DISARMframeworks/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/examples.csv

1	disarm_id	object_id	name	summary
2	E000001	T0002	Diba Facebook Expedition	2016 Diba Facebook Expedition, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall, to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message).
3	E000002	T0003	Narrative examples	Midwesterners are generous, Russia is under attack from outside.
4	E000003	T0004	MH17 competing narratives	"Russian Foreign Ministry again claimed that “absolutely groundless accusations are put forward against the Russian side, which are aimed at discrediting Russia in the eyes of the international community" (deny); "The Dutch MH17 investigation is biased, anti-Russian and factually inaccurate" (dismiss).
5	E000004	T0006	Master narratives promoted by major powers	"Huawei is determined to build trustworthy networks"
6	E000005	T0006	Master narratives promoted by major powers	Russia is the victim of bullying by NATO powers
7	E000006	T0006	Master narratives promoted by major powers	USA is guided by its founding principles of liberty and egalitarianism
8	E000007	T0007	Paying for access to existing accounts	Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook’s new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages.
9	E000008	T0007	Avaaz-reported pages and groups	EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe.
10	E000009	T0007	Fakes listed in the US Mueller report	Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami.
11	E000010	T0008	Denver Guardian	A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton.
12	E000011	T0009	Jade Helm fake experts	For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a “Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME” and the other a “Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author”--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn.
13	E000012	T0011	White House explosions	Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
14	E000013	T0012	Ten_GOP	2016 @TEN_GOP profile where the actual Tennessee Republican Party tried unsuccessfully for months to get Twitter to shut it down, and 2019 Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic personas and social media accounts that spreads falsehoods and amplifies narratives critical of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel.
15	E000014	T0014	VaccinateUS gofundme	2016: #VaccinateUS Gofundme campaigns to pay for Targetted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targetting Washington State mothers, $1,776 to boost posts over 9 months).
16	E000015	T0015	ColumbianChemicals hashtag	#ColumbianChemicals to promote a fake story about a chemical spill in Louisiana.
17	E000016	T0016	Pope endorses Trump	2016: “Pope Francis shocks world, endorses Donald Trump for president.”
18	E000017	T0016	FBI director rumours	2016: "FBI director received millions from Clinton Foundation, his brother’s law firm does Clinton’s taxes”.
19	E000018	T0022	Qanon conspiracy	Example: QAnon: conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful actors, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable "
20	E000019	T0024	Slowed-down Pelosi video	Pelosi video (making her appear drunk)
21	E000020	T0024	Shark on streets	Photoshopped shark on flooded streets of Houston TX.
22	E000021	T0025	Sekondary Infektion	2019: DFRLab report "Secondary Infektion” highlights incident with key asset being a forged “letter” created by the operation to provide ammunition for far-right forces in Europe ahead of the election.
23	E000022	T0029	FCC comments	Flooding FCC with comments
24	E000023	T0029	fake engagement metrics	Creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of given issue.
25	E000024	T0044	Canadians arrested for spying	(2019) China formally arrests Canadians Spavor and Kovrig, accuses them of spying (in retaliation to detention of Hauwei CFO).
26	E000025	T0044	Rumour about syrian rebels gassing their own people	(2018) The Russian ministry of defence put out a press release, claiming that they had intelligence Syrian rebel forces were about to gas their own people in Idlib province as part of a “false flag” operation to frame the Syrian government.
27	E000026	T0047	Singapore act	2019 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread "false statements of fact" in Singapore, where that information is "prejudicial" to Singapore's security or "public tranquility."
28	E000027	T0047	Social media cut off in Kashmir	India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and "anti-national" purposes.
29	E000028	T0048	Rappler	Philippines, Maria Ressa and Rappler journalists targeted Duterte regime, lawsuits, trollings, banned from the presidential palace where press briefings take place.
30	E000029	T0048	ProPublica	2017 bot attack on five ProPublica Journalists.
31	E000030	T0049	Saudi bots	2018: bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi’s death.
32	E000031	T0050	50 Cent army	popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the "Great Firewall")
33	E000032	T0050	Positive images of China	technique used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China.
34	E000033	T0051	FCC comments	2017: the FCC was inundated with nearly 22 million public comments on net neutrality (many from fake accounts)
35	E000034	T0052	Tertiary sites	Examples of tertiary sites include Russia Insider, The Duran, geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca.
36	E000035	T0052	Star News Digital Media	2019, US Domestic news: Snopes reveals Star News Digital Media, Inc. may look like a media company that produces local news, but operates via undisclosed connections to political activism.
37	E000036	T0052	Iranian sites including Liberty Front Press	(2018) FireEye reports on Iranian campaign that created between April 2018 and March 2019 sites used to spread inauthentic content from websites such as Liberty Front Press (LFP), US Journal, and Real Progressive Front during the 2018 US mid-terms.
38	E000037	T0053	Issues that can be politicised	BlackLivesMatter, MeToo
39	E000038	T0054	TrudeauMustGo	2019: #TrudeauMustGo
40	E000039	T0055	PhosphorusDisaster hashtag	#PhosphorusDisaster
41	E000040	T0056	RT/Sputnik	RT/Sputnik or antivax websites seeding stories.
42	E000041	T0057	IRA organising US political rallies	(Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 election
43	E000042	T0057	Facebook groups coordinating public space activities	Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and actvities into the public space.
44	E000043	T0059	China messaging on Taiwan and Hong Kong	China constant messaging that Taiwan and Hong Kong are part of one China.
45	E000044	C00008	Snopes	Snopes is best-known example of fact-checking sites.
46	E000045	C00012	2018 EU regulations	In 2018, the European Union created significant new regulations on the role of social media in media
47	E000046	C00012	German social media content regulations	German model: facebook forced to police content by law
48	E000047	C00014	Buzzfeed rumour list	Buzzfeed real-time disaster rumour list
49	E000048	C00014	FEMA rumour list	FEMA real-time disaster rumour list
50	E000049	C00030	counter narrative handbook	Handbook at https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf
51	E000050	C00030	Reality Team	Realityteam.org
52	E000051	C00048	USAID programs	USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations. Note that USAID operations were at a different level.
53	E000052	C00066	kPop hashtag flooding	kPop stans flooding extremist hashtags with pop videos and images.
54	E000053	C00070	2018 DDOS of troll farms	midterm-2018 elections DDOS against troll farms
55	E000054	C00073	Learn to Discern	The "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.”
56	E000055	C00073	Baltic Center for Media Excellence	NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.”
57	E000056	C00082	Reality Team ground truthing	RealityTeam work that adds clear information to spaces with disinformation in.
58	E000057	C00086	Reddit channels flooded with jokes	This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes.
59	E000058	C00087	kPop hashtag flooding
60	E000059	C00087	LGBT flooding of #proudboys
61	E000060	C00093	Pro-Truth Pledge	community code of conduct
62	E000061	C00111	The Commons Project	The Commons Project from BuildUp.
63	E000062	C00156	US Forces in Latvia	In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.”
64	E000063	C00178	Current Time videos	Using Current Time videos (viewed 40 million times online) to draw viewers away from Russian TV programming in RT and Sputnik. POtential content for this includes conventional entertainment programming (source: The conomist, “America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017).
65	E000064	C00182	Bedep Trojan	(2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia
66	E000065	C00188	2014 Russian poll in France	August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015).
67	E000066	C00188	Latvian newsrooms	Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”
68	E000067	C00195	Using Adwords to redirect ISIS content readers	Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Can apply this method to Russian propaganda.
69	E000068	C00200	India	Indian influencers and aunties countering misinformation.
70	E000069	C00202	Macron election in France	Macron election team modified docs to spike a hack and leak.
71	E000070	C00207	Saudi tit for tat campaign
72	E000071	C00211	Baltic Elves	Baltic Elves. https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/07/disinformation-nation-the-slovaks-fighting-in-defence-of-facts/
73	E000072	C00211	Taiwan humor over rumor	Taiwan humor over rumor strategy.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/feb/17/humour-over-rumour-taiwan-fake-news and https://internews.org/story/using-comedy-and-social-media-educate-disinformation