformation, and rebuilds trust in institutions and processes. In support of these efforts, NDI organized a Digital Disinformation Forum with academic and think tank partners in 2018. NDI has also released guidance for its elections programs concerning disinformation and electoral integrity and an awareness-raising document for staff and local partners.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000496,NATO Stratcom,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000497,NATO: Strategic Communications Center of Excellence (StratCom COE),https://stratcomcoe.org/,"A part of NATO, the StratCom COE provides analysis, practical support, and conducts research and experimentation in communication to support member countries and NATO’s overall aims. This includes, for example, recent reports on disinformation in Sweden, measurement of the Russian Internet Research Agency’s impact in online conversations, strategic communication in the context of elections, a comprehensive study on hybrid threats, and the black market for social media manipulation, among other publications.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000498,NESTA,,UK,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000499,New America: Open Technology Institute,https://www.newamerica.org/oti/,"Through its Open Technology Institute, New America created the Ranking Digital Rights Project, which creates a corporate accountability index to assess technology companies and their commitments to human rights online, including freedom of expression.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000500,New America: Public Interest Technology Initiative,https://www.newamerica.org/public-interest-technology/,New America's Public Interest Technology Initiative published a policy paper in 2018 on digital advertising and its relationship to precision propaganda.,,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000501,New Context,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000502,New Eastern Europe (NEE),http://neweasterneurope.eu/,"NEE is interested in political and policy issues in Eastern European states that were at one time a part of the Soviet Union or a member of the Eastern Bloc. While not a formal scholarly journal, the periodical makes use of journalistic style to provide and explore expert commentary from experts, scholars, historians, and politicians in pertinent areas. NEE authors have increasingly written on the topic of disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000503,New York Times,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000504,New York Times: News Provenance Project,https://www.newsprovenanceproject.com/,The News Provenance Project is dedicated to researching and developing ways to ensure that the context of visual content travels with that content.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000505,New York University,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000506,New York University: Center for Social Media and Politics (CSMaP),https://csmapnyu.org/,CSMaP studies the impact of social media on politics and develops new methods and technology tools to analyze the impact of social media on democracy. The organization houses the Social Media and Political Participation Lab and provides open-source data and tools for other researchers.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000507,New York University: The 100 Questions (GovLab),https://the100questions.org/about.html,"The 100 Questions Initiative seeks to map the world’s 100 most pressing, high-impact questions that could be answered if relevant datasets were leveraged in a responsible manner. The initiative's fifth domain focuses on identifying the top 10 questions related to disinformation:
|
||||
1) understanding the impact of disinformation on society,
|
||||
2) understanding disinformation as a social (engineering) phenomenon,
|
||||
3) improving information quality online and offline and
|
||||
4) evaluating the efficacy of different types of interventions against it.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000508,Newmark Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000509,News Co/Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000510,News Cube,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000511,News Lab (Google News Initiative),https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com/intl/en_gb/google-news-lab/,"Through the News Lab, the Google News Initiative is developing partnerships and providing training on contemporary issues in journalism. Trust and misinformation are News Lab priorities, and the organization provides support for initiatives like the Trust Project, First Draft, and Cross Check. Through the Digital News Innovation Fund, the Google News Initiative is providing support for European projects tackling challenges in the digital news environment, including a project called Digger, which aims to create audio forensic technologies that can assist in detecting deepfakes. Google is also integrating tagging strategies into Google News articles in some countries and modifying its algorithm to punish hate speech and disinformation in search results.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000512,News Literacy Project (NLP),https://newslit.org/,NLP creates digital media literacy curriculum for American middle and high school students. NLP also provides professional development programming for educators and journalists aimed at improving news literacy education.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000513,News UK,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000514,NewsCheck,https://www.newscheck.com/,NewsCheck is an organization analyzing existing journalistic ethics codes and building an artificial intelligence-enhanced system for reviewing and scoring online content.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000515,NewsFrames at Global Voices,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000516,NewsGuard,https://www.newsguardtech.com/,"Based on the input of journalists and editors, NewsGuard has developed a rating system for assessing the trustworthiness of websites based on nine journalistic criteria. The company also provides a ""nutrition label,"" detailing how websites perform against the criteria. NewsGuard's website also includes free news literacy resources for educators, libraries, and parents.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000517,NewsMobile Fact Checker,http://newsmobile.in/articles/category/nm-fact-checker/,"Fact Checker is the fact-checking arm of NewsMobile, an Indian media organization. Fact Checker is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000518,NewsQ,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000519,NewsTracker,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000520,NewsWhip,https://www.newswhip.com/,"NewsWhip is a social media engagement tracking firm that tracks content by amount and location of user engagement, as well as audience interests and changes in interest over time. NewsWhip specializes in monitoring real-time information about the spread of information and the actors behind it, and can help NGOs, news organizations, universities, and other civil society members to address the challenges of misinformation.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000521,Newtral,https://www.newtral.es/zona-verificacion/fact-check/,,,Civil Society,Factchecking & Journalism,,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000522,Newtral para Atresmedia Televisión,https://www.lasexta.com/programas/el-objetivo/,Newtral conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in Spain. The organization is one Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers. El Objetivo de Ana Pastor is a fact checking and data journalism driven television program broadcast on laSexta every Sunday evening.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000523,NewYork Times,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000524,Nisos,https://www.nisos.com,"Nisos offers managed intelligence solutions to help companies mitigate advanced threat actors, stop platform abuse, counter disinformation, mitigate insider threats and conduct due diligence.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000525,Nobias,https://nobias.com/,Nobias is a broswer extension that assesses the potential biases and credibility of news articles.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000526,Nobl Media,https://www.wearenobl.com/,"Formerly Trustium. Trustium is a software-as-a-service company that uses artificial intelligence tools to help advertisers ensure that their ads are placed on trustworthy, credible sites.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000527,Northeastern University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000528,Northeastern University: Network Science Institute (NetSI),https://www.networkscienceinstitute.org/,"NetSI is dedicated to measuring and modeling network properties to better understand physical, social, informational, and technical systems. NetSI received a grant to launch the Center for an Informed Society, which will apply computational social science methods to study Google and Twitter's impact on the online information landscape.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000529,Northern Ireland Foundation: FactCheckNI (NIF),https://factcheckni.org/,"NIF runs FactCheck Northern Ireland (FactCheckNI), an online platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Irish politicians and public figures. FactCheckNI provides interactive training on fact-checking for citizens. FactCheckNI is also part of Co-inform, EU's consortium of experts working to address digital literacy in the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000530,Novetta,https://www.novetta.com/,"Novetta offer cyber analytics to preemptively identify threats, entity analytics to identify bad actors/ influencers, and mission and media analytics to monitor social media and news to identify key patterns and issues in the operating environment. Analysts can use Novetta’s analytics to uncover insights into the dissemination of disinformation on social media platforms and messaging forums. Social platforms can use Novetta’s analytics to identify suspicious posts and accounts associated with disinformation to support their content moderation efforts.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000531,NSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000532,NU.nl,https://www.nu.nl/nucheckt,Nu.nl conducts fact-checking of online content through its NUCheckt page. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000533,NuCheckt,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000534,NuzzleRank,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000535,NYC: Media Lab,https://nycmedialab.org/,"NYC Media Lab is a consortium of private companies and New York universities dedicated to advancing innovation in media and technology. NYC Media Lab runs an annual Machines + Media event and convenes a Machines + Media AI Working Group to address issues like automated content moderation, deepfakes, privacy, and AI-driven publishing and distribution.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000536,NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights,,,,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000537,O Truco,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000538,ObserLatInf,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000539,Observador,https://observador.pt/,Observador is an online news platform that conducts fact-checking and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Portugal,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000540,OFCOM,https://www.ofcom.org.uk,"Ofcom oversees telecommunications, post, broadcast TV and radio (including the BBC’s output), has duties in relation to broadcast advertising and regulates certain online video services. It has a statutory duty to promote media literacy, under which it carries out research into people’s use of online services such as social media and video sharing platforms. In February 2020 the Government announced it was “minded” to grant new powers to Ofcom as the regulator for online harms.",,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000541,Ojo Bionico,https://ojo-publico.com/ojobionico,"Ojo Biónico is the fact-checking section of Ojo Público, a Peruvian investigative journalism outfit.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Peru,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000542,Omelas,https://www.omelas.io/,"Omelas works to prevent violence, terrorism recruitment, and the spread of online propaganda by studying behavioral patterns, applying analytics and strategy, and identifying instances and entities who generate content. Omelas is working to map the online information environment as it pertains to disinformation and propaganda.",,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000543,Online News Association (ONA),https://journalists.org/,"ONA is currently the largest digital journalism association in the world. They seek to support high quality digital journalism through developing best practices for incorporating technology into journalism and reporting, collecting metrics, and developing new revenue models. Recently, ONA has made efforts to grow their efforts to tackle misinformation and fake news. Its 2019 conference featured a session on ""Preparing for the Future of Deepfakes"" alongside other discussions on local news, misinformation, and digital journalism.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000544,Open Government Partnership,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000545,Open Information Partnership,https://www.openinformationpartnership.org,"The Open Information Partnership is a network of organisations and individuals across Europe working in open, independent, fact-based reporting.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000546,Open Society,https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000547,Open Society European Policy Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000548,OpenFacto,https://openfacto.fr/2021/02/14/la-detection-de-la-desinformation-sans-coder/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000549,OpenSources,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000550,OpenX,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000551,Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),https://www.occrp.org/en/about-us,,,,,,,,,Europe,Serbia,,,,,,
|
||||
G000552,OSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000553,Oštro,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Slovenia,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000554,Our.News,https://our.news/,"Our.News has created a browser extension that provides users with ""nutrition labels"" for news consumption to help them better assess the quality of information.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000555,Oxford University: Computational Propaganda Project (Internet Institute),https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Computational Propaganda Project conducts research on algorithms, bots, and social media applications and their impacts on the spread of propaganda, the manipulation of conversations online, trust in media institutions, and political campaigns and elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000556,Oxford University: Internet and Society; Public Policy Programme at The Alan Turing Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000557,Oxford University: Junk News Aggregator,https://newsaggregator.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Junk News Aggregator compiles posts by news outlets that have failed to meet a set of criteria, and are thus not deemed to be trustworthy by the technology. It provides users with an overview of such information trending on Facebook and related engagement statistics.",Yes,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000558,Oxford University: Oxford Internet Institute,https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Oxford Internet Institute is a multidisciplinary research and teaching department of the University of Oxford, dedicated to the social science of the Internet.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000559,Oxford University: Oxford Technology and Elections Commission (OxTEC),https://oxtec.oii.ox.ac.uk/,"The Oxford Technology and Elections Commission, (OxTEC) is uniting experts on politics, technology, security and human rights to re-envision what constitutes trusted guidelines for managing a modern election. With the help of policy makers, elections administrators, and both computer and social scientists, OxTEC is exploring how democracies can integrate democratic norms and practices into the use of information technologies, social media, and big data during campaigns, with the goal of protecting the integrity of elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000560,Oxford University: Reuters Institute for Journalism Studies (RIJS),https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/,"RIJS conducts research and provides fellowships to advance high-quality journalism. In support of its Digital News Project, RIJS researchers investigate topics related to journalism and technology, including social media and online news, citizen trust in media institutions, and the spread of false or misleading information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000561,PageFair,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000562,Pagella Politica,https://pagellapolitica.it/,Pagella Politica is an online fact-checking platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Italian politicians. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000563,Palantir,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000564,Park Advisors,https://www.park-advisors.com/,"Park Advisors uses technology and strategic partnerships to advocate for the rights of vulnerable and at-risk populations. In 2019, Park Advisors published the Disinformation Report, in fulfillment of a commissioned request on the part of the U.S. Department of State's Global Engagement Center (GEC). Park Advisors have also partners with GEC to run DisinfoCloud, and online database that evaluates tools that aim to research or counter online disinformation.",,Other,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000565,Park Associates/GEC advisor,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000566,Patikrinta (15min),https://www.15min.lt/tema/patikrinta-15min-62531,"Patikrinta (Lithuanian for ""Checked Out"") is the fact-checking arm of Lithuanian media organization 15min. 15min is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and is a Facebook Third-Party Fact-Checker.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000567,PEN America,https://pen.org/pen_tags/misinformation/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000568,People-centered Internet,https://peoplecentered.net/pci-home-2/about/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000569,Pesa Check,https://pesacheck.org/,"PesaCheck is an African fact-checking organization that concentrates on financial and statistical information reported and promises made by public figures in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. PesaCheck is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Ethiopia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000570,Pew Research Center,https://www.pewresearch.org/topics/trust-facts-and-democracy/,"The Pew Research Center conducts social science research on American attitudes and trends related to politics and public policy, journalism and media, and technology, among other issues. Recently, Pew has devoted additional resources to its research around trust, facts, and democracy in order to inform conversations about the role of information in society.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000571,PGP Stronger,https://stronger.org/,,,,,,,,Y,,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000572,Ping Digital Network,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000573,Poland,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000574,Poletika,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000575,Policy Change Index,https://policychangeindex.org/,"The Policy Change Index (PCI) is an AI-assisted tool for propaganda analysis. The PCI project is open-source with two key features: It automates the content analysis of propaganda, and it delineates the boundaries between analysts’ objective assessment and subjective judgment.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000576,Polígrafo,https://poligrafo.sapo.pt/,Polígrafo is a Portuguese fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Portugal,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000577,Political Capital,https://www.politicalcapital.hu/introduction.php,"Political Capital has been involved in the fight against conspiracy theories, fake news, disinformation and the post-truth phenomenon since 2010. They work to counter the spread of fake news and conspiracy theories. They also raise awareness about the problem and create guidelines on recognising and arguing against manipulative articles, information.",,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Europe,Hungary,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000578,PolitiFact,https://www.politifact.com,Politifact conducts fact-checking journalism. They aim to give citizens the information they need to govern themselves in a democracy.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000579,Polygraph (BBG),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000580,Pop-Up Newsroom,https://popup.news/,"Pop-Up Newsroom is a media organization that produces innovative reporting to address specific contexts like elections. Pop-Up Newsroom was responsible for Verificado 2018, an anti-misinformation initiative focused on Mexico's 2018 elections and for Riksdagsvalet, a misinformation-tracking initiative focused on Sweden's general elections.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,"Link dead, and there's another, earlier, popup newsroom",
|
||||
G000581,Post Facto,https://www.postfactogame.com/,Post Facto is an online game that teaches players to recognize and flag indicators that an article may contain misinformation. The goal of this solution is to educate the public about how to recognize false information.,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000582,Poynter Institute for Media Studies,https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,"Through its International Fact-Checking Network, the Poynter Institute for Media Studies provides research on trends, best practices, and developments in international fact-checking efforts and supports fact-checking initiatives worldwide. The network provides fellowships, grants, and training for fact-checkers. The Poynter Institute is also the parent organization of PolitiFact, which conducts fact-checking in the United States.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000583,Prague Security Studies Institute (Pražský Institut Bezpečnostních Studií) (PSSI),http://www.pssi.cz/russia-s-influence-activities-in-cee,"PSSI conducts research on international peace and security in European states and provides training to students and professionals through conferences, workshops, and its Security Scholars Program. Part of its research agenda centers around Russian influence activities in Central and Eastern Europe, and PSSI has published analysis and sought to raise awareness about influence operations related to NATO, vaccinations, elections, and other topics. PSSI is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000584,Predata,https://predata.com,"Predata parses open-source data to generate quantitative indicators of risk via machine-learning algorithms that can describe & predict trends. Government agencies can partner with Predata to build a predictive model to notify stakeholders when disinformation activity occurs. Analysts can use Predata algorithms to understand which topics and which actors are most active in spreading online disinformation, as well as better understand and predict disinformation trends and tactics.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000585,Pressland,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000586,Primer.ai,https://primer.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000587,Princeton University: Empirical Studies of Conflict Project,https://esoc.princeton.edu/,"The Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) launched in 2009 to support research on insurgency, civil war, and other politically motivated violence, worldwide. Today, ESOC identifies and compiles a wide range of micro-level data to empower scholarship and to help address pressing security threats. Beyond supporting research, we are committed to enabling policy responses to challenges related to political violence, ranging from civil war to economic development to misinformation campaigns.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000588,Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000589,ProFact Moldova,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000590,Project Domino,https://github.com/TheDataRideAlongs/ProjectDomino,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000591,Propastop,https://www.propastop.org/eng/,Propastop is an independent blog dedicated to exposing propaganda and falsehoods circulating in Estonian media. The organization has also created a monitoring robot called Propamon that searches for mentions of Estonian in Russian media. Propastop is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Estonia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000592,Protected Voices Initiative (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation),https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence/protected-voices,"The FBI’s Protected Voices initiative provides tools and resources to political campaigns, companies, and individuals to protect against online foreign influence operations and cybersecurity threats.",Yes,Government,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000593,Public Editor,,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000594,Quantcast,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000595,Quod,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000596,R Street Institute,https://www.rstreet.org/,"R Street engages in policy work to solve often-under addressed social issues. The recipient of a Madison Initiative Grant, they have used the support to sponsor their Governance Project, which aims to bolster the processes of U.S. democracy and institutions, namely the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, in the face of growing political polarization. The organization also runs an Election Security Initiative to help build capacity for state and federal efforts to share information about threats to elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000597,Radware Bot Manager,https://www.radwarebotmanager.com/,Formerly Shieldsquare. Shieldsquare can be used to protect a website or to prevent bots from interfering with a web application by analyzing their behavior and taking actions to thwart the bot.,,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000598,RAND Corporation,https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html,"RAND Corporation provides public policy research and analysis, and its experts have written on influence operations in the context of ""gray zone"" operations below the threshold of war, media literacy, and Russian propaganda and social media influence, among other topics.",Yes,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000599,Rappler,https://www.rappler.com/,Rappler is a news agency based in the Philippines that provides fact-checking services through its Rappler IQ subsection and supports the development of quality journalism worldwide. Rappler also organizes a Move.PH chat series to engage citizens around the issue of responsible and ethical journalism in the digital age. Rappler is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000600,Raskrinkavanje,https://raskrinkavanje.ba/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000601,Raskrinkavanje Montenegro,https://www.raskrinkavanje.me/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Montenegro,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000602,rbutr,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000603,Real Instituto Elcano,http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en,"Real Instituto Elcano runs a project called MINDb4ACT, which is a multi-stakeholder effort to combat radicalization and violent extremism in Europe. Part of this work is aimed at countering propaganda and hate speech online and better understanding how online radicalization occurs.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000604,Reality Check,https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cp7r8vgl2rgt/reality-check,Reality Check is the BBC's fact-checking section.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000605,Reality Team,http://realityteam.org/,"Reality Team is powered by a team of communications professionals, technologists, cybersecurity and disinformation analysts from the private and public sector who are committed to pushing back against disinformation. Our content is entirely independent, and non-partisan, focused on dispelling myths, rumors and disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000606,Recorded Future,https://www.recordedfuture.com,"Recorded Future uses machine learning and natural language processing to identify the source of dark web content to enable further investigation. Analysts can use Recorded Future to identify if disinformation is being shared on dark web chat forums, or identify an increase in the dissemination of cyberhacking tools and data that enable the spread of disinformation.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000607,Redacción Fáctica,https://nomada.gt/author/factica/,Redacción Fáctica is a Guatemalan fact-checking project created by Agencia Ocote and Nómada.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Guatemala,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000608,Renew Europe Group,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000609,Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press (RCFP),https://factcheckerlegalsupport.org/,"RCFP provides legal resources in support of the U.S. First Amendment. Through its Fact-checkers Legal Support Initiative, developed with the International Fact-Checking Network and the Media Legal Defence Initiative, RCFP has created legal guides for fact-checkers. The organization also supports transparency in journalism and has written about the need to protect journalists from potential unintended consequences of laws aimed at curbing influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000610,Reporters Without Borders: Information & Democracy Commission,https://rsf.org/en,RSF gathered an International Commission on Information & Democracy in 2018 and is working to implement the principles outlined in the resulting International Declaration on Information & Democracy that support Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and efforts to protect freedom of expression online.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000611,Reporters Without Borders: Journalism Trust Initiative (RSF),https://rsf.org/en,"Through its Journalism Trust Initiative (in partnership with Agence France Presse, the European Broadcasting Union, and the Global Editors Network), Reporters without Borders (RSF) is developing a set of trust and transparency standards for journalism outlets with input from stakeholders in media, policy, technology, and academia. RSF also gathered an International Commission on Information & Democracy in 2018 and is working to implement the principles outlined in the resulting International Declaration on Information & Democracy that support Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and efforts to protect freedom of expression online.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,France,Y,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000612,Research Innovations,http://www.researchinnovations.com/,"Research Innovations develops a variety of software for government and military clients. Their expertise includes AI, big data, machine learning and analytics. Users can monitor messaging, disinformation campaigns, and malign influence tactics.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000613,Research Institutes of Sweden (Sveriges Forskningsinstitut) (RISE),https://www.ri.se/en/what-we-do/projects/skilled-online-understanding-disinformation,RISE's Skilled Online project develops and tests curriculum and teaching tools related to disinformation online. Students participate in a workshop where they navigate online interactions based on their personal identities and vulnerabilities and learn skills for identifying and responding to false or misleading information.,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000614,Reuters Digital News Institute,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000615,Reuters Fact Check Team,,US; UK,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000616,Reuters Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000617,REVEAL,https://revealproject.eu/,"REVEAL is an EU-funded project to develop technologies for verification of content online. The company will focus on social media analysis, understanding information flows, and generating an effective picture of how content travels online.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000618,Reveal (Media Verification Assistant),http://reveal-mklab.iti.gr/reveal/index.html,"The Media Verification Assistant is an online tool for assessing the source and veracity of images, developed by CERTH-ITI and Deutsche Welle.",Yes,Media,,,,,,Global,Greece,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000619,Riddle,https://www.ridl.io/en/,"Riddle offers neutral and objective analysis on Russian domestic and foreign engagement. The organization also provides this in-depth analysis in both English and Russian. Recently, Riddle authors have written on topics of fake news and propaganda efforts linked to Russia and the Kremlin.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000620,Right Wing Watch - Muck Rack ,https://muckrack.com/jared-l-holt/articles,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000621,RMIT ABC Fact Check,https://www.abc.net.au/news/factcheck/,"In partnership with RMIT University, ABC has a dedicated fact-checking team called RMIT ABC Fact Check to help assess claims made by politicians, public figures, and others engaged in public debate.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000622,RoBhat Labs,https://www.robhat.com/,"RoBhat Lab's products include Botcheck, which is used to detect and track Twitter propaganda, and SurfSafe, which is a fake news browser extension for Chrome.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000623,Rocket Technology,https://www.rocket-technology.com,"Rocket Technology's solution set, SocioTrust enables analysis of social media disinformation in platforms with text, audio, pictures, photos, and video to determine what individual, corporate, or state actors are injecting into societies and how. It can also create counter-propaganda programs.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000624,Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),https://rusi.org/,RUSI provides research and analysis on influence operations through the lens of defense and security and has published analysis on issues like Russia's influence operations in Central and Eastern Europe and how democracies should respond to influence operations.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000625,RSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000626,Ryerson University: Social Media Lab,https://socialmedialab.ca/,"The Social Media Lab is a multi- and interdisciplinary research laboratory at Ted Rogers School of Management at Ryerson University. The lab studies how social media is changing the way people and organizations communicate, share information, conduct business and form communities online, and how these changes impact society. The lab’s research seeks to advance the public’s understanding of the benefits and pitfalls of social media adoption.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000627,SaferNet,https://new.safernet.org.br/#mobile,SaferNet is a Brazilian non-governmental organization that combats Internet crime in partnership with the Federal Public Ministry. It facilitates anonymous reporting and provides information and training about Internet safety and security.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000628,Schema Claim Review,https://schema.org/ClaimReview,"Schema.org is a website dedicated to the vocabulary of structured data on the internet. If a web page contains content that reviews claims, ClaimReview structured data can enable a summarized version of the fact check to be displayed in search engine results.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000629,Schema.org,https://schema.org,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,,,,,
|
||||
G000630,Science Feedback,http://sciencefeedback.co/,"Science Feedback is a community of scientists that provide context and commentary for scientific information reported in the news. The project has specific sections dedicated to health issues and to climate change issues, called Health Feedback and Climate Feedback.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,World,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000631,Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force,https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/protecting-democracy/security-task-force.html,"Leading up to the 2019 election, the Canadian government established a Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force to outline the responsibilities of various government agencies in monitoring, investigating, and responding to foreign threats to the integrity of Canadian elections.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000632,SEEcheck,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000633,Sensity,https://sensity.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000634,Serelay,https://www.serelay.com/,Serelay has created a product called Trusted Media Capture that conducts point-of-capture verification to enable customers that rely on photographs and videos to authenticate their content.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000635,Servicio de Information Publica,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000636,Sheffield University Natural Language Processing,https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/dcs,,Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000637,Shout Out UK,https://www.shoutoutuk.org/,Shout Out UK creates and sells curriculum on political and media literacy to schools with the goal of empowering students to engage in the political process.,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000638,SIDA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000639,Signal,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000640,Sleeping Giants,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000641,Slovak Foreign Policy Association (Slovenská Asociácia Zahraničnej Politiky) (SFPA),http://www.sfpa.sk/en/,"SFPA provides a space for discussion of foreign policy issues affecting Slovakia and the European Union. SFPA has organized projects on information warfare on the Internet and Russian information warfare and Ukraine, and it hosts the Slovak Forum Against Propaganda to create a space for discussion about influence operations and their impact on the European Union and NATO.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000642,Snopes,https://www.snopes.com/,Snopes.com utilizes high quality and reliable investigative reporting to provide a documented fact-checking service that allows their readers to become informed and draw their own independent conclusions.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000643,SNV,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000644,Social Cyber-Security Working Group (Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems),https://sites.google.com/view/social-cybersec/home?authuser=0,"The Social Cyber-Security Working Group develops new metrics, technologies and algorithms for analyzing human socio-cultural behavior given vast quantities of data. It forecasts and explains changes in the socio-cultural behavior using agent-based model and network science and assesses the impact of, and provides support for, the development of new social and organizational policies and procedures.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000645,Social Media Guide,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000646,Social Media Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA),https://www.disinfobservatory.org/,"SOMA is a European Union-funded project aimed at creating a network of experts in disinformation, providing media literacy training program, and developing tools and standards for evaluating the impact of media programs and the quality of information sources.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Greece,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000647,Social Science One,https://socialscience.one/,"Social Science One is running an inaugural project on ""the effects of social media on democracy and elections"" that will make data from Facebook available to researchers to study the interaction of media, technology, and democracy that can inform future policy recommendations.",,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000648,South Asia Check,http://southasiacheck.org/,South Asia Check is a fact-checking organization that covers South Asian news and the promises of public officials. South Asia Check is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Nepal,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000649,Spanish news,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000650,Sparks & Honey,https://www.sparksandhoney.com/,sparks & honey employs big data and human expertise to develop cultural intelligence. Their proprietary technology inputs data from a wide variety of sources and couples these with expert analysis to create structured data that highlights large-scale cultural trends.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000651,Squint,https://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/squint-sharpens-officials-perspective-to-combat-election-distortion,"SQUINT by MITRE, also known as “Social See Something, Say Something”, is a mobile app and browser plugin that enables crowdsourced reporting of disinformation. The tool allows a user (among the crowd) to quickly and easily submit a screenshot and page metadata of supposed disinformation to state and local officials with the click of an icon.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000652,SSRC Social Media Democracy Research Grants,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000653,"SSRC: Disinformation Research Initiative (Media & Democracy Network, Social Science Research Council)",https://www.ssrc.org/programs/component/media-democracy/the-media-democracy-network/#overview,"SSRC hosts a Program on Media & Democracy that promotes research on the relationship between media technologies and democratic practices. The program conducts the Disinformation Research Initiative to track scholarly research on the topic and manages the Media & Democracy Network as a place to share information and collaborate on scholarly projects related to misinformation/disinformation, polarization, hate speech, media consolidation, and other topics. Through its Social Data Initiative, SSRC also provides grants to organizations working with Social Science One on projects concerning social media and the flow of information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000654,SSRC: Program on Media & Democracy (Social Science Research Council),https://www.ssrc.org/programs/view/media-democracy/,"SSRC hosts a Program on Media & Democracy that promotes research on the relationship between media technologies and democratic practices. The program conducts the Disinformation Research Initiative to track scholarly research on the topic and manages the Media & Democracy Network as a place to share information and collaborate on scholarly projects related to misinformation/disinformation, polarization, hate speech, media consolidation, and other topics.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000655,SSRC: Social Data Initiative (Social Science Research Council),https://www.ssrc.org/programs/view/social-data-initiative/,"Through its Social Data Initiative, SSRC also provides grants to organizations working with Social Science One on projects concerning social media and the flow of information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000656,Stanford,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000657,Stanford University: Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC),https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Housed at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs, CISAC coordinates an Information Warfare Working Group and runs the Project on Russian Power and Purpose, which addresses Russian influence operations in the broader context of Russia's strategic aims and their impact on democracies worldwide.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000658,"Stanford University: Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)",https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs, CDDRL is dedicated to studying the interaction of the political, economic, social, and legal dimensions of democratic development. The center studies and teaches on poverty, instability, abusive rule, authoritarian resurgence, technology, populism, and globalization.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000659,Stanford University: Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society (PACS),https://pacscenter.stanford.edu/research/program-on-democracy-and-the-internet/,"PACS runs the Program on Democracy and the Internet, which conducts multidisciplinary research on ways to maximize the benefits of the Internet while minimizing the threats it poses to democratic processes. Its scholars focus on social media and democracy, algorithmic bias and automated social engineering, the deterioration of digital information ecosystems, and political framing in media.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000660,Stanford University: Cyber Policy Center,https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Cyber Policy Center houses the Global Digital Policy Incubator, a forum for multi-stakeholder collaboration on policies concerning the application of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in an increasingly digital ecosystem.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000661,Stanford University: Information Warfare Working Group; European Security Initiative (Center for International Security and Cooperation) ,https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/information-warfare-working-group,The Information Warfare Working Group is housed at The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. It is a multidisciplinary group of Stanford University scholars that meet quarterly to discuss the issue of cyber-enabled information warfare.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000662,Stanford University: Internet Observatory,https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/about,"Stanford University's Internet Observatory is a program of the Cyber Policy Center. It is a cross-disciplinary program of research, teaching and policy engagement for the study of abuse in current information technologies, with a focus on social media.",,Education/academia,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000663,Stanford University: Journalism and Democracy Initiative (JDI),https://jdi.stanford.edu,"JDI seeks to improve journalism with the use of data and algorithms; combat misinformation; address challenges in reporting, storytelling, news distribution and consumption; and launch a ""Trust and Verify"" project to focus on defending against manipulated photos and videos.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000664,Stanford University: Program on Democracy and the Internet,https://pacscenter.stanford.edu,"The Program on Democracy and the Internet (PDI) is housed at Stanford University. PDI creates and shares original empirical research around how digital technologies are impacting democracy to inform and educate decision-makers in the field, including the next generation of technologists, business leaders, and policymakers. This effort is intended to bring together scholars from a diverse set of disciplines to study the challenges and opportunities the Internet poses for democracies. The project also benefits from existing relationships with technology companies that serve as the new information intermediaries and the platforms for the new public square for modern democracy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000665,State Department,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000666,Stiftung Neue Verantwortung (SNV),https://www.stiftung-nv.de/en/project/strengthening-digital-public-sphere,"Through its ""Strengthening the Digital Public Sphere"" project, SNV is working with the German Federal Foreign Office to build government capacity to deal with disinformation. SNV also conducts research to better understand the spread of disinformation in society, levels of news literacy, and public policy solutions for addressing contemporary information environments.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000667,StopFake,https://www.stopfake.org/ru/glavnaya-2/,StopFake conducts fact-checking and research on influence operations in Central and Eastern European countries. It also provides resources to inform the public about verifying information and conducts trainings for interested parties upon request.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000668,"Study: trust, facts and democracy: public attitudes about the role of information in society",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000669,Sussex University CASM,https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000670,Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap) (MSB),https://www.msb.se/en/,"MSB is the agency of the Swedish government charged with helping prepare for accidents, crises, and the consequences of war. In the area of influence operations, MSB commissioned Lund University researchers to put together a research report and a handbook on countering information influence activities, and the organization has integrated countermeasures into its preparations for Swedish elections and its educational efforts.",,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000671,Tadaweb,https://www.tadaweb.com/,"Tadaweb is a platform for discovering and analyzing information on the web, which allows users to perform analysis of a specific topic to retrospectively derive insights about the spread of propaganda and disinformation. Analysts can monitor specific, suspicious online activity to address and counter disinformation in real-time.",Yes,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Europe,Luxembourg,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000672,Taiwan AI Labs,https://ailabs.tw/,"Taiwan AI Labs’ technology is the “Islander System,” which takes a three-pronged approach to analyzing news and social media content: news content monitoring; news source inspection; and social media user behavioral analysis. The multidimensional analysis of news content will be available online so that users can see how different news outlets report the same story.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000673,Taiwan FactCheck Center,https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/,Taiwan FactCheck Center is a Taiwanese fact-checking organization run by the Association for Quality Journalism and the Taiwan Media Watch and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000674,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/faq/,Tattle is a project that aims to address misinformation on chat apps and encrypted messaging platforms.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000675,Team Defence,,,,Defence/military,,,,,Yes,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000676,Tech Media & Democracy (new york city universities partnership),https://www.techmediademocracy.nyc,"A partnership of New York City universities, Tech Media & Democracy aims to strengthen journalism in the digital environment and support democracy through research, teaching and training for individuals in journalism, design, and engineering.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000677,Terbium Labs,https://terbiumlabs.com/,Terbium Lab’s Matchlight dark web crawler provides visibility into information that has been exposed on the dark web. An API can connect Terbium’s data pipeline with analysis tools.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000678,Teyit.org,https://teyit.org/,Teyit.org conducts fact-checking and hosts fact-checking workshops to promote media literacy. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network and is a Facebook Third-Party Fact-Checker.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Turkey,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000679,The Advertising Association,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000680,The Alan Turing Institute - Public Policy Programme,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000681,The Center for Humane Technology,https://www.humanetech.com/,,,,,,,,,,US,,,,,,
|
||||
G000682,The Conversation Australia,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000683,The Democracy Labs,https://thedemlabs.org/,"Democracy Labs is a hub for ongoing technology and creative innovation in service of a healthy democracy at the national, state, and local levels. We focus on long term, sustainable and affordable solutions. An approach that is longer than an election cycle, and isn’t purely dependent on volunteers, can enable more qualified candidates to run for office and for more issue groups to bring about positive social change with little funds.",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000684,The Engine Room,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000685,The Factual,https://www.thefactual.com/static/about.html,"The Factual is a technology company that assesses the partisanship, bias, and credibility of online news articles.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000686,The Hague Center for Strategic Studies (HCSS),https://hcss.nl,"HCSS conducts research on issues in defense and security and provides policy recommendations, surveys, analyses, risk assessments, and other products to both public and private sector organizations, including the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. Its research has included analysis of hybrid conflict and Russian influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000687,The IndiaSpend Foundation,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000688,The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,icij.org,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000689,The Journal,http://thejournal.ie,The Journal is an Irish online news source that conducts fact-checking. The organization is one Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000690,The Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000691,The Media Bias Chart,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000692,The Nevada Independent Fact Checks,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000693,The News Hero,https://www.thenewshero.org/,The News Hero game gamifies the experience of discerning false news for public consumption. The goal of this solution is to educate the public on how to recognize disinformation.,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000694,The Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,The Pro-Truth Pledge is an initiative that aims to encourage public figures to be truthful in their communications and citizens to hold one another accountable for sharing truthful information.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Global,USA,Y,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000695,The Propaganda Game,https://propagandagame.org,"The Propaganda Game is a free, publicly accessible social media literacy tool that aims to educate players on disinformation and its spread. It features the ability to upload and explore instances of propaganda found online, as well as functionality to facilitate teachers using the game in their classrooms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000696,The Thinkin Project,https://www.thethinkinproject.com/,"A global movement to increase resilience to disinformation, and help QAnon believers find a way out",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000697,The Trade Desk,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000698,The Trust Project,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,Y,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000699,The Trusting News Project,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000700,The Verification Handbook (EJC),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000701,The Washington Post Fact-Checker,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000702,The Washington Post: Fact Checker,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/,The Washington Post's Fact Checker is the official fact-checking service of the U.S. newspaper.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000703,The Whistle,https://www.thewhistle.co.il/feed,The Whistle is an Israeli media monitoring and fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Israel,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000704,Thompson Reuters Special Services,https://www.trssllc.com/,Thomson Reuters Special Services offers data-driven consulting in national security intelligence; the group has created a visualization tool capable of mapping a group or government's influence as it pertains to foreign investments and disinformation.,,Media,Investigations,,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000705,Thomson Reuters,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000706,Thomson Reuters Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000707,TinEye,https://tineye.com/,"TinEye offers a suite of computer vision-based tools that support image search, reverse image search, duplicate/modified image finding, image tracking alerts, and image verification. TinEye also offers an API that enables developers to integrate reverse search functionality into their own platforms or products.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000708,TopNet,http://eng.thu.edu.tw/,TopNet is a tool to identify fake social media accounts developed by Tunghai University in Taiwan.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000709,Transatlantic Council on Election Integrity (TCEI) Alliance of Democracies,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/transatlantic-commission-on-election-integrity/,"The Alliance of Democracies runs the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity (TCEI), which convenes individuals from media and government to prevent foreign interference in elections. TCEI advocates for campaigns to adopt its Pledge for Election Integrity, conducts monitoring in countries with upcoming elections, and promotes public policy solutions addressing deepfakes and other emerging technologies that threaten the integrity of elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000710,Transparency Map,https://www.transparentjournalism.org/journalist/,"A project of Spanish media organization Público, Transparency Map has designed the TJ Tool, a software that allows users to trace news information based on eight editorial indicators.",Yes,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000711,Transparency Task Force,https://www.transparencytaskforce.org/what-does-the-ttf-do/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000712,Trive,https://trive.news/,Trive is a browser extension designed to alert users visiting sites that are not sufficiently credible.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000713,Troll Factory,https://trollfactory.yle.fi/,"Troll factory is a free, publicly accessible social media literacy tool that aims to educate players on disinformation and its spread by asking players to choose which in-game inflammatory content to share as a “troll.”",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000714,Truepic,https://www.truepic.com,"Truepic's technology verifies that an image or video hasn’t been altered or edited, and watermarks it with a time-stamp, geocode, and other metadata. Truepic stores a version of the photo in its digital vault and assigns it a six-digit code and URL for retrieving it. Truepic also immediately logs the image or video onto the Bitcoin blockchain.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000715,Trust & Safety Professional Association,https://www.tspa.info,"The Trust & Safety Professional Association curates a collection of links, which trust and safety professionals may find useful in efforts such as developing policies, supporting moderators, and building systems to detect platform violations.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000716,Trust Metrics,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000717,Trust Project,thetrustproject.org,"The Trust Project offers a set of ""Trust Indicators"" to help audiences better understand an organization's ethics, fairness, accuracy, background, and reporting processes. The project also offers ""Trust Marks"" for any organization that works with the project to meet the standards outlined by the Trust Indicators.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000718,Trusted News,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000719,Trusted Times,https://trustedtimes.org,"Trusted Times uses a browser extension to identify fake and unreliable news and presents additional analysis through machine learning of any news article to show a reporter’s and news source’s bias, if any. Trusted Times screens thousands of news websites in the United States.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000720,TrustServista,https://www.trustservista.com/,"TrustServista provides artificial intelligence-based software to help media organizations and content creators determine the trustworthiness of news sources, analyze text, and track online information flows.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Romania,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000721,Truth and Trust Online,truthandtrustonline.com,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000722,Truth Nest,https://www.truthnest.com,"TruthNest offers an accessible, user-friendly dashboard for Twitter analytics to discern an account’s credibility based on their activity, network, and influence. Additionally, TruthNest offers a score of likelihood that the account is a bot.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Greece,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000723,Truth or Fiction,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000724,Truth Tests,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000725,"Truth, Trust and Technology Commission - London School of Economics",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000726,TruthBuzz by IFCJ,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000727,Trutheum,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000728,Tsek,https://tsek.ph/,,,,,,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000729,Tufts University: Edward R. Murrow Center for a Digital World,https://sites.tufts.edu/murrowcenter/,"Housed at the Fletcher School of International Affairs, the Edward R. Murrow Center for a Digital World was established to examine the role that news media, multinational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations play in international relations. The Center focuses on international media, public diplomacy, and the political and cultural impact of the digital media sphere.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000730,Twitter,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000731,Twitter Elections Integrity Archive,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000732,Twitter Trails,http://twittertrails.com/,TwitterTrails is an online tool used to track the spread of stories on Twitter and measure how users perceive the veracity of the stories.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000733,Twitter UK,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000734,U.S. Department of Justice: Cyber-Digital Task Force (DOJ),https://www.ojp.gov/,"In 2018, DOJ established a Cyber-Digital Task Force to address global cyber threats. The task force produced a report categorizing types of malign foreign influence operations and describing DOJ's responses to these threats.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000735,U.S. Department of State: Global Engagement Center,https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/,"DOS oversees the Global Engagement Center, which leads the U.S. government's efforts to identify and counter foreign and non-state influence operations. The center works with allied governments, civil society and nongovernmental organizations, and private companies to develop best practices, and it oversees the Information Access Fund, intended to provide grant support to organizations countering disinformation. The center's Technology Engagement Team works with stakeholders to develop, test, and demonstrate technological solutions to the problem of foreign influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000736,U.S. Department of State: Technology Engagement Team,https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/,"The Technology Engagement Team directs, leads, synchronizes, integrates, and coordinates efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States and its allies and partner nations",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000737,U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation: Foreign Influence Task Force,https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence,"In 2017, FBI established a Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) to identify and combat foreign influence operations in the United States. FITF collects and shares information about ongoing influence operations and works with field offices on countermeasures.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000738,UCLA,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000739,UK Cabinet office,https://sharechecklist.gov.uk/ ,,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000740,UK Government - DCMS - Online harms,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000741,UK Government: DCMS subcommittee on online harms and disinformation,https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/438/digital-culture-media-and-sport-subcommittee-on-online-harms-and-disinformation/,,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000742,UK Parliament - House of Lords,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000743,UK Safer Internet Centre,https://www.saferinternet.org.uk/safer-internet-day/2021,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000744,Ukraine Crisis Media Center (UCMC),http://ucmc.org.ua/,"UCMC is dedicated to defending Ukraine's sovereignty in the face of Russian influence and serving as a hub for strategic communications within the country. UCMC houses a Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group that convenes experts to provide research and analysis in support of the Ukrainian government's efforts to counter Russian influence, and the organization has also developed a program on Strategic Communication to reassert control over the information space. UCMC is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000745,Ukrainian Prism,http://prismua.org,"Ukrainian Prism provides research and analysis on defense and security policy issues. The organization runs a Russian Disinformation Resilience Index in partnership with EAST Center, meant to assess the strength of Central and Eastern European countries in resisting Russian influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000746,UMass,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000747,UN Verified project,https://shareverified.com/en,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Global,,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000748,Uni Arkansas at Little Rock,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000749,Uni Maryland,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000750,Unilever,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000751,Unisys,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000752,Unitary,https://www.unitary.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000753,United for News,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000754,"United Kingdom Parliamentary Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport",https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/sub-committee-on-disinformation/,"The UK Parliamentary Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport hosts a Sub-Committee on Disinformation to explore legislative solutions to the issue of disinformation in the United Kingdom. The sub-committee grew out of an initial inquiry on disinformation and fake news that began in 2018 and conclusion in February 2019 with the publication of a formal report on the landscape of disinformation, political advertising, foreign influence, media literacy programs, and potential solutions.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000755,University of Arkansas at Little Rock: COSMOS,http://cosmos.ualr.edu/,"The Collaboratorium for Social Media and Online Behavioral Studies (COSMOS) Lab uses analytic methodologies to study online behaviors and sentiments, such as network reactions to certain types of content, and how false information spreads through a network.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000756,University of Cambridge,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000757,University of Florida: Consortium on Trust in Media & Technology (CTMT),https://www.jou.ufl.edu/consortium-on-trust-in-media-and-technology/,"The CTMT is a multidisciplinary research initiative centered around ""the crisis of trust affecting the nation and world."" The consortium creates a space for researchers at the university to collaborate, develop insights into how media and technology can become more trustworthy, and explore potential new policies and laws.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000758,University of Indiana,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000759,University of Liverpool,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000760,University of Michigan,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000761,University of Munich: Center for Applied Policy Research (Universität München Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung) (CAP),https://www.cap-lmu.de/,"CAP conducts research on issues in public policy and international peace and security with the goal of bridging the gap between politicians and academics. CAP has addressed issues concerning cybersecurity, online campaigning, and other technological developments impacting democracy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000762,"University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Center for Information, Technology, and Public Life (CITAP)",https://citap.unc.edu/,"CITAP is dedicated to creating a foundational understanding of information environments in order to conduct research on misinformation, partisanship, polarization, propaganda, and political institutions. The group plans to make its data publicly available to inform additional research on the topic.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000763,University of Pennsylvania: Center for Media at Risk (Annenberg School for Communication),https://www.ascmediarisk.org/about/,The Center for Media at Risk strategizes in response to threatening political conditions. Knowing how media practitioners work under authoritarian regimes and circumstances of creeping authoritarianism can help free/defend/empower/protect/save the media.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000764,University of Pennsylvania: FactCheck.org (Annenberg Public Policy Center) (APPC),https://www.factcheck.org/,"Housed at APPC, Factcheck.org fact-checks statements made by American politicians during election cycles. Factcheck.org is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000765,University of Texas at Arlington,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000766,University of Texas at Austin: Propaganda Program (Center for Media Engagement),https://mediaengagement.org/propaganda-2/,"Under the direction of Dr. Samuel Woolley, the propaganda program at the Center for Media Engagement focuses on how emergent technologies are used in and around global political communication. Woolley’s work on computational propaganda—the use of social media and other digital tools in attempts to manipulate public opinion—has revealed the ways in which a wide variety of political groups in the United States and abroad have leveraged tech such as bots and trending algorithms and tactics of disinformation and trolling in efforts to control information flows online.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000767,University of Texas: Center for Media Engagement (CME),https://mediaengagement.org/,"The Center for Media Engagement conducts research on journalism, media ethics, and science communication to develop strategies for more effective engagement with the public. The Center’s signature approach is one of “connective democracy,” which ""unites newsrooms, scholars, platforms, and public policy entities in a methodical approach toward bridging gaps in our society."" Their research has covered content moderation, building trust in news organizations, mitigating polarization, the ethics of deepfakes, and clickbait, among other topics.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000768,University of Toronto: Citizen Lab,https://citizenlab.ca,"The Citizen Lab conducts research and policy engagement at the intersection of technology and international peace and security. Part of this agenda concerns ""targeted threats,"" or ""investigations into the prevalence and impact of digital espionage operations against civil society groups.""",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000769,University of Virginia: Democracy Initiative (DI),http://democracyinitiative.virginia.edu/,"The Democracy Initiative (DI) is dedicated to the study of democracy and challenges to democracy, both past and present. In 2019, DI announced two new labs: The Deliberative Media Initiative Lab will address the factionalism in the current media ecosystem and the undermining of norms and trust in institutions, and the Democratic Statecraft Lab will address growing authoritarianism around the world and its challenges to democratic institutions.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000770,University of Washington,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000771,University of Washington: Center for an Informed Public,https://ischool.uw.edu/research/center-informed-public,"The CIP is an interdisciplinary, non-partisan effort to convene industry, government, nonprofit, and academic stakeholders around developing strategies to resist misinformation and support an informed public in order to strengthen democracy. The Center is supported by the University of Washington Information School, Human Centered Design and Engineering Program, School of Law, and Communication Leadership Program.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000772,University of Washington: Cybersecurity Initiative (International Policy Institute),https://jsis.washington.edu/research/ipi/ipi-cybersecurity/,"The Cybersecurity Initiative produces written research, cultivates a network of professionals for the exchange of expertise, hosts events on cybersecurity policy, develops and teaches courses on cybersecurity and mentors students interested in cybersecurity policy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000773,University of Washington: Emerging Capacities of Mass Participation Lab (emCOMP) (Human Centered Design and Engineering),https://depts.washington.edu/emcomp/people/,"Housed at the School of Human-Centered Design & Engineering at the University of Washington, the Emerging Capacities of Mass Participation (emCOMP) Lab conducts research on new and social media and the changing dynamics of interaction in digital environments. With a particular focus on crisis events, emCOMP is investigating the spread of rumors and false or misleading information on social media platforms.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000774,University of Washington: International Policy Institute (IPI),https://jsis.washington.edu/research/ipi/ipi-cybersecurity/,"IPI's Cybersecurity Initiative provides research and teaching on international cybersecurity politics and policy. The initiative produces written research, cultivates a network of professionals for the exchange of expertise, and develops and teaches courses on cybersecurity policy. The faculty and fellows affiliated with the Cybersecurity Initiative have addressed disinformation in their research on elections integrity, deepfakes, and Russia’s cyber strategy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000775,University of Wisconsin-Madison: Center for Communication and Civic Renewal (CCCR),https://mcrc.journalism.wisc.edu/groups/cccr/,"CCCR convenes faculty from multiple disciplines to study how state and regional communication systems affect political polarization. Its affiliates utilize public opinion research, computational content analysis, and qualitative interviews to conduct comparative studies of Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina in order to help local media combat political polarization.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000776,US Congress,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8rOMntep8w,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000777,US DOD,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000778,US DoS GEC,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000779,Userfeeds,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000780,VERA Files Fact Check,http://verafiles.org/specials/fact-check,"VERA Files Fact Check is a Filipino fact-checking organization, a member of the International Fact-Checking Network, and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000781,Verifica,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000782,Verificado 2018,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000783,Verificador,https://larepublica.pe/verificador,,,,Fact checking,,,,,South America,Peru,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000784,Verificalo,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000785,Verity,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000786,Vilnius Institute of Policy Analysis (VIPA),http://www.vilniusinstitute.lt/,"VIPA conducts research and analysis on political institutions and public policy in Lithuania. The organization hosts scholars that study disinformation, information security, and media literacy, and it runs the #PackOfLies project, dedicated to revealing specific instances of disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000787,Vinesight,https://www.vinesight.com/,Vinesight fights misinformation on social media channels by detecting trending campaigns and providing analytics and alerts about viral misinformation.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,Israel,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000788,Viralgranskaren,https://www.facebook.com/viralgranskaren/,"Metro's Viral Reviewer helps you find out if the story spread on social media is true. Let's review before you share. viralgranskaren@metro.se
|
||||
You probably do not think about it, but every time you share a link, write a status or instagram a picture, you tell a little story. About yourself, about your contemporaries, about Sweden. Thanks to the internet, today we tell more stories than ever before. We tell about our world, and thereby we shape it.
|
||||
Not infrequently, these stories are widely disseminated. A Facebook status that is starting to be shared can suddenly have reached thousands of people, leading to leaflets and hot debates. But since over 4.7 million Swedes have Facebook, texts can be shared tens of thousands of times without ever passing a journalist's feed. And that's a problem. Because when a story about something sensitive or important, something that places itself in the middle of contemporary currents, is read by many people, they often shape their picture of reality after it. Whether it's true.",,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000789,Vishvas News,http://www.vishvasnews.com/,Vishvas News is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000790,Vistinomer,http://vistinomer.mk/,Vistinomer is a Macedonian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Macedonia,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000791,Voice of San Diego - Fact Check,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000792,W3C,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000793,W3C Credible Web Community Group,https://www.w3.org/community/credibility/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,World,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000794,Watchdog Sri Lanka,https://watchdog.team/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,Asia,Sri Lanka,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000795,WatchDog.md,https://watchdog.md,WatchDog.md conducts research and analysis on public policy in Moldova with the goal of strengthening democratic development within the country. Its experts have published on Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe and the integrity of Moldovan elections in the face of potential foreign influence. WatchDog.md is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Moldova,,N,Y,teamwatchdog,,
|
||||
G000796,We Verify,https://weverify.eu/about/,"WeVerify is an EU-funded project designed to create a platform for collaborative content verification. InVID, a video content verification tool, is one product developed by the initiative.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000797,Web Literacy for Student Fact Checkers,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000798,WebQoof,https://www.thequint.com/news/webqoof,WebQoof is the fact-checking section of Indian media outlet The Quint and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
G000799,WFA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000800,WhiteOps,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000801,Who Targets Me?,https://whotargets.me/en/about-who-targets-me/,"Who Targets Me? is a browser extension that scrapes the ads from a user’s Facebook account in order to observe what political advertisements they receive. These ads are added to a database, where they are stored and analyzed. After continued use, the technology provides the user with a breakdown of posts and information about why the user was targeted with specific political content. Ads within the database can be studied for insights.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000802,Wikimedia Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000803,Wikimedia Germany,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000804,Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies,https://martenscentre.eu,"The official think tank of the European People's Party, the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Policy produces research and analysis on European Union policy. Scholars affiliated with the center have published policy papers and reports on influence operations in relation to social media, content moderation, and European Parliament elections, among other topics.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000805,Wilson Center,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000806,Wilson Center: Digital Futures Project,https://www.wilsoncenter.org,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000807,Wilson Center: Science & Technology Innovation Program,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/science-and-technology-innovation-program,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000808,WITNESS,https://www.witness.org/,"WITNESS is dedicated to helping individuals use media to document human rights abuses. WITNESS has developed technological tools for verifying the authenticity of content, and through its Media Lab, the organization focuses on deepfakes and the need to develop strategies to verify the authenticity of content in order to secure freedom of expression.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000809,Witness,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000810,World Economic Forum: Center for Cybersecurity,https://www.weforum.org/platforms/the-centre-for-cybersecurity,"The Center for Cybersecurity convenes experts around issues including cyber warfare, law, and norms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000811,World Economic Forum: Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution,https://www.weforum.org/,"Through the Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, WEF develops policy frameworks for emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning, and the Center for Cybersecurity convenes experts around issues including cyber warfare, law, and norms. The Strategic Intelligence Center offers insights and contextual intelligence in the areas of AI, behavioral psychology, civic participation, cybersecurity, digital communications, digital identity, geopolitics, and global governance.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000812,"World Economic Forum: Shaping the Future of Media, Entertainment and Culture",https://www.weforum.org/platforms/shaping-the-future-of-media-entertainment-and-sport,"Through its Shaping the Future of Media, Entertainment and Culture Project, WEF is working to rebuild trust in media institutions. Its Quality Project is creating a tool that aggregates data from other initiatives assessing media quality and allows users to make personalized decisions about how to weight factors of media quality in their own assessments. Additionally, Project Meridio aims at creating an open-source tool to empower users to manage their personal data. WEF is also supporting local independent news through its United for News program and helped launch the DQ Institute, which seeks to improve digital literacy.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000813,World Economic Forum: Strategic Intelligence Center,https://www.weforum.org/strategic-intelligence,"The Strategic Intelligence Center offers insights and contextual intelligence in the areas of AI, behavioral psychology, civic participation, cybersecurity, digital communications, digital identity, geopolitics, and global governance.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000814,Xandr,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
G000815,Yale University: Information Society Project (Law School),https://law.yale.edu/isp,"Based at Yale Law School, the Information Society Project is an interdisciplinary research center dedicated to exploring issues at the intersection of technology and law. It houses the Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere, and the Knight Law and Media Program and the Media Freedom & Information Access Clinic, which trains students interested in careers in media law and provides free legal services to defend freedom of speech, freedom of the press and access to information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000816,Yale University: Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere,https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/balkin-receives-funding-knight-foundation-study-digital-public-sphere,The Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere will produce legal and policy recommendations to improve the functioning of the digital public sphere. The initiative studies topics from antitrust and privacy to content moderation and digital propaganda.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000817,Yonder,https://www.yonder-ai.com,"Yonder provides artificial intelligence tools to detect, monitor, and mitigate online influence operations. The company also publishes research on information integrity and digital influence operations. Was New Knowledge",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000818,YOTI,https://www.yoti.com,,Yes,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
|
||||
G000819,YouTube data viewer (Amnesty International),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
|
||||
G000820,Zašto ne (Why Not),https://zastone.ba/en/,"Zašto ne (Why Not) is an organization that works on the creation of a safe, secure, healthy, active, efficient and accountable BiH society through increasing civic participation, influencing government accountability, use of new technology tools and promotion of socially engaged culture on the whole territory of BiH together with other interested groups, organizations, institutions and individuals.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000821,ZeroFox,https://www.zerofox.com/,"ZeroFox has developed a social media risk management platform. It claims to manage risk on social networks, the dark web, and external channels. It also claims to offer protection from fraud and hacking; and provides alerts of physical attacks on specific people, locations, and assets.",Yes,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
|
||||
G000822,Zignal Labs,https://zignallabs.com/,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
|
||||
G000823,ZimFact,http://zimfact.org/,ZimFact is a Zimbabwean fact-checking organization.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Zimbabwe,,Y,Y,,,
|
||||
|
6
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups_removed.csv
Normal file
6
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups_removed.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
name,url,description,provides_tools,sector,primary_role,secondary_role,primary_subject,secondary_subject,volunteers,region,country,rand_list,credco_list,carnegie_list,twitter_handle
|
||||
4Facts,,,,,,,"Blockchain, Media",,,,,,Y,N,
|
||||
BS Detector,https://www.producthunt.com/alternatives/b-s-detector,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
|
||||
Buscador: an OSINT linux virtual machine,https://inteltechniques.com/buscador/,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
|
||||
Remarrk,twitter.com/remarrk,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
|
||||
WikiTribune,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiTribune,,,,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,N,
|
||||
|
74
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups_suggested.csv
Normal file
74
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups_suggested.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
||||
Added?,Name,URL,Has volunteers?,Their description,Notes,Country,Source,Unnamed: 8,Unnamed: 9,Unnamed: 10,Unnamed: 11,Unnamed: 12,Unnamed: 13
|
||||
y,Federation of American Scientists,https://fas.org/ncov/disinformation-reports/,y,"Upon recognition of the threat that false information poses to science, the Federation of American Scientists established the Disinformation Research Group (FAS DRG). FAS DRG is composed of scientists, communications experts, data-scientists, and technologists with the intended purpose of detecting, understanding, and effectively exposing disinformation and false narratives surrounding COVID-19. FAS DRG uses multiple methods, technologies, and resources to execute the mission.",,USA,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,RealityTeam,http://realityteam.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,CogSecCollab,http://cogsec-collab.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,CTI League Disinformation Team,https://cti-league.com/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,Bellingcat,https://www.bellingcat.com/author/bellingcat/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,Credibility Coalition,https://credibilitycoalition.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,AVAAZ,https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/disinfo_volunteer_231/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,UN Verified project,https://shareverified.com/en,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,Cities on the Internet,https://mwi.pl/,y,,,Poland,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,PGP Stronger,https://stronger.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
y,Czech Elves,https://www.facebook.com/cestielfoveofficial/,y,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Iffy News,https://iffy.news/fact-check-search/,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
cloudflare/circl: CIRCL: Cloudflare Interoperable ... - GitHub,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
"https://github.com/cloudflare/circlCIRCL (Cloudflare Interoperable, Reusable Cryptographic Library) is a collection of cryptographic primitives written in Go. The goal of this library is to be used as ...",,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
CIRCL – The Center for Innovative Research in Cyberlearning,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
https://circlcenter.org/Please visit the new Center for Integrative Research in Computing and Learning Sciences (CIRCLS) website to learn about the new Research on Emerging ...,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,name,url,country,operates_in,description,focus,sector,primary_role,notes,provides_tools,volunteers,region,noideawhatthisis
|
||||
,Balkan Investigative Reporting Network,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Baltic Internet Policy Initiative,,,,Check this,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,BBC Media Action ,https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/our-work/covid-19,UK,Global ,"In a crisis, people need the right information to help keep themselves and their families safe. When the COVID-19 outbreak began, we responded quickly – training and working with partners to produce trusted, accurate and timely content for social media, radio and television, to help slow the spread of the novel coronavirus and counter harmful mis- and dis-information...In a crisis, people need the right information to help keep themselves and their families safe. When the COVID-19 outbreak began, we responded quickly – training and working with partners to produce trusted, accurate and timely content for social media, radio and television, to help slow the spread of the novel coronavirus and counter harmful mis- and dis-information.",Disinformation,Charity,,"Our dedicated teams moved rapidly to adapt our existing projects to address the knock-on effects of COVID-19 – from increased levels of violence against women, to children losing out on an education during lockdown. Through media, we’re helping people understand what they can do, individually and as a community, and how they can hold their leaders to account.",,,Europe,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,"We are committed to supporting the international response for the long haul – helping people to survive, cope and recover from COVID-19, meeting their diverse and changing needs, and supporting local media to keep their communities informed.",,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,"As an independent charity, we are not funded by the BBC TV Licence Fee. We rely on the support of generous donors – governments, foundations, corporations and individuals – to make our work possible.",,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,,,,,,,,,Trusted and accurate information will save lives.,,,,
|
||||
,Delfi Melo Detekto,https://www.delfi.lt/news/melo-detektorius/,Lithuania,,,disinformation,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Demagog Poland,https://demagog.org.pl/,Poland,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,DPA,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,ECDC,,,Europe,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Ekspress Meedia / Eesti Päevaleht,https://epl.delfi.ee/kategooria/86056905/faktikontroll-1,Estonia,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Eurasia Partnership Foundation,https://epfarmenia.am,Armena,Armenia/Eurasia,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,European External Action Service,https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en,EU,EU,,Disinformation,,;Public policy;,"""Disinformation is 'verifiably false or misleading information created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public'. Misinformation is verifiably false information that is spread without the intention to mislead, and often shared because the user believes it to be true."" -(action plan):https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54866/action-plan-against-disinformation_en",,,Europe,
|
||||
,Fact and Furious ,https://factandfurious.com,France,Europe,recently reported on paid influencers campaigns to descredit AZ vaccine,Disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Journalism;Fact checking;,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Facta,https://facta.news/,Italy,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Factcheck Vlaanderen,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Factchecking Finland,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Faktoje.al,https://faktoje.al/,Albania,Albania,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Freedom of Information Center of Armenia ,http://www.foi.am/en/,Armenia,Armenia,"online fact-checking courses, capacity building in media literacy for range of audiences",,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Georgia's Reforms Associates (GRASS),https://factcheck.ge/ka,Georgia,Georgia,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Influence,https://startinfluence.com/,USA,USA,"Influence Apps, Inc. is a strategic communications tool that simplifies complex technologies and techniques to help governments counter bad actors online. Powered by ad tech industry and government communications experts, Influence offers a suite of services that provide government operators tools for real-time sentiment analysis and communication campaign management.",,Technology,,,,,North America,Yes
|
||||
,Internews,,,,,,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Maldita,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Media Checker,https://www.mediachecker.ge/,Georgia,Georgia,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Media Development Foundation,http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/home,Georgia,Georgia,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Media Initiatives Centre,https://mediainitiatives.am/,Armenia,Armenia,Training. Runs the “Verified” section of the media.am website,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,MisInfoCon,https://misinfocon.com/about,,Global ,"MisinfoCon is a global movement focused on building solutions to online trust, verification, fact checking, and reader experience in the interest of addressing misinformation in all of its forms. MisinfoCon started as a large gathering at MIT in February 2017. That conference brought together ambassadors from technology platforms, news organizations, as well as experts in social science, media literacy, policy, advocacy and cybersecurity. Ever since then, MisinfoCon has focused on bringing people together in similar meetups, while facilitating online community and resource sharing.",Disinformation,NGO,;Network;,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,OECD,https://disinformation.the100questions.org,France ?,Global ,"100 questions initiative ""bilinguals"" (people with expertise in topical field and data science) to ID the 10 most pertinent disinformation questions to then be addressed",Disinformation,civil Society/NGO,Disinformation;Research (primary/secondary);,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,On the other side of the news,https://coronafakes.com,Ukraine,Ukraine,,disinformation,civil society,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Ostro,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Pledge to Pause,https://www.takecarebeforeyoushare.org/,,,Not checked yet,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Raskrikavanje,https://www.raskrikavanje.rs/,Serbia,Serbia,Site run by Krik,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking; journalism,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Reuters Fact Check,,UK,Global ,"Reuters Fact Check monitors digital platforms for misinformation that is linked to news events and to subjects that are being discussed by the communities we serve. We actively seek out groups and accounts that represent opposing viewpoints and apply the same standards of assessment to all content. Our choice of material to fact check is broad, and is based on the following criteria: [Could the material potentially cause real-world harm, if it is inaccurate?; Editorial value: is the topic timely and of public interest?; Reach: how far has the claim travelled? We examine the level of interactions on individual posts, as well as the visibility of the claim across different platforms.; Potential reach: is the information likely to be shared further? We examine how quickly the post is generating interaction and consider whether it may be repeated by others.; Balance of fact vs opinion: is it possible to isolate certain claims from the material?; After we have identified the content we aim to fact-check, we will first identify and summarize the key claims made in the content.; ",Disinformation,,;Fact checking ;,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA),https://www.disinfobservatory.org/about-us/,Belgium,EU (members of the Observatory),"Offer fact checking tools, collaboartive investigation ",Disinformation,,;Disinformation monitoring ;,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Stanford University: Information Warfare Working Group; European Security Initiative (Center for International Security and Cooperation),https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/information-warfare-working-group,USA,USA,The Information Warfare Working Group is housed at The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. It is a multidisciplinary group of Stanford University scholars that meet quarterly to discuss the issue of cyber-enabled information warfare.,,Education/academia,,,,,North America,
|
||||
,Stop Fake ,https://www.stopfake.org/en/main/,Ukraine,Russia/Ukraine,,Disinformation,NGO,;fact checking ;,Member of International Fact-Checking Network,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Stop Fals,https://stopfals.md/,Moldova,Moldova,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Teyit,https://teyit.org/,Turkey,Turkey,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,The Goethe insititut with International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA),https://www.goethe.de/en/kul/bib/ser/lib/eiv.html,Germany ,Global ,,Disinformation,civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Tjek det,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,Translators without Borders,,World,World,,,,,,,,World,
|
||||
,Trolless,https://www.facebook.com/trolless/,Moldova,Moldova,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,UNDP,https://www1.undp.org/content/oslo-governance-centre/en/home/our-focus/Information-Integrity.html,,Regional/Global,,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);","""Information integrity""",,,Europe,
|
||||
,UNESCO,,World,World,,,,,,,,World,
|
||||
,UNICEF/ECARO,https://www.unicef.org/eca/,Geneva,Regional,no IDM page available,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);",Main focus on Vaccine Confidence Project (VCP). https://worldhealthorg.sharepoint.com/:w:/r/sites/WHERegionalOfficeforEurope/_layouts/15/Doc.aspx?sourcedoc=%7B3176E00E-9252-4DAB-946E-895288D3071B%7D&file=UNICEF%20-%20Social%20Listening%20Capacity%20Building%20Plan%202021.docx&action=default&mobileredirect=true,,,Europe,
|
||||
,Valent Projects,,UK,,Not checked yet. Analyses misinformation for UK govt. ,,,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,VoxCheck,https://voxukraine.org/uk/voxcheck/,Ukraine,Ukraine,,disinformation,civil society,,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,VoxUkraine,,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
,WHO Epidemic and Pandemic Intelligence Hub,,Germany,Global ,,Disinformation,WHO,;disinformation;,,,,Europe,
|
||||
,WHO-EPI WiN,https://www.who.int/teams/risk-communication/infodemic-management,Geneva,,,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);",,,,Europe,
|
||||
|
17
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/forums.csv
Normal file
17
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/forums.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
||||
name,externalgroup,focus,accessibility,url,summary,notes
|
||||
CogSecCollab incubator,CogSecCollab,,private slack,,,
|
||||
Memetics: hacking belief systems,,,public facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/memetics.hacking,,
|
||||
Strategic communication engineering,,,public facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/949960748352854,,
|
||||
Digital investigations for journalists,Knight Foundation,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/328713905036655,course group,
|
||||
Computational social science,,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/523771471380181,,
|
||||
Political depolarization at the Commons,BuildUp,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/thecommonspolitics,,
|
||||
r/DisinformationWatch,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/DisinformationWatch/,,
|
||||
r/ActiveMeasures,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/ActiveMeasures/,,
|
||||
r/DigitalManipulation,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/Digital_Manipulation/,,
|
||||
r/TrollFare,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/trollfare/,,
|
||||
r/Propaganda,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/propaganda/,,
|
||||
CMU IDEAS slack,,,private slack,https://cmuideas.slack.com/,,
|
||||
ArtIntoScience slack,,,private slack,https://artintoscience.slack.com/,,
|
||||
TTO Slack,,,private slack,https://tto-conference.slack.com/,,
|
||||
Misinfocon slack,,,private slack,https://misinfocon.slack.com/,,
|
||||
Fake News Challenge slack,,,private slack,https://fakenewschallenge.slack.com/,,
|
||||
|
4
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/frameworks.csv
Normal file
4
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/frameworks.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,name_DE,summary,summary_DE,longname
|
||||
FW01,DISARM Red,,"incident creation framework. All the things that an incident creator will need to do to create, run, and assess the effectiveness of a disinformation incident.",,FW01 - DISARM Red
|
||||
FW02,DISARM Blue,,"incident counters framework. All the things that a response team, people outside the team, and organisations outside the team, will need to do to mitigate the effects of an incident, slow down an incident, stop an incident etc.",,FW02 - DISARM Blue
|
||||
FW03,DISARM Green,,"counter counters framework. All the things that an incident creation team might do to reduce the effectiveness of mitigations, counters, and responders to an incident. This framework doesn't officially exist yet: this id is for future work. ",,FW03 - DISARM Green
|
||||
|
86
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidents.csv
Normal file
86
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidents.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,objecttype,summary,year_started,attributions_seen,found_in_country,urls,notes,when_added,found_via,longname
|
||||
I00001,Blacktivists facebook group,incident,Internet Research Agency created fake @blacktivists facebook group and twitter account. ,2016,Russia,USA,https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/media/blacktivist-russia-facebook-twitter/index.html,,2019-02-24,,I00001 - Blacktivists facebook group
|
||||
I00002,#VaccinateUS,campaign,use both pro- and anti- topic messaging to create an artificial argument online. ,2014,Russia,World,https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/08/23/russian-trolls-twitter-bots-exploit-vaccine-controversy/,,2019-02-24,,I00002 - #VaccinateUS
|
||||
I00003,Beyonce protest rallies,incident,use both pro- and anti- topic messaging to create an artificial argument in real life. ,2016,Russia,USA,https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/10/russia-facebook-ads-us-elections-congress,,2019-02-24,,I00003 - Beyonce protest rallies
|
||||
I00004,#Macrongate,incident,amplified document dump failed because France was prepared for it.,2017,Russia,France,http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/,,2019-02-24,,I00004 - #Macrongate
|
||||
I00005,Brexit vote,campaign,"In early 2014, then UK PM David Cameron outlined the changes he aimed to bring about in the EU and in the UK's relationship with it. These were: additional immigration controls, especially for citizens of new EU member states; tougher immigration rules for present EU citizens; new powers for national parliaments collectively to veto proposed EU laws; new free-trade agreements and a reduction in bureaucracy for businesses; a lessening of the influence of the European Court of Human Rights on British police and courts; more power for individual member states, and less for the central EU; and abandonment of the EU notion of ""ever closer union"".He intended to bring these about during a series of negotiations with other EU leaders and then, if re-elected, to announce a referendum.
|
||||
European Union Referendum Act was passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It extended to include and take legislative effect in Gibraltar,and received royal assent on 17 December 2015.
|
||||
|
||||
Conservative-led Department for Culture, Media and Sport select committee concluded (2018) Russia engaged in ‘unconventional warfare’ during the Brexit campaign. This included ‘156,252 Russian accounts tweeting about #Brexit’ and posting ‘over 45,000 Brexit messages in the last 48 hours of the campaign.’ As it said, Kremlin-controlled media, ‘RT and Sputnik had more reach on Twitter for anti-EU content than either Vote Leave or Leave.EU, during the referendum campaign’.
|
||||
|
||||
The report by Democrats on the Senate foreign relations committee, titled Putin’s asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: implications for US national security, pinpoints the way in which UK campaign finance laws do not require disclosure of political donations if they are from “the beneficial owners of non-British companies that are incorporated in the EU and carry out business in the UK”.
|
||||
|
||||
The senators point out that Ukip and its then-leader, Nigel Farage, did not just fan anti-EU sentiment but also “criticised European sanctions on Russia, and provided flattering assessments of Russian President Putin”.
|
||||
|
||||
The report adds that although officially the Russian government asserted its neutrality on Brexit, its English-language media outlets RT and Sputnik covered the referendum campaign extensively and offered ‘’systematically one-sided coverage’’.",2016,Russia,UK,https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2018/11/01/russian-trolls-used-islamophobia-to-whip-up-support-for-brexit/#1369afb665f2,,2019-02-24,,I00005 - Brexit vote
|
||||
I00006,Columbian Chemicals,incident,Early Russian (IRA) “fake news” stories. Completely fabricated; very short lifespan. ,2014,Russia,USA,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbian_Chemicals_Plant_explosion_hoax,,2019-02-24,,I00006 - Columbian Chemicals
|
||||
I00007,Incirlik terrorists,incident,Fake story transmitted from Russian media to Trump campaign,2016,Russia,USA,https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/16/paul-manafort/trump-campaign-chair-misquotes-russian-media-makes/,,2019-02-24,,I00007 - Incirlik terrorists
|
||||
I00008,Bujic,incident,,2017,Russia,Serbia,https://www.stopfake.org/en/vencislav-the-virgin-hostile-operation-by-vencislav-bujic-seas-foundation-and-its-network-of-collaborators/,Serbia pro-Kremlin disinfo campaign by Vencislav Bujic,2019-02-24,,I00008 - Bujic
|
||||
I00009,PhilippinesExpert,incident,"President of the Philippine visited Moscow and forged ties on information strategy in 2017, and afterwards a series of disinformation campaign was noted in Philippine social media and mainstream media, mostly in favor of Philippine president and promoting Russian propaganda. Among this is the appearance of an unknown-before expert on global affairs who was cited frequently in Russian IRA-connected outlets. ",2017,Russia,Philippines,https://codastory.com/disinformation/how-a-little-known-pro-kremlin-analyst-became-a-philippine-expert-overnight/,Philippines Social Media: Russian Disinformation by fake “expert”,2019-02-24,,I00009 - PhilippinesExpert
|
||||
I00010,ParklandTeens,incident,IRA trolls amplified the far right messaging around the attack. Most notably they amplified social media speculation that many of the teens involved were “crisis actors” nefariously injected into the conversation by outside actors with an anti-gun poltical agenda. Other amplifications included ongoing harassment of survivors and claims that the event is a hoax from the right; and fatalist cynicism about gun reform from the left.,2018,Unknown,USA,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/us/parkland-students-hogg-gonzalez.html,Parkland survivors,2019-02-01,,I00010 - ParklandTeens
|
||||
I00011,CovingtonTeen,incident,,2019,Unknown,USA,https://www.wcpo.com/news/national/fact-check-viral-misinformation-about-covington-catholic-nathan-phillips-infects-the-internet,MAGA kid (Covington),2019-02-01,,I00011 - CovingtonTeen
|
||||
I00012,ChinaSmog,incident,,2011,China,China,https://www.cjr.org/innovations/memes-pollution-censorship-china-beijing.php,"China smog (not an attack, but a counter to disinformation)",2019-02-24,,I00012 - ChinaSmog
|
||||
I00013,FranceBlacktivists,incident,,2014,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-glimpse-into-a-french-operation-f78dcae78924,France blacktivists,2019-02-24,,I00013 - FranceBlacktivists
|
||||
I00014,GiletsJaunePileon,incident,,2018,Russia,France,https://www.wired.com/story/co-opting-french-unrest-spread-disinformation/,Russian pile-onto #GiletsJaune (and expansion to other countries),2019-02-24,,I00014 - GiletsJaunePileon
|
||||
I00015,ConcordDiscovery,incident,"The Office of Special Counsel accused Concord Management (an IRA funder/handler) and its counsel of abusing the discovery process by leaking discovery materials under false pretences: the documents were altered; the documents were portrayed as material obtained by hacking, rather than legal process; the released documents are selected to maximize exposure targets and methods. ",2019,Russia,USA,https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/02/new-mueller-filing-shows-how-russia-misuses-us-courts/581884/,,2019-02-01,,I00015 - ConcordDiscovery
|
||||
I00016,LithuanianElves,campaign,,2014,Russia,Lithuania,https://www.ft.com/content/b3701b12-2544-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf,,2019-02-01,,I00016 - LithuanianElves
|
||||
I00017,US presidential elections,campaign,"Make Clinton look bad or unpopular, and Trump look good over a long period, to change individuals’ voting intentions. ",2016,Russia,USA,https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf,,2019-02-24,OII,I00017 - US presidential elections
|
||||
I00018,DNC email leak incident,tactic,,2016,Russia,USA,,"Channels: RU domestic, RU multilingual (RT/Sputnik), trolls. OII",2019-02-24,OII,I00018 - DNC email leak incident
|
||||
I00019,MacronTiphaine,incident,Far-right trolls on 4chan and Twitter spreading misinformation about French candidate Macron and spur support for rival candidate Le Pen.,2017,,France,https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/heres-how-far-right-trolls-are-spreading-hoaxes-about,Trolls OII,2019-02-24,OII,I00019 - MacronTiphaine
|
||||
I00020,3000 tanks,incident,,2017,Russia,World,https://medium.com/@DFRLab/three-thousand-fake-tanks-575410c4f64d,,2019-02-24,OII,I00020 - 3000 tanks
|
||||
I00021,Armenia elections,campaign,,2017,Russia,Armenia,https://medium.com/dfrlab/fakes-bots-and-blockings-in-armenia-44a4c87ebc46,,2019-02-24,OII,I00021 - Armenia elections
|
||||
I00022,#Macronleaks,incident,"Countering the spreading of an alleged 9GB of “leaked”, fake documents of Macron campaign",2017,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/hashtag-campaign-macronleaks-4a3fb870c4e8,,2019-02-24,OII,I00022 - #Macronleaks
|
||||
I00023,#dislikemacron,incident,,2017,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/russian-and-french-twitter-mobs-in-election-push-bca327aa41a5,unsuccessful,2019-02-24,OII,I00023 - #dislikemacron
|
||||
I00024,#syriahoax,incident,,2017,Syria,USA,https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-the-alt-right-brought-syriahoax-to-america-47745118d1c9,,2019-02-24,OII,I00024 - #syriahoax
|
||||
I00025,EU Army,incident,"Traces back to 2016: Guardian “Is there a secret plan to create an EU army?” French President Emmanuel Macron has warned that Europeans cannot be protected without a ""true, European army"", as he marks the centenary of the World War One Armistice. On a visit to the former Western Front in Verdun, he said Russia had shown it could be a threat and Europe had to be able ""to defend itself better alone"". German Chancellor Angela Merkel backed the idea of an intervention force in June, but said it would have to be part of ""the structure of defence co-operation"".
|
||||
|
||||
Verdict: “An EU army marching out to war under Brussels’ command is a fantasy shared by Eurosceptics and a small number of federalists. Europe will continue down the road of defence cooperation in a halting way, but an EU army is only for armchair generals.”",2018,Russia,EU,https://medium.com/dfrlab/spread-it-on-reddit-3170a463e787,,2019-02-24,OII,I00025 - EU Army
|
||||
I00026,Netherlands referendum on Ukraine,incident,,2016,Russia,Netherlands,https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russias-influence-in-western-elections/2016/04/08/b427602a-fcf1-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00026 - Netherlands referendum on Ukraine
|
||||
I00027,crucifiedboy,incident,,2014,Russia,Ukraine,https://helda.helsinki.fi//bitstream/handle/10138/233374/KhaldarovaPanttiFakeNews.pdf?sequence=1,,2019-02-24,OII,I00027 - crucifiedboy
|
||||
I00028,mh17 downed,incident,,2014,Russia,Ukraine,https://www.stopfake.org/en/lies-spanish-flight-operations-officer-from-kiev-informed-about-ukrainian-planes-involved-in-boeing-tragedy/%20https:/globalvoices.org/2014/07/20/the-russian-governments-7000-wikipedia-edits/%20https:/foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/29/how-mh17-gave-birth-to-the-modern-russian-spin-machine-putin-ukraine/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00028 - mh17 downed
|
||||
I00029,MH17 investigation,campaign,"Since the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur on 17 July 2014 while flying over eastern Ukraine, killing all 283 passengers and 15 crew on board… wreckage of the aircraft fell near Hrabove in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, 40 km (25 mi) from the border.The shoot-down occurred in the War in Donbass, during the Battle of Shakhtarsk, in an area controlled by pro-Russian rebels. This has proven to be an ongoing example of Russia and their proxies ability to wage a disinformation campaign, and exemplify the use of the 4 D’s (dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay) ",2016,Russia,Ukraine,https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/05/07/112052-facebook-zablokiroval-sergeya-parhomenko-za-kommentariy-doklada-o-sbitom-171-boinge-187%20 https://news.online.ua/754036/v-sotssetyah-na-paltsah-pokazali-kak-rabotayut-boty-kremlya-opublikovany-foto/ https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/ukraine-involved-mh17-downing-claims-14184413,"Changed to campaign (still in the news, and still Russia accusing Ukraine... TASS 03/25/19 and UK Daily Mirror (see URL's). It's links to overall campaign directed against Ukraine",2019-02-24,OII,I00029 - MH17 investigation
|
||||
I00030,LastJedi,incident,,2018,Russia,World,https://slate.com/culture/2018/10/last-jedi-star-wars-twitter-backlash-russia-trolls.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00030 - LastJedi
|
||||
I00031,antivax,apt,,2018,Russia,World,https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304567,,2019-02-24,OII,I00031 - antivax
|
||||
I00032,Kavanaugh,incident,"Before the Senate SCOTUS confirmation hearings of Brett Kavanaugh, professor Christine Blasey Ford--first anonymously, then publicly--accused Kavanaugh of inappropriate or criminal sexual behavior. Amplified by Russian trolls Right wing operatives first tried to doxx Ford, then to discredit her. Many observers suggest that the Kavanaugh hearings were the largest anti-US Russian online operation for months. ",2018,Russia,USA,https://qz.com/1409102/russian-trolls-and-bots-are-flooding-twitter-with-ford-kavanaugh-disinformation/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00032 - Kavanaugh
|
||||
I00033,China 50cent Army,apt,"50cent Army is a CCP “tool” - “massive secret operation” in China pumping out an estimated 488 million fabricated social media posts per year, part of an effort to “regularly distract the public and change the subject” from any policy-related issues that threaten to anger citizens enough to turn them out onto the streets. But the research finds no evidence these 50-centers are, in fact, paid 50 cents, nor does it find they engage in direct and angry argument with their opponents. Instead, they are mostly bureaucrats already on the public payroll, responding to government directives at a time of heightened tension to flood social media with pro-government cheerleading.",2014,China,China,https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/how_the_chinese_government_fabricates_social_media_posts_for_strategic_distraction_not_engaged_argument.pdf https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-that-chinese-troll/3540663.html,"campaign (multiple incidents, e.g. Shanshan riots)",2019-02-24,OII,I00033 - China 50cent Army
|
||||
I00034,DibaFacebookExpedition,incident,"In the Expedition, Diba engaged in a highly organized cyber-attack of a Taiwanese political leader. On January 20, 2016 (the day of President Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration) featuring the posting of an overwhelming number of social media comments in support of a PRC-sanctioned message. Netizens from one of the largest discussion forums in China, known as Diba, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message, a cyberattack referred to as the “Diba Expedition to Facebook.”
|
||||
|
||||
Unique for taking place outside of the Chinese Internet system, both transgressing technical and political norms while exposing their actions to an international audience. In spite of the transgressive nature of the action, “Diba Expedition” was highly praised by Chinese official media, in contrast to comparable activities in the past that lacked its explicit pro-government ideology. Yet—reflecting the complexity of Diba’s relationship with the PRC government—the Expedition was shut down after a few days.",2016,China,Taiwan,https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/96746 https://qz.com/598812/an-army-of-chinese-trolls-has-jumped-the-great-firewall-to-attack-taiwanese-independence-on-facebook/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00034 - DibaFacebookExpedition
|
||||
I00035,Brazilelections,campaign,Bot activity in Brazil elections,2014,Brazil,Brazil,https://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/politicalbots/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Brazil-1.pdf,,2019-02-24,OII,I00035 - Brazilelections
|
||||
I00036,BrazilPresDebate,incident,,2014,Brazil,Brazil,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/bots-brazil-the-activity-social-media-bots-brazilian-elections,,2019-02-24,OII,I00036 - BrazilPresDebate
|
||||
I00037,Rioelections,incident,,2016,Brazil,Brazil,https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/eleicoes-2016/2016/10/1823713-eleicao-no-rio-tem-tatica-antiboato-e-suspeita-de-uso-de-robos.shtml,,2019-02-24,OII,I00037 - Rioelections
|
||||
I00038,Brazilimpeachment,incident,,2016,Brazil,Brazil,http://www.labic.net/cartografia/a-rede-das-imagens-da-vaiadilma-novas-relacoes/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300415619_The_Influence_of_Retweeting_Robots_During_Brazilian_Protests,,2019-02-24,OII,I00038 - Brazilimpeachment
|
||||
I00039,MerkelFacebook,incident,"Top stories about Merkel in both German and English were negative and misleading, most published from fake news sites.",2017,Unknown,Germany,https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/hyperpartisan-sites-and-facebook-pages-are-publishing-false,,2019-02-24,OII,I00039 - MerkelFacebook
|
||||
I00040,modamaniSelfie,incident,,2015,Unknown,Germany,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/syria-refugee-anas-modamani-germany-facebook.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00040 - modamaniSelfie
|
||||
I00041,Refugee crime map,incident,,2017,Unknown,Germany,https://uebermedien.de/11488/kartenlegen-mit-kriminellen-auslaendern/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00041 - Refugee crime map
|
||||
I00042,Saudi/Qatar bot dispute,incident,"In the summer of 2017, Twitter bots—automated accounts—were deployed to boost messaging on both sides of the diplomatic dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.” Calling this a “diplomatic dispute” understates the complexity of regional dynamics, at the center is an alleged report that Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, had made an astonishing speech, and alleged “hack” of Qatar’s official news agency, and further woven into concerns Saudi Arabia has about the influence of public perception, the role of Al Jazeera. ",2017,SaudiArabia,Qatar,https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/robot-wars-how-bots-joined-battle-gulf,"robot wars how bots joined battle in the gulf""",2019-02-24,MIS,I00042 - Saudi/Qatar bot dispute
|
||||
I00043,FCC comments,incident,,2017,Unknown,USA,https://gizmodo.com/how-an-investigation-of-fake-fcc-comments-snared-a-prom-1832788658,"does this count as an incident, or is it just hacking as usual?",2019-02-24,MIS,I00043 - FCC comments
|
||||
I00044,JadeHelm exercise,incident,"In the summer of 2015, thousands of troops from the US Army Special Operations command conducted and multi-state, weeks-long training operation across the southwest. Russian trolls amplified conspiracy theories promoted by far right media operatives such as Alex Jones, specifically: the Jade Helm 15 exercise was a precursor to domestic invasion and subsequent martial law by the Obama Administration in coordination with China. Some versions have deus ex machina such as an asteroid strike. Ultimately the Governor of Texas, Greg Abbot, was forced to speak out on the conspiracy theory, but he hedged on Obama’s motives.",2015,Russia,USA,https://www.politifact.com/texas/article/2018/may/03/jade-helm-15-greg-abbott-texas-state-guard-hayden-/,,2019-02-25,MIS,I00044 - JadeHelm exercise
|
||||
I00045,Skripal,incident,"On 4 March 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and double agent for the UK's intelligence services, and his daughter Yulia Skripal were poisoned in Salisbury, England, with a Novichok nerve agent known as A-234, according to official UK sources and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)",2018,Russia,UK,https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/skripal/ https://euvsdisinfo.eu/conspiracy-mania-marks-one-year-anniversary-of-the-skripal-poisoning/,This is Beliingcat's full library of Skirpal related reporting,2019-03-20,,I00045 - Skripal
|
||||
I00046,North Macedonia,incident,,2018,Russia,Macedonia,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/16/world/europe/macedonia-referendum-russia-nato.html https://www.polygraph.info/a/disinfo-analysis-macedonia-nato-russia/29770631.html,disinformation directed by Russian-backed groups trying to stoke fears and depress turnout in a vote that could put this Balkan nation on a path to join NATO.,2019-03-20,,I00046 - North Macedonia
|
||||
I00047,Sea of Azov,incident,"An international incident occurred on 25 November 2018 when the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coast guard fired upon and captured three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to pass from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait on their way to the port of Mariupol. In 2014, Russia had annexed the nearby Crimean Peninsula, which is dominantly internationally recognised as Ukrainian territory. It later constructed the Crimean Bridge across the strait. Under a 2003 treaty, the strait and the Azov Sea are intended to be the shared territorial waters of both countries, and freely accessible.
|
||||
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is also responsible for border protection, claims that the ships illegally entered Russian waters. The FSB alleges that crews did not comply with demands to stop. In the scuffle, a Russian border patrol ship rammed and damaged a Ukrainian Navy tugboat. Russian forces later seized all three Ukrainian ships, confiscating them for violating Russia's border. Six Ukrainian navy soldiers were injured, the Ukrainian navy reported. ",2018,Russia,World,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/wave-of-disinformation-from-the-azov-sea/,,2019-03-20,,I00047 - Sea of Azov
|
||||
I00048,White Helmets,campaign,,2015,Russia,World,https://thesyriacampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/KillingtheTruth.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/syria-white-helmets-conspiracy-theories,,2019-03-20,,I00048 - White Helmets
|
||||
I00049,White Helmets: Chemical Weapons,incident,"On 7 April 2018, a high number of civilians were killed in the besieged Syrian city of Douma, with evidence pointing towards another chemical attack by the regime, according to the EU. Subsequent to this event, a series of images ""prove"" that the White Helmets ""staged"" the chemical attack in Syria.",2017,Russia,World,http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingghouta/disinformation-2/ https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/12/18/chemical-weapons-and-absurdity-the-disinformation-campaign-against-the-white-helmets/ https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/10/16/why-assad-and-russia-target-the-white-helmets/,,2019-03-20,,I00049 - White Helmets: Chemical Weapons
|
||||
I00050,#HandsOffVenezuela,incident,"Venezuela has been thrown into turmoil after Guaidó declared himself interim president Jan. 23. The 35-year-old president of the National Assembly says Venezuela's constitution grants him power to take control of the government because Maduro was re-elected last year by fraud. Guaidó has called for Maduro to leave office and call new elections.
|
||||
|
||||
More than 50 nations, including the United States and most of Latin America, concluded that Maduro's re-election last year was a fraud. They have recognized Juan Guaidó, president of the opposition-led National Assembly, as Venezuela's legitimate head of state, endorsing his mission to establish a transitional government and hold fresh elections.
|
||||
Maduro has remained defiant in the face of domestic and international pressure, securing the support of the governments of Iran and Russia, as well as the loyalty of the Venezuelan military.",2019,Russia,World,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/twitter-as-an-information-battlefield-venezuela-a-case-study/,,2019-03-20,,I00050 - #HandsOffVenezuela
|
||||
I00051,Integrity Initiative,incident,"The UK Foreign Office has accused Russian state media of trying to discredit a government-funded body that works to counter Kremlin disinformation. A spokesperson said the Institute for Statecraft was hacked several weeks ago and documents were ""published and amplified by Kremlin news channels"".
|
||||
The FCO comments on the IfS were issued after a news report said the group had retweeted stories critical of Labour. Western officials believe the group involved in the hack is linked to the Russian state. Since then internal documents have been leaked to the Russian media about the organisation's activities, including lists of journalists it had contacted. The Foreign Office has provided £2.2m in funding to the institute over the last two years supported its work to counter disinformation overseas and not in the UK",2018,Russia,World,https://eaworldview.com/2019/01/counter-russia-disinformation-integrity-initiative/ https://www.stopfake.org/en/kremlin-watch-briefing-the-eu-has-to-start-taking-pro-kremlin-disinformation-seriously/,"This is an excellent example of the tables getting turned, and how we need to carefully work through offensive measures",2019-03-20,,I00051 - Integrity Initiative
|
||||
I00052,China overiew,campaign,,2015,China,World,https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/,"global strategic goals for China different from those President Vladimir Putin has for Russia; as a result, the social media influence techniques used by China are different from those used by Russia.",2019-03-20,,I00052 - China overiew
|
||||
I00053,China Huawei CFO Arrest,incident,"Dec. 1: Canadian authorities arrest Huawei's chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou at Vancouver’s airport while she is en route from Hong Kong to Mexico, after an extradition request from the Americans. The news becomes public on Dec. 5. Dec. 7: In Vancouver, Meng appears in court, where allegations of fraud are laid out. The U.S. alleges Meng misled American banks in a bid to get around American sanctions on Iran.
|
||||
Geopolitically complex issue combines US/China trade; Security concerns/issues related to Huawei’s 5G wireless equipment; diplomacy between Canada & China as Chinese subsequently arrest Canadian citizens.",2018,China,World,https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/czech-zeman-babis-huawei-xi-trump/584158/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-chinas-envoy-says-white-supremacy-played-part-in-canadas-arrest-of/,"“The Chinese have been very active here,” said General Andor Šándor, a former chief of the Czech military-intelligence service who is now a security consultant. “They don’t want to undermine our relationship with NATO, or the EU, unlike the Russians. What they are really keen on is to squeeze as much technological information from us as possible.”",2019-03-20,,I00053 - China Huawei CFO Arrest
|
||||
I00054,China Muslims,incident,,2018,China,World,https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/china-says-foreign-concerns-over-muslim-rights-unwarranted-1.4178042 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/,"China rejects the allegations that it has locked up large numbers of Muslims in re-education camps. The facilities, it says, are vocational training centers that emphasize “rehabilitation and redemption” and are part of its efforts to combat terrorism and religious extremism.",2019-03-20,,I00054 - China Muslims
|
||||
I00055,50 Cent Army,campaign,,2008,China,World,https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-that-chinese-troll/3540663.html,,2019-03-20,,I00055 - 50 Cent Army
|
||||
I00056,Iran Influence Operations,campaign,"Iranian interference in the politics of Arab countries has become more self-evident since the Arab Spring of 2011. Iran has been trying to widen its influence in the region in a political confrontation with Saudi Arabia. Factor long-held hostility to US (Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil”) & Isreal; it’s funding of proxies (Hezbolla) and Shia militia’s in Iraq; and most recently having the Revolutionary Guard being designated a terror organization; the seeming collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (nuclear programme) and expanding economic sanctions all add up to an increased likihood of Iran expanding their information operations.
|
||||
While there is history to Iran’s information/influence operations, starting with FireEye’s report about Iranian “fake news” websites, and subsequent reports by DFRLab (Jan 31, 2019 and March 26, 2019) we have strong document proof and assets that highlight Iran’s activities.",2012,Iran,World,https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/suspected-iranian-influence-operation.html https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/08/irans-disinformation-campaigns.html https://medium.com/dfrlab/takedown-details-of-the-iranian-propaganda-network-d1fad32fdf30 https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8dhttps://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/04/Iran-Memo.pdf,"FireEye has identified a suspected influence operation that appears to originate from Iran aimed at audiences in the U.S., U.K., Latin America, and the Middle East.",2019-03-20,,I00056 - Iran Influence Operations
|
||||
I00057,Mexico Election,incident,,2018,"Russia,Mexico",Mexico,https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/misinformation-seeded-by-bots-and-trolls-invades-mexico-s-election-20180502-p4zctx.html https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-russian-bots-in-mexico-46003fcab4,,2019-03-20,,I00057 - Mexico Election
|
||||
I00058,Chemnitz,incident,,2018,Russia,Germany,https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2018-09-04/chemnitz-far-right-alternative-news http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-facing-turbulence-after-right-wing-unrest-a-1228121.html,,2019-03-20,,I00058 - Chemnitz
|
||||
I00059,Myanmar - Rohingya ,campaign,,2014,Myanmar,Myanmar,https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/ https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-role-genocide-myanmar-new-reporting-complicates-narrative,Personal note (see Reuters side bar... end of article) JFG contributed research re: Twitter,2019-03-20,,I00059 - Myanmar - Rohingya
|
||||
I00060,White Genocide,campaign,,2018,Russia,World,https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/the-high-price-of-white-genocide-politics-for-australia-20180724-p4zt9k.html https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/trump-white-nationalism/568393/ https://www.iafrikan.com/2018/11/20/social-media-usa-south-africa-fake-news-disinformation/,Personal note (see Reuters side bar... end of article) JFG contributed research re: Twitter,2019-03-20,,I00060 - White Genocide
|
||||
I00061,Military veterans Targetting,campaign,,2017,Russia,US,https://www.stripes.com/congressmen-urge-fbi-to-investigate-bots-targeting-veterans-with-fake-news-1.573284 https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-influence-operations-taking-aim-at-us-military/4640751.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/09/russian-operatives-used-twitter-and-facebook-to-target-veterans-and-military-personnel-study-says/?utm_term=.d6fa34d4819c https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/working-papers/vetops/,,2019-03-20,,I00061 - Military veterans Targetting
|
||||
I00062,Brexit/UK ongoing,campaign,,2015,"Russia,UK",UK,https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-nationalist-dark-web-populism-tommy-robinson/? http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2019)634414,"This is current, and offers very good ""Anatomy of an ecosystem"" / EuroParl Think tank study... this is good CASE STUDY I: THE BREXIT CAMPAIGN and this Polarisation by manipulation",2019-03-20,,I00062 - Brexit/UK ongoing
|
||||
I00063,Olympic Doping Scandal,campaign,"On 18 July 2016, Richard McLaren, a Canadian attorney retained by WADA to investigate Grigor Rodchenkov (the former head of Russia's national anti-doping laboratory, the Anti-Doping Center, which was suspended by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in November 2015 for facilitating Russia's elaborate state-sponsored doping program. Rodchenkov helped develop and distribute banned performance-enhancing substances for thousands of Russian Olympians from 2005 to 2015. He made headlines in 2016 as a whistleblower, helping expose the complex and extensive nature of Russia's doping program. His revelations lead to Russia's partial ban from the 2016 Summer Olympics and total ban from the 2018 Winter Olympics.). These allegations led to a 97-page report covering significant state-sponsored doping in Russia.
|
||||
|
||||
The investigation found corroborating evidence after conducting witness interviews, reviewing thousands of documents, analysis of hard drives, forensic analysis of urine sample collection bottles, and laboratory analysis of individual athlete samples, with ""more evidence becoming available by the day."" The report concluded that it was shown ""beyond a reasonable doubt"" that Russia's Ministry of Sport, the Centre of Sports Preparation of the National Teams of Russia, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the WADA-accredited laboratory in Moscow had ""operated for the protection of doped Russian athletes"" within a ""state-directed failsafe system"" using ""the disappearing positive [test] methodology"" (DPM) after the country's poor medal count during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver. McLaren stated that urine samples were opened in Sochi in order to swap them ""without any evidence to the untrained eye"". The official producer of BEREG-KIT security bottles used for anti-doping tests, Berlinger Group, stated, ""We have no knowledge of the specifications, the methods or the procedures involved in the tests and experiments conducted by the McLaren Commission.""",2016,Russia,World,https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html?module=inline,,2019-04-06,,I00063 - Olympic Doping Scandal
|
||||
|
15
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/metatechniques.csv
Normal file
15
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/metatechniques.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,longname
|
||||
M001,resilience,Increase the resilience to disinformation of the end subjects or other parts of the underlying system,M001 - resilience
|
||||
M002,diversion,"Create alternative channels, messages etc in disinformation-prone systems",M002 - diversion
|
||||
M003,daylight,"Make disinformation objects, mechanisms, messaging etc visible",M003 - daylight
|
||||
M004,friction,"Slow down transmission or uptake of disinformation objects, messaging etc",M004 - friction
|
||||
M005,removal,Remove disinformation objects from the system,M005 - removal
|
||||
M006,scoring,Use a rating system,M006 - scoring
|
||||
M007,metatechnique,,M007 - metatechnique
|
||||
M008,data pollution,Add artefacts to the underlying system that deliberately confound disinformation monitoring,M008 - data pollution
|
||||
M009,dilution,Dilute disinformation artefacts and messaging with other content (kittens!),M009 - dilution
|
||||
M010,countermessaging,Create and distribute alternative messages to disinformation,M010 - countermessaging
|
||||
M011,verification,"Verify objects, content, connections etc. Includes fact-checking",M011 - verification
|
||||
M012,cleaning,Clean unneeded resources (accounts etc) from the underlying system so they can't be used in disinformation,M012 - cleaning
|
||||
M013,targeting,Target the components of a disinformation campaign,M013 - targeting
|
||||
M014,reduce resources,Reduce the resources available to disinformation creators,M014 - reduce resources
|
||||
|
164
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/narratives.csv
Normal file
164
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/narratives.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,main topic,subtopic,notes
|
||||
N00001,gargling with bleach will prevent/cure – also appears as satire,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00002,drinking corona beer will prevent/cure – also appears as satire,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00003,taking acetic acid will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00004,taking steroids will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00005,taking colloidal silver will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00006,taking MMS (which contains chlorine dioxide) can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00007,using essential oils will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00008,gargling with salt water will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00009,gargling with ethanol will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00010,eating raw garlic will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00011,garlic will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00012,spraying normal drinking alcohol on body will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00013,spraying chlorine on body prevents coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00014,drinking or washing in sesame oil prevents coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00015,using a hand dryer will kill corona virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00016,drinking water every 15 minutes will wash virus to the stomach where it will die,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00017,drinking hot water will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00018,avoiding eating ice cream will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00019,rinsing your nose with saline will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00020,aspirating boiling water vapor for five minutes deactivates the coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00021,having a pneumonia shot will prevent you from getting the disease,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00022,having a flu shot will prevent you from getting the disease,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00023,using cocaine prevents/cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00024,Asians are more likely to get Covid 19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00025,Wearing more than one mask will help prevent the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00026,It is dangerous to receive packages from china,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00027,It is dangerous to eat in a Chinese restaurant (more so than other restaurants),,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00028,Cold weather and snow can kill off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00029,Warmer weather will kill off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00030,Taking a hot bath prevents COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00031,Hand dryers are effective in killing off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00032,Antibiotics are effective in preventing and treating the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00033,Vinegar is more effective than hand sanitizer,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00034,Gargling with Vinegar prevents covid-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00035,Hand sanitizer does not work,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00036,Shuanghuanglian (Chinese medical herb) can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00037,drinking cow urine and applying cow dung on the body can cure coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00038,there is no risk to mass public gatherings as the virus is impossible to contract outdoors,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00039,drinking water every 15 minutes will prevent coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00040,Miracle Mineral Supplement cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00041,silver-infused toothpaste will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00042,Kenneth Copeland can cure the virus directly from his tv studio,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00043,you have to be with someone for 10 minutes to catch the virus from them,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00044,"taking ibuprofen makes COVID-19 worse, especially in new patients",,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00045,reading the Quran will make you immune,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00046,you can kill the virus by holding a blow dryer up to your nose,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00047,Sheep head’s soup is a preventative,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00048,Lemon and bicarbonate kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00049,Lemon juice with salt is a cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00050,Lemon juice with Chinese mesona is a cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00051,Lemon juice with turmeric prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00052,Consuming alcoholic beverages may help reduce the risk of infection by the novel coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00053,Coronavirus will be cured after 14 hours of curfew,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00054,Bitter gourd juice can cure coronavirus in two hours,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00055,“Gale of the wind” and neem tree leaves can prevent corona virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00056,Sitting in the sunlight will cure COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00057,Coronavirus can be cured by sniffing clove and camphor,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00058,Green chiretta can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00059,Eating bananas will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00060,15 minutes in Sauna will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00061,Morel mushrooms increase risk by 200%,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00062,Eating onions with salt will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00063,Propolis cures COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00064,Arsenic album-30 homeopathic medicine can prevent coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00065,Drinking boiled garlic water cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00066,A bovine vaccine can be used to inoculate people against coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00067,Shaving your beard prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00068,Turkish raki prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00069,Constant sex kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00070,An alkaline diet prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00071,Volcanic ash kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00072,Ketamine can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00073,Putting an opinion in your room can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00074,Black tea can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00075,Pu’er tea can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00076,Environmental enzymes can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00077,Cocaine kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
|
||||
N00078,Corona virus is just a cold,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00079,Covid 19 is a normal flu and is no more dangerous than that,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00080,Children cannot catch corona virus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00081,SARS-CoV-2 is mutating faster than normal viruses,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00082,Pregnant women who have Covid 19 can pass the virus through the placenta to the unborn child,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00083,Covid 19 only affects the elderly,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00084,The SARS-CoV-2 virus can be transmitted through mosquito bite,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00085,Africans are immune,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00086,Vegetarians are immune,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00087,People in India can resist the coronavirus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00088,People with type-A blood are more prone to get coronavirus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00089,Everyone with Covid 19 dies,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00090,There is no corona (virus),,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00091,This is “fake news” invented by Trump to strengthen the dollar,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00092,Chloroquine in any amount can cure Covid 19,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00093,The outbreak of covid 19 is not real,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00094,COVID-19 breeds rapidly in toilet paper,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00095,Turks area immune to covid-19,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00096,Coronavirus is caused by snakes,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00097,Coronavirus activates all bacterias and viruses in your body,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
|
||||
N00098,It was created in a lab,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00099,It is a US/CIA created bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00100,It is a Chinese bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00101,It is a Russian bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00102,It leaked from a bio-weapons lab in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00103,It leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00104,It was caused by an infected rat biting a student in the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00105,"March 12, Ayatollah Khamenei falsely claimed that there is evidence that COVID-19 might be a “biological attack.”",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00106,Electromagnetic fields and the introduction of 5G wireless technologies led to Covid 19 outbreaks,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00107,Washing hands is propaganda by soap companies,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00108,This was a plan from Gate Foundation to increase the Gate’s wealth,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00109,Qatar knew abut Covid-19 since 2015 and Doha paid billions to China to “grow the virus”,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00110,Corona virus is being spread by Coca-Cola,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00111,US military brought the virus to Wuhan on October 2019,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00112,Bill Gates and Vatican have a plan to depopulate world with coronavirus vaccine,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00113,Saddam Hussein in 90s told his cabinet that US threatened to spread coronavirus if he didn’t follow US commands,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00114,Cuba gave a vaccine to China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00115,Cuba has a vaccine called Interferon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00116,Israel found the cure,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00117,China finds a vaccine 3/17,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00118,Institut Pasteur in France invented COVID-19,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00119,"COVID-19 is no worse than other outbreaks, it is just being hyped to hurt Trump",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00120,COVID-19 is a scripted narrative to justify closed borders,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00121,COVID-19 is a scripted narrative to force people to stay at home,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00122,Egypt developed cure (doctor developed a fluid),,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00123,Egypt gave China the vaccine,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00124,US has 40 thousands troops immune to COVID-19 conducting an invasion of Europe,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00125,CDC admits coronavirus originated in the US,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00126,Cow urine and feces can cure,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00127,COVID-19 was created in 2014 by an English Institute,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00128,Ecuadorean doctor develops vaccine 3/3,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00129,Filipino student develops vaccine and gets 5million US from Alibaba founder Jack Ma,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00130,"Raúl Rodolfo Abhduz Khan, biochemical engineer from Karmalah Laboratories, is the creator of coronavirus.",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
|
||||
N00131,If you can hold your breath for 10 seconds you don’t have Covid 19,,covid19,False Diagnostic Procedures,
|
||||
N00132,NYC is under martial law 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00133,Only people who have tested positive need to stay home and isolate themselves,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00134,Only large gatherings have to be stopped,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00135,All human interaction needs to be stopped,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00136,Coronavirus is spread only by coughing and sneezing,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00137,Social distancing will lead to dramatic immediate results,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00138,1 month of social distancing will stop the epidemic permanently,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00139,Friend/relative at Pentagon said the US is going on total lockdown,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00140,Friend/relative at White House said the US is going on total lockdown,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00141,Russia has unleashed over 500 lions to ensure that people stay inside their homes amid the coronavirus outbreak,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00142,In Spain – free internet during 60 days due to quarantine,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00143,Polish telecommunications company used quarantine as a cover up to put 100 5G antennas in Gdynia,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00144,Riots in London due to unavailability of food leading to lockdown and martial law 3/22,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00145,In USA Helicopters are spraying disinfectants to try to eradicate coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00146,Bangalore Municipal body will be spraying medicine in the air to kill coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00147,Homeland Security is mobilizing the national guard to combat coronavirus 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00148,Janta curfew in India will break the chain of transmission,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00149,Elderly people in Brazil who are caught wandering outside with have their pensions cancelled by the government,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00150,People in Spain are committing suicide due to quarantine 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00151,Parks in Adra Spain are being fumigated with poison,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00152,Spanish helicopters are spreading medicines against coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00153,Oman helicopters are spraying pesticides to eliminate coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00154,Venezuela helicopters are going to spread chemicals against coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00155,Trump will impose a nationwide mandatory quarantine in 38 to 72 hours 3/16,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00156,Military in Philadelphia are preparing to invoke martial law and bring citizens to FEMA camps,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00157,Supermarkets are recalling coronavirus-infected toilet paper,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00158,Pence urges people with coronavirus to go to police 3/2,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00159,Police in China kill covid-19 patients 3/2,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00160,Chinese coronavirus patients are being cremated alive 2/25,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
|
||||
N00161,Pandemic caused Venice’s water to be clear so the swans returned,,covid19,Good News Stories,
|
||||
N00162,Pandemic caused Venice’s water to be clear so the dolphins returned,,covid19,Good News Stories,
|
||||
N00163,Elephants break into a village due to social distancing and get drunk on corn wine,,covid19,Good News Stories,
|
||||
|
5
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/phases.csv
Normal file
5
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/phases.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,name_DE,rank,summary,summary_DE,longname
|
||||
P01,Plan,Planung,1,"Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effective ways of achieving it. Communicate the vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on expected results.",,P01 - Plan
|
||||
P02,Prepare,Vorbereitung,2,"Activities conducted before execution to improve the ability to conduct the action. Examples include: development of the ecosystem needed to support the action: people, network, channels, content etc.",,P02 - Prepare
|
||||
P03,Execute,Durchführung,3,"Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-up and/or maintaining presence etc.",,P03 - Execute
|
||||
P04,Assess,Auswertung,4,"Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in future plans ",,P04 - Assess
|
||||
|
121
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/playbooks.csv
Normal file
121
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/playbooks.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,object_id,name,summary
|
||||
PB00001,C00011,Game Mechanics: show examples of fake news and train the user to identify them on the basis of various types of indicators,
|
||||
PB00002,C00011,Game mechanics: use a crowd-sourced mechanism so that the public can categorize newly spreading news sources or articles a la Re-Captcha,
|
||||
PB00003,C00012,Develop a regulatory body like the CFPB to regulate and enforce regulation for digital organizations. ,
|
||||
PB00004,C00012,Government regulation,
|
||||
PB00005,C00012,Government shutdown. ,
|
||||
PB00006,C00017,Use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . ,
|
||||
PB00007,C00019,"Spread Infographics & Training Material teaching ways to identify and counter divisive rhetorical techniques and content, by stimulating their sense of outrage at being manipulated. Show them how to address the rhetorical technique rather than the content",
|
||||
PB00008,C00019,Twitter hashtags & paid advertising,
|
||||
PB00009,C00019,Teach people to identify non-civil/unconstructive conversations and call them out,
|
||||
PB00010,C00019,"Popularize (via memes, infographics) and get the centrists demographic who are tired of polarization to identify such messaging, call it out and display their outrage on the basis of divisive rhetorical techniques rather than merely arguing about the content",
|
||||
PB00011,C00027,Recruit respected thought leaders to model behavior,
|
||||
PB00012,C00027,Feature established respected thought leaders to model behavior,
|
||||
PB00013,C00027,Promote dialog from communities with disparate viewpoints,
|
||||
PB00014,C00027,"Establish facilitation guidelines for ""civil"" interaction.",
|
||||
PB00015,C00029,Identify ignorant agents (ex: anti-vaxx people willing to pay money to advertise their cause),
|
||||
PB00016,C00029,Sell physical merchandise that has instructive counter-effect,
|
||||
PB00017,C00029,"Secondary Objective: Obtain real-life identity of ignorant agents, to further disrupt their influence activities",
|
||||
PB00018,C00031,Create multiple versions of the narrative and amplify. ,
|
||||
PB00019,C00031,"Dissect narrative, piecemeal the components and then amplify",
|
||||
PB00020,C00032,Hijack hashtag and redirect conversation to truth based content. ,
|
||||
PB00021,C00032,Hijack (man in the middle) redirect from bad content to good content,
|
||||
PB00022,C00036,-Discredit via backstopped blogs/websites showing their past activity and opinions as being opposite to their current ingroup,
|
||||
PB00023,C00036,Create a trail of commentary about their idea of infiltrating the enemy (current in-group),
|
||||
PB00024,C00036,Publicize this by targeting their in-group competitors (ignorant agents),
|
||||
PB00025,C00040,Verify personal credentials ,
|
||||
PB00026,C00040,Syndicated reputation management (fact-checking syndication),
|
||||
PB00027,C00040,Academia ISAO,
|
||||
PB00028,C00044,Rate restrict via regulation posting above a statistical threshold,
|
||||
PB00029,C00044,Unless account is de-anonymized and advertised as automated messaging,
|
||||
PB00030,C00048,"Identify the accounts, the real person's name and shame them on social media.",
|
||||
PB00031,C00053,Social media companies remove inactive accounts,
|
||||
PB00032,C00053,Account holders remove accounts they're no longer using. ,
|
||||
PB00033,C00053,"Influencers encourage people to remove their inactive accounts ""Do you really need that old account"" campaign, world-war-two poster-style. ",
|
||||
PB00034,C00053,"Create alternative memorial websites for accounts of deceased people, so their accounts can't be reactivated on 'live' sites. ",
|
||||
PB00035,C00053,Educate/scare users on the risks of losing control over a dormant account (would their employer be forgiving if an account associated with the user suddenly starting posting extremist content?).,
|
||||
PB00036,C00074,Platform adds a hash of the post to the post metadata and make it publicly available (content addressing). Scrape for duplicate content and deplatform the content/users across affected. In all cases some checks need to prevent deplatforming of highly correlated organic traffic such as a community group copy/pasting their bake sale advert. ,
|
||||
PB00037,C00074,Platform adds plagiarism score metadata to a post and makes it publicly available. Scrape for duplicate content and deplatform the content/users across affected platforms.,
|
||||
PB00038,C00074,Use message hashing and fuzzy hashing to detect identical/similar content.,
|
||||
PB00039,C00074,Use plagiarism algorithm to detect similar blog posts.,
|
||||
PB00040,C00074,"Use basic web scraping techniques, Google dorks, etc to identify similar head lines, uniques phrases, authorship, embedded links and any other correlating data point.",
|
||||
PB00041,C00098,Affected person contacts platform for action,
|
||||
PB00042,C00136,"Work with platform to identify active target audiences through finanical data and messaging.
|
||||
",
|
||||
PB00043,C00136,Use a platform's publicly available advertising/targeting capabilities to enumerate a list of possible microtargeted demographics. Compare these to known TAs of past/ongoing influence ops to identify the vulnerable demographics. ,
|
||||
PB00044,C00140,"DDoS adversary link shorteners by spamming real links.
|
||||
",
|
||||
PB00045,C00140,Compromise service and reroute links to benign content or counter messaging.,
|
||||
PB00046,C00148,Degrade TA engagement using bots; direct the adversary to engage insular bot communities-within-communities rather than the authentic target audience.,
|
||||
PB00047,C00148,Degrade MOEs/MOPs by faking inter-community sharing.,
|
||||
PB00048,C00149,"Distort TA demographics by posting irrelevant content, misleading demogaphic data, etc.",
|
||||
PB00049,C00149,"Work with the media platform to distort publicly available metrics. Can we work with Twitter to get crappy off-brand memes artificially bumped without needing to create fake accounts, etc.?",
|
||||
PB00050,C00149,"Use adtech to promote content inconsistent with TA demographics. If the adversary is reverse engineering a groups demographics by analyzing ads placed on the platform/group, by spamming ads for out-group stuff it may distort analysis of the group.",
|
||||
PB00051,C00149,"Distort Google Trends and other publicly available source of metrics using bots, cyborgs, adtech.",
|
||||
PB00052,C00149,Distort TA emotional response to content/narratives.,
|
||||
PB00053,C00149,Promote damp squibs. Within a known TA promote/inflate crappy off-brand memes which are unlikley to resonate.,
|
||||
PB00054,C00149,"Detect early trending/engagement and undermine the content by responding with 5Ds, toxic community behaviour, satirical responses, etc.",
|
||||
PB00055,C00149,"If adtech is used, fake clicks and engagements on the content.",
|
||||
PB00056,C00174,Elected officials lead return to First Amendment norms that embrace free and fair media as central to democracy.,
|
||||
PB00057,C00188,"TechCamp bringing together local journalists, with a several-day training program that includes a sponsored yearlong investigative project",
|
||||
PB00058,C00197,"Create a standard reporting format and method for social platforms for reporting false accounts.
|
||||
",
|
||||
PB00059,C00197,Determine whether account might be compromised,"Questions: - Is the account compromised?
|
||||
- Is it known to be associated with threat actors
|
||||
- common/random name
|
||||
- Names violate terms of service
|
||||
- Dormant account
|
||||
- Change of country IP
|
||||
- Social network growth patterns (number of friends etc)
|
||||
- Evidence of linguistic artifacts (multiple fingerprints, terms/idiosyncrasies )
|
||||
- Community vs. narrative vs. individuals "
|
||||
PB00060,C00197,Report suspected bots.,
|
||||
PB00061,C00197,"Report ToS violations. In all playbooks the platform must force user verification, credential reset and enable MFA. Suspend the account if it cannot be verified.",
|
||||
PB00062,C00197,Use sites like https://haveibeenpwned.com to detect compromised and at risk user accounts. ,
|
||||
PB00063,C00197,"Monitor for unusual account usage (use of VPN, new geographic location, unusual usage hours, etc). ",
|
||||
PB00064,C00197,Detect sudden deviation in user sentiment such as suddenly dropping hashtags linked to extremist content.,
|
||||
PB00065,C00197,"Purchase ""likes"", ""retweets"" and other vehicles which identify a bot and/or hijacked account. Ban the account.",
|
||||
PB00066,C00197,"Detect hijacked account and spam their posts. ""OP is a known disinformation bot. http://link.to.proof[.]com""",
|
||||
PB00067,C00219,Add date and source to images,
|
||||
PB00068,F00002,"Develop a baseline virality per platform, monitor trends, trigger alert for anomalies.",
|
||||
PB00069,F00003,"Destroy Desire to Work for Propaganda Businesses
|
||||
","-Identify non-committed actors (ie. IRA 2$/h employees)
|
||||
-Identify where they reside (ie. postal code level)
|
||||
-Send a viral message that clarifies the risk of working in influence ops. "
|
||||
PB00070,F00003,"Hack personal accounts
|
||||
-Send inflammatory messages on their behalf",
|
||||
PB00071,F00004,Identify target and entice individual to reveal insider information,
|
||||
PB00072,F00005,"-Model communities on the basis of behavior and identity, etc
|
||||
-Model different online behaviors in terms of how these groups interact with propaganda
|
||||
-Model how these group-based behaviors are affected by the tech platform they are using
|
||||
-This research can feed into later-stage playbooks to adapt them to communities/platforms",
|
||||
PB00073,F00006,Model each major platform,"Determine:
|
||||
a) Moderation Method (global, subcommunity level, none -ie. twitter, reddit, 8chan)
|
||||
b) Access Model (friend request, open, real-life identity)
|
||||
c) Communication Model (global, friends only, subcommunity, hybrid)
|
||||
Determine how the combination of the above (and other characteristics) allow different technical methods to communicate and influence various audiences
|
||||
This will allow to adapt playbooks to specific platforms"
|
||||
PB00074,F00013,"- Trace money and financing
|
||||
- Trace connections to known operations",
|
||||
PB00075,F00014,"- Hashes
|
||||
- Data voids
|
||||
- User handles
|
||||
- Domains + link shortener
|
||||
- TinEye For video (visual artifact)",
|
||||
PB00076,F00017,Create standard scoring for emptional content,
|
||||
PB00077,F00018,"Ad tech
|
||||
- De-platform funding sites
|
||||
- Blockchain transaction
|
||||
- Sell items
|
||||
- Identify manufacturers
|
||||
- Pay to play meetings ",
|
||||
PB00078,F00018,"Identify ad tech on platforms
|
||||
- Selling merch?
|
||||
- Financial platform
|
||||
- Bitcoin etc.. .",
|
||||
PB00079,F00018,"Identify re-use of ads
|
||||
","Look at Ad trackers, Tracking ids, Tracking ads, Re-use of as features (language, name, themes, plug-in, re-use/versions)"
|
||||
PB00080,F00018,track funding sources,
|
||||
PB00081,F00077,Build and update a model bot behaviour. ,
|
||||
PB00082,F00077,Build network of companies that model / rate bots. Build standards around data sharing and exchange,
|
||||
PB00083,F00092,"Build a reporting system for the public, so they can report disinformation artefacts and have them available to channels etc for action. ",
|
||||
|
7
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/resources.csv
Normal file
7
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/resources.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,resource_type,longname
|
||||
R001,datastreams ,Access to streaming data,data,R001 - datastreams
|
||||
R002,funding ,"Money to keep the lights on: for resources, time etc",money,R002 - funding
|
||||
R003,money ,Money for specific resources,money,R003 - money
|
||||
R004,platform algorithms ,Access to the algorithms used in a platform.,algorithms,R004 - platform algorithms
|
||||
R005,slang translation,Translations of slang terms,knowledge,R005 - slang translation
|
||||
R006,disinformation datasets,Access to datasets containing disinformation,data,R006 - disinformation datasets
|
||||
|
8
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/responsetypes.csv
Normal file
8
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/responsetypes.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,longname
|
||||
D01,Detect,"Discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems.",D01 - Detect
|
||||
D02,Deny,"Prevent disinformation creators from accessing and using critical information, systems, and services. Deny is for an indefinite time period. ",D02 - Deny
|
||||
D03,Disrupt,"Completely break or interrupt the flow of information, for a fixed amount of time. (Deny, for a limited time period). Not allowing any efficacy, for a short amount of time. ",D03 - Disrupt
|
||||
D04,Degrade,"Reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of disinformation creators’ command and control or communications systems, and information collection efforts or means, either indefinitely, or for a limited time period. ",D04 - Degrade
|
||||
D05,Deceive,Cause a person to believe what is not true. military deception seeks to mislead adversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality.,D05 - Deceive
|
||||
D06,Destroy,"Damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. Destroy is permanent, e.g. you can rebuild a website, but it’s not the same website. ",D06 - Destroy
|
||||
D07,Deter,Discourage.,D07 - Deter
|
||||
|
15
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/sectors.csv
Normal file
15
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/sectors.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,summary,longname,Jon's comments
|
||||
S001,Nonprofit,,S001 - Nonprofit,"Nonprofit and civil society are not mutually exclusive - in fact, to many, they are the same"
|
||||
S002,Civil Society,,S002 - Civil Society,"Nonprofit and civil society are not mutually exclusive - in fact, to many, they are the same"
|
||||
S003,Government,,S003 - Government,agree
|
||||
S004,Academic,,S004 - Academic,"""Education"" is more the sector - academic is more the term for an individual"
|
||||
S005,Activist,,S005 - Activist,Not a sector
|
||||
S006,General Public,,S006 - General Public,Not a sector
|
||||
S007,Social Media Company,,S007 - Social Media Company,"Social media (delete unecessary ""company"")"
|
||||
S008,Other Tech Company,,S008 - Other Tech Company,Technology (excluding social media)
|
||||
S009,Other Company,,S009 - Other Company,"Other (delete unecessary ""company"")"
|
||||
S010,Media,,S010 - Media,Media (excluding social media)
|
||||
,,,,"There are so many industry sectors
|
||||
Do we need to just highlight those most relevant to red/blue ttps?
|
||||
If so, what about journalism? Fact checking?
|
||||
Sub-sectors of government: Law enforcement? Defence?"
|
||||
|
22
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tactics.csv
Normal file
22
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tactics.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,name_DE,phase_id,rank,summary,summary_DE,changes from v0.1,longname
|
||||
TA01,Plan Strategy,,P01,1,"Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all objectives.",,no change,TA01 - Plan Strategy
|
||||
TA02,Plan Objectives,,P01,2,"Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievable objectives. Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the desired end state. There are four primary considerations:
|
||||
- Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives
|
||||
- The effect should be measurable
|
||||
- The objective statement should not specify the way and means of accomplishment
|
||||
- The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task.",,no change,TA02 - Plan Objectives
|
||||
TA05,Microtarget,,P02,8,Target very specific populations of people,,no change,TA05 - Microtarget
|
||||
TA06,Develop Content,,P02,5,"Create or acquire text, images, and other content",,no change,TA06 - Develop Content
|
||||
TA07,Select Channels and Affordances,,P02,9,"Selecting platforms and affordances assesses which online or offline platforms and their associated affordances maximize an influence operation’s ability to reach its target audience. To select the most appropriate platform(s), an operation may assess the technological affordances including platform algorithms, terms of service, permitted content types, or other attributes that determine platform usability and accessibility. Selecting platforms includes both choosing platforms on which the operation will publish its own content and platforms on which the operation will attempt to restrict adversarial content.",,no change,TA07 - Select Channels and Affordances
|
||||
TA08,Conduct Pump Priming,,P03,10,"Release content on a targetted small scale, prior to general release, including releasing seed. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. ",,no change,TA08 - Conduct Pump Priming
|
||||
TA09,Deliver Content,,P03,11,Release content to general public or larger population,,no change,TA09 - Deliver Content
|
||||
TA10,Drive Offline Activity,,P03,14,"Move incident/campaign from online to offline. Encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage in the physical information space or offline world. This may include operation-aligned rallies or protests, radio, newspaper, or billboards. An influence operation may drive to physical forums to diversify its information channels and facilitate spaces where the target audience can engage with both operation content and like-minded individuals offline. ",,no change,TA10 - Drive Offline Activity
|
||||
TA11,Persist in the Information Environment,,P03,15,Persist in the Information Space refers to taking measures that allow an operation to maintain its presence and avoid takedown by an external entity. Techniques in Persist in the Information Space help campaigns operate without detection and appear legitimate to the target audience and platform monitoring services. Influence operations on social media often persist online by varying the type of information assets and platforms used throughout the campaign.,,no change,TA11 - Persist in the Information Environment
|
||||
TA12,Assess Effectiveness,,P04,16,"Assess effectiveness of action, for use in future plans ",,no change,TA12 - Assess Effectiveness
|
||||
TA13,Target Audience Analysis,,P01,3,"Identifying and analyzing the target audience examines target audience member locations, political affiliations, financial situations, and other attributes that an influence operation may incorporate into its messaging strategy. During this tactic, influence operations may also identify existing similarities and differences between target audience members to unite like groups and divide opposing groups. Identifying and analyzing target audience members allows influence operations to tailor operation strategy and content to their analysis. ",,no change,TA13 - Target Audience Analysis
|
||||
TA14,Develop Narratives,,P02,4,"The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a """"whole of society"""" perspective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion constitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level. Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline.",,new,TA14 - Develop Narratives
|
||||
TA15,Establish Social Assets,,P02,6,"Establishing information assets generates messaging tools, including social media accounts, operation personnel, and organizations, including directly and indirectly managed assets. For assets under their direct control, the operation can add, change, or remove these assets at will.
|
||||
Establishing information assets allows an influence operation to promote messaging directly to the target audience without navigating through external entities. Many online influence operations create or compromise social media accounts as a primary vector of information dissemination.",,new,TA15 - Establish Social Assets
|
||||
TA16,Establish Legitimacy,,P02,7,Establish assets that create trust,,new,TA16 - Establish Legitimacy
|
||||
TA17,Maximize Exposure,,P03,12,"Maximize exposure of the target audience to incident/campaign content via flooding, amplifying, and cross-posting.",,new,TA17 - Maximize Exposure
|
||||
TA18,Drive Online Harms,,P03,13,"Actions taken by an influence operation to harm their opponents in online spaces through harassment, suppression, releasing private information, and controlling the information space through offensive cyberspace operations. ",,new,TA18 - Drive Online Harms
|
||||
|
43
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tasks.csv
Normal file
43
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tasks.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,name_DE,tactic_id,summary,summary_DE,framework_id,longname
|
||||
TK0001,Goal setting,,TA01,Set the goals for this incident. ,,FW01,TK0001 - Goal setting
|
||||
TK0002,Population research / audience analysis (centre of gravity),,TA01,"Research intended audience. Includes audience segmentation, hot-button issues etc. ",,FW01,TK0002 - Population research / audience analysis (centre of gravity)
|
||||
TK0003,Campaign design (objective design),,TA01,Design the campaign(s) needed to meet the incident goals,,FW01,TK0003 - Campaign design (objective design)
|
||||
TK0031,OPSEC for TA01,,TA01,OPSEC for TA01,,FW02,TK0031 - OPSEC for TA01
|
||||
TK0004,Identify target subgroups,,TA02,Identify groups that can best be used to meet incident goals,,FW01,TK0004 - Identify target subgroups
|
||||
TK0005,Analyse subgroups,,TA02,Analyse subgroups,,FW01,TK0005 - Analyse subgroups
|
||||
TK0006,create master narratives,,TA02,create master narratives,,FW01,TK0006 - create master narratives
|
||||
TK0007,Decide on techniques (4Ds etc),,TA02,Decide on techniques (4Ds etc),,FW01,TK0007 - Decide on techniques (4Ds etc)
|
||||
TK0008,Create subnarratives,,TA02,Create subnarratives,,FW01,TK0008 - Create subnarratives
|
||||
TK0009,4chan/8chan coordinating content,,TA02,4chan/8chan coordinating content,,FW01,TK0009 - 4chan/8chan coordinating content
|
||||
TK0032,OPSEC for TA02,,TA02,OPSEC for TA02,,FW02,TK0032 - OPSEC for TA02
|
||||
TK0010,Create personas,,TA15,Create personas,,FW01,TK0010 - Create personas
|
||||
TK0011,Recruit contractors,,TA15,Recruit contractors,,FW01,TK0011 - Recruit contractors
|
||||
TK0012,Recruit partisans,,TA15,Recruit partisans,,FW01,TK0012 - Recruit partisans
|
||||
TK0013,find influencers,,TA15,find influencers,,FW01,TK0013 - find influencers
|
||||
TK0033,OPSEC for TA15,,TA15,OPSEC for TA15,,FW02,TK0033 - OPSEC for TA15
|
||||
TK0014,Network building,,TA15,Network building,,FW01,TK0014 - Network building
|
||||
TK0015,Network infiltration,,TA15,Network infiltration,,FW01,TK0015 - Network infiltration
|
||||
TK0016,identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks,,TA15,identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks,,FW01,TK0016 - identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks
|
||||
TK0034,OPSEC for TA15,,TA15,OPSEC for TA15,,FW02,TK0034 - OPSEC for TA15
|
||||
TK0035,OPSEC for TA05,,TA05,OPSEC for TA05,,FW02,TK0035 - OPSEC for TA05
|
||||
TK0017,content creation,,TA06,content creation,,FW01,TK0017 - content creation
|
||||
TK0018,content appropriation,,TA06,content appropriation,,FW01,TK0018 - content appropriation
|
||||
TK0036,OPSEC for TA06,,TA06,OPSEC for TA06,,FW02,TK0036 - OPSEC for TA06
|
||||
TK0037,OPSEC for TA07,,TA07,OPSEC for TA07,,FW02,TK0037 - OPSEC for TA07
|
||||
TK0019,anchor trust / credibility,,TA08,anchor trust / credibility,,FW01,TK0019 - anchor trust / credibility
|
||||
TK0020,insert themes,,TA08,insert themes,,FW01,TK0020 - insert themes
|
||||
TK0038,OPSEC for TA08,,TA08,OPSEC for TA08,,FW02,TK0038 - OPSEC for TA08
|
||||
TK0021,"deamplification (suppression, censoring)",,TA09,"deamplification (suppression, censoring)",,FW01,"TK0021 - deamplification (suppression, censoring)"
|
||||
TK0022,amplification,,TA09,amplification,,FW01,TK0022 - amplification
|
||||
TK0039,OPSEC for TA09,,TA09,OPSEC for TA09,,FW02,TK0039 - OPSEC for TA09
|
||||
TK0040,OPSEC for TA10,,TA10,OPSEC for TA10,,FW02,TK0040 - OPSEC for TA10
|
||||
TK0023,retention,,TA11,retention,,FW01,TK0023 - retention
|
||||
TK0024,customer relationship,,TA11,customer relationship,,FW01,TK0024 - customer relationship
|
||||
TK0025,advocacy/ zealotry,,TA11,advocacy/ zealotry,,FW01,TK0025 - advocacy/ zealotry
|
||||
TK0026,conversion,,TA11,conversion,,FW01,TK0026 - conversion
|
||||
TK0027,keep recruiting/prospecting,,TA11,keep recruiting/prospecting,,FW01,TK0027 - keep recruiting/prospecting
|
||||
TK0041,OPSEC for TA11,,TA11,OPSEC for TA11,,FW02,TK0041 - OPSEC for TA11
|
||||
TK0028,evaluation,,TA12,evaluation,,FW01,TK0028 - evaluation
|
||||
TK0029,post-mortem,,TA12,post-mortem,,FW01,TK0029 - post-mortem
|
||||
TK0030,after-action analysis,,TA12,after-action analysis,,FW01,TK0030 - after-action analysis
|
||||
TK0042,OPSEC for TA12,,TA12,OPSEC for TA12,,FW02,TK0042 - OPSEC for TA12
|
||||
|
278
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/techniques.csv
Normal file
278
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/techniques.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,name_DE,tactic_id,summary,summary_DE,changes from v0.1,longname
|
||||
T0002,Facilitate State Propaganda,,TA02,Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.,,no change,T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
|
||||
T0003,Leverage Existing Narratives,,TA14,"Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. ",,no change,T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
|
||||
T0004,Develop Competing Narratives,,TA14,"Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the ""firehose of misinformation"" approach.",,no change,T0004 - Develop Competing Narratives
|
||||
T0007,Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups,,TA15,"Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.",,no change,T0007 - Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups
|
||||
T0009,Create fake experts,,TA16,"Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. ",,no change,T0009 - Create fake experts
|
||||
T0009.001,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications,,TA16,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications,,no change,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications -
|
||||
T0010,Cultivate ignorant agents,,TA15,"Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as ""useful idiots"" or ""unwitting agents"".",,no change,T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
T0011,Compromise legitimate accounts,,TA16,Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.,,no change,T0011 - Compromise legitimate accounts
|
||||
T0013,Create inauthentic websites,,TA15,"Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.",,no change,T0013 - Create inauthentic websites
|
||||
T0014,Prepare fundraising campaigns,,TA15,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",,no change,T0014 - Prepare fundraising campaigns
|
||||
T0014.001,Raise funds from malign actors,,TA15,"Raising funds from malign actors may include contributions from foreign agents, cutouts or proxies, shell companies, dark money groups, etc. ",,no change,Raise funds from malign actors -
|
||||
T0014.002,Raise funds from ignorant agents,,TA15,"Raising funds from ignorant agents may include scams, donations intended for one stated purpose but then used for another, etc. ",,no change,Raise funds from ignorant agents -
|
||||
T0015,Create hashtags and search artifacts,,TA06,"Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only ""real"" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage ""conversation"" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). ",,no change,T0015 - Create hashtags and search artifacts
|
||||
T0016,Create Clickbait,,TA05,"Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.",,no change,T0016 - Create Clickbait
|
||||
T0017,Conduct fundraising,,TA10,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",,no change,T0017 - Conduct fundraising
|
||||
T0017.001,Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns,,TA10,"An influence operation may Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns on platforms such as GoFundMe, GiveSendGo, Tipeee, Patreon, etc.",,no change,Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns -
|
||||
T0018,Purchase Targeted Advertisements,,TA05,Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations,,no change,T0018 - Purchase Targeted Advertisements
|
||||
T0019,Generate information pollution,,TA06,"Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. ""Nothing is true, but everything is possible."" Akin to astroturfing campaign.",,no change,T0019 - Generate information pollution
|
||||
T0019.001,Create fake research,,TA06,"Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx",,no change,Create fake research -
|
||||
T0019.002,Hijack Hashtags,,TA06,"Hashtag hijacking occurs when users “[use] a trending hashtag to promote topics that are substantially different from its recent context” (VanDam and Tan, 2016) or “to promote one’s own social media agenda” (Darius and Stephany, 2019).",,no change,Hijack Hashtags -
|
||||
T0020,Trial content,,TA08,"Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates",,no change,T0020 - Trial content
|
||||
T0022,Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"""Conspiracy narratives"" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model. ",,no change,T0022 - Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
|
||||
T0022.001,Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"An influence operation may amplify an existing conspiracy theory narrative that aligns with its incident or campaign goals. By amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, operators can leverage the power of the existing communities that support and propagate those theories without needing to expend resources creating new narratives or building momentum and buy in around new narratives. ",,no change,Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives -
|
||||
T0022.002,Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"While this requires more resources than amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, an influence operation may develop original conspiracy theory narratives in order to achieve greater control and alignment over the narrative and their campaign goals. Prominent examples include the USSR's Operation INFEKTION disinformation campaign run by the KGB in the 1980s to plant the idea that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as part of a biological weapons research project at Fort Detrick, Maryland. More recently, Fort Detrick featured prominently in a new conspiracy theory narratives around the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic. ",,no change,Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives -
|
||||
T0023,Distort facts,,TA06,"Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content",,no change,T0023 - Distort facts
|
||||
T0023.001,Reframe Context,,TA06,"Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions. ",,no change,Reframe Context -
|
||||
T0023.002,Edit Open-Source Content,,TA06,"An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets. ",,no change,Edit Open-Source Content -
|
||||
T0029,Online polls,,TA07,"Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well",,no change,T0029 - Online polls
|
||||
T0039 ,Bait legitimate influencers,,TA08,"Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. ""Influencers"" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.",,no change,T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
T0040,Demand insurmountable proof,,TA14,"Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the ""firehose of misinformation"". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of ""questions"" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.",,no change,T0040 - Demand insurmountable proof
|
||||
T0042,Seed Kernel of truth,,TA08,"Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.",,no change,T0042 - Seed Kernel of truth
|
||||
T0043,Chat apps,,TA07,"Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.",,no change,T0043 - Chat apps
|
||||
T0043.001,Use Encrypted Chat Apps,,TA07,"Examples include Signal, WhatsApp, Discord, Wire, etc.",,no change,Use Encrypted Chat Apps -
|
||||
T0043.002,Use Unencrypted Chats Apps,,TA07,"Examples include SMS, etc.",,no change,Use Unencrypted Chats Apps -
|
||||
T0044,Seed distortions,,TA08,"Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. ",,no change,T0044 - Seed distortions
|
||||
T0045,Use fake experts,,TA08,"Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give ""credility"" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias",,no change,T0045 - Use fake experts
|
||||
T0046,Use Search Engine Optimization,,TA08,"Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka ""Black-hat SEO"" ",,no change,T0046 - Use Search Engine Optimization
|
||||
T0047,Censor social media as a political force,,TA18,Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).,,no change,T0047 - Censor social media as a political force
|
||||
T0048,Harass,,TA18,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",,no change,T0048 - Harass
|
||||
T0048.001,"Boycott/""Cancel"" Opponents",,TA18,"Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organization, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasizing an adversary’s problematic or disputed behavior and presenting its own content as an alternative. ",,no change,"Boycott/""Cancel"" Opponents - "
|
||||
T0048.002,Harass People Based on Identities,,TA18,"Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.",,no change,Harass People Based on Identities -
|
||||
T0048.003,Threaten to Dox,,TA18,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",,no change,Threaten to Dox -
|
||||
T0048.004,Dox,,TA18,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",,no change,Dox -
|
||||
T0049,Flooding the Information Space,,TA17,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,,no change,T0049 - Flooding the Information Space
|
||||
T0049.001,Trolls amplify and manipulate,,TA17,"Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).",,no change,Trolls amplify and manipulate -
|
||||
T0049.002,Hijack existing hashtag,,TA17,Take over an existing hashtag to drive exposure.,,no change,Hijack existing hashtag -
|
||||
T0049.003,Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting,,TA17,"Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content.
|
||||
Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more ""popular"" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.",,no change,Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting -
|
||||
T0049.004,Utilize Spamoflauge,,TA17,"Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, ""you've w0n our jackp0t!"". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging. ",,no change,Utilize Spamoflauge -
|
||||
T0049.005,Conduct Swarming,,TA17,"Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centers exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach. ",,no change,Conduct Swarming -
|
||||
T0049.006,Conduct Keyword Squatting,,TA17,"Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term. ",,no change,Conduct Keyword Squatting -
|
||||
T0049.007,Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives,,TA17,"Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.",,no change,Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives -
|
||||
T0057,Organize Events,,TA10,"Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.",,no change,T0057 - Organize Events
|
||||
T0057.001,Pay for Physical Action,,TA10,"Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest. ",,no change,Pay for Physical Action -
|
||||
T0057.002,Conduct Symbolic Action,,TA10,"Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signaling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space. ",,no change,Conduct Symbolic Action -
|
||||
T0059,Play the long game,,TA11,Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.,,no change,T0059 - Play the long game
|
||||
T0060,Continue to Amplify,,TA11,continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished,,no change,T0060 - Continue to Amplify
|
||||
T0061,Sell Merchandise,,TA10,Sell mechandise refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world while making money,,no change,T0061 - Sell Merchandise
|
||||
T0065,Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities,,TA15,"Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).",,no change,T0065 - Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities
|
||||
T0066,Degrade Adversary,,TA02,Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.,,no change,T0066 - Degrade Adversary
|
||||
T0068,Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis,,TA14,"Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. ",,no change,T0068 - Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis
|
||||
T0072,Segment Audiences,,TA13,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",,no change,T0072 - Segment Audiences
|
||||
T0072.001,Geographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localized Content (see: Establish Legitimacy). ",,no change,Geographic Segmentation -
|
||||
T0072.002,Demographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age. ",,no change,Demographic Segmentation -
|
||||
T0072.003,Economic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division. ",,no change,Economic Segmentation -
|
||||
T0072.004,Psychographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes. ",,no change,Psychographic Segmentation -
|
||||
T0072.005,Political Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.",,no change,Political Segmentation -
|
||||
T0073,Determine Target Audiences,,TA01,Determining the target audiences (segments of the population) who will receive campaign narratives and artifacts intended to achieve the strategic ends.,,new,T0073 - Determine Target Audiences
|
||||
T0074,Determine Strategic Ends,,TA01,"Determining the campaigns goals or objectives. Examples include achieving achieving geopolitical advantage like undermining trust in an adversary, gaining domestic political advantage, achieving financial gain, or attaining a policy change, ",,new,T0074 - Determine Strategic Ends
|
||||
T0075,Dismiss,,TA02,Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.,,Split from T0001,T0075 - Dismiss
|
||||
T0075.001,Discredit Credible Sources,,TA02,"Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.",,no change,Discredit Credible Sources -
|
||||
T0076,Distort,,TA02,"Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.",,Split from T0001,T0076 - Distort
|
||||
T0077,Distract,,TA02,"Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).",,Split from T0001,T0077 - Distract
|
||||
T0078,Dismay,,TA02,"Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.",,Split from T0001,T0078 - Dismay
|
||||
T0079,Divide,,TA02,"Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community",,Split from T0001,T0079 - Divide
|
||||
T0080,Map Target Audience Information Environment,,TA13,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
|
||||
Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",,new,T0080 - Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
T0080.001,Monitor Social Media Analytics,,TA13,"An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics. ",,no change,Monitor Social Media Analytics -
|
||||
T0080.002,Evaluate Media Surveys,,TA13,"An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.",,no change,Evaluate Media Surveys -
|
||||
T0080.003,Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags,,TA13,An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralized page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity. ,,no change,Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags -
|
||||
T0080.004,Conduct Web Traffic Analysis,,TA13,"An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.",,no change,Conduct Web Traffic Analysis -
|
||||
T0080.005,Assess Degree/Type of Media Access,,TA13,"An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties. ",,no change,Assess Degree/Type of Media Access -
|
||||
T0081,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,,TA13,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
|
||||
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",,new,T0081 - Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
T0081.001,Find Echo Chambers,,TA13,"Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with. ",,no change,Find Echo Chambers -
|
||||
T0081.002,Identify Data Voids,,TA13,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.
|
||||
A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ",,no change,Identify Data Voids -
|
||||
T0081.003,Identify Existing Prejudices,,TA13,"An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarize its target audience from the rest of the public.",,no change,Identify Existing Prejudices -
|
||||
T0081.004,Identify Existing Fissures,,TA13,"An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer"" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides.",,no change,Identify Existing Fissures -
|
||||
T0081.005,Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions,,TA13,An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives. ,,no change,Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions -
|
||||
T0081.006,Identify Wedge Issues,,TA13,"A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarizing the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions.",,no change,Identify Wedge Issues -
|
||||
T0081.007,Identify Target Audience Adversaries,,TA13,"An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to center operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view. ",,no change,Identify Target Audience Adversaries -
|
||||
T0081.008,Identify Media System Vulnerabilities,,TA13,"An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content. ",,no change,Identify Media System Vulnerabilities -
|
||||
T0082,Develop New Narratives,,TA14,"Actors may develop new narratives to further strategic or tactical goals, especially when existing narratives adequately align with the campaign goals. New narratives provide more control in terms of crafting the message to achieve specific goals. However, new narratives may require more effort to disseminate than adapting or adopting existing narratives. ",,new,T0082 - Develop New Narratives
|
||||
T0083,Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative,,TA14,"An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.",,new,T0083 - Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative
|
||||
T0084,Reuse Existing Content,,TA06,When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,,new,T0084 - Reuse Existing Content
|
||||
T0084.001,Use Copypasta,,TA06,"Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text. ",,no change,Use Copypasta -
|
||||
T0084.002,Plagiarize Content,,TA06,An influence operation may take content from other sources without proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources. ,,no change,Plagiarize Content -
|
||||
T0084.003,Deceptively Labeled or Translated,,TA06,An influence operation may take authentic content from other sources and add deceptive labels or deceptively translate the content into other langauges. ,,no change,Deceptively Labeled or Translated -
|
||||
T0084.004,Appropriate Content,,TA06,An influence operation may take content from other sources with proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources. Examples include the appropriation of content from one inauthentic news site to another inauthentic news site or network in ways that align with the originators licensing or terms of service.,,no change,Appropriate Content -
|
||||
T0085,Develop Text-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading text-based artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign.",,new,T0085 - Develop Text-based Content
|
||||
T0085.001,Develop AI-Generated Text,,TA06,"AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Text -
|
||||
T0085.002,Develop False or Altered Documents,,TA06,Develop False or Altered Documents,,no change,Develop False or Altered Documents -
|
||||
T0085.003,Develop Inauthentic News Articles,,TA06,An influence operation may develop false or misleading news articles aligned to their campaign goals or narratives. ,,no change,Develop Inauthentic News Articles -
|
||||
T0086,Develop Image-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading visual artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include photographing staged real-life situations, repurposing existing digital images, or using image creation and editing technologies.",,new,T0086 - Develop Image-based Content
|
||||
T0086.001,Develop Memes,,TA06,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",,no change,Develop Memes -
|
||||
T0086.002,Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes) -
|
||||
T0086.003,Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap fakes) -
|
||||
T0086.004,Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages,,TA06,Image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan),,no change,Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages -
|
||||
T0087,Develop Video-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading video artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include staging videos of purportedly real situations, repurposing existing video artifacts, or using AI-generated video creation and editing technologies (including deepfakes).",,new,T0087 - Develop Video-based Content
|
||||
T0087.001,Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes) -
|
||||
T0087.002,Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes) -
|
||||
T0088,Develop Audio-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading audio artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include creating completely new audio content, repurposing existing audio artifacts (including cheap fakes), or using AI-generated audio creation and editing technologies (including deepfakes).",,new,T0088 - Develop Audio-based Content
|
||||
T0088.001,Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes) -
|
||||
T0088.002,Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes) -
|
||||
T0089,Obtain Private Documents,,TA06,"Procuring documents that are not publicly available, by whatever means -- whether legal or illegal, highly-resourced or less so. These documents can include authentic non-public documents, authentic non-public documents have been altered, or inauthentic documents intended to appear as if they are authentic non-public documents. All of these types of documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,new,T0089 - Obtain Private Documents
|
||||
T0089.001,Obtain Authentic Documents,,TA06,"Procure authentic documents that are not publicly available, by whatever means -- whether legal or illegal, highly-resourced or less so. These documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Obtain Authentic Documents -
|
||||
T0089.002,Create Inauthentic Documents,,TA06,"Create inauthentic documents intended to appear as if they are authentic non-public documents. These documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Create Inauthentic Documents -
|
||||
T0089.003,Alter Authentic Documents,,TA06,"Alter authentic documents (public or non-public) to achieve campaign goals. The altered documents are intended to appear as if they are authentic can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Alter Authentic Documents -
|
||||
T0090,Create Inauthentic Accounts,,TA15,"Inauthentic accounts include bot accounts, cyborg accounts, sockpuppet accounts, and anonymous accounts.",,new,T0090 - Create Inauthentic Accounts
|
||||
T0090.001,Create Anonymous Accounts,,TA15,Anonymous accounts or anonymous users refer to users that access network resources without providing a username or password. An influence operation may use anonymous accounts to spread content without direct attribution to the operation. ,,no change,Create Anonymous Accounts -
|
||||
T0090.002,Create Cyborg Accounts,,TA15,"Cyborg accounts refer to partly manned, partly automated social media accounts. Cyborg accounts primarily act as bots, but a human operator periodically takes control of the account to engage with real social media users by responding to comments and posting original content. Influence operations may use cyborg accounts to reduce the amount of direct human input required to maintain a regular account but increase the apparent legitimacy of the cyborg account by occasionally breaking its bot-like behavior with human interaction. ",,no change,Create Cyborg Accounts -
|
||||
T0090.003,Create Bot Accounts,,TA15,"Bots refer to autonomous internet users that interact with systems or other users while imitating traditional human behavior. Bots use a variety of tools to stay active without direct human operation, including artificial intelligence and big data analytics. For example, an individual may program a Twitter bot to retweet a tweet every time it contains a certain keyword or hashtag. An influence operation may use bots to increase its exposure and artificially promote its content across the internet without dedicating additional time or human resources.
|
||||
Amplifier bots promote operation content through reposts, shares, and likes to increase the content’s online popularity. Hacker bots are traditionally covert bots running on computer scripts that rarely engage with users and work primarily as agents of larger cyberattacks, such as a Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Spammer bots are programmed to post content on social media or in comment sections, usually as a supplementary tool. Impersonator bots102 pose as real people by mimicking human behavior, complicating their detection. ",,no change,Create Bot Accounts -
|
||||
T0090.004,Create Sockpuppet Accounts,,TA15,Sockpuppet accounts refer to falsified accounts that either promote the influence operation’s own material or attack critics of the material online. Individuals who control sockpuppet accounts also man at least one other user account.67 Sockpuppet accounts help legitimize operation narratives by providing an appearance of external support for the material and discrediting opponents of the operation. ,,no change,Create Sockpuppet Accounts -
|
||||
T0091,Recruit malign actors,,TA15,"Operators recruit bad actors paying recruiting, or exerting control over individuals includes trolls, partisans, and contractors.",,new,T0091 - Recruit malign actors
|
||||
T0091.001,Recruit Contractors,,TA15,Operators recruit paid contractor to support the campaign.,,no change,Recruit Contractors -
|
||||
T0091.002,Recruit Partisans,,TA15,Operators recruit partisans (ideologically-aligned individuals) to support the campaign.,,no change,Recruit Partisans -
|
||||
T0091.003,Enlist Troll Accounts,,TA15,"An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate.
|
||||
Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organization, and post content with a specific ideological goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalized or less organized and work for a single individual. ",,no change,Enlist Troll Accounts -
|
||||
T0092,Build Network,,TA15,"Operators build their own network, creating links between accounts -- whether authentic or inauthentic -- in order amplify and promote narratives and artifacts, and encourage further growth of ther network, as well as the ongoing sharing and engagement with operational content.",,new,T0092 - Build Network
|
||||
T0092.001,Create Organizations,,TA15,"Influence operations may establish organizations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities.",,no change,Create Organizations -
|
||||
T0092.002,Use Follow Trains,,TA15,"A follow train is a group of people who follow each other on a social media platform, often as a way for an individual or campaign to grow its social media following. Follow trains may be a violation of platform Terms of Service. They are also known as follow-for-follow groups. ",,no change,Use Follow Trains -
|
||||
T0092.003,Create Community or Sub-group,,TA15,"When there is not an existing community or sub-group that meets a campaign's goals, an influence operation may seek to create a community or sub-group. ",,no change,Create Community or Sub-group -
|
||||
T0093,Acquire/Recruit Network,,TA15,"Operators acquire an existing network by paying, recruiting, or exerting control over the leaders of the existing network. ",,new,T0093 - Acquire/Recruit Network
|
||||
T0093.001,Fund Proxies,,TA15,"An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including:
|
||||
- Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution
|
||||
- Reducing the workload for direct operation assets ",,no change,Fund Proxies -
|
||||
T0093.002,Acquire Botnets,,TA15,A botnet is a group of bots that can function in coordination with each other. ,,no change,Acquire Botnets -
|
||||
T0094,Infiltrate Existing Networks,,TA15,Operators deceptively insert social assets into existing networks as group members in order to influence the members of the network and the wider information environment that the network impacts.,,new,T0094 - Infiltrate Existing Networks
|
||||
T0094.001,Identify susceptible targets in networks,,TA15,"When seeking to infiltrate an existing network, an influence operation may identify individuals and groups that might be susceptible to being co-opted or influenced.",,no change,Identify susceptible targets in networks -
|
||||
T0094.002,Utilize Butterfly Attacks,,TA15,"Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organizations, and media campaigns. ",,no change,Utilize Butterfly Attacks -
|
||||
T0095,Develop Owned Media Assets,,TA15,"An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites, blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and organization of content.",,new,T0095 - Develop Owned Media Assets
|
||||
T0096,Leverage Content Farms,,TA15,Using the services of large-scale content providers for creating and amplifying campaign artifacts at scale.,,new,T0096 - Leverage Content Farms
|
||||
T0096.001,Create Content Farms,,TA15,An influence operation may create an organization for creating and amplifying campaign artifacts at scale.,,no change,Create Content Farms -
|
||||
T0096.002,Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations,,TA15,"An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organization that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed organizations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content farms for high volumes of targeted media. ",,no change,Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations -
|
||||
T0097,Create personas,,TA16,"Creating fake people, often with accounts across multiple platforms. These personas can be as simple as a name, can contain slightly more background like location, profile pictures, backstory, or can be effectively backstopped with indicators like fake identity documents. ",,new,T0097 - Create personas
|
||||
T0097.001,Backstop personas ,,TA16,"Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability",,no change,Backstop personas -
|
||||
T0098,Establish Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,"Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.",,new,T0098 - Establish Inauthentic News Sites
|
||||
T0098.001,Create Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,Create Inauthentic News Sites,,no change,Create Inauthentic News Sites -
|
||||
T0098.002,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites,,no change,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites -
|
||||
T0099,Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,,TA16,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities.
|
||||
An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ",,new,T0099 - Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities
|
||||
T0099.001,Astroturfing,,TA16,"Astroturfing occurs when an influence operation disguises itself as grassroots movement or organization that supports operation narratives. Unlike butterfly attacks, astroturfing aims to increase the appearance of popular support for the operation cause and does not infiltrate existing groups to discredit their objectives. ",,no change,Astroturfing -
|
||||
T0099.002,Spoof/parody account/site,,TA16,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. ",,no change,Spoof/parody account/site -
|
||||
T0100,Co-opt Trusted Sources,,TA16,"An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include:
|
||||
- National or local new outlets
|
||||
- Research or academic publications
|
||||
- Online blogs or websites ",,new,T0100 - Co-opt Trusted Sources
|
||||
T0100.001,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals,,TA16,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals,,no change,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals -
|
||||
T0100.002,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups,,TA16,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups,,no change,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups -
|
||||
T0100.003,Co-opt Influencers,,TA16,Co-opt Influencers,,no change,Co-opt Influencers -
|
||||
T0101,Create Localized Content,,TA05,"Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.",,new,T0101 - Create Localized Content
|
||||
T0102,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,"An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. ",,new,T0102 - Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles
|
||||
T0102.001,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,no change,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles -
|
||||
T0102.002,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,no change,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles -
|
||||
T0102.003,Exploit Data Voids,,TA05,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.
|
||||
A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ",,no change,Exploit Data Voids -
|
||||
T0103,Livestream,,TA07,A livestream refers to an online broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,new,T0103 - Livestream
|
||||
T0103.001,Video Livestream,,TA07,A video livestream refers to an online video broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,no change,Video Livestream -
|
||||
T0103.002,Audio Livestream,,TA07,An audio livestream refers to an online audio broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,no change,Audio Livestream -
|
||||
T0104,Social Networks,,TA07,"Social media are interactive digital channels that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, interests, and other forms of expression through virtual communities and networks.",,new,T0104 - Social Networks
|
||||
T0104.001,Mainstream Social Networks,,TA07,"Examples include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.",,no change,Mainstream Social Networks -
|
||||
T0104.002,Dating Apps,,TA07,"A video livestream refers to an online video broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks. Examples include Facebook Live, Instagram, Youtube, Tik Tok, and Twitter. ",,no change,Dating Apps -
|
||||
T0104.003,Private/Closed Social Networks,,TA07,"An audio livestream refers to an online audio broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks. Examples include Twitter Spaces, ",,no change,Private/Closed Social Networks -
|
||||
T0104.004,Interest-Based Networks,,TA07,"Examples include smaller and niche networks including Gettr, Truth Social, Parler, etc.",,no change,Interest-Based Networks -
|
||||
T0104.005,Use hashtags,,TA07,"Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident.",,no change,Use hashtags -
|
||||
T0104.006,Create dedicated hashtag,,TA07,Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag.,,no change,Create dedicated hashtag -
|
||||
T0105,Media Sharing Networks,,TA07,"Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.",,new,T0105 - Media Sharing Networks
|
||||
T0105.001,Photo Sharing,,TA07,"Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, Flickr, etc",,no change,Photo Sharing -
|
||||
T0105.002,Video Sharing,,TA07,"Examples include Youtube, TikTok, ShareChat, Rumble, etc",,no change,Video Sharing -
|
||||
T0105.003,Audio sharing,,TA07,"Examples include podcasting apps, Soundcloud, etc.",,no change,Audio sharing -
|
||||
T0106,Discussion Forums,,TA07,"Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.",,new,T0106 - Discussion Forums
|
||||
T0106.001,Anonymous Message Boards,,TA07,Examples include the Chans,,no change,Anonymous Message Boards -
|
||||
T0107,Bookmarking and Content Curation,,TA07,"Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc.",,new,T0107 - Bookmarking and Content Curation
|
||||
T0108,Blogging and Publishing Networks,,TA07,"Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. ",,new,T0108 - Blogging and Publishing Networks
|
||||
T0109,Consumer Review Networks,,TA07,"Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc. Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.",,new,T0109 - Consumer Review Networks
|
||||
T0110,Formal Diplomatic Channels,,TA07,"Leveraging formal, traditional, diplomatic channels to communicate with foreign governments (written documents, meetings, summits, diplomatic visits, etc). This type of diplomacy is conducted by diplomats of one nation with diplomats and other officials of another nation or international organization.",,new,T0110 - Formal Diplomatic Channels
|
||||
T0111,Traditional Media,,TA07,"Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.",,new,T0111 - Traditional Media
|
||||
T0111.001,TV,,TA07,TV,,no change,TV -
|
||||
T0111.002,Newspaper,,TA07,Newspaper,,no change,Newspaper -
|
||||
T0111.003,Radio,,TA07,Radio,,no change,Radio -
|
||||
T0112,Email,,TA07,Delivering content and narratives via email. This can include using list management or high-value individually targeted messaging.,,new,T0112 - Email
|
||||
T0113,Employ Commercial Analytic Firms,,TA08,"Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences. ",,new,T0113 - Employ Commercial Analytic Firms
|
||||
T0114,Deliver Ads,,TA09,Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.,,new,T0114 - Deliver Ads
|
||||
T0114.001,Social media,,TA09,Social Media,,no change,Social media -
|
||||
T0114.002,Traditional Media,,TA09,"Examples include TV, Radio, Newspaper, billboards",,no change,Traditional Media -
|
||||
T0115,Post Content,,TA09,Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,,new,T0115 - Post Content
|
||||
T0115.001,Share Memes,,TA09,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",,no change,Share Memes -
|
||||
T0115.002,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash,,TA09,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash.,,no change,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash -
|
||||
T0115.003,One-Way Direct Posting,,TA09,"Direct posting refers to a method of posting content via a one-way messaging service, where the recipient cannot directly respond to the poster’s messaging. An influence operation may post directly to promote operation narratives to the target audience without allowing opportunities for fact-checking or disagreement, creating a false sense of support for the narrative. ",,no change,One-Way Direct Posting -
|
||||
T0116,Comment or Reply on Content,,TA09,Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,,new,T0116 - Comment or Reply on Content
|
||||
T0116.001,Post inauthentic social media comment,,TA09,"Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums.",,no change,Post inauthentic social media comment -
|
||||
T0117,Attract Traditional Media,,TA09,Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media).,,new,T0117 - Attract Traditional Media
|
||||
T0118,Amplify Existing Narrative,,TA17,An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. ,,new,T0118 - Amplify Existing Narrative
|
||||
T0119,Cross-Posting,,TA17,"Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. ",,new,T0119 - Cross-Posting
|
||||
T0119.001,Post Across Groups,,TA17,An influence operation may post content across groups to spread narratives and content to new communities within the target audiences or to new target audiences. ,,no change,Post Across Groups -
|
||||
T0119.002,Post Across Platform,,TA17,"An influence operation may post content across platforms to spread narratives and content to new communities within the target audiences or to new target audiences. Posting across platforms can also remove opposition and context, helping the narrative spread with less opposition on the cross-posted platform. ",,no change,Post Across Platform -
|
||||
T0119.003,Post Across Disciplines,,TA17,Post Across Disciplines,,no change,Post Across Disciplines -
|
||||
T0120,Incentivize Sharing,,TA17,"Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.",,new,T0120 - Incentivize Sharing
|
||||
T0120.001,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs,,TA17,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs,,no change,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs -
|
||||
T0120.002,Use Contests and Prizes,,TA17,Use Contests and Prizes,,no change,Use Contests and Prizes -
|
||||
T0121,Manipulate Platform Algorithm,,TA17,"Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines. ",,new,T0121 - Manipulate Platform Algorithm
|
||||
T0121.001,Bypass Content Blocking,,TA17,"Bypassing content blocking refers to actions taken to circumvent network security measures that prevent users from accessing certain servers, resources, or other online spheres. An influence operation may bypass content blocking to proliferate its content on restricted areas of the internet. Common strategies for bypassing content blocking include:
|
||||
- Altering IP addresses to avoid IP filtering
|
||||
- Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to avoid IP filtering
|
||||
- Using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to avoid IP filtering
|
||||
- Enabling encryption to bypass packet inspection blocking
|
||||
- Manipulating text to avoid filtering by keywords
|
||||
- Posting content on multiple platforms to avoid platform-specific removals - Using local facilities or modified DNS servers to avoid DNS filtering ",,no change,Bypass Content Blocking -
|
||||
T0122,Direct Users to Alternative Platforms,,TA17,"Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content. ",,new,T0122 - Direct Users to Alternative Platforms
|
||||
T0123,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,,TA18,Controlling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,,new,T0123 - Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations
|
||||
T0123.001,Delete Opposing Content,,TA18,"Deleting opposing content refers to the removal of content that conflicts with operational narratives from selected platforms. An influence operation may delete opposing content to censor contradictory information from the target audience, allowing operation narratives to take priority in the information space.",,no change,Delete Opposing Content -
|
||||
T0123.002,Block Content,,TA18,Content blocking refers to actions taken to restrict internet access or render certain areas of the internet inaccessible. An influence operation may restrict content based on both network and content attributes. ,,no change,Block Content -
|
||||
T0123.003,Destroy Information Generation Capabilities,,TA18,"Destroying information generation capabilities refers to actions taken to limit, degrade, or otherwise incapacitate an actor’s ability to generate conflicting information. An influence operation may destroy an actor’s information generation capabilities by physically dismantling the information infrastructure, disconnecting resources needed for information generation, or redirecting information generation personnel. An operation may destroy an adversary’s information generation capabilities to limit conflicting content exposure to the target audience and crowd the information space with its own narratives. ",,no change,Destroy Information Generation Capabilities -
|
||||
T0123.004,Conduct Server Redirect,,TA18,"A server redirect, also known as a URL redirect, occurs when a server automatically forwards a user from one URL to another using server-side scripting languages. An influence operation may conduct a server redirect to divert target audience members from one website to another without their knowledge. The redirected website may pose as a legitimate source, host malware, or otherwise aid operation objectives.",,no change,Conduct Server Redirect -
|
||||
T0124,Suppress Opposition,,TA18,Operators can suppress the opposition by exploiting platform content moderation tools and processes like reporting non-violative content to platforms for takedown and goading opposition actors into taking actions that result in platform action or target audience disapproval. ,,new,T0124 - Suppress Opposition
|
||||
T0124.001,Report Non-Violative Opposing Content,,TA18,"Reporting opposing content refers to notifying and providing an instance of a violation of a platform’s guidelines and policies for conduct on the platform. In addition to simply reporting the content, an operation may leverage copyright regulations to trick social media and web platforms into removing opposing content by manipulating the content to appear in violation of copyright laws. Reporting opposing content facilitates the suppression of contradictory information and allows operation narratives to take priority in the information space. ",,no change,Report Non-Violative Opposing Content -
|
||||
T0124.002,Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself),,TA18,Goad people into actions that violate terms of service or will lead to having their content or accounts taken down. ,,no change,Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself) -
|
||||
T0124.003,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation,,TA18,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation,,no change,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation -
|
||||
T0125,Platform Filtering,,TA18,Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation),,new,T0125 - Platform Filtering
|
||||
T0126,Encourage Attendance at Events,,TA10,Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.,,new,T0126 - Encourage Attendance at Events
|
||||
T0126.001,Call to action to attend ,,TA10,Call to action to attend an event,,no change,Call to action to attend -
|
||||
T0126.002,Facilitate logistics or support for attendance,,TA10,"Facilitate logistics or support for travel, food, housing, etc.",,no change,Facilitate logistics or support for attendance -
|
||||
T0127,Physical Violence,,TA10,"Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. ",,new,T0127 - Physical Violence
|
||||
T0127.001,Conduct Physical Violence,,TA10,An influence operation may directly Conduct Physical Violence to achieve campaign goals. ,,no change,Conduct Physical Violence -
|
||||
T0127.002,Encourage Physical Violence,,TA10,An influence operation may Encourage others to engage in Physical Violence to achieve campaign goals. ,,no change,Encourage Physical Violence -
|
||||
T0128,Conceal People,,TA11,Conceal the identity or provenance of a campaign account and people assets to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0128 - Conceal People
|
||||
T0128.001,Use Pseudonyms,,TA11,"An operation may use pseudonyms, or fake names, to mask the identity of operation accounts, publish anonymous content, or otherwise use falsified personas to conceal identity of the operation. An operation may coordinate pseudonyms across multiple platforms, for example, by writing an article under a pseudonym and then posting a link to the article on social media on an account with the same falsified name. ",,no change,Use Pseudonyms -
|
||||
T0128.002,Conceal Network Identity,,TA11,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ",,no change,Conceal Network Identity -
|
||||
T0128.003,Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation,,TA11,"Distancing reputable individuals from the operation occurs when enlisted individuals, such as celebrities or subject matter experts, actively disengage themselves from operation activities and messaging. Individuals may distance themselves from the operation by deleting old posts or statements, unfollowing operation information assets, or otherwise detaching themselves from the operation’s timeline. An influence operation may want reputable individuals to distance themselves from the operation to reduce operation exposure, particularly if the operation aims to remove all evidence.",,no change,Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation -
|
||||
T0128.004,Launder Accounts,,TA11,Account laundering occurs when an influence operation acquires control of previously legitimate online accounts from third parties through sale or exchange and often in contravention of terms of use. Influence operations use laundered accounts to reach target audience members from an existing information channel and complicate attribution. ,,no change,Launder Accounts -
|
||||
T0128.005,Change Names of Accounts,,TA11,Changing names of accounts occurs when an operation changes the name of an existing social media account. An operation may change the names of its accounts throughout an operation to avoid detection or alter the names of newly acquired or repurposed accounts to fit operational narratives. ,,no change,Change Names of Accounts -
|
||||
T0129,Conceal Operational Activity,,TA11,Conceal the campaign's operational activity to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0129 - Conceal Operational Activity
|
||||
T0129.001,Conceal Network Identity,,TA11,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ",,no change,Conceal Network Identity -
|
||||
T0129.002,Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative,,TA11,"An influence operation may mix its own operation content with legitimate news or external unrelated content to disguise operational objectives, narratives, or existence. For example, an operation may generate ""lifestyle"" or ""cuisine"" content alongside regular operation content. ",,no change,Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative -
|
||||
T0129.003,Break Association with Content,,TA11,"Breaking association with content occurs when an influence operation actively separates itself from its own content. An influence operation may break association with content by unfollowing, unliking, or unsharing its content, removing attribution from its content, or otherwise taking actions that distance the operation from its messaging. An influence operation may break association with its content to complicate attribution or regain credibility for a new operation. ",,no change,Break Association with Content -
|
||||
T0129.004,Delete URLs,,TA11,"URL deletion occurs when an influence operation completely removes its website registration, rendering the URL inaccessible. An influence operation may delete its URLs to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred.",,no change,Delete URLs -
|
||||
T0129.005,Coordinate on encrypted/closed networks,,TA11,Coordinate on encrypted/ closed networks,,no change,Coordinate on encrypted/closed networks -
|
||||
T0129.006,Deny involvement,,TA11,"Without ""smoking gun"" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in ""Demand insurmountable proof"", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a ""firehose of misinformation"" environment.",,no change,Deny involvement -
|
||||
T0129.007,Delete Accounts/Account Activity,,TA11,"Deleting accounts and account activity occurs when an influence operation removes its online social media assets, including social media accounts, posts, likes, comments, and other online artifacts. An influence operation may delete its accounts and account activity to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred. ",,no change,Delete Accounts/Account Activity -
|
||||
T0129.008,Redirect URLs,,TA11,"An influence operation may redirect its falsified or typosquatted URLs to legitimate websites to increase the operation's appearance of legitimacy, complicate attribution, and avoid detection. ",,no change,Redirect URLs -
|
||||
T0129.009,Remove Post Origins,,TA11,"Removing post origins refers to the elimination of evidence that indicates the initial source of operation content, often to complicate attribution. An influence operation may remove post origins by deleting watermarks, renaming files, or removing embedded links in its content. ",,no change,Remove Post Origins -
|
||||
T0129.010,Misattribute Activity,,TA11,"Misattributed activity refers to incorrectly attributed operation activity. For example, a state sponsored influence operation may conduct operation activity in a way that mimics another state so that external entities misattribute activity to the incorrect state. An operation may misattribute their activities to complicate attribution, avoid detection, or frame an adversary for negative behavior. ",,no change,Misattribute Activity -
|
||||
T0130,Conceal Infrastructure,,TA11,Conceal the campaign's infrastructure to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0130 - Conceal Infrastructure
|
||||
T0130.001,Conceal Sponsorship,,TA11,"Concealing sponsorship aims to mislead or obscure the identity of the hidden sponsor behind an operation rather than entity publicly running the operation. Operations that conceal sponsorship may maintain visible falsified groups, news outlets, non-profits, or other organizations, but seek to mislead or obscure the identity sponsoring, funding, or otherwise supporting these entities.
|
||||
Influence operations may use a variety of techniques to mask the location of their social media accounts to complicate attribution and conceal evidence of foreign interference. Operation accounts may set their location to a false place, often the location of the operation’s target audience, and post in the region’s language",,no change,Conceal Sponsorship -
|
||||
T0130.002,Utilize Bulletproof Hosting,,TA11,"Hosting refers to services through which storage and computing resources are provided to an individual or organization for the accommodation and maintenance of one or more websites and related services. Services may include web hosting, file sharing, and email distribution. Bulletproof hosting refers to services provided by an entity, such as a domain hosting or web hosting firm, that allows its customer considerable leniency in use of the service. An influence operation may utilize bulletproof hosting to maintain continuity of service for suspicious, illegal, or disruptive operation activities that stricter hosting services would limit, report, or suspend. ",,no change,Utilize Bulletproof Hosting -
|
||||
T0130.003,Use Shell Organizations,,TA11,Use Shell Organizations to conceal sponsorship.,,no change,Use Shell Organizations -
|
||||
T0130.004,Use Cryptocurrency,,TA11,"Use Cryptocurrency to conceal sponsorship. Examples include Bitcoin, Monero, and Etherium. ",,no change,Use Cryptocurrency -
|
||||
T0130.005,Obfuscate Payment,,TA11,Obfuscate Payment,,no change,Obfuscate Payment -
|
||||
T0131,Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,,TA11,Exploiting weaknesses in platforms' terms of service and content moderation policies to avoid takedowns and platform actions.,,new,T0131 - Exploit TOS/Content Moderation
|
||||
T0131.001,Legacy web content,,TA11,"Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.",,no change,Legacy web content -
|
||||
T0131.002,Post Borderline Content,,TA11,Post Borderline Content,,no change,Post Borderline Content -
|
||||
T0132,Measure Performance,,TA12,A metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions. “Are the actions being executed as planned?”,,new,T0132 - Measure Performance
|
||||
T0132.001,People Focused,,TA12,Measure the performance individuals in achieving campaign goals,,no change,People Focused -
|
||||
T0132.002,Content Focused,,TA12,Measure the performance of campaign content,,no change,Content Focused -
|
||||
T0132.003,View Focused,,TA12,View Focused,,no change,View Focused -
|
||||
T0133,Measure Effectiveness,,TA12,A metric used to measure a current system state. “Are we on track to achieve the intended new system state within the planned timescale?”,,new,T0133 - Measure Effectiveness
|
||||
T0133.001,Behavior changes,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from misinformation incidents. ,,no change,Behavior changes -
|
||||
T0133.002,Content,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of campaign content. ,,no change,Content -
|
||||
T0133.003,Awareness,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing awareness. ,,no change,Awareness -
|
||||
T0133.004,Knowledge,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing knowledge. ,,no change,Knowledge -
|
||||
T0133.005,Action/attitude,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing action/attitude. ,,no change,Action/attitude -
|
||||
T0134,Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),,TA12,"Ensuring that Key Performace Indicators are identified and tracked, so that the performance and effectivess of campaigns, and elements of campaigns, can be measured, during and after their execution",,new,T0134 - Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)
|
||||
T0134.001,Message reach,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinformation incidents. ,,no change,Message reach -
|
||||
T0134.002,Social media engagement,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate social media engagement in misinformation incidents.,,no change,Social media engagement -
|
||||
|
152
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools.csv
Normal file
152
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
|
||||
disarm_id,name,externalgroup,url,category,disinformation_use,cogseccollab_use,function,summary,notes,code_url,artifacts,automation,platform,accessibility
|
||||
TL00002,Ad Observer,New York University,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ad-observer/enliecaalhkhhihcmnbjfmmjkljlcinl,Advertising Analysis,Designed for disinfo,,Collect and share ads,,,,ads,human,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00035,Exodus,Exodus tool,https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/,Advertising Analysis,,,Exodus tool to evaluate a mobile app’s permissions and ad trackers,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00036,Facebook political/issue ads database,Facebook,https://www.facebook.com/ads/archive/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US,Advertising Analysis,,,Facebook political/issue ads database,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00054,Google political ads database,Google,http://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/home,Advertising Analysis,,,Google political ads database,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00080,Moat,Moat,https://moat.com/,Advertising Analysis,,,Moat ad analytics tool,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00093,Pathmatics,Pathmatics,https://www.pathmatics.com/,Advertising Analysis,,,Pathmatics display and Facebook ads tracking tool (paid),,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00148,Who Targets Me,,https://whotargets.me/en/about-who-targets-me/,Advertising Analysis,,,political ad scraper,,,https://github.com/WhoTargetsMe/,ads,,browser extension,open source
|
||||
TL00019,Check My Ads,Check My Ads,https://www.checkmyads.org/,Advertising Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00010,Bot Sentinel,,https://botsentinel.com/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,yes,,,,,accounts,,,
|
||||
TL00011,Botometer,University of Indiana,https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,,,,Was BotOrNot,,accounts,,,
|
||||
TL00012,Botslayer,University of Indiana,https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/botslayer/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,accounts,,,
|
||||
TL00052,Ghostery,Ghostery,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ghostery-%E2%80%93-privacy-ad-blo/mlomiejdfkolichcflejclcbmpeaniij,Browser Plugin,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00144,WayBack Machine,WayBack Machine,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/wayback-machine/fpnmgdkabkmnadcjpehmlllkndpkmiak,Browser Plugin,Commonly used,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00022,Corporate registrars list,Kanton St.Gallen,https://www.commercial-register.sg.ch/home/worldwide.html,Corporate/Business Tools,,,List of corporate registrars around the world,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00023,Corporation Wiki,Corporation Wiki,https://www.corporationwiki.com/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00062,ICIJ Offshoreleaks Database,The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00066,Investigative Dashboard,Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),https://investigativedashboard.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00075,Little Sis database,Little Sis database,https://littlesis.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,"Relationships between people, companies etc.",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00089,Open Corporates,Open Corporates,https://opencorporates.com/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00090,Opensanctions,Opensanctions,https://www.opensanctions.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,"Global database of persons and companies of political, criminal, or economic interest. It combines the most important sanctions lists, databases of politically exposed persons etc",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00091,Orbis directory,Orbis,https://orbisdirectory.bvdinfo.com/version-2018619/OrbisDirectory/Companies,Corporate/Business Tools,,,Paid corporate search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00060,Hooyu,Hooyu Business,https://hooyubusiness.com,Finding People,,,Hooyu is a great paid tool for identifying connections between people and entities in the UK,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00081,Name2email,Name2email,https://name2email.com/,Finding People,,,Name2email browser extension that helps you find a person’s correct email,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00095,Pipl,Pipl,https://pipl.com/,Finding People,,,Pipl people Search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00111,Skopenow,Skopenow,https://www.skopenow.com/,Finding People,,,Skopenow (an excellent paid tool),,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00115,Spokeo,Spokeo,http://www.spokeo.com/,Finding People,,,Spokeo people search (good for the US only),,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00120,Thats Them,Thats Them,https://thatsthem.com/,Finding People,,,Thats Them people search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00007,Assembler,,https://projectassembler.org/,Image analysis,Designed for disinfo,,image analysis,,,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00033,e-witness,CUNY,https://ewitness.commons.gc.cuny.edu/,Image analysis,Potentially useful,,image provenance,"eWitness uses blockchain to establish provenance of images and videos taken from a smart phone camera. eWitness can be used to gather evidence of crime, human rights violation, domestic violence, corruption, traffic violations and more. An eWitness user is protected behind a pseudo-identity which is hidden even from the eWitness backend, until the user is ready to reveal themselves or to quietly pass the evidence on to their case-worker, trusted friend or sponsor. The purpose of eWitness is to create images and videos that can be trusted. The technology behind eWitness, provides the proof of location and time the media was taken and the proof that the media was not altered to misinform or deform the fact in any manner.",,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00041,FindClone,FindClone,https://findclone.ru/,Image analysis,,,Reverse image/facial recognition,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00046,Foto Forensics,Hacker Factory,http://fotoforensics.com,Image analysis,Useful,,image forensics,,,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00047,FotoForensics,FotoForensics,http://fotoforensics.com/,Image analysis,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00048,Free Online OCR,NewOCR,https://www.newocr.com/,Image analysis,,,Take an image and convert characters to text,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00067,InVid,InVid,https://www.invid-project.eu/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,image and video verification,,,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00068,Jeffrey Friedl's Image Metadata Viewer,EXIF Reader,http://exif.regex.info/,Image analysis,Useful,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00101,Reality Defender,AI Foundation,https://rd2020.org/,Image analysis,,,detect synthetic media,,,,images,,,request access
|
||||
TL00104,Remove.bg,Remove,https://www.remove.bg/,Image analysis,,,"Free tool that helps remove background images from a photo, to help with reverse image search",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00105,Reverse image search,Karmadecay,http://karmadecay.com/,Image analysis,,,Reverse image search tool for Reddit,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00106,Reverse image search,Yandex,https://yandex.com/images/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00108,Sensity tool for detecting GAN generated faces,Sensity,https://platform.sensity.ai/deepfake-detection,Image analysis,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00124,TinEye,TinEye,https://tineye.com/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,reverse image search,,,,images,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00125,TinEye,,tineye.com,Image analysis,,,search for images,,,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00129,Truepic,,https://www.truepic.com,Image analysis,,,image verification,,,,images,,,
|
||||
TL00153,YouTube Data Viewer,Citizen Evidence Lab (Amnesty International),https://citizenevidence.org/2014/07/01/youtube-dataviewer/,Image analysis,,,Extract hidden data from videos hosted on YouTube. Useful for tracking down original content,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00003,Aletheia,Midstream Technology,http://midstream.us,Network analysis,Designed for disinfo,,social network analysis; astroturf,,,,accounts,,,
|
||||
TL00050,Gephi,,https://gephi.org/users/install/,Network analysis,Commonly used,,network visualisation,,,,,,Install on PC,
|
||||
TL00077,MentionMapp,MentionMapp Analytics,https://mentionmapp.com/,Network analysis,Commonly used,,social network visualisation,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00063,Iffy Quotient,University of Michigan,https://csmr.umich.edu/platform-health-metrics/,Ratings,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00132,Trustium,,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/trustium/fkcccoomlgbfmhcgcepbdfjmofckejgo?hl=en,Ratings,Designed for disinfo,,site rating for advertisers,,,,webpages,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00001,Account Analysis,Account Analysis,https://accountanalysis.app/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Account Analysis is another great Twitter account analysis tool,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00015,Buzzweb,,https://buzzweb.pro/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Buzzweb Instagram analysis tool,,,,instagram,,,
|
||||
TL00038,FakeSpot,,https://www.fakespot.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Tool to analyze whether reviews on amazon/Yelp/TripAdvisor etc. are fake,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00039,FBstalker,,https://fbstalker.thao.pw/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Facebook profile investigator,,,,facebook,,,
|
||||
TL00043,Foller.me ,,https://foller.me/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Foller.me Analytics for Twitter,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00044,Followerwonk ,,https://followerwonk.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Followerwonk Twitter tool for searching bios, user analysis etc.",,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00056,Gramspy,,http://gramspy.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Gramspy Instagram analysis tool,,,,instagram,,,
|
||||
TL00057,Graph.tips,,http://graph.tips/beta,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,Facebook Graph search interface,,,,facebook,,,
|
||||
TL00082,NameChk,,https://namechk.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Tool to see if a username is used across different online services,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00107,SearchUsers,,https://searchusers.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,A tool to search for Instagram users by name or username without having to login,,,,instagram,,,
|
||||
TL00113,SocialBlade,,https://socialblade.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"SocialBlade tool for analyzing YouTube, Twitter, Insta, Twitch accounts",,,,"youtube,twitter,instagram,twitch,facebook,tiktok,dailymotion,odysee,trovo,mixer,dlive,storyfire",,,
|
||||
TL00119,TGStat,Telegram Analytics,http://tgstat.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,A tool for analyzing a Telegram account/channel,,,,telegram,,,
|
||||
TL00126,Tinfoleak,Tinfoleak,https://tinfoleak.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Get useful overview related to a Twitter account,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00134,TweetBeaver,TweetBeaver,https://tweetbeaver.com/index.php,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,TweetBeaver account tools,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00135,Twiangulate,,http://twiangulate.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Twiangulate.com for mapping connections between accounts,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00136,Twitonomy,Twitonomy,https://www.twitonomy.com/go-premium.php,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Analyzing a twitter account, hashtags, etc.",,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00137,Twitter advanced search,,https://twitter.com/search-advanced,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Twitter advanced search,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00139,Twren,,https://twren.ch/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Tool that lists the accounts that retweeted a specific account, with lots of sorting and filtering options",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00145,Webmii,,http://webmii.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Webmii social media profile search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00147,WhatsMyName,,https://whatsmyname.app/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,An even more comprehensive tool for searching a username across platforms,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00150,WhoPostedWhat,,http://whopostedwhat.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,Search for dates and date ranges on Facebook,,,,facebook,,,
|
||||
TL00025,Crowdtangle (chrome extension),Facebook,https://apps.crowdtangle.com/chrome-extension,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Commonly used,yes,,,,,socialmedia,,browser extension,Free
|
||||
TL00026,Crowdtangle (full),Facebook,https://www.crowdtangle.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Commonly used,,,,,,socialmedia,,,request access
|
||||
TL00069,Jod Bot,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/jod-bot,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Telegram archiver,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,telegram,,,open source
|
||||
TL00073,Khoj,Tattle,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,message verification,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,telegram,,,open source
|
||||
TL00074,Kosh,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/kosh/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,archive,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/kosh,messageapps,,,open source
|
||||
TL00102,Reaper,,https://reaper.social/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,,,,https://github.com/ScriptSmith/reaper,,,,
|
||||
TL00112,Social Media Analysis Toolkit (SMAT),,https://www.smat-app.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,trends,,,,"gab,parler,4chan,8kun,win,poal,telegram,gettr,rumble,bitchute,lbry,mewe,wimkin,minds,Vkontakte",,,
|
||||
TL00133,TruthNest,Athens Technology Centre (ATC),https://www.truthnest.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Designed for disinfo,,twitter analytics,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00138,Twitter Trails,,http://twittertrails.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,twitter tracking,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00146,WhatsApp archiver,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/whatsapp-archiver,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,WhatsApp archiver,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/whatsapp-scraper/tree/master/python_scraper,whatsapp,,,open source
|
||||
TL00117,Squint,MITRE,https://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/squint-sharpens-officials-perspective-to-combat-election-distortion,Tipline,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,browser extension;mobile app,
|
||||
TL00029,Disinformation Diaries,,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/initiatives/the-campaign/the-disinformation-diaries/,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00051,Get Bad News,DROG,https://getbadnews.com/#intro,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00121,The News Hero,NATO Stratcom,https://www.thenewshero.org/,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00122,The propaganda game,,https://propagandagame.org,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00004,Alexa,Alexa,https://www.alexa.com,Web Traffic Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00008,Backlink Watch,Backlink Watch,http://www.backlinkwatch.com/,Web Traffic Analysis,,,Backlink checker,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00110,SimilarWeb,SimilarWeb,http://similarweb.com/,Web Traffic Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00005,AnalyzeID,,http://analyzeid.com/,Website Analysis,Useful,,AnalyzeID find related websites through ad codes,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00006,Archive.is,,http://archive.is/,Website Analysis,,,Archive.is often used for social media profiles as well,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00016,Carbon Date,,http://carbondate.cs.odu.edu/,Website Analysis,,,A tool that tries to guess when a webpage first went online,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00027,Deep Duck Dive,,https://deepdiveduck.com,Website Analysis,,,Paid tool to monitor changes to specific webpages,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00030,DNSlytics,,https://dnslytics.com/,Website Analysis,,,"DNSlytics is another great tool for connecting websites together via AdSense, Google Analytics, IP etc. Reasonably-priced paid verison, too",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00031,Domain Big Data,,https://domainbigdata.com/,Website Analysis,,,Domain Big Data free whois/domain name search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00032,DomainTools,,https://whois.domaintools.com/,Website Analysis,,,DomainTools paid whois search and investigations tool,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00042,FOCA,,https://www.elevenpaths.com/labstools/foca/index.html,Website Analysis,,,FOCA tool for analyzing metadata in documents on the web (Windows only),,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00065,Internet Archive,Internet Archive,https://archive.org/web/,Website Analysis,,,Internet Archive/Wayback Machine,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00083,NerdyData,NerdyData,https://nerdydata.com/search,Website Analysis,,,NerdyData source code search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00099,Publicwww,,https://publicwww.com/,Website Analysis,,,"Publicwww, search to see how many websites have the same source code or snippet of text (looks in HTML, JS and CSS code as well as webpages)",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00116,Spy On Web,,http://www.spyonweb.com/,Website Analysis,,,Spy On Web search for tracking Google Analytics and AdSense,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00140,URLScan,,https://urlscan.io/,Website Analysis,,,"URLScan is a free tool that gives an overview of a site, the tools used to build it, and other useful info",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00141,Viewcached.com,,http://viewcached.com/,Website Analysis,,,Viewcached.com tool for retrieving cached pages from multiple search engines,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00142,ViewDNS,,https://viewdns.info/reverseip/,Website Analysis,,,ViewDNS is another useful tool for analyzing domain names.,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00149,Whoisology,,https://whoisology.com/,Website Analysis,,,Whoisology whois-domain search,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00009,Blackbird Constellation Engine,Blackbird,https://www.blackbird.ai/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,paid
|
||||
TL00013,Builtwith,,Builtwith.com,Website Analysis,Designed for disinfo,yes,"website details, links to other websites",,,,webpages,,,Freemium
|
||||
TL00014,Buzzsumo,,https://buzzsumo.com/,,Commonly used,,trends; social listening,,,,,,,paid
|
||||
TL00017,Check,Meedan,https://meedan.com/check,Analysis tracking and support,Designed for disinfo,,,,,https://github.com/meedan/check,,human,,open source
|
||||
TL00018,Check browser add-on,Meedan,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/check/pjfgpbclkfjkfiljlcfehjmpafeoafdi?hl=en,Analysis tracking and support,Designed for disinfo,,,"Browse the internet, and find a Tweet, YouTube video, Facebook post or an Instagram photo that you want your team to fact-check and investigate. Click the Check icon, choose one of the projects you want to add this item to, and save it",,,artifacts,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00020,Claim Review,Schema.org,https://schema.org/ClaimReview,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00021,ClaimBuster,University of Texas at Arlington,https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00024,Counter propaganda and disinformation explorer (CPD),IBM,https://www.ibm.com/watson,,Designed for disinfo,,summarisation?,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00028,Disinfo Busters,,http://disinfobusters.eu,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00034,Emergent,Columbia University: Tow Center,http://www.emergent.info/about,,Designed for disinfo,,rumor tracker,Emergent is a real-time rumor tracker. It's part of a research project with the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University that focuses on how unverified information and rumor are reported in the media. It aims to develop best practices for debunking misinformation.,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00037,Fakebook Experiment,Avaaz,https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/disinfo_volunteer_231/,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00040,Feed Reflect (browser extension),,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/feedreflect/bigmeipgaifggglelcnpnpbaefimpooc?hl=en-US,,Potentially useful,,,Browser extension designed to promote awareness when reading news on Twitter. This browser extension changes twitter feed by making posts more or less visible and help users distinguish news with differing level of reliability. ,,,,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00045,Fortis AI,Alion,https://www.alionscience.com,,Potentially useful,,IO platform,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00049,GenSynth,Darwin AI,https://www.darwinai.com,,Potentially useful,,explainable AI - relevant?,,I think they're talking about the tool in here: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.11951,,,,,
|
||||
TL00053,Giant Language Model Test Room (GLTR),,http://gltr.io,,Designed for disinfo,,text forensics,"The aim of GLTR is to take the same models that are used to generated fake text as a tool for detection. GLTR has access to the GPT-2 117M language model from OpenAI, one of the largest publicly available models. It can use any textual input and analyze what GPT-2 would have predicted at each position. Since the output is a ranking of all of the words that the model knows, we can compute how the observed following word ranks. We use this positional information to overlay a colored mask over the text that corresponds to the position in the ranking. A word that ranks within the most likely words is highlighted in green (top 10), yellow (top 100), red (top 1,000), and the rest of the words in purple. Thus, we can get a direct visual indication of how likely each word was under the model.",,,text,,,
|
||||
TL00055,Google Trends,,https://trends.google.com/trends,,Commonly used,,trends,,,,,,,free
|
||||
TL00058,Ground News,Ground News,https://www.ground.news/about,,,,bias tags on news articles,,,,,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00059,Hoaxy,University of Indiana,https://hoaxy.osome.iu.edu/,,Designed for disinfo,,network analysis of twitter data,,,,twitter,,,
|
||||
TL00061,Hypothes.is,Hypothes.is,https://web.hypothes.is/,Analysis tracking and support,Commonly used,,webpage markup,,,,webpages,human,,
|
||||
TL00064,Influence apps,Influence,https://startinfluence.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,paid
|
||||
TL00071,KeyHole,KeyHole,https://keyhole.co/,,,,impact measurement,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00072,Kharon,Kharon,https://www.kharon.com,,,,data and analytics tools,,Not sure this is in area?,,,,,
|
||||
TL00076,Meltwater Explore,,https://www.meltwater.com/en/solutions/social-listening,,,,trends; social listening,,,,,,,paid
|
||||
TL00078,MIDAC,Mythos Labs,http://www.mythoslabs.org/,,Designed for disinfo,,countering with humour,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00079,Misp,,https://www.misp-project.org/,,Useful,,,,,,,,,open source
|
||||
TL00084,NewsCheck,NewsCheck,https://www.newscheck.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00085,NewsGuard,NewsGuard,https://www.newsguardtech.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,trust rating system for urls,,,,webpages,,,
|
||||
TL00086,NewsWhip,NewsWhip,https://www.newswhip.com/,,,,soclal media analytics,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00087,Nobias,Nobias,https://nobias.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00092,Our.News,Our.News,https://our.news/,,,,,,,,,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00094,PimEyes: Face Recognition Search Engine and Reverse Image Search,PimEyes,https://pimeyes.com/en,,,,"Advanced face recognition search engine, a reverse image search tool, and a photo search mechanism used to find out where your face appears online",,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00096,Policy Change Index,Policy Change Index,https://policychangeindex.org/,,,,automated content analysis,,,https://github.com/PSLmodels,,,,open source
|
||||
TL00097,PR Aegis,Cosmetheus,https://cosmetheus.com/,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00098,Predata Platform,Predata,https://predata.com,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00100,Q,Sparks&Honey,https://www.sparksandhoney.com/,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00103,Recorded Future,Recorded Future,https://www.recordedfuture.com,,,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00109,Share The Facts,Duke Reporters Lab / Jigsaw,,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00114,SocialReaper,,,,,,,"scrapes Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Youtube, Pinterest, Tumblr APIs",,https://github.com/ScriptSmith/socialreaper,,,,
|
||||
TL00118,Tattle,Labor of Love,https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=studio.laboroflove.tattle&hl=en_GB&gl=US,,,,WhatsApp message forwarding,,,,messageapps,,,
|
||||
TL00123,TIES,Facebook,https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/facebook-outlines-new-system-for-detecting-fake-accounts-and-misinformation/584228/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,closed
|
||||
TL00127,Trendolizer,,http://get.trendolizer.com/,,,,trending stories,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00128,Trive,Trive,https://trive.news/,,,,"""human swarming""",,,,,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00130,Truly Media,Athens Technology Centre (ATC),https://www.truly.media/,,Designed for disinfo,,crowdsourced verification,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00131,Trusted Times,,https://trustedtimes.org,,,,news article analysis,,,,webpages,,browser extension,
|
||||
TL00143,Vortimo,,,Analysis tracking and support,Useful,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00151,Wolf Totem,Omelas,https://www.omelas.io/wolf-totem-product,,Designed for disinfo,,dashboard,,,,,,,
|
||||
TL00152,Yonder,Yonder,https://www.yonder-ai.com,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
|
||||
|
5
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools_removed.csv
Normal file
5
DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools_removed.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
Active,name,externalgroup,artifacts,automation,function,platform,accessibility,url,code_url,description,notes
|
||||
retired,BotCheck.me,RoBhat,accounts,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
|
||||
retired,FactCheck.me,RoBhat,,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
|
||||
retired,NewsBotAI,RoBhat,,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
|
||||
retired,SurfState.me,RoBhat,,,,browser extension,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
|
||||
|
BIN
generated_pages/.DS_Store
vendored
BIN
generated_pages/.DS_Store
vendored
Binary file not shown.
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user