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diff --git a/CODE/.DS_Store b/CODE/.DS_Store
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diff --git a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_create_counters_summaries-checkpoint.ipynb b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_create_counters_summaries-checkpoint.ipynb
deleted file mode 100644
index 960c609..0000000
--- a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_create_counters_summaries-checkpoint.ipynb
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,459 +0,0 @@
-{
- "cells": [
-  {
-   "cell_type": "markdown",
-   "metadata": {},
-   "source": [
-    "# Create counters summaries\n",
-    "Create summaries of disinfo countermeasures for use in dataset cleaning etc."
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 1,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/ALcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA01counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA02counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA03counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA04counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA05counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA06counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA07counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA08counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA09counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA10counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA11counters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA12counters.md\n",
-      "updated ../counter_tactic_counts.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/cleaningcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/countermessagingcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/data pollutioncounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/daylightcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/dilutioncounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/diversioncounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/frictioncounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/metatechniquecounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/reduce resourcescounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/removalcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/resiliencecounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/scoringcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/targetingcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counters_metatag/verificationcounters.md\n",
-      "updated ../counter_metatag_counts.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/DHScounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/NGOcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/activistscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/adtechcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/civil_societycounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/community_groupscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/companiescounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/content_creatorscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/data_scientistcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/datastreamscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/developerscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/educatorscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/elvescounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/factcheckerscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/fundingcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/gamesdesignerscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/governmentcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/government:policymakerscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/influencerscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/influencers:trusted_authoritycounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/infoseccounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/librariescounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/mediacounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/militarycounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/moneycounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/platform_admincounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/platform_admin:adtechcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/platform_admin:fundingsitescounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/platform_admin:socialmediacounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/platform_algorithmscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/platform_outreachcounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/platformscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/publiccounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/public:account_ownerscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/religious_organisationscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/schoolscounters.md\n",
-      "Writing ../counter_resource/server_admincounters.md\n",
-      "updated ../counter_resource_counts.md\n"
-     ]
-    },
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>ID</th>\n",
-       "      <th>metatechnique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Title</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Details</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Playbook(s)</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Resources needed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>How found</th>\n",
-       "      <th>References</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Incidents</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Response</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Techniques</th>\n",
-       "      <th>NOTES</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00043</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cleaning</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Detect hijacked accounts and reallocate them</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>In all playbooks the platform must force user ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>platform_admin,activists,civil_society,money</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03 Develop People</td>\n",
-       "      <td>D3 Disrupt</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0011 - Hijack accounts</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cleaning</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Delete old accounts / Remove unused social med...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Social media companies remove inactive account...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia,publ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00004</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>\n",
-       "      <td>D4 Degrade</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0011 - Hijack accounts\\nTA06 - Develop Conten...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00074</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cleaning</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Identify identical content and mass deplatform</td>\n",
-       "      <td>\\n</td>\n",
-       "      <td>In all cases some checks need to prevent depla...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06 Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>D2 Deny</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0022 - Conspiracy narratives\\nT0026 - Create ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00026</td>\n",
-       "      <td>countermessaging</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Shore up democracy based messages (peace, free...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Unsure</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>\n",
-       "      <td>D4 Degrade</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00082</td>\n",
-       "      <td>countermessaging</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Ground truthing as automated response to pollu...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06 Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>D3 Disrupt</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>...</th>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>181</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00214</td>\n",
-       "      <td>metatechnique</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create policy that makes social media police d...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>German model: facebook forced to police conten...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>government:policymakers</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>\n",
-       "      <td>D3 Disrupt</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>182</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00215</td>\n",
-       "      <td>metatechnique</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use fraud legislation to clean up social media</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>government:policymakers</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2019-11-workshop</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>\n",
-       "      <td>D3 Disrupt</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>183</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00217</td>\n",
-       "      <td>daylight</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Registries alert when large batches of newsy U...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>platform_admin</td>\n",
-       "      <td>grugq</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>\n",
-       "      <td>D2 Deny</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>184</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00218</td>\n",
-       "      <td>removal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Censorship</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Alter and/or block the publication/disseminati...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>platform_admin</td>\n",
-       "      <td>grugq</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Taylor81</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09 Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td>D2 Deny</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>185</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
-       "      <td>daylight</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Add metadata to content - out of the control o...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Add date and source to images</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>grugq</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06 Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>D3 Disrupt</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "<p>186 rows × 13 columns</p>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "         ID     metatechnique  \\\n",
-       "0    C00043          cleaning   \n",
-       "1    C00053          cleaning   \n",
-       "2    C00074          cleaning   \n",
-       "3    C00026  countermessaging   \n",
-       "4    C00082  countermessaging   \n",
-       "..      ...               ...   \n",
-       "181  C00214     metatechnique   \n",
-       "182  C00215     metatechnique   \n",
-       "183  C00217          daylight   \n",
-       "184  C00218           removal   \n",
-       "185  C00219          daylight   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                                 Title  \\\n",
-       "0        Detect hijacked accounts and reallocate them    \n",
-       "1    Delete old accounts / Remove unused social med...   \n",
-       "2       Identify identical content and mass deplatform   \n",
-       "3    Shore up democracy based messages (peace, free...   \n",
-       "4    Ground truthing as automated response to pollu...   \n",
-       "..                                                 ...   \n",
-       "181  Create policy that makes social media police d...   \n",
-       "182     Use fraud legislation to clean up social media   \n",
-       "183  Registries alert when large batches of newsy U...   \n",
-       "184                                         Censorship   \n",
-       "185  Add metadata to content - out of the control o...   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                               Details  \\\n",
-       "0                                                  NaN   \n",
-       "1                                                  NaN   \n",
-       "2                                                   \\n   \n",
-       "3                                               Unsure   \n",
-       "4                                                  NaN   \n",
-       "..                                                 ...   \n",
-       "181  German model: facebook forced to police conten...   \n",
-       "182                                                NaN   \n",
-       "183                                                NaN   \n",
-       "184  Alter and/or block the publication/disseminati...   \n",
-       "185                                                NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           Playbook(s)  \\\n",
-       "0    In all playbooks the platform must force user ...   \n",
-       "1    Social media companies remove inactive account...   \n",
-       "2    In all cases some checks need to prevent depla...   \n",
-       "3                                                  NaN   \n",
-       "4                                                  NaN   \n",
-       "..                                                 ...   \n",
-       "181                                                NaN   \n",
-       "182                                                NaN   \n",
-       "183                                                NaN   \n",
-       "184                                                NaN   \n",
-       "185                      Add date and source to images   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                      Resources needed  \\\n",
-       "0         platform_admin,activists,civil_society,money   \n",
-       "1    platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia,publ...   \n",
-       "2            platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia   \n",
-       "3                                                  NaN   \n",
-       "4                                                  NaN   \n",
-       "..                                                 ...   \n",
-       "181                            government:policymakers   \n",
-       "182                            government:policymakers   \n",
-       "183                                     platform_admin   \n",
-       "184                                     platform_admin   \n",
-       "185                                                NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                           How found References Incidents  \\\n",
-       "0                   2019-11-workshop        NaN       NaN   \n",
-       "1    2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search        NaN    I00004   \n",
-       "2                   2019-11-workshop        NaN       NaN   \n",
-       "3                   2019-11-workshop        NaN       NaN   \n",
-       "4                   2019-11-workshop        NaN       NaN   \n",
-       "..                               ...        ...       ...   \n",
-       "181                 2019-11-workshop        NaN       NaN   \n",
-       "182                 2019-11-workshop        NaN       NaN   \n",
-       "183                            grugq        NaN       NaN   \n",
-       "184                            grugq   Taylor81       NaN   \n",
-       "185                            grugq        NaN       NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                      Tactic    Response  \\\n",
-       "0        TA03 Develop People  D3 Disrupt   \n",
-       "1      TA04 Develop Networks  D4 Degrade   \n",
-       "2       TA06 Develop Content     D2 Deny   \n",
-       "3    TA01 Strategic Planning  D4 Degrade   \n",
-       "4       TA06 Develop Content  D3 Disrupt   \n",
-       "..                       ...         ...   \n",
-       "181   TA07 Channel Selection  D3 Disrupt   \n",
-       "182   TA07 Channel Selection  D3 Disrupt   \n",
-       "183   TA07 Channel Selection     D2 Deny   \n",
-       "184            TA09 Exposure     D2 Deny   \n",
-       "185     TA06 Develop Content  D3 Disrupt   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                            Techniques NOTES  \n",
-       "0                              T0011 - Hijack accounts   NaN  \n",
-       "1    T0011 - Hijack accounts\\nTA06 - Develop Conten...   NaN  \n",
-       "2    T0022 - Conspiracy narratives\\nT0026 - Create ...   NaN  \n",
-       "3                  T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda   NaN  \n",
-       "4                                                  NaN   NaN  \n",
-       "..                                                 ...   ...  \n",
-       "181                                                NaN   NaN  \n",
-       "182                                                NaN   NaN  \n",
-       "183                                                NaN   NaN  \n",
-       "184                                                NaN   NaN  \n",
-       "185                                                NaN   NaN  \n",
-       "\n",
-       "[186 rows x 13 columns]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 1,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "import generate_amitt_counters\n",
-    "\n",
-    "counter = generate_amitt_counters.Counter()\n",
-    "counter.write_tactics_markdown()\n",
-    "counter.write_metacounts_markdown()\n",
-    "counter.write_resource_markdown()\n",
-    "counter.dfcounters"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": []
-  }
- ],
- "metadata": {
-  "kernelspec": {
-   "display_name": "Python 3",
-   "language": "python",
-   "name": "python3"
-  },
-  "language_info": {
-   "codemirror_mode": {
-    "name": "ipython",
-    "version": 3
-   },
-   "file_extension": ".py",
-   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
-   "name": "python",
-   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
-   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
-   "version": "3.8.3"
-  }
- },
- "nbformat": 4,
- "nbformat_minor": 2
-}
diff --git a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_create_incident_visualisations-checkpoint.ipynb b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_create_incident_visualisations-checkpoint.ipynb
deleted file mode 100644
index 59bd892..0000000
--- a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_create_incident_visualisations-checkpoint.ipynb
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,268 +0,0 @@
-{
- "cells": [
-  {
-   "cell_type": "markdown",
-   "metadata": {},
-   "source": [
-    "# Create AMITT incident visualisations\n",
-    "\n",
-    "Many thanks to https://python-graph-gallery.com/91-customize-seaborn-heatmap/"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "import seaborn as sns\n",
-    "import pandas as pd\n",
-    "import numpy as np\n",
-    "import generate_amitt_ttps\n",
-    "\n",
-    "# Check that heatmap works\n",
-    "df = pd.DataFrame(np.random.random((10,12)), columns=[\"a\",\"b\",\"c\",\"d\",\"e\",\"f\",\"g\",\"h\",\"i\",\"j\",\"k\",\"l\"])\n",
-    "sns.heatmap(df, annot=True, annot_kws={\"size\": 7})"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "amitt = generate_amitt_ttps.Amitt()\n",
-    "redgrid = amitt.create_padded_framework_table('AMITT Red', 'technique_ids', False)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "techcounts = amitt.it[['id_incident','id_technique']].drop_duplicates().groupby('id_technique').count().to_dict()['id_incident']\n",
-    "techlabels = redgrid[2:][:]\n",
-    "nrows = len(techlabels)\n",
-    "ncols = len(techlabels[0])\n",
-    "techgrid = np.zeros([nrows, ncols], dtype = int)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "for row in range(nrows):\n",
-    "    for col in range(ncols):\n",
-    "        if techlabels[row][col] in techcounts:\n",
-    "            techgrid[row][col] = techcounts[techlabels[row][col]]\n",
-    "\n",
-    "sns.heatmap(techgrid, annot=True, annot_kws={\"size\": 7})\n",
-    "techgrid"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "amitt.df_tactics"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "amitt.it"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "ct = amitt.cross_counterid_techniqueid\n",
-    "ct[ct['technique_id'] != '']"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "ct[(ct['id'] == 'C00197') & (ct['technique_id'].isin(['T0002', 'T0007']))]"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "ct = ct[ct['technique_id'].isin(amitt.df_techniques['id'].to_list()) & ct['id'].isin(amitt.df_counters['id'].to_list())]\n",
-    "ct"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "technique_id_list = ['T0007', 'T0008', 'T0022', 'T0023', 'T0043', 'T0052', 'T0036', 'T0037', 'T0038']\n",
-    "counter_id_list = ['C00009', 'C00008', 'C00042', 'C00030', 'C00093', 'C00193', 'C00073', 'C000197', 'C00174', 'C00205']\n",
-    "possible_counters_for_techniques = ct[ct['technique_id'].isin(technique_id_list)] \n",
-    "possible_techniques_for_counters = ct[ct['id'].isin(counter_id_list)] \n",
-    "coverage = ct[(ct['id'].isin(counter_id_list)) & (ct['technique_id'].isin(technique_id_list))]\n",
-    "coverage"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {
-    "scrolled": true
-   },
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "possible_techniques_for_counters"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {
-    "scrolled": true
-   },
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "possible_counters_for_techniques"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 6,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "clicked button T0045 8 7\n",
-      "clicked button T0046 9 7\n",
-      "clicked button T0049 4 8\n",
-      "clicked button T0057 2 9\n",
-      "clicked button T0060 4 10\n",
-      "clicked button T0029 2 6\n",
-      "clicked button T0016 2 4\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "import tkinter as Tk\n",
-    "import numpy as np\n",
-    "import generate_amitt_ttps\n",
-    "\n",
-    "class Begueradj(Tk.Frame):\n",
-    "    def __init__(self,parent):\n",
-    "        amitt = generate_amitt_ttps.Amitt()\n",
-    "        self.redgrid = amitt.create_padded_framework_table('AMITT Red', 'technique_ids', False)\n",
-    "        self.bluegrid = amitt.create_padded_framework_table('AMITT Blue', 'counter_ids', False)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "        Tk.Frame.__init__(self, parent)\n",
-    "        self.parent = parent\n",
-    "        self.button= ''\n",
-    "        self.initialize()\n",
-    "        \n",
-    "    def initialize(self):\n",
-    "        '''\n",
-    "        Draw the GUI\n",
-    "        '''\n",
-    "        self.parent.title(\"AMITT FRAMEWORK COVERAGE\")       \n",
-    "        self.parent.grid_rowconfigure(1,weight=1)\n",
-    "        self.parent.grid_columnconfigure(1,weight=1)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "        self.frame = Tk.Frame(self.parent)  \n",
-    "        self.frame.pack(fill=Tk.X, padx=5, pady=5)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "        # Create a 6x7 array of zeros as the one you used\n",
-    "        numrows = len(self.redgrid) - 1\n",
-    "        numcols = len(self.redgrid[0])\n",
-    "        self.buttons = {}\n",
-    "        for row in range(1,numrows):\n",
-    "            for col in range(0,numcols):\n",
-    "                button_id = self.redgrid[row][col]\n",
-    "                self.button = Tk.Button(self.frame, text = button_id, bg='blue', \n",
-    "                                        command= lambda bid=button_id, row=row, col=col: self.clicked(bid, row, col))\n",
-    "                self.button.grid(row=row, column=col)\n",
-    "                \n",
-    "    def clicked(self, bid, row, col):\n",
-    "        print('clicked button {} {} {}'.format(bid, row, col))\n",
-    "        self.find_in_grid(self.frame, row, col)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "    def find_in_grid(self, frame, row, column):\n",
-    "        for children in frame.children.values():\n",
-    "            info = children.grid_info()\n",
-    "            #note that rows and column numbers are stored as string\n",
-    "            if info['row'] == str(row) and info['column'] == str(column):\n",
-    "                print('{}'.format(children.get()))\n",
-    "        return None\n",
-    "\n",
-    "root=Tk.Tk()\n",
-    "app = Begueradj(root)   \n",
-    "root.mainloop()"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {
-    "scrolled": true
-   },
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "redgrid"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "for row in range(2,len(redgrid)):\n",
-    "    print(len(redgrid[row]))"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "redgrid[1][2]"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": []
-  }
- ],
- "metadata": {
-  "kernelspec": {
-   "display_name": "Python 3",
-   "language": "python",
-   "name": "python3"
-  },
-  "language_info": {
-   "codemirror_mode": {
-    "name": "ipython",
-    "version": 3
-   },
-   "file_extension": ".py",
-   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
-   "name": "python",
-   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
-   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
-   "version": "3.8.3"
-  }
- },
- "nbformat": 4,
- "nbformat_minor": 2
-}
diff --git a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_create_website_sql-checkpoint.ipynb b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_create_website_sql-checkpoint.ipynb
deleted file mode 100644
index 21ce1db..0000000
--- a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_create_website_sql-checkpoint.ipynb
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8443 +0,0 @@
-{
- "cells": [
-  {
-   "cell_type": "markdown",
-   "metadata": {},
-   "source": [
-    "# Create AMITT website sql\n",
-    "\n",
-    "Creates the sqlite file used as a datasource in the AMITT website tests. "
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 20,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>amitt_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>incident_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>technique_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>id</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>buy FB targeted ads</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Targeted FB paid ads</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Targeted FB paid ads</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>3</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Promote \"funding\" campaign</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000003</td>\n",
-       "      <td>create web-site - information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000014</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>6</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (r...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>7</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000037</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>8</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000061</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>9</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>9</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000082</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>10</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>10</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000094</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>11</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>11</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000120</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>12</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>12</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000137</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>13</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>13</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000146</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>14</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>14</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000156</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>15</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>15</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000180</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>16</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>16</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000004</td>\n",
-       "      <td>create web-site - information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>17</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>17</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>18</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>18</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (r...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>19</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>19</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000038</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>20</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>20</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000062</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>21</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>21</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000083</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>22</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>22</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000095</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>23</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>23</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000121</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>24</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>24</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000138</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>25</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>25</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000147</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>26</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>26</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000157</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>27</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>27</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000162</td>\n",
-       "      <td>State-run media seeds foreign influence enviro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>28</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>28</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000181</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>29</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>29</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>30</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>30</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>31</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>31</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000043</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>32</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>32</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000071</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>33</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>33</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000085</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>34</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>34</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000103</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>35</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>35</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000125</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>36</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>36</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000140</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>37</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>37</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000149</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>38</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>38</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000161</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>39</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>39</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000172</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>40</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>40</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000183</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>41</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>41</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058</td>\n",
-       "      <td>42</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>42</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058</td>\n",
-       "      <td>43</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>43</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000176</td>\n",
-       "      <td>legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058</td>\n",
-       "      <td>44</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>44</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>45</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>45</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>46</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>46</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000041</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>47</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>47</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000055</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>48</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>48</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000076</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>49</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>49</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000079</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>50</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>50</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000090</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>51</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>51</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000115</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>52</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>52</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000118</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>53</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>53</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000131</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>54</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>54</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000134</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>55</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>55</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000144</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>56</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>56</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000154</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>57</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>57</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000169</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>58</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>58</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000177</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>59</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>59</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>60</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>60</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000035</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>61</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>61</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>62</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>62</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>63</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>63</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000077</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>64</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>64</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000080</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>65</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>65</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000091</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>66</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>66</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000119</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>67</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>67</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000132</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>68</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>68</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000135</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>69</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>69</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000145</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>70</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>70</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000155</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>71</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>71</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000170</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>72</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>72</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000178</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>73</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>73</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000011</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups + dark content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>74</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>74</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake twitter profiles to amplify</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots used to drive visbility</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>75</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>75</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000039</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FB pages</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>76</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>76</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000045</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FB pages/groups/profiles</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>77</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>77</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000058</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups + dark content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>78</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>78</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000078</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>79</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>79</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000092</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups/pages/profiles</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>80</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>80</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000171</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>81</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>81</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000012</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>82</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>82</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000059</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>83</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>83</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000093</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>84</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>84</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000164</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Events coordinated and promoted across media p...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>85</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>85</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000166</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>86</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>86</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000013</td>\n",
-       "      <td>manipulate social media \"online polls\"?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>87</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>87</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000060</td>\n",
-       "      <td>manipulate social media \"online polls\"?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>88</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>88</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000016</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>89</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>89</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>90</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>90</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>91</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>91</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>92</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>92</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000084</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>93</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>93</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000104</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>94</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>94</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000126</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>95</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>95</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000139</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>96</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>96</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000148</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>97</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>97</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000158</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>98</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>98</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000182</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>99</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>99</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>100</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>100</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>101</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>101</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000064</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>102</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>102</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000087</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>103</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>103</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000096</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>104</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>104</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000122</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>105</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>105</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000142</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>106</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>106</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000151</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>107</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>107</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000159</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>108</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>108</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000185</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>109</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>109</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>110</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>110</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>111</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>111</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000065</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>112</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>112</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000088</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>113</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>113</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000097</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>114</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>114</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000123</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>115</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>115</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000143</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>116</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>116</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000152</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>117</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>117</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000160</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>118</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>118</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000186</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>119</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>119</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>120</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>120</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000067</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>121</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>121</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000099</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>122</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>122</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035</td>\n",
-       "      <td>123</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>123</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000068</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035</td>\n",
-       "      <td>124</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>124</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000100</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035</td>\n",
-       "      <td>125</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>125</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036</td>\n",
-       "      <td>126</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>126</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000069</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036</td>\n",
-       "      <td>127</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>127</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000101</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036</td>\n",
-       "      <td>128</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>128</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000023</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Meme that ISIS was responsible for a local che...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>129</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>129</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000072</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>130</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>130</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000117</td>\n",
-       "      <td>memes</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>131</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>131</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000173</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>132</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>132</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000024</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Backstop personas</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Wikipedia fake persona \"AmandaGray91\".</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0030</td>\n",
-       "      <td>133</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>133</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000074</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Backstop personas</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0030</td>\n",
-       "      <td>134</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>134</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use SMS/text messages</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SMS messages sent to local residents</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0043</td>\n",
-       "      <td>135</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>135</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000026</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake video/images</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake youtube video of ISIS claiming responsibi...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0024</td>\n",
-       "      <td>136</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>136</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000116</td>\n",
-       "      <td>photoshopped/fake images</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0024</td>\n",
-       "      <td>137</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>137</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000027</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create and use hashtag</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>138</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>138</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000028</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create and use hashtag</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0055</td>\n",
-       "      <td>139</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>139</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000030</td>\n",
-       "      <td>bait journalists/media/politicians</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039</td>\n",
-       "      <td>140</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>140</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>journalist/media baiting</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039</td>\n",
-       "      <td>141</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>141</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>journalist/media baiting</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039</td>\n",
-       "      <td>142</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>142</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000036</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Using \"expert\"</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0045</td>\n",
-       "      <td>143</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>143</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000040</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>144</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>144</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000086</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>145</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>145</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000141</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>146</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>146</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000150</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mi...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>147</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>147</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000184</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>148</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>148</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000048</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>149</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>149</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000070</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>150</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>150</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000102</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>151</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>151</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000124</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>152</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>152</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Forge ('release' altered hacked documents)</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>153</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>153</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>154</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>154</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>155</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>155</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000075</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>156</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>156</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000153</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>157</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>157</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>158</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>158</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000066</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>159</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>159</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000098</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>160</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>160</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000073</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0016</td>\n",
-       "      <td>161</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>161</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000081</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>162</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>162</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000128</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>163</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>163</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000129</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine fo...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>164</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>164</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000136</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>165</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>165</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000167</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China also plays victim, innocence, plays by r...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>166</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>166</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000168</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>167</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>167</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000179</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>168</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>168</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000089</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Demand insurmountable proof</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0040</td>\n",
-       "      <td>169</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>169</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000133</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Demand insurmountable proof</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0040</td>\n",
-       "      <td>170</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>170</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000105</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/spon...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>171</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>171</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000112</td>\n",
-       "      <td>flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politici...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>172</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>172</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000113</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>173</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>173</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000106</td>\n",
-       "      <td>fabricated social media comment</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>174</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>174</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000107</td>\n",
-       "      <td>domestic social media influence operations foc...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>175</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>175</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000165</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>176</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>176</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000108</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>177</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>177</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000109</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0048</td>\n",
-       "      <td>178</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>178</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000110</td>\n",
-       "      <td>facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>179</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>179</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000111</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Netizens from one of the largest discussion fo...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>180</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>180</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000114</td>\n",
-       "      <td>“hack” of Qatar’s official news agency</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0011</td>\n",
-       "      <td>181</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>181</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000127</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and sc...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>182</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>182</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000130</td>\n",
-       "      <td>(Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0023</td>\n",
-       "      <td>183</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>183</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000163</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0023</td>\n",
-       "      <td>184</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>184</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000174</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>185</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>185</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000175</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake news/synthetic web-sites</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>186</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "       amitt_id                                               name  \\\n",
-       "0    IT00000001                                buy FB targeted ads   \n",
-       "1    IT00000010                               Targeted FB paid ads   \n",
-       "2    IT00000057                               Targeted FB paid ads   \n",
-       "3    IT00000002                         Promote \"funding\" campaign   \n",
-       "4    IT00000003            create web-site - information pollution   \n",
-       "5    IT00000014        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "6    IT00000031  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (r...   \n",
-       "7    IT00000037       RT & Sputnik generate information pollution    \n",
-       "8    IT00000061        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "9    IT00000082  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "10   IT00000094        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "11   IT00000120        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "12   IT00000137  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "13   IT00000146  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "14   IT00000156        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "15   IT00000180  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "16   IT00000004            create web-site - information pollution   \n",
-       "17   IT00000015        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "18   IT00000032  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (r...   \n",
-       "19   IT00000038       RT & Sputnik generate information pollution    \n",
-       "20   IT00000062        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "21   IT00000083  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "22   IT00000095        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "23   IT00000121        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "24   IT00000138  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "25   IT00000147  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "26   IT00000157        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "27   IT00000162  State-run media seeds foreign influence enviro...   \n",
-       "28   IT00000181  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "29   IT00000005        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "30   IT00000022        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "31   IT00000043        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "32   IT00000071        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "33   IT00000085        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "34   IT00000103        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "35   IT00000125        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "36   IT00000140        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "37   IT00000149        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "38   IT00000161        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "39   IT00000172        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "40   IT00000183        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "41   IT00000006                                 legacy web content   \n",
-       "42   IT00000007  hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit...   \n",
-       "43   IT00000176                                 legacy web content   \n",
-       "44   IT00000008                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "45   IT00000034                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "46   IT00000041                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "47   IT00000055                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "48   IT00000076                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "49   IT00000079                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "50   IT00000090                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "51   IT00000115                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "52   IT00000118                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "53   IT00000131                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "54   IT00000134                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "55   IT00000144                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "56   IT00000154                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "57   IT00000169                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "58   IT00000177                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "59   IT00000009                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "60   IT00000035                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "61   IT00000042                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "62   IT00000056                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "63   IT00000077                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "64   IT00000080                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "65   IT00000091                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "66   IT00000119                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "67   IT00000132                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "68   IT00000135                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "69   IT00000145                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "70   IT00000155                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "71   IT00000170                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "72   IT00000178                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "73   IT00000011                      Fake FB groups + dark content   \n",
-       "74   IT00000029                   Fake twitter profiles to amplify   \n",
-       "75   IT00000039                                           FB pages   \n",
-       "76   IT00000045                           FB pages/groups/profiles   \n",
-       "77   IT00000058                      Fake FB groups + dark content   \n",
-       "78   IT00000078       Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content   \n",
-       "79   IT00000092                     Fake FB groups/pages/profiles    \n",
-       "80   IT00000171  Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (...   \n",
-       "81   IT00000012  Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...   \n",
-       "82   IT00000059  Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...   \n",
-       "83   IT00000093  Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...   \n",
-       "84   IT00000164  Events coordinated and promoted across media p...   \n",
-       "85   IT00000166  Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...   \n",
-       "86   IT00000013           manipulate social media \"online polls\"?    \n",
-       "87   IT00000060           manipulate social media \"online polls\"?    \n",
-       "88   IT00000016       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "89   IT00000033  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "90   IT00000044  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "91   IT00000063       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "92   IT00000084       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "93   IT00000104  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "94   IT00000126  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "95   IT00000139  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "96   IT00000148  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "97   IT00000158       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "98   IT00000182      cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots    \n",
-       "99   IT00000017    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "100  IT00000046                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "101  IT00000064  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "102  IT00000087                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "103  IT00000096  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "104  IT00000122                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "105  IT00000142                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "106  IT00000151                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "107  IT00000159                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "108  IT00000185                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "109  IT00000018    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "110  IT00000047                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "111  IT00000065  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "112  IT00000088                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "113  IT00000097  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "114  IT00000123                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "115  IT00000143                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "116  IT00000152                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "117  IT00000160                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "118  IT00000186                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "119  IT00000019    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "120  IT00000067  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "121  IT00000099  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "122  IT00000020    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "123  IT00000068  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "124  IT00000100  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "125  IT00000021    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "126  IT00000069  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "127  IT00000101  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "128  IT00000023  Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...   \n",
-       "129  IT00000072  Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...   \n",
-       "130  IT00000117                                              memes   \n",
-       "131  IT00000173  Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...   \n",
-       "132  IT00000024                                  Backstop personas   \n",
-       "133  IT00000074                                  Backstop personas   \n",
-       "134  IT00000025                              Use SMS/text messages   \n",
-       "135  IT00000026                                  Fake video/images   \n",
-       "136  IT00000116                           photoshopped/fake images   \n",
-       "137  IT00000027                             Create and use hashtag   \n",
-       "138  IT00000028                             Create and use hashtag   \n",
-       "139  IT00000030                 bait journalists/media/politicians   \n",
-       "140  IT00000049                           journalist/media baiting   \n",
-       "141  IT00000053                           journalist/media baiting   \n",
-       "142  IT00000036                                     Using \"expert\"   \n",
-       "143  IT00000040  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "144  IT00000086  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "145  IT00000141  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "146  IT00000150  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mi...   \n",
-       "147  IT00000184  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "148  IT00000048                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "149  IT00000070                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "150  IT00000102                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "151  IT00000124                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "152  IT00000050         Forge ('release' altered hacked documents)   \n",
-       "153  IT00000051                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "154  IT00000054                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "155  IT00000075                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "156  IT00000153                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "157  IT00000052   Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly   \n",
-       "158  IT00000066  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "159  IT00000098  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "160  IT00000073  Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (...   \n",
-       "161  IT00000081  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "162  IT00000128  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "163  IT00000129  Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine fo...   \n",
-       "164  IT00000136  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "165  IT00000167  China also plays victim, innocence, plays by r...   \n",
-       "166  IT00000168  Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of ...   \n",
-       "167  IT00000179  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "168  IT00000089                        Demand insurmountable proof   \n",
-       "169  IT00000133                        Demand insurmountable proof   \n",
-       "170  IT00000105  2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/spon...   \n",
-       "171  IT00000112  flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politici...   \n",
-       "172  IT00000113  Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted ...   \n",
-       "173  IT00000106                    fabricated social media comment   \n",
-       "174  IT00000107  domestic social media influence operations foc...   \n",
-       "175  IT00000165  Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...   \n",
-       "176  IT00000108  cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...   \n",
-       "177  IT00000109  cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...   \n",
-       "178  IT00000110      facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises   \n",
-       "179  IT00000111  Netizens from one of the largest discussion fo...   \n",
-       "180  IT00000114             “hack” of Qatar’s official news agency   \n",
-       "181  IT00000127  Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and sc...   \n",
-       "182  IT00000130  (Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian ...   \n",
-       "183  IT00000163  Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese...   \n",
-       "184  IT00000174  Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...   \n",
-       "185  IT00000175                      Fake news/synthetic web-sites   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                               summary incident_id  \\\n",
-       "0                                                           I00002   \n",
-       "1                                                           I00005   \n",
-       "2                                                           I00017   \n",
-       "3                                                           I00002   \n",
-       "4                                                           I00002   \n",
-       "5                                                           I00005   \n",
-       "6                                                           I00007   \n",
-       "7                                                           I00009   \n",
-       "8                                                           I00017   \n",
-       "9                                                           I00029   \n",
-       "10                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "11                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "12                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "13                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "14                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "15                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "16                                                          I00002   \n",
-       "17                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "18                                                          I00007   \n",
-       "19                                                          I00009   \n",
-       "20                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "21                                                          I00029   \n",
-       "22                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "23                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "24                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "25                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "26                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "27                                                          I00053   \n",
-       "28                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "29                                                          I00002   \n",
-       "30                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "31                                                          I00010   \n",
-       "32                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "33                                                          I00029   \n",
-       "34                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "35                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "36                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "37                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "38                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "39                                                          I00056   \n",
-       "40                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "41                                                          I00002   \n",
-       "42                                                          I00002   \n",
-       "43                                                          I00056   \n",
-       "44                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "45                                                          I00007   \n",
-       "46                                                          I00010   \n",
-       "47                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "48                                                          I00022   \n",
-       "49                                                          I00029   \n",
-       "50                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "51                                                          I00042   \n",
-       "52                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "53                                                          I00047   \n",
-       "54                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "55                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "56                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "57                                                          I00056   \n",
-       "58                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "59                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "60                                                          I00007   \n",
-       "61                                                          I00010   \n",
-       "62                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "63                                                          I00022   \n",
-       "64                                                          I00029   \n",
-       "65                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "66                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "67                                                          I00047   \n",
-       "68                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "69                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "70                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "71                                                          I00056   \n",
-       "72                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "73                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "74                Twitter bots used to drive visbility      I00006   \n",
-       "75                                                          I00009   \n",
-       "76                                                          I00010   \n",
-       "77                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "78                                                          I00022   \n",
-       "79                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "80                                                          I00056   \n",
-       "81                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "82                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "83                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "84                                                          I00053   \n",
-       "85                                                          I00053   \n",
-       "86                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "87                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "88                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "89                                                          I00007   \n",
-       "90                                                          I00010   \n",
-       "91                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "92                                                          I00029   \n",
-       "93                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "94                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "95                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "96                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "97                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "98                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "99                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "100                                                         I00010   \n",
-       "101                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "102                                                         I00029   \n",
-       "103                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "104                                                         I00044   \n",
-       "105                                                         I00049   \n",
-       "106                                                         I00050   \n",
-       "107                                                         I00051   \n",
-       "108                                                         I00063   \n",
-       "109                                                         I00005   \n",
-       "110                                                         I00010   \n",
-       "111                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "112                                                         I00029   \n",
-       "113                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "114                                                         I00044   \n",
-       "115                                                         I00049   \n",
-       "116                                                         I00050   \n",
-       "117                                                         I00051   \n",
-       "118                                                         I00063   \n",
-       "119                                                         I00005   \n",
-       "120                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "121                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "122                                                         I00005   \n",
-       "123                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "124                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "125                                                         I00005   \n",
-       "126                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "127                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "128  Meme that ISIS was responsible for a local che...      I00005   \n",
-       "129                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "130                                                         I00042   \n",
-       "131                                                         I00056   \n",
-       "132            Wikipedia fake persona \"AmandaGray91\".       I00005   \n",
-       "133                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "134               SMS messages sent to local residents      I00006   \n",
-       "135  Fake youtube video of ISIS claiming responsibi...      I00006   \n",
-       "136                                                         I00042   \n",
-       "137          Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals      I00006   \n",
-       "138          Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals      I00006   \n",
-       "139                                                         I00006   \n",
-       "140                                                         I00010   \n",
-       "141                                                         I00015   \n",
-       "142                                                         I00009   \n",
-       "143                                                         I00009   \n",
-       "144                                                         I00029   \n",
-       "145                                                         I00049   \n",
-       "146                                                         I00050   \n",
-       "147                                                         I00063   \n",
-       "148                                                         I00010   \n",
-       "149                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "150                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "151                                                         I00044   \n",
-       "152                                                         I00015   \n",
-       "153                                                         I00015   \n",
-       "154                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "155                                                         I00022   \n",
-       "156                                                         I00051   \n",
-       "157                                                         I00015   \n",
-       "158                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "159                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "160                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "161                                                         I00029   \n",
-       "162                                                         I00047   \n",
-       "163                                                         I00047   \n",
-       "164                                                         I00049   \n",
-       "165                                                         I00053   \n",
-       "166                                                         I00053   \n",
-       "167                                                         I00063   \n",
-       "168                                                         I00029   \n",
-       "169                                                         I00047   \n",
-       "170                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "171                                                         I00034   \n",
-       "172                                                         I00034   \n",
-       "173                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "174                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "175                                                         I00053   \n",
-       "176                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "177                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "178                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "179                                                         I00034   \n",
-       "180                                                         I00042   \n",
-       "181                                                         I00044   \n",
-       "182                                                         I00047   \n",
-       "183                                                         I00053   \n",
-       "184                                                         I00056   \n",
-       "185                                                         I00056   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "    technique_id   id  \n",
-       "0          T0018    1  \n",
-       "1          T0018    2  \n",
-       "2          T0018    3  \n",
-       "3          T0017    4  \n",
-       "4          T0019    5  \n",
-       "5          T0019    6  \n",
-       "6          T0019    7  \n",
-       "7          T0019    8  \n",
-       "8          T0019    9  \n",
-       "9          T0019   10  \n",
-       "10         T0019   11  \n",
-       "11         T0019   12  \n",
-       "12         T0019   13  \n",
-       "13         T0019   14  \n",
-       "14         T0019   15  \n",
-       "15         T0019   16  \n",
-       "16         T0056   17  \n",
-       "17         T0056   18  \n",
-       "18         T0056   19  \n",
-       "19         T0056   20  \n",
-       "20         T0056   21  \n",
-       "21         T0056   22  \n",
-       "22         T0056   23  \n",
-       "23         T0056   24  \n",
-       "24         T0056   25  \n",
-       "25         T0056   26  \n",
-       "26         T0056   27  \n",
-       "27         T0056   28  \n",
-       "28         T0056   29  \n",
-       "29         T0046   30  \n",
-       "30         T0046   31  \n",
-       "31         T0046   32  \n",
-       "32         T0046   33  \n",
-       "33         T0046   34  \n",
-       "34         T0046   35  \n",
-       "35         T0046   36  \n",
-       "36         T0046   37  \n",
-       "37         T0046   38  \n",
-       "38         T0046   39  \n",
-       "39         T0046   40  \n",
-       "40         T0046   41  \n",
-       "41         T0058   42  \n",
-       "42         T0058   43  \n",
-       "43         T0058   44  \n",
-       "44         T0054   45  \n",
-       "45         T0054   46  \n",
-       "46         T0054   47  \n",
-       "47         T0054   48  \n",
-       "48         T0054   49  \n",
-       "49         T0054   50  \n",
-       "50         T0054   51  \n",
-       "51         T0054   52  \n",
-       "52         T0054   53  \n",
-       "53         T0054   54  \n",
-       "54         T0054   55  \n",
-       "55         T0054   56  \n",
-       "56         T0054   57  \n",
-       "57         T0054   58  \n",
-       "58         T0054   59  \n",
-       "59         T0053   60  \n",
-       "60         T0053   61  \n",
-       "61         T0053   62  \n",
-       "62         T0053   63  \n",
-       "63         T0053   64  \n",
-       "64         T0053   65  \n",
-       "65         T0053   66  \n",
-       "66         T0053   67  \n",
-       "67         T0053   68  \n",
-       "68         T0053   69  \n",
-       "69         T0053   70  \n",
-       "70         T0053   71  \n",
-       "71         T0053   72  \n",
-       "72         T0053   73  \n",
-       "73         T0007   74  \n",
-       "74         T0007   75  \n",
-       "75         T0007   76  \n",
-       "76         T0007   77  \n",
-       "77         T0007   78  \n",
-       "78         T0007   79  \n",
-       "79         T0007   80  \n",
-       "80         T0007   81  \n",
-       "81         T0057   82  \n",
-       "82         T0057   83  \n",
-       "83         T0057   84  \n",
-       "84         T0057   85  \n",
-       "85         T0057   86  \n",
-       "86         T0029   87  \n",
-       "87         T0029   88  \n",
-       "88         T0010   89  \n",
-       "89         T0010   90  \n",
-       "90         T0010   91  \n",
-       "91         T0010   92  \n",
-       "92         T0010   93  \n",
-       "93         T0010   94  \n",
-       "94         T0010   95  \n",
-       "95         T0010   96  \n",
-       "96         T0010   97  \n",
-       "97         T0010   98  \n",
-       "98         T0010   99  \n",
-       "99         T0031  100  \n",
-       "100        T0031  101  \n",
-       "101        T0031  102  \n",
-       "102        T0031  103  \n",
-       "103        T0031  104  \n",
-       "104        T0031  105  \n",
-       "105        T0031  106  \n",
-       "106        T0031  107  \n",
-       "107        T0031  108  \n",
-       "108        T0031  109  \n",
-       "109        T0032  110  \n",
-       "110        T0032  111  \n",
-       "111        T0032  112  \n",
-       "112        T0032  113  \n",
-       "113        T0032  114  \n",
-       "114        T0032  115  \n",
-       "115        T0032  116  \n",
-       "116        T0032  117  \n",
-       "117        T0032  118  \n",
-       "118        T0032  119  \n",
-       "119        T0034  120  \n",
-       "120        T0034  121  \n",
-       "121        T0034  122  \n",
-       "122        T0035  123  \n",
-       "123        T0035  124  \n",
-       "124        T0035  125  \n",
-       "125        T0036  126  \n",
-       "126        T0036  127  \n",
-       "127        T0036  128  \n",
-       "128        T0021  129  \n",
-       "129        T0021  130  \n",
-       "130        T0021  131  \n",
-       "131        T0021  132  \n",
-       "132        T0030  133  \n",
-       "133        T0030  134  \n",
-       "134        T0043  135  \n",
-       "135        T0024  136  \n",
-       "136        T0024  137  \n",
-       "137        T0015  138  \n",
-       "138        T0055  139  \n",
-       "139        T0039  140  \n",
-       "140        T0039  141  \n",
-       "141        T0039  142  \n",
-       "142        T0045  143  \n",
-       "143        T0052  144  \n",
-       "144        T0052  145  \n",
-       "145        T0052  146  \n",
-       "146        T0052  147  \n",
-       "147        T0052  148  \n",
-       "148        T0020  149  \n",
-       "149        T0020  150  \n",
-       "150        T0020  151  \n",
-       "151        T0020  152  \n",
-       "152        T0025  153  \n",
-       "153        T0025  154  \n",
-       "154        T0025  155  \n",
-       "155        T0025  156  \n",
-       "156        T0025  157  \n",
-       "157        T0044  158  \n",
-       "158        T0033  159  \n",
-       "159        T0033  160  \n",
-       "160        T0016  161  \n",
-       "161        T0001  162  \n",
-       "162        T0001  163  \n",
-       "163        T0001  164  \n",
-       "164        T0001  165  \n",
-       "165        T0001  166  \n",
-       "166        T0001  167  \n",
-       "167        T0001  168  \n",
-       "168        T0040  169  \n",
-       "169        T0040  170  \n",
-       "170        T0049  171  \n",
-       "171        T0049  172  \n",
-       "172        T0049  173  \n",
-       "173        T0051  174  \n",
-       "174        T0050  175  \n",
-       "175        T0050  176  \n",
-       "176        T0047  177  \n",
-       "177        T0048  178  \n",
-       "178        T0002  179  \n",
-       "179        T0002  180  \n",
-       "180        T0011  181  \n",
-       "181        T0009  182  \n",
-       "182        T0023  183  \n",
-       "183        T0023  184  \n",
-       "184        T0022  185  \n",
-       "185        T0008  186  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 20,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "# Get AMITT variables\n",
-    "\n",
-    "import pandas as pd\n",
-    "import sqlite3 as sql\n",
-    "import os\n",
-    "from sqlalchemy import create_engine\n",
-    "from generate_amitt_ttps import Amitt\n",
-    "pd.set_option('display.max_rows', 1000)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "\n",
-    "# Generate AMITT datasets\n",
-    "amitt = Amitt()\n",
-    "\n",
-    "dbasetype = 'postgresql_local' #'sqlite' #'heroku'\n",
-    "\n",
-    "\n",
-    "# Create connection to database\n",
-    "if dbasetype == 'sqlite':\n",
-    "    # Generate minimal sqlite database from the Amitt variables\n",
-    "    conn = sql.connect('amittsite.sqlite')\n",
-    "elif dbasetype == 'postgresql_local':\n",
-    "    conn = create_engine('postgresql://sara:@localhost:5432/amittsite')\n",
-    "\n",
-    "    \n",
-    "# Add table to database    \n",
-    "def add_table(dataframe, tablename, columns):    \n",
-    "    # Create sql-appropriate table from dataframe\n",
-    "    colnames = ', '.join(['{} TEXT NOT NULL'.format(col) for col in columns])\n",
-    "    newtable = dataframe[columns].copy().applymap(str)\n",
-    "    newtable['id'] = range(1,len(newtable)+1)\n",
-    "    \n",
-    "    # send to database\n",
-    "    if dbasetype == 'sqlite':\n",
-    "        conn.execute(\"DROP TABLE IF EXISTS {}\".format(tablename))\n",
-    "        conn.execute('''CREATE TABLE {} (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, {});'''.format(tablename, colnames))\n",
-    "        newtable.to_sql(tablename, conn, index=False, if_exists='append')\n",
-    "        conn.commit()\n",
-    "    elif dbasetype == 'postgresql_local':\n",
-    "        newtable.to_sql(tablename, conn, index=False, if_exists='replace')\n",
-    "    return newtable\n",
-    "\n",
-    "\n",
-    "# Build a cross-table\n",
-    "def object_tactics_techniques(objectcol, objecttable, crosstable):\n",
-    "    # objects to techniques\n",
-    "    ctech = crosstable.copy()\n",
-    "    ctech = ctech[(ctech['technique_id'] != '') & (~ctech['technique_id'].str.startswith('TA'))]\n",
-    "    ctech.rename(columns={'amitt_id':objectcol}, inplace=True)\n",
-    "    ctech['summary'] = 'N/A'\n",
-    "\n",
-    "    # objects to tactics\n",
-    "    ctact = crosstable[crosstable['technique_id'].str.startswith('TA')].copy()\n",
-    "    ctact.rename(columns={'amitt_id':objectcol, 'technique_id': 'tactic_id'}, inplace=True)\n",
-    "    ctact['main_tactic'] = 'N'\n",
-    "    ctactmain = objecttable[['amitt_id', 'tactic_id']].copy()\n",
-    "    ctactmain.rename(columns={'amitt_id':objectcol}, inplace=True)\n",
-    "    ctactmain['main_tactic'] = 'Y'\n",
-    "    ctact = pd.concat([ctact, ctactmain], ignore_index=True, sort=False)\n",
-    "    ctact['summary'] = 'N/A'\n",
-    "    return(ctech, ctact)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "#Load all the tables - Heroku needs them in correct order... \n",
-    "\n",
-    "# -- frameworks --\n",
-    "\n",
-    "#newtable = add_table(amitt.df_actortypes, 'actor_type', ['amitt_id', 'sector_id', 'framework_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_counters, 'counter', ['amitt_id', 'tactic_id', 'metatechnique_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_detections, 'detection', ['amitt_id', 'tactic_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_frameworks, 'framework', ['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_metatechniques, 'metatechnique', ['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_phases, 'phase', ['amitt_id', 'name', 'rank', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_playbook, 'playbook', ['amitt_id', 'object_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_resources, 'resource', ['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary', 'resource_type'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_responsetypes, 'responsetype', ['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "#newtable = add_table(amitt.df_sector, 'sector', ['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_tactics, 'tactic', ['amitt_id', 'phase_id', 'name', 'rank', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_tasks, 'task', ['amitt_id', 'tactic_id', 'framework_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_techniques, 'technique', ['amitt_id', 'tactic_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "\n",
-    "(ctech, ctact) = object_tactics_techniques('counter_id', amitt.df_counters, amitt.cross_counterid_techniqueid)\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(ctech, 'counter_technique', ['counter_id', 'technique_id', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(ctact, 'counter_tactic', ['counter_id', 'tactic_id', 'main_tactic', 'summary'])\n",
-    "\n",
-    "(dtech, dtact) = object_tactics_techniques('detection_id', amitt.df_detections, amitt.cross_detectionid_techniqueid)\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(dtech, 'detection_technique', ['detection_id', 'technique_id', 'summary'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(dtact, 'detection_tactic', ['detection_id', 'tactic_id', 'main_tactic', 'summary'])\n",
-    "\n",
-    "# -- datasets --\n",
-    "\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_examples, 'example', ['amitt_id', 'object_id', 'name', 'summary'])\n",
-    "\n",
-    "# dataset\n",
-    "# reference - create this from other tables. \n",
-    "# Also need incidentcounter etc - create from data\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_groups, 'group', ['amitt_id', 'name', 'url', 'summary', \n",
-    "                                                'sector', 'primary_role', 'secondary_role', \n",
-    "                                                'primary_subject', 'secondary_subject', \n",
-    "                                                'volunteers', 'region', 'country', \n",
-    "                                                'twitter_handle'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_incidents, 'incident', ['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary', \n",
-    "                                                      'year_started', 'attributions_seen', \n",
-    "                                                      'found_in_country', 'objecttype'])\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(amitt.df_tools, 'tool', ['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary',\n",
-    "                                              'organization', 'url', 'category', \n",
-    "                                              'disinformation_use', 'cogseccollab_use', \n",
-    "                                              'function', 'code_url', 'artifacts', \n",
-    "                                              'automation', 'platform', 'accessibility'])\n",
-    "# incidenttechnique crosstable\n",
-    "it = vars(amitt)['it'][['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary', 'amitt_id_incident', 'amitt_id_technique']].copy()\n",
-    "it.rename(columns={'amitt_id_incident':'incident_id', 'amitt_id_technique': 'technique_id'}, inplace=True)\n",
-    "newtable = add_table(it, 'incident_technique', ['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary', \n",
-    "                                                'incident_id', 'technique_id'])\n",
-    "\n",
-    "# Load in users table, and close connection\n",
-    "if dbasetype == 'sqlite':\n",
-    "    conn.execute(\"DROP TABLE IF EXISTS {}\".format('users'))\n",
-    "    conn.execute('''CREATE TABLE users (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, password TEXT NOT NULL);''')\n",
-    "    conn.close()\n",
-    "else:\n",
-    "    dfusers = pd.DataFrame([['test','testing']], columns=['username', 'password'])\n",
-    "    usertable = add_table(dfusers, 'users', ['username', 'password'])\n",
-    "\n",
-    "newtable"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "markdown",
-   "metadata": {},
-   "source": [
-    "## test area"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 21,
-   "metadata": {
-    "scrolled": true
-   },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "dict_keys(['df_phases', 'df_frameworks', 'df_techniques', 'df_tasks', 'df_incidents', 'df_groups', 'df_tools', 'df_examples', 'df_counters', 'df_detections', 'df_actortypes', 'df_resources', 'df_responsetypes', 'df_metatechniques', 'it', 'df_tactics', 'df_techniques_per_tactic', 'df_counters_per_tactic', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'counters', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'resources', 'num_tactics', 'cross_counterid_techniqueid', 'cross_counterid_resourceid', 'cross_counterid_actortypeid', 'cross_detectionid_techniqueid', 'cross_detectionid_resourceid', 'cross_detectionid_actortypeid'])\n",
-      "\n",
-      "it columns: Index(['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary', 'amitt_id_incident', 'name_incident',\n",
-      "       'amitt_id_technique', 'name_technique'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n"
-     ]
-    },
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>amitt_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>amitt_id_incident</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_incident</th>\n",
-       "      <th>amitt_id_technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_technique</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>buy FB targeted ads</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#VaccinateUS</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Paid targeted ads</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Targeted FB paid ads</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Paid targeted ads</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Targeted FB paid ads</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Paid targeted ads</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Promote \"funding\" campaign</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#VaccinateUS</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Promote online funding</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000003</td>\n",
-       "      <td>create web-site - information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#VaccinateUS</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000014</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (r...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Incirlik terrorists</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000037</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>PhilippinesExpert</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000061</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>9</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000082</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>10</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000094</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>11</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000120</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>JadeHelm exercise</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>12</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000137</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>White Helmets: Chemical Weapons</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>13</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000146</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#HandsOffVenezuela</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>14</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000156</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Integrity Initiative</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>15</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000180</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Olympic Doping Scandal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>16</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000004</td>\n",
-       "      <td>create web-site - information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#VaccinateUS</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>17</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>18</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (r...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Incirlik terrorists</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>19</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000038</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>PhilippinesExpert</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>20</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000062</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>21</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000083</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>22</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000095</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>23</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000121</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>JadeHelm exercise</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>24</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000138</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>White Helmets: Chemical Weapons</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>25</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000147</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#HandsOffVenezuela</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>26</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000157</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Integrity Initiative</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>27</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000162</td>\n",
-       "      <td>State-run media seeds foreign influence enviro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China Huawei CFO Arrest</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>28</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000181</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Olympic Doping Scandal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>29</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#VaccinateUS</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>30</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>31</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000043</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ParklandTeens</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>32</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000071</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>33</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000085</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>34</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000103</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>35</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000125</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>JadeHelm exercise</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>36</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000140</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>White Helmets: Chemical Weapons</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>37</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000149</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#HandsOffVenezuela</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>38</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000161</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Integrity Initiative</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>39</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000172</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Iran Influence Operations</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>40</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000183</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Olympic Doping Scandal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>41</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#VaccinateUS</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>42</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#VaccinateUS</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>43</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000176</td>\n",
-       "      <td>legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Iran Influence Operations</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>44</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>45</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Incirlik terrorists</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>46</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000041</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ParklandTeens</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>47</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000055</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>48</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000076</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#Macronleaks</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>49</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000079</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>50</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000090</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>51</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000115</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Saudi/Qatar bot dispute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>52</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000118</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>JadeHelm exercise</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>53</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000131</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Sea of Azov</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>54</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000134</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>White Helmets: Chemical Weapons</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>55</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000144</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#HandsOffVenezuela</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>56</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000154</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Integrity Initiative</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>57</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000169</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Iran Influence Operations</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>58</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000177</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Olympic Doping Scandal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>59</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>60</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000035</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Incirlik terrorists</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>61</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ParklandTeens</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>62</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>63</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000077</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#Macronleaks</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>64</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000080</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>65</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000091</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>66</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000119</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>JadeHelm exercise</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>67</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000132</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Sea of Azov</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>68</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000135</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>White Helmets: Chemical Weapons</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>69</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000145</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#HandsOffVenezuela</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>70</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000155</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Integrity Initiative</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>71</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000170</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Iran Influence Operations</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>72</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000178</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Olympic Doping Scandal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>73</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000011</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups + dark content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>74</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake twitter profiles to amplify</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots used to drive visbility</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Columbian Chemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>75</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000039</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FB pages</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>PhilippinesExpert</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>76</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000045</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FB pages/groups/profiles</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ParklandTeens</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>77</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000058</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups + dark content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>78</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000078</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#Macronleaks</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>79</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000092</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups/pages/profiles</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>80</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000171</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Iran Influence Operations</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>81</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000012</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Organise remote rallies and events</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>82</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000059</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Organise remote rallies and events</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>83</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000093</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Organise remote rallies and events</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>84</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000164</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Events coordinated and promoted across media p...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China Huawei CFO Arrest</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Organise remote rallies and events</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>85</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000166</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China Huawei CFO Arrest</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Organise remote rallies and events</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>86</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000013</td>\n",
-       "      <td>manipulate social media \"online polls\"?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Manipulate online polls</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>87</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000060</td>\n",
-       "      <td>manipulate social media \"online polls\"?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Manipulate online polls</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>88</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000016</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>89</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Incirlik terrorists</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>90</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ParklandTeens</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>91</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>92</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000084</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>93</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000104</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>94</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000126</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>JadeHelm exercise</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>95</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000139</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>White Helmets: Chemical Weapons</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>96</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000148</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#HandsOffVenezuela</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>97</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000158</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Integrity Initiative</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>98</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000182</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Olympic Doping Scandal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>99</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>100</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ParklandTeens</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>101</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000064</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>102</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000087</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>103</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000096</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>104</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000122</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>JadeHelm exercise</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>105</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000142</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>White Helmets: Chemical Weapons</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>106</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000151</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#HandsOffVenezuela</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>107</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000159</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Integrity Initiative</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>108</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000185</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Olympic Doping Scandal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>109</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>110</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ParklandTeens</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>111</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000065</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>112</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000088</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>113</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000097</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>114</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000123</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>JadeHelm exercise</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>115</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000143</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>White Helmets: Chemical Weapons</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>116</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000152</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#HandsOffVenezuela</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>117</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000160</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Integrity Initiative</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>118</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000186</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Olympic Doping Scandal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>119</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>LinkedIn</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>120</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000067</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>LinkedIn</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>121</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000099</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>LinkedIn</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>122</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Pinterest</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>123</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000068</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Pinterest</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>124</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000100</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Pinterest</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>125</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036</td>\n",
-       "      <td>WhatsApp</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>126</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000069</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036</td>\n",
-       "      <td>WhatsApp</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>127</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000101</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036</td>\n",
-       "      <td>WhatsApp</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>128</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000023</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Meme that ISIS was responsible for a local che...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>129</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000072</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>130</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000117</td>\n",
-       "      <td>memes</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Saudi/Qatar bot dispute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>131</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000173</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Iran Influence Operations</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>132</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000024</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Backstop personas</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Wikipedia fake persona \"AmandaGray91\".</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Brexit vote</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0030</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Backstop personas</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>133</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000074</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Backstop personas</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0030</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Backstop personas</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>134</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use SMS/text messages</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SMS messages sent to local residents</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Columbian Chemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0043</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>135</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000026</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake video/images</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake youtube video of ISIS claiming responsibi...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Columbian Chemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0024</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake videos and images</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>136</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000116</td>\n",
-       "      <td>photoshopped/fake images</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Saudi/Qatar bot dispute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0024</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake videos and images</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>137</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000027</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create and use hashtag</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Columbian Chemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create hashtag</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>138</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000028</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create and use hashtag</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Columbian Chemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0055</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use hashtag</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>139</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000030</td>\n",
-       "      <td>bait journalists/media/politicians</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Columbian Chemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Bait legitimate influencers</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>140</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>journalist/media baiting</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ParklandTeens</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Bait legitimate influencers</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>141</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>journalist/media baiting</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ConcordDiscovery</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Bait legitimate influencers</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>142</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000036</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Using \"expert\"</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>PhilippinesExpert</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0045</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use fake experts</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>143</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000040</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>PhilippinesExpert</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Tertiary sites amplify news</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>144</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000086</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Tertiary sites amplify news</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>145</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000141</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>White Helmets: Chemical Weapons</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Tertiary sites amplify news</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>146</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000150</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mi...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#HandsOffVenezuela</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Tertiary sites amplify news</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>147</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000184</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Olympic Doping Scandal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Tertiary sites amplify news</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>148</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000048</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ParklandTeens</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Trial content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>149</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000070</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Trial content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>150</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000102</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Trial content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>151</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000124</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>JadeHelm exercise</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Trial content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>152</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Forge ('release' altered hacked documents)</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ConcordDiscovery</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Leak altered documents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>153</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ConcordDiscovery</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Leak altered documents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>154</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Leak altered documents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>155</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000075</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>#Macronleaks</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Leak altered documents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>156</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000153</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Integrity Initiative</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Leak altered documents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>157</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ConcordDiscovery</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Seed distortions</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>158</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000066</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Instagram</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>159</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000098</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kavanaugh</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Instagram</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>160</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000073</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>US presidential elections</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0016</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Clickbait</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>161</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000081</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>162</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000128</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Sea of Azov</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>163</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000129</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine fo...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Sea of Azov</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>164</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000136</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>White Helmets: Chemical Weapons</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>165</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000167</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China also plays victim, innocence, plays by r...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China Huawei CFO Arrest</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>166</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000168</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China Huawei CFO Arrest</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>167</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000179</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Olympic Doping Scandal</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>168</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000089</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Demand insurmountable proof</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>MH17 investigation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0040</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Demand unsurmountable proof</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>169</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000133</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Demand insurmountable proof</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Sea of Azov</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0040</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Demand unsurmountable proof</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>170</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000105</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/spon...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China 50cent Army</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Flooding</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>171</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000112</td>\n",
-       "      <td>flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politici...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>DibaFacebookExpedition</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Flooding</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>172</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000113</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>DibaFacebookExpedition</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Flooding</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>173</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000106</td>\n",
-       "      <td>fabricated social media comment</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China 50cent Army</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fabricate social media comment</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>174</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000107</td>\n",
-       "      <td>domestic social media influence operations foc...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China 50cent Army</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cheerleading domestic social media ops</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>175</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000165</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China Huawei CFO Arrest</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cheerleading domestic social media ops</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>176</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000108</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China 50cent Army</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Muzzle social media as a political force</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>177</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000109</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China 50cent Army</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0048</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cow online opinion leaders</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>178</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000110</td>\n",
-       "      <td>facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China 50cent Army</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Facilitate State Propaganda</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>179</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000111</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Netizens from one of the largest discussion fo...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>DibaFacebookExpedition</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Facilitate State Propaganda</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>180</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000114</td>\n",
-       "      <td>“hack” of Qatar’s official news agency</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Saudi/Qatar bot dispute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0011</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Hijack legitimate account</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>181</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000127</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and sc...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>JadeHelm exercise</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake experts</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>182</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000130</td>\n",
-       "      <td>(Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Sea of Azov</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0023</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Distort facts</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>183</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000163</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China Huawei CFO Arrest</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0023</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Distort facts</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>184</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000174</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Iran Influence Operations</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Conspiracy narratives</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>185</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000175</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake news/synthetic web-sites</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Iran Influence Operations</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake or imposter news sites</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "       amitt_id                                               name  \\\n",
-       "0    IT00000001                                buy FB targeted ads   \n",
-       "1    IT00000010                               Targeted FB paid ads   \n",
-       "2    IT00000057                               Targeted FB paid ads   \n",
-       "3    IT00000002                         Promote \"funding\" campaign   \n",
-       "4    IT00000003            create web-site - information pollution   \n",
-       "5    IT00000014        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "6    IT00000031  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (r...   \n",
-       "7    IT00000037       RT & Sputnik generate information pollution    \n",
-       "8    IT00000061        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "9    IT00000082  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "10   IT00000094        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "11   IT00000120        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "12   IT00000137  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "13   IT00000146  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "14   IT00000156        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "15   IT00000180  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "16   IT00000004            create web-site - information pollution   \n",
-       "17   IT00000015        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "18   IT00000032  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (r...   \n",
-       "19   IT00000038       RT & Sputnik generate information pollution    \n",
-       "20   IT00000062        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "21   IT00000083  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "22   IT00000095        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "23   IT00000121        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "24   IT00000138  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "25   IT00000147  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "26   IT00000157        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "27   IT00000162  State-run media seeds foreign influence enviro...   \n",
-       "28   IT00000181  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "29   IT00000005        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "30   IT00000022        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "31   IT00000043        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "32   IT00000071        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "33   IT00000085        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "34   IT00000103        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "35   IT00000125        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "36   IT00000140        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "37   IT00000149        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "38   IT00000161        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "39   IT00000172        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "40   IT00000183        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "41   IT00000006                                 legacy web content   \n",
-       "42   IT00000007  hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit...   \n",
-       "43   IT00000176                                 legacy web content   \n",
-       "44   IT00000008                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "45   IT00000034                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "46   IT00000041                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "47   IT00000055                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "48   IT00000076                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "49   IT00000079                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "50   IT00000090                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "51   IT00000115                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "52   IT00000118                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "53   IT00000131                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "54   IT00000134                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "55   IT00000144                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "56   IT00000154                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "57   IT00000169                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "58   IT00000177                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "59   IT00000009                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "60   IT00000035                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "61   IT00000042                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "62   IT00000056                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "63   IT00000077                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "64   IT00000080                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "65   IT00000091                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "66   IT00000119                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "67   IT00000132                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "68   IT00000135                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "69   IT00000145                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "70   IT00000155                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "71   IT00000170                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "72   IT00000178                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "73   IT00000011                      Fake FB groups + dark content   \n",
-       "74   IT00000029                   Fake twitter profiles to amplify   \n",
-       "75   IT00000039                                           FB pages   \n",
-       "76   IT00000045                           FB pages/groups/profiles   \n",
-       "77   IT00000058                      Fake FB groups + dark content   \n",
-       "78   IT00000078       Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content   \n",
-       "79   IT00000092                     Fake FB groups/pages/profiles    \n",
-       "80   IT00000171  Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (...   \n",
-       "81   IT00000012  Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...   \n",
-       "82   IT00000059  Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...   \n",
-       "83   IT00000093  Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...   \n",
-       "84   IT00000164  Events coordinated and promoted across media p...   \n",
-       "85   IT00000166  Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...   \n",
-       "86   IT00000013           manipulate social media \"online polls\"?    \n",
-       "87   IT00000060           manipulate social media \"online polls\"?    \n",
-       "88   IT00000016       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "89   IT00000033  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "90   IT00000044  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "91   IT00000063       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "92   IT00000084       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "93   IT00000104  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "94   IT00000126  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "95   IT00000139  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "96   IT00000148  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "97   IT00000158       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "98   IT00000182      cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots    \n",
-       "99   IT00000017    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "100  IT00000046                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "101  IT00000064  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "102  IT00000087                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "103  IT00000096  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "104  IT00000122                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "105  IT00000142                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "106  IT00000151                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "107  IT00000159                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "108  IT00000185                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "109  IT00000018    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "110  IT00000047                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "111  IT00000065  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "112  IT00000088                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "113  IT00000097  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "114  IT00000123                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "115  IT00000143                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "116  IT00000152                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "117  IT00000160                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "118  IT00000186                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "119  IT00000019    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "120  IT00000067  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "121  IT00000099  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "122  IT00000020    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "123  IT00000068  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "124  IT00000100  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "125  IT00000021    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "126  IT00000069  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "127  IT00000101  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "128  IT00000023  Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...   \n",
-       "129  IT00000072  Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...   \n",
-       "130  IT00000117                                              memes   \n",
-       "131  IT00000173  Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...   \n",
-       "132  IT00000024                                  Backstop personas   \n",
-       "133  IT00000074                                  Backstop personas   \n",
-       "134  IT00000025                              Use SMS/text messages   \n",
-       "135  IT00000026                                  Fake video/images   \n",
-       "136  IT00000116                           photoshopped/fake images   \n",
-       "137  IT00000027                             Create and use hashtag   \n",
-       "138  IT00000028                             Create and use hashtag   \n",
-       "139  IT00000030                 bait journalists/media/politicians   \n",
-       "140  IT00000049                           journalist/media baiting   \n",
-       "141  IT00000053                           journalist/media baiting   \n",
-       "142  IT00000036                                     Using \"expert\"   \n",
-       "143  IT00000040  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "144  IT00000086  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "145  IT00000141  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "146  IT00000150  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mi...   \n",
-       "147  IT00000184  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "148  IT00000048                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "149  IT00000070                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "150  IT00000102                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "151  IT00000124                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "152  IT00000050         Forge ('release' altered hacked documents)   \n",
-       "153  IT00000051                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "154  IT00000054                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "155  IT00000075                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "156  IT00000153                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "157  IT00000052   Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly   \n",
-       "158  IT00000066  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "159  IT00000098  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "160  IT00000073  Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (...   \n",
-       "161  IT00000081  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "162  IT00000128  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "163  IT00000129  Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine fo...   \n",
-       "164  IT00000136  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "165  IT00000167  China also plays victim, innocence, plays by r...   \n",
-       "166  IT00000168  Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of ...   \n",
-       "167  IT00000179  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "168  IT00000089                        Demand insurmountable proof   \n",
-       "169  IT00000133                        Demand insurmountable proof   \n",
-       "170  IT00000105  2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/spon...   \n",
-       "171  IT00000112  flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politici...   \n",
-       "172  IT00000113  Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted ...   \n",
-       "173  IT00000106                    fabricated social media comment   \n",
-       "174  IT00000107  domestic social media influence operations foc...   \n",
-       "175  IT00000165  Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...   \n",
-       "176  IT00000108  cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...   \n",
-       "177  IT00000109  cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...   \n",
-       "178  IT00000110      facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises   \n",
-       "179  IT00000111  Netizens from one of the largest discussion fo...   \n",
-       "180  IT00000114             “hack” of Qatar’s official news agency   \n",
-       "181  IT00000127  Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and sc...   \n",
-       "182  IT00000130  (Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian ...   \n",
-       "183  IT00000163  Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese...   \n",
-       "184  IT00000174  Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...   \n",
-       "185  IT00000175                      Fake news/synthetic web-sites   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                               summary amitt_id_incident  \\\n",
-       "0                                                                 I00002   \n",
-       "1                                                                 I00005   \n",
-       "2                                                                 I00017   \n",
-       "3                                                                 I00002   \n",
-       "4                                                                 I00002   \n",
-       "5                                                                 I00005   \n",
-       "6                                                                 I00007   \n",
-       "7                                                                 I00009   \n",
-       "8                                                                 I00017   \n",
-       "9                                                                 I00029   \n",
-       "10                                                                I00032   \n",
-       "11                                                                I00044   \n",
-       "12                                                                I00049   \n",
-       "13                                                                I00050   \n",
-       "14                                                                I00051   \n",
-       "15                                                                I00063   \n",
-       "16                                                                I00002   \n",
-       "17                                                                I00005   \n",
-       "18                                                                I00007   \n",
-       "19                                                                I00009   \n",
-       "20                                                                I00017   \n",
-       "21                                                                I00029   \n",
-       "22                                                                I00032   \n",
-       "23                                                                I00044   \n",
-       "24                                                                I00049   \n",
-       "25                                                                I00050   \n",
-       "26                                                                I00051   \n",
-       "27                                                                I00053   \n",
-       "28                                                                I00063   \n",
-       "29                                                                I00002   \n",
-       "30                                                                I00005   \n",
-       "31                                                                I00010   \n",
-       "32                                                                I00017   \n",
-       "33                                                                I00029   \n",
-       "34                                                                I00032   \n",
-       "35                                                                I00044   \n",
-       "36                                                                I00049   \n",
-       "37                                                                I00050   \n",
-       "38                                                                I00051   \n",
-       "39                                                                I00056   \n",
-       "40                                                                I00063   \n",
-       "41                                                                I00002   \n",
-       "42                                                                I00002   \n",
-       "43                                                                I00056   \n",
-       "44                                                                I00005   \n",
-       "45                                                                I00007   \n",
-       "46                                                                I00010   \n",
-       "47                                                                I00017   \n",
-       "48                                                                I00022   \n",
-       "49                                                                I00029   \n",
-       "50                                                                I00032   \n",
-       "51                                                                I00042   \n",
-       "52                                                                I00044   \n",
-       "53                                                                I00047   \n",
-       "54                                                                I00049   \n",
-       "55                                                                I00050   \n",
-       "56                                                                I00051   \n",
-       "57                                                                I00056   \n",
-       "58                                                                I00063   \n",
-       "59                                                                I00005   \n",
-       "60                                                                I00007   \n",
-       "61                                                                I00010   \n",
-       "62                                                                I00017   \n",
-       "63                                                                I00022   \n",
-       "64                                                                I00029   \n",
-       "65                                                                I00032   \n",
-       "66                                                                I00044   \n",
-       "67                                                                I00047   \n",
-       "68                                                                I00049   \n",
-       "69                                                                I00050   \n",
-       "70                                                                I00051   \n",
-       "71                                                                I00056   \n",
-       "72                                                                I00063   \n",
-       "73                                                                I00005   \n",
-       "74                Twitter bots used to drive visbility            I00006   \n",
-       "75                                                                I00009   \n",
-       "76                                                                I00010   \n",
-       "77                                                                I00017   \n",
-       "78                                                                I00022   \n",
-       "79                                                                I00032   \n",
-       "80                                                                I00056   \n",
-       "81                                                                I00005   \n",
-       "82                                                                I00017   \n",
-       "83                                                                I00032   \n",
-       "84                                                                I00053   \n",
-       "85                                                                I00053   \n",
-       "86                                                                I00005   \n",
-       "87                                                                I00017   \n",
-       "88                                                                I00005   \n",
-       "89                                                                I00007   \n",
-       "90                                                                I00010   \n",
-       "91                                                                I00017   \n",
-       "92                                                                I00029   \n",
-       "93                                                                I00032   \n",
-       "94                                                                I00044   \n",
-       "95                                                                I00049   \n",
-       "96                                                                I00050   \n",
-       "97                                                                I00051   \n",
-       "98                                                                I00063   \n",
-       "99                                                                I00005   \n",
-       "100                                                               I00010   \n",
-       "101                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "102                                                               I00029   \n",
-       "103                                                               I00032   \n",
-       "104                                                               I00044   \n",
-       "105                                                               I00049   \n",
-       "106                                                               I00050   \n",
-       "107                                                               I00051   \n",
-       "108                                                               I00063   \n",
-       "109                                                               I00005   \n",
-       "110                                                               I00010   \n",
-       "111                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "112                                                               I00029   \n",
-       "113                                                               I00032   \n",
-       "114                                                               I00044   \n",
-       "115                                                               I00049   \n",
-       "116                                                               I00050   \n",
-       "117                                                               I00051   \n",
-       "118                                                               I00063   \n",
-       "119                                                               I00005   \n",
-       "120                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "121                                                               I00032   \n",
-       "122                                                               I00005   \n",
-       "123                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "124                                                               I00032   \n",
-       "125                                                               I00005   \n",
-       "126                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "127                                                               I00032   \n",
-       "128  Meme that ISIS was responsible for a local che...            I00005   \n",
-       "129                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "130                                                               I00042   \n",
-       "131                                                               I00056   \n",
-       "132            Wikipedia fake persona \"AmandaGray91\".             I00005   \n",
-       "133                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "134               SMS messages sent to local residents            I00006   \n",
-       "135  Fake youtube video of ISIS claiming responsibi...            I00006   \n",
-       "136                                                               I00042   \n",
-       "137          Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals            I00006   \n",
-       "138          Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals            I00006   \n",
-       "139                                                               I00006   \n",
-       "140                                                               I00010   \n",
-       "141                                                               I00015   \n",
-       "142                                                               I00009   \n",
-       "143                                                               I00009   \n",
-       "144                                                               I00029   \n",
-       "145                                                               I00049   \n",
-       "146                                                               I00050   \n",
-       "147                                                               I00063   \n",
-       "148                                                               I00010   \n",
-       "149                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "150                                                               I00032   \n",
-       "151                                                               I00044   \n",
-       "152                                                               I00015   \n",
-       "153                                                               I00015   \n",
-       "154                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "155                                                               I00022   \n",
-       "156                                                               I00051   \n",
-       "157                                                               I00015   \n",
-       "158                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "159                                                               I00032   \n",
-       "160                                                               I00017   \n",
-       "161                                                               I00029   \n",
-       "162                                                               I00047   \n",
-       "163                                                               I00047   \n",
-       "164                                                               I00049   \n",
-       "165                                                               I00053   \n",
-       "166                                                               I00053   \n",
-       "167                                                               I00063   \n",
-       "168                                                               I00029   \n",
-       "169                                                               I00047   \n",
-       "170                                                               I00033   \n",
-       "171                                                               I00034   \n",
-       "172                                                               I00034   \n",
-       "173                                                               I00033   \n",
-       "174                                                               I00033   \n",
-       "175                                                               I00053   \n",
-       "176                                                               I00033   \n",
-       "177                                                               I00033   \n",
-       "178                                                               I00033   \n",
-       "179                                                               I00034   \n",
-       "180                                                               I00042   \n",
-       "181                                                               I00044   \n",
-       "182                                                               I00047   \n",
-       "183                                                               I00053   \n",
-       "184                                                               I00056   \n",
-       "185                                                               I00056   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                       name_incident amitt_id_technique  \\\n",
-       "0                       #VaccinateUS              T0018   \n",
-       "1                        Brexit vote              T0018   \n",
-       "2          US presidential elections              T0018   \n",
-       "3                       #VaccinateUS              T0017   \n",
-       "4                       #VaccinateUS              T0019   \n",
-       "5                        Brexit vote              T0019   \n",
-       "6                Incirlik terrorists              T0019   \n",
-       "7                  PhilippinesExpert              T0019   \n",
-       "8          US presidential elections              T0019   \n",
-       "9                 MH17 investigation              T0019   \n",
-       "10                         Kavanaugh              T0019   \n",
-       "11                 JadeHelm exercise              T0019   \n",
-       "12   White Helmets: Chemical Weapons              T0019   \n",
-       "13                #HandsOffVenezuela              T0019   \n",
-       "14              Integrity Initiative              T0019   \n",
-       "15            Olympic Doping Scandal              T0019   \n",
-       "16                      #VaccinateUS              T0056   \n",
-       "17                       Brexit vote              T0056   \n",
-       "18               Incirlik terrorists              T0056   \n",
-       "19                 PhilippinesExpert              T0056   \n",
-       "20         US presidential elections              T0056   \n",
-       "21                MH17 investigation              T0056   \n",
-       "22                         Kavanaugh              T0056   \n",
-       "23                 JadeHelm exercise              T0056   \n",
-       "24   White Helmets: Chemical Weapons              T0056   \n",
-       "25                #HandsOffVenezuela              T0056   \n",
-       "26              Integrity Initiative              T0056   \n",
-       "27           China Huawei CFO Arrest              T0056   \n",
-       "28            Olympic Doping Scandal              T0056   \n",
-       "29                      #VaccinateUS              T0046   \n",
-       "30                       Brexit vote              T0046   \n",
-       "31                     ParklandTeens              T0046   \n",
-       "32         US presidential elections              T0046   \n",
-       "33                MH17 investigation              T0046   \n",
-       "34                         Kavanaugh              T0046   \n",
-       "35                 JadeHelm exercise              T0046   \n",
-       "36   White Helmets: Chemical Weapons              T0046   \n",
-       "37                #HandsOffVenezuela              T0046   \n",
-       "38              Integrity Initiative              T0046   \n",
-       "39         Iran Influence Operations              T0046   \n",
-       "40            Olympic Doping Scandal              T0046   \n",
-       "41                      #VaccinateUS              T0058   \n",
-       "42                      #VaccinateUS              T0058   \n",
-       "43         Iran Influence Operations              T0058   \n",
-       "44                       Brexit vote              T0054   \n",
-       "45               Incirlik terrorists              T0054   \n",
-       "46                     ParklandTeens              T0054   \n",
-       "47         US presidential elections              T0054   \n",
-       "48                      #Macronleaks              T0054   \n",
-       "49                MH17 investigation              T0054   \n",
-       "50                         Kavanaugh              T0054   \n",
-       "51           Saudi/Qatar bot dispute              T0054   \n",
-       "52                 JadeHelm exercise              T0054   \n",
-       "53                       Sea of Azov              T0054   \n",
-       "54   White Helmets: Chemical Weapons              T0054   \n",
-       "55                #HandsOffVenezuela              T0054   \n",
-       "56              Integrity Initiative              T0054   \n",
-       "57         Iran Influence Operations              T0054   \n",
-       "58            Olympic Doping Scandal              T0054   \n",
-       "59                       Brexit vote              T0053   \n",
-       "60               Incirlik terrorists              T0053   \n",
-       "61                     ParklandTeens              T0053   \n",
-       "62         US presidential elections              T0053   \n",
-       "63                      #Macronleaks              T0053   \n",
-       "64                MH17 investigation              T0053   \n",
-       "65                         Kavanaugh              T0053   \n",
-       "66                 JadeHelm exercise              T0053   \n",
-       "67                       Sea of Azov              T0053   \n",
-       "68   White Helmets: Chemical Weapons              T0053   \n",
-       "69                #HandsOffVenezuela              T0053   \n",
-       "70              Integrity Initiative              T0053   \n",
-       "71         Iran Influence Operations              T0053   \n",
-       "72            Olympic Doping Scandal              T0053   \n",
-       "73                       Brexit vote              T0007   \n",
-       "74               Columbian Chemicals              T0007   \n",
-       "75                 PhilippinesExpert              T0007   \n",
-       "76                     ParklandTeens              T0007   \n",
-       "77         US presidential elections              T0007   \n",
-       "78                      #Macronleaks              T0007   \n",
-       "79                         Kavanaugh              T0007   \n",
-       "80         Iran Influence Operations              T0007   \n",
-       "81                       Brexit vote              T0057   \n",
-       "82         US presidential elections              T0057   \n",
-       "83                         Kavanaugh              T0057   \n",
-       "84           China Huawei CFO Arrest              T0057   \n",
-       "85           China Huawei CFO Arrest              T0057   \n",
-       "86                       Brexit vote              T0029   \n",
-       "87         US presidential elections              T0029   \n",
-       "88                       Brexit vote              T0010   \n",
-       "89               Incirlik terrorists              T0010   \n",
-       "90                     ParklandTeens              T0010   \n",
-       "91         US presidential elections              T0010   \n",
-       "92                MH17 investigation              T0010   \n",
-       "93                         Kavanaugh              T0010   \n",
-       "94                 JadeHelm exercise              T0010   \n",
-       "95   White Helmets: Chemical Weapons              T0010   \n",
-       "96                #HandsOffVenezuela              T0010   \n",
-       "97              Integrity Initiative              T0010   \n",
-       "98            Olympic Doping Scandal              T0010   \n",
-       "99                       Brexit vote              T0031   \n",
-       "100                    ParklandTeens              T0031   \n",
-       "101        US presidential elections              T0031   \n",
-       "102               MH17 investigation              T0031   \n",
-       "103                        Kavanaugh              T0031   \n",
-       "104                JadeHelm exercise              T0031   \n",
-       "105  White Helmets: Chemical Weapons              T0031   \n",
-       "106               #HandsOffVenezuela              T0031   \n",
-       "107             Integrity Initiative              T0031   \n",
-       "108           Olympic Doping Scandal              T0031   \n",
-       "109                      Brexit vote              T0032   \n",
-       "110                    ParklandTeens              T0032   \n",
-       "111        US presidential elections              T0032   \n",
-       "112               MH17 investigation              T0032   \n",
-       "113                        Kavanaugh              T0032   \n",
-       "114                JadeHelm exercise              T0032   \n",
-       "115  White Helmets: Chemical Weapons              T0032   \n",
-       "116               #HandsOffVenezuela              T0032   \n",
-       "117             Integrity Initiative              T0032   \n",
-       "118           Olympic Doping Scandal              T0032   \n",
-       "119                      Brexit vote              T0034   \n",
-       "120        US presidential elections              T0034   \n",
-       "121                        Kavanaugh              T0034   \n",
-       "122                      Brexit vote              T0035   \n",
-       "123        US presidential elections              T0035   \n",
-       "124                        Kavanaugh              T0035   \n",
-       "125                      Brexit vote              T0036   \n",
-       "126        US presidential elections              T0036   \n",
-       "127                        Kavanaugh              T0036   \n",
-       "128                      Brexit vote              T0021   \n",
-       "129        US presidential elections              T0021   \n",
-       "130          Saudi/Qatar bot dispute              T0021   \n",
-       "131        Iran Influence Operations              T0021   \n",
-       "132                      Brexit vote              T0030   \n",
-       "133        US presidential elections              T0030   \n",
-       "134              Columbian Chemicals              T0043   \n",
-       "135              Columbian Chemicals              T0024   \n",
-       "136          Saudi/Qatar bot dispute              T0024   \n",
-       "137              Columbian Chemicals              T0015   \n",
-       "138              Columbian Chemicals              T0055   \n",
-       "139              Columbian Chemicals              T0039   \n",
-       "140                    ParklandTeens              T0039   \n",
-       "141                 ConcordDiscovery              T0039   \n",
-       "142                PhilippinesExpert              T0045   \n",
-       "143                PhilippinesExpert              T0052   \n",
-       "144               MH17 investigation              T0052   \n",
-       "145  White Helmets: Chemical Weapons              T0052   \n",
-       "146               #HandsOffVenezuela              T0052   \n",
-       "147           Olympic Doping Scandal              T0052   \n",
-       "148                    ParklandTeens              T0020   \n",
-       "149        US presidential elections              T0020   \n",
-       "150                        Kavanaugh              T0020   \n",
-       "151                JadeHelm exercise              T0020   \n",
-       "152                 ConcordDiscovery              T0025   \n",
-       "153                 ConcordDiscovery              T0025   \n",
-       "154        US presidential elections              T0025   \n",
-       "155                     #Macronleaks              T0025   \n",
-       "156             Integrity Initiative              T0025   \n",
-       "157                 ConcordDiscovery              T0044   \n",
-       "158        US presidential elections              T0033   \n",
-       "159                        Kavanaugh              T0033   \n",
-       "160        US presidential elections              T0016   \n",
-       "161               MH17 investigation              T0001   \n",
-       "162                      Sea of Azov              T0001   \n",
-       "163                      Sea of Azov              T0001   \n",
-       "164  White Helmets: Chemical Weapons              T0001   \n",
-       "165          China Huawei CFO Arrest              T0001   \n",
-       "166          China Huawei CFO Arrest              T0001   \n",
-       "167           Olympic Doping Scandal              T0001   \n",
-       "168               MH17 investigation              T0040   \n",
-       "169                      Sea of Azov              T0040   \n",
-       "170                China 50cent Army              T0049   \n",
-       "171           DibaFacebookExpedition              T0049   \n",
-       "172           DibaFacebookExpedition              T0049   \n",
-       "173                China 50cent Army              T0051   \n",
-       "174                China 50cent Army              T0050   \n",
-       "175          China Huawei CFO Arrest              T0050   \n",
-       "176                China 50cent Army              T0047   \n",
-       "177                China 50cent Army              T0048   \n",
-       "178                China 50cent Army              T0002   \n",
-       "179           DibaFacebookExpedition              T0002   \n",
-       "180          Saudi/Qatar bot dispute              T0011   \n",
-       "181                JadeHelm exercise              T0009   \n",
-       "182                      Sea of Azov              T0023   \n",
-       "183          China Huawei CFO Arrest              T0023   \n",
-       "184        Iran Influence Operations              T0022   \n",
-       "185        Iran Influence Operations              T0008   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                        name_technique  \n",
-       "0                                    Paid targeted ads  \n",
-       "1                                    Paid targeted ads  \n",
-       "2                                    Paid targeted ads  \n",
-       "3                               Promote online funding  \n",
-       "4                       Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "5                       Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "6                       Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "7                       Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "8                       Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "9                       Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "10                      Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "11                      Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "12                      Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "13                      Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "14                      Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "15                      Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "16   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "17   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "18   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "19   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "20   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "21   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "22   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "23   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "24   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "25   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "26   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "27   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "28   Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...  \n",
-       "29                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "30                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "31                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "32                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "33                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "34                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "35                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "36                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "37                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "38                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "39                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "40                          Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "41                                  Legacy web content  \n",
-       "42                                  Legacy web content  \n",
-       "43                                  Legacy web content  \n",
-       "44                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "45                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "46                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "47                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "48                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "49                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "50                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "51                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "52                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "53                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "54                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "55                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "56                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "57                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "58                                Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "59               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "60               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "61               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "62               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "63               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "64               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "65               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "66               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "67               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "68               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "69               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "70               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "71               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "72               Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "73   Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...  \n",
-       "74   Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...  \n",
-       "75   Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...  \n",
-       "76   Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...  \n",
-       "77   Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...  \n",
-       "78   Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...  \n",
-       "79   Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...  \n",
-       "80   Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...  \n",
-       "81                  Organise remote rallies and events  \n",
-       "82                  Organise remote rallies and events  \n",
-       "83                  Organise remote rallies and events  \n",
-       "84                  Organise remote rallies and events  \n",
-       "85                  Organise remote rallies and events  \n",
-       "86                             Manipulate online polls  \n",
-       "87                             Manipulate online polls  \n",
-       "88                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "89                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "90                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "91                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "92                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "93                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "94                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "95                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "96                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "97                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "98                           Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "99                                             YouTube  \n",
-       "100                                            YouTube  \n",
-       "101                                            YouTube  \n",
-       "102                                            YouTube  \n",
-       "103                                            YouTube  \n",
-       "104                                            YouTube  \n",
-       "105                                            YouTube  \n",
-       "106                                            YouTube  \n",
-       "107                                            YouTube  \n",
-       "108                                            YouTube  \n",
-       "109                                             Reddit  \n",
-       "110                                             Reddit  \n",
-       "111                                             Reddit  \n",
-       "112                                             Reddit  \n",
-       "113                                             Reddit  \n",
-       "114                                             Reddit  \n",
-       "115                                             Reddit  \n",
-       "116                                             Reddit  \n",
-       "117                                             Reddit  \n",
-       "118                                             Reddit  \n",
-       "119                                           LinkedIn  \n",
-       "120                                           LinkedIn  \n",
-       "121                                           LinkedIn  \n",
-       "122                                          Pinterest  \n",
-       "123                                          Pinterest  \n",
-       "124                                          Pinterest  \n",
-       "125                                           WhatsApp  \n",
-       "126                                           WhatsApp  \n",
-       "127                                           WhatsApp  \n",
-       "128                                              Memes  \n",
-       "129                                              Memes  \n",
-       "130                                              Memes  \n",
-       "131                                              Memes  \n",
-       "132                                  Backstop personas  \n",
-       "133                                  Backstop personas  \n",
-       "134                       Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps  \n",
-       "135                      Create fake videos and images  \n",
-       "136                      Create fake videos and images  \n",
-       "137                                     Create hashtag  \n",
-       "138                                        Use hashtag  \n",
-       "139                        Bait legitimate influencers  \n",
-       "140                        Bait legitimate influencers  \n",
-       "141                        Bait legitimate influencers  \n",
-       "142                                   Use fake experts  \n",
-       "143                        Tertiary sites amplify news  \n",
-       "144                        Tertiary sites amplify news  \n",
-       "145                        Tertiary sites amplify news  \n",
-       "146                        Tertiary sites amplify news  \n",
-       "147                        Tertiary sites amplify news  \n",
-       "148                                      Trial content  \n",
-       "149                                      Trial content  \n",
-       "150                                      Trial content  \n",
-       "151                                      Trial content  \n",
-       "152                             Leak altered documents  \n",
-       "153                             Leak altered documents  \n",
-       "154                             Leak altered documents  \n",
-       "155                             Leak altered documents  \n",
-       "156                             Leak altered documents  \n",
-       "157                                   Seed distortions  \n",
-       "158                                          Instagram  \n",
-       "159                                          Instagram  \n",
-       "160                                          Clickbait  \n",
-       "161   5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)  \n",
-       "162   5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)  \n",
-       "163   5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)  \n",
-       "164   5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)  \n",
-       "165   5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)  \n",
-       "166   5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)  \n",
-       "167   5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)  \n",
-       "168                        Demand unsurmountable proof  \n",
-       "169                        Demand unsurmountable proof  \n",
-       "170                                           Flooding  \n",
-       "171                                           Flooding  \n",
-       "172                                           Flooding  \n",
-       "173                     Fabricate social media comment  \n",
-       "174             Cheerleading domestic social media ops  \n",
-       "175             Cheerleading domestic social media ops  \n",
-       "176           Muzzle social media as a political force  \n",
-       "177                         Cow online opinion leaders  \n",
-       "178                        Facilitate State Propaganda  \n",
-       "179                        Facilitate State Propaganda  \n",
-       "180                          Hijack legitimate account  \n",
-       "181                                Create fake experts  \n",
-       "182                                      Distort facts  \n",
-       "183                                      Distort facts  \n",
-       "184                              Conspiracy narratives  \n",
-       "185                 Create fake or imposter news sites  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 21,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "# Check which amitt variables we can see from here\n",
-    "print('{}\\n'.format(vars(amitt).keys()))\n",
-    "testdfname = 'it'\n",
-    "testdf = vars(amitt)[testdfname]\n",
-    "print('{} columns: {}'.format(testdfname, testdf.columns))\n",
-    "testdf"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 22,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>amitt_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>incident_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>technique_id</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>buy FB targeted ads</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Targeted FB paid ads</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Targeted FB paid ads</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Promote \"funding\" campaign</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0017</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000003</td>\n",
-       "      <td>create web-site - information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000014</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (r...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000037</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000061</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>9</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000082</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>10</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000094</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>11</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000120</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>12</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000137</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>13</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000146</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>14</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000156</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>15</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000180</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>16</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000004</td>\n",
-       "      <td>create web-site - information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>17</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>18</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (r...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>19</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000038</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>20</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000062</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>21</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000083</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>22</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000095</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>23</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000121</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>24</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000138</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>25</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000147</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>26</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000157</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>27</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000162</td>\n",
-       "      <td>State-run media seeds foreign influence enviro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>28</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000181</td>\n",
-       "      <td>RT &amp; Sputnik generate information pollution (s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>29</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>30</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>31</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000043</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>32</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000071</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>33</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000085</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>34</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000103</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>35</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000125</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>36</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000140</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>37</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000149</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>38</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000161</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>39</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000172</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>40</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000183</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>41</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>42</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>43</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000176</td>\n",
-       "      <td>legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>44</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>45</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>46</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000041</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>47</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000055</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>48</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000076</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>49</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000079</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>50</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000090</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>51</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000115</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>52</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000118</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>53</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000131</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>54</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000134</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>55</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000144</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>56</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000154</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>57</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000169</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>58</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000177</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>59</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>60</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000035</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>61</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>62</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>63</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000077</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>64</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000080</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>65</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000091</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>66</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000119</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>67</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000132</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>68</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000135</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>69</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000145</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>70</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000155</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>71</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000170</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>72</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000178</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify &amp; manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>73</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000011</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups + dark content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>74</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake twitter profiles to amplify</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots used to drive visbility</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>75</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000039</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FB pages</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>76</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000045</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FB pages/groups/profiles</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>77</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000058</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups + dark content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>78</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000078</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>79</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000092</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups/pages/profiles</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>80</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000171</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>81</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000012</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>82</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000059</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>83</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000093</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>84</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000164</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Events coordinated and promoted across media p...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>85</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000166</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>86</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000013</td>\n",
-       "      <td>manipulate social media \"online polls\"?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0029</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>87</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000060</td>\n",
-       "      <td>manipulate social media \"online polls\"?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0029</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>88</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000016</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>89</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>90</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>91</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>92</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000084</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>93</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000104</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>94</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000126</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>95</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000139</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>96</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000148</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>97</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000158</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>98</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000182</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>99</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>100</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>101</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000064</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>102</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000087</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>103</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000096</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>104</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000122</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>105</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000142</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>106</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000151</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>107</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000159</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>108</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000185</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>109</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>110</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>111</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000065</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>112</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000088</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>113</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000097</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>114</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000123</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>115</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000143</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>116</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000152</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>117</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000160</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>118</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000186</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit;</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>119</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>120</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000067</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>121</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000099</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>122</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>123</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000068</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>124</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000100</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>125</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>126</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000069</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>127</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000101</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>128</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000023</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Meme that ISIS was responsible for a local che...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>129</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000072</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>130</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000117</td>\n",
-       "      <td>memes</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>131</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000173</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>132</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000024</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Backstop personas</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Wikipedia fake persona \"AmandaGray91\".</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0030</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>133</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000074</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Backstop personas</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0030</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>134</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use SMS/text messages</td>\n",
-       "      <td>SMS messages sent to local residents</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0043</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>135</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000026</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake video/images</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake youtube video of ISIS claiming responsibi...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0024</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>136</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000116</td>\n",
-       "      <td>photoshopped/fake images</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0024</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>137</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000027</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create and use hashtag</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0015</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>138</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000028</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create and use hashtag</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0055</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>139</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000030</td>\n",
-       "      <td>bait journalists/media/politicians</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>140</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>journalist/media baiting</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>141</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>journalist/media baiting</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>142</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000036</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Using \"expert\"</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0045</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>143</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000040</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>144</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000086</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>145</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000141</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>146</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000150</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mi...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>147</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000184</td>\n",
-       "      <td>News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>148</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000048</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>149</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000070</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>150</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000102</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>151</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000124</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4Chan/8Chan - trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>152</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Forge ('release' altered hacked documents)</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>153</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>154</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>155</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000075</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>156</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000153</td>\n",
-       "      <td>hack/leak/manipulate/distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>157</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0044</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>158</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000066</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0033</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>159</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000098</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0033</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>160</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000073</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0016</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>161</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000081</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>162</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000128</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>163</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000129</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine fo...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>164</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000136</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>165</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000167</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China also plays victim, innocence, plays by r...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>166</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000168</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>167</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000179</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>168</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000089</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Demand insurmountable proof</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0040</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>169</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000133</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Demand insurmountable proof</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0040</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>170</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000105</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/spon...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>171</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000112</td>\n",
-       "      <td>flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politici...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>172</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000113</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>173</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000106</td>\n",
-       "      <td>fabricated social media comment</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0051</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>174</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000107</td>\n",
-       "      <td>domestic social media influence operations foc...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0050</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>175</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000165</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0050</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>176</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000108</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0047</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>177</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000109</td>\n",
-       "      <td>cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0048</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>178</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000110</td>\n",
-       "      <td>facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>179</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000111</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Netizens from one of the largest discussion fo...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>180</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000114</td>\n",
-       "      <td>“hack” of Qatar’s official news agency</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0011</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>181</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000127</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and sc...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0009</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>182</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000130</td>\n",
-       "      <td>(Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0023</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>183</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000163</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0023</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>184</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000174</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0022</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>185</th>\n",
-       "      <td>IT00000175</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fake news/synthetic web-sites</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0008</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "       amitt_id                                               name  \\\n",
-       "0    IT00000001                                buy FB targeted ads   \n",
-       "1    IT00000010                               Targeted FB paid ads   \n",
-       "2    IT00000057                               Targeted FB paid ads   \n",
-       "3    IT00000002                         Promote \"funding\" campaign   \n",
-       "4    IT00000003            create web-site - information pollution   \n",
-       "5    IT00000014        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "6    IT00000031  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (r...   \n",
-       "7    IT00000037       RT & Sputnik generate information pollution    \n",
-       "8    IT00000061        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "9    IT00000082  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "10   IT00000094        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "11   IT00000120        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "12   IT00000137  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "13   IT00000146  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "14   IT00000156        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "15   IT00000180  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "16   IT00000004            create web-site - information pollution   \n",
-       "17   IT00000015        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "18   IT00000032  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (r...   \n",
-       "19   IT00000038       RT & Sputnik generate information pollution    \n",
-       "20   IT00000062        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "21   IT00000083  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "22   IT00000095        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "23   IT00000121        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "24   IT00000138  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "25   IT00000147  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "26   IT00000157        RT & Sputnik generate information pollution   \n",
-       "27   IT00000162  State-run media seeds foreign influence enviro...   \n",
-       "28   IT00000181  RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (s...   \n",
-       "29   IT00000005        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "30   IT00000022        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "31   IT00000043        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "32   IT00000071        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "33   IT00000085        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "34   IT00000103        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "35   IT00000125        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "36   IT00000140        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "37   IT00000149        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "38   IT00000161        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "39   IT00000172        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "40   IT00000183        SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")   \n",
-       "41   IT00000006                                 legacy web content   \n",
-       "42   IT00000007  hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit...   \n",
-       "43   IT00000176                                 legacy web content   \n",
-       "44   IT00000008                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "45   IT00000034                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "46   IT00000041                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "47   IT00000055                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "48   IT00000076                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "49   IT00000079                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "50   IT00000090                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "51   IT00000115                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "52   IT00000118                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "53   IT00000131                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "54   IT00000134                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "55   IT00000144                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "56   IT00000154                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "57   IT00000169                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "58   IT00000177                  Twitter bots amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "59   IT00000009                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "60   IT00000035                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "61   IT00000042                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "62   IT00000056                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "63   IT00000077                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "64   IT00000080                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "65   IT00000091                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "66   IT00000119                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "67   IT00000132                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "68   IT00000135                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "69   IT00000145                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "70   IT00000155                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "71   IT00000170                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "72   IT00000178                Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate   \n",
-       "73   IT00000011                      Fake FB groups + dark content   \n",
-       "74   IT00000029                   Fake twitter profiles to amplify   \n",
-       "75   IT00000039                                           FB pages   \n",
-       "76   IT00000045                           FB pages/groups/profiles   \n",
-       "77   IT00000058                      Fake FB groups + dark content   \n",
-       "78   IT00000078       Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content   \n",
-       "79   IT00000092                     Fake FB groups/pages/profiles    \n",
-       "80   IT00000171  Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (...   \n",
-       "81   IT00000012  Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...   \n",
-       "82   IT00000059  Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...   \n",
-       "83   IT00000093  Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies...   \n",
-       "84   IT00000164  Events coordinated and promoted across media p...   \n",
-       "85   IT00000166  Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...   \n",
-       "86   IT00000013           manipulate social media \"online polls\"?    \n",
-       "87   IT00000060           manipulate social media \"online polls\"?    \n",
-       "88   IT00000016       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "89   IT00000033  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "90   IT00000044  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "91   IT00000063       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "92   IT00000084       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "93   IT00000104  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "94   IT00000126  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "95   IT00000139  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "96   IT00000148  cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (...   \n",
-       "97   IT00000158       cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots   \n",
-       "98   IT00000182      cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots    \n",
-       "99   IT00000017    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "100  IT00000046                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "101  IT00000064  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "102  IT00000087                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "103  IT00000096  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "104  IT00000122                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "105  IT00000142                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "106  IT00000151                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "107  IT00000159                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "108  IT00000185                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "109  IT00000018    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "110  IT00000047                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "111  IT00000065  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "112  IT00000088                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "113  IT00000097  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "114  IT00000123                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "115  IT00000143                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "116  IT00000152                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "117  IT00000160                                    YouTube; Reddit   \n",
-       "118  IT00000186                                  YouTube; Reddit;    \n",
-       "119  IT00000019    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "120  IT00000067  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "121  IT00000099  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "122  IT00000020    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "123  IT00000068  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "124  IT00000100  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "125  IT00000021    YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?   \n",
-       "126  IT00000069  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "127  IT00000101  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "128  IT00000023  Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...   \n",
-       "129  IT00000072  Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fea...   \n",
-       "130  IT00000117                                              memes   \n",
-       "131  IT00000173  Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...   \n",
-       "132  IT00000024                                  Backstop personas   \n",
-       "133  IT00000074                                  Backstop personas   \n",
-       "134  IT00000025                              Use SMS/text messages   \n",
-       "135  IT00000026                                  Fake video/images   \n",
-       "136  IT00000116                           photoshopped/fake images   \n",
-       "137  IT00000027                             Create and use hashtag   \n",
-       "138  IT00000028                             Create and use hashtag   \n",
-       "139  IT00000030                 bait journalists/media/politicians   \n",
-       "140  IT00000049                           journalist/media baiting   \n",
-       "141  IT00000053                           journalist/media baiting   \n",
-       "142  IT00000036                                     Using \"expert\"   \n",
-       "143  IT00000040  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "144  IT00000086  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "145  IT00000141  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "146  IT00000150  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mi...   \n",
-       "147  IT00000184  News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Ru...   \n",
-       "148  IT00000048                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "149  IT00000070                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "150  IT00000102                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "151  IT00000124                        4Chan/8Chan - trial content   \n",
-       "152  IT00000050         Forge ('release' altered hacked documents)   \n",
-       "153  IT00000051                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "154  IT00000054                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "155  IT00000075                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "156  IT00000153                       hack/leak/manipulate/distort   \n",
-       "157  IT00000052   Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly   \n",
-       "158  IT00000066  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "159  IT00000098  YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pintere...   \n",
-       "160  IT00000073  Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (...   \n",
-       "161  IT00000081  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "162  IT00000128  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "163  IT00000129  Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine fo...   \n",
-       "164  IT00000136  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "165  IT00000167  China also plays victim, innocence, plays by r...   \n",
-       "166  IT00000168  Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of ...   \n",
-       "167  IT00000179  4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Of...   \n",
-       "168  IT00000089                        Demand insurmountable proof   \n",
-       "169  IT00000133                        Demand insurmountable proof   \n",
-       "170  IT00000105  2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/spon...   \n",
-       "171  IT00000112  flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politici...   \n",
-       "172  IT00000113  Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted ...   \n",
-       "173  IT00000106                    fabricated social media comment   \n",
-       "174  IT00000107  domestic social media influence operations foc...   \n",
-       "175  IT00000165  Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ...   \n",
-       "176  IT00000108  cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...   \n",
-       "177  IT00000109  cow online opinion leaders into submission, mu...   \n",
-       "178  IT00000110      facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises   \n",
-       "179  IT00000111  Netizens from one of the largest discussion fo...   \n",
-       "180  IT00000114             “hack” of Qatar’s official news agency   \n",
-       "181  IT00000127  Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and sc...   \n",
-       "182  IT00000130  (Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian ...   \n",
-       "183  IT00000163  Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese...   \n",
-       "184  IT00000174  Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narr...   \n",
-       "185  IT00000175                      Fake news/synthetic web-sites   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                               summary incident_id  \\\n",
-       "0                                                           I00002   \n",
-       "1                                                           I00005   \n",
-       "2                                                           I00017   \n",
-       "3                                                           I00002   \n",
-       "4                                                           I00002   \n",
-       "5                                                           I00005   \n",
-       "6                                                           I00007   \n",
-       "7                                                           I00009   \n",
-       "8                                                           I00017   \n",
-       "9                                                           I00029   \n",
-       "10                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "11                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "12                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "13                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "14                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "15                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "16                                                          I00002   \n",
-       "17                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "18                                                          I00007   \n",
-       "19                                                          I00009   \n",
-       "20                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "21                                                          I00029   \n",
-       "22                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "23                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "24                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "25                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "26                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "27                                                          I00053   \n",
-       "28                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "29                                                          I00002   \n",
-       "30                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "31                                                          I00010   \n",
-       "32                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "33                                                          I00029   \n",
-       "34                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "35                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "36                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "37                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "38                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "39                                                          I00056   \n",
-       "40                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "41                                                          I00002   \n",
-       "42                                                          I00002   \n",
-       "43                                                          I00056   \n",
-       "44                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "45                                                          I00007   \n",
-       "46                                                          I00010   \n",
-       "47                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "48                                                          I00022   \n",
-       "49                                                          I00029   \n",
-       "50                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "51                                                          I00042   \n",
-       "52                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "53                                                          I00047   \n",
-       "54                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "55                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "56                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "57                                                          I00056   \n",
-       "58                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "59                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "60                                                          I00007   \n",
-       "61                                                          I00010   \n",
-       "62                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "63                                                          I00022   \n",
-       "64                                                          I00029   \n",
-       "65                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "66                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "67                                                          I00047   \n",
-       "68                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "69                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "70                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "71                                                          I00056   \n",
-       "72                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "73                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "74                Twitter bots used to drive visbility      I00006   \n",
-       "75                                                          I00009   \n",
-       "76                                                          I00010   \n",
-       "77                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "78                                                          I00022   \n",
-       "79                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "80                                                          I00056   \n",
-       "81                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "82                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "83                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "84                                                          I00053   \n",
-       "85                                                          I00053   \n",
-       "86                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "87                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "88                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "89                                                          I00007   \n",
-       "90                                                          I00010   \n",
-       "91                                                          I00017   \n",
-       "92                                                          I00029   \n",
-       "93                                                          I00032   \n",
-       "94                                                          I00044   \n",
-       "95                                                          I00049   \n",
-       "96                                                          I00050   \n",
-       "97                                                          I00051   \n",
-       "98                                                          I00063   \n",
-       "99                                                          I00005   \n",
-       "100                                                         I00010   \n",
-       "101                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "102                                                         I00029   \n",
-       "103                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "104                                                         I00044   \n",
-       "105                                                         I00049   \n",
-       "106                                                         I00050   \n",
-       "107                                                         I00051   \n",
-       "108                                                         I00063   \n",
-       "109                                                         I00005   \n",
-       "110                                                         I00010   \n",
-       "111                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "112                                                         I00029   \n",
-       "113                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "114                                                         I00044   \n",
-       "115                                                         I00049   \n",
-       "116                                                         I00050   \n",
-       "117                                                         I00051   \n",
-       "118                                                         I00063   \n",
-       "119                                                         I00005   \n",
-       "120                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "121                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "122                                                         I00005   \n",
-       "123                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "124                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "125                                                         I00005   \n",
-       "126                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "127                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "128  Meme that ISIS was responsible for a local che...      I00005   \n",
-       "129                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "130                                                         I00042   \n",
-       "131                                                         I00056   \n",
-       "132            Wikipedia fake persona \"AmandaGray91\".       I00005   \n",
-       "133                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "134               SMS messages sent to local residents      I00006   \n",
-       "135  Fake youtube video of ISIS claiming responsibi...      I00006   \n",
-       "136                                                         I00042   \n",
-       "137          Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals      I00006   \n",
-       "138          Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals      I00006   \n",
-       "139                                                         I00006   \n",
-       "140                                                         I00010   \n",
-       "141                                                         I00015   \n",
-       "142                                                         I00009   \n",
-       "143                                                         I00009   \n",
-       "144                                                         I00029   \n",
-       "145                                                         I00049   \n",
-       "146                                                         I00050   \n",
-       "147                                                         I00063   \n",
-       "148                                                         I00010   \n",
-       "149                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "150                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "151                                                         I00044   \n",
-       "152                                                         I00015   \n",
-       "153                                                         I00015   \n",
-       "154                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "155                                                         I00022   \n",
-       "156                                                         I00051   \n",
-       "157                                                         I00015   \n",
-       "158                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "159                                                         I00032   \n",
-       "160                                                         I00017   \n",
-       "161                                                         I00029   \n",
-       "162                                                         I00047   \n",
-       "163                                                         I00047   \n",
-       "164                                                         I00049   \n",
-       "165                                                         I00053   \n",
-       "166                                                         I00053   \n",
-       "167                                                         I00063   \n",
-       "168                                                         I00029   \n",
-       "169                                                         I00047   \n",
-       "170                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "171                                                         I00034   \n",
-       "172                                                         I00034   \n",
-       "173                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "174                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "175                                                         I00053   \n",
-       "176                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "177                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "178                                                         I00033   \n",
-       "179                                                         I00034   \n",
-       "180                                                         I00042   \n",
-       "181                                                         I00044   \n",
-       "182                                                         I00047   \n",
-       "183                                                         I00053   \n",
-       "184                                                         I00056   \n",
-       "185                                                         I00056   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "    technique_id  \n",
-       "0          T0018  \n",
-       "1          T0018  \n",
-       "2          T0018  \n",
-       "3          T0017  \n",
-       "4          T0019  \n",
-       "5          T0019  \n",
-       "6          T0019  \n",
-       "7          T0019  \n",
-       "8          T0019  \n",
-       "9          T0019  \n",
-       "10         T0019  \n",
-       "11         T0019  \n",
-       "12         T0019  \n",
-       "13         T0019  \n",
-       "14         T0019  \n",
-       "15         T0019  \n",
-       "16         T0056  \n",
-       "17         T0056  \n",
-       "18         T0056  \n",
-       "19         T0056  \n",
-       "20         T0056  \n",
-       "21         T0056  \n",
-       "22         T0056  \n",
-       "23         T0056  \n",
-       "24         T0056  \n",
-       "25         T0056  \n",
-       "26         T0056  \n",
-       "27         T0056  \n",
-       "28         T0056  \n",
-       "29         T0046  \n",
-       "30         T0046  \n",
-       "31         T0046  \n",
-       "32         T0046  \n",
-       "33         T0046  \n",
-       "34         T0046  \n",
-       "35         T0046  \n",
-       "36         T0046  \n",
-       "37         T0046  \n",
-       "38         T0046  \n",
-       "39         T0046  \n",
-       "40         T0046  \n",
-       "41         T0058  \n",
-       "42         T0058  \n",
-       "43         T0058  \n",
-       "44         T0054  \n",
-       "45         T0054  \n",
-       "46         T0054  \n",
-       "47         T0054  \n",
-       "48         T0054  \n",
-       "49         T0054  \n",
-       "50         T0054  \n",
-       "51         T0054  \n",
-       "52         T0054  \n",
-       "53         T0054  \n",
-       "54         T0054  \n",
-       "55         T0054  \n",
-       "56         T0054  \n",
-       "57         T0054  \n",
-       "58         T0054  \n",
-       "59         T0053  \n",
-       "60         T0053  \n",
-       "61         T0053  \n",
-       "62         T0053  \n",
-       "63         T0053  \n",
-       "64         T0053  \n",
-       "65         T0053  \n",
-       "66         T0053  \n",
-       "67         T0053  \n",
-       "68         T0053  \n",
-       "69         T0053  \n",
-       "70         T0053  \n",
-       "71         T0053  \n",
-       "72         T0053  \n",
-       "73         T0007  \n",
-       "74         T0007  \n",
-       "75         T0007  \n",
-       "76         T0007  \n",
-       "77         T0007  \n",
-       "78         T0007  \n",
-       "79         T0007  \n",
-       "80         T0007  \n",
-       "81         T0057  \n",
-       "82         T0057  \n",
-       "83         T0057  \n",
-       "84         T0057  \n",
-       "85         T0057  \n",
-       "86         T0029  \n",
-       "87         T0029  \n",
-       "88         T0010  \n",
-       "89         T0010  \n",
-       "90         T0010  \n",
-       "91         T0010  \n",
-       "92         T0010  \n",
-       "93         T0010  \n",
-       "94         T0010  \n",
-       "95         T0010  \n",
-       "96         T0010  \n",
-       "97         T0010  \n",
-       "98         T0010  \n",
-       "99         T0031  \n",
-       "100        T0031  \n",
-       "101        T0031  \n",
-       "102        T0031  \n",
-       "103        T0031  \n",
-       "104        T0031  \n",
-       "105        T0031  \n",
-       "106        T0031  \n",
-       "107        T0031  \n",
-       "108        T0031  \n",
-       "109        T0032  \n",
-       "110        T0032  \n",
-       "111        T0032  \n",
-       "112        T0032  \n",
-       "113        T0032  \n",
-       "114        T0032  \n",
-       "115        T0032  \n",
-       "116        T0032  \n",
-       "117        T0032  \n",
-       "118        T0032  \n",
-       "119        T0034  \n",
-       "120        T0034  \n",
-       "121        T0034  \n",
-       "122        T0035  \n",
-       "123        T0035  \n",
-       "124        T0035  \n",
-       "125        T0036  \n",
-       "126        T0036  \n",
-       "127        T0036  \n",
-       "128        T0021  \n",
-       "129        T0021  \n",
-       "130        T0021  \n",
-       "131        T0021  \n",
-       "132        T0030  \n",
-       "133        T0030  \n",
-       "134        T0043  \n",
-       "135        T0024  \n",
-       "136        T0024  \n",
-       "137        T0015  \n",
-       "138        T0055  \n",
-       "139        T0039  \n",
-       "140        T0039  \n",
-       "141        T0039  \n",
-       "142        T0045  \n",
-       "143        T0052  \n",
-       "144        T0052  \n",
-       "145        T0052  \n",
-       "146        T0052  \n",
-       "147        T0052  \n",
-       "148        T0020  \n",
-       "149        T0020  \n",
-       "150        T0020  \n",
-       "151        T0020  \n",
-       "152        T0025  \n",
-       "153        T0025  \n",
-       "154        T0025  \n",
-       "155        T0025  \n",
-       "156        T0025  \n",
-       "157        T0044  \n",
-       "158        T0033  \n",
-       "159        T0033  \n",
-       "160        T0016  \n",
-       "161        T0001  \n",
-       "162        T0001  \n",
-       "163        T0001  \n",
-       "164        T0001  \n",
-       "165        T0001  \n",
-       "166        T0001  \n",
-       "167        T0001  \n",
-       "168        T0040  \n",
-       "169        T0040  \n",
-       "170        T0049  \n",
-       "171        T0049  \n",
-       "172        T0049  \n",
-       "173        T0051  \n",
-       "174        T0050  \n",
-       "175        T0050  \n",
-       "176        T0047  \n",
-       "177        T0048  \n",
-       "178        T0002  \n",
-       "179        T0002  \n",
-       "180        T0011  \n",
-       "181        T0009  \n",
-       "182        T0023  \n",
-       "183        T0023  \n",
-       "184        T0022  \n",
-       "185        T0008  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 22,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "it = vars(amitt)['it'][['amitt_id', 'name', 'summary', 'amitt_id_incident', 'amitt_id_technique']].copy()\n",
-    "it.rename(columns={'amitt_id_incident':'incident_id', \n",
-    "                  'amitt_id_technique': 'technique_id'}, inplace=True)\n",
-    "it"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 23,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/plain": [
-       "incident    44\n",
-       "campaign    16\n",
-       "apt          2\n",
-       "tactic       1\n",
-       "Name: objecttype, dtype: int64"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 23,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "dii = vars(amitt)['df_incidents']\n",
-    "dii['objecttype'].value_counts()"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 24,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>amitt_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>objecttype</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>year_started</th>\n",
-       "      <th>attributions_seen</th>\n",
-       "      <th>found_in_country</th>\n",
-       "      <th>urls</th>\n",
-       "      <th>notes</th>\n",
-       "      <th>when_added</th>\n",
-       "      <th>found_via</th>\n",
-       "      <th>longname</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>30</th>\n",
-       "      <td>I00031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>antivax</td>\n",
-       "      <td>apt</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>2018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Russia</td>\n",
-       "      <td>World</td>\n",
-       "      <td>https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>2019-02-24</td>\n",
-       "      <td>OII</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00031 - antivax</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>32</th>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China 50cent Army</td>\n",
-       "      <td>apt</td>\n",
-       "      <td>50cent Army is a CCP “tool” - “massive secret ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2014</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China</td>\n",
-       "      <td>China</td>\n",
-       "      <td>https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/ho...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>campaign (multiple incidents, e.g. Shanshan ri...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2019-02-24</td>\n",
-       "      <td>OII</td>\n",
-       "      <td>I00033 - China 50cent Army</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "   amitt_id               name objecttype  \\\n",
-       "30   I00031            antivax        apt   \n",
-       "32   I00033  China 50cent Army        apt   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                              summary  year_started  \\\n",
-       "30                                                             2018   \n",
-       "32  50cent Army is a CCP “tool” - “massive secret ...          2014   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "   attributions_seen found_in_country  \\\n",
-       "30            Russia            World   \n",
-       "32             China            China   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                                 urls  \\\n",
-       "30  https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2...   \n",
-       "32  https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/ho...   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                                notes  when_added found_via  \\\n",
-       "30                                                     2019-02-24       OII   \n",
-       "32  campaign (multiple incidents, e.g. Shanshan ri...  2019-02-24       OII   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                      longname  \n",
-       "30            I00031 - antivax  \n",
-       "32  I00033 - China 50cent Army  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 24,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "dii[dii['objecttype'] == 'apt']"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 25,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>amitt_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>tactic_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>longname</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Nimmo's \"4Ds of propaganda\": dismiss, distort,...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, disma...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Facilitate State Propaganda</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0003</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Leverage Existing Narratives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0004</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Competing Narratives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Advance competing narratives connected to same...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0004 - Competing Narratives</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Center of Gravity Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Recon/research to identify \"the source of powe...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0005 - Center of Gravity Analysis</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create Master Narratives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>The promotion of beneficial master narratives ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0006 - Create Master Narratives</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create key social engineering assets needed to...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pa...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake or imposter news sites</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Modern computational propaganda makes use of a...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake experts</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Stories planted or promoted in computational p...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0009 - Create fake experts</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>9</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>10</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0011</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Hijack legitimate account</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Hack or take over legimate accounts to distrib...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0011 - Hijack legitimate account</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>11</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0012</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use concealment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use anonymous social media profiles. Examples ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0012 - Use concealment</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>12</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0013</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake websites</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create media assets to support fake organizati...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0013 - Create fake websites</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>13</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0014</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create funding campaigns</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate revenue through online funding campai...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0014 - Create funding campaigns</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>14</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create hashtag</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Many incident-based campaigns will create a ha...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0015 - Create hashtag</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>15</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0016</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Clickbait</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0016 - Clickbait</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>16</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Promote online funding</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive traffic/engagement to funding campaign s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0017 - Promote online funding</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>17</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Paid targeted ads</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create or fund advertisements targeted at spec...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018 - Paid targeted ads</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>18</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagemen...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0019 - Generate information pollution</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>19</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Trial content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Iteratively test incident performance (message...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0020 - Trial content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>20</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Memes are one of the most important single art...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0021 - Memes</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>21</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Conspiracy narratives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>\"Conspiracy narratives appeal to the human des...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0022 - Conspiracy narratives</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>22</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0023</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Distort facts</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0023 - Distort facts</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>23</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0024</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake videos and images</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake videos and/or images by manipulati...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0024 - Create fake videos and images</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>24</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Leak altered documents</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then a...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025 - Leak altered documents</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>25</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0026</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake research</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake academic research. Example: fake s...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0026 - Create fake research</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>26</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0027</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Adapt existing narratives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Adapting existing narratives to current operat...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0027 - Adapt existing narratives</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>27</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0028</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create competing narratives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Misinformation promotes an agenda by advancing...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0028 - Create competing narratives</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>28</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Manipulate online polls</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create fake online polls, or manipulate existi...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0029 - Manipulate online polls</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>29</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0030</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Backstop personas</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relatio...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0030 - Backstop personas</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>30</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>YouTube</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use YouTube as a narrative dissemination channel</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0031 - YouTube</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>31</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Reddit</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use Reddit as a narrative dissemination channel</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0032 - Reddit</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>32</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Instagram</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use Instagram as a narrative dissemination cha...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0033 - Instagram</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>33</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034</td>\n",
-       "      <td>LinkedIn</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use LinkedIn as a narrative dissemination channel</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0034 - LinkedIn</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>34</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Pinterest</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use Pinterest as a narrative dissemination cha...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0035 - Pinterest</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>35</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036</td>\n",
-       "      <td>WhatsApp</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use WhatsApp as a narrative dissemination channel</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0036 - WhatsApp</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>36</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0037</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Facebook</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use Facebook as a narrative dissemination channel</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0037 - Facebook</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>37</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0038</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use Twitter as a narrative dissemination channel</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0038 - Twitter</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>38</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Bait legitimate influencers</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Credibility in a social media environment is o...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>39</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0040</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Demand unsurmountable proof</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Campaigns often leverage tactical and informat...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0040 - Demand unsurmountable proof</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>40</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0041</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Deny involvement</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Without \"smoking gun\" proof (and even with pro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0041 - Deny involvement</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>41</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0042</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kernel of Truth</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Wrap lies or altered context/facts around trut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0042 - Kernel of Truth</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>42</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0043</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Direct messaging via encypted app is an increa...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>43</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0044</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Seed distortions</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Try a wide variety of messages in the early ho...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0044 - Seed distortions</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>44</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0045</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use fake experts</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0045 - Use fake experts</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>45</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Red...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0046 - Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>46</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0047</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Muzzle social media as a political force</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use political influence or the power of state ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>47</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0048</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cow online opinion leaders</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Intimidate, coerce, threaten critics/dissident...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>48</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Flooding</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0049 - Flooding</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>49</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0050</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Cheerleading domestic social media ops</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Deploy state-coordinated social media commente...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>50</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0051</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Fabricate social media comment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use government-paid social media commenters, a...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0051 - Fabricate social media comment</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>51</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Tertiary sites amplify news</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create content/news/opinion web-sites to cross...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>52</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipu...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>53</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0054 - Twitter bots amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>54</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0055</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use hashtag</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Use a dedicated hashtag for the incident - eit...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0055 - Use hashtag</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>55</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Output information pollution (e.g. articles on...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate informa...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>56</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Organise remote rallies and events</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Coordinate and promote real-world events acros...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>57</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Make incident content visible for a long time,...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0058 - Legacy web content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>58</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0059</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Play the long game</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Play the long game can mean a couple of things...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0059 - Play the long game</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>59</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0060</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Continue to amplify</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>continue narrative or message amplification af...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0060 - Continue to amplify</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>60</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0061</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Sell merchandising</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Sell hats, t-shirts, flags and other branded c...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0061 - Sell merchandising</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>61</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0062</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Behaviour changes</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from mi...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0062 - Behaviour changes</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>62</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0063</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Message reach</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinfor...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0063 - Message reach</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>63</th>\n",
-       "      <td>T0064</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Social media engagement</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Monitor and evaluate social media engagement i...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0064 - Social media engagement</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "   amitt_id                                               name tactic_id  \\\n",
-       "0     T0001   5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)      TA01   \n",
-       "1     T0002                        Facilitate State Propaganda      TA01   \n",
-       "2     T0003                       Leverage Existing Narratives      TA01   \n",
-       "3     T0004                               Competing Narratives      TA01   \n",
-       "4     T0005                         Center of Gravity Analysis      TA02   \n",
-       "5     T0006                           Create Master Narratives      TA02   \n",
-       "6     T0007  Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...      TA03   \n",
-       "7     T0008                 Create fake or imposter news sites      TA03   \n",
-       "8     T0009                                Create fake experts      TA03   \n",
-       "9     T0010                          Cultivate ignorant agents      TA04   \n",
-       "10    T0011                          Hijack legitimate account      TA04   \n",
-       "11    T0012                                    Use concealment      TA04   \n",
-       "12    T0013                               Create fake websites      TA04   \n",
-       "13    T0014                           Create funding campaigns      TA04   \n",
-       "14    T0015                                     Create hashtag      TA04   \n",
-       "15    T0016                                          Clickbait      TA05   \n",
-       "16    T0017                             Promote online funding      TA05   \n",
-       "17    T0018                                  Paid targeted ads      TA05   \n",
-       "18    T0019                     Generate information pollution      TA06   \n",
-       "19    T0020                                      Trial content      TA06   \n",
-       "20    T0021                                              Memes      TA06   \n",
-       "21    T0022                              Conspiracy narratives      TA06   \n",
-       "22    T0023                                      Distort facts      TA06   \n",
-       "23    T0024                      Create fake videos and images      TA06   \n",
-       "24    T0025                             Leak altered documents      TA06   \n",
-       "25    T0026                               Create fake research      TA06   \n",
-       "26    T0027                          Adapt existing narratives      TA06   \n",
-       "27    T0028                        Create competing narratives      TA06   \n",
-       "28    T0029                            Manipulate online polls      TA07   \n",
-       "29    T0030                                  Backstop personas      TA07   \n",
-       "30    T0031                                            YouTube      TA07   \n",
-       "31    T0032                                             Reddit      TA07   \n",
-       "32    T0033                                          Instagram      TA07   \n",
-       "33    T0034                                           LinkedIn      TA07   \n",
-       "34    T0035                                          Pinterest      TA07   \n",
-       "35    T0036                                           WhatsApp      TA07   \n",
-       "36    T0037                                           Facebook      TA07   \n",
-       "37    T0038                                            Twitter      TA07   \n",
-       "38    T0039                        Bait legitimate influencers      TA08   \n",
-       "39    T0040                        Demand unsurmountable proof      TA08   \n",
-       "40    T0041                                   Deny involvement      TA08   \n",
-       "41    T0042                                    Kernel of Truth      TA08   \n",
-       "42    T0043                       Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps      TA08   \n",
-       "43    T0044                                   Seed distortions      TA08   \n",
-       "44    T0045                                   Use fake experts      TA08   \n",
-       "45    T0046                         Search Engine Optimization      TA08   \n",
-       "46    T0047           Muzzle social media as a political force      TA09   \n",
-       "47    T0048                         Cow online opinion leaders      TA09   \n",
-       "48    T0049                                           Flooding      TA09   \n",
-       "49    T0050             Cheerleading domestic social media ops      TA09   \n",
-       "50    T0051                     Fabricate social media comment      TA09   \n",
-       "51    T0052                        Tertiary sites amplify news      TA09   \n",
-       "52    T0053              Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate      TA09   \n",
-       "53    T0054                               Twitter bots amplify      TA09   \n",
-       "54    T0055                                        Use hashtag      TA09   \n",
-       "55    T0056  Dedicated channels disseminate information pol...      TA09   \n",
-       "56    T0057                 Organise remote rallies and events      TA10   \n",
-       "57    T0058                                 Legacy web content      TA11   \n",
-       "58    T0059                                 Play the long game      TA11   \n",
-       "59    T0060                                Continue to amplify      TA11   \n",
-       "60    T0061                                 Sell merchandising      TA10   \n",
-       "61    T0062                                  Behaviour changes      TA12   \n",
-       "62    T0063                                      Message reach      TA12   \n",
-       "63    T0064                            Social media engagement      TA12   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                              summary  \\\n",
-       "0   Nimmo's \"4Ds of propaganda\": dismiss, distort,...   \n",
-       "1   Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. ...   \n",
-       "2   Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where ...   \n",
-       "3   Advance competing narratives connected to same...   \n",
-       "4   Recon/research to identify \"the source of powe...   \n",
-       "5   The promotion of beneficial master narratives ...   \n",
-       "6   Create key social engineering assets needed to...   \n",
-       "7   Modern computational propaganda makes use of a...   \n",
-       "8   Stories planted or promoted in computational p...   \n",
-       "9   Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals...   \n",
-       "10  Hack or take over legimate accounts to distrib...   \n",
-       "11  Use anonymous social media profiles. Examples ...   \n",
-       "12  Create media assets to support fake organizati...   \n",
-       "13  Generate revenue through online funding campai...   \n",
-       "14  Many incident-based campaigns will create a ha...   \n",
-       "15  Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, ...   \n",
-       "16  Drive traffic/engagement to funding campaign s...   \n",
-       "17  Create or fund advertisements targeted at spec...   \n",
-       "18  Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagemen...   \n",
-       "19  Iteratively test incident performance (message...   \n",
-       "20  Memes are one of the most important single art...   \n",
-       "21  \"Conspiracy narratives appeal to the human des...   \n",
-       "22  Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to...   \n",
-       "23  Create fake videos and/or images by manipulati...   \n",
-       "24  Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then a...   \n",
-       "25  Create fake academic research. Example: fake s...   \n",
-       "26  Adapting existing narratives to current operat...   \n",
-       "27  Misinformation promotes an agenda by advancing...   \n",
-       "28  Create fake online polls, or manipulate existi...   \n",
-       "29  Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relatio...   \n",
-       "30   Use YouTube as a narrative dissemination channel   \n",
-       "31    Use Reddit as a narrative dissemination channel   \n",
-       "32  Use Instagram as a narrative dissemination cha...   \n",
-       "33  Use LinkedIn as a narrative dissemination channel   \n",
-       "34  Use Pinterest as a narrative dissemination cha...   \n",
-       "35  Use WhatsApp as a narrative dissemination channel   \n",
-       "36  Use Facebook as a narrative dissemination channel   \n",
-       "37   Use Twitter as a narrative dissemination channel   \n",
-       "38  Credibility in a social media environment is o...   \n",
-       "39  Campaigns often leverage tactical and informat...   \n",
-       "40  Without \"smoking gun\" proof (and even with pro...   \n",
-       "41  Wrap lies or altered context/facts around trut...   \n",
-       "42  Direct messaging via encypted app is an increa...   \n",
-       "43  Try a wide variety of messages in the early ho...   \n",
-       "44  Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009...   \n",
-       "45  Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Red...   \n",
-       "46  Use political influence or the power of state ...   \n",
-       "47  Intimidate, coerce, threaten critics/dissident...   \n",
-       "48  Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels ...   \n",
-       "49  Deploy state-coordinated social media commente...   \n",
-       "50  Use government-paid social media commenters, a...   \n",
-       "51  Create content/news/opinion web-sites to cross...   \n",
-       "52  Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipu...   \n",
-       "53  Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm...   \n",
-       "54  Use a dedicated hashtag for the incident - eit...   \n",
-       "55  Output information pollution (e.g. articles on...   \n",
-       "56  Coordinate and promote real-world events acros...   \n",
-       "57  Make incident content visible for a long time,...   \n",
-       "58  Play the long game can mean a couple of things...   \n",
-       "59  continue narrative or message amplification af...   \n",
-       "60  Sell hats, t-shirts, flags and other branded c...   \n",
-       "61  Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from mi...   \n",
-       "62  Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinfor...   \n",
-       "63  Monitor and evaluate social media engagement i...   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                             longname  \n",
-       "0   T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, disma...  \n",
-       "1                 T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda  \n",
-       "2                T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives  \n",
-       "3                        T0004 - Competing Narratives  \n",
-       "4                  T0005 - Center of Gravity Analysis  \n",
-       "5                    T0006 - Create Master Narratives  \n",
-       "6   T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pa...  \n",
-       "7          T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites  \n",
-       "8                         T0009 - Create fake experts  \n",
-       "9                   T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents  \n",
-       "10                  T0011 - Hijack legitimate account  \n",
-       "11                            T0012 - Use concealment  \n",
-       "12                       T0013 - Create fake websites  \n",
-       "13                   T0014 - Create funding campaigns  \n",
-       "14                             T0015 - Create hashtag  \n",
-       "15                                  T0016 - Clickbait  \n",
-       "16                     T0017 - Promote online funding  \n",
-       "17                          T0018 - Paid targeted ads  \n",
-       "18             T0019 - Generate information pollution  \n",
-       "19                              T0020 - Trial content  \n",
-       "20                                      T0021 - Memes  \n",
-       "21                      T0022 - Conspiracy narratives  \n",
-       "22                              T0023 - Distort facts  \n",
-       "23              T0024 - Create fake videos and images  \n",
-       "24                     T0025 - Leak altered documents  \n",
-       "25                       T0026 - Create fake research  \n",
-       "26                  T0027 - Adapt existing narratives  \n",
-       "27                T0028 - Create competing narratives  \n",
-       "28                    T0029 - Manipulate online polls  \n",
-       "29                          T0030 - Backstop personas  \n",
-       "30                                    T0031 - YouTube  \n",
-       "31                                     T0032 - Reddit  \n",
-       "32                                  T0033 - Instagram  \n",
-       "33                                   T0034 - LinkedIn  \n",
-       "34                                  T0035 - Pinterest  \n",
-       "35                                   T0036 - WhatsApp  \n",
-       "36                                   T0037 - Facebook  \n",
-       "37                                    T0038 - Twitter  \n",
-       "38                T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers  \n",
-       "39                T0040 - Demand unsurmountable proof  \n",
-       "40                           T0041 - Deny involvement  \n",
-       "41                            T0042 - Kernel of Truth  \n",
-       "42               T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps  \n",
-       "43                           T0044 - Seed distortions  \n",
-       "44                           T0045 - Use fake experts  \n",
-       "45                 T0046 - Search Engine Optimization  \n",
-       "46   T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force  \n",
-       "47                 T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders  \n",
-       "48                                   T0049 - Flooding  \n",
-       "49     T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops  \n",
-       "50             T0051 - Fabricate social media comment  \n",
-       "51                T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news  \n",
-       "52      T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate  \n",
-       "53                       T0054 - Twitter bots amplify  \n",
-       "54                                T0055 - Use hashtag  \n",
-       "55  T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate informa...  \n",
-       "56         T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events  \n",
-       "57                         T0058 - Legacy web content  \n",
-       "58                         T0059 - Play the long game  \n",
-       "59                        T0060 - Continue to amplify  \n",
-       "60                         T0061 - Sell merchandising  \n",
-       "61                          T0062 - Behaviour changes  \n",
-       "62                              T0063 - Message reach  \n",
-       "63                    T0064 - Social media engagement  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 25,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "dii = vars(amitt)['df_techniques']\n",
-    "dii"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 26,
-   "metadata": {
-    "scrolled": true
-   },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/plain": [
-       "[['TA01',\n",
-       "  'TA02',\n",
-       "  'TA03',\n",
-       "  'TA04',\n",
-       "  'TA05',\n",
-       "  'TA06',\n",
-       "  'TA07',\n",
-       "  'TA08',\n",
-       "  'TA09',\n",
-       "  'TA10',\n",
-       "  'TA11',\n",
-       "  'TA12'],\n",
-       " ['T0001',\n",
-       "  'T0005',\n",
-       "  'T0007',\n",
-       "  'T0010',\n",
-       "  'T0016',\n",
-       "  'T0019',\n",
-       "  'T0029',\n",
-       "  'T0039',\n",
-       "  'T0047',\n",
-       "  'T0057',\n",
-       "  'T0058',\n",
-       "  'T0062'],\n",
-       " ['T0002',\n",
-       "  'T0006',\n",
-       "  'T0008',\n",
-       "  'T0011',\n",
-       "  'T0017',\n",
-       "  'T0020',\n",
-       "  'T0030',\n",
-       "  'T0040',\n",
-       "  'T0048',\n",
-       "  'T0061',\n",
-       "  'T0059',\n",
-       "  'T0063'],\n",
-       " ['T0003',\n",
-       "  '',\n",
-       "  'T0009',\n",
-       "  'T0012',\n",
-       "  'T0018',\n",
-       "  'T0021',\n",
-       "  'T0031',\n",
-       "  'T0041',\n",
-       "  'T0049',\n",
-       "  '',\n",
-       "  'T0060',\n",
-       "  'T0064'],\n",
-       " ['T0004',\n",
-       "  '',\n",
-       "  '',\n",
-       "  'T0013',\n",
-       "  '',\n",
-       "  'T0022',\n",
-       "  'T0032',\n",
-       "  'T0042',\n",
-       "  'T0050',\n",
-       "  '',\n",
-       "  '',\n",
-       "  ''],\n",
-       " ['', '', '', 'T0014', '', 'T0023', 'T0033', 'T0043', 'T0051', '', '', ''],\n",
-       " ['', '', '', 'T0015', '', 'T0024', 'T0034', 'T0044', 'T0052', '', '', ''],\n",
-       " ['', '', '', '', '', 'T0025', 'T0035', 'T0045', 'T0053', '', '', ''],\n",
-       " ['', '', '', '', '', 'T0026', 'T0036', 'T0046', 'T0054', '', '', ''],\n",
-       " ['', '', '', '', '', 'T0027', 'T0037', '', 'T0055', '', '', ''],\n",
-       " ['', '', '', '', '', 'T0028', 'T0038', '', 'T0056', '', '', '']]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 26,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "# Generate arrays used to create D3 grids\n",
-    "dflists = dii.groupby('tactic_id')['amitt_id'].apply(list).reset_index()\n",
-    "dfidgrid = pd.DataFrame(dflists['amitt_id'].to_list())\n",
-    "dfgrid = pd.concat([dflists[['tactic_id']], dfidgrid], axis=1).fillna('')\n",
-    "gridarray = [dfgrid[col].to_list() for col in dfgrid.columns]\n",
-    "gridarray"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 50,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/plain": [
-       "{'IT00000001': 'buy FB targeted ads',\n",
-       " 'IT00000010': 'Targeted FB paid ads',\n",
-       " 'IT00000057': 'Targeted FB paid ads',\n",
-       " 'IT00000002': 'Promote \"funding\" campaign',\n",
-       " 'IT00000003': 'create web-site - information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000014': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000031': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (report an unreported false story/event)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000037': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000061': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000082': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000094': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000120': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000137': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000146': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000156': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000180': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000004': 'create web-site - information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000015': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000032': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (report an unreported false story/event)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000038': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000062': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000083': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000095': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000121': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000138': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000147': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000157': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution',\n",
-       " 'IT00000162': 'State-run media seeds foreign influence environment',\n",
-       " 'IT00000181': 'RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000005': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000022': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000043': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000071': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000085': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000103': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000125': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000140': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000149': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000161': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000172': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000183': 'SEO optimisation/manipulation (\"key words\")',\n",
-       " 'IT00000006': 'legacy web content',\n",
-       " 'IT00000007': 'hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit TOS',\n",
-       " 'IT00000176': 'legacy web content',\n",
-       " 'IT00000008': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000034': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000041': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000055': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000076': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000079': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000090': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000115': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000118': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000131': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000134': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000144': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000154': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000169': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000177': 'Twitter bots amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000009': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000035': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000042': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000056': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000077': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000080': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000091': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000119': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000132': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000135': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000145': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000155': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000170': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000178': 'Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate',\n",
-       " 'IT00000011': 'Fake FB groups + dark content',\n",
-       " 'IT00000029': 'Fake twitter profiles to amplify',\n",
-       " 'IT00000039': 'FB pages',\n",
-       " 'IT00000045': 'FB pages/groups/profiles',\n",
-       " 'IT00000058': 'Fake FB groups + dark content',\n",
-       " 'IT00000078': 'Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content',\n",
-       " 'IT00000092': 'Fake FB groups/pages/profiles ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000171': 'Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (non-paid advertising)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000012': 'Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies & events?',\n",
-       " 'IT00000059': 'Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies & events',\n",
-       " 'IT00000093': 'Digital to physical \"organize+promote\" rallies & events?',\n",
-       " 'IT00000164': 'Events coordinated and promoted across media platforms',\n",
-       " 'IT00000166': 'Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ie: support for Meng outside courthouse',\n",
-       " 'IT00000013': 'manipulate social media \"online polls\"? ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000060': 'manipulate social media \"online polls\"? ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000016': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots',\n",
-       " 'IT00000033': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (in the case Paul Manafort)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000044': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories; false flags, crisis actors)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000063': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots',\n",
-       " 'IT00000084': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots',\n",
-       " 'IT00000104': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000126': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000139': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Roger Waters; Venessa Beeley...)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000148': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Roger Waters)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000158': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots',\n",
-       " 'IT00000182': 'cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000017': 'YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?',\n",
-       " 'IT00000046': 'YouTube; Reddit',\n",
-       " 'IT00000064': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000087': 'YouTube; Reddit; ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000096': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000122': 'YouTube; Reddit',\n",
-       " 'IT00000142': 'YouTube; Reddit; ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000151': 'YouTube; Reddit; ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000159': 'YouTube; Reddit',\n",
-       " 'IT00000185': 'YouTube; Reddit; ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000018': 'YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?',\n",
-       " 'IT00000047': 'YouTube; Reddit',\n",
-       " 'IT00000065': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000088': 'YouTube; Reddit; ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000097': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000123': 'YouTube; Reddit',\n",
-       " 'IT00000143': 'YouTube; Reddit; ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000152': 'YouTube; Reddit; ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000160': 'YouTube; Reddit',\n",
-       " 'IT00000186': 'YouTube; Reddit; ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000019': 'YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?',\n",
-       " 'IT00000067': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000099': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000020': 'YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?',\n",
-       " 'IT00000068': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000100': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000021': 'YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?',\n",
-       " 'IT00000069': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000101': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000023': 'Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fear, outrage, conspiracy narratives',\n",
-       " 'IT00000072': 'Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fear, outrage, conspiracy narratives',\n",
-       " 'IT00000117': 'memes',\n",
-       " 'IT00000173': 'Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narratives',\n",
-       " 'IT00000024': 'Backstop personas',\n",
-       " 'IT00000074': 'Backstop personas',\n",
-       " 'IT00000025': 'Use SMS/text messages',\n",
-       " 'IT00000026': 'Fake video/images',\n",
-       " 'IT00000116': 'photoshopped/fake images',\n",
-       " 'IT00000027': 'Create and use hashtag',\n",
-       " 'IT00000028': 'Create and use hashtag',\n",
-       " 'IT00000030': 'bait journalists/media/politicians',\n",
-       " 'IT00000049': 'journalist/media baiting',\n",
-       " 'IT00000053': 'journalist/media baiting',\n",
-       " 'IT00000036': 'Using \"expert\"',\n",
-       " 'IT00000040': 'News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000086': 'News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000141': 'News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000150': 'News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mint Press News, globalresearch.ca)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000184': 'News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000048': '4Chan/8Chan - trial content',\n",
-       " 'IT00000070': '4Chan/8Chan - trial content',\n",
-       " 'IT00000102': '4Chan/8Chan - trial content',\n",
-       " 'IT00000124': '4Chan/8Chan - trial content',\n",
-       " 'IT00000050': \"Forge ('release' altered hacked documents)\",\n",
-       " 'IT00000051': 'hack/leak/manipulate/distort',\n",
-       " 'IT00000054': 'hack/leak/manipulate/distort',\n",
-       " 'IT00000075': 'hack/leak/manipulate/distort',\n",
-       " 'IT00000153': 'hack/leak/manipulate/distort',\n",
-       " 'IT00000052': 'Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly',\n",
-       " 'IT00000066': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000098': 'YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000073': 'Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (ie: Denver Guardian; Macedonian teens)',\n",
-       " 'IT00000081': \"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS\",\n",
-       " 'IT00000128': \"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS\",\n",
-       " 'IT00000129': 'Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine for sparking the clashes, saying their \"irrefutable\" evidence would \"soon be made public',\n",
-       " 'IT00000136': \"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS\",\n",
-       " 'IT00000167': 'China also plays victim, innocence, plays by rules, misunderstood narrative',\n",
-       " 'IT00000168': 'Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of applying a double standard, and has decried what he sees as “Western egotism and white supremacy” in the treatment of detained Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou.” ',\n",
-       " 'IT00000179': \"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Putin himself; Embassies & Sports Ministry; TASS\",\n",
-       " 'IT00000089': 'Demand insurmountable proof',\n",
-       " 'IT00000133': 'Demand insurmountable proof',\n",
-       " 'IT00000105': '2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/sponsored astroturfing',\n",
-       " 'IT00000112': 'flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message',\n",
-       " 'IT00000113': 'Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted nearly 40,000 Facebook comments in just eight hours.',\n",
-       " 'IT00000106': 'fabricated social media comment',\n",
-       " 'IT00000107': 'domestic social media influence operations focus primarily on “cheerleading” or presenting or furthering a positive narrative about the Chinese state',\n",
-       " 'IT00000165': 'Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ie: support for Meng outside courthouse',\n",
-       " 'IT00000108': 'cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force',\n",
-       " 'IT00000109': 'cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force',\n",
-       " 'IT00000110': 'facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises',\n",
-       " 'IT00000111': 'Netizens from one of the largest discussion forums in China, known as Diba, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall',\n",
-       " 'IT00000114': '“hack” of Qatar’s official news agency',\n",
-       " 'IT00000127': 'Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and scary) titles',\n",
-       " 'IT00000130': '(Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov suggesting that Ukraine deliberately provoked Russia in hopes of gaining additional support from the United States and Europe.',\n",
-       " 'IT00000163': 'Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese State and Party',\n",
-       " 'IT00000174': 'Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narratives',\n",
-       " 'IT00000175': 'Fake news/synthetic web-sites'}"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 50,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "it.index = it.amitt_id\n",
-    "it[['name']].transpose().to_dict('records')[0]"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": []
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": []
-  }
- ],
- "metadata": {
-  "kernelspec": {
-   "display_name": "Python 3",
-   "language": "python",
-   "name": "python3"
-  },
-  "language_info": {
-   "codemirror_mode": {
-    "name": "ipython",
-    "version": 3
-   },
-   "file_extension": ".py",
-   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
-   "name": "python",
-   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
-   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
-   "version": "3.8.3"
-  }
- },
- "nbformat": 4,
- "nbformat_minor": 4
-}
diff --git a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_generate_github_files-checkpoint.ipynb b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_generate_github_files-checkpoint.ipynb
deleted file mode 100644
index 44d2ab9..0000000
--- a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/AMITT_generate_github_files-checkpoint.ipynb
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,608 +0,0 @@
-{
- "cells": [
-  {
-   "cell_type": "markdown",
-   "metadata": {},
-   "source": [
-    "# Generate AMITT github files\n",
-    "\n",
-    "Generate all the AMITT github files from the AMITT master spreadsheet, being careful to reatin any comments people have made below the \"don't write above this\" line in them. "
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 1,
-   "metadata": {
-    "scrolled": true
-   },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "updated ../amitt_red_framework.md\n",
-      "updated ../amitt_red_framework_clickable.html\n",
-      "updated ../amitt_blue_framework.md\n",
-      "updated ../amitt_blue_framework_clickable.html\n",
-      "Temp: objecttype phase\n",
-      "updated ../phases_index.md\n",
-      "Temp: objecttype tactic\n",
-      "updated ../tactics_index.md\n",
-      "Temp: objecttype technique\n",
-      "updated ../techniques_index.md\n",
-      "Temp: objecttype task\n",
-      "updated ../tasks_index.md\n",
-      "Temp: objecttype incident\n",
-      "updated ../incidents_index.md\n",
-      "Temp: objecttype counter\n",
-      "updated ../counters_index.md\n",
-      "Temp: objecttype metatechnique\n",
-      "updated ../metatechniques_index.md\n",
-      "Temp: objecttype actortype\n",
-      "updated ../actortypes_index.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A001.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A002.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A003.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A004.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A005.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A006.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A007.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A008.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A009.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A010.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A011.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A012.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A013.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A014.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A015.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A016.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A017.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A018.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A019.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A020.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A021.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A022.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A023.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A024.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A025.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A026.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A027.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A028.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A029.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A030.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A031.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A032.md\n",
-      "Updating ../actortypes/A033.md\n",
-      "updated ../responsetype_index.md\n",
-      "updated ../detections_index.md\n",
-      "updated ../tactics_by_responsetype_table.md\n",
-      "updated ../metatechniques_by_responsetype_table.md\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "import pandas as pd\n",
-    "from generate_amitt_ttps import Amitt\n",
-    "amitt = Amitt()\n",
-    "amitt.generate_and_write_datafiles()"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 2,
-   "metadata": {
-    "scrolled": true
-   },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>amitt_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>sector_ids</th>\n",
-       "      <th>framework_ids</th>\n",
-       "      <th>longname</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>data scientist</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Person who can wrangle data, implement machine...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW01, FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A001 - data scientist</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>target</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Person being targeted by disinformation campaign</td>\n",
-       "      <td>S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A002 - target</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A003</td>\n",
-       "      <td>trusted authority</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Influencer</td>\n",
-       "      <td>S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW01, FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A003 - trusted authority</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A004</td>\n",
-       "      <td>activist</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A004 - activist</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A005</td>\n",
-       "      <td>community group</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A005 - community group</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>educator</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A006 - educator</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>factchecker</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Someone with the skills to verify whether info...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>S002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A007 - factchecker</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>library</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A008 - library</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NGO</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A009 - NGO</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>9</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>religious organisation</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A010 - religious organisation</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>10</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A011</td>\n",
-       "      <td>school</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S002</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A011 - school</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>11</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A012</td>\n",
-       "      <td>account owner</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Anyone who owns an account online</td>\n",
-       "      <td>S006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW01\\nFW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A012 - account owner</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>12</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A013</td>\n",
-       "      <td>content creator</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW01\\nFW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A013 - content creator</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>13</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A014</td>\n",
-       "      <td>elves</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A014 - elves</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>14</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A015</td>\n",
-       "      <td>general public</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A015 - general public</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>15</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A016</td>\n",
-       "      <td>influencer</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW01\\nFW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A016 - influencer</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>16</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A017</td>\n",
-       "      <td>coordinating body</td>\n",
-       "      <td>For example the DHS</td>\n",
-       "      <td>S003</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A017 - coordinating body</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>17</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>government</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Government agencies</td>\n",
-       "      <td>S003</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW01\\nFW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A018 - government</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>18</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A019</td>\n",
-       "      <td>military</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S003</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A019 - military</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>19</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A020</td>\n",
-       "      <td>policy maker</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S003</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A020 - policy maker</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>20</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A021</td>\n",
-       "      <td>media organisation</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW01\\nFW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A021 - media organisation</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>21</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A022</td>\n",
-       "      <td>company</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A022 - company</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>22</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A023</td>\n",
-       "      <td>adtech provider</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A023 - adtech provider</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>23</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A024</td>\n",
-       "      <td>developer</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A024 - developer</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>24</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>funding_site_admin</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Funding site admin</td>\n",
-       "      <td>S008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A025 - funding_site_admin</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>25</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A026</td>\n",
-       "      <td>games designer</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW01, FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A026 - games designer</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>26</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A027</td>\n",
-       "      <td>information security</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A027 - information security</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>27</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A028</td>\n",
-       "      <td>platform administrator</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A028 - platform administrator</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>28</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A029</td>\n",
-       "      <td>server admininistrator</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A029 - server admininistrator</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>29</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A030</td>\n",
-       "      <td>platforms</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A030 - platforms</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>30</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A031</td>\n",
-       "      <td>social media platform adminstrator</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Person with the authority to make changes to a...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>S007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A031 - social media platform adminstrator</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>31</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A032</td>\n",
-       "      <td>social media platform outreach</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>S007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A032 - social media platform outreach</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>32</th>\n",
-       "      <td>A033</td>\n",
-       "      <td>social media platform owner</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Person with authority to make changes to a soc...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>S007</td>\n",
-       "      <td>FW02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A033 - social media platform owner</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "   amitt_id                                name  \\\n",
-       "0      A001                     data scientist    \n",
-       "1      A002                              target   \n",
-       "2      A003                  trusted authority    \n",
-       "3      A004                            activist   \n",
-       "4      A005                     community group   \n",
-       "5      A006                            educator   \n",
-       "6      A007                         factchecker   \n",
-       "7      A008                             library   \n",
-       "8      A009                                 NGO   \n",
-       "9      A010             religious organisation    \n",
-       "10     A011                             school    \n",
-       "11     A012                       account owner   \n",
-       "12     A013                    content creator    \n",
-       "13     A014                               elves   \n",
-       "14     A015                      general public   \n",
-       "15     A016                          influencer   \n",
-       "16     A017                   coordinating body   \n",
-       "17     A018                         government    \n",
-       "18     A019                           military    \n",
-       "19     A020                        policy maker   \n",
-       "20     A021                  media organisation   \n",
-       "21     A022                             company   \n",
-       "22     A023                     adtech provider   \n",
-       "23     A024                           developer   \n",
-       "24     A025                  funding_site_admin   \n",
-       "25     A026                      games designer   \n",
-       "26     A027                information security   \n",
-       "27     A028              platform administrator   \n",
-       "28     A029             server admininistrator    \n",
-       "29     A030                          platforms    \n",
-       "30     A031  social media platform adminstrator   \n",
-       "31     A032     social media platform outreach    \n",
-       "32     A033         social media platform owner   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                              summary  \\\n",
-       "0   Person who can wrangle data, implement machine...   \n",
-       "1    Person being targeted by disinformation campaign   \n",
-       "2                                          Influencer   \n",
-       "3                                                       \n",
-       "4                                                       \n",
-       "5                                                       \n",
-       "6   Someone with the skills to verify whether info...   \n",
-       "7                                                       \n",
-       "8                                                       \n",
-       "9                                                       \n",
-       "10                                                      \n",
-       "11                  Anyone who owns an account online   \n",
-       "12                                                      \n",
-       "13                                                      \n",
-       "14                                                      \n",
-       "15                                                      \n",
-       "16                                For example the DHS   \n",
-       "17                                Government agencies   \n",
-       "18                                                      \n",
-       "19                                                      \n",
-       "20                                                      \n",
-       "21                                                      \n",
-       "22                                                      \n",
-       "23                                                      \n",
-       "24                                 Funding site admin   \n",
-       "25                                                      \n",
-       "26                                                      \n",
-       "27                                                      \n",
-       "28                                                      \n",
-       "29                                                      \n",
-       "30  Person with the authority to make changes to a...   \n",
-       "31                                                      \n",
-       "32  Person with authority to make changes to a soc...   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           sector_ids framework_ids  \\\n",
-       "0   S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008...    FW01, FW02   \n",
-       "1   S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008...          FW02   \n",
-       "2   S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008...    FW01, FW02   \n",
-       "3                                                S002          FW02   \n",
-       "4                                                S002          FW02   \n",
-       "5                                                S002          FW02   \n",
-       "6                                                S002          FW02   \n",
-       "7                                                S002          FW02   \n",
-       "8                                                S002          FW02   \n",
-       "9                                                S002          FW02   \n",
-       "10                                               S002          FW02   \n",
-       "11                                               S006    FW01\\nFW02   \n",
-       "12                                               S006    FW01\\nFW02   \n",
-       "13                                               S006          FW02   \n",
-       "14                                               S006          FW02   \n",
-       "15                                               S006    FW01\\nFW02   \n",
-       "16                                               S003          FW02   \n",
-       "17                                               S003    FW01\\nFW02   \n",
-       "18                                               S003          FW02   \n",
-       "19                                               S003          FW02   \n",
-       "20                                               S010    FW01\\nFW02   \n",
-       "21                                               S009          FW02   \n",
-       "22                                               S008          FW02   \n",
-       "23                                               S008          FW02   \n",
-       "24                                               S008          FW02   \n",
-       "25                                               S008    FW01, FW02   \n",
-       "26                                               S008          FW02   \n",
-       "27                                               S008          FW02   \n",
-       "28                                               S008          FW02   \n",
-       "29                                               S007          FW02   \n",
-       "30                                               S007          FW02   \n",
-       "31                                               S007          FW02   \n",
-       "32                                               S007          FW02   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                     longname  \n",
-       "0                      A001 - data scientist   \n",
-       "1                               A002 - target  \n",
-       "2                   A003 - trusted authority   \n",
-       "3                             A004 - activist  \n",
-       "4                      A005 - community group  \n",
-       "5                             A006 - educator  \n",
-       "6                          A007 - factchecker  \n",
-       "7                              A008 - library  \n",
-       "8                                  A009 - NGO  \n",
-       "9              A010 - religious organisation   \n",
-       "10                             A011 - school   \n",
-       "11                       A012 - account owner  \n",
-       "12                    A013 - content creator   \n",
-       "13                               A014 - elves  \n",
-       "14                      A015 - general public  \n",
-       "15                          A016 - influencer  \n",
-       "16                   A017 - coordinating body  \n",
-       "17                         A018 - government   \n",
-       "18                           A019 - military   \n",
-       "19                        A020 - policy maker  \n",
-       "20                  A021 - media organisation  \n",
-       "21                             A022 - company  \n",
-       "22                     A023 - adtech provider  \n",
-       "23                           A024 - developer  \n",
-       "24                  A025 - funding_site_admin  \n",
-       "25                      A026 - games designer  \n",
-       "26                A027 - information security  \n",
-       "27              A028 - platform administrator  \n",
-       "28             A029 - server admininistrator   \n",
-       "29                          A030 - platforms   \n",
-       "30  A031 - social media platform adminstrator  \n",
-       "31     A032 - social media platform outreach   \n",
-       "32         A033 - social media platform owner  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 2,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "amitt.df_actortypes"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": []
-  }
- ],
- "metadata": {
-  "kernelspec": {
-   "display_name": "Python 3",
-   "language": "python",
-   "name": "python3"
-  },
-  "language_info": {
-   "codemirror_mode": {
-    "name": "ipython",
-    "version": 3
-   },
-   "file_extension": ".py",
-   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
-   "name": "python",
-   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
-   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
-   "version": "3.8.3"
-  }
- },
- "nbformat": 4,
- "nbformat_minor": 4
-}
diff --git a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/DISARM_code_testbed-checkpoint.ipynb b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/DISARM_code_testbed-checkpoint.ipynb
deleted file mode 100644
index 22f267a..0000000
--- a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/DISARM_code_testbed-checkpoint.ipynb
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,425 +0,0 @@
-{
- "cells": [
-  {
-   "cell_type": "markdown",
-   "metadata": {},
-   "source": [
-    "# Test area for DISARM code"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 2,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "dict_keys(['df_phases', 'df_frameworks', 'df_techniques', 'df_tasks', 'df_incidents', 'df_counters', 'df_detections', 'df_actortypes', 'df_resources', 'df_responsetypes', 'df_metatechniques', 'it', 'df_tactics', 'df_techniques_per_tactic', 'df_counters_per_tactic', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'counters', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'resources', 'num_tactics', 'cross_counterid_techniqueid', 'cross_counterid_resourceid', 'cross_counterid_actortypeid'])\n"
-     ]
-    },
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>amitt_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>technique_id</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0015</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0043</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>...</th>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>135</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>136</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00220</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>137</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00221</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>138</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00222</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>139</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00223</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "<p>898 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "    amitt_id technique_id\n",
-       "0     C00006        T0007\n",
-       "0     C00006        T0015\n",
-       "0     C00006        T0018\n",
-       "0     C00006        T0043\n",
-       "0     C00006        T0053\n",
-       "..       ...          ...\n",
-       "135   C00219        T0025\n",
-       "136   C00220             \n",
-       "137   C00221             \n",
-       "138   C00222             \n",
-       "139   C00223             \n",
-       "\n",
-       "[898 rows x 2 columns]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 2,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "import pandas as pd\n",
-    "import sqlite3 as sql\n",
-    "from generate_DISARM_pages import Disarm\n",
-    "\n",
-    "\n",
-    "# Generate AMITT datasets\n",
-    "disarm = Disarm()\n",
-    "\n",
-    "# Check which amitt variables we can see from here\n",
-    "print('{}'.format(vars(disarm).keys()))\n",
-    "vars(disarm)['cross_counterid_techniqueid']"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 41,
-   "metadata": {
-    "scrolled": true
-   },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>actor_id</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A033</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A007</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A016</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A006</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00010</td>\n",
-       "      <td>A020</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>...</th>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>135</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>136</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00220</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>137</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00221</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>138</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00222</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>139</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00223</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "<p>166 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "         id actor_id\n",
-       "0    C00006     A033\n",
-       "1    C00008     A007\n",
-       "2    C00009     A016\n",
-       "2    C00009     A006\n",
-       "3    C00010     A020\n",
-       "..      ...      ...\n",
-       "135  C00219         \n",
-       "136  C00220         \n",
-       "137  C00221         \n",
-       "138  C00222         \n",
-       "139  C00223         \n",
-       "\n",
-       "[166 rows x 2 columns]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 41,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "disarm.cross_counterid_actorid"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 3,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>technique_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Weight</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0006</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00008</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0009</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>...</th>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>134</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00216</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>134</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00216</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>135</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0024</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>135</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0026</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>135</th>\n",
-       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "<p>717 rows × 3 columns</p>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "         id technique_id  Weight\n",
-       "1    C00008         TA01       1\n",
-       "1    C00008         TA06       1\n",
-       "1    C00008         TA08       1\n",
-       "1    C00008        T0006       1\n",
-       "1    C00008        T0009       1\n",
-       "..      ...          ...     ...\n",
-       "134  C00216        T0018       1\n",
-       "134  C00216        T0057       1\n",
-       "135  C00219        T0024       1\n",
-       "135  C00219        T0026       1\n",
-       "135  C00219        T0025       1\n",
-       "\n",
-       "[717 rows x 3 columns]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 3,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "ct = disarm.cross_counterid_techniqueid\n",
-    "ct['Weight'] = 1\n",
-    "ct = ct[ct['technique_id'].str.len() > 0]\n",
-    "ct.to_csv('../visualisations/cross_counterid_techniqueid.csv', index=False, header=['Source','Target', 'Weight'])\n",
-    "ct"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": []
-  }
- ],
- "metadata": {
-  "kernelspec": {
-   "display_name": "Python 3",
-   "language": "python",
-   "name": "python3"
-  },
-  "language_info": {
-   "codemirror_mode": {
-    "name": "ipython",
-    "version": 3
-   },
-   "file_extension": ".py",
-   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
-   "name": "python",
-   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
-   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
-   "version": "3.8.3"
-  }
- },
- "nbformat": 4,
- "nbformat_minor": 4
-}
diff --git a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/check_DISARM_excel_changes-checkpoint.ipynb b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/check_DISARM_excel_changes-checkpoint.ipynb
deleted file mode 100644
index 80d4f87..0000000
--- a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/check_DISARM_excel_changes-checkpoint.ipynb
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-{
- "cells": [
-  {
-   "cell_type": "markdown",
-   "metadata": {},
-   "source": [
-    "# fix the problem with excelfile changes\n",
-    "\n",
-    "Background: DISARM's master dataset is in an excelfile. Changes in this dont' show up in github, so it's difficult to tell what's changed between versions.  Code below checks for those differences - use this repeatedly until versions align. "
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "import pandas as pd\n",
-    "import sqlite3 as sql\n",
-    "from generate_DISARM_pages import Disarm\n",
-    "import pandas as pd\n",
-    "import numpy as np\n",
-    "import os\n",
-    "from sklearn.feature_extraction.text import CountVectorizer\n",
-    "pd.set_option('display.max_rows', 1000)\n",
-    "pd.set_option('display.max_colwidth', -1)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "newfile = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
-    "oldfile = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_previous_version.xlsx'\n",
-    "\n",
-    "# Load dfs from file\n",
-    "newdfs = {}\n",
-    "newxlsx = pd.ExcelFile(newfile)\n",
-    "for sheetname in newxlsx.sheet_names:\n",
-    "    newdfs[sheetname] = newxlsx.parse(sheetname)\n",
-    "    newdfs[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "olddfs = {}\n",
-    "oldxlsx = pd.ExcelFile(oldfile)\n",
-    "for sheetname in oldxlsx.sheet_names:\n",
-    "    olddfs[sheetname] = oldxlsx.parse(sheetname)\n",
-    "    olddfs[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)\n",
-    "\n",
-    "addedtables = newdfs.keys() - olddfs.keys()\n",
-    "losttables = olddfs.keys() - newdfs.keys()\n",
-    "if len(addedtables) + len(losttables) > 0:\n",
-    "    print('Table changes: new tables are {}, lost tables are {}'.format(addedtables, losttables))\n",
-    "\n",
-    "def investigate_table(table):\n",
-    "    print('\\n\\nTable {} is changed'.format(table))\n",
-    "    # Column headings\n",
-    "    coldiffs = set(newdfs[table].columns).symmetric_difference(set(olddfs[table].columns))\n",
-    "    if len(coldiffs) > 0:\n",
-    "        print('column differences: {}'.format(coldiffs))\n",
-    "    # length\n",
-    "    if len(newdfs[table]) != len(olddfs[table]):\n",
-    "        print('length differences: new {} old {}'.format(len(newdfs[table]), len(olddfs[table])))\n",
-    "\n",
-    "    # column by column\n",
-    "    for column in newdfs[table].columns:\n",
-    "        coldiffs = newdfs[table][column] != olddfs[table][column]\n",
-    "        if len(newdfs[table][coldiffs]) > 0:\n",
-    "            print('Differences in column {}'.format(column))\n",
-    "    return\n",
-    "\n",
-    "for table in newdfs.keys():\n",
-    "    if newdfs[table].equals(olddfs[table]) == False:\n",
-    "        investigate_table(table)"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "# Look at individual table differences\n",
-    "table = 'countermeasures'\n",
-    "column = 'summary'\n",
-    "coldiffs = newdfs[table][column] != olddfs[table][column]\n",
-    "diffcols = pd.DataFrame()\n",
-    "diffcols['amitt_id'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs]['amitt_id']\n",
-    "diffcols['new'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
-    "diffcols['old'] = olddfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
-    "diffcols[diffcols['old'] != '']"
-   ]
-  }
- ],
- "metadata": {
-  "kernelspec": {
-   "display_name": "Python 3",
-   "language": "python",
-   "name": "python3"
-  },
-  "language_info": {
-   "codemirror_mode": {
-    "name": "ipython",
-    "version": 3
-   },
-   "file_extension": ".py",
-   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
-   "name": "python",
-   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
-   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
-   "version": "3.8.3"
-  }
- },
- "nbformat": 4,
- "nbformat_minor": 4
-}
diff --git a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/check_new_table_updates-checkpoint.ipynb b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/check_new_table_updates-checkpoint.ipynb
index 10fbac0..ce56c98 100644
--- a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/check_new_table_updates-checkpoint.ipynb
+++ b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/check_new_table_updates-checkpoint.ipynb
@@ -9,291 +9,11 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 1,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>Unnamed: 0</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Phase</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Subtechnique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Feedback from EEAS</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Action to Do</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Action Taken</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Where did it come from?</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Where from more info</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>AMITT</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>36</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Prepare</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Activities conducted before execution to impro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>126</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>263</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>7</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Objectives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dismiss</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Discredit Credible Sources</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and d...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>AMITT</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0067 Plan to Discredit Credible Sources</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>...</th>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>272</th>\n",
-       "      <td>184</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>273</th>\n",
-       "      <td>204</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Online Harms</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Actions taken by an influence operation to har...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>274</th>\n",
-       "      <td>221</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Move incident/campaign from online to offline....</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA14</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>275</th>\n",
-       "      <td>235</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA15</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>276</th>\n",
-       "      <td>264</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA16</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "<p>277 rows × 12 columns</p>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "     Unnamed: 0 DISARM Phase                     DISARM Tactic  \\\n",
-       "0             1         Plan                               NaN   \n",
-       "1            36      Prepare                               NaN   \n",
-       "2           126      Execute                               NaN   \n",
-       "3           263       Assess                               NaN   \n",
-       "4             7         Plan                   Plan Objectives   \n",
-       "..          ...          ...                               ...   \n",
-       "272         184      Execute                 Maximize Exposure   \n",
-       "273         204      Execute                Drive Online Harms   \n",
-       "274         221      Execute            Drive Offline Activity   \n",
-       "275         235      Execute  Persist in the Information Space   \n",
-       "276         264       Assess              Assess Effectiveness   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "    DISARM Technique         DISARM Subtechnique  \\\n",
-       "0                NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "1                NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "2                NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "3                NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "4            Dismiss  Discredit Credible Sources   \n",
-       "..               ...                         ...   \n",
-       "272              NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "273              NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "274              NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "275              NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "276              NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           Description DISARM ID  \\\n",
-       "0    Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...       P01   \n",
-       "1    Activities conducted before execution to impro...       P02   \n",
-       "2    Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...       P03   \n",
-       "3    Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...       P04   \n",
-       "4    Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and d...    ST0001   \n",
-       "..                                                 ...       ...   \n",
-       "272  Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...      TA12   \n",
-       "273  Actions taken by an influence operation to har...      TA13   \n",
-       "274  Move incident/campaign from online to offline....      TA14   \n",
-       "275  Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...      TA15   \n",
-       "276                                                NaN      TA16   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "     Feedback from EEAS  Action to Do  Action Taken Where did it come from?  \\\n",
-       "0                   NaN           NaN           NaN                   AMITT   \n",
-       "1                   NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "2                   NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "3                   NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "4                   NaN           NaN           NaN                   AMITT   \n",
-       "..                  ...           ...           ...                     ...   \n",
-       "272                 NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "273                 NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "274                 NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "275                 NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "276                 NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                         Where from more info  \n",
-       "0                                         NaN  \n",
-       "1                                         NaN  \n",
-       "2                                         NaN  \n",
-       "3                                         NaN  \n",
-       "4    T0067 Plan to Discredit Credible Sources  \n",
-       "..                                        ...  \n",
-       "272                                       NaN  \n",
-       "273                                       NaN  \n",
-       "274                                       NaN  \n",
-       "275                                       NaN  \n",
-       "276                                       NaN  \n",
-       "\n",
-       "[277 rows x 12 columns]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 1,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "import pandas as pd\n",
     "\n",
@@ -322,88 +42,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 2,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Phase</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Prepare</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Activities conducted before execution to impro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "  DISARM Phase DISARM Tactic  \\\n",
-       "0         Plan           NaN   \n",
-       "1      Prepare           NaN   \n",
-       "2      Execute           NaN   \n",
-       "3       Assess           NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                         Description DISARM ID  \n",
-       "0  Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...       P01  \n",
-       "1  Activities conducted before execution to impro...       P02  \n",
-       "2  Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...       P03  \n",
-       "3  Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...       P04  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 2,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "phases = df[['DISARM Phase', 'DISARM Tactic', 'Description', 'DISARM ID']]\n",
     "phases = phases[phases['DISARM Tactic'].isnull()]\n",
@@ -412,26 +53,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 3,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 4 and 4\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Assess', 'Execute', 'Plan', 'Prepare'], dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Execute', 'Prepare', 'Plan', 'Assess'], dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: set()\n",
-      "null ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [DISARM Phase, DISARM Tactic, Description, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n",
-      "repeated ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [index, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(phases['DISARM Phase'], df['DISARM Phase'])\n",
     "check_ids(phases)"
@@ -439,196 +63,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 4,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>261</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Strategy</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA01</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>262</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Objectives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>263</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Target Audience Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>264</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Narratives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>The promotion of beneficial master narratives ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>265</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>266</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Establish Social Assets</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Establishing information assets generates mess...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>267</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Establish Legitimacy</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>268</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Microtarget</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>269</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Select Channels and Affordances</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>270</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>271</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Deliver Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content to general public or larger po...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>272</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>273</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Online Harms</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Actions taken by an influence operation to har...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>274</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Move incident/campaign from online to offline....</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA14</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>275</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA15</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>276</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA16</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "                        DISARM Tactic DISARM Technique  \\\n",
-       "261                     Plan Strategy              NaN   \n",
-       "262                   Plan Objectives              NaN   \n",
-       "263          Target Audience Analysis              NaN   \n",
-       "264                Develop Narratives              NaN   \n",
-       "265                   Develop Content              NaN   \n",
-       "266           Establish Social Assets              NaN   \n",
-       "267              Establish Legitimacy              NaN   \n",
-       "268                       Microtarget              NaN   \n",
-       "269   Select Channels and Affordances              NaN   \n",
-       "270              Conduct Pump Priming              NaN   \n",
-       "271                   Deliver Content              NaN   \n",
-       "272                 Maximize Exposure              NaN   \n",
-       "273                Drive Online Harms              NaN   \n",
-       "274            Drive Offline Activity              NaN   \n",
-       "275  Persist in the Information Space              NaN   \n",
-       "276              Assess Effectiveness              NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           Description DISARM ID  \n",
-       "261  Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...      TA01  \n",
-       "262  Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...      TA02  \n",
-       "263  Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...      TA03  \n",
-       "264  The promotion of beneficial master narratives ...      TA04  \n",
-       "265                                                NaN      TA05  \n",
-       "266  Establishing information assets generates mess...      TA06  \n",
-       "267                                                NaN      TA07  \n",
-       "268         Target very specific populations of people      TA08  \n",
-       "269  Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...      TA09  \n",
-       "270  Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...      TA10  \n",
-       "271  Release content to general public or larger po...      TA11  \n",
-       "272  Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...      TA12  \n",
-       "273  Actions taken by an influence operation to har...      TA13  \n",
-       "274  Move incident/campaign from online to offline....      TA14  \n",
-       "275  Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...      TA15  \n",
-       "276                                                NaN      TA16  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 4,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "tactics = df[['DISARM Tactic', 'DISARM Technique', 'Description', 'DISARM ID']]#['DISARM Tactic'].notnull()\n",
     "tactics = tactics[(tactics['DISARM Tactic'].notnull()) & (tactics['DISARM Technique'].isnull())]\n",
@@ -637,41 +74,11 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 5,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 16 and 16\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Drive Online Harms', 'Maximize Exposure', 'Conduct Pump Priming',\n",
-      "       'Deliver Content', 'Persist in the Information Space',\n",
-      "       'Assess Effectiveness', 'Establish Social Assets',\n",
-      "       'Target Audience Analysis', 'Develop Narratives', 'Plan Strategy',\n",
-      "       'Select Channels and Affordances', 'Develop Content', 'Plan Objectives',\n",
-      "       'Microtarget', 'Establish Legitimacy', 'Drive Offline Activity'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Develop Content', 'Establish Social Assets',\n",
-      "       'Select Channels and Affordances', 'Persist in the Information Space',\n",
-      "       'Target Audience Analysis', 'Maximize Exposure', 'Drive Online Harms',\n",
-      "       'Establish Legitimacy', 'Assess Effectiveness',\n",
-      "       'Drive Offline Activity', 'Deliver Content', 'Develop Narratives',\n",
-      "       'Plan Objectives', 'Conduct Pump Priming', 'Microtarget',\n",
-      "       'Plan Strategy'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: set()\n",
-      "null ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [DISARM Tactic, DISARM Technique, Description, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n",
-      "repeated ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [index, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(tactics['DISARM Tactic'], df['DISARM Tactic'])\n",
     "check_ids(tactics)"
@@ -679,154 +86,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 6,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Subtechnique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>164</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Determine Target Audiences</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>165</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Determine Strategic Ends</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>166</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Dismiss</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Push back against criticism by dismissing your...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0003</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>167</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twist the narrative. Take information, or arti...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0004</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>168</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Distract</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Shift attention to a different narrative or ac...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0005</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>...</th>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>256</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Exploit TOS/Content Moderation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0093</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>257</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Play the long game</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1....</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0094</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>258</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Performance</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0095</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>259</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0096</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>260</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0097</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "<p>97 rows × 4 columns</p>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "                               DISARM Technique DISARM Subtechnique  \\\n",
-       "164                  Determine Target Audiences                 NaN   \n",
-       "165                    Determine Strategic Ends                 NaN   \n",
-       "166                                     Dismiss                 NaN   \n",
-       "167                                     Distort                 NaN   \n",
-       "168                                    Distract                 NaN   \n",
-       "..                                          ...                 ...   \n",
-       "256              Exploit TOS/Content Moderation                 NaN   \n",
-       "257                          Play the long game                 NaN   \n",
-       "258                         Measure Performance                 NaN   \n",
-       "259                       Measure Effectiveness                 NaN   \n",
-       "260  Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)                 NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           Description DISARM ID  \n",
-       "164                                                NaN     T0001  \n",
-       "165                                                NaN     T0002  \n",
-       "166  Push back against criticism by dismissing your...     T0003  \n",
-       "167  Twist the narrative. Take information, or arti...     T0004  \n",
-       "168  Shift attention to a different narrative or ac...     T0005  \n",
-       "..                                                 ...       ...  \n",
-       "256                                                NaN     T0093  \n",
-       "257  Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1....     T0094  \n",
-       "258                                                NaN     T0095  \n",
-       "259                                                NaN     T0096  \n",
-       "260                                                NaN     T0097  \n",
-       "\n",
-       "[97 rows x 4 columns]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 6,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "techs = df[['DISARM Technique', 'DISARM Subtechnique', 'Description', 'DISARM ID']]\n",
     "techs = techs[(techs['DISARM Technique'].notnull()) & (techs['DISARM Subtechnique'].isnull())]\n",
@@ -835,124 +97,11 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 7,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 97 and 97\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles',\n",
-      "       'Map Target Audience Information Environment', 'Physical Violence',\n",
-      "       'Direct Users to Alternative Platforms', 'Develop Audio-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Develop Owned Media Assets', 'Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives',\n",
-      "       'Develop Text-based Content', 'Develop Video-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Deliver Ads', 'Leverage Content Farm',\n",
-      "       'Bookmarking and Content Curation', 'Use Search Engine Optimization',\n",
-      "       'Livestream', 'Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis',\n",
-      "       'Recruit bad actors', 'Incentivize Sharing', 'Media Sharing Networks',\n",
-      "       'Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities',\n",
-      "       'Create Inauthentic Accounts', 'Prepare fundraising campaigns', 'Email',\n",
-      "       'Online polls', 'Purchase Targeted Advertisements',\n",
-      "       'Obtain Private Documents', 'Play the long game', 'Build Network',\n",
-      "       ' Social Networks', 'Discussion Forums', 'Divide',\n",
-      "       'Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups',\n",
-      "       'Conduct fundraising', 'Acquire/ recruit Network', 'Cross-Posting',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Existing Narratives', 'Traditional Media',\n",
-      "       'Conceal Operational Activity', 'Create Clickbait',\n",
-      "       'Reuse Existing Content', 'Measure Effectiveness', 'Distort',\n",
-      "       'Conceal Infrastructure', 'Generate information pollution',\n",
-      "       'Develop New Narratives', 'Bait legitimate influencers',\n",
-      "       'Facilitate State Propaganda', 'Post Content', 'Co-opt Trusted Sources',\n",
-      "       'Seed distortions', 'Compromise legitimate accounts',\n",
-      "       'Blogging and Publishing Networks', 'Platform Filtering',\n",
-      "       'Determine Target Audiences', 'Dismiss', 'Consumer Review Networks',\n",
-      "       'Merchandising/ Advertising', 'Develop Image-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities',\n",
-      "       'Flooding the Information Space', 'Distract', 'Measure Performance',\n",
-      "       'Distort facts', 'Use fake experts', 'Comment or Reply on Content',\n",
-      "       'Create fake experts', 'Create personas', 'Seed Kernel of truth',\n",
-      "       'Conceal People', 'Attract Traditional Media',\n",
-      "       'Determine Strategic Ends', 'Create inauthentic websites',\n",
-      "       'Cultivate ignorant agents', 'Create Localized Content',\n",
-      "       'Create hashtags and search artifacts',\n",
-      "       'Censor social media as a political force', 'Dismay',\n",
-      "       'Segment Audiences', 'Establish Inauthentic News Sites',\n",
-      "       'Organize Events', 'Harass', 'Suppress Opposition',\n",
-      "       'Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations',\n",
-      "       'Infiltrate Existing Networks', 'Formal Diplomatic Channels',\n",
-      "       'Chat apps', 'Encourage Attendance at Events',\n",
-      "       'Develop Competing Narratives', 'Employ Commercial Analytic Firms',\n",
-      "       'Degrade Adversary', 'Amplify Existing Narrative',\n",
-      "       'Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)',\n",
-      "       'Exploit TOS/Content Moderation',\n",
-      "       'Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities',\n",
-      "       'Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative',\n",
-      "       'Manipulate Platform Algorithm', 'Trial content',\n",
-      "       'Demand insurmountable proof'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Conceal Operational Activity',\n",
-      "       'Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities',\n",
-      "       'Flooding the Information Space', ' Social Networks',\n",
-      "       'Segment Audiences', 'Conceal People',\n",
-      "       'Map Target Audience Information Environment', 'Conceal Infrastructure',\n",
-      "       'Measure Effectiveness', 'Harass',\n",
-      "       'Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations',\n",
-      "       'Reuse Existing Content', 'Create Inauthentic Accounts',\n",
-      "       'Develop Image-based Content', 'Obtain Private Documents',\n",
-      "       'Co-opt Trusted Sources', 'Recruit bad actors',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles', 'Build Network',\n",
-      "       'Post Content', 'Measure Performance', 'Traditional Media',\n",
-      "       'Cross-Posting', 'Media Sharing Networks', 'Suppress Opposition',\n",
-      "       'Develop Text-based Content', 'Leverage Content Farm',\n",
-      "       'Infiltrate Existing Networks', 'Physical Violence', 'Livestream',\n",
-      "       'Organize Events', 'Establish Inauthentic News Sites', 'Distort facts',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives', 'Develop Audio-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Incentivize Sharing', 'Deliver Ads', 'Generate information pollution',\n",
-      "       'Acquire/ recruit Network', 'Encourage Attendance at Events',\n",
-      "       'Develop Video-based Content', 'Prepare fundraising campaigns',\n",
-      "       'Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)',\n",
-      "       'Exploit TOS/Content Moderation',\n",
-      "       'Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities', 'Chat apps',\n",
-      "       'Discussion Forums', 'Comment or Reply on Content',\n",
-      "       'Merchandising/ Advertising', 'Manipulate Platform Algorithm',\n",
-      "       'Conduct fundraising', 'Create fake experts', 'Dismiss',\n",
-      "       'Create personas', 'Develop Owned Media Assets',\n",
-      "       'Direct Users to Alternative Platforms', 'Create Clickbait',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Existing Narratives', 'Cultivate ignorant agents',\n",
-      "       'Play the long game', 'Develop New Narratives',\n",
-      "       'Use Search Engine Optimization', 'Purchase Targeted Advertisements',\n",
-      "       'Use fake experts', 'Determine Target Audiences',\n",
-      "       'Facilitate State Propaganda', 'Create Localized Content',\n",
-      "       'Attract Traditional Media', 'Trial content',\n",
-      "       'Create inauthentic websites', 'Bait legitimate influencers', 'Divide',\n",
-      "       'Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups',\n",
-      "       'Seed Kernel of truth', 'Censor social media as a political force',\n",
-      "       'Seed distortions', 'Bookmarking and Content Curation',\n",
-      "       'Degrade Adversary', 'Consumer Review Networks', 'Platform Filtering',\n",
-      "       'Create hashtags and search artifacts', 'Develop Competing Narratives',\n",
-      "       'Distort', 'Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities',\n",
-      "       'Amplify Existing Narrative', 'Determine Strategic Ends',\n",
-      "       'Employ Commercial Analytic Firms',\n",
-      "       'Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative', 'Dismay',\n",
-      "       'Formal Diplomatic Channels', 'Blogging and Publishing Networks',\n",
-      "       'Compromise legitimate accounts', 'Distract', 'Online polls', 'Email',\n",
-      "       'Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis',\n",
-      "       'Demand insurmountable proof'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: set()\n",
-      "null ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [DISARM Technique, DISARM Subtechnique, Description, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n",
-      "repeated ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [index, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(techs['DISARM Technique'], df['DISARM Technique'])\n",
     "check_ids(techs)\n",
@@ -961,167 +110,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 19,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Subtechnique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Discredit Credible Sources</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dismiss</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and d...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Monitor Social Media Analytics</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Map Target Audience Information Environment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>An influence operation may use social media an...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0002</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Evaluate Media Surveys</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Map Target Audience Information Environment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>An influence operation may evaluate its own or...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0003</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Map Target Audience Information Environment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>An influence operation may identify trending h...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0004</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Web Traffic Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Map Target Audience Information Environment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>An influence operation may conduct web traffic...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0005</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>...</th>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>159</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Awareness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0156</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>160</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Knowledge</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0157</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>161</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Action/attitude</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0158</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>162</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Message reach</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinfor...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0159</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>163</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Social media engagement</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Monitor and evaluate social media engagement i...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0160</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "<p>160 rows × 4 columns</p>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "                   DISARM Subtechnique  \\\n",
-       "4           Discredit Credible Sources   \n",
-       "5       Monitor Social Media Analytics   \n",
-       "6               Evaluate Media Surveys   \n",
-       "7    Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags   \n",
-       "8         Conduct Web Traffic Analysis   \n",
-       "..                                 ...   \n",
-       "159                          Awareness   \n",
-       "160                          Knowledge   \n",
-       "161                    Action/attitude   \n",
-       "162                      Message reach   \n",
-       "163            Social media engagement   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                DISARM Technique  \\\n",
-       "4                                        Dismiss   \n",
-       "5    Map Target Audience Information Environment   \n",
-       "6    Map Target Audience Information Environment   \n",
-       "7    Map Target Audience Information Environment   \n",
-       "8    Map Target Audience Information Environment   \n",
-       "..                                           ...   \n",
-       "159                        Measure Effectiveness   \n",
-       "160                        Measure Effectiveness   \n",
-       "161                        Measure Effectiveness   \n",
-       "162   Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)   \n",
-       "163   Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           Description DISARM ID  \n",
-       "4    Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and d...    ST0001  \n",
-       "5    An influence operation may use social media an...    ST0002  \n",
-       "6    An influence operation may evaluate its own or...    ST0003  \n",
-       "7    An influence operation may identify trending h...    ST0004  \n",
-       "8    An influence operation may conduct web traffic...    ST0005  \n",
-       "..                                                 ...       ...  \n",
-       "159                                                NaN    ST0156  \n",
-       "160                                                NaN    ST0157  \n",
-       "161                                                NaN    ST0158  \n",
-       "162  Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinfor...    ST0159  \n",
-       "163  Monitor and evaluate social media engagement i...    ST0160  \n",
-       "\n",
-       "[160 rows x 4 columns]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 19,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "subs = df[['DISARM Subtechnique', 'DISARM Technique', 'Description', 'DISARM ID']]\n",
     "subs = subs[subs['DISARM Subtechnique'].notnull()]\n",
@@ -1130,7 +121,7 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 21,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
    "outputs": [],
    "source": [
@@ -1140,50 +131,11 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 9,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 159 and 159\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Conceal Network Identity', 'Co-opt Influencers', 'Newspaper',\n",
-      "       'Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications',\n",
-      "       'Legacy web content', 'Audio sharing', 'Utilize Butterfly Attack',\n",
-      "       'Demographic Segmentation', 'Political Segmentation',\n",
-      "       'Create Organizations',\n",
-      "       ...\n",
-      "       'Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative', 'Hijack existing hashtag',\n",
-      "       'Delete Opposing Content', 'Backstop personas ',\n",
-      "       'Co-Opt Trusted Individuals', 'Post Across Groups',\n",
-      "       'Identify Data Voids', 'Create fake research', 'Content Focused',\n",
-      "       'Share Memes'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object', length=159)\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Conceal Network Identity', 'Co-opt Influencers', 'Newspaper',\n",
-      "       'Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications',\n",
-      "       'Legacy web content', 'Audio sharing', 'Utilize Butterfly Attack',\n",
-      "       'Demographic Segmentation', 'Political Segmentation',\n",
-      "       'Create Organizations',\n",
-      "       ...\n",
-      "       'Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative', 'Hijack existing hashtag',\n",
-      "       'Delete Opposing Content', 'Backstop personas ',\n",
-      "       'Co-Opt Trusted Individuals', 'Post Across Groups',\n",
-      "       'Identify Data Voids', 'Create fake research', 'Content Focused',\n",
-      "       'Share Memes'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object', length=159)\n",
-      "set difference: set()\n",
-      "null ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [DISARM Subtechnique, Description, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n",
-      "repeated ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [index, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(subs['DISARM Subtechnique'], df['DISARM Subtechnique'])\n",
     "check_ids(subs)"
@@ -1198,18 +150,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 25,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "Current keys: dict_keys(['FRAMEWORK_ADMIN_README', 'FRAMEWORK_ADMIN CODES', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'subtechniques', 'frameworks', 'tasks', 'detections', 'countermeasures', 'playbooks', 'responsetypes', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'sectors', 'resources', 'MOE', 'MOP'])\n",
-      "Old keys: dict_keys(['ADMIN_README', 'ADMIN CODES', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'countermeasures', 'frameworks', 'tasks', 'detections', 'playbooks', 'responsetypes', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'actortype_framework', 'actortype_sector', 'sectors', 'resources', 'MOE', 'MOP'])\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'\n",
     "frameworkfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
@@ -1231,272 +174,27 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 11,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>rank</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>longname</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Planung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01 - Plan</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Prepare</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Vorbereitung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Activities conducted before execution to impro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02 - Prepare</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Durchführung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>3</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03 - Execute</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Auswertung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04 - Assess</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "  disarm_id     name       name_DE  rank  \\\n",
-       "0       P01     Plan       Planung     1   \n",
-       "1       P02  Prepare  Vorbereitung     2   \n",
-       "2       P03  Execute  Durchführung     3   \n",
-       "3       P04   Assess    Auswertung     4   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                             summary summary_DE       longname  \n",
-       "0  Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...                P01 - Plan  \n",
-       "1  Activities conducted before execution to impro...             P02 - Prepare  \n",
-       "2  Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...             P03 - Execute  \n",
-       "3  Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...              P04 - Assess  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 11,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "metadata['phases']"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 12,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Phase</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Prepare</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Activities conducted before execution to impro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "  DISARM Phase DISARM Tactic  \\\n",
-       "0         Plan           NaN   \n",
-       "1      Prepare           NaN   \n",
-       "2      Execute           NaN   \n",
-       "3       Assess           NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                         Description DISARM ID  \n",
-       "0  Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...       P01  \n",
-       "1  Activities conducted before execution to impro...       P02  \n",
-       "2  Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...       P03  \n",
-       "3  Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...       P04  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 12,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "phases"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 13,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Phase</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>rank</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>longname</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Auswertung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04 - Assess</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "  DISARM Phase DISARM Tactic  \\\n",
-       "3       Assess           NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                         Description DISARM ID disarm_id  \\\n",
-       "3  Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...       P04       P04   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "     name     name_DE  rank  \\\n",
-       "3  Assess  Auswertung     4   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                             summary summary_DE      longname  \n",
-       "3  Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...             P04 - Assess  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 13,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "# do union of both tables, to get new spreadsheet table\n",
     "check_descriptions(phases, metadata['phases'])"
@@ -1504,465 +202,42 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 14,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 4 and 4\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Assess', 'Execute', 'Plan', 'Prepare'], dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Assess', 'Execute', 'Plan', 'Prepare'], dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: set()\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(metadata['phases']['name'], phases['DISARM Phase'])"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 15,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>phase_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>rank</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>longname</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Objectives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Objective Planning</td>\n",
-       "      <td>objektive Planung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02 - Objective Planning</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Target Audience Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop People</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Menschen entwickeln</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop online and offline users and agents, i...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03 - Develop People</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Narratives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>The promotion of beneficial master narratives ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Networks</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Netzwerke entwickeln</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop online and offline communities and tra...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04 - Develop Networks</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Microtargeting</td>\n",
-       "      <td>individualisierte Wählerwerbung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>6</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05 - Microtargeting</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Establish Social Assets</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Establishing information assets generates mess...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Inhalte entwickeln</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>7</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create and acquire content used in incident</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06 - Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Establish Legitimacy</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Channel Selection</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kanalauswahl</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>8</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07 - Channel Selection</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Microtarget</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Ankurbelung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>9</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08 - Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Select Channels and Affordances</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>10</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content to general public or push to l...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09 - Exposure</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>9</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Move incident into offline world</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10 - Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>10</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Deliver Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content to general public or larger po...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persistence</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11 - Persistence</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>11</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>13</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12 - Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>12</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Online Harms</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Actions taken by an influence operation to har...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>3</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Recon/research to identify \"the source of powe...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13 - Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "                      DISARM Tactic DISARM Technique  \\\n",
-       "1                   Plan Objectives              NaN   \n",
-       "2          Target Audience Analysis              NaN   \n",
-       "3                Develop Narratives              NaN   \n",
-       "4                   Develop Content              NaN   \n",
-       "5           Establish Social Assets              NaN   \n",
-       "6              Establish Legitimacy              NaN   \n",
-       "7                       Microtarget              NaN   \n",
-       "8   Select Channels and Affordances              NaN   \n",
-       "9              Conduct Pump Priming              NaN   \n",
-       "10                  Deliver Content              NaN   \n",
-       "11                Maximize Exposure              NaN   \n",
-       "12               Drive Online Harms              NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                          Description DISARM ID disarm_id  \\\n",
-       "1   Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...      TA02      TA02   \n",
-       "2   Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...      TA03      TA03   \n",
-       "3   The promotion of beneficial master narratives ...      TA04      TA04   \n",
-       "4                                                 NaN      TA05      TA05   \n",
-       "5   Establishing information assets generates mess...      TA06      TA06   \n",
-       "6                                                 NaN      TA07      TA07   \n",
-       "7          Target very specific populations of people      TA08      TA08   \n",
-       "8   Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...      TA09      TA09   \n",
-       "9   Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...      TA10      TA10   \n",
-       "10  Release content to general public or larger po...      TA11      TA11   \n",
-       "11  Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...      TA12      TA12   \n",
-       "12  Actions taken by an influence operation to har...      TA13      TA13   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                  name                          name_DE  \\\n",
-       "1                   Objective Planning                objektive Planung   \n",
-       "2                       Develop People              Menschen entwickeln   \n",
-       "3                     Develop Networks             Netzwerke entwickeln   \n",
-       "4                       Microtargeting  individualisierte Wählerwerbung   \n",
-       "5                      Develop Content               Inhalte entwickeln   \n",
-       "6                    Channel Selection                     Kanalauswahl   \n",
-       "7                         Pump Priming                      Ankurbelung   \n",
-       "8                             Exposure                                    \n",
-       "9               Drive Offline Activity                                    \n",
-       "10                         Persistence                                    \n",
-       "11               Measure Effectiveness                                    \n",
-       "12  Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis                                    \n",
-       "\n",
-       "   phase_id  rank                                            summary  \\\n",
-       "1       P01     2  Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...   \n",
-       "2       P02     4  Develop online and offline users and agents, i...   \n",
-       "3       P02     5  Develop online and offline communities and tra...   \n",
-       "4       P02     6         Target very specific populations of people   \n",
-       "5       P02     7        Create and acquire content used in incident   \n",
-       "6       P02     8  Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...   \n",
-       "7       P03     9  Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...   \n",
-       "8       P03    10  Release content to general public or push to l...   \n",
-       "9       P03    11                   Move incident into offline world   \n",
-       "10      P03    12  Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...   \n",
-       "11      P04    13  Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...   \n",
-       "12      P01     3  Recon/research to identify \"the source of powe...   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "   summary_DE                                   longname  \n",
-       "1                              TA02 - Objective Planning  \n",
-       "2                                  TA03 - Develop People  \n",
-       "3                                TA04 - Develop Networks  \n",
-       "4                                  TA05 - Microtargeting  \n",
-       "5                                 TA06 - Develop Content  \n",
-       "6                               TA07 - Channel Selection  \n",
-       "7                                    TA08 - Pump Priming  \n",
-       "8                                        TA09 - Exposure  \n",
-       "9                          TA10 - Drive Offline Activity  \n",
-       "10                                    TA11 - Persistence  \n",
-       "11                          TA12 - Measure Effectiveness  \n",
-       "12             TA13 - Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 15,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_descriptions(tactics, metadata['tactics'])"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 16,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 13 and 16\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Strategic Planning', 'Persistence', 'Microtargeting',\n",
-      "       'Channel Selection', 'Develop Networks', 'Objective Planning',\n",
-      "       'Measure Effectiveness', 'Exposure',\n",
-      "       'Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis', 'Drive Offline Activity',\n",
-      "       'Pump Priming', 'Develop Content', 'Develop People'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Drive Online Harms', 'Maximize Exposure', 'Conduct Pump Priming',\n",
-      "       'Deliver Content', 'Persist in the Information Space',\n",
-      "       'Assess Effectiveness', 'Establish Social Assets',\n",
-      "       'Target Audience Analysis', 'Develop Narratives', 'Plan Strategy',\n",
-      "       'Select Channels and Affordances', 'Develop Content', 'Plan Objectives',\n",
-      "       'Microtarget', 'Establish Legitimacy', 'Drive Offline Activity'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: {'Develop Networks', 'Channel Selection', 'Pump Priming', 'Measure Effectiveness', 'Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis', 'Exposure', 'Objective Planning', 'Develop People', 'Microtargeting', 'Persistence', 'Strategic Planning'}\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(metadata['tactics']['name'], tactics['DISARM Tactic'])"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 17,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 71 and 97\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Backstop personas', 'Message reach', 'Twitter bots amplify',\n",
-      "       'Demand unsurmountable proof', 'Behaviour changes',\n",
-      "       'Create fake videos and images', 'Play the long game',\n",
-      "       'Purchase advertisements', 'Manipulate online polls',\n",
-      "       'Facilitate State Propaganda', 'Find echo chambers', 'Clickbait',\n",
-      "       'Pinterest', 'Seed distortions', 'Cow online opinion leaders',\n",
-      "       'Segment audiences',\n",
-      "       'Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution',\n",
-      "       'Organise remote rallies and events', 'Prepare fundraising campaigns',\n",
-      "       'Muzzle social media as a political force',\n",
-      "       'Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate',\n",
-      "       'Create pseudoscientific or disingenuous research',\n",
-      "       'Develop Narrative Concepts', 'Cheerleading domestic social media ops',\n",
-      "       '5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Existing Narratives', 'Continue to amplify', 'Reddit',\n",
-      "       'Trial content', 'LinkedIn', 'Leak altered documents',\n",
-      "       'Conspiracy narratives', 'Use hashtag',\n",
-      "       'Generate information pollution', 'Analyze existing communities',\n",
-      "       'Fabricate social media comment', 'Cultivate ignorant agents',\n",
-      "       'YouTube', 'Compromise legitimate account',\n",
-      "       'Create competing narratives', 'Kernel of Truth',\n",
-      "       'Respond to breaking news event', 'Twitter',\n",
-      "       'Plan to discredit credible sources', 'Distort facts',\n",
-      "       'Use physical broadcast capabilities', 'Use fake experts', 'Facebook',\n",
-      "       'Create fake experts', 'Devise Competing Narratives', 'Instagram',\n",
-      "       'Bait legitimate influencers', 'Respond to active crisis',\n",
-      "       'Create hashtags', 'Flooding', 'Legacy web content',\n",
-      "       'Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups',\n",
-      "       'Create fake websites', 'Deny involvement',\n",
-      "       'Tertiary sites amplify news', 'Adapt existing narratives',\n",
-      "       'Search Engine Optimization', 'Degrade adversary', 'Use concealment',\n",
-      "       'Sell merchandising', 'Conduct Fundraising Campaigns',\n",
-      "       'Social media engagement', 'Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps', 'Memes',\n",
-      "       'WhatsApp', 'Create fake or imposter news sites'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles',\n",
-      "       'Map Target Audience Information Environment', 'Physical Violence',\n",
-      "       'Direct Users to Alternative Platforms', 'Develop Audio-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Develop Owned Media Assets', 'Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives',\n",
-      "       'Develop Text-based Content', 'Develop Video-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Deliver Ads', 'Leverage Content Farm',\n",
-      "       'Bookmarking and Content Curation', 'Use Search Engine Optimization',\n",
-      "       'Livestream', 'Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis',\n",
-      "       'Recruit bad actors', 'Incentivize Sharing', 'Media Sharing Networks',\n",
-      "       'Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities',\n",
-      "       'Create Inauthentic Accounts', 'Prepare fundraising campaigns', 'Email',\n",
-      "       'Online polls', 'Purchase Targeted Advertisements',\n",
-      "       'Obtain Private Documents', 'Play the long game', 'Build Network',\n",
-      "       ' Social Networks', 'Discussion Forums', 'Divide',\n",
-      "       'Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups',\n",
-      "       'Conduct fundraising', 'Acquire/ recruit Network', 'Cross-Posting',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Existing Narratives', 'Traditional Media',\n",
-      "       'Conceal Operational Activity', 'Create Clickbait',\n",
-      "       'Reuse Existing Content', 'Measure Effectiveness', 'Distort',\n",
-      "       'Conceal Infrastructure', 'Generate information pollution',\n",
-      "       'Develop New Narratives', 'Bait legitimate influencers',\n",
-      "       'Facilitate State Propaganda', 'Post Content', 'Co-opt Trusted Sources',\n",
-      "       'Seed distortions', 'Compromise legitimate accounts',\n",
-      "       'Blogging and Publishing Networks', 'Platform Filtering',\n",
-      "       'Determine Target Audiences', 'Dismiss', 'Consumer Review Networks',\n",
-      "       'Merchandising/ Advertising', 'Develop Image-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities',\n",
-      "       'Flooding the Information Space', 'Distract', 'Measure Performance',\n",
-      "       'Distort facts', 'Use fake experts', 'Comment or Reply on Content',\n",
-      "       'Create fake experts', 'Create personas', 'Seed Kernel of truth',\n",
-      "       'Conceal People', 'Attract Traditional Media',\n",
-      "       'Determine Strategic Ends', 'Create inauthentic websites',\n",
-      "       'Cultivate ignorant agents', 'Create Localized Content',\n",
-      "       'Create hashtags and search artifacts',\n",
-      "       'Censor social media as a political force', 'Dismay',\n",
-      "       'Segment Audiences', 'Establish Inauthentic News Sites',\n",
-      "       'Organize Events', 'Harass', 'Suppress Opposition',\n",
-      "       'Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations',\n",
-      "       'Infiltrate Existing Networks', 'Formal Diplomatic Channels',\n",
-      "       'Chat apps', 'Encourage Attendance at Events',\n",
-      "       'Develop Competing Narratives', 'Employ Commercial Analytic Firms',\n",
-      "       'Degrade Adversary', 'Amplify Existing Narrative',\n",
-      "       'Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)',\n",
-      "       'Exploit TOS/Content Moderation',\n",
-      "       'Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities',\n",
-      "       'Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative',\n",
-      "       'Manipulate Platform Algorithm', 'Trial content',\n",
-      "       'Demand insurmountable proof'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: {'Degrade adversary', 'Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate', 'Create pseudoscientific or disingenuous research', 'Message reach', 'Develop Narrative Concepts', 'Continue to amplify', 'Behaviour changes', 'Cheerleading domestic social media ops', '5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)', 'Create fake websites', 'Muzzle social media as a political force', 'LinkedIn', 'Deny involvement', 'Conspiracy narratives', 'Organise remote rallies and events', 'Reddit', 'Instagram', 'Demand unsurmountable proof', 'Purchase advertisements', 'Use hashtag', 'Find echo chambers', 'Memes', 'Manipulate online polls', 'Clickbait', 'Pinterest', 'Create fake or imposter news sites', 'Cow online opinion leaders', 'Flooding', 'Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups', 'Tertiary sites amplify news', 'Adapt existing narratives', 'Search Engine Optimization', 'Legacy web content', 'Sell merchandising', 'Create competing narratives', 'Conduct Fundraising Campaigns', 'Social media engagement', 'Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps', 'Fabricate social media comment', 'WhatsApp', 'Use concealment', 'Create hashtags', 'Use physical broadcast capabilities', 'Segment audiences', 'Respond to active crisis', 'Compromise legitimate account', 'Twitter bots amplify', 'Kernel of Truth', 'Analyze existing communities', 'Respond to breaking news event', 'YouTube', 'Twitter', 'Plan to discredit credible sources', 'Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution', 'Facebook', 'Create fake videos and images', 'Leak altered documents', 'Devise Competing Narratives', 'Backstop personas'}\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(metadata['techniques']['name'], techs['DISARM Technique'])"
    ]
@@ -1976,70 +251,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 45,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_y</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_y</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>False</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "  disarm_id  name_changed  summary_changed  name_x  name_y  \\\n",
-       "3       P04         False             True  Assess  Assess   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           summary_x  \\\n",
-       "3  Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           summary_y  \n",
-       "3  Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 45,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "def check_version_descriptions(df1, df2):\n",
     "    merge = df1.merge(df2, on='disarm_id')\n",
@@ -2053,281 +267,18 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 46,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_y</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_y</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>False</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Strategy</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Strategic Planning</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Objectives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Objective Planning</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>False</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Microtarget</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Microtargeting</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>False</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create and acquire content used in incident</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Select Channels and Affordances</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Channel Selection</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Deliver Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content to general public or larger po...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content to general public or push to l...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
-       "      <td>False</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Move incident/campaign from online to offline....</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Move incident into offline world</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Environment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persistence</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>9</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>10</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target Audience Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Recon/research to identify \"the source of powe...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "   disarm_id  name_changed  summary_changed  \\\n",
-       "0       TA01          True            False   \n",
-       "1       TA02          True             True   \n",
-       "2       TA05          True            False   \n",
-       "3       TA06         False             True   \n",
-       "4       TA07          True             True   \n",
-       "5       TA08          True             True   \n",
-       "6       TA09          True             True   \n",
-       "7       TA10         False             True   \n",
-       "8       TA11          True             True   \n",
-       "9       TA12          True             True   \n",
-       "10      TA13          True             True   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                    name_x  \\\n",
-       "0                            Plan Strategy   \n",
-       "1                          Plan Objectives   \n",
-       "2                              Microtarget   \n",
-       "3                          Develop Content   \n",
-       "4          Select Channels and Affordances   \n",
-       "5                     Conduct Pump Priming   \n",
-       "6                          Deliver Content   \n",
-       "7                   Drive Offline Activity   \n",
-       "8   Persist in the Information Environment   \n",
-       "9                     Assess Effectiveness   \n",
-       "10                Target Audience Analysis   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                name_y  \\\n",
-       "0                   Strategic Planning   \n",
-       "1                   Objective Planning   \n",
-       "2                       Microtargeting   \n",
-       "3                      Develop Content   \n",
-       "4                    Channel Selection   \n",
-       "5                         Pump Priming   \n",
-       "6                             Exposure   \n",
-       "7               Drive Offline Activity   \n",
-       "8                          Persistence   \n",
-       "9                Measure Effectiveness   \n",
-       "10  Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                            summary_x  \\\n",
-       "0   Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...   \n",
-       "1   Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...   \n",
-       "2          Target very specific populations of people   \n",
-       "3                                                       \n",
-       "4   Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...   \n",
-       "5   Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...   \n",
-       "6   Release content to general public or larger po...   \n",
-       "7   Move incident/campaign from online to offline....   \n",
-       "8   Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...   \n",
-       "9   Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...   \n",
-       "10  Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                            summary_y  \n",
-       "0   Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...  \n",
-       "1   Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...  \n",
-       "2          Target very specific populations of people  \n",
-       "3         Create and acquire content used in incident  \n",
-       "4   Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...  \n",
-       "5   Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...  \n",
-       "6   Release content to general public or push to l...  \n",
-       "7                    Move incident into offline world  \n",
-       "8   Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...  \n",
-       "9   Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...  \n",
-       "10  Recon/research to identify \"the source of powe...  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 46,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_version_descriptions(metadata['tactics'], oldmeta['tactics'])"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 47,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_y</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_y</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "Empty DataFrame\n",
-       "Columns: [disarm_id, name_changed, summary_changed, name_x, name_y, summary_x, summary_y]\n",
-       "Index: []"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 47,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_version_descriptions(metadata['techniques'], oldmeta['techniques'])"
    ]
diff --git a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/generate_DISARM_pages-checkpoint.ipynb b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/generate_DISARM_pages-checkpoint.ipynb
index 22ee222..49455cf 100644
--- a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/generate_DISARM_pages-checkpoint.ipynb
+++ b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/generate_DISARM_pages-checkpoint.ipynb
@@ -27,6 +27,36 @@
      "name": "stdout",
      "output_type": "stream",
      "text": [
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv ADMIN_DATA_README\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/detections.csv detections\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/actortypes.csv actortypes\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/responsetypes.csv responsetypes\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/phases.csv phases\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroupcounters.csv externalgroupcounters\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/metatechniques.csv metatechniques\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/techniques.csv techniques\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOP.csv MOP\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOE.csv MOE\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/narratives.csv narratives\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/forums.csv forums\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/playbooks.csv playbooks\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/resources.csv resources\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/suggested_externalgroups.csv suggested_externalgroups\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tasks.csv tasks\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidenttechniques.csv incidenttechniques\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/examples.csv examples\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools.csv tools\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/removed_externalgroups.csv removed_externalgroups\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/removed_tools.csv removed_tools\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/frameworks.csv frameworks\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups.csv externalgroups\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/countermeasures.csv countermeasures\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tactics.csv tactics\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/sectors.csv sectors\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidents.csv incidents\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/disarm_red_framework.md\n",
       "updated ../generated_files/disarm_red_framework_clickable.html\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/disarm_blue_framework.md\n",
@@ -35,248 +65,18 @@
       "updated ../generated_pages/phases_index.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype tactic\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/tactics_index.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA01.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA02.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA05.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA06.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA07.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA08.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA09.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA10.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA11.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA12.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA15.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype technique\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/techniques_index.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0002.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0003.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0004.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0007.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0009.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0010.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0011.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0013.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0014.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0015.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0016.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0017.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0018.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0019.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0020.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0022.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0023.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0029.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0040.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0042.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0043.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0044.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0045.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0046.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0047.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0048.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0049.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0057.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0059.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0060.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0061.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype task\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/tasks_index.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype incident\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/incidents_index.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00002.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00005.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00006.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00007.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00009.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00010.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00015.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00017.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00022.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00029.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00032.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00033.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00034.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00042.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00044.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00047.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00049.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00050.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00051.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00053.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00056.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00063.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype counter\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/counters_index.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00006.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00008.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00009.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00010.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00011.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00012.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00013.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00014.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00016.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00017.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00019.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00021.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00022.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00024.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00026.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00027.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00029.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00030.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00031.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00034.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00036.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00040.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00042.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00044.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00046.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00048.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00051.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00052.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00053.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00058.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00059.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00060.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00065.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00066.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00067.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00070.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00071.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00072.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00073.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00074.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00076.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00078.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00080.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00081.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00082.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00084.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00085.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00086.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00087.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00090.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00091.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00092.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00093.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00096.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00097.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00098.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00099.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00101.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00103.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00105.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00106.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00107.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00111.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00112.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00113.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00114.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00115.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00117.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00118.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00119.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00120.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00121.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00122.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00123.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00124.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00125.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00126.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00128.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00129.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00130.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00131.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00133.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00135.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00136.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00138.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00142.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00143.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00147.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00148.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00149.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00153.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00154.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00155.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00156.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00160.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00161.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00162.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00164.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00169.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00172.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00174.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00176.md\n"
-     ]
-    },
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00178.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00182.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00184.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00188.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00189.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00190.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00195.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00197.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00203.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00205.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00207.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00211.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00212.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00216.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype metatechnique\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/metatechniques_index.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M001.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M002.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M003.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M004.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M005.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M006.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M007.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M008.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M009.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M010.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M011.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M012.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M013.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/metatechniques/M014.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype actortype\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/actortypes_index.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A001.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A003.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A004.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A005.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A006.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A007.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A008.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A009.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A010.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A012.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A013.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A014.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A015.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A016.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A017.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A018.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A019.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A020.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A021.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A023.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A024.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A025.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A026.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A027.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A028.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A029.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A031.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A032.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/actortypes/A033.md\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/responsetype_index.md\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/detections_index.md\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/tactics_by_responsetype_table.md\n",
@@ -300,31 +100,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 2,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "'plan-strategy' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'plan-objectives' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'microtarget' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'select-channels-and-affordances' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'conduct-pump-priming' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'deliver-content' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'drive-offline-activity' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'persist-in-the-information-environment' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'assess-effectiveness' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'target-audience-analysis' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'develop-narratives' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'establish-social-assets' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'establish-legitimacy' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'maximize-exposure' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n",
-      "'drive-online-harms' is not a recognized DISARM Tactic.\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "import sys\n",
     "sys.path.insert(0, \"DISARM-STIX2\")\n",
@@ -342,7 +120,7 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 3,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
    "outputs": [],
    "source": [
@@ -361,7 +139,7 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 4,
+   "execution_count": 2,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
@@ -908,7 +686,7 @@
        "32                                                     "
       ]
      },
-     "execution_count": 4,
+     "execution_count": 2,
      "metadata": {},
      "output_type": "execute_result"
     }
diff --git a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/generate_crosstable_csvs-checkpoint.ipynb b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/generate_crosstable_csvs-checkpoint.ipynb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab2148e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/generate_crosstable_csvs-checkpoint.ipynb
@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+{
+ "cells": [
+  {
+   "cell_type": "markdown",
+   "metadata": {},
+   "source": [
+    "# one-shot code to generate crosstable files\n",
+    "\n",
+    "Should only need to use this once. \n",
+    "\n",
+    "Grabbing these objects: \n",
+    "* cross_counterid_techniqueid\n",
+    "* cross_counterid_resourceid\n",
+    "* cross_counterid_actortypeid\n",
+    "* cross_detectionid_techniqueid      \n",
+    "* cross_detectionid_resourceid\n",
+    "* cross_detectionid_actortypeid "
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 1,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [],
+   "source": [
+    "import pandas as pd\n",
+    "from generate_DISARM_pages import Disarm\n",
+    "MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'\n",
+    "\n",
+    "disarm = Disarm()"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 2,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [],
+   "source": [
+    "def grab_crosstable(df, column, outfile):\n",
+    "    df = df[df[column] != '']\n",
+    "    df.to_csv(MASTERDATA_DIR + outfile, index=False)\n",
+    "    return df"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 3,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>technique_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0003</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0006</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0027</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>...</th>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>134</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00216</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>134</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00216</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>135</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0024</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>135</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0026</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>135</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "<p>881 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "    disarm_id technique_id\n",
+       "0      C00022        T0001\n",
+       "0      C00022        T0002\n",
+       "0      C00022        T0003\n",
+       "0      C00022        T0006\n",
+       "0      C00022        T0027\n",
+       "..        ...          ...\n",
+       "134    C00216        T0018\n",
+       "134    C00216        T0057\n",
+       "135    C00219        T0024\n",
+       "135    C00219        T0026\n",
+       "135    C00219        T0025\n",
+       "\n",
+       "[881 rows x 2 columns]"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 3,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_techniqueid, \n",
+    "                'technique_id', 'cross_counter_technique.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 4,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>resource_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>26</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00044</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>59</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00092</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>63</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00097</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>65</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00099</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>67</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00101</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>69</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00105</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R003</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>99</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00142</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>102</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00147</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>103</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00148</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>126</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00195</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R002</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>127</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00197</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R003</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "    disarm_id resource_id\n",
+       "26     C00044        R004\n",
+       "59     C00092        R001\n",
+       "63     C00097        R004\n",
+       "65     C00099        R004\n",
+       "67     C00101        R004\n",
+       "69     C00105        R003\n",
+       "99     C00142        R004\n",
+       "102    C00147        R004\n",
+       "103    C00148        R004\n",
+       "126    C00195        R002\n",
+       "127    C00197        R003"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 4,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_resourceid, \n",
+    "                'resource_id', 'cross_counter_resource.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 5,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>actortype_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00006</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A033</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>2</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00008</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A007</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>3</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00009</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A016</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>3</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00009</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A006</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>4</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00010</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A020</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>...</th>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>132</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00207</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A018</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>132</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00207</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A033</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>133</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00212</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A006</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>133</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00212</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A018</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>134</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00216</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A023</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "<p>79 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "    disarm_id actortype_id\n",
+       "1      C00006         A033\n",
+       "2      C00008         A007\n",
+       "3      C00009         A016\n",
+       "3      C00009         A006\n",
+       "4      C00010         A020\n",
+       "..        ...          ...\n",
+       "132    C00207         A018\n",
+       "132    C00207         A033\n",
+       "133    C00212         A006\n",
+       "133    C00212         A018\n",
+       "134    C00216         A023\n",
+       "\n",
+       "[79 rows x 2 columns]"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 5,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_actortypeid, \n",
+    "                'actortype_id', 'cross_counter_actortype.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 6,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>technique_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00001</td>\n",
+       "      <td>All</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00002</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00002</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00002</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00002</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>...</th>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>82</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00083</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0012</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>82</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00083</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>92</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00093</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0011</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>93</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00094</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0013</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>93</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00094</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0008</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "<p>159 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "   disarm_id technique_id\n",
+       "0     F00001          All\n",
+       "1     F00002        T0049\n",
+       "1     F00002        T0052\n",
+       "1     F00002        T0053\n",
+       "1     F00002        T0054\n",
+       "..       ...          ...\n",
+       "82    F00083        T0012\n",
+       "82    F00083        T0021\n",
+       "92    F00093        T0011\n",
+       "93    F00094        T0013\n",
+       "93    F00094        T0008\n",
+       "\n",
+       "[159 rows x 2 columns]"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 6,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_techniqueid, \n",
+    "                'technique_id', 'cross_detection_technique.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 7,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>resource_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>19</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00020</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>81</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00082</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R005</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>91</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00092</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R006</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "   disarm_id resource_id\n",
+       "19    F00020        R004\n",
+       "81    F00082        R005\n",
+       "91    F00092        R006"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 7,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_resourceid, \n",
+    "                'resource_id', 'cross_detection_resource.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 8,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>actortype_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>19</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00020</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A015</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>19</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00020</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>19</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00020</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A031</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>42</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00043</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A031</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>42</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00043</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A015</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>66</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00067</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>69</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00070</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>70</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00071</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>71</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00072</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>78</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00079</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>79</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00080</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A015</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>81</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00082</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A028</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>90</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00091</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>90</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00091</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A024</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>91</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00092</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A015</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>93</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00094</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A028</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "   disarm_id actortype_id\n",
+       "19    F00020         A015\n",
+       "19    F00020         A001\n",
+       "19    F00020         A031\n",
+       "42    F00043         A031\n",
+       "42    F00043         A015\n",
+       "66    F00067         A001\n",
+       "69    F00070         A001\n",
+       "70    F00071         A001\n",
+       "71    F00072         A001\n",
+       "78    F00079         A001\n",
+       "79    F00080         A015\n",
+       "81    F00082         A028\n",
+       "90    F00091         A001\n",
+       "90    F00091         A024\n",
+       "91    F00092         A015\n",
+       "93    F00094         A028"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 8,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_actortypeid, \n",
+    "                'actortype_id', 'cross_detection_actortype.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": null,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [],
+   "source": []
+  }
+ ],
+ "metadata": {
+  "kernelspec": {
+   "display_name": "Python 3",
+   "language": "python",
+   "name": "python3"
+  },
+  "language_info": {
+   "codemirror_mode": {
+    "name": "ipython",
+    "version": 3
+   },
+   "file_extension": ".py",
+   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
+   "name": "python",
+   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
+   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
+   "version": "3.8.3"
+  }
+ },
+ "nbformat": 4,
+ "nbformat_minor": 4
+}
diff --git a/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles-checkpoint.ipynb b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles-checkpoint.ipynb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fec515
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles-checkpoint.ipynb
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+{
+ "cells": [],
+ "metadata": {},
+ "nbformat": 4,
+ "nbformat_minor": 4
+}
diff --git a/CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_crosstable_csvs.ipynb b/CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_crosstable_csvs.ipynb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab2148e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_crosstable_csvs.ipynb
@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+{
+ "cells": [
+  {
+   "cell_type": "markdown",
+   "metadata": {},
+   "source": [
+    "# one-shot code to generate crosstable files\n",
+    "\n",
+    "Should only need to use this once. \n",
+    "\n",
+    "Grabbing these objects: \n",
+    "* cross_counterid_techniqueid\n",
+    "* cross_counterid_resourceid\n",
+    "* cross_counterid_actortypeid\n",
+    "* cross_detectionid_techniqueid      \n",
+    "* cross_detectionid_resourceid\n",
+    "* cross_detectionid_actortypeid "
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 1,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [],
+   "source": [
+    "import pandas as pd\n",
+    "from generate_DISARM_pages import Disarm\n",
+    "MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'\n",
+    "\n",
+    "disarm = Disarm()"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 2,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [],
+   "source": [
+    "def grab_crosstable(df, column, outfile):\n",
+    "    df = df[df[column] != '']\n",
+    "    df.to_csv(MASTERDATA_DIR + outfile, index=False)\n",
+    "    return df"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 3,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>technique_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0003</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0006</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0027</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>...</th>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>134</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00216</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>134</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00216</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>135</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0024</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>135</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0026</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>135</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00219</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0025</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "<p>881 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "    disarm_id technique_id\n",
+       "0      C00022        T0001\n",
+       "0      C00022        T0002\n",
+       "0      C00022        T0003\n",
+       "0      C00022        T0006\n",
+       "0      C00022        T0027\n",
+       "..        ...          ...\n",
+       "134    C00216        T0018\n",
+       "134    C00216        T0057\n",
+       "135    C00219        T0024\n",
+       "135    C00219        T0026\n",
+       "135    C00219        T0025\n",
+       "\n",
+       "[881 rows x 2 columns]"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 3,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_techniqueid, \n",
+    "                'technique_id', 'cross_counter_technique.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 4,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>resource_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>26</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00044</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>59</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00092</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>63</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00097</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>65</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00099</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>67</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00101</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>69</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00105</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R003</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>99</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00142</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>102</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00147</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>103</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00148</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>126</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00195</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R002</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>127</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00197</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R003</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "    disarm_id resource_id\n",
+       "26     C00044        R004\n",
+       "59     C00092        R001\n",
+       "63     C00097        R004\n",
+       "65     C00099        R004\n",
+       "67     C00101        R004\n",
+       "69     C00105        R003\n",
+       "99     C00142        R004\n",
+       "102    C00147        R004\n",
+       "103    C00148        R004\n",
+       "126    C00195        R002\n",
+       "127    C00197        R003"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 4,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_resourceid, \n",
+    "                'resource_id', 'cross_counter_resource.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 5,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>actortype_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00006</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A033</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>2</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00008</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A007</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>3</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00009</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A016</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>3</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00009</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A006</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>4</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00010</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A020</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>...</th>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>132</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00207</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A018</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>132</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00207</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A033</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>133</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00212</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A006</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>133</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00212</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A018</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>134</th>\n",
+       "      <td>C00216</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A023</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "<p>79 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "    disarm_id actortype_id\n",
+       "1      C00006         A033\n",
+       "2      C00008         A007\n",
+       "3      C00009         A016\n",
+       "3      C00009         A006\n",
+       "4      C00010         A020\n",
+       "..        ...          ...\n",
+       "132    C00207         A018\n",
+       "132    C00207         A033\n",
+       "133    C00212         A006\n",
+       "133    C00212         A018\n",
+       "134    C00216         A023\n",
+       "\n",
+       "[79 rows x 2 columns]"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 5,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_counterid_actortypeid, \n",
+    "                'actortype_id', 'cross_counter_actortype.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 6,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>technique_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00001</td>\n",
+       "      <td>All</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00002</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00002</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0052</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00002</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0053</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00002</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0054</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>...</th>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>...</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>82</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00083</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0012</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>82</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00083</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0021</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>92</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00093</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0011</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>93</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00094</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0013</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>93</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00094</td>\n",
+       "      <td>T0008</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "<p>159 rows × 2 columns</p>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "   disarm_id technique_id\n",
+       "0     F00001          All\n",
+       "1     F00002        T0049\n",
+       "1     F00002        T0052\n",
+       "1     F00002        T0053\n",
+       "1     F00002        T0054\n",
+       "..       ...          ...\n",
+       "82    F00083        T0012\n",
+       "82    F00083        T0021\n",
+       "92    F00093        T0011\n",
+       "93    F00094        T0013\n",
+       "93    F00094        T0008\n",
+       "\n",
+       "[159 rows x 2 columns]"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 6,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_techniqueid, \n",
+    "                'technique_id', 'cross_detection_technique.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 7,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>resource_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>19</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00020</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R004</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>81</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00082</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R005</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>91</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00092</td>\n",
+       "      <td>R006</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "   disarm_id resource_id\n",
+       "19    F00020        R004\n",
+       "81    F00082        R005\n",
+       "91    F00092        R006"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 7,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_resourceid, \n",
+    "                'resource_id', 'cross_detection_resource.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 8,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>actortype_id</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>19</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00020</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A015</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>19</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00020</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>19</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00020</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A031</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>42</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00043</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A031</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>42</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00043</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A015</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>66</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00067</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>69</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00070</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>70</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00071</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>71</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00072</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>78</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00079</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>79</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00080</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A015</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>81</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00082</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A028</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>90</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00091</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A001</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>90</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00091</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A024</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>91</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00092</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A015</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>93</th>\n",
+       "      <td>F00094</td>\n",
+       "      <td>A028</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "   disarm_id actortype_id\n",
+       "19    F00020         A015\n",
+       "19    F00020         A001\n",
+       "19    F00020         A031\n",
+       "42    F00043         A031\n",
+       "42    F00043         A015\n",
+       "66    F00067         A001\n",
+       "69    F00070         A001\n",
+       "70    F00071         A001\n",
+       "71    F00072         A001\n",
+       "78    F00079         A001\n",
+       "79    F00080         A015\n",
+       "81    F00082         A028\n",
+       "90    F00091         A001\n",
+       "90    F00091         A024\n",
+       "91    F00092         A015\n",
+       "93    F00094         A028"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 8,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "grab_crosstable(disarm.cross_detectionid_actortypeid, \n",
+    "                'actortype_id', 'cross_detection_actortype.csv')"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": null,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [],
+   "source": []
+  }
+ ],
+ "metadata": {
+  "kernelspec": {
+   "display_name": "Python 3",
+   "language": "python",
+   "name": "python3"
+  },
+  "language_info": {
+   "codemirror_mode": {
+    "name": "ipython",
+    "version": 3
+   },
+   "file_extension": ".py",
+   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
+   "name": "python",
+   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
+   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
+   "version": "3.8.3"
+  }
+ },
+ "nbformat": 4,
+ "nbformat_minor": 4
+}
diff --git a/CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles.ipynb b/CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles.ipynb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..baca7f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles.ipynb
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+{
+ "cells": [
+  {
+   "cell_type": "markdown",
+   "metadata": {},
+   "source": [
+    "# Generate CSV version of DISARM dataset\n",
+    "\n",
+    "Generate CSV files to match older Excelfile versions of DISARM"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": null,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [],
+   "source": [
+    "\n",
+    "import pandas as pd\n",
+    "import os\n",
+    "\n",
+    "MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'\n",
+    "\n",
+    "    \n",
+    "frameworkfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx' \n",
+    "datafile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
+    "#commentsfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv'\n",
+    "        \n",
+    "# Get basic datasets from files\n",
+    "metadata = {}\n",
+    "for filein in [frameworkfile, datafile]:\n",
+    "    xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(filein)\n",
+    "    for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:\n",
+    "        print('{} sheet {}'.format(filein, sheetname))\n",
+    "        metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)\n",
+    "        metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)\n",
+    "        metadata[sheetname].to_csv(MASTERDATA_DIR + sheetname + '.csv', index=False)\n",
+    "\n",
+    "# create cross tables using DISARM code\n",
+    "def create_cross_table(df, col, newcol, divider=','):\n",
+    "    crosstable = df.join(df[col]\n",
+    "                    .str.split(divider, expand=True).stack()\n",
+    "                    .reset_index(drop=True,level=1)\n",
+    "                    .rename(newcol)).drop(col, axis=1)\n",
+    "    crosstable = crosstable[crosstable[newcol].notnull()]\n",
+    "    crosstable[newcol+'_id'] = crosstable[newcol].str.split(' ').str[0]\n",
+    "    crosstable.drop(newcol, axis=1, inplace=True)\n",
+    "    return crosstable\n",
+    "\n",
+    "def create_incident_technique_crosstable(it_metadata):\n",
+    "    # Generate full cross-table between incidents and techniques\n",
+    "    it = it_metadata\n",
+    "    it.index=it['disarm_id']\n",
+    "    it = it['technique_ids'].str.split(',').apply(lambda x: pd.Series(x)).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True).to_frame('technique_id').reset_index().merge(it.drop('disarm_id', axis=1).reset_index()).drop('technique_ids', axis=1)\n",
+    "    it = it.merge(self.df_incidents[['disarm_id','name']], \n",
+    "                  left_on='incident_id', right_on='disarm_id',\n",
+    "                  suffixes=['','_incident']).drop('incident_id', axis=1)\n",
+    "    it = it.merge(self.df_techniques[['disarm_id','name']], \n",
+    "                  left_on='technique_id', right_on='disarm_id',\n",
+    "                  suffixes=['','_technique']).drop('technique_id', axis=1)\n",
+    "    return(it)\n",
+    "\n",
+    "it = create_incident_technique_crosstable(metadata['incidenttechniques'])\n",
+    "cross_counterid_techniqueid = create_cross_table(df_counters[['disarm_id', 'techniques']], \n",
+    "                                                           'techniques', 'technique', '\\n')        \n",
+    "cross_counterid_resourceid = create_cross_table(df_counters[['disarm_id', 'resources_needed']], \n",
+    "                                                          'resources_needed', 'resource', ',')\n",
+    "cross_counterid_actortypeid = create_cross_table(self.df_counters[['disarm_id', 'actortypes']], \n",
+    "                                                          'actortypes', 'actortype', ',')\n",
+    "cross_detectionid_techniqueid = create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'techniques']], \n",
+    "                                                           'techniques', 'technique', '\\n')        \n",
+    "cross_detectionid_resourceid = create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'resources_needed']], \n",
+    "                                                          'resources_needed', 'resource', ',')\n",
+    "cross_detectionid_actortypeid = create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'actortypes']], \n",
+    "                                                          'actortypes', 'actortype', ',')\n",
+    "\n"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": null,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [],
+   "source": []
+  }
+ ],
+ "metadata": {
+  "kernelspec": {
+   "display_name": "Python 3",
+   "language": "python",
+   "name": "python3"
+  },
+  "language_info": {
+   "codemirror_mode": {
+    "name": "ipython",
+    "version": 3
+   },
+   "file_extension": ".py",
+   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
+   "name": "python",
+   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
+   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
+   "version": "3.8.3"
+  }
+ },
+ "nbformat": 4,
+ "nbformat_minor": 4
+}
diff --git a/CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles.py b/CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc34d93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CODE/ARCHIVED_CODE/generate_csv_versions_of_excelfiles.py
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+
+import pandas as pd
+import os
+
+MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'
+
+    
+frameworkfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx' 
+datafile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx'
+#commentsfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv'
+        
+# Get basic datasets from files
+metadata = {}
+for filein in [frameworkfile, datafile]:
+    xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(filein)
+    for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:
+        print('{} sheet {}'.format(filein, sheetname))
+        metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)
+        metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)
+        metadata[sheetname].to_csv(MASTERDATA_DIR + sheetname + '.csv', index=False)
+
+# Then use existing code to create the crosstable files. 
diff --git a/CODE/__pycache__/generate_DISARM_pages.cpython-38.pyc b/CODE/__pycache__/generate_DISARM_pages.cpython-38.pyc
index 9f62f15..7f6d131 100644
Binary files a/CODE/__pycache__/generate_DISARM_pages.cpython-38.pyc and b/CODE/__pycache__/generate_DISARM_pages.cpython-38.pyc differ
diff --git a/CODE/__pycache__/generate_disarm_sql.cpython-38.pyc b/CODE/__pycache__/generate_disarm_sql.cpython-38.pyc
deleted file mode 100644
index 449e532..0000000
Binary files a/CODE/__pycache__/generate_disarm_sql.cpython-38.pyc and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/CODE/check_new_table_updates.ipynb b/CODE/check_new_table_updates.ipynb
index 10fbac0..21cc319 100644
--- a/CODE/check_new_table_updates.ipynb
+++ b/CODE/check_new_table_updates.ipynb
@@ -9,291 +9,11 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 1,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>Unnamed: 0</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Phase</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Subtechnique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Feedback from EEAS</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Action to Do</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Action Taken</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Where did it come from?</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Where from more info</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>AMITT</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>36</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Prepare</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Activities conducted before execution to impro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>126</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>263</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>7</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Objectives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dismiss</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Discredit Credible Sources</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and d...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0001</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>AMITT</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0067 Plan to Discredit Credible Sources</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>...</th>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>272</th>\n",
-       "      <td>184</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>273</th>\n",
-       "      <td>204</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Online Harms</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Actions taken by an influence operation to har...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>274</th>\n",
-       "      <td>221</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Move incident/campaign from online to offline....</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA14</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>275</th>\n",
-       "      <td>235</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA15</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>276</th>\n",
-       "      <td>264</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA16</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "<p>277 rows × 12 columns</p>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "     Unnamed: 0 DISARM Phase                     DISARM Tactic  \\\n",
-       "0             1         Plan                               NaN   \n",
-       "1            36      Prepare                               NaN   \n",
-       "2           126      Execute                               NaN   \n",
-       "3           263       Assess                               NaN   \n",
-       "4             7         Plan                   Plan Objectives   \n",
-       "..          ...          ...                               ...   \n",
-       "272         184      Execute                 Maximize Exposure   \n",
-       "273         204      Execute                Drive Online Harms   \n",
-       "274         221      Execute            Drive Offline Activity   \n",
-       "275         235      Execute  Persist in the Information Space   \n",
-       "276         264       Assess              Assess Effectiveness   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "    DISARM Technique         DISARM Subtechnique  \\\n",
-       "0                NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "1                NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "2                NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "3                NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "4            Dismiss  Discredit Credible Sources   \n",
-       "..               ...                         ...   \n",
-       "272              NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "273              NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "274              NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "275              NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "276              NaN                         NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           Description DISARM ID  \\\n",
-       "0    Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...       P01   \n",
-       "1    Activities conducted before execution to impro...       P02   \n",
-       "2    Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...       P03   \n",
-       "3    Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...       P04   \n",
-       "4    Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and d...    ST0001   \n",
-       "..                                                 ...       ...   \n",
-       "272  Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...      TA12   \n",
-       "273  Actions taken by an influence operation to har...      TA13   \n",
-       "274  Move incident/campaign from online to offline....      TA14   \n",
-       "275  Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...      TA15   \n",
-       "276                                                NaN      TA16   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "     Feedback from EEAS  Action to Do  Action Taken Where did it come from?  \\\n",
-       "0                   NaN           NaN           NaN                   AMITT   \n",
-       "1                   NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "2                   NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "3                   NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "4                   NaN           NaN           NaN                   AMITT   \n",
-       "..                  ...           ...           ...                     ...   \n",
-       "272                 NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "273                 NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "274                 NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "275                 NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "276                 NaN           NaN           NaN                     NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                         Where from more info  \n",
-       "0                                         NaN  \n",
-       "1                                         NaN  \n",
-       "2                                         NaN  \n",
-       "3                                         NaN  \n",
-       "4    T0067 Plan to Discredit Credible Sources  \n",
-       "..                                        ...  \n",
-       "272                                       NaN  \n",
-       "273                                       NaN  \n",
-       "274                                       NaN  \n",
-       "275                                       NaN  \n",
-       "276                                       NaN  \n",
-       "\n",
-       "[277 rows x 12 columns]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 1,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "import pandas as pd\n",
     "\n",
@@ -322,88 +42,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 2,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Phase</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Prepare</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Activities conducted before execution to impro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "  DISARM Phase DISARM Tactic  \\\n",
-       "0         Plan           NaN   \n",
-       "1      Prepare           NaN   \n",
-       "2      Execute           NaN   \n",
-       "3       Assess           NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                         Description DISARM ID  \n",
-       "0  Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...       P01  \n",
-       "1  Activities conducted before execution to impro...       P02  \n",
-       "2  Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...       P03  \n",
-       "3  Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...       P04  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 2,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "phases = df[['DISARM Phase', 'DISARM Tactic', 'Description', 'DISARM ID']]\n",
     "phases = phases[phases['DISARM Tactic'].isnull()]\n",
@@ -412,26 +53,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 3,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 4 and 4\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Assess', 'Execute', 'Plan', 'Prepare'], dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Execute', 'Prepare', 'Plan', 'Assess'], dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: set()\n",
-      "null ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [DISARM Phase, DISARM Tactic, Description, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n",
-      "repeated ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [index, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(phases['DISARM Phase'], df['DISARM Phase'])\n",
     "check_ids(phases)"
@@ -439,196 +63,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 4,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>261</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Strategy</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA01</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>262</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Objectives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>263</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Target Audience Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>264</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Narratives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>The promotion of beneficial master narratives ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>265</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>266</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Establish Social Assets</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Establishing information assets generates mess...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>267</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Establish Legitimacy</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>268</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Microtarget</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>269</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Select Channels and Affordances</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>270</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>271</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Deliver Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content to general public or larger po...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>272</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>273</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Online Harms</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Actions taken by an influence operation to har...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>274</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Move incident/campaign from online to offline....</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA14</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>275</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA15</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>276</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA16</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "                        DISARM Tactic DISARM Technique  \\\n",
-       "261                     Plan Strategy              NaN   \n",
-       "262                   Plan Objectives              NaN   \n",
-       "263          Target Audience Analysis              NaN   \n",
-       "264                Develop Narratives              NaN   \n",
-       "265                   Develop Content              NaN   \n",
-       "266           Establish Social Assets              NaN   \n",
-       "267              Establish Legitimacy              NaN   \n",
-       "268                       Microtarget              NaN   \n",
-       "269   Select Channels and Affordances              NaN   \n",
-       "270              Conduct Pump Priming              NaN   \n",
-       "271                   Deliver Content              NaN   \n",
-       "272                 Maximize Exposure              NaN   \n",
-       "273                Drive Online Harms              NaN   \n",
-       "274            Drive Offline Activity              NaN   \n",
-       "275  Persist in the Information Space              NaN   \n",
-       "276              Assess Effectiveness              NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           Description DISARM ID  \n",
-       "261  Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...      TA01  \n",
-       "262  Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...      TA02  \n",
-       "263  Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...      TA03  \n",
-       "264  The promotion of beneficial master narratives ...      TA04  \n",
-       "265                                                NaN      TA05  \n",
-       "266  Establishing information assets generates mess...      TA06  \n",
-       "267                                                NaN      TA07  \n",
-       "268         Target very specific populations of people      TA08  \n",
-       "269  Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...      TA09  \n",
-       "270  Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...      TA10  \n",
-       "271  Release content to general public or larger po...      TA11  \n",
-       "272  Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...      TA12  \n",
-       "273  Actions taken by an influence operation to har...      TA13  \n",
-       "274  Move incident/campaign from online to offline....      TA14  \n",
-       "275  Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...      TA15  \n",
-       "276                                                NaN      TA16  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 4,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "tactics = df[['DISARM Tactic', 'DISARM Technique', 'Description', 'DISARM ID']]#['DISARM Tactic'].notnull()\n",
     "tactics = tactics[(tactics['DISARM Tactic'].notnull()) & (tactics['DISARM Technique'].isnull())]\n",
@@ -637,41 +74,11 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 5,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 16 and 16\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Drive Online Harms', 'Maximize Exposure', 'Conduct Pump Priming',\n",
-      "       'Deliver Content', 'Persist in the Information Space',\n",
-      "       'Assess Effectiveness', 'Establish Social Assets',\n",
-      "       'Target Audience Analysis', 'Develop Narratives', 'Plan Strategy',\n",
-      "       'Select Channels and Affordances', 'Develop Content', 'Plan Objectives',\n",
-      "       'Microtarget', 'Establish Legitimacy', 'Drive Offline Activity'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Develop Content', 'Establish Social Assets',\n",
-      "       'Select Channels and Affordances', 'Persist in the Information Space',\n",
-      "       'Target Audience Analysis', 'Maximize Exposure', 'Drive Online Harms',\n",
-      "       'Establish Legitimacy', 'Assess Effectiveness',\n",
-      "       'Drive Offline Activity', 'Deliver Content', 'Develop Narratives',\n",
-      "       'Plan Objectives', 'Conduct Pump Priming', 'Microtarget',\n",
-      "       'Plan Strategy'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: set()\n",
-      "null ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [DISARM Tactic, DISARM Technique, Description, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n",
-      "repeated ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [index, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(tactics['DISARM Tactic'], df['DISARM Tactic'])\n",
     "check_ids(tactics)"
@@ -679,154 +86,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 6,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Subtechnique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>164</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Determine Target Audiences</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>165</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Determine Strategic Ends</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0002</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>166</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Dismiss</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Push back against criticism by dismissing your...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0003</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>167</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Distort</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Twist the narrative. Take information, or arti...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0004</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>168</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Distract</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Shift attention to a different narrative or ac...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0005</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>...</th>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>256</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Exploit TOS/Content Moderation</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0093</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>257</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Play the long game</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1....</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0094</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>258</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Performance</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0095</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>259</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0096</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>260</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>T0097</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "<p>97 rows × 4 columns</p>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "                               DISARM Technique DISARM Subtechnique  \\\n",
-       "164                  Determine Target Audiences                 NaN   \n",
-       "165                    Determine Strategic Ends                 NaN   \n",
-       "166                                     Dismiss                 NaN   \n",
-       "167                                     Distort                 NaN   \n",
-       "168                                    Distract                 NaN   \n",
-       "..                                          ...                 ...   \n",
-       "256              Exploit TOS/Content Moderation                 NaN   \n",
-       "257                          Play the long game                 NaN   \n",
-       "258                         Measure Performance                 NaN   \n",
-       "259                       Measure Effectiveness                 NaN   \n",
-       "260  Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)                 NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           Description DISARM ID  \n",
-       "164                                                NaN     T0001  \n",
-       "165                                                NaN     T0002  \n",
-       "166  Push back against criticism by dismissing your...     T0003  \n",
-       "167  Twist the narrative. Take information, or arti...     T0004  \n",
-       "168  Shift attention to a different narrative or ac...     T0005  \n",
-       "..                                                 ...       ...  \n",
-       "256                                                NaN     T0093  \n",
-       "257  Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1....     T0094  \n",
-       "258                                                NaN     T0095  \n",
-       "259                                                NaN     T0096  \n",
-       "260                                                NaN     T0097  \n",
-       "\n",
-       "[97 rows x 4 columns]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 6,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "techs = df[['DISARM Technique', 'DISARM Subtechnique', 'Description', 'DISARM ID']]\n",
     "techs = techs[(techs['DISARM Technique'].notnull()) & (techs['DISARM Subtechnique'].isnull())]\n",
@@ -835,124 +97,11 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 7,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 97 and 97\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles',\n",
-      "       'Map Target Audience Information Environment', 'Physical Violence',\n",
-      "       'Direct Users to Alternative Platforms', 'Develop Audio-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Develop Owned Media Assets', 'Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives',\n",
-      "       'Develop Text-based Content', 'Develop Video-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Deliver Ads', 'Leverage Content Farm',\n",
-      "       'Bookmarking and Content Curation', 'Use Search Engine Optimization',\n",
-      "       'Livestream', 'Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis',\n",
-      "       'Recruit bad actors', 'Incentivize Sharing', 'Media Sharing Networks',\n",
-      "       'Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities',\n",
-      "       'Create Inauthentic Accounts', 'Prepare fundraising campaigns', 'Email',\n",
-      "       'Online polls', 'Purchase Targeted Advertisements',\n",
-      "       'Obtain Private Documents', 'Play the long game', 'Build Network',\n",
-      "       ' Social Networks', 'Discussion Forums', 'Divide',\n",
-      "       'Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups',\n",
-      "       'Conduct fundraising', 'Acquire/ recruit Network', 'Cross-Posting',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Existing Narratives', 'Traditional Media',\n",
-      "       'Conceal Operational Activity', 'Create Clickbait',\n",
-      "       'Reuse Existing Content', 'Measure Effectiveness', 'Distort',\n",
-      "       'Conceal Infrastructure', 'Generate information pollution',\n",
-      "       'Develop New Narratives', 'Bait legitimate influencers',\n",
-      "       'Facilitate State Propaganda', 'Post Content', 'Co-opt Trusted Sources',\n",
-      "       'Seed distortions', 'Compromise legitimate accounts',\n",
-      "       'Blogging and Publishing Networks', 'Platform Filtering',\n",
-      "       'Determine Target Audiences', 'Dismiss', 'Consumer Review Networks',\n",
-      "       'Merchandising/ Advertising', 'Develop Image-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities',\n",
-      "       'Flooding the Information Space', 'Distract', 'Measure Performance',\n",
-      "       'Distort facts', 'Use fake experts', 'Comment or Reply on Content',\n",
-      "       'Create fake experts', 'Create personas', 'Seed Kernel of truth',\n",
-      "       'Conceal People', 'Attract Traditional Media',\n",
-      "       'Determine Strategic Ends', 'Create inauthentic websites',\n",
-      "       'Cultivate ignorant agents', 'Create Localized Content',\n",
-      "       'Create hashtags and search artifacts',\n",
-      "       'Censor social media as a political force', 'Dismay',\n",
-      "       'Segment Audiences', 'Establish Inauthentic News Sites',\n",
-      "       'Organize Events', 'Harass', 'Suppress Opposition',\n",
-      "       'Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations',\n",
-      "       'Infiltrate Existing Networks', 'Formal Diplomatic Channels',\n",
-      "       'Chat apps', 'Encourage Attendance at Events',\n",
-      "       'Develop Competing Narratives', 'Employ Commercial Analytic Firms',\n",
-      "       'Degrade Adversary', 'Amplify Existing Narrative',\n",
-      "       'Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)',\n",
-      "       'Exploit TOS/Content Moderation',\n",
-      "       'Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities',\n",
-      "       'Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative',\n",
-      "       'Manipulate Platform Algorithm', 'Trial content',\n",
-      "       'Demand insurmountable proof'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Conceal Operational Activity',\n",
-      "       'Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities',\n",
-      "       'Flooding the Information Space', ' Social Networks',\n",
-      "       'Segment Audiences', 'Conceal People',\n",
-      "       'Map Target Audience Information Environment', 'Conceal Infrastructure',\n",
-      "       'Measure Effectiveness', 'Harass',\n",
-      "       'Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations',\n",
-      "       'Reuse Existing Content', 'Create Inauthentic Accounts',\n",
-      "       'Develop Image-based Content', 'Obtain Private Documents',\n",
-      "       'Co-opt Trusted Sources', 'Recruit bad actors',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles', 'Build Network',\n",
-      "       'Post Content', 'Measure Performance', 'Traditional Media',\n",
-      "       'Cross-Posting', 'Media Sharing Networks', 'Suppress Opposition',\n",
-      "       'Develop Text-based Content', 'Leverage Content Farm',\n",
-      "       'Infiltrate Existing Networks', 'Physical Violence', 'Livestream',\n",
-      "       'Organize Events', 'Establish Inauthentic News Sites', 'Distort facts',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives', 'Develop Audio-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Incentivize Sharing', 'Deliver Ads', 'Generate information pollution',\n",
-      "       'Acquire/ recruit Network', 'Encourage Attendance at Events',\n",
-      "       'Develop Video-based Content', 'Prepare fundraising campaigns',\n",
-      "       'Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)',\n",
-      "       'Exploit TOS/Content Moderation',\n",
-      "       'Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities', 'Chat apps',\n",
-      "       'Discussion Forums', 'Comment or Reply on Content',\n",
-      "       'Merchandising/ Advertising', 'Manipulate Platform Algorithm',\n",
-      "       'Conduct fundraising', 'Create fake experts', 'Dismiss',\n",
-      "       'Create personas', 'Develop Owned Media Assets',\n",
-      "       'Direct Users to Alternative Platforms', 'Create Clickbait',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Existing Narratives', 'Cultivate ignorant agents',\n",
-      "       'Play the long game', 'Develop New Narratives',\n",
-      "       'Use Search Engine Optimization', 'Purchase Targeted Advertisements',\n",
-      "       'Use fake experts', 'Determine Target Audiences',\n",
-      "       'Facilitate State Propaganda', 'Create Localized Content',\n",
-      "       'Attract Traditional Media', 'Trial content',\n",
-      "       'Create inauthentic websites', 'Bait legitimate influencers', 'Divide',\n",
-      "       'Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups',\n",
-      "       'Seed Kernel of truth', 'Censor social media as a political force',\n",
-      "       'Seed distortions', 'Bookmarking and Content Curation',\n",
-      "       'Degrade Adversary', 'Consumer Review Networks', 'Platform Filtering',\n",
-      "       'Create hashtags and search artifacts', 'Develop Competing Narratives',\n",
-      "       'Distort', 'Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities',\n",
-      "       'Amplify Existing Narrative', 'Determine Strategic Ends',\n",
-      "       'Employ Commercial Analytic Firms',\n",
-      "       'Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative', 'Dismay',\n",
-      "       'Formal Diplomatic Channels', 'Blogging and Publishing Networks',\n",
-      "       'Compromise legitimate accounts', 'Distract', 'Online polls', 'Email',\n",
-      "       'Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis',\n",
-      "       'Demand insurmountable proof'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: set()\n",
-      "null ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [DISARM Technique, DISARM Subtechnique, Description, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n",
-      "repeated ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [index, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(techs['DISARM Technique'], df['DISARM Technique'])\n",
     "check_ids(techs)\n",
@@ -961,167 +110,9 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 19,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Subtechnique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Discredit Credible Sources</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Dismiss</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and d...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0001</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Monitor Social Media Analytics</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Map Target Audience Information Environment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>An influence operation may use social media an...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0002</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Evaluate Media Surveys</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Map Target Audience Information Environment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>An influence operation may evaluate its own or...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0003</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Map Target Audience Information Environment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>An influence operation may identify trending h...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0004</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Web Traffic Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Map Target Audience Information Environment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>An influence operation may conduct web traffic...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0005</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>...</th>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>159</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Awareness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0156</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>160</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Knowledge</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0157</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>161</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Action/attitude</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0158</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>162</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Message reach</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinfor...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0159</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>163</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Social media engagement</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Monitor and evaluate social media engagement i...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>ST0160</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "<p>160 rows × 4 columns</p>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "                   DISARM Subtechnique  \\\n",
-       "4           Discredit Credible Sources   \n",
-       "5       Monitor Social Media Analytics   \n",
-       "6               Evaluate Media Surveys   \n",
-       "7    Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags   \n",
-       "8         Conduct Web Traffic Analysis   \n",
-       "..                                 ...   \n",
-       "159                          Awareness   \n",
-       "160                          Knowledge   \n",
-       "161                    Action/attitude   \n",
-       "162                      Message reach   \n",
-       "163            Social media engagement   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                DISARM Technique  \\\n",
-       "4                                        Dismiss   \n",
-       "5    Map Target Audience Information Environment   \n",
-       "6    Map Target Audience Information Environment   \n",
-       "7    Map Target Audience Information Environment   \n",
-       "8    Map Target Audience Information Environment   \n",
-       "..                                           ...   \n",
-       "159                        Measure Effectiveness   \n",
-       "160                        Measure Effectiveness   \n",
-       "161                        Measure Effectiveness   \n",
-       "162   Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)   \n",
-       "163   Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           Description DISARM ID  \n",
-       "4    Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and d...    ST0001  \n",
-       "5    An influence operation may use social media an...    ST0002  \n",
-       "6    An influence operation may evaluate its own or...    ST0003  \n",
-       "7    An influence operation may identify trending h...    ST0004  \n",
-       "8    An influence operation may conduct web traffic...    ST0005  \n",
-       "..                                                 ...       ...  \n",
-       "159                                                NaN    ST0156  \n",
-       "160                                                NaN    ST0157  \n",
-       "161                                                NaN    ST0158  \n",
-       "162  Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinfor...    ST0159  \n",
-       "163  Monitor and evaluate social media engagement i...    ST0160  \n",
-       "\n",
-       "[160 rows x 4 columns]"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 19,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "subs = df[['DISARM Subtechnique', 'DISARM Technique', 'Description', 'DISARM ID']]\n",
     "subs = subs[subs['DISARM Subtechnique'].notnull()]\n",
@@ -1130,7 +121,7 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 21,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
    "outputs": [],
    "source": [
@@ -1140,50 +131,11 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 9,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 159 and 159\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Conceal Network Identity', 'Co-opt Influencers', 'Newspaper',\n",
-      "       'Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications',\n",
-      "       'Legacy web content', 'Audio sharing', 'Utilize Butterfly Attack',\n",
-      "       'Demographic Segmentation', 'Political Segmentation',\n",
-      "       'Create Organizations',\n",
-      "       ...\n",
-      "       'Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative', 'Hijack existing hashtag',\n",
-      "       'Delete Opposing Content', 'Backstop personas ',\n",
-      "       'Co-Opt Trusted Individuals', 'Post Across Groups',\n",
-      "       'Identify Data Voids', 'Create fake research', 'Content Focused',\n",
-      "       'Share Memes'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object', length=159)\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Conceal Network Identity', 'Co-opt Influencers', 'Newspaper',\n",
-      "       'Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications',\n",
-      "       'Legacy web content', 'Audio sharing', 'Utilize Butterfly Attack',\n",
-      "       'Demographic Segmentation', 'Political Segmentation',\n",
-      "       'Create Organizations',\n",
-      "       ...\n",
-      "       'Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative', 'Hijack existing hashtag',\n",
-      "       'Delete Opposing Content', 'Backstop personas ',\n",
-      "       'Co-Opt Trusted Individuals', 'Post Across Groups',\n",
-      "       'Identify Data Voids', 'Create fake research', 'Content Focused',\n",
-      "       'Share Memes'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object', length=159)\n",
-      "set difference: set()\n",
-      "null ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [DISARM Subtechnique, Description, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n",
-      "repeated ids: Empty DataFrame\n",
-      "Columns: [index, DISARM ID]\n",
-      "Index: []\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(subs['DISARM Subtechnique'], df['DISARM Subtechnique'])\n",
     "check_ids(subs)"
@@ -1198,22 +150,14 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 25,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "Current keys: dict_keys(['FRAMEWORK_ADMIN_README', 'FRAMEWORK_ADMIN CODES', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'subtechniques', 'frameworks', 'tasks', 'detections', 'countermeasures', 'playbooks', 'responsetypes', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'sectors', 'resources', 'MOE', 'MOP'])\n",
-      "Old keys: dict_keys(['ADMIN_README', 'ADMIN CODES', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'countermeasures', 'frameworks', 'tasks', 'detections', 'playbooks', 'responsetypes', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'actortype_framework', 'actortype_sector', 'sectors', 'resources', 'MOE', 'MOP'])\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
+    "import pandas as pd\n",
+    "\n",
     "MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'\n",
     "frameworkfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
-    "oldframefile = MASTERDATA_DIR + '2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_0_1.xlsx'\n",
     "\n",
     "def create_excel_metadata(frameworkfile):\n",
     "    metadata = {}\n",
@@ -1221,282 +165,35 @@
     "    for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:\n",
     "        metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)\n",
     "        metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)\n",
+    "        metadata[sheetname].rename(columns={'amitt_id': 'disarm_id'}, inplace=True)\n",
     "    return metadata\n",
     "\n",
-    "metadata = create_excel_metadata(frameworkfile)\n",
-    "oldmeta = create_excel_metadata(oldframefile)\n",
-    "print('Current keys: {}'.format(metadata.keys()))\n",
-    "print('Old keys: {}'.format(oldmeta.keys()))"
+    "metadata = create_excel_metadata(frameworkfile)"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 11,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>rank</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>longname</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Planung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>1</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01 - Plan</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Prepare</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Vorbereitung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Activities conducted before execution to impro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02 - Prepare</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Durchführung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>3</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03 - Execute</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Auswertung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04 - Assess</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "  disarm_id     name       name_DE  rank  \\\n",
-       "0       P01     Plan       Planung     1   \n",
-       "1       P02  Prepare  Vorbereitung     2   \n",
-       "2       P03  Execute  Durchführung     3   \n",
-       "3       P04   Assess    Auswertung     4   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                             summary summary_DE       longname  \n",
-       "0  Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...                P01 - Plan  \n",
-       "1  Activities conducted before execution to impro...             P02 - Prepare  \n",
-       "2  Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...             P03 - Execute  \n",
-       "3  Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...              P04 - Assess  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 11,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "metadata['phases']"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 12,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Phase</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Prepare</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Activities conducted before execution to impro...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Execute</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "  DISARM Phase DISARM Tactic  \\\n",
-       "0         Plan           NaN   \n",
-       "1      Prepare           NaN   \n",
-       "2      Execute           NaN   \n",
-       "3       Assess           NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                         Description DISARM ID  \n",
-       "0  Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effectiv...       P01  \n",
-       "1  Activities conducted before execution to impro...       P02  \n",
-       "2  Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-...       P03  \n",
-       "3  Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...       P04  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 12,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "phases"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 13,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Phase</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>rank</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>longname</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Auswertung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04 - Assess</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "  DISARM Phase DISARM Tactic  \\\n",
-       "3       Assess           NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                         Description DISARM ID disarm_id  \\\n",
-       "3  Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...       P04       P04   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "     name     name_DE  rank  \\\n",
-       "3  Assess  Auswertung     4   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                             summary summary_DE      longname  \n",
-       "3  Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...             P04 - Assess  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 13,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "# do union of both tables, to get new spreadsheet table\n",
     "check_descriptions(phases, metadata['phases'])"
@@ -1504,834 +201,46 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 14,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 4 and 4\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Assess', 'Execute', 'Plan', 'Prepare'], dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Assess', 'Execute', 'Plan', 'Prepare'], dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: set()\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(metadata['phases']['name'], phases['DISARM Phase'])"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 15,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Tactic</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM Technique</th>\n",
-       "      <th>Description</th>\n",
-       "      <th>DISARM ID</th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>phase_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>rank</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_DE</th>\n",
-       "      <th>longname</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Objectives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Objective Planning</td>\n",
-       "      <td>objektive Planung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>2</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02 - Objective Planning</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Target Audience Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop People</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Menschen entwickeln</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>4</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop online and offline users and agents, i...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA03 - Develop People</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Narratives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>The promotion of beneficial master narratives ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Networks</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Netzwerke entwickeln</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>5</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop online and offline communities and tra...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA04 - Develop Networks</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Microtargeting</td>\n",
-       "      <td>individualisierte Wählerwerbung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>6</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05 - Microtargeting</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Establish Social Assets</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Establishing information assets generates mess...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Inhalte entwickeln</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>7</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create and acquire content used in incident</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06 - Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Establish Legitimacy</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Channel Selection</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Kanalauswahl</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>8</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07 - Channel Selection</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Microtarget</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Ankurbelung</td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>9</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08 - Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Select Channels and Affordances</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>10</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content to general public or push to l...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09 - Exposure</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>9</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Move incident into offline world</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10 - Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>10</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Deliver Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content to general public or larger po...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persistence</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P03</td>\n",
-       "      <td>12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11 - Persistence</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>11</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>13</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12 - Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>12</th>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Online Harms</td>\n",
-       "      <td>NaN</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Actions taken by an influence operation to har...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13</td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>P01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>3</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Recon/research to identify \"the source of powe...</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13 - Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "                      DISARM Tactic DISARM Technique  \\\n",
-       "1                   Plan Objectives              NaN   \n",
-       "2          Target Audience Analysis              NaN   \n",
-       "3                Develop Narratives              NaN   \n",
-       "4                   Develop Content              NaN   \n",
-       "5           Establish Social Assets              NaN   \n",
-       "6              Establish Legitimacy              NaN   \n",
-       "7                       Microtarget              NaN   \n",
-       "8   Select Channels and Affordances              NaN   \n",
-       "9              Conduct Pump Priming              NaN   \n",
-       "10                  Deliver Content              NaN   \n",
-       "11                Maximize Exposure              NaN   \n",
-       "12               Drive Online Harms              NaN   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                          Description DISARM ID disarm_id  \\\n",
-       "1   Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...      TA02      TA02   \n",
-       "2   Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...      TA03      TA03   \n",
-       "3   The promotion of beneficial master narratives ...      TA04      TA04   \n",
-       "4                                                 NaN      TA05      TA05   \n",
-       "5   Establishing information assets generates mess...      TA06      TA06   \n",
-       "6                                                 NaN      TA07      TA07   \n",
-       "7          Target very specific populations of people      TA08      TA08   \n",
-       "8   Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...      TA09      TA09   \n",
-       "9   Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...      TA10      TA10   \n",
-       "10  Release content to general public or larger po...      TA11      TA11   \n",
-       "11  Maximize exposure of the target audience to in...      TA12      TA12   \n",
-       "12  Actions taken by an influence operation to har...      TA13      TA13   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                  name                          name_DE  \\\n",
-       "1                   Objective Planning                objektive Planung   \n",
-       "2                       Develop People              Menschen entwickeln   \n",
-       "3                     Develop Networks             Netzwerke entwickeln   \n",
-       "4                       Microtargeting  individualisierte Wählerwerbung   \n",
-       "5                      Develop Content               Inhalte entwickeln   \n",
-       "6                    Channel Selection                     Kanalauswahl   \n",
-       "7                         Pump Priming                      Ankurbelung   \n",
-       "8                             Exposure                                    \n",
-       "9               Drive Offline Activity                                    \n",
-       "10                         Persistence                                    \n",
-       "11               Measure Effectiveness                                    \n",
-       "12  Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis                                    \n",
-       "\n",
-       "   phase_id  rank                                            summary  \\\n",
-       "1       P01     2  Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...   \n",
-       "2       P02     4  Develop online and offline users and agents, i...   \n",
-       "3       P02     5  Develop online and offline communities and tra...   \n",
-       "4       P02     6         Target very specific populations of people   \n",
-       "5       P02     7        Create and acquire content used in incident   \n",
-       "6       P02     8  Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...   \n",
-       "7       P03     9  Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...   \n",
-       "8       P03    10  Release content to general public or push to l...   \n",
-       "9       P03    11                   Move incident into offline world   \n",
-       "10      P03    12  Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...   \n",
-       "11      P04    13  Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...   \n",
-       "12      P01     3  Recon/research to identify \"the source of powe...   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "   summary_DE                                   longname  \n",
-       "1                              TA02 - Objective Planning  \n",
-       "2                                  TA03 - Develop People  \n",
-       "3                                TA04 - Develop Networks  \n",
-       "4                                  TA05 - Microtargeting  \n",
-       "5                                 TA06 - Develop Content  \n",
-       "6                               TA07 - Channel Selection  \n",
-       "7                                    TA08 - Pump Priming  \n",
-       "8                                        TA09 - Exposure  \n",
-       "9                          TA10 - Drive Offline Activity  \n",
-       "10                                    TA11 - Persistence  \n",
-       "11                          TA12 - Measure Effectiveness  \n",
-       "12             TA13 - Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 15,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_descriptions(tactics, metadata['tactics'])"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 16,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 13 and 16\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Strategic Planning', 'Persistence', 'Microtargeting',\n",
-      "       'Channel Selection', 'Develop Networks', 'Objective Planning',\n",
-      "       'Measure Effectiveness', 'Exposure',\n",
-      "       'Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis', 'Drive Offline Activity',\n",
-      "       'Pump Priming', 'Develop Content', 'Develop People'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Drive Online Harms', 'Maximize Exposure', 'Conduct Pump Priming',\n",
-      "       'Deliver Content', 'Persist in the Information Space',\n",
-      "       'Assess Effectiveness', 'Establish Social Assets',\n",
-      "       'Target Audience Analysis', 'Develop Narratives', 'Plan Strategy',\n",
-      "       'Select Channels and Affordances', 'Develop Content', 'Plan Objectives',\n",
-      "       'Microtarget', 'Establish Legitimacy', 'Drive Offline Activity'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: {'Develop Networks', 'Channel Selection', 'Pump Priming', 'Measure Effectiveness', 'Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis', 'Exposure', 'Objective Planning', 'Develop People', 'Microtargeting', 'Persistence', 'Strategic Planning'}\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(metadata['tactics']['name'], tactics['DISARM Tactic'])"
    ]
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 17,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "name": "stdout",
-     "output_type": "stream",
-     "text": [
-      "lengths are: 71 and 97\n",
-      "first list: Index(['Backstop personas', 'Message reach', 'Twitter bots amplify',\n",
-      "       'Demand unsurmountable proof', 'Behaviour changes',\n",
-      "       'Create fake videos and images', 'Play the long game',\n",
-      "       'Purchase advertisements', 'Manipulate online polls',\n",
-      "       'Facilitate State Propaganda', 'Find echo chambers', 'Clickbait',\n",
-      "       'Pinterest', 'Seed distortions', 'Cow online opinion leaders',\n",
-      "       'Segment audiences',\n",
-      "       'Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution',\n",
-      "       'Organise remote rallies and events', 'Prepare fundraising campaigns',\n",
-      "       'Muzzle social media as a political force',\n",
-      "       'Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate',\n",
-      "       'Create pseudoscientific or disingenuous research',\n",
-      "       'Develop Narrative Concepts', 'Cheerleading domestic social media ops',\n",
-      "       '5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Existing Narratives', 'Continue to amplify', 'Reddit',\n",
-      "       'Trial content', 'LinkedIn', 'Leak altered documents',\n",
-      "       'Conspiracy narratives', 'Use hashtag',\n",
-      "       'Generate information pollution', 'Analyze existing communities',\n",
-      "       'Fabricate social media comment', 'Cultivate ignorant agents',\n",
-      "       'YouTube', 'Compromise legitimate account',\n",
-      "       'Create competing narratives', 'Kernel of Truth',\n",
-      "       'Respond to breaking news event', 'Twitter',\n",
-      "       'Plan to discredit credible sources', 'Distort facts',\n",
-      "       'Use physical broadcast capabilities', 'Use fake experts', 'Facebook',\n",
-      "       'Create fake experts', 'Devise Competing Narratives', 'Instagram',\n",
-      "       'Bait legitimate influencers', 'Respond to active crisis',\n",
-      "       'Create hashtags', 'Flooding', 'Legacy web content',\n",
-      "       'Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups',\n",
-      "       'Create fake websites', 'Deny involvement',\n",
-      "       'Tertiary sites amplify news', 'Adapt existing narratives',\n",
-      "       'Search Engine Optimization', 'Degrade adversary', 'Use concealment',\n",
-      "       'Sell merchandising', 'Conduct Fundraising Campaigns',\n",
-      "       'Social media engagement', 'Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps', 'Memes',\n",
-      "       'WhatsApp', 'Create fake or imposter news sites'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "second list: Index(['Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles',\n",
-      "       'Map Target Audience Information Environment', 'Physical Violence',\n",
-      "       'Direct Users to Alternative Platforms', 'Develop Audio-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Develop Owned Media Assets', 'Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives',\n",
-      "       'Develop Text-based Content', 'Develop Video-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Deliver Ads', 'Leverage Content Farm',\n",
-      "       'Bookmarking and Content Curation', 'Use Search Engine Optimization',\n",
-      "       'Livestream', 'Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis',\n",
-      "       'Recruit bad actors', 'Incentivize Sharing', 'Media Sharing Networks',\n",
-      "       'Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities',\n",
-      "       'Create Inauthentic Accounts', 'Prepare fundraising campaigns', 'Email',\n",
-      "       'Online polls', 'Purchase Targeted Advertisements',\n",
-      "       'Obtain Private Documents', 'Play the long game', 'Build Network',\n",
-      "       ' Social Networks', 'Discussion Forums', 'Divide',\n",
-      "       'Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups',\n",
-      "       'Conduct fundraising', 'Acquire/ recruit Network', 'Cross-Posting',\n",
-      "       'Leverage Existing Narratives', 'Traditional Media',\n",
-      "       'Conceal Operational Activity', 'Create Clickbait',\n",
-      "       'Reuse Existing Content', 'Measure Effectiveness', 'Distort',\n",
-      "       'Conceal Infrastructure', 'Generate information pollution',\n",
-      "       'Develop New Narratives', 'Bait legitimate influencers',\n",
-      "       'Facilitate State Propaganda', 'Post Content', 'Co-opt Trusted Sources',\n",
-      "       'Seed distortions', 'Compromise legitimate accounts',\n",
-      "       'Blogging and Publishing Networks', 'Platform Filtering',\n",
-      "       'Determine Target Audiences', 'Dismiss', 'Consumer Review Networks',\n",
-      "       'Merchandising/ Advertising', 'Develop Image-based Content',\n",
-      "       'Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities',\n",
-      "       'Flooding the Information Space', 'Distract', 'Measure Performance',\n",
-      "       'Distort facts', 'Use fake experts', 'Comment or Reply on Content',\n",
-      "       'Create fake experts', 'Create personas', 'Seed Kernel of truth',\n",
-      "       'Conceal People', 'Attract Traditional Media',\n",
-      "       'Determine Strategic Ends', 'Create inauthentic websites',\n",
-      "       'Cultivate ignorant agents', 'Create Localized Content',\n",
-      "       'Create hashtags and search artifacts',\n",
-      "       'Censor social media as a political force', 'Dismay',\n",
-      "       'Segment Audiences', 'Establish Inauthentic News Sites',\n",
-      "       'Organize Events', 'Harass', 'Suppress Opposition',\n",
-      "       'Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations',\n",
-      "       'Infiltrate Existing Networks', 'Formal Diplomatic Channels',\n",
-      "       'Chat apps', 'Encourage Attendance at Events',\n",
-      "       'Develop Competing Narratives', 'Employ Commercial Analytic Firms',\n",
-      "       'Degrade Adversary', 'Amplify Existing Narrative',\n",
-      "       'Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)',\n",
-      "       'Exploit TOS/Content Moderation',\n",
-      "       'Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities',\n",
-      "       'Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative',\n",
-      "       'Manipulate Platform Algorithm', 'Trial content',\n",
-      "       'Demand insurmountable proof'],\n",
-      "      dtype='object')\n",
-      "set difference: {'Degrade adversary', 'Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate', 'Create pseudoscientific or disingenuous research', 'Message reach', 'Develop Narrative Concepts', 'Continue to amplify', 'Behaviour changes', 'Cheerleading domestic social media ops', '5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)', 'Create fake websites', 'Muzzle social media as a political force', 'LinkedIn', 'Deny involvement', 'Conspiracy narratives', 'Organise remote rallies and events', 'Reddit', 'Instagram', 'Demand unsurmountable proof', 'Purchase advertisements', 'Use hashtag', 'Find echo chambers', 'Memes', 'Manipulate online polls', 'Clickbait', 'Pinterest', 'Create fake or imposter news sites', 'Cow online opinion leaders', 'Flooding', 'Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups', 'Tertiary sites amplify news', 'Adapt existing narratives', 'Search Engine Optimization', 'Legacy web content', 'Sell merchandising', 'Create competing narratives', 'Conduct Fundraising Campaigns', 'Social media engagement', 'Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps', 'Fabricate social media comment', 'WhatsApp', 'Use concealment', 'Create hashtags', 'Use physical broadcast capabilities', 'Segment audiences', 'Respond to active crisis', 'Compromise legitimate account', 'Twitter bots amplify', 'Kernel of Truth', 'Analyze existing communities', 'Respond to breaking news event', 'YouTube', 'Twitter', 'Plan to discredit credible sources', 'Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution', 'Facebook', 'Create fake videos and images', 'Leak altered documents', 'Devise Competing Narratives', 'Backstop personas'}\n"
-     ]
-    }
-   ],
+   "outputs": [],
    "source": [
     "check_diffs(metadata['techniques']['name'], techs['DISARM Technique'])"
    ]
   },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "markdown",
-   "metadata": {},
-   "source": [
-    "# Check against last version of framework"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 45,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_y</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_y</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
-       "      <td>False</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "  disarm_id  name_changed  summary_changed  name_x  name_y  \\\n",
-       "3       P04         False             True  Assess  Assess   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           summary_x  \\\n",
-       "3  Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                           summary_y  \n",
-       "3  Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 45,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "def check_version_descriptions(df1, df2):\n",
-    "    merge = df1.merge(df2, on='disarm_id')\n",
-    "    merge['name_changed'] = merge['name_x'] != merge['name_y']\n",
-    "    merge['summary_changed'] = merge['summary_x'] != merge['summary_y']\n",
-    "    return merge[(merge['name_changed']) | (merge['summary_changed'])][['disarm_id', 'name_changed', 'summary_changed', 'name_x', \n",
-    "                                                                        'name_y', 'summary_x', 'summary_y']]\n",
-    "\n",
-    "check_version_descriptions(metadata['phases'], oldmeta['phases'])"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 46,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_y</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_y</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>0</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA01</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>False</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Strategy</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Strategic Planning</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>1</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Plan Objectives</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Objective Planning</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>2</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>False</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Microtarget</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Microtargeting</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>3</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
-       "      <td>False</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td></td>\n",
-       "      <td>Create and acquire content used in incident</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>4</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Select Channels and Affordances</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Channel Selection</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>5</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Pump Priming</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>6</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Deliver Content</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Exposure</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content to general public or larger po...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Release content to general public or push to l...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>7</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
-       "      <td>False</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Move incident/campaign from online to offline....</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Move incident into offline world</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>8</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Environment</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persistence</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>9</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "    <tr>\n",
-       "      <th>10</th>\n",
-       "      <td>TA13</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>True</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Target Audience Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...</td>\n",
-       "      <td>Recon/research to identify \"the source of powe...</td>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "   disarm_id  name_changed  summary_changed  \\\n",
-       "0       TA01          True            False   \n",
-       "1       TA02          True             True   \n",
-       "2       TA05          True            False   \n",
-       "3       TA06         False             True   \n",
-       "4       TA07          True             True   \n",
-       "5       TA08          True             True   \n",
-       "6       TA09          True             True   \n",
-       "7       TA10         False             True   \n",
-       "8       TA11          True             True   \n",
-       "9       TA12          True             True   \n",
-       "10      TA13          True             True   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                    name_x  \\\n",
-       "0                            Plan Strategy   \n",
-       "1                          Plan Objectives   \n",
-       "2                              Microtarget   \n",
-       "3                          Develop Content   \n",
-       "4          Select Channels and Affordances   \n",
-       "5                     Conduct Pump Priming   \n",
-       "6                          Deliver Content   \n",
-       "7                   Drive Offline Activity   \n",
-       "8   Persist in the Information Environment   \n",
-       "9                     Assess Effectiveness   \n",
-       "10                Target Audience Analysis   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                name_y  \\\n",
-       "0                   Strategic Planning   \n",
-       "1                   Objective Planning   \n",
-       "2                       Microtargeting   \n",
-       "3                      Develop Content   \n",
-       "4                    Channel Selection   \n",
-       "5                         Pump Priming   \n",
-       "6                             Exposure   \n",
-       "7               Drive Offline Activity   \n",
-       "8                          Persistence   \n",
-       "9                Measure Effectiveness   \n",
-       "10  Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                            summary_x  \\\n",
-       "0   Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...   \n",
-       "1   Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...   \n",
-       "2          Target very specific populations of people   \n",
-       "3                                                       \n",
-       "4   Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...   \n",
-       "5   Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...   \n",
-       "6   Release content to general public or larger po...   \n",
-       "7   Move incident/campaign from online to offline....   \n",
-       "8   Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...   \n",
-       "9   Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...   \n",
-       "10  Identifying and analyzing the target audience ...   \n",
-       "\n",
-       "                                            summary_y  \n",
-       "0   Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...  \n",
-       "1   Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...  \n",
-       "2          Target very specific populations of people  \n",
-       "3         Create and acquire content used in incident  \n",
-       "4   Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...  \n",
-       "5   Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...  \n",
-       "6   Release content to general public or push to l...  \n",
-       "7                    Move incident into offline world  \n",
-       "8   Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...  \n",
-       "9   Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...  \n",
-       "10  Recon/research to identify \"the source of powe...  "
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 46,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "check_version_descriptions(metadata['tactics'], oldmeta['tactics'])"
-   ]
-  },
-  {
-   "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 47,
-   "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [
-    {
-     "data": {
-      "text/html": [
-       "<div>\n",
-       "<style scoped>\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
-       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "\n",
-       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
-       "        text-align: right;\n",
-       "    }\n",
-       "</style>\n",
-       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
-       "  <thead>\n",
-       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
-       "      <th></th>\n",
-       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>name_y</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_x</th>\n",
-       "      <th>summary_y</th>\n",
-       "    </tr>\n",
-       "  </thead>\n",
-       "  <tbody>\n",
-       "  </tbody>\n",
-       "</table>\n",
-       "</div>"
-      ],
-      "text/plain": [
-       "Empty DataFrame\n",
-       "Columns: [disarm_id, name_changed, summary_changed, name_x, name_y, summary_x, summary_y]\n",
-       "Index: []"
-      ]
-     },
-     "execution_count": 47,
-     "metadata": {},
-     "output_type": "execute_result"
-    }
-   ],
-   "source": [
-    "check_version_descriptions(metadata['techniques'], oldmeta['techniques'])"
-   ]
-  },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
    "execution_count": null,
diff --git a/CODE/compare_DISARM_excel_versions.ipynb b/CODE/compare_DISARM_excel_versions.ipynb
index 80d4f87..d823687 100644
--- a/CODE/compare_DISARM_excel_versions.ipynb
+++ b/CODE/compare_DISARM_excel_versions.ipynb
@@ -11,9 +11,36 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": null,
+   "execution_count": 5,
    "metadata": {},
-   "outputs": [],
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "name": "stderr",
+     "output_type": "stream",
+     "text": [
+      "<ipython-input-5-7e799212f01e>:9: FutureWarning: Passing a negative integer is deprecated in version 1.0 and will not be supported in future version. Instead, use None to not limit the column width.\n",
+      "  pd.set_option('display.max_colwidth', -1)\n"
+     ]
+    },
+    {
+     "name": "stdout",
+     "output_type": "stream",
+     "text": [
+      "table README is the same\n",
+      "table examples is the same\n",
+      "table incidents is the same\n",
+      "table incidenttechniques is the same\n",
+      "table narratives is the same\n",
+      "table externalgroups is the same\n",
+      "table externalgroupcounters is the same\n",
+      "table suggested_externalgroups is the same\n",
+      "table removed_externalgroups is the same\n",
+      "table forums is the same\n",
+      "table tools is the same\n",
+      "table removed_tools is the same\n"
+     ]
+    }
+   ],
    "source": [
     "import pandas as pd\n",
     "import sqlite3 as sql\n",
@@ -25,8 +52,8 @@
     "pd.set_option('display.max_rows', 1000)\n",
     "pd.set_option('display.max_colwidth', -1)\n",
     "\n",
-    "newfile = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
-    "oldfile = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_previous_version.xlsx'\n",
+    "newfile = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
+    "oldfile = '../../DISARMframeworks_2022_08_10/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
     "\n",
     "# Load dfs from file\n",
     "newdfs = {}\n",
@@ -65,7 +92,68 @@
     "\n",
     "for table in newdfs.keys():\n",
     "    if newdfs[table].equals(olddfs[table]) == False:\n",
-    "        investigate_table(table)"
+    "        investigate_table(table)\n",
+    "    else:\n",
+    "        print('table {} is the same'.format(table))"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 3,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>new</th>\n",
+       "      <th>old</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "Empty DataFrame\n",
+       "Columns: [disarm_id, new, old]\n",
+       "Index: []"
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 3,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "# Look at individual table differences\n",
+    "table = 'countermeasures'\n",
+    "column = 'summary'\n",
+    "coldiffs = newdfs[table][column] != olddfs[table][column]\n",
+    "diffcols = pd.DataFrame()\n",
+    "diffcols['disarm_id'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs]['disarm_id']\n",
+    "diffcols['new'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
+    "diffcols['old'] = olddfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
+    "diffcols[diffcols['old'] != '']"
    ]
   },
   {
@@ -73,17 +161,7 @@
    "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
    "outputs": [],
-   "source": [
-    "# Look at individual table differences\n",
-    "table = 'countermeasures'\n",
-    "column = 'summary'\n",
-    "coldiffs = newdfs[table][column] != olddfs[table][column]\n",
-    "diffcols = pd.DataFrame()\n",
-    "diffcols['amitt_id'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs]['amitt_id']\n",
-    "diffcols['new'] = newdfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
-    "diffcols['old'] = olddfs[table][coldiffs][column]\n",
-    "diffcols[diffcols['old'] != '']"
-   ]
+   "source": []
   }
  ],
  "metadata": {
diff --git a/CODE/compare_disarm_versions.ipynb b/CODE/compare_disarm_versions.ipynb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c4c7bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CODE/compare_disarm_versions.ipynb
@@ -0,0 +1,814 @@
+{
+ "cells": [
+  {
+   "cell_type": "markdown",
+   "metadata": {},
+   "source": [
+    "# Compare disarm versions"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 3,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "name": "stdout",
+     "output_type": "stream",
+     "text": [
+      "Current keys: dict_keys(['FRAMEWORK_ADMIN_README', 'FRAMEWORK_ADMIN CODES', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'subtechniques', 'frameworks', 'tasks', 'detections', 'countermeasures', 'playbooks', 'responsetypes', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'sectors', 'resources', 'MOE', 'MOP'])\n",
+      "Old keys: dict_keys(['ADMIN_README', 'ADMIN CODES', 'phases', 'tactics', 'techniques', 'frameworks', 'tasks', 'detections', 'countermeasures', 'playbooks', 'responsetypes', 'metatechniques', 'actortypes', 'sectors', 'resources', 'MOE', 'MOP'])\n"
+     ]
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "import pandas as pd\n",
+    "\n",
+    "MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'\n",
+    "frameworkfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
+    "oldframefile = MASTERDATA_DIR + '2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_0_1.xlsx'\n",
+    "oldframefile = 'AMITT_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx'\n",
+    "\n",
+    "def create_excel_metadata(frameworkfile):\n",
+    "    metadata = {}\n",
+    "    xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(frameworkfile)\n",
+    "    for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:\n",
+    "        metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)\n",
+    "        metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)\n",
+    "        metadata[sheetname].rename(columns={'amitt_id': 'disarm_id'}, inplace=True)\n",
+    "    return metadata\n",
+    "\n",
+    "def check_version_descriptions(df1, df2):\n",
+    "    merge = df1.merge(df2, on='disarm_id')\n",
+    "    merge['name_changed'] = merge['name_x'] != merge['name_y']\n",
+    "    merge['summary_changed'] = merge['summary_x'] != merge['summary_y']\n",
+    "    return merge[(merge['name_changed']) | (merge['summary_changed'])][['disarm_id', 'name_changed', 'summary_changed', 'name_x', \n",
+    "                                                                        'name_y', 'summary_x', 'summary_y']]\n",
+    "\n",
+    "metadata = create_excel_metadata(frameworkfile)\n",
+    "oldmeta = create_excel_metadata(oldframefile)\n",
+    "print('Current keys: {}'.format(metadata.keys()))\n",
+    "print('Old keys: {}'.format(oldmeta.keys()))"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 7,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>name_changed</th>\n",
+       "      <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
+       "      <th>name_x</th>\n",
+       "      <th>name_y</th>\n",
+       "      <th>summary_x</th>\n",
+       "      <th>summary_y</th>\n",
+       "      <th>type</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>3</th>\n",
+       "      <td>P04</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Assess</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>phase</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "  disarm_id  name_changed  summary_changed  name_x  name_y  \\\n",
+       "3       P04         False             True  Assess  Assess   \n",
+       "\n",
+       "                                           summary_x  \\\n",
+       "3  Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...   \n",
+       "\n",
+       "                                           summary_y   type  \n",
+       "3  Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in f...  phase  "
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 7,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "dfchanges = pd.DataFrame([])\n",
+    "changes = check_version_descriptions(metadata['phases'], oldmeta['phases'])\n",
+    "changes['type'] = 'phase'\n",
+    "dfchanges = changes\n",
+    "changes"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 9,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>name_changed</th>\n",
+       "      <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
+       "      <th>name_x</th>\n",
+       "      <th>name_y</th>\n",
+       "      <th>summary_x</th>\n",
+       "      <th>summary_y</th>\n",
+       "      <th>type</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>0</th>\n",
+       "      <td>TA01</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Plan Strategy</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Strategic Planning</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>tactic</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>1</th>\n",
+       "      <td>TA02</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Plan Objectives</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Objective Planning</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>tactic</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>2</th>\n",
+       "      <td>TA05</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Microtarget</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Microtargeting</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Target very specific populations of people</td>\n",
+       "      <td>tactic</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>3</th>\n",
+       "      <td>TA06</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Develop Content</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create or acquire text, images, and other content</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create and acquire content used in incident</td>\n",
+       "      <td>tactic</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>4</th>\n",
+       "      <td>TA07</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Select Channels and Affordances</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Channel Selection</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>tactic</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>5</th>\n",
+       "      <td>TA08</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Conduct Pump Priming</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Pump Priming</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>tactic</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>6</th>\n",
+       "      <td>TA09</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Deliver Content</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Exposure</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Release content to general public or larger po...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Release content to general public or push to l...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>tactic</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>7</th>\n",
+       "      <td>TA10</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Drive Offline Activity</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Go Physical</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Move incident/campaign from online to offline....</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Move incident into offline world</td>\n",
+       "      <td>tactic</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>8</th>\n",
+       "      <td>TA11</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Persist in the Information Environment</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Persistence</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>tactic</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>9</th>\n",
+       "      <td>TA12</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Assess Effectiveness</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Measure Effectiveness</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>tactic</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "  disarm_id  name_changed  summary_changed  \\\n",
+       "0      TA01          True            False   \n",
+       "1      TA02          True             True   \n",
+       "2      TA05          True            False   \n",
+       "3      TA06         False             True   \n",
+       "4      TA07          True             True   \n",
+       "5      TA08          True             True   \n",
+       "6      TA09          True             True   \n",
+       "7      TA10          True             True   \n",
+       "8      TA11          True             True   \n",
+       "9      TA12          True             True   \n",
+       "\n",
+       "                                   name_x                 name_y  \\\n",
+       "0                           Plan Strategy     Strategic Planning   \n",
+       "1                         Plan Objectives     Objective Planning   \n",
+       "2                             Microtarget         Microtargeting   \n",
+       "3                         Develop Content        Develop Content   \n",
+       "4         Select Channels and Affordances      Channel Selection   \n",
+       "5                    Conduct Pump Priming           Pump Priming   \n",
+       "6                         Deliver Content               Exposure   \n",
+       "7                  Drive Offline Activity            Go Physical   \n",
+       "8  Persist in the Information Environment            Persistence   \n",
+       "9                    Assess Effectiveness  Measure Effectiveness   \n",
+       "\n",
+       "                                           summary_x  \\\n",
+       "0  Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...   \n",
+       "1  Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...   \n",
+       "2         Target very specific populations of people   \n",
+       "3  Create or acquire text, images, and other content   \n",
+       "4  Selecting platforms and affordances assesses w...   \n",
+       "5  Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...   \n",
+       "6  Release content to general public or larger po...   \n",
+       "7  Move incident/campaign from online to offline....   \n",
+       "8  Persist in the Information Space refers to tak...   \n",
+       "9  Assess effectiveness of action, for use in fut...   \n",
+       "\n",
+       "                                           summary_y    type  \n",
+       "0  Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of ...  tactic  \n",
+       "1  Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievabl...  tactic  \n",
+       "2         Target very specific populations of people  tactic  \n",
+       "3        Create and acquire content used in incident  tactic  \n",
+       "4  Set up specific delivery, amplification and ma...  tactic  \n",
+       "5  Release content on a targetted small scale, pr...  tactic  \n",
+       "6  Release content to general public or push to l...  tactic  \n",
+       "7                   Move incident into offline world  tactic  \n",
+       "8  Keep incident 'alive', beyond the incident cre...  tactic  \n",
+       "9  Measure effectiveness of incident, for use in ...  tactic  "
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 9,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "changes = check_version_descriptions(metadata['tactics'], oldmeta['tactics'])\n",
+    "changes['type'] = 'tactic'\n",
+    "dfchanges = pd.concat([dfchanges, changes])\n",
+    "changes"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 10,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [
+    {
+     "data": {
+      "text/html": [
+       "<div>\n",
+       "<style scoped>\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th:only-of-type {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: middle;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe tbody tr th {\n",
+       "        vertical-align: top;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "\n",
+       "    .dataframe thead th {\n",
+       "        text-align: right;\n",
+       "    }\n",
+       "</style>\n",
+       "<table border=\"1\" class=\"dataframe\">\n",
+       "  <thead>\n",
+       "    <tr style=\"text-align: right;\">\n",
+       "      <th></th>\n",
+       "      <th>disarm_id</th>\n",
+       "      <th>name_changed</th>\n",
+       "      <th>summary_changed</th>\n",
+       "      <th>name_x</th>\n",
+       "      <th>name_y</th>\n",
+       "      <th>summary_x</th>\n",
+       "      <th>summary_y</th>\n",
+       "      <th>type</th>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </thead>\n",
+       "  <tbody>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>2</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0004</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Develop Competing Narratives</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Competing Narratives</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Advance competing narratives connected to same...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Advance competing narratives connected to same...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>3</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0007</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create key social engineering assets needed to...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create key social engineering assets needed to...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>6</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0011</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Compromise legitimate accounts</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Hijack legitimate account</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Hack or take over legimate accounts to distrib...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Hack or take over legimate accounts to distrib...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>7</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0013</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create inauthentic websites</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create fake websites</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create media assets to support inauthentic org...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create media assets to support fake organizati...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>8</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0014</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Prepare fundraising campaigns</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create funding campaigns</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence op...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Generate revenue through online funding campai...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>9</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0015</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create hashtags and search artifacts</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create hashtag</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag gro...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Many incident-based campaigns will create a ha...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>10</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0016</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create Clickbait</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Clickbait</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, ...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, ...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>11</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0017</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Conduct fundraising</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Promote online funding</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence op...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Drive traffic/engagement to funding campaign s...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>12</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0018</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Purchase Targeted Advertisements</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Paid targeted ads</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create or fund advertisements targeted at spec...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create or fund advertisements targeted at spec...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>15</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0022</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Conspiracy narratives</td>\n",
+       "      <td>\"Conspiracy narratives\" appeal to the human de...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>\"Conspiracy narratives appeal to the human des...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>17</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0029</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Online polls</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Manipulate online polls</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create fake online polls, or manipulate existi...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Create fake online polls, or manipulate existi...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>18</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0040</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Demand insurmountable proof</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Demand unsurmountable proof</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Campaigns often leverage tactical and informat...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Campaigns often leverage tactical and informat...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>19</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0042</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Seed Kernel of truth</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Kernel of Truth</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Wrap lies or altered context/facts around trut...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Wrap lies or altered context/facts around trut...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>20</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0043</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Chat apps</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Direct messaging via encypted app is an increa...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>22</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0045</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Use fake experts</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Use fake experts</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Use the fake experts that were set up during E...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>23</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0046</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Use Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Search Engine Optimization</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Red...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Red...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>24</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0047</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Censor social media as a political force</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Muzzle social media as a political force</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Use political influence or the power of state ...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Use political influence or the power of state ...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>25</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0048</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Harass</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Cow online opinion leaders</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Threatening or harassing believers of opposing...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Intimidate, coerce, threaten critics/dissident...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>26</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0049</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Flooding the Information Space</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Flooding</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels ...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels ...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>27</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0057</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Organize Events</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Organise remote rallies and events</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Coordinate and promote real-world events acros...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Coordinate and promote real-world events acros...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>28</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0059</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Play the long game</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Play the long game</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1....</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Play the long game can mean a couple of things...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>29</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0060</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>False</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Continue to Amplify</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Continue to amplify</td>\n",
+       "      <td>continue narrative or message amplification af...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>continue narrative or message amplification af...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "    <tr>\n",
+       "      <th>30</th>\n",
+       "      <td>T0061</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>True</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Sell Merchandise</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Sell merchandising</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Sell mechandise refers to getting the message ...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>Sell hats, t-shirts, flags and other branded c...</td>\n",
+       "      <td>technique</td>\n",
+       "    </tr>\n",
+       "  </tbody>\n",
+       "</table>\n",
+       "</div>"
+      ],
+      "text/plain": [
+       "   disarm_id  name_changed  summary_changed  \\\n",
+       "2      T0004          True             True   \n",
+       "3      T0007          True             True   \n",
+       "6      T0011          True             True   \n",
+       "7      T0013          True             True   \n",
+       "8      T0014          True             True   \n",
+       "9      T0015          True             True   \n",
+       "10     T0016          True             True   \n",
+       "11     T0017          True             True   \n",
+       "12     T0018          True            False   \n",
+       "15     T0022          True             True   \n",
+       "17     T0029          True            False   \n",
+       "18     T0040          True            False   \n",
+       "19     T0042          True             True   \n",
+       "20     T0043          True             True   \n",
+       "22     T0045         False             True   \n",
+       "23     T0046          True            False   \n",
+       "24     T0047          True             True   \n",
+       "25     T0048          True             True   \n",
+       "26     T0049          True             True   \n",
+       "27     T0057          True             True   \n",
+       "28     T0059         False             True   \n",
+       "29     T0060          True            False   \n",
+       "30     T0061          True             True   \n",
+       "\n",
+       "                                              name_x  \\\n",
+       "2                       Develop Competing Narratives   \n",
+       "3   Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups   \n",
+       "6                     Compromise legitimate accounts   \n",
+       "7                        Create inauthentic websites   \n",
+       "8                      Prepare fundraising campaigns   \n",
+       "9               Create hashtags and search artifacts   \n",
+       "10                                  Create Clickbait   \n",
+       "11                               Conduct fundraising   \n",
+       "12                  Purchase Targeted Advertisements   \n",
+       "15             Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives   \n",
+       "17                                      Online polls   \n",
+       "18                       Demand insurmountable proof   \n",
+       "19                              Seed Kernel of truth   \n",
+       "20                                         Chat apps   \n",
+       "22                                  Use fake experts   \n",
+       "23                    Use Search Engine Optimization   \n",
+       "24          Censor social media as a political force   \n",
+       "25                                            Harass   \n",
+       "26                    Flooding the Information Space   \n",
+       "27                                   Organize Events   \n",
+       "28                                Play the long game   \n",
+       "29                               Continue to Amplify   \n",
+       "30                                  Sell Merchandise   \n",
+       "\n",
+       "                                               name_y  \\\n",
+       "2                                Competing Narratives   \n",
+       "3   Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Gr...   \n",
+       "6                           Hijack legitimate account   \n",
+       "7                                Create fake websites   \n",
+       "8                            Create funding campaigns   \n",
+       "9                                      Create hashtag   \n",
+       "10                                          Clickbait   \n",
+       "11                             Promote online funding   \n",
+       "12                                  Paid targeted ads   \n",
+       "15                              Conspiracy narratives   \n",
+       "17                            Manipulate online polls   \n",
+       "18                        Demand unsurmountable proof   \n",
+       "19                                    Kernel of Truth   \n",
+       "20                       Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps   \n",
+       "22                                   Use fake experts   \n",
+       "23                         Search Engine Optimization   \n",
+       "24           Muzzle social media as a political force   \n",
+       "25                         Cow online opinion leaders   \n",
+       "26                                           Flooding   \n",
+       "27                 Organise remote rallies and events   \n",
+       "28                                 Play the long game   \n",
+       "29                                Continue to amplify   \n",
+       "30                                 Sell merchandising   \n",
+       "\n",
+       "                                            summary_x  \\\n",
+       "2   Advance competing narratives connected to same...   \n",
+       "3   Create key social engineering assets needed to...   \n",
+       "6   Hack or take over legimate accounts to distrib...   \n",
+       "7   Create media assets to support inauthentic org...   \n",
+       "8   Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence op...   \n",
+       "9   Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag gro...   \n",
+       "10  Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, ...   \n",
+       "11  Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence op...   \n",
+       "12  Create or fund advertisements targeted at spec...   \n",
+       "15  \"Conspiracy narratives\" appeal to the human de...   \n",
+       "17  Create fake online polls, or manipulate existi...   \n",
+       "18  Campaigns often leverage tactical and informat...   \n",
+       "19  Wrap lies or altered context/facts around trut...   \n",
+       "20  Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing...   \n",
+       "22  Use the fake experts that were set up during E...   \n",
+       "23  Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Red...   \n",
+       "24  Use political influence or the power of state ...   \n",
+       "25  Threatening or harassing believers of opposing...   \n",
+       "26  Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels ...   \n",
+       "27  Coordinate and promote real-world events acros...   \n",
+       "28  Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1....   \n",
+       "29  continue narrative or message amplification af...   \n",
+       "30  Sell mechandise refers to getting the message ...   \n",
+       "\n",
+       "                                            summary_y       type  \n",
+       "2   Advance competing narratives connected to same...  technique  \n",
+       "3   Create key social engineering assets needed to...  technique  \n",
+       "6   Hack or take over legimate accounts to distrib...  technique  \n",
+       "7   Create media assets to support fake organizati...  technique  \n",
+       "8   Generate revenue through online funding campai...  technique  \n",
+       "9   Many incident-based campaigns will create a ha...  technique  \n",
+       "10  Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, ...  technique  \n",
+       "11  Drive traffic/engagement to funding campaign s...  technique  \n",
+       "12  Create or fund advertisements targeted at spec...  technique  \n",
+       "15  \"Conspiracy narratives appeal to the human des...  technique  \n",
+       "17  Create fake online polls, or manipulate existi...  technique  \n",
+       "18  Campaigns often leverage tactical and informat...  technique  \n",
+       "19  Wrap lies or altered context/facts around trut...  technique  \n",
+       "20  Direct messaging via encypted app is an increa...  technique  \n",
+       "22  Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009...  technique  \n",
+       "23  Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Red...  technique  \n",
+       "24  Use political influence or the power of state ...  technique  \n",
+       "25  Intimidate, coerce, threaten critics/dissident...  technique  \n",
+       "26  Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels ...  technique  \n",
+       "27  Coordinate and promote real-world events acros...  technique  \n",
+       "28  Play the long game can mean a couple of things...  technique  \n",
+       "29  continue narrative or message amplification af...  technique  \n",
+       "30  Sell hats, t-shirts, flags and other branded c...  technique  "
+      ]
+     },
+     "execution_count": 10,
+     "metadata": {},
+     "output_type": "execute_result"
+    }
+   ],
+   "source": [
+    "changes = check_version_descriptions(metadata['techniques'], oldmeta['techniques'])\n",
+    "changes['type'] = 'technique'\n",
+    "dfchanges = pd.concat([dfchanges, changes])\n",
+    "changes"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": 11,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [],
+   "source": [
+    "dfchanges.to_csv('temp_versionchanges.csv', index=False)"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "cell_type": "code",
+   "execution_count": null,
+   "metadata": {},
+   "outputs": [],
+   "source": []
+  }
+ ],
+ "metadata": {
+  "kernelspec": {
+   "display_name": "Python 3",
+   "language": "python",
+   "name": "python3"
+  },
+  "language_info": {
+   "codemirror_mode": {
+    "name": "ipython",
+    "version": 3
+   },
+   "file_extension": ".py",
+   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
+   "name": "python",
+   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
+   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
+   "version": "3.8.3"
+  }
+ },
+ "nbformat": 4,
+ "nbformat_minor": 4
+}
diff --git a/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.ipynb b/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.ipynb
index 5969efa..49455cf 100644
--- a/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.ipynb
+++ b/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.ipynb
@@ -27,6 +27,36 @@
      "name": "stdout",
      "output_type": "stream",
      "text": [
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv ADMIN_DATA_README\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/detections.csv detections\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/actortypes.csv actortypes\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/responsetypes.csv responsetypes\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/phases.csv phases\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroupcounters.csv externalgroupcounters\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/metatechniques.csv metatechniques\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/techniques.csv techniques\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOP.csv MOP\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOE.csv MOE\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/narratives.csv narratives\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/forums.csv forums\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/playbooks.csv playbooks\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/resources.csv resources\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/suggested_externalgroups.csv suggested_externalgroups\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tasks.csv tasks\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidenttechniques.csv incidenttechniques\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/examples.csv examples\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools.csv tools\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/removed_externalgroups.csv removed_externalgroups\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/removed_tools.csv removed_tools\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/frameworks.csv frameworks\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups.csv externalgroups\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/countermeasures.csv countermeasures\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tactics.csv tactics\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/sectors.csv sectors\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES\n",
+      "../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidents.csv incidents\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/disarm_red_framework.md\n",
       "updated ../generated_files/disarm_red_framework_clickable.html\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/disarm_blue_framework.md\n",
@@ -35,12 +65,8 @@
       "updated ../generated_pages/phases_index.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype tactic\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/tactics_index.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA10.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype technique\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/techniques_index.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0103.001.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0103.002.md\n",
-      "Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0128.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype task\n",
       "updated ../generated_pages/tasks_index.md\n",
       "Temp: objecttype incident\n",
@@ -74,7 +100,7 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 2,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
    "outputs": [],
    "source": [
@@ -94,7 +120,7 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 3,
+   "execution_count": null,
    "metadata": {},
    "outputs": [],
    "source": [
@@ -113,7 +139,7 @@
   },
   {
    "cell_type": "code",
-   "execution_count": 4,
+   "execution_count": 2,
    "metadata": {
     "scrolled": true
    },
@@ -660,7 +686,7 @@
        "32                                                     "
       ]
      },
-     "execution_count": 4,
+     "execution_count": 2,
      "metadata": {},
      "output_type": "execute_result"
     }
@@ -699,4 +725,4 @@
  },
  "nbformat": 4,
  "nbformat_minor": 4
-}
\ No newline at end of file
+}
diff --git a/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.py b/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.py
index 9481f70..b6d507a 100644
--- a/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.py
+++ b/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.py
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ todo:
 import pandas as pd
 import numpy as np
 import os
+import glob
 from sklearn.feature_extraction.text import CountVectorizer
 
 GENERATED_PAGES_DIR = '../generated_pages/'
@@ -84,22 +85,16 @@ MASTERDATA_DIR = '../DISARM_MASTER_DATA/'
 class Disarm:
 
     
-    def __init__(self, 
-                 frameworkfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx', 
-                 datafile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx',
-                 commentsfile = MASTERDATA_DIR + 'DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.xlsx'):
+    def __init__(self):
         
-        # Load metadata from file
+        # Load metadata from files
+        # Older versions of DISARM are in excel files; newer ones in sets of CSV files
         metadata = {}
-        xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(frameworkfile)
-        for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:
-            metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)
+        for csvfile in glob.glob(MASTERDATA_DIR + '*.csv'):
+            sheetname = csvfile[csvfile.rfind('/')+1:-4]
+            metadata[sheetname] = pd.read_csv(csvfile)
             metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)
 
-        xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(datafile)
-        for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names:
-            metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname)
-            metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True)
 
         # Create individual tables and dictionaries
         self.df_phases = metadata['phases']
@@ -120,9 +115,16 @@ class Disarm:
         self.df_resources = metadata['resources']
         self.df_responsetypes = metadata['responsetypes']
         self.df_metatechniques = metadata['metatechniques']
-        self.it = self.create_incident_technique_crosstable(metadata['incidenttechniques'])
+        self.it = self.refine_incident_technique_crosstable(metadata['cross_incident_technique'])
         self.df_tactics = metadata['tactics']
         self.df_playbooks = metadata['playbooks']
+        self.cross_counterid_techniqueid = metadata['cross_counter_technique']       
+        self.cross_counterid_resourceid = metadata['cross_counter_resource']
+        self.cross_counterid_actortypeid = metadata['cross_counter_actortype']
+        self.cross_detectionid_techniqueid = metadata['cross_detection_technique']       
+        self.cross_detectionid_resourceid = metadata['cross_detection_resource']
+        self.cross_detectionid_actortypeid = metadata['cross_detection_actortype']
+
 
         # Add columns containing lists of techniques and counters to the tactics dataframe
         self.df_techniques_per_tactic = self.df_techniques.groupby('tactic_id')['disarm_id'].apply(list).reset_index().rename({'disarm_id':'technique_ids'}, axis=1)
@@ -142,22 +144,8 @@ class Disarm:
         # Create the data table for each framework file
         self.num_tactics = len(self.df_tactics)
 
-        # Create counters and detections cross-tables
-        self.cross_counterid_techniqueid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_counters[['disarm_id', 'techniques']], 
-                                                                   'techniques', 'technique', '\n')        
-        self.cross_counterid_resourceid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_counters[['disarm_id', 'resources_needed']], 
-                                                                  'resources_needed', 'resource', ',')
-        self.cross_counterid_actortypeid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_counters[['disarm_id', 'actortypes']], 
-                                                                  'actortypes', 'actortype', ',')
-        self.cross_detectionid_techniqueid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'techniques']], 
-                                                                   'techniques', 'technique', '\n')        
-        self.cross_detectionid_resourceid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'resources_needed']], 
-                                                                  'resources_needed', 'resource', ',')
-        self.cross_detectionid_actortypeid = self.create_cross_table(self.df_detections[['disarm_id', 'actortypes']], 
-                                                                  'actortypes', 'actortype', ',')
 
-
-    def create_incident_technique_crosstable(self, it_metadata):
+    def refine_incident_technique_crosstable(self, it_metadata):
         # Generate full cross-table between incidents and techniques
 
         it = it_metadata
@@ -175,21 +163,6 @@ class Disarm:
     def make_object_dictionary(self, df):
         return(pd.Series(df.name.values,index=df.disarm_id).to_dict())
 
-
-    def create_cross_table(self, df, col, newcol, divider=','):
-        ''' Convert a column with multiple values per cell into a crosstable
-
-        # Thanks https://stackoverflow.com/questions/17116814/pandas-how-do-i-split-text-in-a-column-into-multiple-rows?noredirect=1
-        '''
-        crosstable = df.join(df[col]
-                        .str.split(divider, expand=True).stack()
-                        .reset_index(drop=True,level=1)
-                        .rename(newcol)).drop(col, axis=1)
-        crosstable = crosstable[crosstable[newcol].notnull()]
-        crosstable[newcol+'_id'] = crosstable[newcol].str.split(' ').str[0]
-        crosstable.drop(newcol, axis=1, inplace=True)
-        return crosstable
-
     
     def create_technique_incidents_string(self, techniqueid):
 
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/.DS_Store b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/.DS_Store
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diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/.DS_Store b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/.DS_Store
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5751c81
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diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-01-01_AMITT/AMITT_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-01-01_AMITT/AMITT_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e345d33
Binary files /dev/null and b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-01-01_AMITT/AMITT_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx differ
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER_0_1.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER_0_1.csv
similarity index 100%
rename from DISARM_MASTER_DATA/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER_0_1.csv
rename to DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER_0_1.csv
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_DATA_MASTER_0_1.xlsx b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_DATA_MASTER_0_1.xlsx
similarity index 100%
rename from DISARM_MASTER_DATA/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_DATA_MASTER_0_1.xlsx
rename to DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_DATA_MASTER_0_1.xlsx
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_0_1.xlsx b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_0_1.xlsx
similarity index 100%
rename from DISARM_MASTER_DATA/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_0_1.xlsx
rename to DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-06-30_DISARM_0_1/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER_0_1.xlsx
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_a/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv
similarity index 100%
rename from DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv
rename to DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_a/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_a/DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx
similarity index 98%
rename from DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx
rename to DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_a/DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx
index e5ed780..a339c84 100644
Binary files a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx and b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_a/DISARM_DATA_MASTER.xlsx differ
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_a/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx
similarity index 99%
rename from DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx
rename to DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_a/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx
index 29d31e9..e4fece1 100644
Binary files a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx and b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_a/DISARM_FRAMEWORKS_MASTER.xlsx differ
diff --git a/CODE/DISARM-STIX2/.DS_Store b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/.DS_Store
similarity index 80%
rename from CODE/DISARM-STIX2/.DS_Store
rename to DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/.DS_Store
index 0e98b23..3734fa1 100644
Binary files a/CODE/DISARM-STIX2/.DS_Store and b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/.DS_Store differ
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72125e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Unnamed: 0,Unnamed: 1,Unnamed: 2,Unnamed: 3,Unnamed: 4,Unnamed: 5
+"Spreadsheet created by initially combining CredCo's CredWeb and the Carnegie Endowment lists of disinformation initiatives with CSC's Rolodex, Disinfo Cloud list and a list compiled by Jon B",,,,,
+Further work needed to assimilate addition data from the lists below...,,,,,
+,DATASETS,,No. of entries,Categorisation,
+,Carnegie post,https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/14/mapping-worldwide-initiatives-to-counter-influence-operations-pub-83435 ,Commentary on Carnegie list,,
+,"Carnegie list, created from credweb, rand, disinfocloud",https://ceip.knack.com/pcio-baseline-datasets#initiatives/ ,460,Added. See below,
+,CredCo's CredWeb catalogue:,https://credibilitycoalition.org/credcatalog/,252,Added. Theory; Practice; Content; Infrastructure,
+,Rand list of tools,https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/fighting-disinformation.html,90,Bot/spam detection; Codes and standards; Credibility scoring; Disinformation tracking; Education/training; Verification; Whitelisting,
+,Disinfocloud list of technologies:,https://disinfocloud.com/about-us,265,Need to sign in with org name - CSC has an account,
+,Disinfocloud has a useful list of tool categories:,https://disinfocloud.com/tools-overview/,,,
+,Facebook map of fact checkers,https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-checking/partner-map,,"I've checked Africa, South America, Central America.  Everything else still to do",
+,WHO covid19 disinfo note,https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ucor7vU81HbBbxvre2QI5Rv08Ys1VvX2JrWtNSGk4XY/edit#,,NEED TO CHECK THROUGH THIS,
+,IRI list of european groups,https://dash-iribeaconproject.org/,,ADD TO LISTS,
+,"DCMS index of companies - safe-tech issues, incl disinfo",https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/directory-of-uk-safety-tech-providers,,ADD TO LISTS,
+,Duke Reporters Lab of Fact Checkers,https://reporterslab.org/fact-checking/,,ADD TO LISTS,
+,ISACs/ISAOs,https://www.nationalisacs.org/member-isacs-3,,ADD TO LISTS?,
+,Turing online hate research hub,https://www.turing.ac.uk/research/research-programmes/public-policy/online-hate-research-hub,,ADD TO LISTS?,
+,Internationl Fact Checking Network (Poynter),https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,,,
+,European Union report list,https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/624278/EPRS_STU(2019)624278_EN.pdf,,,ADD TO LISTS
+,Ryerson Uni covid19 factcheckers list ,https://covid19misinfo.org/fact-checking/covid-19-fact-checkers/ and https://dataverse.scholarsportal.info/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5683/SP2/IMISPE,,,
+,Countering Disinformation list,https://counteringdisinformation.org/interventions/,,TRIAGE LISTS,
+,,,,,
+,,,,,
+MAP,https://datastudio.google.com/u/2/reporting/a8491164-6aa8-45d0-b609-c70339689127/page/ierzB ,,597,,
+,,,,,
+QUESTIONS,,,,,
+,Suggested corrections in form:,https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScnjgJg2lGw3FB_xGaZPrZuKEZSY1OOy9-UosMS9T2yWAtm3A/viewform,,,
+,,,,,
+CODES,,,,,
+,Initiatives Studying Influence Operations Code Book,,,,
+,Field,Description,,,
+,Name,"Name of the initiative, with any larger host organization listed in brackets after the name. e.g.: Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project (American Press Institute)",,,
+,Organization Type,"Academia – initiative is housed at a university
+Civil Society – initiative is led by a think tank, non-governmental organization, non-profit or charity.
+Government & Intergovernmental – initiative is run by a single government or government-level international organization such as NATO, the UN or EU.
+Media – initiative is run by a media outlet
+Tech – initiative is led by a social media platform or technology company",,,
+,Initiative Focus,"Countermeasures – seeks to counter or disrupt influence operations.
+Democracy & Civil Liberties –aims to support the democratic process by identifying attempts to subvert or influence elections, factchecking political statements and/or engaging in cross-sector engagement to build understanding of the threat.
+Factchecking & Journalism –conducts fact checking (e.g., of media reporting or political statements), verifies videos and images, detects disinformation narratives, verifies the credibility of websites, or supports journalism more broadly;
+Investigations –conducts research into ongoing or recent influence operations to expose them, reveal hidden networks and nodes, highlight tactics, and make attributions, typically on tight deadlines. 
+Public Policy – develops new policy and regulatory proposals and/or evaluates the effectiveness of existing ones
+Research – conducts longer-term academic-level research on influence operations, including campaigns, their effects and countermeasures.
+Societal Resilience – initiative aims to build public resilience to influence operations narratives and improve the information ecosystem through education, media literacy, and/or promoting responsible journalism
+Tools – provides tools to help researchers and end-users to understand or control their experience within the information environment",,,
+,Self- Description,Description of main activities as per the initiative’s publicly available information,,,
+,Location,"Geographic location by continent. Presence on 3 or more continents counts as global
+North America
+South America
+Europe
+Asia
+Africa
+Australia and Oceania
+Global",,,
+,URL,Link to the website of the initiative,,,
+,,,,,
+,,,,,
+,76,on the tools sheet,,,
+,130,with 'tool provider' checked on the org sheet,,,
+,811,organisations,,,
+,297,contacts,,,
+,,,,,
+CRUNCHBASE,,,,,
+,Deb gives this as an example model,https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/lookup-2,,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a395af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv	
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+disarm_object,id_prefix,id_digits,next number on stack
+actortype,A,3,
+countermeasure,C,5,
+responsetype,D,2,
+example,E,6,
+detection,F,5,
+framework,FW,2,
+group,G,6,
+incident,I,5,
+metatechnique,M,3,
+moe,ME,5,
+mop,MP,5,
+narrative,N,5,
+phase,P,2,P05
+playbook,PB,5,
+resource,R,3,
+sector,S,3,
+technique,T,4,T0073
+tactic,TA,2,TA19
+task,TK,4,
+tool,TL,5,
+subtechnique,ST,4,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eca32b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+MASTER COPY OF DISARM TTPS,Unnamed: 1,Unnamed: 2,Unnamed: 3
+,,,
+HISTORY OF THIS SPREADSHEET,,,
+,,,
+Date,Who,Description,Comments
+2019-11-15 00:00:00,ALL,"""Blue Team"" workshop, Washington DC 15-16 Nov 2019",
+2019-12-05 00:00:00,SJT,copied all wall post-its into spreadsheet,
+2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,Took copy for cleaning,
+2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,Put notes here if you spot something unusual or do something you want crosschecking,
+2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,"First task: look for the techniques for each row in the spreadsheet, and add them to the ""techniques"" column. A list of Technique numbers is best; if it applies to all techniques in a tactic, put the tactic number; if it applies to all techniques, put “all”.",
+2019-12-21 00:00:00,Eric D.,"I am unsure to what extent content dissemination is included in the ""Develop"" phases or Channel Selection, compared to belonging more or less solely within Pump Priming, Exposure, Go Physical and Persistence.",
+2020-01-07 00:00:00,SJT,"Content dissemination is generally right of boom, but might be needed as part of eg. creating convincing sockpuppets or groups in a channel",
+2020-01-10 00:00:00,SJT,"New copy of spreadsheet. Going to put all counters in here, as a playbook",
+2020-01-12 00:00:00,SJT,"Included post-it notes from 2019-11 workshop. Included incident-counters from 2019-11 preparation worksheet. Included general-counters from 2019-11 preparation worksheet. Added References worksheet, to hold URLs to references (excel only allows 1 URL per cell, which wipes data if we're not careful)",
+2020-01-13 00:00:00,SJT,"Included counters and playbooks from teams 1,2,3,4,D",
+2020-01-14 00:00:00,SJT,"Took copy of spreadsheet, so we have a snapshot of all the inputs into it. Now it's time to get cleaning!",
+2020-01-20 00:00:00,SJT,"Started the cleanup. First, gave every counter an id. ",
+2020-01-31 00:00:00,SJT,"Split output report into two: ""finding ways to counter disinformation campaigns"" and ""Disinformation counters"" so we can publish the first part faster",
+2020-02-10 00:00:00,Roger J.,"Add ""Measure of Effectiveness"" and ""Measure of Performance"" sheet. This is a requirement for effective data pollution where the objective is to degrade the adversary's ability to measure their affect.",
+2020-05-14 00:00:00,SJT,"Clean up tactic and response names in countermeasures sheet, so they don’t mess up the generators",
+,,,
+,,,
+SUGGESTED TASKS,,,
+,,,
+Date,Suggested by,Suggested Task,Comments
+,SJT,"Add links to references with each counter in, to the rows for those counters. Add each document to the REFERENCES tab, and its [ref] to the column ""References"" in the Countermeasures sheet. ",
+,SJT,"Check through spreadsheet for duplicate counters, and counters at the wrong level of details (e.g. work out what should be at the counter level, and what should be at the playbook level). Clean up accordingly.",
+,SJT,"Create code similar to the DISARM github code, that creates: a page for each technique, listing the counters relevant to that technique; a page for each tactic, listing the counters relevant to that tactic, by response type then alphabetically; a COA grid with the number of responses for each tactic/response combination ",done
+,SJT,"Create a chapter in the summary document for each tactic, describing the types of counter relevant at that tactic stage. ",Done
+,SJT,Write a document chapter on viewing disinformation as an ecosystem and potential solution space to be explored. ,
+2021-07-17 00:00:00,SJT,"Look at SG note for wording, counters we haven't listed https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-misinformation-advisory.pdf",
+REFERENCES USED,,,
+,,,
+ID,URL,Reference,Comments
+RAND2237,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2237.html,"Helmus et al, ""Russian Social Media Influence: understanding Russian propaganda in Eastern Europe"", Rand Corporation 2018",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
+Corker18,https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf,"Corker et al, ""Putin's asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: implications for US national security"", 2018",
+Hicks19,https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-i-campaigning-gray-zone,"Hicks et al, ""By other means part 1: campaigning in the gray zone"", 2019",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
+Dalton19,csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-ii-adapting-compete-gray-zone,"Dalton et al, ""By other means part 2: adapting to compete in the gray zone"", 2019",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
+Taylor81,http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2742/ToP.pdf,"Philip M. Taylor (1981): Techniques of persuasion: basic ground rules of British propaganda during the Second World War, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 1:1, 57 – 66",https://web.archive.org/web/20170226100346/http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2742/ToP.pdf
+,https://www.psywar.org/content/irdSpecialOperations,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..045fb69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/DISARM_COMMENTS_MASTER.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,1755 @@
+0,1,2
+"counter","C00066","
+
+New content.  
+
+If a group has the ability - e.g. enough dedicated person-hours - it can hijack the artifacts and narratives of a disinformation incident, by flooding them with counter-content.   This has been seen in the past as accidental hashtag flooding - e.g. a new disinformation hashtag was unknowingly chosen that was the same as a children's swim team, which became active during a swim meet.  In 2020, kPop stans flooded disinformation-carrying hashtags including #whitelivesmatter, and gay men flooded the #proudboys hashtag. 
+
+This is an example of a countertechnique that mirrors an existing disinformation technique - in this case T0049.  
+"
+"incident","I00002","
+
+Actor: IRA, individuals (e.g. Larry Cook).
+
+Timeframe: 
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals:
+Physical damage to country? 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Targetted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targetting Washington State mothers, $1,776 to boost posts over 9 months). 
+* Gofundme campaigns to pay for ads (Larry Cook)
+
+Effects:
+
+* “The U.S. anti-vax movement has been blamed for two outbreaks of measles that have infected some 300 people—mostly children—in New York and the Pacific Northwest.”
+
+Counters:
+
+* American Medical Association “warned social-media giants, including Amazon, Facebook, Google, Pinterest, Twitter, and YouTube, that they were helping to amplify the propaganda and confuse parents.”
+* Gofundme banned antivaxxers: “Campaigns raising money to promote misinformation about vaccines violate GoFundMe’s terms of service and will be removed from the platform”.  Less than 10 campaigns reported as removed.
+
+Related incidents:
+
+Artefacts:
+
+Search terms vaccination, anti-vaccination, “vaccine choice”. 
+
+Notes:
+
+Started by looking for vaccine-related content in my misinformation datasets
+Then did google search for “antivax misinformation” to get references etc. 
+Larry Cook runs “Stop Mandatory Vaccination”: “donations go “directly” to his bank account and funds “may be used to pay [his] personal bills.”
+
+
+References;
+
+* https://www.thedailybeast.com/brooklyn-hasidic-community-is-in-the-midst-of-a-dire-measles-outbreak
+* https://www.thedailybeast.com/amazon-wont-take-a-stand-in-war-over-forrest-maready-book-the-autism-vaccine
+* https://www.bmj.com/content/362/bmj.k3739
+* https://hub.jhu.edu/2018/08/24/russian-trolls-bots-spread-vaccine-misinformation/
+* https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304567 
+* Arciga, [GoFundMe Bans Anti-Vaxxers Who Raise Money to Spread Misinformation](https://www.thedailybeast.com/gofundme-bans-anti-vaxxers-who-raise-money-to-spread-misinformation), Daily Beast 2019-03-22
+* Arciga, [Anti-Vaxxer Larry Cook Has Weaponized Facebook Ads in War Against Science](https://www.thedailybeast.com/anti-vaxxer-larry-cook-has-weaponized-facebook-ads-in-war-against-science), Daily Beast 2019-02-15
+* Gofundmes (removed, but check archives) https://www.gofundme.com/help-save-vaccine-exemptions-in-washington-state https://www.gofundme.com/parents-wake-up-vaccines-kill 
+* Markay, [Anti-Vaccine Facebook Ads Target Women in Measles-Stricken States](https://www.thedailybeast.com/anti-vaccine-facebook-ads-target-women-in-measles-stricken-states/), Daily Beast 2019-02-14
+
+Data
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00053","
+
+Actor: China
+
+Timeframe: December 5, 2018 - still active on 04/03/2019
+
+Date: December 5, 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Unlike Russia, Chinese state has employed a plethora of state-run media to exploit the openness of American democratic society in an effort to insert an intentionally distorted and biased narrative portraying a utopian view of the Chinese government and party. 
+
+Method: 
+
+* China’s state-run social media operations are largely positive and coordinated because those techniques support Chinese strategic goals. State-run media seeds foreign influence environment
+* Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese State and Party
+* Events coordinated and promoted across media platforms
+* Extend from digital into physical space with gatherings, ie: support for Meng outside courthouse
+
+* In the case of Chinese state-run information manipulation campaigns — to distinguish the political intent and national strategies underlying these campaigns as different from simply another perspective on the news. China also play’s victim, innocence, plays by rules, misunderstood narrative… they too have their version of the 4D’s. Examples: “Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye has accused Canada of applying a double standard, and has decried what he sees as “Western egotism and white supremacy” in the treatment of detained Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou.” - Op-Ed in Globe & Mail. The Chinese embassy in Canada says the Vancouver arrest of a top Huawei executive amounts to a “political conspiracy” to undermine the telecom giant and it dismisses Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s assertion that he had no role in the high-profile case. Canada's arrest of a senior Huawei executive was the ""backstabbing"" of a friend, Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye said Thursday, and he warned of repercussions if the federal government bars her telecom company from building a Canadian 5G network.
+
+Counters: none identified/researched
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* See Poland (arrest of Huawei employee); Czech republic; 
+* Five Eyes to ban or not ban Huawei 5G network equipment 
+
+
+References: 
+
+* https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-chinas-envoy-says-white-supremacy-played-part-in-canadas-arrest-of/
+* https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews
+* https://twitter.com/UserExperienceU
+* https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190125061623487
+* https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-universities-continuing-rd-funding-partnerships-with/
+* http://fortune.com/2019/01/18/oxford-university-huawei-research-funding/
+* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-security-universities-insig/u-s-universities-unplug-from-chinas-huawei-under-pressure-from-trump-idUSKCN1PI0GV
+
+
+* Beyond Hybrid War: How China Exploits Social Media to Sway American Opinion
+https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-china-says-arrest-of-huawei-cfo-part-of-political-conspiracy-by/
+* https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/czech-zeman-babis-huawei-xi-trump/584158
+* https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/04/installing-chinese-5g-gear-dangerous-and-probably-inevitable-nato-report/156007/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
+* https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-s-arrest-of-huawei-exec-an-act-of-backstabbing-chinese-ambassador-says-1.4258201
+* https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/09/asia/china-canada-meng-huawei-intl/index.html
+* https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-on-china-has-canada-lost-its-sense-of-justice/
+* https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/proper-news-or-propaganda-chinas-social-media-manipulations-exposed
+* https://globalnews.ca/news/4758109/china-bully-canada-release-huawei-cfo/
+* https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-will-pay-chinese-state-media-threaten-repercussions-over-huawei-arrest-1.4216293
+* https://business.financialpost.com/telecom/inside-huaweis-rather-awkward-charm-offensive-to-convince-the-world-its-ok
+* https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3001272/despite-us-allegations-huawei-has-done-nothing-wrong-why-should-it
+
+Datasets: none identified (mining more Twitter data, Reddit, and comment forums could be valuable research)
+
+Notes: 
+
+While a hypothesis and not related to Meng’s arrest, research done by John Gray (using  Mentionmapp data from January 13, 2019) also suggests the need to look at adjecent/tangential flow of social data. In this case (could be coincidence) simutatneaous flow of tweets via State Media @globaltimesnews (reporting on Poland arrest) and of “influencer” (using bots to amplify content) @UserExperienceU tweeting favorable about Huawei technology. Need to consider the amplifiers/influencers operate to support/put the happy face on Huawei. More work needs to be done researching social behavior outside the “Great Firewall” using trolls, bots, cyborgs, and “willing/unwitting” idiots. Just like Russia, we also need to give more consideration to how bots/automation (low-volume in particular) is operating to amplify State Media in order to gain higher fidelity in search engines.  
+
+We should also recognize another form of Huawei/China manipulation in the form of research programs in Universities across North America and Europe
+https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190125061623487
+https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-universities-continuing-rd-funding-partnerships-with/
+fortune.com/2019/01/18/oxford-university-huawei-research-funding/
+https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-security-universities-insig/u-s-universities-unplug-from-chinas-huawei-under-pressure-from-trump-idUSKCN1PI0GV
+
+Timeline of events
+
+Dec. 6: China demands Canada release Meng and “immediately correct the mistake” officials made in arresting her. The Chinese also say they were not briefed on the reasons for Meng’s arrest.
+In Ottawa, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau says Meng’s case is part of an independent legal process with no outside political influence.
+Dec. 7: In Vancouver, Meng appears in court, where allegations of fraud are laid out. The U.S. alleges Meng misled American banks in a bid to get around American sanctions on Iran.
+Dec. 8: Canada’s ambassador to China, John McCallum, is summoned to a meeting with China’s assistant foreign minister so the country can register complaints about Meng’s arrest. “China strongly urges the Canadian side to immediately release the detained Huawei executive … or face grave consequences that the Canadian side should be held accountable for,” the assistant minister, Le Yucheng, says in a statement.
+
+Dec. 12: China’s foreign ministry says it has no information about Kovrig, but says the organization he worked with – the International Crisis Group – was not registered in China, making its activities in the country illegal.
+
+Dec. 13: China’s foreign ministry says Kovrig and Spavor have been detained on suspicion of “endangering national security.”
+
+Dec. 20: Indictments unsealed in the United States allege two Chinese citizens targeted companies in Canada and around the world as part of a years-long hacking campaign to steal data.
+
+Dec. 24: China’s foreign ministry calls out the U.S., Britain and EU, saying the trio should be condemning Canada for Meng’s arrest. Spokeswoman Hua Chunying says Canada should “correct its mistakes” and stop acting at the behest of the United States. She says Kovrig and Spavor’s rights are being respected in custody.
+
+Jan. 9: China’s envoy in Ottawa suggests Canada and its Western allies are white supremacists for calling for the release of two Canadians imprisoned last month by his country’s communist government. Ambassador Lu Shaye makes the accusation in an op-ed in the Hill Times.
+
+Jan. 15: China expresses its “strong dissatisfaction” with Trudeau over his criticism of Schellenberg’s sentence. Trudeau should “respect the rule of law, respect China’s judicial sovereignty, correct mistakes and stop making irresponsible remarks,” foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying says.
+
+Jan. 17: Ambassador Shaye says Canada’s arrest of Meng was an act of “backstabbing” by a friend. Lu warns of “repercussions” if Canada bars the firm from its new 5G network for security reasons, as have three of its intelligence-sharing allies.
+
+Jan. 22: China demands the U.S. drop a request that Canada extradite Meng. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said Meng’s case was out of the ordinary and Canada’s extradition treaty with the U.S. infringed on the “safety and legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens.”
+Jan. 28: The U.S. Department of Justice formally levels criminal charges against Huawei, two subsidiaries and Meng. The charges, contained in two newly unsealed indictments, allege that Huawei misrepresented its ownership of a Hong Kong-based subsidiary to circumvent American sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, they say Huawei stole telecommunications technology, trade secrets and equipment from U.S. cellphone provider T-Mobile USA. Meng is charged with bank fraud, wire fraud and two counts of conspiracy to commit both. In a statement, Huawei denied committing any of the violations cited in the indictment.
+
+Jan. 29:China calls on the U.S. to “stop the unreasonable crackdown” on Huawei, saying it will “firmly defend” its companies.
+
+March 6: A lawyer for Meng tells a judge the United States’ bid for extradition raises serious concerns about the political motivations behind the case as the matter is scheduled to return to court on May 8 to set hearing dates.
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00032","
+
+Summary:  
+
+Actors: 
+
+* IRA; other Russian state actors; 
+* Roger Stone, Alex Jones, gamergaters
+
+Timeframe: Fall 2018
+
+Date: September-October 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Divide the American public on gender and party lines; Harass and intimidate anti-Trump voices; 
+* Promote epistemic confusion; 
+* Seed the narrative terrain for future operations; 
+* Promote “both sides” relativism; 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Amplify extreme and hyper-partisan rhetoric; 
+* Promote divisive conspiracy theories; 
+* Re-up debunked theories in new contexts (e.g. hashtags); 
+* Re-center debates on emotional, rather than rational, content; 
+* Alter “ground-truth” resources, such as Wikipedia
+
+Counters: None / Media exposure
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* gamergate; 
+* 2016 election
+
+References
+
+* [Russian trolls and bots are flooding Twitter with Ford-Kavanaugh disinformation](https://qz.com/1409102/russian-trolls-and-bots-are-flooding-twitter-with-ford-kavanaugh-disinformation/)
+* [Brett Kavanaugh and the information terrorists trying to reshape America](https://www.wired.com/story/information-terrorists-trying-to-reshape-america/)
+* [How the Kavanaugh information war mirrors real warzones](https://www.wired.com/story/how-the-kavanaugh-information-war-mirrors-real-warzones/)
+* [How Facebook polarized us during the Kavanaugh hearings](https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/6/17943680/facebook-polarization-kavanaugh-partisan-news-groups)
+* [Brett Kavanaugh has huge opposition in the U.S. - but Russian state propaganda loves Donald Trump's nominee](https://www.newsweek.com/brett-kavanaugh-has-huge-opposition-us-russian-state-propaganda-loves-donald-1155046)
+
+Details
+
+Last month, the attorney of Christine Blasey Ford, the California professor who has accused Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh of sexual assault at a long-ago high school party, revealed that Blasey Ford and her family were in hiding and had hired private security after Blasey Ford received death threats over email and social media. Among those cheering on the hate-trollers were many familiar faces from the sewers of the modern far-right disinformation metropolis: dandified Republican rogue (and likely Mueller investigee) Roger Stone, his alt-media protégés Mike Cernovich and Jack Posobiec, anarchist turned Kremlin propaganda employee turned Bernie backer turned Trump backer Cassandra Fairbanks, and breathless Infowars conspiracist-in-chief Alex Jones. And not surprisingly, alt-right super-troll Chuck Johnson had his own connection to players in the scandal.
+
+This is an operational unit of information terrorists helping to transform the way Americans consume news in the age of Trump—some of the central nodes that give order to the information deluge and around which bot armies and human amplification networks can be organized, wiped out, reconstituted, and armed for attack.
+
+The attacks on Blasey Ford aimed to discredit and silence her using the same tactics that have been deployed to discredit and silence others over the past few years. As others have come forward to accuse Kavanaugh of wrongdoing—including Deborah Ramirez and Julie Swetnick—they have been similarly harassed and smeared by the same machinery and themes.
+
+Online Twitter accounts tied to Russia are heavily involved in discussing the Supreme Court nominee and allegations against him online. Hamilton68, a project run by the German Marshall Fund think tank that tracks tweets “tied to Russia-linked influence networks,” listed Kavanaugh, Trump, the FBI, and Ford as the top four topics mentioned by Russia-linked accounts on the evening of Oct.1.
+
+The Russia-linked accounts are largely lending their support to Kavanaugh, says Jonathon Morgan, CEO of New Knowledge, the company that built the software behind Hamilton68. Morgan, who is currently tracking a set of around 1,000 accounts he believes are tied to Russia, says the Kavanaugh hearings have unleashed more US domestic-focused propaganda from foreign-linked networks than his firm has seen in months.
+
+Posts about Ford and Kavanaugh are “really cluttered and confused,” with various pieces of clear fabrication from both sides, says Decker.
+
+The effort to introduce a doppelganger aligned with another key method used in LikeWars around the world: muddying the debate by throwing out alternative theories. Russia has long been the master of this disinformation tactic. After its 2014 shootdown of the MH-17 airliner over Ukraine, for instance, Russia spread over a dozen different theories of what had really happened. Many were contradictory and debunked previous claims. But the goal wasn’t to find the truth—it was to obscure it behind a smokescreen of lies.
+
+Similarly, the Kavanaugh debate has given rise to false claims and ridiculous photoshopped images, often spread under fake identities. There have been debunked rumors that Kavanaugh had ruled against Ford’s parents in a house foreclosure and that Ford’s brother was part of the Russia investigation. There was even a flurry of unsubstantiated sexual assault charges leveled against Kavanaugh in the hours before the hearing. His supporters were outraged; those opposed to Kavanaugh's nomination speculated that they were placed so that his defenders could point to the media’s unreliability and cast doubt on Ford's credibility.
+
+The state-funded outlet RT, which was recently obligated to register its U.S. branch under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, trumpeted the news that the White House had found no proof of sexual misconduct by Kavanaugh after reviewing the findings of a time-limited FBI investigation into the allegations.
+
+The same outlet also called attention to the arrest of several high-profile celebrities, actress and comedian Amy Schumer and model Emily Ratajkowski, who were protesting Kavanaugh’s potential appointment in front of the Supreme Court on Thursday. “Obstruction of Justice?” the outlet asked.
+
+Pro-Kavanaugh accounts have pushed out false smears aimed at discrediting Ford. One notable anti-Kavanaugh post picked up more than 11,000 retweets while purporting to to cite a Wall Street Journal article that in fact didn’t exist.
+
+Other accounts are using popular interest in the Ford-Kavanaugh dispute to push unrelated disinformation. A common tactic is to re-up a conspiracy theory or previously debunked story and add tags related to Kavanaugh so the tweet gains more traction.
+
+Examples include re-circulating debunked sexual assault allegations against Democrats like representative Keith Ellison, senator Cory Booker, and former vice president Joe Biden; or against Republicans like senator Lindsey Graham. “Both sides are coopting matters that may have been killed off and never gained traction, and using the Kavanaugh incident to rehash these different claims,” Decker said.
+
+Morgan says the Russian bots he’s tracking are largely using this latter method, seemingly with the broad aim of making Kavanaugh seem no worse than Democrats. The approach differs from Russian activity during the 2016 election, where influence campaigns aimed to sow discontent among both liberals and conservatives by pushing propaganda that appealed to both sides.
+
+This has all taken on a new heady energy as pushback to #MeToo—and riding the coattails of the conspiracy bandwagon. But the intent is the same: to demonize the opponent, define identity, activate the base around emotional rather than rational concepts, and build a narrative that can be used to normalize marginal and radical political views. It is, after all, very convenient to have a narrative positing that all your political opponents are part of a secret cabal of sexual predators, which thus exonerates your side by default.
+
+Daily Wire’s top story about Kavanaugh confirmation was published Oct. 1 with the headline “Prosecutor Who Questioned Ford Shreds Her Case In Five-Page Memo.” It’s generated more than 205,000 engagements. The site also received just under 180,000 engagements for the story, “Bill Clinton Rape Accuser Juanita Broaddrick Crashes Kavanaugh Hearing, Slams Dems For ‘Biggest Double Standard.’”
+
+Occupy Democrats’ top story about Kavanaugh-Ford is headlined “Matt Damon just DESTROYED Kavanaugh and Senate Republicans in hilarious SNL cold open.” It had just under 70,000 engagements. Another story about the Kavanaugh confirmation, “Bernie Sanders just demanded the FBI investigate five lies Kavanaugh told at his hearing,” generated over 44,000 engagements.
+
+This is the ideological landscape that has been so swiftly leveraged in the defense of Brett Kavanaugh.
+
+The cadre and their followers knew exactly what to do when the allegations made against Kavanaugh by Christine Blasey Ford became public. They did not disappoint. Rapid efforts by far-right blogs and personalities to dox and troll Blasey Ford resulted in the targeting of the wrong Christine Blasey Ford; Posobiec was one of those reportedly amping this misguided doxxing. Cernovich said Blasey Ford was a ""far left wing activist"" who had been ""scrubbing"" her social media profile, so her accusations were ""activism."" Alex Jones made a joke of the whole thing, with Infowars saying Blasey Ford is a ""leftist"" whose accusations were a ""political ploy."" Fairbanks: ""She can't prove it… Her clothes were on… Fuck that lady."" That's a particularly strong comment from a one-time anti-rape activist. Stone: ""This is a woman looking for her Anita Hill moment.""
+
+This is the information that flowed through the architecture the Stone cadre popularized and mainstreamed over the past few years, moving it from the fringe to a central pillar of the conservative agenda, cartoonifying legitimate issues of conservative concern and recruiting new supporters as they went. The narrative was set long ago—allegations are false, men (especially white men) are oppressed, the people who stand against you are corrupt perverts worthy of demonization, and everything that is the America you know will fall apart if you don't fight for some notion of the way things were and should be again. And the best way to achieve this, since the system will fight back, is viciousness.
+
+This architecture is established, and permanently in transmit mode.
+
+Consider the now-infamous and disavowed (but archived here) Ed Whelan twitter thread, an odd diversionary narrative hyped as an alternate theory of the night Blasey Ford describes. Its gist: mistaken identity of the perpetrator. Potential defamation issues aside, it seemed to build on the groundwork being laid by Senate Republicans and the White House to carefully insinuate that Blasey Ford wasn't lying, merely mistaken about who attacked her. But Whelan transformed it into a bonkers Twitterverse conspiracy theory about the bedroom at the top of the stairs.
+
+An analysis of the accounts that retweeted Whelan's teaser for his conspiracy most frequently post content from right and far-right media, several of which are anchors in the far-right disinformation ecosphere (and Russian disinformation, to boot).
+
+Posted for less than 24 hours, Whelan's mistaken-identity theory sparked a wave of blog posts and discussions on far-right sites that live on even after Whelan backed off. This post, for example, repeats Whelan's claims and suggests they all but vindicate Kavanaugh. It was a top-trending piece on disinformation trackers and was still being circulated on Twitter days after the source was deleted. And so was this one, this one, and this one. Some 1.5 million ""Fox and Friends"" viewers heard all about the mistaken-identity theory live on TV. Once it's out there, you can't pull it back.
+
+The narratives to defend Kavanaugh were mostly about discrediting Blasey Ford: that she was part of a secret CIA mind-control project (the CIA connection was also alluded to by Kremlin disinformation purveyors); that George Soros was behind her allegations; that her lawyer was linked to Hillary Clinton; that she was motivated by profit; that she did this as revenge for a foreclosure case where Kavanaugh's mother, also a judge, ruled against Blasey Ford's parents (only, she didn't—she ruled in their favor); that she had also made false allegations against Neil Gorsuch; and many more.
+
+In the course of his angry self-defense, Kavanaugh stamped a lot of bingo squares: attempted rape allegations as a political tool, false allegations, Clinton, secret conspiracies. By going out and taking the big swing, he elicited a powerful emotional response in his defense—an activated response from a hardened base. #ConfirmKavanaugh was trending—with support of far-right and Russian-linked accounts—after the hearing.
+
+Not even history itself is safe—at least the online version of it, which we increasingly depend on. When Kavanaugh testified that Devil's Triangle, as mentioned on his high school yearbook page, was a drinking game, there was no online evidence to back up his claim. (Other sources asserted it was a known sexual term.) So an anonymous person immediately updated Wikipedia to support Kavanaugh's definition. It was a near perfect parallel to how Russian operatives repeatedly edited the Wikipedia entry for “MH17” in the hours after the airliner was shot down to try to provide an alternative history.
+
+Examples
+
+"
+"incident","I00063","
+
+Actor: Russia
+
+Timeframe: July 18, 2016 - ongoing
+
+Date: July 18, 2016
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Sports ie the Olympics is another platform to project power, and bans on Russian athletes, the stripping of medals is serious business. Deflect from negative West perspective as state-run cheats/crooks; World/West plot against us; Proclaim Russian innocence & image to domestic audience; 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Some Russians described the allegations as an anti-Russian plot while others stated that Russia was ""just doing what the rest of the world does"" Just like MH17 and Skripal, Russia gets caught and goes into 4-D mode… ie: the above comment - dismiss/”what-aboutism”
+* Deny - Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia had ""never supported any violations in sport, we have never supported it at the state level, and we will never support this"" and that the allegations were part of an ""anti-Russia policy"" by the West.
+* Dismiss - Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, commented that the United States ""fears honest competition"", affirming Vladimir Putin's position that the United States used its influence within the IOC to ""orchestrate the doping scandal""
+* Many Russians believed that the IOC was retaliating against Russia for their discriminatory anti-gay law which provoked considerable controversy with the IOC during the 2014 Winter Olympics. Russian MP Dmitry Svishchev, who is also the head of Russia's Curling Federation, was quoted by Ria Novosti news agency as saying: ""This is what we expected. There's nothing new, only empty allegations against all of us. If you are Russian, you'll get accused of every single sin."" Aleksei Pushkov, chairman of Russia's parliamentary foreign affairs committee, said that the IAAF's decision to uphold its ban was ""an act of political revenge against Russia for its independent foreign policy."" A member of Russia's parliament, Vadim Dengin, stated, ""The entire doping scandal is a pure falsification, invented to discredit and humiliate Russia
+Talking points as above are futher amplifed/spun via Russian media, and public apologists; while this happened prior to 2016 US Elections, suggesting the IRA along with trolls & bots operating in the social space (Twitter, FB, YouTube, Reddit) could be deemed naive. 
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents:  
+
+* Prelude to 2016
+* the end of the 2014 Sochi Olympics where Russian athletes dominate (in combination with Euromaiden “crisis”)  “emboldens” Putin/Russia to make move on Ukraine invasion. 
+* Russians allegedly tried to hack the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)... The Justice Department filed criminal charges against seven members of the GRU, Russia's main military intelligence unit, accusing them of hacking into the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency in Colorado Springs, Colorado, as well as four international sports governing bodies. A grand jury indictment said the operation was in retaliation for the exposure of Russia's state-sponsored athlete doping program that resulted in a ban from the 2016 summer Olympics in Brazil.
+
+References: 
+
+* https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/international-olympic-committee-bars-russia-2018-winter-games-over-doping-n826671
+
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html?module=inline
+* https://www.bbc.com/sport/38261608
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doping_in_Russia
+* https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/22/russian-hackers-world-anti-doping-agency-dnc-hack-fancy-bear
+* https://www.dw.com/en/two-russians-probed-for-hacking-anti-doping-agency-wada/a-45502397
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/sports/olympics/russian-hackers-emails-doping.html
+* https://qz.com/1413474/all-of-the-victims-named-in-the-latest-russian-hacking-scandal/
+* https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/7-russians-indicted-hacking-related-olympic-doping-scandal-nerve-agent-n916656
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00006","
+
+Actor: probably IRA (source: recordedfuture)
+
+Timeframe: 1 day
+
+Date: Sept 11 2014
+
+Presumed goals: test deployment
+
+Method: 
+* Artefacts: text messages, images, video
+* Create messages. e.g. “A powerful explosion heard from miles away happened at a chemical plant in Centerville, Louisiana #ColumbianChemicals”
+* Post messages from fake twitter accounts; include handles of local and global influencers (journalists, media, politicians, e.g. @senjeffmerkley)
+* Amplify, by repeating messages on twitter via fake twitter accounts
+* Not seen: interaction, refutation etc. 
+* TL;DR: early attempts to create fake incidents had limited traction. 
+
+Counters:
+
+* None seen.  Fake stories were debunked very quickly. 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* BP oil spill tsunami
+* #PhosphorusDisaster - fake story about water contamination scare
+* #EbolaInAtlanta -  fake story about Ebola outbreak in Atlanta
+* #shockingmurderinatlanta -  fake story about unarmed black woman killed by police in Atlanta
+
+These were all well-produced fake news stories, promoted on Twitter to influencers through a single dominant hashtag (the single hashtag might have been something learned from crisismapping practice of forcing a single hashtag for each disaster because it was easier to track)
+
+References:
+
+* [RecordedFuture trace of attack]()
+
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbian_Chemicals_Plant_explosion_hoax 
+* https://www.recordedfuture.com/columbianchemicals-hoax-analysis/
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=0 
+* https://twitter.com/hashtag/PhosphorusDisaster?src=hash
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00047","
+
+Actor: Russia
+
+Timeframe: November 25, 2018 - ongoing
+
+Date: November 25, 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Russian media,quoted authorities who accused Kyiv of seeking to “create a conflict situation.” 
+“The same Moscow spokespeople who assured us in 2014 that the little green men who seized Crimea were not Russian soldiers—until Vladimir Putin himself spilled the beans weeks later—are now telling the world that volatile maneuvers of Ukrainian ships led to the collision November 25. 
+* Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine for sparking the clashes, saying their ""irrefutable"" evidence would ""soon be made public"". Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on the next day that Ukraine had violated international legal norms by failing to obtain authorisation for its vessels.  Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy warned of the danger of a war.
+* The goal of this campaign is to create confusion, to portray Ukraine as the culprit for both the Kerch Strait incident and the deteriorating security situation in the region, and to exonerate Russia of any responsibility.
+
+Method: 
+
+* (Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov suggesting that Ukraine deliberately provoked Russia in hopes of gaining additional support from the United States and Europe.
+distracting the audience from the main issue – Russia shooting at Ukrainian boats and capturing the vessels and crews. Instead they target the president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko: “Washington incited Poroshenko to launch this “sea provocation” against Russia in order to “thwart the Putin -Trump meeting”” and “President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko uses the Kerch provocation for a coup d’état“. But in reality, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a resolution scheduling the presidential elections for 31 March 2019.
+Dismissing the critic has also found its place under the sun of Kremlin info-war. Claims were spread that the Russian ships have moved so far ahead “in their technological development” that they “do not use ramming as a tactic“.
+
+* Attempts to pollute the German Twitter: Russian disinformation does not only rely on its own resources to spread its narratives about Ukraine. Twitter has been used so heavily that Russia Today and Sputnik are scoring more engagement than some of the German quality media combined. Between Sunday and Tuesday, more than 10,000 German-language Tweets from 3,000 unique accounts mentioned Ukraine, almost all of them relating to the confrontation in the Sea of Azov. Despite the large overall number of tweeters, a small group of 30 accounts has been driving a significant share of the debate so far.
+ 
+* Dmitry Peskov described Ukrainian navy’s actions as “an invasion of foreign military ships into Russia’s territorial waters.” Belittling Ukraine’s navy; Ridiculing and dehumanising Ukrainians - This ridiculing of Ukraine’s navy echoes other cases when disinformation has been used to show Ukraine as weak and dependent.
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* This is not the first time the Kremlin has used the four-D tactics. 
+* @DFRLab has documented the Kremlin’s use of the 4Ds of disinformation to deny its involvement in the downing of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine, the Skripal poisoning, and the interference in the U.S. Presidential elections in 2016.
+
+References: 
+
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/washington-incited-poroshenko-to-launch-a-sea-provocation-to-thwart-the-putin-trump-meeting/
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/kerch-confrontation-part-of-poroshenkos-plan-to-postpone-the-ukrainian-elections/
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/russia-does-not-shirk-international-law/
+* https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/11/26/how-russia-captured-three-ukrainian-ships-in-the-black-sea
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/uk-poisoning-russia-recycles-responses-77e1d357b777
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/propaganda-pushed-around-indictment-f63b85ac0587
+* https://www.dw.com/en/the-scars-of-ukraines-war-in-mariupol/a-19430738
+* https://www.dw.com/en/crimea-applies-for-annexation-by-moscow-after-secession-referendum-wins-968-approval/a-17500659
+
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/wave-of-disinformation-from-the-azov-sea/
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/minskmonitor-disinformation-tactics-extend-to-kerch-c32351c7c293
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/11/30/investigating-the-kerch-strait-incident/
+* https://www.justsecurity.org/61835/rogue-kremlin-push-international-law/
+* https://www.stopfake.org/en/denigrating-ukraine-with-disinformation/
+
+* https://www.dw.com/en/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-conflict-in-the-sea-of-azov/a-46461361
+* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-ukraine-feud-heats-up-the-sea-of-azov
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerch_Strait_incident
+
+
+Datasets: 
+
+Notes: 
+
+Given anything related to the ukraine is a key testing ground/flashpoint for Russia narrative manipultion & anti-democracy disinformation, the incident and geographic chokepoint will be an ongoing issue. 
+
+The Kerch Strait is the only connection between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and the only way to reach two important Ukrainian ports, Mariupol and Berdiansk. The route is vital for Mariupol's two large metallurgical plants. Russia has controlled the strait since annexing Crimea in 2014, which has made traffic significantly more difficult for Ukrainian ships. The consequences of Russian control have become particularly noticeable since the completion of the Crimean Bridge in May 2018. The bridge connects the Russian mainland with the occupied peninsula. The FSB inspects all ships bound for Ukraine, sometimes taking days, which has aggravated the situation. The volume of freight has steadily declined since then. The war in Ukraine's Donbass region is also problematic for Ukraine's ports.
+
+this most recent escalation in the Kerch Strait is aggravating the already existing conflict between Ukraine and Russia that began after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
+ 
+On the evening of 28 November, Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Volodymyr Omelyan said that vessels bound for the ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol awaited entrance to the Sea of Azov and vessels were also waiting to go southbound. He characterised this as a virtual blockade. No vessels were identified as Ukrainian. On 4 December Omelyan stated that Russia did let ships reach Berdyansk and Mariupol again. The same day the Ukrainian Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs claimed that the accumulation of ships waiting to go to the Ukrainian ports had led to several accidents. Russia denied it ever blocked vessels from sailing to Ukrainian ports and asserted that any possible disruptions were due to bad weather
+On 19 January 2019, USS Donald Cook entered the Black Sea, being the second American vessel to arrive in the Black Sea after the Kerch Strait incident after USS Fort McHenry entered in 10 January 2019
+In March 2019, Canada, the United States and the EU imposed sanctions on Russian citizens and companies for their participation in the incident and activities in Crimea and separatist-controlled eastern Ukraine
+
+"
+"incident","I00022","
+
+Actor: 
+
+* 4chan user with Latvian IP address, 
+* pro-Trump Twitter accounts
+
+Timeframe: a few days
+
+Date: Two days before the second round of French 2017 election (May 5, 2017)
+
+Presumed goals: sabotaging Macron campaign in the last stage of the election.
+
+Method:
+
+* Hashtag campaign: #MacronLeaks with use of bots. 
+* Hashtags initially launched in the US, then got publicized by alt-right influencer, Le Pen’s supporters, Wikileaks.
+
+Counters:
+
+* French agencies that monitor cybersecurity, electoral integrity.
+* Technical precautions: ending e-voting.
+* Facebook removed 70,000 suspicious accounts in France 10 days before the vote.
+* Campaign staff responding to social media posts and comments.
+* Technically, placing traps along the way, using fake passwords, email addresses, documents to trap hackers.
+* Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets.
+* Use encrypted apps for confidential communication.
+* Requesting the media not to report false information.
+
+Related incidents:
+
+References:
+
+* https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/
+* https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/heres-how-far-right-trolls-are-spreading-hoaxes-about
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/hashtag-campaign-macronleaks-4a3fb870c4e8
+"
+"incident","I00033","
+
+Actor: China
+
+Timeframe: 2011
+
+Date:
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Commentators’ duty to guide public opinion in a “constructive” way and engage the internet as “an important battlefield of ideology.” The vice minister of public security said that the police should use microblogs as a communication platform to “release correct information and dispel misunderstandings.”
+* Accounts describing the operations of progovernment commentators that have emerged in recent years indicate that they are also involved in identifying and recommending content for deletion. Other testimonies highlight the fact that the posts do not only praise or support the CCP and government policy, but also target government critics with negative remarks. Other forms of misdirection involve deliberate attempts to muddy the facts of a particular incident—for example, a false eyewitness can contradict the account of a netizen reporting a case of police abuse.
+* The Chinese government has long been suspected of hiring as many as 2,000,000 people to surreptitiously insert huge numbers of pseudonymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of real social media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many academics, and most journalists and activists, claim that these so-called “50c party” posts vociferously argue for the government’s side in political and policy debates.
+
+Method: 
+
+* Astroturfing: “surreptitiously post large numbers of fabricated social media comments, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary Chinese people""
+* Cow online opinion leaders into submission
+* Bombard Taiwan social media (Facebook, twitter, chat groups) with ani-DPP, anti-Tsai content.
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+Notes: 
+
+(Recorded Future) The term “Great Firewall” was coined in a June 1997 Wired magazine article in which an anonymous Communist Party official stated that the firewall was “designed to keep Chinese cyberspace free of pollutants of all sorts, by the simple means of requiring ISPs [internet service providers] to block access to ‘problem’ sites abroad.”
+
+Our research focused on the English-language social media activity of six major state-run propaganda organizations from October 1, 2018 through January 21, 2019, which included over 40,000 posts. We selected these six organizations — Xinhua, People’s Daily, China Global Television (CGTN), China Central Television (CCTV), China Plus News, and the Global Times — because they: Are highly digitized; Possess accounts on multiple English language social media platforms; Are associated with Chinese intelligence agencies and/or English language propaganda systems
+
+Because our intent was to map out Chinese state-run influence campaigns targeting the American public, we evaluated only English language posts and comments, as the posts in Chinese were unlikely to affect most Americans. Further, our research focused on answering two fundamental questions about Chinese influence operations: Does China employ the same influence tactics in the English-language social media space as it does domestically? How do Chinese state-run influence operations differ from Russian ones? In what ways are they similar and different, and why?
+
+The information-control regime in China has evolved to include a dizzying array of techniques, technologies, and resources: Blocking traffic via IP address and domain; Mobile application bans; Protocol blocking, specifically Virtual Private Network protocols and applications; Filtering and blocking keywords in domains (URL filtering); Resetting TCP connections; Packet filtering; Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks (the so-called Great Cannon); Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks; Search engine keyword filtering; Government-paid social media commenters and astroturfers; Social media account blocking, topic filtering, content censorship; State-run media monopoly and censorship; Social Credit System; Mandatory real-name account registration; 
+
+This tool set, combined with the now-ubiquitous mass physical surveillance systems, place China at the forefront of integrating information technology, influence operations, surveillance, and censorship in a model referred to by two scholars from MERICS as “IT-based authoritarianism.”
+
+In addition to the constraints imposed by the Great Firewall and content censorship, the Chinese state also employs a series of active disinformation and distortion measures to influence domestic social media users. One of the most widely studied has been the so-called “50 Cent Party.” The 50 Cent Party is a group of people hired by the Chinese government to “surreptitiously post large numbers of fabricated social media comments, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary Chinese people.” The name is derivative of a rumor that these fake commentators were paid 50 Chinese cents per comment (this has been largely disproven). This fabrication of social media comments and sentiment is largely known by the term “astroturfing.” Among scholars of the Chinese domestic social media environment, there is much disagreement regarding what the goals or objectives of government-paid astroturfers are. One study by professors at Harvard, Stanford, and UC San Diego, published in April 2017, determined that one in every 178 social media posts are fabricated by the government and that comments and campaigns are focused and directed against specific topics or issues. Additionally, these scholars have assessed that domestic social media influence operations focus primarily on “cheerleading” or presenting or furthering a positive narrative about the Chinese state. Conversely, a separate set of scholars at the University of Michigan, who also examined posts from the 50 Cent Party astroturfers, determined that at least one in every six posts on Chinese domestic social media was fabricated by the government. Further, these scholars argued that less than 40 percent of astroturfed comments could be classified as “cheerleading” and that the rest were a combination of vitriol, racism, insults, and rage against events or individuals. They additionally argue that censors and state-sponsored influence campaigns focus much of their resources on “opinion leaders” and users with large numbers of followers as opposed to simply intervening based on content.
+
+ Chinese government has used a combination of muscle and guile to cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force, and leaching public dialogue of much of its independence. But beneath the peppy, pablum-filled surface that has resulted, Chinese social media remains a contested space.
+
+(Taiwan election) Tsai futilely urged Taiwanese citizens to see Beijing’s effort for what it was — a Russian-style influence campaign. The island’s 23 million citizens were bombarded with anti-Tsai and anti-DPP content through Facebook, Twitter and online chat groups, promoted by China’s “50-cent army” of paid social media trolls. There are also dozens of investigations into allegations that Chinese money went to fund Taiwanese candidates opposing Tsai and the DPP.
+After the elections, Chinese state media pointed to Tsai’s losses as evidence that her tough stance vis-à-vis China was unpopular and wrongheaded. Beijing’s overall goal is to replace her with a more malleable leader in Taipei as part of its broad effort to exert control over Taiwan and weaken Taipei’s relationships with the international community.
+The Chinese government is bribing or coercing foreign governments to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan, pressuring them to evict Taiwan from international organizations. Beijing is also threatening foreign companies unless they literally erase Taiwan from their websites. Their ultimate goal is to dissolve the U.S.-Taiwan partnership and subjugate the island to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
+
+There are numerous agencies sponsoring internet commentators, including local propaganda offices, ministries and even schools and state-owned enterprises. For instance, China’s largest oil and gasoline producer, Sinopec, was found to be running an astroturfing campaign justifying rising gasoline prices in 2011 (Wang 2011). 
+The following excerpt from a recruiting flyer from the Propaganda Department of the Zhengding Party Committee, Hebei, provides an example of what online commentators are expected to do (Zhonggong Zhengding Xianwei Xuanchuanbu 2009): 
+compose original postings and carry out positive publicity online to promote the priorities and major deployments of the party committee and the government; 
+release authoritative information on major incidents to hinder the spread of rumours and ensure correct direction of online opinion; 
+answer questions and clarify confusion for netizens on hotbutton incidents, interpret the policies of and measures taken by the party and the government and divert netizens’ emotions; 
+strengthen information management on the internet and tightly integrate the analysis of online opinion, disposing of harmful information and guiding online opinion. 
+
+These instructions show that besides monitoring public opinion, the primary mission for online commentators is to facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises. In online propaganda campaigns, commentators work to attract public attention and fabricate an audience, if necessary. 
+
+ “American Cent Party” (美分党) who express western democratic values and criticize the Chinese communist regime online, and the “internet water army” (网络水军), which refers to for-hire astroturfers working for and advancing the interests of companies and other actors willing to pay their fees.
+Prominent dissident Ai Weiwei said “If you oppose the US and Japan [online], you are a member of the 50 cents army” (Strafella and Berg, 2015). 50c party members “combat hostile energy,” defined as posts that “go against socialist core values,” or “are not amenable to the unity of the people.” Such information should be “resolutely resisted, proactively refuted, and eagerly reported to Internet authorities.” 4 (Haley, 2010). Through active engagement of opposition views, they try to “sway public opinion” (Editors, 2016; Jason Ng, 2011), “influence public opinion. . . pretending to be ordinary citizens and defending or promoting the government’s point of view” (O. Lam, 2013), or “steer conversations in the right direction” (Editors, 2013). Estimates by journalists of the size of the 50c party is between 500,000 to 2 million (Philipp, 2015).
+
+References:
+
+* https://www.wired.com/1997/06/china-3/
+* https://en.greatfire.org/analyzer
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/business/media/new-york-times-apps-apple-china.html
+* https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/29/apple-removes-vpn-apps-from-the-app-store-in-china/
+* https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9fc1/d1815a678583c1e73233bb93aaaab7d0fd4f.pdf
+* https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf
+* https://citizenlab.ca/2015/04/chinas-great-cannon/
+* https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xjHWI0Ih3abONxL0WoXj2swlcBuiRCXO/view
+* https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2738325
+* http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-s-xinjiang-province-a-surveillance-state-unlike-any-the-world-has-ever-seen-a-1220174.html
+* https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/MPOC_ChinasCoreExecutive_web.pdf
+* https://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=691&cmb=34#Vice
+* http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/05/09/12125
+* http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/05/chinese-bloggers-on-the-history-and-influence-of-the-fifty-cent-party/
+* http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/50c.pdf?m=1463587807
+* http://blakeapm.com/
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/21/can-the-chinese-government-really-control-the-internet-we-found-cracks-in-the-great-firewall/
+* https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xjHWI0Ih3abONxL0WoXj2swlcBuiRCXO/view
+* https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/whisper-together/
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/world/asia/taiwan-elections-meddling.html
+* http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/10/23/2003702864
+* https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/news-rattles-taiwan-elections-181123005140173.html
+* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-politics/china-heaps-pressure-on-taiwan-president-after-poll-defeat-idUSKCN1NV02X
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-is-failing-to-counter-chinas-diplomatic-assault-on-taiwan/2018/09/06/e744f97c-b20c-11e8-9a6a-565d92a3585d_story.html
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/05/05/white-house-calls-chinas-threats-to-airlines-orwellian-nonsense/
+* https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/how_the_chinese_government_fabricates_social_media_posts_for_strategic_distraction_not_engaged_argument.pdf 
+* https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-that-chinese-troll/3540663.html
+* https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/850/851
+* https://www.scmp.com/culture/books/article/2144692/how-china-censors-its-internet-and-controls-information-great-firewall
+* https://freedomhouse.org/blog/china%E2%80%99s-growing-army-paid-internet-commentators
+* https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/
+* https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/19/meet-the-chinese-internet-trolls-pumping-488-million-posts-harvard-stanford-ucsd-research/
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/18/chinas-interference-elections-succeeded-taiwan/
+
+"
+"incident","I00062","
+
+See also I00005."
+"incident","I00056","
+
+Actor: Iran
+
+Timeframe: 2012 - ongoing
+
+Date: Aug 21, 20198
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Iran’s meddling in the politics of the Arab states has become more conspicuous since the Arab Spring of 2011. Iran has been trying to widen its influence in the region in its political jousting against Saudi Arabia which is sometimes referred to as “the Arab Cold War”. Although the two regional rivals have never declared war, the two players have been involved in proxy wars in the region including Syria and Yemen.
+* Pages promoted or amplified views in line with Iranian government’s international stances. The pages posted content with strong bias for the government in Tehran and against the “West” and regional neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Israel.The operation was noteworthy, however, that more than 30 percent of the removed assets were active for five or more years, indicating that Iranian entities have been engaged in social media influence campaigns since as early as 2010 (DFRLab)
+
+
+Method:  
+
+* In August 2018, Facebook removed 652 pages, groups, and accounts on Facebook and Instagram originating from Iran for engaging in a “coordinated inauthentic behaviour”. 15 These operations targeted people in the Middle East, Latin America, the UK, and the US. In October 2018, Facebook announced the removal of another 82 pages, groups, and accounts on Facebook and Instagram. This time the company announced that these accounts and pages targeted people in the US and the UK.16 Some of these accounts masqueraded as American citizens pushing anti-Saudi and anti-Israel narratives.
+* In October 2018, Twitter published two data sets comprising 3,841 accounts affiliated with the Internet Research Agency (IRA), and 770 accounts that could be traced back to Iran. These accounts were suspended by Twitter in August 2018 for engaging in coordinated manipulation on the platform. Twitter believes that the information operations linked to Iran are potentially backed by the state
+* 70 websites found by Reuters which push Iranian propaganda to 15 countries, in an operation that cybersecurity experts, social media firms and journalists are only starting to uncover. The sites found by Reuters are visited by more than half a million people a month, and have been promoted by social media accounts with more than a million followers… the sites in the campaign have been active at different times since 2012. They look like normal news and media outlets,but only a couple disclose any Iranian ties.
+* The social media companies have closed hundreds of accounts that promoted the sites or pushed Iranian messaging. Facebook said last month it had taken down 82 pages, groups and accounts linked to the Iranian campaign; these had gathered more than one million followers in the United States and Britain. But the sites uncovered by Reuters have a much wider scope. They have published in 16 different languages, from Azerbaijani to Urdu, targeting Internet users in less-developed countries. That they reached readers in tightly controlled societies such as Egypt, which has blocked hundreds of news websites since 2017, highlights the campaign’s reach.
+* Ten outlets targeting readers in Yemen, where Iran and U.S. ally Saudi Arabia have been fighting a proxy conflict since civil war broke out in 2015; A media outlet offering daily news and satirical cartoons in Sudan. Reuters could not reach any of its staff; A website called Realnie Novosti, or “Real News,” for Russian readers. It offers a downloadable mobile phone app but its operator could not be traced.
+* One of IUVM’s most popular users is a site called Sudan Today, which SimilarWeb data shows receives almost 150,000 unique visitors each month. On Facebook, it tells its 57,000 followers that it operates without political bias. Its 18,000 followers on Twitter have included the Italian Embassy in Sudan, and its work has been cited in a report by the Egyptian Electricity Ministry.
+The office address registered for Sudan Today in 2016 covers a whole city district in north Khartoum, according to archived website registration details provided by WhoisAPI Inc and DomainTools LLC. The phone number listed in those records does not work.
+* We have observed inauthentic social media personas, masquerading as American liberals supportive of U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders, heavily promoting Quds Day, a holiday established by Iran in 1979 to express support for Palestinians and opposition to Israel. (FireEye)
+* Broadly speaking, the intent behind this activity appears to be to promote Iranian political interests, including anti-Saudi, anti-Israeli, and pro-Palestinian themes, as well as to promote support for specific U.S. policies favorable to Iran, such as the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). In the context of the U.S.-focused activity, this also includes significant anti-Trump messaging and the alignment of social media personas with an American liberal identity. However, it is important to note that the activity does not appear to have been specifically designed to influence the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, as it extends well beyond U.S. audiences and U.S. politics. (FireEye)
+* All 17 of the pages containing information about manager location had managers from Iran. Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Syria were other common locations of page managers. (DFRLab)
+Promoting Shi’a Political and Militant Views
+* One of the removed pages — @alalsadrr1 — promoted Moqtada al-Sadr, an influential Shi’a cleric and militia leader from Iraq and leader of the Mahdi Army. According to the Wilson Center, in the mid-2000’s, the Mahdi Army received weapons and training from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah agents. In May 2018, The Atlantic reported that the “controversial” leader and his followers had committed brutal atrocities in Iraq, fought the U.S. military in Sadr City and Basra, and were known for corruption. (DfRLab)
+* In January, Facebook took down 783 accounts and pages, which it assessed as “directed from Iran, in some cases repurposing Iranian state media content.” (DFRLab - March 26, 2019)
+The operation strongly resembled the earlier IUVM operation. Facebook did not attribute it to IUVM directly, but the latest network used the same techniques and pointed to some of the same websites, making attribution to the same network likely, although not confirmed.
+In particular, pages across the network reproduced IUVM content, as well as content from other websites which have featured in earlier exposés and takedowns.
+The network functioned by steering users towards ostensibly independent news websites, which amplified Iranian regime propaganda, often copied verbatim from regime assets. The social media content therefore served as a secondary amplifier, rather than a direct audience-engagement tool.
+Despite the heterogeneous nature of the assets — they were spread across many countries, languages, and cultures — their messaging was largely homogeneous. It dealt with issues of importance to the Iranian government, supporting Palestinians and Shia Muslims on one hand, and attacking Israel, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the conduct of the military campaign in Yemen on the other.
+The focus on South Asia was noteworthy. Indonesia and India had the most pages targeted at them; African countries also featured prominently. This expands the known area of Iranian influence operations, which have thus far been primarily exposed in the Middle East and in the West.
+
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Facebook and Twitter content take-downs
+
+Related incidents:  
+
+* See Venezuela:
+https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-01/iran-slams-u-s-over-venezuela-secretly-some-may-be-relieved
+https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/02/hezbollah-is-in-venezuela-to-stay.html
+
+
+References: 
+
+* http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/
+* http://www.arabnews.com/node/1329971/middle-east
+* https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/part-2-pro-iran-militias-iraq
+* https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/iraq-moqtada-sadr/559499/
+* https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/10/iraq-evidence-war-crimes-government-backed-shi-militias/
+* http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/18/AR2008041803429.html
+* https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1498970/UK-troops-left-isolated-as-Mahdi-Army-weaves-a-web-of-official-corruption.html
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8d
+* https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/01/removing-cib-iran/
+* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT
+* https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/08/irans-disinformation-campaigns.html
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/takedown-details-of-the-iranian-propaganda-network-d1fad32fdf30
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8d
+* https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/04/Iran-Memo.pdf
+* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/suspected-iranian-influence-operation.html
+
+"
+"incident","I00007","
+
+Actor: RT/Sputnik
+
+Timeframe: 2 weeks
+
+Date: July-August 2016
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+Method: 
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents:  
+
+* Jade Helm exercise
+* Black Lives Matter protests
+* Bundy Ranch standoff
+
+Notes:
+
+Story was that the Incirlik NATO base in Turkey was under attack by terrorists. 
+2016-08-14 Paul Manafort cited that the Incirlik NATO base in Turkey was under attack by terrorists, as an example of an unreported true story. 
+“The weekend of July 30, RT.com and Sputnik reported 7,000 armed police with heavy vehicles had surrounded Incirlik air base in Adana, Turkey, where 2,500 U.S. troops are stationed and some 50 U.S. nuclear weapons are stored. The two Kremlin-funded outlets suggested that the lockdown was in response to another coup attempt after a faction of the Turkish military failed to overthrow Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.”
+“On the evening of 30 July 2016, my colleagues and I watched as RT and Sputnik news simultaneously launched false stories about the U.S. air base in Incirlik, Turkey being overrun by terrorists,” he told the committee. Within minutes pro-Russian social media aggregators and automated bots amplified this false news story,” Watts said. “There were more than 4,000 tweets in the first 75 to 78 minutes after launching this false story. Perhaps the most stunning development for Watt and his companions was that the rapid proliferation of that story was linked back to the active measures accounts (Russian bots) they had tracked for the preceding two years. These previously identified accounts almost simultaneously appearing from different geographic locations and communities amplified the big news story in unison,” Watts said. The hashtags promoted by the bots, according to Watts, were “nuclear, media, Trump and Benghazi. The most common words, he said found in English speaking Twitter user profiles were “God, military Trump, family, country, conservative, Christian, America and constitution. The objective of the messages, Watts said, “clearly sought to convince Americans that U.S. military bases being overrun in a terrorist attack.”
+
+Data
+
+* Looked at Twitter for these dates: https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=incirlik%20until%3A2014-08-14&src=typd
+https://twitter.com/ElectionLawCtr/status/492850603039522816
+
+
+References: 
+* https://www.rt.com/news/354042-turkish-police-incirlik-nato-coup/
+* https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20160731/1043797161/incirlik-turkey-erdogan-nato-nukes.html
+* https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/16/paul-manafort/trump-campaign-chair-misquotes-russian-media-makes/
+* https://wtop.com/j-j-green-national/2017/09/anatomy-russian-attack-first-signs/slide/1/ 
+"
+"incident","I00017","
+
+Actor: IRA
+
+Timeframe: 2 years
+
+Date: December 2015 - 2017
+
+Presumed goals: “Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency” - James Clapper
+
+Method:
+
+* Facebook ads promoting minor candidates (Jill Stein)
+
+References:
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-beyond-russian-impact-2f5777677cc0
+* https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-secret-documents-from-russias-election-trolls-leak
+
+Notes:
+
+DailyBeast article gives sizings and method - 80 people on this.  If they were working 8-6, that gives us a sizing on how much trolling they could do. 
+
+"
+"incident","I00003","
+
+Actor: IRA
+
+Timeframe: 
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals:
+
+Method: 
+
+Counters:
+
+Related incidents:
+
+
+References:
+
+* https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/994704834577215495 
+* https://twitter.com/donie/status/957246815056908288 
+* https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/10/russia-facebook-ads-us-elections-congress
+"
+"incident","I00042","
+
+Actor: 
+
+* Saudi Arabia / Qatar /Turkey. 
+* While the dispute is between these two Kingdoms, it’s with certainty that one can suggest Iran (both projection and the containment of its power/influence in the region) is at the center of it.
+
+Timeframe: May - September 2017 
+
+Date: May, 2017
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* The programmatic/synthetic amplification of respective “positions and/or plights.” 
+* The respective hashtags can not be categorized as organic in nature, but launched in conjunction with the botnet deployments. As well, none of the identified bot related activity points to an effort to drown out/flood the opponents. 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Twitter campaign; bots/botnets seriously distorted the conversation on Twitter.
+* Commercial botnets (these are created en masse and rented out to any user who is willing to pay for retweets, likes, and follow—either for their own account or for somebody else’s. They are thus the easiest and quickest way to obtain artificial amplification)
+* On 24 May 2017, for example, pro-Qatar users launched the hashtag or “Qatar is not alone.”
+* Supporters of Saudi Arabia also turned to apparently commercial bots to promote their messages. On 21 July, supporters of Qatar launched another hashtag, or “Tamim the Glorious,” in honor of the Emir. In response, supporters ,#تميم_المج ُد of Saudi Arabia used a botnet to attack the hashtag. The attack began when an account called @al_muhairiuae posted a photoshopped image of the Emir designed to make him look foolish.
+* Combined with the Korean imagery, this suggests they were a commercial botnet that an unknown user rented to amplify the anti-Qatar tweet and to subvert the pro-Qatar hashtag, which had only just started to trend.
+* At least one botnet seemed based in Turkey, joining the fray in mid-September in a bid to support Qatar.”
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Essentially the was a tit-for-tat campaign with a brief “incursion”/support/spike of activity most likely (but not officially verified) from Turkey in support of Qatar
+
+* Global Research (Pro-Kremlin publication/organization located in Montreal, QC) contributed anti-Saudi spin via their blog. Global Research (anti-Saudi… campaign); Global Research (more)
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* Jamal Khashoggi incident will bear hallmarks of the incident, but moves beyond a regional information operation into one of global significance. In 2018 the NY Times investigates Saudi Arabia’s Troll Army
+
+References: 
+
+* https://www.globalresearch.ca/saudi-arabias-march-towards-civil-war/5616699
+* https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-machiavellian-plot-to-provoke-saudi-arabia-and-qatar-into-a-blood-border-war/5593870
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/20/us/politics/saudi-image-campaign-twitter.html
+* https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/robot-wars-how-bots-joined-battle-gulf
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/07/hacking-bots-and-information-wars-in-the-qatar-spat/
+* https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/russian-hackers-qatar-fake-news-gulf-diplomatic-row-fbi-doha-saudi-arabia-bahrain-uae-egypt-a7776446.html
+* https://qz.com/1107023/the-inside-story-of-the-hack-that-nearly-started-another-middle-east-war/
+* https://theconversation.com/the-world-cup-in-digital-and-social-the-viewers-the-tweets-and-the-trolls-99625
+
+* https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-44294826
+* https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/robot-wars-how-bots-joined-battle-gulf
+
+Datasets:  Mining and analyzing Twitter data is unlikely to “prove” or offer much more insight than Ben Nimmo’s work.
+
+Notes: 
+
+Given the apparent use of commercial botnets, it’s difficult to attribute much of the activity to state actors, however it is fair to suggest some of this behavior would undoubtedly needed tacit state support… private “patriots” of the state?
+
+This article https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/robot-wars-how-bots-joined-battle-gulf highlights the mechanics and dynamics of the bot operations/amplification in some cases to short life span of the activity and assets (quickly deleted from the platform), but doesn’t communicate the underlying political issues that drove these incidents.
+ 
+The focus of these Arabic-language hashtags was clearly local and regional rather than international; this was a question of messaging to the domestic population and to Arabic-language rivals, rather than the non-Arabic-speaking world.
+Claims of Russian involvement/hack are reported by both the Washington Post and the Independent UK (cites CNN as source). Quartz as well cites the Russian connection, further citing documentation shared with them via Qatar (flimsy at best) and further point blame for the affair at President Trump. 
+
+Post incident - Given Qatar is hosting the 2022 World Cup of Soccer, the World Cup 2018, was a “test” ground for this ongoing online “war” while subtle was evident (Mentionmapp Analytics… John’s research) "
+"incident","I00008","
+
+Actor: 
+
+Timeframe: 
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals:
+
+Method: 
+
+Counters:
+
+Related incidents:
+
+References:
+
+* https://www.ceas-serbia.org/images/2018/201803_CEAS_Report.pdf
+* https://www.stopfake.org/en/vencislav-the-virgin-hostile-operation-by-vencislav-bujic-seas-foundation-and-its-network-of-collaborators/
+* https://seas.foundation/en/2018/03/15/155
+
+"
+"incident","I00049","
+
+Actor: Russia, Syrian Government and Iran
+
+Timeframe: April-June
+
+Date: April 8, 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* can’t trust anyone who is reporting about it & fit into the “false flag,” commonly used conspiracy trope positing that mass casualty incidents are engineered internally to provide pretext for either government repression or military action 
+
+Method: 
+
+* One novel attack on the White Helmets in the wake of the Douma attacks featured the claim that the group had run a film studio in the besieged city, and used it to stage propaganda videos. This was initially reported by Lebanon-based Al-Aahed News[81] and Iran’s Fars News,[82] each of which attributed it to the other. It was then picked up by Russian state outlets in both Russian[83] and English.[84] As Bellingcat was quick to point out, the images of the studio were actually taken from the Facebook page of a film called Revolution Man.[85] The way in which this demonstrably false claim was amplified on pro-Assad channels reinforces the conclusion that its purpose was to discredit the White Helmets because their reporting was accurate—not because it was false.
+* A separate line of argument focused on the Western response to the Douma attack, and the conclusion that the chemical attack had indeed been launched by Assad’s forces. This argument claimed, in essence, that the West’s response was hasty, ill-judged, and went beyond the evidence.[86]
+* A third line of attack focused on accusing the West of condoning or staging chemical attacks, including the Douma one, and thus delegitimizing Western outrage. On April 13, the Russian Ministry of Defense said that it had “evidence proving the United Kingdom’s direct involvement in the organization of this provocation in eastern Ghouta,”[91]
+* A fourth tactic featured apocalyptic warnings that any Western strike into Syria that harmed Russians could trigger World War III. On April 8, for example, the Russian Foreign Ministry warned of “very grave consequences” of an American strike.[93]
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Fact checking (Snopes & Bellingcat)
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* foundation to Russia ramping up chemical weapon disinformation leading-op to Idlib offensive 
+
+References: 
+
+* https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/42657/syria-eu-calls-accountability-after-yet-another-chemical-attack_en
+* This is the most detailed article/resource helps lay the background, details, players, tactics http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingghouta/disinformation-2/
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/17/russia-is-gearing-up-to-misinform-the-u-s-public-about-syria-heres-our-cheat-sheet-to-identify-twitter-trolls/?utm_term=.7d3c56b0b03a
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/bbc-admits-that-reason-for-bombing-syria-was-fake/
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/12/18/chemical-weapons-and-absurdity-the-disinformation-campaign-against-the-white-helmets/
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/08/30/russian-chem-disinfo-idlib/
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/chlorine/
+* https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/10/16/why-assad-and-russia-target-the-white-helmets/
+* https://www.snopes.com/news/2018/04/12/disinformation-conspiracy-trolling-syrian-chemical-attack/
+* https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/is-this-proof-white-helmets-staged-chemical-attack/
+* https://www.dw.com/en/russias-syria-chemical-weapons-attack-warning-dubious-experts-say/a-45250441
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/new-chemical-attack-to-be-staged-by-the-white-helmets-in-idlib/
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-attack-ghouta.html
+
+Datasets: 
+
+Notes: 
+
+For the Syrian opposition, the use of these weapons in high-casualty attacks now brought the possibility of US military intervention. For the Syrian government and Russia, that same possibility brought an urgent need to sow doubt around the veracity of any claims of chemical weapons use—including by claiming that the reports of chemical weapons use were a conspiracy launched by foreign enemies to trigger more strikes.
+In parallel, perhaps in an attempt to deflect potential consequences, Russian government sources began claiming that rebel groups and the White Helmets rescue organization, backed by Western powers, were planning “false flag” chemical attacks, designed to kill civilians and point the blame at the Syrian government. Against the background of the 2017 US strikes that followed the Khan Sheikhoun attack, such claims introduced the idea of American complicity in any future attacks, suggesting that such attacks would be a false flag to cover an already-decided US engagement, rather than a consequence of the regime or Russia’s decision to use chemical weapons. This seeded a narrative that could later be passed on to anti-interventionist media outlets and campaigners in the West.
+The claim that a given incident was a false flag attack, designed to discredit the Russian government, has regularly been deployed by Kremlin supporters—for example, over the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine and the poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in England, as well as in Syria. Such claims have been repeated and disseminated through a complex ecosystem of blogs and social media posts, largely written in English by self-styled “investigative journalists” with ties to Kremlin-operated media outlets.[18] These provided vital validation to the Syrian/Russian narrative, and played an important role in its dissemination.
+The disinformation campaign waged by the Syrian and Russian regimes was large scale, persistent, and supported by a range of Western commentators. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, its impact was limited, and the bulk of mainstream reporting focused on establishing the series of events. According to an online scan of Twitter mentions of the word “Douma” conducted with the Sysomos online service, none of the ten most-retweeted tweets posted on April 7-9 contained pro-Assad content, indicating that the conversation was dominated by other voices.[110] In all, the scan collected some 435,000 tweets. Progressively, however, the mainstream media shifted their focus to other issues, while the supporters of the Syrian and Russian regimes kept their focus on Douma; thus, the overall volume of traffic declined, and the share of the conversation dominated by pro-Assad voices increased. In a similar scan of the period from April 10-16, six of the ten most-retweeted posts came from Assad supporters, out of a total of 487,000 posts.[111]
+This analysis also reveals the integration of government-funded media (RT, SputnikNews) and geopolitical think tanks (GlobalResearch) as source content for anti-WH [anti-White Helmet] narratives.”[120]
+Pro-Assad and pro-Russian disinformation was further amplified by a group of ostensibly independent news websites that have since been demonstrated to have Iranian links,[121] and which systematically promoted pro-Iranian regime messaging.[122] These sites included IUVMPress.com, an apparent news site that reproduced content from Iranian regime and pro-regime sources, stripped it of its attribution, and passed it onto other sites; institutomanquehue.org, ostensibly a think tank focused on Latin America; and britishleft.com, apparently a site dedicated to left-wing British politics
+Commentators such as Beeley, Bartlett, and 21st Century Wire colleague Patrick Henningsen bridged the gap between the “alt-right” movement in the United States and the Russian state communications network, being cited both on sites such as RT, and alt-right hubs such as Infowars. Beeley and Bartlett contribute to both 21st Century Wire[129] and RT;[130] Henningsen formerly wrote for Infowars,[131] writes for 21st Century Wire, and is featured as a contributor on RT’s site.[132] Their contributions helped to spread pro-Assad and pro-Kremlin messaging into US audiences, very much in the manner described by Simonyan, when she spoke of the need for “English-speaking talking heads” to validate the Kremlin’s view.
+
+On at least one occasion, their messaging broke into the mainstream. On April 13, 2018, rock guitarist Roger Waters told a concert in Barcelona that he thought the White Helmets were a “fake organization that is creating propaganda for jihadists and terrorists”—a very similar misrepresentation to that publicized by the Kremlin disinformation networks.[134
+A video clip of his comments was repeatedly uploaded to YouTube by Kremlin and pro-Kremlin users, including RT UK,[136]Beeley,[137] Hands Off Syria,[138] and Clarity of Signal.[139] Together, these totalled more than 140,000 views by September 19, 2018
+
+When incidents such as the Waters amplification are taken into account, the reason that Russia’s General Dvornikov spoke so highly of information operations becomes clear. The combination of state-funded outlets, covert outlets such as IUVMPress, official statements, and supporting bloggers and trolls allowed the pro-Assad narrative to dominate the online conversation for extended periods, especially during times when the credible media outlets were focusing on other issues.
+"
+"incident","I00039","
+
+Actor:
+
+* Right-wing FB pages
+* Fake news sites e.g. yesimright.com; shoebat.com; endingthefed.com; truthfeed.com; yournewswire.com.
+* British tabloids: Express, MailOnline.
+
+Timeframe: Data was collected and analyzed in 2016.
+
+Date: 2016.
+
+Presumed goals:
+* To attack Merkel’s liberal position on the refugee crisis.
+
+Method:
+* Fake news sites mix legitimate partisan political content with false and conspiratorial information.
+* Large right-wing FB pages in the US also share anti-Merkel content.
+* Most popular Merkel articles on Facebook also come from legitimate, but negative and right-wing news sources.
+* German links that generated most engagement in 2016 spread conspiratorial claims about Merkel’s mental health.
+
+Counters:
+* No counter actions were taken.
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* Defamation of Modamani – a Syrian refugee - who took a selfie with Merkel and was accused on social media as having links to terrorism.
+
+References:
+
+* Source: Buzzfeed analysis
+* https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/hyperpartisan-sites-and-facebook-pages-are-publishing-false
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/syria-refugee-anas-modamani-germany-facebook.html
+ "
+"incident","I00029","
+
+Actor: Russia 
+
+Timeframe: July 2014 - still active
+
+Date: July 17, 2014
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Ongoing campaign to discredit/undermine Ukraine & NATO & Democracy
+
+Method: 
+
+* Multi-pronged media & source driven campaign… ie: 
+* Russian state sources military, embassy, media (RT, Sputnik, TASS); 
+* Kremlin’s “witting idiots” ie: 21Wire, Global research; trolls & bots. 
+* “All” media platforms… ie: Youtube; Twitter; Reddit
+* See collection of visual assets 
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Bellingcat; Dutch gov’t, DFRLab
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* Anything related to Ukraine
+* Donetsk
+* Crimea
+* Sea of Azov
+* Ukrainian election (2019)
+
+References:
+
+* [Bellingcat (collection of related investigations)](https://www.bellingcat.com/?s=MH17) 
+Ie: [“The Kremlin’s Shifting, Self-Contradicting Narratives on MH17”](https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/01/05/kremlins-shifting-self-contradicting-narratives-mh17/)
+
+* [DFRLab MH17 4D's ""playbook""](https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-dismissing-mh17-8268d2968b9) 
+* [In social networks on the fingers showed how the Kremlin bots work](https://news.online.ua/754036/v-sotssetyah-na-paltsah-pokazali-kak-rabotayut-boty-kremlya-opublikovany-foto/):
+“Censoring” the news (Facebook page “takedown”) [Facebook blocked Sergey Parkhomenko for commenting on the report of the downed ""Boeing""](https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/05/07/112052-facebook-zablokiroval-sergeya-parhomenko-za-kommentariy-doklada-o-sbitom-171-boinge-187%20)
+* [The most comprehensive guide ever to MH17 conspiracies](http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/10/14/confuse-and-obfuscate-the-most-comprehensive-guide-ever-to-mh17-conspiracies/)
+
+* http://tass.com/world/1050324
+* https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/ukraine-involved-mh17-downing-claims-14184413
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2014/07/17/geolocating-the-missile-launcher-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/
+* https://globalnews.ca/news/4993120/russia-rising-part-5-maskirovka/
+* http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/12/06/ukraine-related-narratives-dominate-russian-propaganda/
+
+Datasets: none searched for
+
+Notes:
+
+Russia still accusing Ukraine (03.25.2019)... TASS and UK Daily Mirror 
+
+First Bellingcat report: Efforts to Geolocate the Launcher 07/17/14
+Countless example of Elliot Higgins & team getting trolled since, popular hashtag is #bellingcrap
+
+This is a good summary: 
+“But not only did Russia fiercely deny those accusations, a number of Russian leaders, officials and broadcasters responded by offering dozens of different alternative explanations, “including quite outlandish theories,” says Nilsson.
+
+“For instance, that an airplane would’ve been loaded with already dead people and that Ukrainian airplanes would then have shot it down to make it look like Russia was shooting down passenger airplanes,” he explains.
+
+“There were tons of these stories going around, quite a few of them coming from official Russian sources. And they were not meant to be taken seriously. They were simply supposed to occupy the attention span of the world for a while, to the extent that everyone would lose track of the original explanation, which turned out to be quite the right one.” https://globalnews.ca/news/4993120/russia-rising-part-5-maskirovka/
+
+Topics of Ukraine-related narratives
+http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/12/06/ukraine-related-narratives-dominate-russian-propaganda/
+Back in 2016, StopFake co-founder Yevhen Fedchenko identified 18 major Ukraine-related fake narrative topics spread by Russian propaganda by analyzing 500 debunked disinformation items.
+The Euromaidan Revolution as a “coup d’état“
+Ukraine as a “fascist state“
+Ukraine as a “failed state“
+“Russia is not a part of the occupation/war in Ukraine“
+Discrediting the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF)
+Discrediting the volunteer battalions (which officially became a part of UAF in 2015)
+Donbas and Crimean internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees
+Territorial disintegration of Ukraine
+“Territorial claims” for parts of Ukraine from neighboring Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia
+Fake “international legitimization” of annexation and occupation of Crimea
+The war in Ukraine “conducted by the US, NATO or Western private contractors”
+The West’s “Ukraine fatigue“
+Manipulating international organizations
+Fakes about EU-Ukraine relations
+“Decay” of the US and West in general, and the “disintegration of the EU”
+Flight MH17 crash fakes
+The West “uses biological weapons” in Ukraine
+Mix-ups of the fake narratives about Ukraine, Syria, ISIS terrorists (e.g., Crimean Tatars being depicted as jihadists or Ukraine as a training ground for terrorists)
+For post-Maidan Ukraine, Russian propaganda’s most used narratives were the Euromaidan as “coup d’etat” which brought a “Western-backed junta” (mostly “US-backed”) to power, and “fascism” as the main ideology of the post-Maidan government, Fedchenko notes.
+
+"
+"incident","I00009"," 
+
+Suspected actors:
+
+* Attacker: IRA or more broadly Russian state-sponsored disinformation campaign.
+* Amplifiers: through the persona of “Adam Garrie” (who first appeared on RT (Russian Today) and pro-Russia sites, with no background in Asia and Philippine affairs but suddenly rose to become a global affairs expert).
+* Garrie was then promoted by pro-Duterte officials, social media pages and news outlets.
+ 
+Timeframe: After Putin and Philippine’s president Duterte met in Russia in May 2017 and forged a partnership in information dissemination. Duterte and Putin signed a number of national security agreements, including a deal on intelligence sharing, an “MOU on Cooperation in Mass Communications.”
+ 
+Date: 2017- ongoing
+
+Presumed goals:
+
+* To spread pro-Duterte and Russian propaganda through collaborative effort of both Philippine and Russian disinformation actors.
+
+Method:
+ 
+* Footprint of Garrie on the Philippine media scene started from his connection with Russian IRA websites and pages (GI Analytics Facebook page, Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca.)
+ 
+* RT, one of media outlets that interviewed Garrie, was identified by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence in January 2017 as the primary source of propaganda that the Russians used to further their interests in the 2016 US elections.
+ 
+* Also has appearance on Iran’s IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), which was identified by the US Department of the Treasury in 2013 as a network that broadcasts false reports and forced confessions of political detainees and has ties with “politically motivated phishing” accounts on Google.
+ 
+* The Daily Sentry, a Philippine news site emerged at the start of 2018 (no ownership information), started citing Adam Garrie as a global expert after Philippine-Russian ties grew stronger. Between Feb 2018 and Jan 2019, The Daily Sentry cited Garrie in 41% of posts on Facebook that mentioned experts.
+ 
+* By March 2018, Garrie started to come to the mainstream: The Manila Times – a supporter outlet of the Philippine president, cited by pro-Duterte social media pages.
+ 
+* Philippine online groups and pages began to spread Russian propaganda. Some sites link to Duterte officials and supporters including Duterte’s former assistant secretary. For example, Duterte’s former assistant secretary shared content from Trending News Portal site.
+ 
+Counters:
+
+* Facebook took down 220 pages and 73 Philippine accounts for spam, including pages of The Daily Sentry and its affiliates, TNP page and related pages.
+ 
+Related incidents:
+
+References:
+
+* http://www.interaksyon.com/breaking-news/2017/05/30/75431/ph-russia-communication-offices-to-partner-in-info-dissemination/
+* https://www.rappler.com/nation/188378-ph-russia-sign-bilateral-agreements
+* https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf
+* 
+* https://codastory.com/disinformation/how-a-little-known-pro-kremlin-analyst-became-a-philippine-expert-overnight/
+* https://www.rappler.com/technology/social-media/220741-facebook-remove-trending-news-portal-twinmark-media-enterprises
+* https://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/221422-facebook-maria-ressa-rappler-philippines
+* https://www.rappler.com/nation/194814-maria-ressa-pcoo-training-china-russia
+* http://www.interaksyon.com/breaking-news/2017/05/30/75431/ph-russia-communication-offices-to-partner-in-info-dissemination/
+
+"
+"incident","I00019","
+
+Actor: 
+
+* individual accounts on 4chan (IP addresses indicate locations of Sweden, US, France), 
+* accounts on Twitter (both identifiable and anonymous).
+
+Timeframe: a few days
+
+Date: few hours after Macron and Le Pen were declared winners of the first round of France’s presidential election (April 23, 2017).
+
+Presumed goals: creating and spreading hoaxes and misinformation related to Macron’s personal life, marriage, sexuality, position on terrorism, etc. to spur support for Le Pen in the second round of voting.
+
+Method: posts and memes started on 4chan and later shared in Twitter
+
+Counters: no actions noted.
+
+Related incidents:
+
+* #MacronGate and #MacronCacheCash: fake documents on 4chan about Macron’s alleged offshore account.
+
+References:
+* https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/heres-how-far-right-trolls-are-spreading-hoaxes-about
+* https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/
+"
+"incident","I00004","
+
+Actor: IRA
+
+Timeframe: 1 day (plus preparation)
+
+Date: May 2017
+
+Presumed goals: reduce Emmanuel Macron’s chance of winning French presidential election
+
+Method:
+
+* fake documents posted on 4chan about Macron’s alleged offshore account, 
+* amplified by pro-Trump Twitter accounts using #MacronGate and #MacronCacheCash
+
+Counters: 
+
+* preparation (resilience, account removals), 
+* honeytraps, 
+* counter-response with humour.
+
+Related incidents:
+
+* DNC document release, US presidential elections, 2016
+
+
+References:
+
+* Source: https://www.patreon.com/posts/macrongate-tied-11940855 
+* http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/
+* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/08/macron-hackers-linked-to-russian-affiliated-group-behind-us-attack 
+"
+"incident","I00045","
+
+Actor: Russia
+
+Timeframe: March 4, 2018 - ongoing
+
+Date: March 4, 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Russian officials have sought to exploit holes in the complicated narrative of the poisoning to suggest an anti-Russian conspiracy. Mark Galeotti, an expert on the Russian intelligence services, wrote in an op-ed in The Moscow Times… “The Kremlin is enjoying the reputation of being a swashbuckling maverick, ruthless, dangerous and decisive,” he wrote. “This has a certain value, not least in deterring the fainthearted.”
+* Reuters: Commentary: For Putin’s Russia, a poisoned spy sends a political message “the poisoning as a sign of just how committed Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin has become to eradicating its enemies – and reminding others it can do so.”
+
+Method: 
+
+* Multi-source/channel/media response 
+* highlighting conspiracies: It was a British “false flag” operation; It could be the CIA; Because of Donald Trump; There’s always Ukraine
+* The conspiracy theories did not stop here. Multiple special-interest groups have attempted to lay the blame for the Skripals’ poisoning at the door of their chosen enemies. A UKIP branch in High Wycombe, in the English Home Counties, tweeted to accuse “a third party such as the EU” of “trying to interfere in UK Russian relations.” Sputnik even misquoted former Kremlin advisor Alexander Nekrassov as accusing “rouge agents” [sic] of carrying out the attack, “for some sort agenda [sic] such as slander or tarnish Russia [sic] or cause friction between Britain and Russia.” Matteo Salvini, Italian politician and member of the Italian senate, shared an article on his Facebook page, titled “The Skripal Case is a hoax, the war of the West against Russia is terribly true”. His post was liked 3,800 times and generated over 800 shares.
+* Here are 20 different narratives offered by Russian media and officials for the poisoning: The United Kingdom did it to fuel anti-Russian sentiment (source: Russia 1 TV channel); Ukraine did it to frame Russia (Russia 1); The United States did it to destabilize the world (Russia 1); Theresa May helped orchestrate the attack because she is a friend of CIA director Gina Haspel (Zvezda); It was an attempted suicide (Russia 1)
+It was an accidental overdose (RIA Novosti); It was due to accidental exposure from Britain’s Porton Down research facility (Russia 24 TV channel); The Porton Down lab carried out illicit human testing and is lying about not producing Novichok (RT); Skripal’s future mother-in-law did it (Moskovsky Komsomolets: mk.ru)
+Terrorists did it (Russian ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson); American-British financier Bill Browder — blacklisted in Russia for denouncing corruption — did it (Russia 1); A drone did it (Zvezda and Russian defense ministry); Skripal was a chemical weapons smuggler (Pravda); The West is using the case to deflect attention from Russia’s successes in Syria (Russian ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson); Britain is using the case to deflect attention from Brexit (Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian UN ambassador, Russian OSCE ambassador); The attack was an attempt by a rival faction to undermine Vladimir Putin (state TV); Russia has destroyed all its stockpiles of Novichok (Sputnik); Russia never developed Novichok (Interfax); Only the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Sweden have Novichok (Russian ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson). All three countries have denied the claim.; There is no evidence that the nerve agent used against the Skripals was Novichok, Porton Down lab is struggling to identify the substance (RT)
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Bellingcat; 
+* DFRLab; 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* ties to ongoing campaigns/narrative - Ukraine; NATO; EU; Brexit
+
+References:
+
+* https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/03/a-year-after-the-skripal-poisoning-how-much-has-really-changed-a64677
+* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-poisoning-commentary/commentary-for-putins-russia-a-poisoned-spy-sends-a-political-message-idUSKCN1GK309
+* https://twitter.com/UKIPHighWycombe/status/971773863230164992
+* https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201803141062498438-uk-novichok-nerve-agent-skripal/
+* https://www.facebook.com/salviniofficial/posts/10155663618083155
+* http://www.linkiesta.it/it/article/2018/03/28/il-caso-skripal-e-una-bufala-la-guerra-delloccidente-alla-russia-e-ter/37595/
+* https://www.rt.com/news/452946-skripal-anniversary-truth-novichok/
+* https://disinfoportal.org/sputnik-abkhazias-disinformation-about-porton-down-allegedly-denying-russian-trace-in-skripal-poisoning/
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/world/europe/russia-skripal-poisoning-britain.html
+
+
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/skripal/
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/skripal-poisoning-if-not-russia-then-1d49f086e3e0
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/uk-poisoning-russia-recycles-responses-77e1d357b777
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-social-media-surge-on-skripal-b5132db6f439
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/conspiracy-mania-marks-one-year-anniversary-of-the-skripal-poisoning/
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/world/europe/russia-skripal-poisoning-britain.html
+* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-skripal/third-suspect-in-skripal-poisoning-is-russian-gru-agent-bellingcat-idUSKCN1Q32BZ
+* http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/04/11/five-ways-russia-is-generating-a-conspiracy-smokescreen-around-the-skripal-poisoning/
+* http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/03/30/russian-media-have-published-20-different-narratives-on-skripal-poisoning/
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poisoning_of_Sergei_and_Yulia_Skripal
+
+Visual assets (Google Drive)
+
+Datasets: 
+
+Notes: 
+
+On 6 March 2018 Andrey Lugovoy, deputy of Russia's State Duma (the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) and alleged killer of Alexander Litvinenko, in his interview with the Echo of Moscow said: ""Something constantly happens to Russian citizens who either run away from Russian justice, or for some reason choose for themselves a way of life they call a change of their Motherland. So the more Britain accepts on its territory every good-for-nothing, every scum from all over the world, the more problems they will have.""
+Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 9 March rejected Britain's claim of Russia's involvement in Skripal's poisoning and accused the United Kingdom of spreading ""propaganda"". Lavrov said that Russia was ""ready to cooperate"" and demanded access to the samples of the nerve-agent which was used to poison Skripal. The request was rejected by the British government.
+
+Ongoing… one year later
+https://disinfoportal.org/sputnik-abkhazias-disinformation-about-porton-down-allegedly-denying-russian-trace-in-skripal-poisoning/
+On February 7, 2019, Sputnik-Abkhazia released an article headlined “Scotland Yard about the third suspect in the Skripal case: the investigation continues.” According to Sputnik-Abkhazia, the Russian Foreign Ministry caught British Prime Minister Theresa May in a lie, because the Porton Down Laboratory denied that a nerve agent that poisoned Russian ex-spy, Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia had been produced in Russia
+
+https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/world/europe/russia-skripal-poisoning-britain.html
+Rather than ignoring the anniversary, however, Russia punctuated the occasion on Monday with an hourlong news conference at the United Nations and a 52-page report rehashing the episode in detail, amplified by extensive coverage on its English-language government channel, RT.
+ 
+Russian officials also have tried to turn the tables, accusing Britain of violating international law by refusing to provide Russian consular officials access to the Skripals, who survived and whose whereabouts has not been made public. 
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00051","
+
+Actor: Russia
+
+Timeframe: December 2018 - (ongoing)
+
+Date: December 10, 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Russian disinformation intended to confuse audiences and discredit an organisation (Integrity Inititative)which is working independently to tackle the threat of disinformation. Russia’s state-owned media outlets have seized on the posted materials, with the government’s RT and Sputnik news sites writing dozens of stories claiming that the materials prove that the British government, rather than Russia, is trying to poison internet discourse with propaganda.
+ 
+Method: 
+
+* Hack (email), leak, amplify, smear MSM
+
+Counters: none identified
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* The campaign also threads other organization into the “conspiracy” such as Britsh Military, NATO and the CIA.
+* With it, efforts to further discredit MH17 for instance; tie-in Soro’s (dog-whistle for the far-right); 
+* yet at the same defend the far-left alleging Integrity Initiative was running a smear campaign again UK Labour/Jeremy Corbyn
+
+References: 
+* https://eaworldview.com/2019/01/counter-russia-disinformation-integrity-initiative/
+* https://www.stopfake.org/en/kremlin-watch-briefing-the-eu-has-to-start-taking-pro-kremlin-disinformation-seriously/
+* https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kevincollier/russian-hackers-british-institute
+* https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-46509956
+* https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/anti-propaganda-website-forced-offline-by-hacking-b0ds2bkbp
+* https://eaworldview.com/2019/01/counter-russia-disinformation-integrity-initiative/
+* https://news.sky.com/story/highly-likely-moscow-hacked-uk-agency-countering-russian-disinformation-11656539
+* http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/01/17/russian-attack-on-the-integrity-initiative-what-makes-the-mafia-different-from-the-police/
+
+Datasets: 
+
+Notes: 
+
+RT and Sputnik claim that the Integrity Initiative hack was the work of freelancers aligned with the online Anonymous collective and who were not affiliated with the Russian government. The primary evidence for that, according to RT and Sputnik, is that the stolen Integrity Initiative material was posted to the website of a hacktivist collective called CyberGuerrilla, alongside manifestos claiming “We are Anonymous” and posts saying “We have warned the UK government that it must conduct an honest and transparent investigation into the activity of the Integrity Initiative and the Institute for Statecraft.”
+
+The Integrity Initiative has pulled down its website, replacing it with a reiteration of its mission, a description of the hack, and a call for tips.
+“This international public programme was set up in 2015 to counter disinformation and other forms of malign influence being conducted by states and sub-state actors seeking to interfere in democratic processes and to undermine public confidence in national political institutions,” a spokesperson said in a statement.
+
+ 
+
+"
+"incident","I00034","
+
+Actor: China
+
+Timeframe: 72 hours?
+
+Date: January 20th, 2016
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* The trolls planned their attack for 7pm, China time, on January 20. Members of Di Ba—one of the largest message boards on the internet—would organize into groups, leap over the Great Firewall to reach Facebook, and flood it with the message that Taiwan is part of China. The anti-independence and pro-China posts started to take over the Facebook page of Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s newly elected president
+
+Method: 
+
+* Tsai’s latest Facebook post, about a meeting she had with leaders from her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted nearly 40,000 Facebook comments in just eight hours.
+* News of the attack spread far and wide, with a number of posts making their way around social network WeChat. * For most of the day “Di Ba’s Facebook battle” has been at the top of the list of searched terms on Weibo, a Chinese microblog site similar to Twitter. News outlets in Taiwan covered the story (link in Chinese).
+* Information also spread suggesting that Di Ba’s battle was organized and well-prepared. Screenshots showed that attackers were separated into six “columns,” in the military sense: information gathering; posting; writing opinions and creating images; translation; miscellaneous Facebook tasks such as liking posts; and a vanguard to head things up.
+* The majority of the 26K comments consisted of lines copied and pasted from the officially designated messages
+*  more than 42,000 people had made comments on a single post of Ms Tsai's Facebook page, demanding her self-ruled island be brought under Chinese control.
+* Beginning at 7 pm on January 20, 2016 CST (China Standard Time), tens of thousands of
+comments against Taiwan independence appeared in posts of Taiwan President-elect Ms. Tsai Ing-Wen’s Facebook page as well as news media’s such as Sanli News and Apple Daily. While the organizers claim to taking further steps on issues against Taiwan independence, the event lasted for less than two days due to Chinese government’s intervention, leaving tens of thousands of comments either deleted or unattended.
+* Within this most active group, every username posted 6 comments at least and 12 comments
+on average. The most productive one posted 192 comments during this period. Two interesting
+findings come from the discrepant mapping result of Facebook usernames and IDs, which imply
+participants’ strategy. First, users might share account. We found five IDs, each of which is
+associated with different usernames. According to one internal document downloaded from the
+QQ group, some participants would register Facebook accounts in advance, and then give them to those responsible for attack. Since Facebook allows users to change their usernames anytime, we speculate whether this may be due to the sharing of accounts but changing the name to differentiate the identity.
+* Second, users shared some usernames to maintain the consistency of their identities. The total
+number of IDs is more than the number of unique usernames. Many usernames are shared by
+different IDs, which account for 2.82% of all 16,891 IDs. One possible reason for this practice is
+that during the attack, reporting and blocking accounts is a prevalent tactic used by both sides as defense. Once the account is “dead”, the user has to register for a new account to keep fighting. One commenter said that he/she was blocked over 3 times, but kept registering new accounts to fight. It is thus not surprising to see a small percentage of users who have more than one ID while maintaining the same username.
+* More notable is the case where one username is shared by more than 10 IDs. One possible
+explanation is that someone dedicates himself/herself to this event and intends to increase their
+visibility. However, for those usernames associated with over 30 IDs, we argue that it might be a
+unique strategy for attacking or trolling, because it is difficult to log into multiple accounts and
+post comments by a single user.
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+References:
+
+* https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/96746
+* https://qz.com/598812/an-army-of-chinese-trolls-has-jumped-the-great-firewall-to-attack-taiwanese-independence-on-facebook/
+* https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-21/chinese-facebook-users-flooding-taiwan-president-elect-account/7105228
+* https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-people-are-flooding-the-internet-with-a-campaign-against-taiwan-2016-1
+
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00010","
+
+Actors: IRA, Alex Jones, far right and far left trolls
+
+Timeframe: Ongoing
+
+Date: February 2018
+
+Presumed goals: Divide the American public on the issues of guns, race, generational politics and activism
+
+Method: Amplification via sockpuppet and cyborg accounts
+
+Counters: None / Media exposure
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* Sandy Hook hoaxers / Sandy Hook fatalists
+
+References
+
+* [How Russian trolls exploited Parkland mass shooting on social media](https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2018/feb/22/how-russian-trolls-exploited-parkland-mass-shootin/)
+* [PRO-GUN RUSSIAN BOTS FLOOD TWITTER AFTER PARKLAND SHOOTING](https://www.wired.com/story/pro-gun-russian-bots-flood-twitter-after-parkland-shooting/)
+* [Russian trolls flood Twitter after Parkland shooting](https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/russian-trolls-flood-twitter-after-parkland-shooting-n848471)
+* [Russian Trolls Are Tweeting Propaganda After Stoneman Shooting](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/02/russian-trolls-tweet-propaganda-after-florida-shooting.html)
+
+Details
+
+Following the Feb. 14 shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School that left 17 dead, an army of human-controlled and automated accounts spread related content across Twitter. 
+
+Hamilton 68, a website created by Alliance for Securing Democracy, tracks Twitter activity from accounts it has identified as linked to Russian influence campaigns. As of morning, shooting-related terms dominated the site’s trending hashtags and topics, including Parkland, guncontrolnow, Florida, guncontrol, and Nikolas Cruz, the name of the alleged shooter. Popular trending topics among the bot network include shooter, NRA, shooting, Nikolas, Florida, and teacher.
+
+According to the German Marshall Fund, which tracks Russian-linked Twitter activity, the following are some of the more popular narratives, themes and articles.
+The 'crisis actor' conspiracy
+'False flag' and other conspiracy hashtags
+Meanwhile, some accounts with large bot followings are already spreading misinformation about the shooter's ties to far-left group Antifa, even though the Associated Press reported that he was a member of a local white nationalist group.
+One theory associated with these hashtags is that Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School was targeted because the school’s namesake was opposed to ""draining the swamp"" of the Florida Everglades. Under this theory, the Parkland shooting was a cryptic message to Trump, who vowed during his campaign to ""drain the swamp"" in Washington by hollowing out its infrastructure of career politicians, insiders and influence peddlers.
+Sowing discord
+Experts say the goal of Russian troll propagandists isn't to sway people's opinions in one way or another. Instead, the accounts seek to exploit divisions in order to break down society into smaller, warring groups. Trolls drum up persona accounts on every side of the ideological spectrum and take advantage of high-impact events to spread confusion and disarray. In particular, they're able to take advantage of how Twitter doesn't require users to verify their identity.
+Russian accounts boosted erroneous content concerning the motives of the alleged shooter Nikolas Cruz.
+According to the German Marshall Fund, one of the top links shared by Russia-linked accounts in the aftermath of the shooting was our 2014 article that largely debunked a statistic cited by pro-gun control group Everytown for Gun Safety.
+A survey of tweets using the top hashtags flagged by the Hamilton 68 dashboard showed tweets adamantly in favor of gun control and saying the NRA had taken ""blood money."" Other tweets attacked liberals, the media and lawmakers.
+Another top link shared by the network covers the “deranged” Instagram account of the shooter, showing images of him holding guns and knives, wearing army hats, and a screenshot of a Google search of the phrase “Allahu Akbar.” Characterizing shooters as deranged lone wolves with potential terrorist connections is a popular strategy of pro-gun groups because of the implication that new gun laws could not have prevented their actions.
+The use of pro-gun control hashtags like #guncontrolnow, along with the spread of anti-gun control links like the Politifact article, appear at first to show the Russian strategy of promoting discord on both sides of a debate.
+In other cases, the bots jump on existing hashtags to take control of the conversation and amplify a message. That’s likely what is happening with the Parkland shooting and the hashtag guncontrolnow.
+Public awareness that antagonistic bots flood the Twitter debate hasn’t stopped them from achieving their goals of ratcheting up the vitriol—even amid a live tragedy like the Parkland shooting. The goal, after all, isn't to help one side or the other of the gun control debate win. It's to amplify the loudest voices in that fight, deepening the divisions between us.
+
+Examples
+
+"
+"incident","I00050","
+
+Actor: Russia, Cuba, China, Iran
+
+Timeframe: January 23, 2019
+
+Date: January 29, 2019 - ongoing
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Given the history (going back to the Monroe Doctrine) the US is easily characterized with “imperialist” aspirations. Of course there’s the connected issue of oil and Venezuela’s indebtedness to Russia and China. The relationship between Cuba and Venezuela can not be underscored going back to Castro & Chavez’s relationship.
+
+* Search (google) #handsofvenezuela the results are largely linking to articles denouncing the US and those countries opposed to the Maduro regime. “There's been a lot of misinformation in the international media about whether what is happening in Venezuela is a brazen US-led power grab or a constitutional …”  Jan 13, 2019 - An attempt at an imperialist coup d'état is underway in Venezuela. It must ... Most likely this is another attempt by Washington to spread misinformation and ... socialist and anti-imperialist, is to reject this scandalous imperialist …
+
+* Activists to Trump: 'Hands Off Venezuela' - Truthdig
+https://www.truthdig.com/articles/activists-to-trump-hands-off-venezuela/
+Mar 17, 2019 - medeabenjamin “We are absolutely opposed to economic sanctions in Venezuela” at the #HandsOffVenezuela rally. pic.twitter.com/ ... Packed London meeting says: “US-UK, hands off Venezuela!""
+https://www.marxist.com/packed-london-meeting-says-us-uk-hands-off-venezuela.htm
+Jan 31, 2019 - Nearly 100 people packed the #HandsOffVenezuela meeting in London on 30 January, and heard Venezuelan ambassador Rocío Manero, ...
+
+Method: 
+
+* From efforts via blogs, “news” sites and media supporting the left/socialism/stateism positioning anti-Maduro efforts as “imperialisitic” it’s noteworthy to documented the efforts in February to deliver aid to the country. For instance this case study - analysis demonstrates that the depiction of Russia’s role as “peacekeeper” and “defender” has had a big impact on the networks. We filtered all mentions to include only those containing the words “Russia”, “Moscow” or “Putin” in reference to Venezuela. This resulted in a total number of 60,315 tweets for the period. A few peaks can be noticed at times when Russian sources, mainly RT and Sputnik, forward Venezuela-related news.
+A: Russia expresses an adamant position that Maduro is the legitimate president of Venezuela
+B: Russia will defend the Venezuelan Constitution
+C: The US is massing troops at the Venezuelan border
+E: Russia is sending humanitarian aid to Venezuela
+* The Trojan Horse. The most striking success of the Russian disinformation campaign is the impact of the Trojan Horse Narrative. The first case of describing US and EU humanitarian aid to Venezuela as a Trojan horse, in Spanish Caballo de Troya, appeared in Spanish language networks on 24 January:
+From February 23, 2019 - Billionaire businessman Richard Branson says he hopes his Live Aid-inspired concert to raise funds for Venezuelans will persuade members of the country's military to defy President Nicolas Maduro and allow humanitarian aid to cross the border.
+Branson, who will host ""Venezuela Aid Live"" on Friday in the Colombian border town of Cucuta, said he is aiming to raise about $100 million to buy food and medicine, essential supplies for the country, which is gripped by a political and humanitarian crisis.
+In reaction to - Maduro’s government announced that it would accept contributions from China and Cuba, but called Guaidó-organized aid, which includes contributions from the United States, a “handout.” In an interview with the Associated Press this week, Maduro blamed U.S. sanctions for Venezuela’s economic woes, saying “the infected hand of Donald Trump is hurting Venezuela.”
+* Like the White Helmets (Musician) Roger Waters (willing idiot) weighs in - In a two-minute video posted on Twitter, the musician says Mr Branson's ""Live-Aid-ish"" concert has ""nothing to do with humanitarian aid at all"". ""It has to do with Richard Branson, and I'm not surprised by this, having bought the US saying: 'We have decided to take over Venezuela, for whatever our reasons may be,'"" Mr Waters says. ""But it has nothing to do with the needs of the Venezuelan people, it has nothing to do with democracy, it has nothing to do with freedom, and it has nothing to do with aid."" He adds that he has ""friends that are in Caracas"" who claim there is ""no civil war, no mayhem, no murder, no apparent dictatorship, no suppression of the press""
+Maduro government holds their own concert to counter Branson’s efforts
+https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/19/richard-branson-maduro-concert-on-venezuela-border.html
+https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/19/maduro-government-richard-branson-rival-venezuela-concerts
+Just 300 metres away, the first of some 150 artists began performing at Maduro's Hands off Venezuela festival. 
+https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/rival-concerts-backdrop-venezuela-power-struggle-190222142807321.html
+
+* The Russian official line - (talking points for trolls & willing/unwitting idiots)
+On Tuesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov criticized the U.S. sanctions, which meant that proceeds from the sale of Venezuelan oil would be withheld from Maduro’s government.
+In a press conference, Lavrov dubbed the U.S. sanctions “illegitimate” and “cynical,” adding that Russia “along with other responsible members of the global community will do everything to support the legal government of the president,” RIA Novosti reported.
+There is concern in Moscow about the level of debt Caracas owes Russia. Russian Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak said the sanctions may mean Venezuela will have problems servicing sovereign debt to Russia.
+Venezuela has two months to pay Russian $100 million and there is uncertainty as to whether PDVSA can service its debt to Russia’s state energy giant Rosneft, Radio Free Europe reported
+The evolution/spread of talking points 
+But while the Canadian government, which accused Maduro of seizing power through fraudulent elections, has expressed full support for Guaido, some Canadian protesters are calling it out for what they say is an attack on Venezuela’s sovereignty.
+“What is brewing, what is being organized is an actual military intervention of Venezuela,” said Margaret Villamizar, who attended a protest in Windsor, Ont. “If it doesn’t turn out to be full-scale military, what’s being called diplomacy is really an attack on Venezuela’s sovereignty.”
+ 
+* Also - In an interview with Foreign Policy, Adm. Craig Faller, the four-star military officer who heads U.S. Southern Command, pointed to a Chinese disinformation campaign designed to blame the United States for the blackouts that devastated Venezuela in recent weeks. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/08/us-military-wary-of-chinas-foothold-in-venezuela-maduro-faller-guaido-trump-pentagon/
+A Chinese plane loaded with 65 tons of medical supplies landed in Venezuela's capital of Caracas on Friday amid a power struggle between President Nicolas Maduro and opposition leader Juan Guaido.
+Maduro welcomed the arrival of the humanitarian aid on Twitter, saying ""Venezuela is breaking the imperialist siege and advancing with a victory.""
+He shared photos showing the arrival of the aid as well as a photo of him taken with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping during his visit to China last year.
+China's move came after Russia sent humanitarian aid to Caracas last week.
+Venezuela has been rocked by protests since Jan. 10, when Maduro was sworn in for a second term following a vote boycotted by the opposition.
+https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/venezuela-welcomes-arrival-of-chinese-medical-aid/1435166
+ 
+Counters: 
+
+* Every report suggesting that Venezuela is mired in a humanitarian crisis.
+April 10, 2019 The UN reports “There is a very real humanitarian problem in Venezuela,” said Mark Lowcock, the UN humanitarian chief. “We estimate that 7 million people in Venezuela need humanitarian assistance. That is some 25 per cent of the population,”
+April 10, 2019 NY Times ‘You Shouldn’t Be Here’: U.S. Pushes U.N. to Pull Venezuela Envoy’s Credentials
+Go back to October 2018 Washington Post: A humanitarian crisis in Venezuela? Nothing to see here, government says. Human Rights Watch Report
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* Speculation but research worthy… right/left regional binary pitting new right wing governments in Brazil & Columbia and hosility/percieved hosility to regimes like Venezuela & Ecuador
+
+References: 
+
+* https://www.truthdig.com/articles/activists-to-trump-hands-off-venezuela/
+* https://www.marxist.com/packed-london-meeting-says-us-uk-hands-off-venezuela.htm
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/twitter-as-an-information-battlefield-venezuela-a-case-study/
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-venezuela-humanitarian-aid-has-become-a-political-weapon/2019/02/14/5eab781a-3089-11e9-8781-763619f12cb4_story.html
+* https://www.apnews.com/21b641f6def1400894125e3a8117f66c
+* https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/19/richard-branson-maduro-concert-on-venezuela-border.html
+* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/19/maduro-government-richard-branson-rival-venezuela-concerts
+* https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/rival-concerts-backdrop-venezuela-power-struggle-190222142807321.html
+* https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/08/us-military-wary-of-chinas-foothold-in-venezuela-maduro-faller-guaido-trump-pentagon/
+* https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/venezuela-welcomes-arrival-of-chinese-medical-aid/1435166
+* https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/04/1036441
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/world/americas/pence-venezuela-un-envoy.html
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/a-humanitarian-crisis-in-venezuela-nothing-to-see-here-government-says/2018/10/12/6ebd1aa6-c2ac-11e8-9451-e878f96be19b_story.html
+* https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/venezuela
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/twitter-as-an-information-battlefield-venezuela-a-case-study/
+* https://www.npr.org/2019/03/25/706635580/venezuelas-maduro-faces-pressure-from-much-of-the-world-yet-he-persists
+* https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2019/02/26/venezuela-protests-in-tucson/
+* https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-told-hands-venezuela-countrys-president-who-has-full-backing-1309188
+* https://www.dw.com/cda/en/venezuela-juan-guaido-urges-army-to-let-aid-through/a-47651164
+* https://www.npr.org/2019/04/02/709306132/maduro-allies-move-against-rival-juan-guaid-in-venezuela
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/02/trump-has-russia-problem-venezuela/?utm_term=.9233de48de14
+* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-s-venezuela-challenge
+* https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-venezuelas-maduro-seeks-to-restore-power-stem-looting-as-china/
+* https://www.npr.org/tags/587365601/venezuela-crisis
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/02/16/richard-bransons-goal-million-venezuela-could-face-an-obstacle-maduro/?utm_term=.8a5ad46a730a
+* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47271182
+
+Notes:
+
+
+ 
+
+"
+"incident","I00001","
+
+Actor: 
+
+Timeframe: 
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals: “Russian-linked social media accounts saw racial tensions as something to be exploited in order to achieve the broader Russian goal of dividing Americans and creating chaos in U.S. politics during a campaign in which race repeatedly became an issue.”
+
+Method: 
+Possibly linked: black lives matter facebook ads, targetted at Baltimore, Ferguson, Missouri https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/27/media/facebook-black-lives-matter-targeting/index.html?iid=EL 
+
+Counters:
+
+Related incidents:
+
+* Txrebels facebook group
+* MuslimAmerica facebook group
+* Patriotus facebook group
+* SecuredBorders facebook group
+* Lgbtun facebook group
+* Black Matters facebook group
+
+References:
+* https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/media/blacktivist-russia-facebook-twitter/index.html
+* https://news.docnow.io/blacktivists-in-the-archive-71c807aa247e
+* https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-secret-documents-from-russias-election-trolls-leak
+
+
+
+Datasets
+
+* https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1OZcRCZuz83bMpxVjpUYEALiS4OtKU-pTVtTveG_Ljs0/edit#gid=0 - from https://news.docnow.io/blacktivists-in-the-archive-71c807aa247e are the @blacktivists tweets that used the #blacklivesmatter hashtag
+* Jonathan Albright got the facebook text: https://data.world/d1gi/missing-fb-posts-w-share-stats/workspace/file?filename=Blacktivist+Facebook+Page+%28Text%29.pdf https://data.world/d1gi/missing-fb-posts-w-share-stats/workspace/file?filename=Blacktivist+Facebook+Page+%28Text%29-2.docx 
+
+Notes
+
+First i read the cnn article, then did a twitter search to see if there are traces of the accounts left online.  Only discussion about the IRA operation seem to be on Twitter.  Also searched twitter for some of the text found later (in datasets) - nothing matches. 
+Reading the docnow.io post showed some interesting behavours.  Also that there was no central data repo for the blacktivists posts.  Classic was the tweets being sent only in 8am-6pm Moscow time. Also interesting: the followers grew over time, but they grew and dropped friends (people they followed) in batches periodically - was this to avoid hitting limits? 
+Reading the dailybeast.com article (on an IRA leak), it seems specific individuals were targetted.  Thinking about the places we need to search: if it’s Russia, seems like we need to check twitter, facebook, youtube, reddit, tumblr, instagram, 9gag. 
+Names some of the people contacted, e.g. Craig Carson, a Rochester, New York, attorney and civil rights activist; maybe Shanall LaRay Logan—who lives in Sacramento, California; 
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00035","
+
+Summary:  
+
+Actor: 
+
+Timeframe: 
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+Method:
+
+* Bot activity that inflates the visibility of and perceived support for certain candidates and ideologies in 2014 elections.
+* Campaigns use bots or spread content favorable to their respective candidates in 2014. Neves’ operation used bots on a much larger scale than the Rousseff’s campaign (on FB, Twitter and WhatsApp).
+
+Counters:
+
+* Facebook removed 200 pages run by individuals connected to the right-wing activist organization Movimento Brasil Livre related to the Brazil elections.
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+References:
+* https://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/politicalbots/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Brazil-1.pdf
+* https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/bots-brazil-the-activity-social-media-bots-brazilian-elections
+ 
+
+"
+"incident","I00025","
+
+Actor: Russia
+
+Timeframe: November 6, 2018 - end of November 2018
+
+Date: November 6, 2018
+
+Presumed goals:
+
+* Include - Leave campaigners have claimed that the UK would be forced into an ‘EU army’ under the rules allowing for these activities. https://fullfact.org/europe/hunt-eu-army/
+* Baltic states are frightened by the single European army. The new European security system will be anti-American. To the leadership of the Baltic states, based on Russophobia, this doesn’t look good.
+
+Method: 
+
+* “Limited” engagement & channels. In this case Reddit was key forum. 
+* Could not find examples of engagement from “usual suspects” ie: Russian embassy; military or broad mentions via RT & Sputnik
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+References: 
+
+* https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/27/is-there-a-secret-plan-to-create-an-eu-army
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/spread-it-on-reddit-3170a463e787
+* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-european-army-eminently-defensible-but-not-probable-for-a-long-time-to-come
+* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46108633
+* https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-emmanuel-macron-eu-army-to-complement-nato/
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/baltic-states-frightened-by-the-single-european-army/
+* https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/25/brexiters-european-army-myths-franco-german
+* https://fullfact.org/europe/hunt-eu-army/
+* https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/27/is-there-a-secret-plan-to-create-an-eu-army
+
+
+Datasets: 
+
+Notes:
+Worth noting the Breitbart commentary (see visual assets); compared to campaigns against NATO for instance, this incident didn’t seemingly have much traction/momentum, and seemed more of a potential wedge for the pro-Brexit audience.
+
+Visual Assets
+
+"
+"incident","I00060","
+
+Actors: 
+
+Timeframe:
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+Method: 
+
+Counters:
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+References:
+* (Trump’s White-Nationalist Pipeline)[https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/trump-white-nationalism/568393/] 
+* (Parallels between social media misinformation campaigns in the USA and South Africa)[https://www.iafrikan.com/2018/11/20/social-media-usa-south-africa-fake-news-disinformation/]
+* (The high price of 'white genocide' politics for Australia)[https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/the-high-price-of-white-genocide-politics-for-australia-20180724-p4zt9k.html]
+"
+"incident","I00005","
+
+Actor: Russia/ Internet Research Agency (IRA)
+
+Timeframe: December 2015 - ongoing
+
+Date: June 23, 2016
+
+Presumed goals: Change Brexit vote to ‘leave’; continue to divide/undermine EU; drive Eurosceptic narrative/agenda
+
+Method:
+* (From The European Values Think-Tank)
+* Before Brexit, Russia Today and Sputnik released more anti-EU articles than the official Vote Leave website and Leave.EU website. The British version of Sputnik has an annual budget of £ 1.8 million from the Russian government. Kremlin-owned channels potentially influenced 134 million impressions during the Brexit campaign
+* Method: The data that was used by 89up was derived from the Twitter Search API, Buzzsumo, the Facebook API and other scraping methods. In the timeframe from January 2016 to the day of the British referendum, analysts identified and analysed 261 of the most shared and popular articles that were clearly anti-European. The two main media outlets were RT and Sputnik. Costs: The total value of Kremlin media for the Leave campaign in the six months before the EU referendum was £1,353,000. The PR value for the Leave campaign, based on the 261 heavily pro-Leave articles published by RT and Sputnik, is estimated at nearly £1,500,000based on figures from a leading media monitoring tool. This excludes the significant social media value of these news articles. Estimated value of Russian media Facebook impressions is around $102,000 and the estimated value of Russian media’s potential impressions on Twitter is between $47,000 - $100,000. 
+* Content: The analysis also shows that the overwhelming majority of articles published by RT and Sputnik (131 of the 200 most shared) were clearly for Leave; 59 articles were Neutral and only 10 were set to Remain. When the neutral articles are filtered out, numbers show that the negative articles of RT/Sputnik, together, elicited nearly the same number of engagements as the official Vote Leave website.
+* Social reach: The report shows the social reach of these anti-EU articles published by the Kremlin-owned channels was 134 million potential impressions, in comparison with a total social reach of just 33 million and 11 million potential impressions for all content shared from the Vote Leave website and Leave.EU website respectively.
+* (Jane Mayer, staff writer at The New Yorker, via NPR) Role of - Cambridge Analytica, which is a big data company that worked for the Trump campaign in the end - and it was owned principally by one of Trump's largest backers, Robert Mercer - was also involved in helping the early stages of the Brexit campaign in England.
+And the man who spanned both countries and pushed for both, really, was Steve Bannon, it seems there was actually a lot of Russian money offered to Arron Banks, who was one of the major political figures leading the Brexit campaign. The Russian money was offered to him in the form of business opportunities and gold mines and diamond mines by the Russian ambassador to England. So there seems to be financial incentives that were dangled. 
+* There are bots and trolls and posts that are coming from the same Russian Internet agency in St. Petersburg. So in both countries, we see pushing Brexit and pushing Trump at the same time by the same trolls and bots. research conducted by a joint team of experts from the University of California at Berkeley and Swansea University reportedly identified 150,000 Twitter accounts with various Russian ties that disseminated messages about Brexit.
+* A cache of posts from 2016, seen by WIRED, shows how a coordinated network of Russian-based Twitter accounts spread racial hatred in an attempt to disrupt politics in the UK and Europe.
+A network of accounts posted pro and anti-Brexit, anti-immigration and racist tweets around the EU referendum vote while also targeting posts in response to terrorist attacks across the continent. 
+* More broadly, a Russian espionage operation funneling money into a political campaign aimed at unwinding European integration would be entirely consistent with the Kremlin’s perceived political interests and tactics of hybrid warfare. Covert financial infiltration is part of a toolkit Moscow uses to interfere in European and American politics. Another tool deployed ahead of the 2016 referendum was pro-Brexit messaging pumped out by RT, Sputnik, and the Internet Research Agency.
+* From 1 to 8 February 2016, Sputnik ran 14 stories on the “Brexit” issue. Eight of them had negative headlines, either featuring criticism of the deal or focusing on the difficulties Cameron faces; five headlines were broadly factual; one reported a positive comment that the Bank of England had “not yet seen” an impact on investor sentiment, but gave it a negative slant by headlining, “Bank of England on Brexit: No need to panic, yet.” (The word “panic” did not appear in the story.) Not one headline reported reactions supporting the deal. Both Sputnik and RT quoted a disproportionate number of reactions from “Out” campaigners. RT, for example, quoted five “Out” partisans: MP Liam Fox; the founder of Leave.EU; London Mayor Boris Johnson; MEP Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK Independence Party; and UKIP member Paul Nuttall.
+* anti-immigrant adverts were targeted at Facebook users in the UK and the US. One – headlined “You’re not the only one to despise immigration”, which cost 4,884 roubles (£58) and received 4,055 views – was placed in January 2016. Another, which accused immigrants of stealing jobs, cost 5,514 roubles and received 14,396 impressions
+* A study of social media during the Brexit campaign by 89Up, a consultancy, found that Russian bots delivered 10m potential Twitter impressions—about a third of the number generated by the Vote Leave campaign’s Twitter account. Such echoing amplifies the effect of RT and Sputnik stories, which are in general not much watched.
+
+Counters: FB & Twitter content take-downs
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* 2016 US Election… pick ‘em
+
+References:
+
+* https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/363/36308.htm#_idTextAnchor033
+* https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf
+* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/russian-troll-factories-researchers-damn-twitters-refusal-to-share-data
+* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/congress-should-explain-how-dark-russian-money-infiltrates-western-democracies
+* http://sputniknews.com/search/?query=Brexit
+* http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160202/1034093305/cameron-tusk-brexit-deal.html
+* http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160203/1034124763/tusk-eu-reform.html
+* http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160204/1034209396/cameron-eu-brexit-talks.html
+* http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160205/1034290031/business-investments-brexit-europe.html
+* https://www.rt.com/uk/331734-cameron-calais-jungle-brexit/
+* https://www.rt.com/uk/331161-eu-referendum-date-brexit/
+* https://www.rt.com/uk/330977-tusk-eu-deal-brexit/
+* https://twitter.com/brexit_sham/status/994982969705189377
+
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/europe/russia-brexit-twitter-facebook.html 
+* https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2018/11/01/russian-trolls-used-islamophobia-to-whip-up-support-for-brexit/#11ee8dd465f2
+* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/10/russian-influence-brexit-vote-detailed-us-senate-report
+* https://www.npr.org/2019/01/19/686830510/senate-finds-russian-bots-bucks-helped-push-brexit-vote-through
+* https://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Influence-of-Russian-Disinformation-Operations-Specific-examples-in-data-and-numbers.pdf
+* https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/11/14/the-extent-of-russian-backed-fraud-means-the-referendum-is-invalid/
+* https://www.wired.co.uk/article/brexit-russia-influence-twitter-bots-internet-research-agency
+* https://www.buzzfeed.com/jamesball/a-suspected-network-of-13000-twitter-bots-pumped-out-pro?utm_term=.ipWGa5zK#.oeeKD58v
+* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/use-brexit-delay-to-investigate-russian-money
+* http://www.interpretermag.com/putins-media-are-pushing-britain-for-the-brexit/
+* https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/12/facebook-brexit-russia-unresolved-40-questions
+* https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/02/22/russian-disinformation-distorts-american-and-european-democracy
+
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00044","
+
+Actors: 
+
+* SVR and IRA; 
+* Alex Jones; 
+* Global Research; 
+* anti-gov trolls; rapture trolls; alt-right trolls;
+
+Timeframe: Most of 2015
+
+Date: May - Oct 2015
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* US operational dry run; 
+* Test 2016 themes; 
+* Promote paranoia in right wing US populations; 
+* Establish and prime anti-government narratives for future use. 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Amplification via sockpuppet and cyborg accounts; 
+* Social media groups and meetups; 
+* Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and scary) titles; 
+* Amplify US media derision of message “carriers” in Russian state media;
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Media exposure; 
+* Texas Governor disavows 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* 2016 US election; 
+* QAnon; 
+* Texas secession
+
+References
+
+* [That 'Jade Helm' Conspiracy Freakout Was Spurred By Russian Bots, Ex-Intel Chief Says](https://taskandpurpose.com/jade-helm-conspiracy-russian-bots)
+* [Russians Sowed Divisions in Texas Politics, Says U.S. Senate Report](https://www.texasmonthly.com/news/russians-sowed-divisions-texas-politics-says-u-s-senate-report/)
+* [Case Analysis: Jade Helm 15 and Russian Active Measures](https://toinformistoinfluence.com/2015/11/16/case-analysis-jade-helm-15-and-russian-active-measures/)
+* [Trolling for Trump: how Russia is trying to destroy our democracy](https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/trolling-for-trump-how-russia-is-trying-to-destroy-our-democracy/)
+* [Anatomy of a Russian attack: First signs of the Kremlin’s attempt to influence the 2016 election](https://wtop.com/j-j-green-national/2017/09/anatomy-russian-attack-first-signs/slide/1/)
+
+Details
+
+Even before the 2016 presidential election, the Russians had been testing disinformation in Texas by stirring up the controversy surrounding the Jade Helm military maneuver in the summer of 2015. Conspiracy theorists had created the idea that a joint military training exercise in Texas was cover for President Obama to declare martial law and seize Texas. The conspiracy theory gained traction when Abbott ordered the Texas State Guard to monitor the U.S. military. Earlier this year, a former head of the National Security Agency and the CIA—Air Force General Michael Hayden—said the Jade Helm disinformation campaign was pivotal to the Russians’ decision to try to influence the U.S. presidential campaign. “At that point, I’m figuring the Russians are saying, ‘We can go big-time.’ And at that point, I think they made the decision, ‘We’re going to play in the electoral process,’” Hayden said.
+
+When thousands of troops from Army Special Operations Command descended on the American southwest for the totally normal eight-week training exercise Jade Helm 15, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott — goaded on by anti-government ideologues, rapture-predicting ministries and alt-right internet famewhores — ordered the state's volunteer guard to ""monitor"" the U.S. service members on their land to make sure they didn't start kidnapping undesirables and grabbing people's guns.
+
+It was a precursor to martial law, they said. It was ""way worse than you realize: police, military working together toward population control,"" they said. It was ""secretly using recently closed Wal-Marts to stockpile supplies for Chinese troops who will be arriving to disarm Americans,"" they said. It was preparation for Obama's takeover after an impending asteroid impact that would begin the global apocalypse, they said. It mobilized right-wing activists to prepare to fight their government — their uniformed soldiers! — to the death.
+
+Russian intelligence, state media, and trolls under President Vladimir Putin sought to bum steer U.S. domestic reactions to Jade Helm 15, the multi-state U.S.-based military training exercise concludedSeptember 15th. Russia has invested tens to hundreds of millions to infiltrate U.S. media markets with English language news, opinion, conspiracy, and troll content, often interlocking with the most popular U.S. conspiracy theory websites on the net.
+
+On July 2015, at a community meeting in Bastrop, some Texans were up in arms about hosting part of a multi-state U.S. military training exercise named Jade Helm 15. While most locals were unswayed by the conspiracy theories of Jade Helm 15 ushering in martial law, the video of  the crowd at the link records aspects of U.S. social and cognitive vulnerability to Russian “active measures.”
+
+It's an age-old problem; during the Cold War, Soviet agencies worked to whip up leftist anger at the U.S. government, highlighting America's race and inequality problems. But today, they've found that the most effective, salient mode of fuckery in U.S. affairs is to push right-wing conspiracy theories — ""deep state,"" Hillary emails, Pizzagate, Seth Rich, Soros, Islamists sneaking over the Mexico-U.S. border, Benghazi — that reinforce the idea that anyone to the left of, say, President Donald Trump, is a robotic foreign-paid human-trafficking overlord doing the bidding of the Rothschilds or Trilaterals or Freemasons or Kellers some other inane shit.
+
+The Russian SVR (Sluzhba vneshney razvedki) has chief responsibility for conducting active measures outside of Russia. The SVR’s active measures surrounding Jade Helm 15 generated fear to ignite a range of behaviors serving Russian foreign policy objectives, from feeding cynicism about the U.S. governing system and its people, to inciting violence and sabotage in the U.S.
+
+One example of how this messaging worked in ramping up fear of Jade Helm 15 was found at “Global Research,” a media outlet for a Canadian non-profit called Centre for Research on Globalization. Entitled, Towards a Militarized Police State in America? Explosive New Revelations over “Jade Helm 15 Exercise” and Potential False Flags, the online article was posted May 27, 2015, roughly 48 days before the Jade Helm 15 training exercise was to begin. Such a lead would give the piece time to disseminate to conspiracist sites and gullible readers ample time to organize a response.
+
+The idea is to get Americans thinking other Americans are the real enemies of humanity and progress. And it works, because a lot of Americans are already disposed to that way of thinking.
+
+On the other hand, it’s an easy cop-out to blame the Russians for every insecure dumbass idea that excitable Americans run with.
+
+Considering their interlocking content and links, Global Research and Alex Jones’s InfoWars.com (one of the most popular conspiracy websites on the internet) have a de facto alliance. Both sites published conspiracy pieces about Jade Helm 15 in advance of the exercise, as did many other conspiracist websites that link with one or both.
+
+The blizzard of conspiracy has had an effect. By May 2015, a Rasmussen poll on Jade Helm 15 found that “45% of voters are concerned that the government will use U.S. military training operations to impose greater control over some states,” with 19% “Very Concerned.” Rasmussen also reported that “21% believe the government’s decision to conduct military training exercises in some states is an infringement on the rights of the citizens in those states.”
+
+Some debate the effectiveness of Russian active measures, propaganda, and trolling. Russia Today (RT) is a more sophisticated Kremlin media outlet, with slick television, internet, and periodical output. RT’s portrayal of Jade Helm 15was to depict Americans as prone to conspiracy theory, and to amplify left-leaning U.S. media derision of Texas demographics disturbed by Jade Helm 15, while casting doubt on the government operation with headlines and sub-headlines. Russia Today’s approach had accentuated personal caricatures and distrust driving partisan anger in the U.S.
+
+On social media however, Kremlin-linked and other conspiracists sometimes represent themselves as insiders or experts whose content can be frightening and inciting.
+
+For example, on LinkedIn.com, many Pulse posts have focused on Jade Helm 15. Below I profile two examples of Pulse writers who hit Jade Helm 15 theme especially hard, one of them naming himself a “Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME” and the other a “Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author”
+
+Are apocalyptic conspiracies harmless despite their over-the-top claims?
+
+Apparently not. One ominous event may have turned Jade Helm 15 Active measures into a high-yield victory for Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin. Three North Carolina men amassed arms, munitions, and weapons and had been actively preparing to ambush Jade Helm 15 troops in training. Fortunately, the FBI received a tip from a gun and surplus store owner and arrested the would-be domestic-terrorists who feared that Jade Helm 15 was a prelude to martial law in the U.S.
+
+The Russian SVR and Putin’s media have aimed at Texas before. Did Putin foresee that Texas politicians might respond to popular conspiracist fears ramped up by the Kremlin itself and so cause strife in the partisan divide? That happened when Governor Greg Abbot tried to reassure Texans about Jade Helm 15, and opposition media lampooned him.
+
+Yet according to the San Antonio Express News, Governor Abbot, who is also a former Texas Supreme Court Justice not of the conspiracist mold, had initially a milder approach. Yet the opposing partisan media did more than just embarrass Gov. Abbot over his response, it called some of his constituents who had been moved by conspiracy propaganda “dumb,” which further tends to divide U.S. demographics along stereotypical lines. Mr. Putin must have been pleased.
+
+Examples
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00015","
+
+Actors: Russian state actors, Concord Management
+
+Timeframe: Fall 2018 - Winter 2019
+
+Date: October 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Discredit Mueller findings; 
+* sow doubt about Russian active measures; 
+* expose investigatory sources, priorities and methods; 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Release non-public documents with favorable amendments; 
+* Disguise document provenance as hacking (i.e. revelation); 
+* Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly 
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Media exposure; 
+* motions to limit future discovery
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* 2016 US election
+
+References
+
+* [Document: Concord Management Used Discovery for Disinformation Campaign, Mueller Says](https://www.lawfareblog.com/document-concord-management-used-discovery-disinformation-campaign-mueller-says)
+* [Mueller says some private case files were used in 'disinformation campaign' to discredit Russia probe](https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/427723-mueller-says-some-of-his-private-case-files-were-used-in)
+* [Mueller says Russians are using his discovery materials in disinformation effort](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/mueller-says-russians-using-his-discovery-materials-disinformation-effort-n964811)
+* [Mueller says discovery materials in case against Russian firm were used in a cyber-disinformation campaign](https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/mueller-says-discovery-materials-in-case-against-russian-firm-were-used-in-a-cyber-disinformation-campaign/2019/01/30/9fd60218-24c9-11e9-81fd-b7b05d5bed90_story.html?utm_term=.4b814db9f811)
+* [Mueller's Team Questions How Files in Russia Case Ended Up Online](https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/01/30/muellers-team-questions-how-files-in-russia-case-ended-up-online/?slreturn=20190231112904)
+* https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5700929-Concord-Discovery-Opposition.html
+
+Details
+
+The special counsel's office has filed a memorandum in U.S. v. Concord Management and Consulting, LLC in opposition to Concord's motion to disclose documents identified as ""sensitive"" by the Special Counsel to certain Concord officers and employees. The memo alleges that subsequent investigations into Concord have ""revealed that certain non-sensitive discovery materials in the defense’s possession appear to have been altered and disseminated as part of a disinformation campaign"" apparently aimed at discrediting the special counsel's investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election.
+
+That discovery — evidence and documents traded between both sides of a lawsuit — appears to have been altered and disseminated as part of a disinformation campaign apparently aimed at discrediting the ongoing investigations in Russian interference in the U.S. political system, according to the documents.
+
+Prosecutors said sensitive evidence also could reveal government investigative techniques and identify cooperating individuals and companies.
+
+Concord is among 13 Russian individuals and entities charged last February in connection with Mueller’s probe. Concord is alleged to have funded the operation of the Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll farm that spread divisive content to U.S. audiences on social media as part of broader effort to meddle in the 2016 vote.
+
+Prosecutors said that some nonpublic files supplied to Concord’s defense attorneys were apparently altered and disseminated using the Twitter account @HackingRedstone, which has since been suspended on the platform.
+
+On Thursday, Mueller's team updated their filing with precise dates for the actions taken on Twitter, noting that the account @HackingRedstone started sending direct messages to members of the media on October 22, before making a public tweet on October 30 in regards to the supposed discovery documents.
+
+The filing cites an Oct. 22, 2018, tweet in which the account claimed, “We’ve got access to the Special Counsel Mueller’s probe database as we hacked Russian server with info from the Russian troll case Concord LLC v. Mueller. You can view all the files Mueller had about the IRA and Russia collusion. Enjoy the reading!” 
+
+The tweet linked to a webpage with folders containing scores of files that mimicked names and folder structures of materials produced by the special counsel’s office in discovery, the filing states.
+
+The prosecutors’ filing said the matching files included images of political memes from Facebook and other social media accounts used online by the Internet Research Agency, many of which are presumably still available elsewhere on the Internet, but not with the unique identifiers used in materials turned over by prosecutors.
+
+Prosecutors said in their filing that an FBI review found no evidence of a hack of the special counsel’s office. The filing also said that defense lawyers told the Mueller team that the vendor it was using reported no unauthorized access to the nonsensitive files. Under a court protective order, sensitive evidence in the case must be reviewed by a U.S. government “firewall” counsel, and then a judge must give permission before the evidence can be given to any non-U.S. national.
+
+The facts “establish that the person(s) who created the Web page had access to at least some of the nonsensitive discovery produced by the government in this case,” wrote Justice Department national security division attorney Heather N. Alpino for a team including prosecutors with Mueller’s office and the U.S. attorney’s office of the District.
+
+
+Mueller’s team firmly pushed back on the request in the filing Wednesday, asserting releasing the files to the firm’s employees in Russia – including Prigozhin – would risk U.S. national security. 
+
+“Concord’s request to send the discovery to the Russian Federation unreasonably risks the national security interests of the United States,” the filing states.  “The government’s concerns are only heightened by the apparent release and manipulation of information produced to Concord as ‘non-sensitive’ discovery in this case.” 
+
+The filing also notes that the discovery files labeled ""sensitive"" identify ""uncharged individuals"" who government investigators believe are ""continuing to engage in operations to interfere with lawful U.S. government functions like those activities charged in the indictment.” 
+
+Mueller’s prosecutors did not oppose allowing Concord employees to view the files at their defense attorney’s offices under security protections, noting that “appearance in the United States would allow them to stand trial.”
+"
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/MOE.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/MOE.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc9e08f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/MOE.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+disarm_id,info_category,info_type,meta,name,brainstorm,phase,tactic,counter,summary,longname
+ME00001,,,,,,TA06 - Develop Content,T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites,Identify affilliated imposter accounts,,ME00001
+ME00002,,,,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,T0009 - Create fake experts,Verify published research accreditation,,ME00002
+ME00003,,,,,"-measure credibility of expert, credibility of each media company, their amplification factor, as a metric of the value the expert provides.
+
+
+
+X media power, measure whether actor can be knocked off one class of ""credible media"" down to the next in the ladder",TA15 - Establish Social Assets,T0009 - Create fake experts,Publicly deplatform fake experts,,ME00003
+ME00004,,,,,-MOE = predictive value of differentiation by intent via other counters related to polls?,TA07 - Channel Selection,T0029 - Manipulate online polls,Categorize polls by intent,,ME00004
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/MOP.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/MOP.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00717ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/MOP.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+disarm_id,info_category,data_type,Unnamed: 3,name,Unnamed: 5,Unnamed: 6,summary,longname
+MP00001,,,social_media,Likes,,,,MP00001
+MP00002,,,social_media,Shares,,,,MP00002
+MP00003,,,social_media,Comments,,,,MP00003
+MP00004,,,social_media,Follows,,,,MP00004
+MP00005,,,social_media,Retweets,,,,MP00005
+MP00006,,,social_media,Clicks,,,,MP00006
+MP00007,,,social_media,Active Followers,,,,MP00007
+MP00008,,,social_media,Relevance Score,,,see: facebook relevance algo,MP00008
+MP00009,,,social_media,Follwers vs. Following Ratio,,,,MP00009
+MP00010,,,social_media,Inter-Community Posting ,,,4chan to Reddit,MP00010
+MP00011,,,social_media,Intra-Community Posting,,,crossposting between boards,MP00011
+MP00012,,,social_media,Reach vs. Impressions,,,,MP00012
+MP00013,,,social_media,Direct Messages,,,,MP00013
+MP00014,,,,,,,,MP00014
+MP00015,,,,Web Site Traffic Growth,,,,MP00015
+MP00016,,,,Search Engine Ranking,,,,MP00016
+MP00017,,,mobile,Mobile App Downloads,,,,MP00017
+MP00018,,,mobile,SMS/Push Notification List,,,,MP00018
+MP00019,,,,,,,,MP00019
+MP00020,,,target_audience,Audience Demographics,,,,MP00020
+MP00021,,,target_audience,Audience Mentions,,,,MP00021
+MP00022,,,,,,,,MP00022
+MP00023,,,,,,,,MP00023
+MP00024,,,,,,,,MP00024
+MP00025,,,adtech,Ad Conversions,,,,MP00025
+MP00026,,,,,,,,MP00026
+MP00027,,,,,,,,MP00027
+MP00028,,,,,,,,MP00028
+MP00029,,,,,,,,MP00029
+MP00030,,,,Adversary intelligence system fails to detect,,,,MP00030
+MP00031,,,,,,,,MP00031
+MP00032,,,email,Email List,,,,MP00032
+MP00033,,,email,Email Open Rate,,,,MP00033
+MP00034,,,email,Email Click-Through Rate,,,,MP00034
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/actortypes.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/actortypes.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cdfa82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/actortypes.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,sector_ids,framework_ids,longname,Jon's comments/questions
+A001,data scientist ,"Person who can wrangle data, implement machine learning algorithms etc","S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010","FW01, FW02",A001 - data scientist ,"What actual actions do data scientists execute? Do we not need a clearer idea of this, to help up map ttps (actions) to actortypes (who execute the action)"
+A002,target,Person being targeted by disinformation campaign,"S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010",FW02,A002 - target,"Both red and blue framework users will refer to A002? So in FW01, as well as FW02?"
+A003,trusted authority ,Influencer,"S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010","FW01, FW02",A003 - trusted authority ,"Is A003 best summarised by the word ""Inluencer""? Is an influencer not a separate actortype?
+Just seen below, A016"
+A004,activist,,S002,FW02,A004 - activist,What does this actortype do?
+A005,community group,,S002,FW02,A005 - community group,What does this actortype do?
+A006,educator,,S002,FW02,A006 - educator,
+A007,factchecker,Someone with the skills to verify whether information posted is factual,S002,FW02,A007 - factchecker,
+A008,library,,S002,FW02,A008 - library,"Is this an actortype? A sub-sector, yes. But what is the 'action type' to help describe the 'actortype'?"
+A009,NGO,,S002,FW02,A009 - NGO,"This is a sector, not an actortype"
+A010,religious organisation ,,S002,FW02,A010 - religious organisation ,"""Faith communities"" are a sub-sector of the Civil Society sector. I think we need clear differentiation between the 'Sector' object (where an actor sits) vs 'Actortype' object (what an actor does)"
+A011,school ,,S002,FW02,A011 - school ,"This is a subsector of S004 - not an actortype, or is there a clear role for a school? If teaching, is this not A006"
+A012,account owner,Anyone who owns an account online,S006,"FW01
+FW02",A012 - account owner,
+A013,content creator ,,S006,"FW01
+FW02",A013 - content creator ,
+A014,elves,,S006,FW02,A014 - elves,"??? SJ, you have told me, but I've forgotten"
+A015,general public,,S006,FW02,A015 - general public,"Duplication of a field in the sector object. But I'm querying if this belongs under sector either. Aren't we talking here about ""individuals"". And, then again, what do these individuals do? They are a target. Or an influencer. Or something else. But being an individual doesn't seem to help describe their applicability to an action"
+A016,influencer,,S006,"FW01
+FW02",A016 - influencer,
+A017,coordinating body,For example the DHS,S003,FW02,A017 - coordinating body,"""Response coordinator""? Or just 'Coordinator"""
+A018,government ,Government agencies,S003,"FW01
+FW02",A018 - government ,"DHS (A017) is ""government"". Again, this is a field/value of the sector object"
+A019,military ,,S003,FW02,A019 - military ,"A019 is a sub-sector of ""government"". Again, this is a field/value of the sector object"
+A020,policy maker,,S003,FW02,A020 - policy maker,
+A021,media organisation,,S010,"FW01
+FW02",A021 - media organisation,"Not an actortype. The actor is perhaps as the owner, or the journalist, or the ad buyer, ad seller etc"
+A022,company,,S009,FW02,A022 - company,
+A023,adtech provider,,S008,FW02,A023 - adtech provider,"Should Adtech be a called-out subsector of S008? Separate question: is ""provider"" relevant? What action does it imply? Or what TTP does it map to?"
+A024,developer,,S008,FW02,A024 - developer,
+A025,funding_site_admin,Funding site admin,S008,FW02,A025 - funding_site_admin,What is this?
+A026,games designer,,S008,"FW01, FW02",A026 - games designer,"Just ""Designer""? Would the TTP context not make it clear the context was 'gaming'?"
+A027,information security,,S008,FW02,A027 - information security,
+A028,platform administrator,,S008,FW02,A028 - platform administrator,"Just ""Administrator""?"
+A029,server admininistrator ,,S008,FW02,A029 - server admininistrator ,"Just ""Administrator""? (de-duplicating A028)"
+A030,platforms ,,S007,FW02,A030 - platforms ,"The same as S007? If there is an action here, is it done by actortype = ""algorithm""? Maybe ""Platform"" is right"
+A031,social media platform adminstrator,"Person with the authority to make changes to algorithms, take down content etc. ",S007,FW02,A031 - social media platform adminstrator,"Not needed, given A028. The sector selection does the differentiation"
+A032,social media platform outreach ,,S007,FW02,A032 - social media platform outreach ,What does this do?
+A033,social media platform owner,Person with authority to make changes to a social media company’s business model,S007,FW02,A033 - social media platform owner,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/countermeasures.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/countermeasures.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96ccf96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/countermeasures.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,923 @@
+disarm_id,name,metatechnique,summary,actortypes,resources_needed,how_found,references,incident_ids,tactic,responsetype,notes,tags,techniques,longname
+C00022,Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety,M001 - resilience,Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+",C00022 - Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety
+C00006,Charge for social media,M004 - friction,"Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information.  There are examples of this not working, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc. ",A033 - social media platform owner,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,"T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0015 - Create hashtag
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+",C00006 - Charge for social media
+C00008,Create shared fact-checking database,M006 - scoring,"Share fact-checking resources - tips, responses, countermessages, across respose groups.  ",A007 - factchecker,,"2019-11-workshop
+2019-11-search",,"I00049,I00050",TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,information,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0013 - Create fake websites
+T0014 - Create funding campaigns
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0045 - Use fake experts",C00008 - Create shared fact-checking database
+C00009,Educate high profile influencers on best practices,M001 - resilience,"Find online influencers. Provide training in the mechanisms of disinformation, how to spot campaigns, and/or how to contribute to responses by countermessaging, boosting information sites etc. ","A016 - influencer,A006 - educator",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,education,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0042 - Kernel of truth
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00009 - Educate high profile influencers on best practices
+C00010,Enhanced privacy regulation for social media,M004 - friction,"Implement stronger privacy standards, to reduce the ability to microtarget community members. ",A020 - policy maker,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,regulation,"T0005 - Center of gravity analysis
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads",C00010 - Enhanced privacy regulation for social media
+C00011,Media literacy. Games to identify fake news,M001 - resilience,"Create and use games to show people the mechanics of disinformation, and how to counter them. ","A006 - educator,A026 - games designer,A024 - developer",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,education,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0013 - Create fake websites
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0045 - Use fake experts",C00011 - Media literacy. Games to identify fake news
+C00012,Platform regulation,M007 - metatechnique,"Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy.  Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media.  The U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media","A020 - policy maker,A018 - government,A033 - social media platform owner",,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,regulation,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0013 - Create fake websites
+T0014 - Create funding campaigns
+T0015 - Create hashtag
+T0016 - Clickbait
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0021 - Memes
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0046 - Search Engine Optimization
+T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+T0049 - Flooding
+T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00012 - Platform regulation
+C00013,Rating framework for news,M006 - scoring,"This is ""strategic innoculation"", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body.  Include full transcripts, link source, add items. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,information,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news",C00013 - Rating framework for news
+C00014,Real-time updates to fact-checking database,M006 - scoring,Update fact-checking databases and resources in real time.  Especially import for time-limited events like natural disasters. ,A007 - factcheckers,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0013 - Create fake websites
+T0014 - Create funding campaigns
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0045 - Use fake experts",C00014 - Real-time updates to fact-checking database
+C00016,Censorship,M005 - removal,Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of information controlled by disinformation creators. Not recommended. ,A031 - social media platform administrator,,grugq,Taylor81,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0013 - Create fake websites
+T0014 - Create funding campaign
+T0015 - Create hashtag
+T0016 - Clickbait 
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0043 - Use SMS/WhatsApp/ Chat apps
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0049 - Flooding 
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0058 - Legacy web content
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+",C00016 - Censorship
+C00017,Repair broken social connections,M010 - countermessaging,"For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. ",A021 - media organisation,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0023 - Distort facts",C00017 - Repair broken social connections
+C00019,Reduce effect of division-enablers,M003 - daylight,"includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0052 - Teriary sites amplify news
+T0056 - Dedicated channel disseminate information pollution",C00019 - Reduce effect of division-enablers
+C00021,Encourage in-person communication,M001 - resilience,Encourage offline communication,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+",C00021 - Encourage in-person communication
+C00024,Promote healthy narratives,M001 - resilience,"Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA).  Includes promoting identity neutral narratives. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+",C00024 - Promote healthy narratives
+C00026,Shore up democracy based messages,M010 - countermessaging,"Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy",,,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda",C00026 - Shore up democracy based messages
+C00027,Create culture of civility,M001 - resilience,This is passive.  Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,narrative,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0021 - Memes
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers",C00027 - Create culture of civility
+C00029,Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise,M002 - diversion,Create websites in disinformation voids - spaces where people are looking for known disinformation. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,narrative,"T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives",C00029 - Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise
+C00028,Make information provenance available,M011 - verification,"Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments.  Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted.
+
+This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,information,"TA07 - Channel Selection
+TA08 - Pump Priming
+TA09 - Exposure
+TA10 - Go Physical",C00028 - Make information provenance available
+C00030,Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based),M002 - diversion,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,narrative,"T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives",C00030 - Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)
+C00031,"Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify",M009 - dilution,"Create competing narratives. Included ""Facilitate State Propaganda"" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,CAVEAT: some element of disinformation is simply filling the information space with so much data that it overwhelms people and they shutdown. Any swarm-counter-narrative needs to be cautious of this outcome.,narrative,"T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives","C00031 - Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify"
+C00042,Address truth contained in narratives,M010 - countermessaging,"Focus on and boost truths in misinformation narratives, removing misinformation from them. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,narrative,"T0004 - Competing Narratives
+T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0042 - Kernel of Truth
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0059 - Play the long game",C00042 - Address truth contained in narratives
+C00032,Hijack content and link to truth- based info,M002 - diversion,Link to platform,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,T0055 - Use hashtag,C00032 - Hijack content and link to truth- based info
+C00034,Create more friction at account creation,M004 - friction,Counters fake account,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,"T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0012 - Use concealment
+T0030 - Backstop personas",C00034 - Create more friction at account creation
+C00036,Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide),M013 - targeting,All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,"T0005 - Center of Gravity Analysis
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0012 - Use concealment
+T0030 - Backstop personas
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events",C00036 - Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)
+C00040,third party verification for people,M011 - verification,counters fake experts,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,"T0007 - Create fake social media profiles
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0012 - Use concealment",C00040 - third party verification for people
+C00067,Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding),M013 - targeting,Reduce the credibility of groups behind misinformation-linked funding campaigns. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,narrative,"T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00067 - Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)
+C00044,Keep people from posting to social media immediately,M004 - friction,"Platforms can introduce friction to slow down activities, force a small delay between posts, or replies to posts.",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
+T0049 - Flooding
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0056 - Dedicated channel disseminate information pollution
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops",C00044 - Keep people from posting to social media immediately
+C00046,Marginalise and discredit extremist groups,M013 - targeting,Reduce the credibility of extremist groups posting misinformation.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0021 - Memes
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0052 - Teriary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0056 - Dedicated channel disseminate information pollution
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0060 - Continue to amplify
+T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00046 - Marginalise and discredit extremist groups
+C00047,Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics,M008 - data pollution,"Flood disinformation spaces with obviously fake content, to dilute core misinformation narratives in them. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D05,,action,"T0063 - Social Media engagement
+T0062 - Message reach",C00047 - Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics
+C00048,Name and Shame Influencers,M003 - daylight,"Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account.  Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”.  Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual.  Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts.  Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - ""Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.",,,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237 and Dalton19,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D07,,information,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0052 - Teriary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0056 - Dedicated channel disseminate information pollution
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0060 - Continue to amplify
+T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00048 - Name and Shame Influencers
+C00051,Counter social engineering training,M001 - resilience,"Includes anti-elicitation training, phishing prevention education. ",A006 - educator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,education,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0012 - Use concealment",C00051 - Counter social engineering training
+C00052,Infiltrate platforms,M013 - targeting,Detect and degrade,A004 - activist,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,"T0012 - Use concealment
+T0030 - Backstop personas",C00052 - Infiltrate platforms
+C00053,Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts,M012 - cleaning,"remove or remove access to (e.g. stop the ability to update) old social media accounts, to reduce the pool of accounts available for takeover, botnets etc. ","A031 - social media platform administrator,A028 - platform administrator,A012 - account owner",,"2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search",,I00004,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,"T0011 - Hijack legitimate accounts
+T0030 - Backstop personas",C00053 - Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts
+C00056,Encourage people to leave social media,M004 - friction,Encourage people to leave spcial media.  We don't expect this to work,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,,C00056 - Encourage people to leave social media
+C00058,Report crowdfunder as violator,M005 - removal,counters crowdfunding. Includes ‘Expose online funding as fake”. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,"T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00058 - Report crowdfunder as violator
+C00059,Verification of project before posting fund requests,M011 - verification,third-party verification of projects posting funding campaigns before those campaigns can be posted. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,T0014 - Create funding campaigns,C00059 - Verification of project before posting fund requests
+C00060,Legal action against for-profit engagement factories,M013 - targeting,"Take legal action against for-profit ""factories"" creating misinformation. ",A020 - policy maker,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,regulation,"TA07 - Channel Selection
+T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force",C00060 - Legal action against for-profit engagement factories
+C00062,Free open library sources worldwide,M010 - countermessaging,"Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as DISARM can be created to counter the adversarial efforts.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,information,"TA01 - Strategic planning
+TA02 - Objective planning
+TA15 - Establish Social Assets
+TA15 - develop networks
+TA05 - microtargeting
+TA06 - develop content
+TA07 - channel selection
+TA08 - pump priming
+TA09 - exposure
+TA10 - go physical
+TA11 - persistence
+TA12 - measure effectiveness",C00062 - Free open library sources worldwide
+C00065,Reduce political targeting,M005 - removal,Includes “ban political micro targeting” and “ban political ads”,A020 - policy maker,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D03,,action,T0018 - Paid targeted ads,C00065 - Reduce political targeting
+C00066,Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back),M009 - dilution,Flood a disinformation-related hashtag with other content. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D03,,information,"T0015 - Create hashtag
+T0055 - Use hashtag",C00066 - Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)
+C00080,Create competing narrative,M002 - diversion,"Create counternarratives, or narratives that compete in the same spaces as misinformation narratives.  Could also be degrade",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,narrative,"T0003 - Leverate existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives 
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives ",C00080 - Create competing narrative
+C00070,Block access to disinformation resources,M005 - removal,"Resources = accounts, channels etc.  Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker.
+
+TA02*: DDOS at the critical time, to deny an adversary's time-bound objective.
+
+T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy.
+
+Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag.
+
+T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as ""blocking access to a platform"".",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0014 - Create funding campaigns
+T0015 - Create hashtag
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0046 - Search Engine Optimization
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0058 - Legacy web content",C00070 - Block access to disinformation resources
+C00071,Block source of pollution,M005 - removal,"Block websites, accounts, groups etc connected to misinformation and other information pollution. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,"T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00071 - Block source of pollution
+C00072,Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended,M005 - removal,"Check special-interest groups (e.g. medical, knitting) for unrelated and misinformation-linked content, and remove it. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,"T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0021 - Memes
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0049 - Flooding
+",C00072 - Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended
+C00073,Inoculate populations through media literacy training,M001 - resilience,"Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution.  Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit.  Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting.  Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language.   Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value.   Concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training.  Covers detect, deny, and degrade. ","A006 - educator,A008 - library,A017 - coordinating body,A009 - NGO,A032 - social media platform outreach,A021 - media organization,A005 - community group,A010 - religious organisation",,"2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,education,"T0016 - Clickbait 
+T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0021 - Memes
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0040 - Deny insurmountable proof
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00073 - Inoculate populations through media literacy training
+C00074,Identify and delete or rate limit identical content,M012 - cleaning,C00000,"A031 - social media platform administrator,A028 - platform administrator",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,"T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0021 - Memes
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0043 - Use SMS
+T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0049 - Flooding
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0061 - Sell merchandising
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00074 - Identify and delete or rate limit identical content
+C00075,normalise language,M010 - countermessaging,normalise the language around disinformation and misinformation; give people the words for artifact and effect types. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,information,,C00075 - normalise language
+C00076,Prohibit images in political discourse channels,M005 - removal,Make political discussion channels text-only. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,"T0016 - Clickbait 
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0021 - Memes",C00076 - Prohibit images in political discourse channels
+C00077,"Active defence: run TA15 ""develop people” - not recommended",M013 - targeting,Develop networks of communities and influencers around counter-misinformation. Match them to misinformation creators ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,,"C00077 - Active defence: run TA15 ""develop people” - not recommended"
+C00078,Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content,M002 - diversion,Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side”,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,action,"TA07 - Channel Selection
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0046 - Search Engine Optimization
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00078 - Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content
+C00084,"Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them",M002 - diversion,"Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”.  Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with ""far-up/down/left/right"" actors. ""Long Game"" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations.  Can also replay technique T0003. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,narrative,"T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverate existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0059 - Play the long game","C00084 - Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them"
+C00081,"Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations",M003 - daylight,"Discredit by pointing out the ""noise"" and informing public that ""flooding"" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of ""noise""",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,"T0003 - Leverate existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution","C00081 - Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations"
+C00082,Ground truthing as automated response to pollution,M010 - countermessaging,Also inoculation.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,"T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverate existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00082 - Ground truthing as automated response to pollution
+C00087,Make more noise than the disinformation,M009 - dilution,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,narrative,"T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0049 - Flooding 
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00087 - Make more noise than the disinformation
+C00085,Mute content,M003 - daylight,"Rate-limit disinformation content.  Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns.
+
+Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0049 - Flooding 
+T0051 - Fabcricate social media comment
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0061 - Sell merchandising
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00085 - Mute content
+C00086,Distract from noise with addictive content,M002 - diversion,"Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a ""conversion rate"" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's ""information bubble"" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,"T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0049 - Flooding 
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+",C00086 - Distract from noise with addictive content
+C00112,"""Prove they are not an op!""",M004 - friction,Challenge misinformation creators to prove they're not an information operation.  ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,narrative,"T0040 - Demand insurmontable proof
+T0042 - Kernel of truth","C00112 - ""Prove they are not an op!"""
+C00090,Fake engagement system,M002 - diversion,"Create honeypots for misinformation creators to engage with, and reduce the resources they have available for misinformation campaigns. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D05,,action,"T0020 - Trial content
+T0062 - Message reach
+T0063 - Social media engagement",C00090 - Fake engagement system
+C00091,Honeypot social community,M002 - diversion,"Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D05,,action,"T0062 - Message reach
+T0063 - Social media engagement
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0049 - Flooding",C00091 - Honeypot social community
+C00092,Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers,M006 - scoring,"Includes ""Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”.  Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers. ",A001 - data scientist,R001 - datastreams,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D07,,information,"TA07 - Channel Selection
+TA08 - Pump Priming
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00092 - Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers
+C00093,Influencer code of conduct,M001 - resilience,Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers.  Can be platform code of conduct; can also be community code.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D07,,information,"TA07 - Channel Selection
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate",C00093 - Influencer code of conduct
+C00094,Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research,M003 - daylight,Accountability move: make sure research is published with its funding sources. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,T0026 - Create fake research,C00094 - Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research
+C00096,Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers,M006 - scoring,"Increase credibility, visibility, and reach of positive influencers in the information space. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,information,"T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narrativies
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0023 - Distort facts
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+",C00096 - Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers
+C00097,Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment,M004 - friction,Reduce poll flooding by online taking comments or poll entries from verified accounts. ,A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
+T0030 - Backstop personas
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate",C00097 - Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment
+C00098,"Revocation of allowlisted or ""verified"" status",M004 - friction,remove blue checkmarks etc from known misinformation accounts. ,A031 - social media platform administrator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,action,"T0038 - Twitter 
+T0011 - Hijack legitimate account","C00098 - Revocation of allowlisted or ""verified"" status"
+C00099,Strengthen verification methods,M004 - friction,"Improve content veerification methods available to groups, individuals etc.  ",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,"T0030 - Backstop personas
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups",C00099 - Strengthen verification methods
+C00100,Hashtag jacking,M002 - diversion,Post large volumes of unrelated content on known misinformation hashtags ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,information,T0055 - Use hashtag,C00100 - Hashtag jacking
+C00101,Create friction by rate-limiting engagement,M004 - friction,"Create participant friction.  Includes Make repeat voting hard, and throttle number of forwards. ",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D04,,action,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
+T0049 - Flooding 
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify",C00101 - Create friction by rate-limiting engagement
+C00103,Create a bot that engages / distract trolls,M002 - diversion,"This is reactive, not active measure (honeypots are active).  It's a platform controlled measure.",A024 - developer,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D05,,action,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
+T0062 - Message Reach
+T0063 - Social Media Engagement
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate",C00103 - Create a bot that engages / distract trolls
+C00105,Buy more advertising than misinformation creators,M009 - dilution,Shift influence and algorithms by posting more adverts into spaces than misinformation creators. ,A023 - adtech provider,R003 - money,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D03,,information,"T0016 - Clickbait 
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads",C00105 - Buy more advertising than misinformation creators
+C00106,Click-bait centrist content,M002 - diversion,Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,T0016 - Clickbait,C00106 - Click-bait centrist content
+C00107,Content moderation,"M006 - scoring, M005 - removal","includes social media content take-downs, e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs",A031 - social media platform administrator,,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",,"I00005,I00009,I00056",TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,"T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0013 - Create fake websites
+T0014 - Create funding campaign
+T0015 - Create hashtag
+T0016 - Clickbait 
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00107 - Content moderation
+C00109,Dampen Emotional Reaction,M001 - resilience,"Reduce emotional responses to misinformation through calming messages, etc. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,,C00109 - Dampen Emotional Reaction
+C00111,Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views,M001 - resilience,,"A021 - media organisation,A013 - content creator",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,information,T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents,C00111 - Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views
+C00118,Repurpose images with new text,M010 - countermessaging,Add countermessage text to iamges used in misinformation incidents. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,narrative,"T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images",C00118 - Repurpose images with new text
+C00113,Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.,M003 - daylight,"Debunk fake experts, their credentials, and potentially also their  audience quality",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,T0045 - Use fake experts,C00113 - Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.
+C00114,Don't engage with payloads,M004 - friction,Stop passing on misinformation,A015 - general public,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,"T0039 - Bait legitimate inffluencers 
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+",C00114 - Don't engage with payloads
+C00115,Expose actor and intentions,M003 - daylight,Debunk misinformation creators and posters. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,"T0041 - Deny involvement
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00115 - Expose actor and intentions
+C00116,Provide proof of involvement,M003 - daylight,Build and post information about groups etc's involvement in misinformation incidents. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,T0041 - Deny involvement,C00116 - Provide proof of involvement
+C00117,Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people,M010 - countermessaging,Label promote counter to disinformation,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,information,"T0046 - Search engine optimization
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0060 - Continue to amplify
+",C00117 - Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people
+C00125,Prebunking,M001 - resilience,"Produce material in advance of misinformation incidents, by anticipating the narratives used in them, and debunking them. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,narrative,"T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+",C00125 - Prebunking
+C00119,Engage payload and debunk.,M010 - countermessaging,debunk misinformation content.  Provide link to facts. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,information,"T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00119 - Engage payload and debunk.
+C00120,Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes,M007 - metatechnique,Redesign platforms and algorithms to reduce the effectiveness of disinformation,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,action,"T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00120 - Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes
+C00121,Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. ,M001 - resilience,"Make algorithms in platforms explainable, and visible to people using those platforms. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,information,T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat app,C00121 - Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. 
+C00122,Content moderation,M004 - friction,Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship. ,A031 - social media platform administrator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0014 - Create funding campaign
+T0015 - Create hashtag
+T0016 - Clickbait 
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0049 - Flooding 
+T0051 - Fabcricate social media comment
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0061 - Sell merchandising
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00122 - Content moderation
+C00123,Remove or rate limit botnets,M004 - friction,reduce the visibility of known botnets online. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
+T0049 - Flooding
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00123 - Remove or rate limit botnets
+C00124,Don't feed the trolls,M004 - friction,Don't engage with individuals relaying misinformation. ,"A015 - general public,A021 - media organisation",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,"TA08 - Pump Priming
+TA09 - Exposure
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0063 - Social media engagement",C00124 - Don't feed the trolls
+C00211,Use humorous counter-narratives,M010 - countermessaging,,,,2019-11-search,,I00004,TA09 Exposure,D03,,narrative,"T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0020 - Trial content
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events",C00211 - Use humorous counter-narratives
+C00126,Social media amber alert,M003 - daylight,"Create an alert system around disinformation and misinformation artifacts, narratives, and incidents ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,"T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events",C00126 - Social media amber alert
+C00128,"Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other ""decelerants""",M009 - dilution,"Repost or comment on misinformation artifacts, using ridicule or other content to reduce the likelihood of reposting. ",A003 - trusted authority,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,"T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0049 - Flooding 
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0061 - Sell merchandising","C00128 - Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other ""decelerants"""
+C00129,Use banking to cut off access ,M014 - reduce resources,fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,"T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0061 - Sell merchandising
+T0014 - Create funding campaign
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads",C00129 - Use banking to cut off access 
+C00130,"Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.",M001 - resilience,Train local influencers in countering misinformation. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D07,,education,T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents,"C00130 - Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously."
+C00131,Seize and analyse botnet servers,M005 - removal,Take botnet servers offline by seizing them. ,A029 - server administrator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D02,,action,"T0049 - Flooding
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",C00131 - Seize and analyse botnet servers
+C00133,Deplatform Account*,M005 - removal,Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left.,A031 - social media platform administrator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,"TA07 - Channel Selection
+TA09 - Exposure
+TA10 - Go Physical
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0045 - Use fale experts
+T0011 - Hijack legitimate account
+T0045 - Use fake experts",C00133 - Deplatform Account*
+C00135,Deplatform message groups and/or message boards,M005 - removal,Merged two rows here. ,A031 - social media platform administrator,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,"TA07 - Channel Selection
+TA09 - Exposure
+TA10 - Go Physical
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps",C00135 - Deplatform message groups and/or message boards
+C00136,Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages,M010 - countermessaging,"Find communities likely to be targetted by misinformation campaigns, and send them countermessages or pointers to information sources. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,information,"TA08 - Pump Priming
+TA09 - Exposure
+TA10 - Go Physical
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0020 - Trial content
+T0063 - Social media engagement",C00136 - Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages
+C00138,Spam domestic actors with lawsuits,M014 - reduce resources,"File multiple lawsuits against known misinformation creators and posters, to distract them from disinformation creation. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,regulation,"T0060 - Continue to amplify
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",C00138 - Spam domestic actors with lawsuits
+C00139,Weaponise youtube content matrices,M004 - friction,God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out. ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,information,,C00139 - Weaponise youtube content matrices
+C00140,"""Bomb"" link shorteners with lots of calls",M008 - data pollution,"Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except ""T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D03,,action,"TA05 - Microtargeting
+TA09 - Exposure*
+TA10 - Go Physical","C00140 - ""Bomb"" link shorteners with lots of calls"
+C00142,Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content,M004 - friction,"Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “""Hey this story is old"" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice.  Includes “mark clickbait visually”. ",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,"TA05 - Microtargeting
+TA09 - Exposure
+TA10 - Go Physical
+TA11 - Persistence
+T0016 - Clickbait
+",C00142 - Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content
+C00143,(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time,M013 - targeting,Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc. ,"A015 - general public,A014 - elves",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D04,,regulation,"T0060 - Continue to amplify
+T0058 - Legacy web content
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images",C00143 - (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time
+C00144,Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs,M014 - reduce resources,Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days.  Not recommended,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D04,,action,T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate,C00144 - Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs
+C00147,Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days),M004 - friction,"Stop new community activity (likes, comments) on old social media posts.  ",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,T0060 - Continue to amplify,C00147 - Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)
+C00148,Add random links to network graphs,M008 - data pollution,"If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which DISARM techniques.",A031 - social media platform administrator,R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D04,,action,"T0062 - Message reach
+T0063 - Social media engagement
+",C00148 - Add random links to network graphs
+C00149,Poison the monitoring & evaluation data,M008 - data pollution,Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D04,,action,"TA12 - Measure Effectiveness
+T0020 - Trial content
+T0046 - Search Engine Optimization
+T0057 - Organise  remote rallies and events
+T0063 - Social media engagement",C00149 - Poison the monitoring & evaluation data
+C00153,Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure,M013 - targeting,"Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate.",A027 - information security,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0011 - Hijack legitimate account
+T0013 - Create fake websites
+T0014 - Create funding campaign
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0049 - Flooding 
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0058 - Legacy web content
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00153 - Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure
+C00154,Ask media not to report false information,M005 - removal,"Train media to spot and respond to misinformation, and ask them not to post or transmit misinformation they've found. ",A021 - media organisation,,2019-11-search,,I00022,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,"T0039 - Bait legitimate inffluencers
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders
+T0045 - Use fake experts",C00154 - Ask media not to report false information
+C00155,Ban incident actors from funding sites,M005 - removal,Ban misinformation creators and posters from funding sites,A025 - funding site admin,,2019-11-search,,I00002,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,"T0014 - Create funding campaign
+T0017 - Promote online funding",C00155 - Ban incident actors from funding sites
+C00156,Better tell your country or organization story,M010 - countermessaging,"Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces.  NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. ","A018 - government,A019 - military",,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,information,"T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents",C00156 - Better tell your country or organization story
+C00159,Have a disinformation response plan,M007 - metatechnique,"e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort.  It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict.",,,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,,C00159 - Have a disinformation response plan
+C00160,find and train influencers,M001 - resilience,"Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources.","A001 - data scientist,A016 - influencer",,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,education,"T0039 - Bait legitimate inffluencers
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders",C00160 - find and train influencers
+C00161,Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements,M007 - metatechnique,"Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad.",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,action,"T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives",C00161 - Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements
+C00162,Unravel/target the Potemkin villages,M013 - targeting,"Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year.",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,information,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives
+T0039 - Bait legitimate inffluencers
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminnate information pollution
+T0050 - Cheerleading domemstic social media ops",C00162 - Unravel/target the Potemkin villages
+C00164,compatriot policy,M013 - targeting,"protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,action,"T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives
+",C00164 - compatriot policy
+C00165,Ensure integrity of official documents,M004 - friction,"e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions",,,2019-11-search,,I00015,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,information,T0025 - leak altered documents,C00165 - Ensure integrity of official documents
+C00169,develop a creative content hub,M010 - countermessaging,"international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,action,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0004 - Competing narratives
+T0039 - Bait legitimate inffluencers",C00169 - develop a creative content hub
+C00170,elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft,M007 - metatechnique,"Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly.",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,,C00170 - elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft
+C00172,social media source removal,M005 - removal,"Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal",A031 - social media platform administrator,,2019-11-search,,I00035,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0013 - Create fake websites
+",C00172 - social media source removal
+C00174,Create a healthier news environment,"M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion","Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom.  Note difference between news and editorialising.  Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle.  includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.",A021 - media organisation,,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search","Hicks19, p143 of Corker18, Rand2237",,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0044 - Seed distortions",C00174 - Create a healthier news environment
+C00176,Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private,M007 - metatechnique,"Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations. ",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,action,"T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0013 - Create fake websites
+T0014 - Create funding campaign
+T0015 - Create hashtag
+T0016 - Clickbait 
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0021 - Memes 
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0043 - Use SMS/WhatsApp/ Chat apps
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0051 - Fabricate social media comment
+T0049 - Flooding 
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0058 - Legacy web content
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0061 - Sell merchandising",C00176 - Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private
+C00178,Fill information voids with non-disinformation content,"M009 - dilution, M008 - data pollution","1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation.  ",,,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA05 Microtargeting,D04,,information,"T0016 - Clickbait 
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0020 - Trial content",C00178 - Fill information voids with non-disinformation content
+C00182,Redirection / malware detection/ remediation,M005 - removal,"Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete.  ",A027 - information security,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,"T0011 - Hijack legitimate account
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify",C00182 - Redirection / malware detection/ remediation
+C00184,Media exposure,M003 - daylight,highlight misinformation activities and actors in media,,,2019-11-search,,"I00010,I00015,I00032,I00044",TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,information,"T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0041 - Deny involvement
+T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents",C00184 - Media exposure
+C00188,Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves,M001 - resilience,"Includes SEO influence.   Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community.  Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. ","A021 - media organisation,A006 - educator",,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,education,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0046 - Search Engine Optimization
+",C00188 - Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves
+C00189,Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts,M003 - daylight,"Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of ""flagged"" profiles.  Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D06,,action,"T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0011 - Hijack legitimate account
+T0014 - Create funding campaign
+T0009 - Create fake experts",C00189 - Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts
+C00190,open engagement with civil society,M001 - resilience,"Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.",A015 - general public,,2019-11-search,"Dalton19, Hicks19",,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0025 - Leak altered documents",C00190 - open engagement with civil society
+C00195,Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content ,M002 - diversion,Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or propaganda themes. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content. ,,R002 - funding,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0016 - Clickbait 
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0046 - Search engine optimization
+T0055 - Use hashtag",C00195 - Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content 
+C00197,remove suspicious accounts,M005 - removal,"Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues).  Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners. ","A031 - social media platform administrator,A004 activist",R003 - money,"2019-11-search, 2019-11-workshop",,I00022,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,"T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0011 - Hijack accounts",C00197 - remove suspicious accounts
+C00200,Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo,M010 - countermessaging,FIXIT: standardize language used for influencer/ respected figure. ,A016 - influencer,,2019-11-search,,I00044,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0025 - Leak altered documents",C00200 - Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo
+C00202,Set data 'honeytraps',M002 - diversion,Set honeytraps in content likely to be accessed for disinformation. ,,,2019-11-search,,"I00004,I00022",TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,T0025 - leak altered documents,C00202 - Set data 'honeytraps'
+C00203,Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets,M004 - friction,Remove access to official press events from known misinformation actors. ,A018 - government,,2019-11-search,,I00022,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0028 - Create competing narratives
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news",C00203 - Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets
+C00205,strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting,M007 - metatechnique,Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. ,"A018 - government,A033 - social media platform owner,",,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives
+T0025 - Leak altered documents
+T0027 - Adapt existing narratives",C00205 - strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting
+C00207,Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended,M013 - targeting,,"A018 - government,A033 - social media platform owner",,2019-11-search,,I00042,TA02 Objective Planning,D07,,action,,C00207 - Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended
+C00212,build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant,M001 - resilience,"Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education.","A006 - educator,A018 - government",,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0003 - Leverage existing narratives
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0022 - Conspiracy narratives",C00212 - build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant
+C00216,Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors,M014 - reduce resources,Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains,A023 - adtech provider,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D02,,action,"T0014 - Create funding campaign
+T0016 - Clickbait 
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0061 - Sell merchandising
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events",C00216 - Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors
+C00219,Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators,M003 - daylight,"Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc. ",,,grugq,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,"T0024 - Create fake videos and images
+T0026 - Create fake research
+T0025 - Leak altered documents",C00219 - Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators
+C00220,Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan,M007 - metatechnique,"Create a plan for misinformation and disinformation response, before it's needed.  Include connections / contacts needed, expected counteremessages etc. ",,,Counters cleanup,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,,C00220 - Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan
+C00221,"Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors",M007 - metatechnique,"Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency",,,Counters cleanup,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,,"C00221 - Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors"
+C00222,Tabletop simulations,M007 - metatechnique,"Simulate misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and responses to them, before campaigns happen. ",,,,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,education,,C00222 - Tabletop simulations
+C00223,Strengthen Trust in social media platforms,M001 - resilience,Improve trust in the misinformation responses from social media and other platforms.  Examples include creating greater transparancy on their actions and algorithms. ,,,,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,,C00223 - Strengthen Trust in social media platforms
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/detections.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/detections.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c5e9c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/detections.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+disarm_id,name,metatechnique,summary,actortypes,resources_needed,how_found,references,incidents,tactic,responsetype,notes,techniques,longname
+F00001,Analyse aborted / failed campaigns,,Examine failed campaigns. How did they fail? Can we create useful activities that increase these failures? ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,All,F00001 - Analyse aborted / failed campaigns
+F00002,Analyse viral fizzle,,We have no idea what this means.  Is it something to do with the way a viral story spreads? ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,"T0049 - Flooding
+T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0059 - Play the long game
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",F00002 - Analyse viral fizzle
+F00003,Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,"TA06 - Develop Content
+TA08 - Pump Priming
+TA09 - Exposure
+
+T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0021 - Memes",F00003 - Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors
+F00004,"Recruit like-minded converts ""people who used to be in-group"" ",,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,"T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0061 - Sell merchandising (ie. source of identification)
+
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers","F00004 - Recruit like-minded converts ""people who used to be in-group"" "
+F00005,SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups,,"Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis of groups and audience segments. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,All,F00005 - SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups
+F00006,SWOT analysis of tech platforms,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,"TA05 - Microtargeting
+TA07 - Channel Selection
+TA08 - Pump Priming
+TA09 - Exposure
+TA10 - Go Physical
+TA11 - Persistence
+
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0014 - Create funding campaigns
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0021 - Memes",F00006 - SWOT analysis of tech platforms
+F00007,Monitor account level activity in social networks,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D01,,All,F00007 - Monitor account level activity in social networks
+F00008,Detect abnormal amplification,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"T0052 - Tertiary sites amplify news
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",F00008 - Detect abnormal amplification
+F00009,Detect abnormal events,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups,F00009 - Detect abnormal events
+F00010,Detect abnormal groups,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups,F00010 - Detect abnormal groups
+F00011,Detect abnormal pages,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups,F00011 - Detect abnormal pages
+F00012,"Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ people",,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups,"F00012 - Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ people"
+F00013,Identify fake news sites,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0008,F00013 - Identify fake news sites
+F00014,Trace connections,,for e.g. fake news sites,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0008,F00014 - Trace connections
+F00015,Detect anomalies in membership growth patterns,,I include Fake Experts as they may use funding campaigns such as Patreon to fund their operations and so these should be watched.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"TA07 - Channel Selection
+
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0015 - Create hashtag
+T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events",F00015 - Detect anomalies in membership growth patterns
+F00016,Identify fence-sitters,,"Note: In each case, depending on the platform there may be a way to identify a fence-sitter. For example, online polls may have a neutral option or a ""somewhat this-or-that"" option, and may reveal who voted for that to all visitors. This information could be of use to data analysts.
+
+In TA08-11, the engagement level of victims could be identified to detect and respond to increasing engagement.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"TA08 - Pump Priming
+TA09 - Exposure
+TA10 - Go Physical
+TA11 - Persistence
+
+T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0029 - Manipulate online polls
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0048 - Cow online opinion leaders",F00016 - Identify fence-sitters
+F00017,Measure emotional valence,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"T0001 - 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0053 - Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate",F00017 - Measure emotional valence
+F00018,Follow the money,,track funding sources,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0009,F00018 - Follow the money
+F00019,Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated),,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0011 - Hijack accounts,F00019 - Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated)
+F00020,Detect anomalous activity,,,"A015 - general public,A001 - data scientist,A031 - social media platform administrator",R004 - platform algorithms,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0011 - Hijack accounts,F00020 - Detect anomalous activity
+F00021,AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planning,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,Automated Detection of Campaign,"TA15 - Establish Social Assets
+TA15 - Develop Networks
+TA05 - Microtargeting
+TA06 - Develop Content
+TA07 - Channel Selection
+TA08 - Pump Priming
+TA09 - Exposure
+TA10 - Go Physical
+TA11 - Persistence",F00021 - AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planning
+F00022,Digital authority - regulating body (united states),,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,,F00022 - Digital authority - regulating body (united states)
+F00023,Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account),,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0011 - Hijack accounts,F00023 - Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account)
+F00024,Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniors,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,,F00024 - Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniors
+F00025,Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detection,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,"TA01 - Strategic Planning
+TA02 - Objective Planning",F00025 - Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detection
+F00026,Language anomoly detection,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,,F00026 - Language anomoly detection
+F00027,Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topics,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,,F00027 - Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topics
+F00028,Associate a public key signature with government documents,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0025 - Leak altered documents,F00028 - Associate a public key signature with government documents
+F00029,"Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, Sputnik",,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"TA01 - Strategic Planning
+
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution","F00029 - Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, Sputnik"
+F00030,Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect content,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"TA15 - Establish Social Assets
+TA15 - Develop Networks
+TA05 - Microtargeting
+TA06 - Develop Content
+TA08 - Pump Priming
+TA09 - Exposure
+TA10 - Go Physical",F00030 - Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect content
+F00031,Educate on how to identify information pollution,,Strategic planning included as innoculating population has strategic value.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"TA01 - Strategic Planning
+
+T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",F00031 - Educate on how to identify information pollution
+F00032,Educate on how to identify to pollution,,DUPLICATE - DELETE ,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,DUPLICATE - DELETE ,F00032 - Educate on how to identify to pollution
+F00033,Fake websites: add transparency on business model,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0013 - Create fake websites,F00033 - Fake websites: add transparency on business model
+F00034,Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effort,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0049 - Flooding,F00034 - Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effort
+F00035,Identify repeated narrative DNA,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"TA01 - Strategic Planning
+
+T0006 - Create Master Narratives
+T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0050 - Cheerleading domestic social media ops
+T0056 - Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution",F00035 - Identify repeated narrative DNA
+F00036,Looking for AB testing in unregulated channels,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0020 - Trial content,F00036 - Looking for AB testing in unregulated channels
+F00037,News content provenance certification. ,,"Original Comment: Shortcomings: intentional falsehood. Doesn't solve accuracy. Can't be mandatory. 
+
+Technique should be in terms of ""strategic innoculation"", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,TA01 - Strategic Planning* (non-existent technique),F00037 - News content provenance certification. 
+F00038,Social capital as attack vector,,"Unsure I understood the original intention or what it applied to. Therefore the techniques listed (10, 39, 43, 57, 61) are under my interpretation - which is that we want to track ignorant agents who fall into the enemy's trap and show a cost to financing/reposting/helping the adversary via public shaming or other means.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0043 - Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps
+T0057 - Organise remote rallies and events
+T0061 - Sell merchandising",F00038 - Social capital as attack vector
+F00039,standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industry,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0024 - Create fake videos and images,F00039 - standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industry
+F00040,Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenance,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,T0024 - Create fake videos and images,F00040 - Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenance
+F00041,Bias detection,,Not technically left of boom,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,T00029,F00041 - Bias detection
+F00042,Categorize polls by intent,,"Use T00029, but against the creators",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,T00029,F00042 - Categorize polls by intent
+F00043,Monitor for creation of fake known personas,,Platform companies and some information security companies (e.g. ZeroFox) do this. ,"A031 - social media platform administrator,A015 - general public",,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,T00030,F00043 - Monitor for creation of fake known personas
+F00044,Forensic analysis,,Can be used in all phases for all techniques.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,All,F00044 - Forensic analysis
+F00045,Forensic linguistic analysis,,Can be used in all phases for all techniques.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,All,F00045 - Forensic linguistic analysis
+F00046,Pump priming analytics,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,TA08 - Pump Priming,F00046 - Pump priming analytics
+F00047,trace involved parties,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,,F00047 - trace involved parties
+F00048,Trace known operations and connection,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,,F00048 - Trace known operations and connection
+F00049,trace money,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,,F00049 - trace money
+F00050,Web cache analytics,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,,F00050 - Web cache analytics
+F00051,Challenge expertise,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,"T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0045 - Use fake experts",F00051 - Challenge expertise
+F00052,Discover sponsors,,"Discovering the sponsors behind a campaign, narrative, bot, a set of accounts, or a social media comment, or anything else is useful.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,All,F00052 - Discover sponsors
+F00053,Government rumour control office (what can we learn?),,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,"T0049
+T0050
+T0052
+T0053
+T0054
+T0055
+T0056",F00053 - Government rumour control office (what can we learn?)
+F00054,Restrict people who can @ you on social networks,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00054 - Restrict people who can @ you on social networks
+F00055,Verify credentials,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00055 - Verify credentials
+F00056,Verify organisation legitimacy,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00056 - Verify organisation legitimacy
+F00057,Verify personal credentials of experts,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00057 - Verify personal credentials of experts
+F00058,Deplatform (cancel culture),,"*Deplatform People: This technique needs to be a bit more specific to distinguish it from ""account removal"" or DDOS and other techniques that get more specific when applied to content.
+
+For example, other ways of deplatforming people include attacking their sources of funds, their allies, their followers, etc.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,"TA07 - Channel Selection
+TA09 - Exposure
+TA10 - Go Physical
+
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0011 - Hijack legitimate account
+T0014 - Create funding campaigns
+T0017 - Promote online funding
+T0018 - Paid targeted ads
+T0045 - Use fake experts",F00058 - Deplatform (cancel culture)
+F00059,Identify susceptible demographics,,"All techniques provide or are susceptible to being countered by, or leveraged for, knowledge about user demographics.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,All,F00059 - Identify susceptible demographics
+F00060,Identify susceptible influencers,,"I assume this was a transcript error. Otherwise, ""Identify Susceptible Influences"" as in the various methods of influences that may work against a victim could also be a technique. Nope, wasn't a transcript error: original note says influencers, as in find people of influence that might be targetted. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,T0039 - Bait legitimate influencers,F00060 - Identify susceptible influencers
+F00061,Microtargeting,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,All,F00061 - Microtargeting
+F00062,Detect when Dormant account turns active,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,"TA09 - Exposure
+
+T0007 - Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
+T0011 - Hijack legitimate account",F00062 - Detect when Dormant account turns active
+F00063,Linguistic change analysis,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,,F00063 - Linguistic change analysis
+F00064,Monitor reports of account takeover,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,T0011 - Hijack legitimate account,F00064 - Monitor reports of account takeover
+F00065,Sentiment change analysis,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,,F00065 - Sentiment change analysis
+F00066,"Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilities",,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,,"F00066 - Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilities"
+F00067,Data forensics,,,A001 - data scientist,,2019-11-search,,"I00029,I00045",,D01,,,F00067 - Data forensics
+F00068,Resonance analysis,,"a developing methodology for identifying statistical differences in how social groups use language and quantifying how common those statistical differences are within a larger population. In essence, it hypothesizes how much affinity might exist for a specific group within a general population, based on the language its members employ",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00068 - Resonance analysis
+F00069,Track Russian media and develop analytic methods.,,"To effectively counter Russian propaganda, it will be critical to track Russian influence efforts. The information requirements are varied and include the following: • Identify fake-news stories and their sources. • Understand narrative themes and content that pervade various Russian media sources. • Understand the broader Russian strategy that underlies tactical propaganda messaging.",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00069 - Track Russian media and develop analytic methods.
+F00070,Full spectrum analytics,,,A001 - data scientist,,2019-11-workshop,,,ALL,D01,,,F00070 - Full spectrum analytics
+F00071,Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers,,"Local influencers detected via Twitter networks are likely local influencers in other online and off-line channels as well. In addition, the content and themes gleaned from Russia and Russia-supporting populations, as well as anti-Russia activists, likely swirl in other online and off-line mediums as well.",A001 - data scientist,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00071 - Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers
+F00072,network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community.,,It is possible that some of these are bots or trolls and could be flagged for suspension for violating Twitter’s terms of service.,A001 - data scientist,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00072 - network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community.
+F00073,collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators,,"Players at the level of covert attribution, referred to as “black” in the grayscale of deniability, produce content on user-generated media, such as YouTube, but also add fear-mongering commentary to and amplify content produced by others and supply exploitable content to data dump websites. These activities are conducted by a network of trolls, bots, honeypots, and hackers. ",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00073 - collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators
+F00074,identify relevant fence-sitter communities,,"brand ambassador programs could be used with influencers across a variety of social media channels. It could also target other prominent experts, such as academics, business leaders, and other potentially prominent people. Authorities must ultimately take care in implementing such a program given the risk that contact with U.S. or NATO authorities might damage influencer reputations. Engagements must consequently be made with care, and, if possible, government interlocutors should work through local NGOs.",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00074 - identify relevant fence-sitter communities
+F00075,leverage open-source information,,"significant amounts of quality open-source information are now available and should be leveraged to build products and analysis prior to problem prioritization in the areas of observation, attribution, and intent. Successfully distinguishing the gray zone campaign signal through the global noise requires action through the entirety of the national security community. Policy, process, and tools must all adapt and evolve to detect, discern, and act upon a new type of signal",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,D01,,,F00075 - leverage open-source information
+F00076,Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots”,,"Target audience connected to ""useful idiots rather than the specific profiles because - The active presence of such sources complicates targeting of Russian propaganda, given that it is often difficult to discriminate between authentic views and opinions on the internet and those disseminated by the Russian state.
+",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,,F00076 - Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots”
+F00077,Model for bot account behavior,,"Bot account: action based, people. Unsure which DISARM techniques.",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,,F00077 - Model for bot account behavior
+F00078,Monitor account level activity in social networks,,All techniques benefit from careful analysis and monitoring of activities on social network.,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,All,F00078 - Monitor account level activity in social networks
+F00079,Network anomaly detection,,,A001 - data scientist,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,"T0029 - Manipulate online polls
+T0047 - Muzzle social media as a political force
+T0049 - Flooding
+T0054 - Twitter bots amplify
+T0055 - Use hashtag
+T0060 - Continue to amplify",F00079 - Network anomaly detection
+F00080,Hack the polls/ content yourself,,"Two wrongs don't make a right? But if you hack your own polls, you do learn how it could be done, and learn what to look for",A015 - general public,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,T0029 - Manipulate online polls,F00080 - Hack the polls/ content yourself
+F00081,Need way for end user to report operations,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,"T0049
+T0050
+T0052
+T0053
+T0054
+T0055
+T0056",F00081 - Need way for end user to report operations
+F00082,"Control the US ""slang"" translation boards",,,A028 - platform administrator,R005 - slang translation,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,,"F00082 - Control the US ""slang"" translation boards"
+F00083,"Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contents",,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D05,,"T0012 - Use concealment
+T0021 - Memes","F00083 - Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contents"
+F00084,Track individual bad actors,,,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,,F00084 - Track individual bad actors
+F00085,detection of a weak signal through global noise,,"Gray zone threats are challenging given that warning requires detection of a weak signal through global noise and across threat vectors and regional boundaries.Three interconnected gray zone elements characterize the nature of the activity: 
+Temporality: The nature of gray zone threats truly requires a “big picture view” over long timescales and across regions and functional topics.
+Attribution: requiring an “almost certain” or “nearly certain analytic assessment before acting costs time and analytic effort
+Intent: judgement of adversarial intent to conduct gray zone activity. Indeed, the purpose of countering gray zone threats is to deter adversaries from fulfilling their intent to act. While attribution is one piece of the puzzle, closing the space around intent often means synthesizing multiple relevant indicators and warnings, including the state’s geopolitical ambitions, military ties, trade and investment, level of corruption, and media landscape, among others.",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,,,,F00085 - detection of a weak signal through global noise
+F00086,Outpace Competitor Intelligence Capabilities,,"Develop an intelligence-based understanding of foreign actors’ motivations, psychologies, and societal and geopolitical contexts. Leverage artificial intelligence to identify patterns and infer competitors’ intent",,,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA02 Objective planning,D01,,,F00086 - Outpace Competitor Intelligence Capabilities
+F00087,Improve Indications and Warning,,"United States has not adequately adapted its information indicators and thresholds for warning policymakers to account for gray zone tactics. Competitors have undertaken a marked shift to slow-burn, deceptive, non-military, and indirect challenges to U.S. interests. Relative to traditional security indicators and warnings, these are more numerous and harder to detect and make it difficult for analysts to infer intent.",,,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,,D01,,,F00087 - Improve Indications and Warning
+F00088,"Revitalize an “active measures working group,”",,"Recognize campaigns from weak signals, including rivals’ intent, capability, impact, interactive effects, and impact on U.S. interests... focus on adversarial covert action aspects of campaigning.",,,2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,D01,,,"F00088 - Revitalize an “active measures working group,”"
+F00089,"target/name/flag ""grey zone"" website content",,"""Gray zone"" is second level of content producers and circulators, composed of outlets with uncertain attribution. This category covers conspiracy websites, far-right or far-left websites, news aggregators, and data dump websites",,,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,,"F00089 - target/name/flag ""grey zone"" website content"
+F00090,Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements,,Bring private sector and civil society into accord on U.S. interests,,,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,,F00090 - Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements
+F00091,Partner to develop analytic methods & tools,,"This might include working with relevant technology firms to ensure that contracted analytic support is available. Contracted support is reportedly valuable because technology to monitor social media data is continually evolving, and such firms can provide the expertise to help identify and analyze trends, and they can more effectively stay abreast of the changing systems and develop new models as they are required","A001 data scientist,A024 developer",,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,,F00091 - Partner to develop analytic methods & tools
+F00092,daylight,,Warn social media companies about an ongoing campaign (e.g. antivax sites).  Anyone with datasets or data summaries can help with this,A015 - general public,R006 - disinformation datasets,2019-11-search,,I00002,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00092 - daylight
+F00093,S4d detection and re-allocation approaches,M004 - friction,"S4D is a way to separate out different speakers in text, audio. ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,T0011 - Hijack legitimate account,F00093 - S4d detection and re-allocation approaches
+F00094,Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together,M003 - daylight,,A028 - platform administrator,,grugq,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,"T0013 - Create fake websites
+T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites",F00094 - Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together
+F00095,Fact checking,,"Process suspicious artifacts, narratives, and incidents",,,SJ,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,,F00095 - Fact checking
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/examples.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/examples.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b10b48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/examples.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+disarm_id,object_id,name,summary
+E000001,T0002,Diba Facebook Expedition,"2016 Diba Facebook Expedition, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall, to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message)."
+E000002,T0003,Narrative examples,"Midwesterners are generous, Russia is under attack from outside."
+E000003,T0004,MH17 competing narratives,"""Russian Foreign Ministry again claimed that “absolutely groundless accusations are put forward against the Russian side, which are aimed at discrediting Russia in the eyes of the international community"" (deny); ""The Dutch MH17 investigation is biased, anti-Russian and factually inaccurate"" (dismiss). "
+E000004,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers," ""Huawei is determined to build trustworthy networks"""
+E000005,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers,Russia is the victim of bullying by NATO powers
+E000006,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers,USA is guided by its founding principles of liberty and egalitarianism
+E000007,T0007,Paying for access to existing accounts,Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook’s new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages. 
+E000008,T0007,Avaaz-reported pages and groups,EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe. 
+E000009,T0007,Fakes listed in the US Mueller report,"Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami. "
+E000010,T0008,Denver Guardian,"A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton."
+E000011,T0009,Jade Helm fake experts,"For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a “Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME” and the other a “Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author”--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn."
+E000012,T0011,White House explosions,Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
+E000013,T0012,Ten_GOP,"2016 @TEN_GOP profile where the actual Tennessee Republican Party tried unsuccessfully for months to get Twitter to shut it down, and 2019 Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic personas and social media accounts that spreads falsehoods and amplifies narratives critical of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel."
+E000014,T0014,VaccinateUS gofundme,"2016: #VaccinateUS Gofundme campaigns to pay for Targetted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targetting Washington State mothers, $1,776 to boost posts over 9 months)."
+E000015,T0015,ColumbianChemicals hashtag,#ColumbianChemicals to promote a fake story about a chemical spill in Louisiana. 
+E000016,T0016,Pope endorses Trump,"2016: “Pope Francis shocks world, endorses Donald Trump for president.” "
+E000017,T0016,FBI director rumours,"2016: ""FBI director received millions from Clinton Foundation, his brother’s law firm does Clinton’s taxes”."
+E000018,T0022,Qanon conspiracy,"Example: QAnon: conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful actors, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable """
+E000019,T0024,Slowed-down Pelosi video,Pelosi video (making her appear drunk)
+E000020,T0024,Shark on streets,Photoshopped shark on flooded streets of Houston TX.
+E000021,T0025,Sekondary Infektion,"2019: DFRLab report ""Secondary Infektion” highlights incident with key asset being a forged “letter” created by the operation to provide ammunition for far-right forces in Europe ahead of the election."
+E000022,T0029,FCC comments,Flooding FCC with comments
+E000023,T0029,fake engagement metrics,Creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of given issue. 
+E000024,T0044,Canadians arrested for spying,"(2019) China formally arrests Canadians Spavor and Kovrig, accuses them of spying (in retaliation to detention of Hauwei CFO). "
+E000025,T0044,Rumour about syrian rebels gassing their own people,"(2018) The Russian ministry of defence put out a press release, claiming that they had intelligence Syrian rebel forces were about to gas their own people in Idlib province as part of a “false flag” operation to frame the Syrian government."
+E000026,T0047,Singapore act,"2019 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread ""false statements of fact"" in Singapore, where that information is ""prejudicial"" to Singapore's security or ""public tranquility."" "
+E000027,T0047,Social media cut off in Kashmir,"India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and ""anti-national"" purposes."
+E000028,T0048,Rappler,"Philippines, Maria Ressa and Rappler journalists targeted Duterte regime, lawsuits, trollings, banned from the presidential palace where press briefings take place. "
+E000029,T0048,ProPublica,2017 bot attack on five ProPublica Journalists.
+E000030,T0049,Saudi bots,2018: bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi’s death.
+E000031,T0050,50 Cent army,"popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the ""Great Firewall"") "
+E000032,T0050,Positive images of China,"technique used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China. "
+E000033,T0051,FCC comments,2017: the FCC was inundated with nearly 22 million public comments on net neutrality (many from fake accounts)
+E000034,T0052,Tertiary sites,"Examples of tertiary sites include Russia Insider, The Duran, geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca."
+E000035,T0052,Star News Digital Media,"2019, US Domestic news: Snopes reveals Star News Digital Media, Inc. may look like a media company that produces local news, but operates via undisclosed connections to political activism. "
+E000036,T0052,Iranian sites including Liberty Front Press,"(2018) FireEye reports on Iranian campaign that created between April 2018 and March 2019 sites used to spread inauthentic content from websites such as Liberty Front Press (LFP), US Journal, and Real Progressive Front during the 2018 US mid-terms."
+E000037,T0053,Issues that can be politicised,"BlackLivesMatter, MeToo"
+E000038,T0054,TrudeauMustGo,2019: #TrudeauMustGo 
+E000039,T0055,PhosphorusDisaster hashtag,#PhosphorusDisaster
+E000040,T0056,RT/Sputnik,RT/Sputnik or antivax websites seeding stories.
+E000041,T0057,IRA organising US political rallies,"(Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 election"
+E000042,T0057,Facebook groups coordinating public space activities,Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and actvities into the public space.
+E000043,T0059,China messaging on Taiwan and Hong Kong,China constant messaging that Taiwan and Hong Kong are part of one China.
+E000044,C00008,Snopes,Snopes is best-known example of fact-checking sites. 
+E000045,C00012,2018 EU regulations,"In 2018, the European Union created significant new regulations on the role of social media in media"
+E000046,C00012,German social media content regulations,German model: facebook forced to police content by law
+E000047,C00014,Buzzfeed rumour list,Buzzfeed real-time disaster rumour list
+E000048,C00014,FEMA rumour list,FEMA real-time disaster rumour list
+E000049,C00030,counter narrative handbook,Handbook at https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf 
+E000050,C00030,Reality Team,Realityteam.org
+E000051,C00048,USAID programs,"USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations.  Note that USAID operations were at a different level."
+E000052,C00066,kPop hashtag flooding,kPop stans flooding extremist hashtags with pop videos and images. 
+E000053,C00070,2018 DDOS of troll farms,midterm-2018 elections DDOS against troll farms
+E000054,C00073,Learn to Discern,"The ""Learn to Discern"" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.” "
+E000055,C00073,Baltic Center for Media Excellence,"NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.”"
+E000056,C00082,Reality Team ground truthing,RealityTeam work that adds clear information to spaces with disinformation in.  
+E000057,C00086,Reddit channels flooded with jokes,"This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes."
+E000058,C00087,kPop hashtag flooding,
+E000059,C00087,LGBT flooding of #proudboys,
+E000060,C00093,Pro-Truth Pledge,community code of conduct
+E000061,C00111,The Commons Project,The Commons Project from BuildUp. 
+E000062,C00156,US Forces in Latvia,"In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.”"
+E000063,C00178,Current Time videos,"Using Current Time videos (viewed 40 million times online) to draw viewers away from Russian TV programming in RT and Sputnik. POtential content for this includes conventional entertainment programming (source: The conomist, “America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017)."
+E000064,C00182,Bedep Trojan,"(2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia"
+E000065,C00188,2014 Russian poll in France,"August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015)."
+E000066,C00188,Latvian newsrooms,"Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”"
+E000067,C00195,Using Adwords to redirect ISIS content readers,"Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Can apply this method to Russian propaganda.  "
+E000068,C00200,India,Indian influencers and aunties countering misinformation. 
+E000069,C00202,Macron election in France,Macron election team modified docs to spike a hack and leak. 
+E000070,C00207,Saudi tit for tat campaign,
+E000071,C00211,Baltic Elves,"Baltic Elves.
+https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/07/disinformation-nation-the-slovaks-fighting-in-defence-of-facts/ "
+E000072,C00211,Taiwan humor over rumor, Taiwan humor over rumor strategy.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/feb/17/humour-over-rumour-taiwan-fake-news and https://internews.org/story/using-comedy-and-social-media-educate-disinformation 
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/externalgroupcounters.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/externalgroupcounters.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb12b45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/externalgroupcounters.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,824 @@
+disarm_id,externalgroup_id,activity_id,summary
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diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/externalgroups.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/externalgroups.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e2c42c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/externalgroups.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,832 @@
+disarm_id,name,url,summary,provides_tools,sector,primary_role,secondary_role,primary_subject,secondary_subject,volunteers,region,country,rand_list,credco_list,carnegie_list,twitter_handle,notes,Unnamed: 18
+G000001,5Rights,https://5rightsframework.com/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000002,AACC (Association des Agences Conseils en Communication),https://www.aacc.fr/,,,,,,,,,Europe,France,,,,,,
+G000003,ABT Shield by Edge NPD,https://abtshield.com,"ABT SHIELD technology is an AI-based tool, designed to limit the impact of bots and trolls on readers’ experience and limit the spread of online disinformation. ABT SHIELD is a product designed in close cooperation with publishers, advertisers, academic institutions, think tanks and EU institutions.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000004,Access Now,https://www.accessnow.org/,"Access Now is dedicated to protecting digital rights through a 24/7 Digital Security Helpline, legal support, advocacy campaigns and cross-sector partnerships, and policy analysis and recommendations. Access Now works on issues related to freedom of expression and has responded to proposals aimed at curbing disinformation online by stressing the need to develop evidence-based solutions that protect online users.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000005,Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project (American Press Institute),https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/category/fact-checking-project/,The American Press Institute’s Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project aims to increase and improve fact-checking and other accountability journalism practices.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000006,Ad Fontes Media,https://www.adfontesmedia.com/interactive-media-bias-chart-2/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000007,Ad Observer (New York University),https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ad-observer/enliecaalhkhhihcmnbjfmmjkljlcinl,Ad Observer is a crowdsourcing Chrome browser extension that will gather ads from a user's Facebook news feed—to enable investigative journalism and research.The project is run by the Online Political Ads Transparency Project at New York University.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000008,"Advertising Standards Authority (ASA, UK)",https://www.asa.org.uk/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000009,AFP Medialab,https://www.afp.com/en/agency/medialab,"The AFP Medialab is a multi-disciplinary team of journalists and engineers. Since the 1st of January 2016, the Medialab has participated in the InVID project (social media video content verification on social networks), funded by the European Union Horizon 2020 framework.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000010,Africa Check,https://africacheck.org/,Africa Check promotes accuracy in public debate and the media in Africa. The goal of their work is to raise the quality of information available to society across the continent.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000011,Agence France Presse (AFP),https://www.afp.com/en,"AFP is a global news agency that worked with First Draft to implement the CrossCheck Project during the 2017 French presidential elections. The organization has since started its own fact-checking blog and helped set up the Journalism Trust Initiative with Reporters Without Borders, the European Broadcasting Union, and the Global Editors Network. AFP is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers. AFP also runs a Medialab, where it develops innovative tools for verifying content and understanding information flows.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
+G000012,Agência Lupa,https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/lupa,"Agência Lupa is a Brazilian fact-checking organization. A member of the Trust Project, the organization also provides training to students and professionals to contribute to the prevalence of fact-checking techniques and tools.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
+G000013,Agência Pública (Truco Project),https://apublica.org/truco-antigo/,Agência Pública is an investigative journalism outfit that conducts fact-checking through its Truco project.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000014,AI Foundation,http://www.aifoundation.com,"Reality Defender is a browser extension that scans every piece of media content appearing in the browser to check for known fakes, and uses AI algorithms to check the content for signs of alterations. Reality Defender also allows for users to report media as fake, which builds their database of known fakes and improves the browser extension’s accuracy.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000015,Alethea Group,https://www.aletheagroup.com/,"We protect clients from the threat of disinformation that targets brands, reputations, employee safety, or financial bottom lines through our industry-leading investigation and remediation services.",,Other,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000016,Alion,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000017,Alliance for Europe: Social Media Intelligence Unit,https://www.alliance4europe.eu/digital-intelligence/,"The Social Media Intelligence Unit (SMIU) collects and analyses social media data from across Europe. The platform enables tracking disinformation and hate-speech, aiming to develop a predictive model of its spread.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,Europe,Belgium,,N,N,,,
+G000018,Alliance for Securing Democracy (German Marshall Fund) (GMF),https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/,"Housed at GMF, the Alliance for Securing Democracy convenes policymakers and technical experts to provide analysis and policy recommendations concerning authoritarian interference in democracies. The Alliance for Securing Democracy runs an Authoritarian Interference Tracker and the Hamilton 2.0 interactive dashboard, which provides information on Russian state-funded narratives.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000019,Alliance of Democracies,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/transatlantic-commission-on-election-integrity/,"The Alliance of Democracies runs the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity (TCEI), which convenes individuals from media and government to prevent foreign interference in elections. TCEI advocates for campaigns to adopt its Pledge for Election Integrity, conducts monitoring in countries with upcoming elections, and promotes public policy solutions addressing deepfakes and other emerging technologies that threaten the integrity of elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000020,American Press Institute (API),https://www.americanpressinstitute.org,"Through its Fact-checking and Accountability Journalism Project, API provides research and training to help journalists and publishers improve their political fact-checking work. In collaboration with the Donald W. Reynolds Journalism Institute,",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000021,American Press Institute: Trusting News project,https://trustingnews.org,"API hosts the Trusting News project, which seeks to build trust in newsrooms through newsroom coaching and research on transparency, consumer news decisions, and social media.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000022,Amnesty International,https://www.amnesty.org,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000023,Amped Software,https://ampedsoftware.com/authenticate,"Amped Software offers image and video forensics and authentication tools that enable users to detect whether images or videos have been manipulated or altered. Amped uses peer-reviewed, scientific techniques for its product, and law enforcement agencies have used the tool for rigorous use cases such as discerning whether an image can be used in court.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000024,Analiziraj,https://analiziraj.ba/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,N,N,,,
+G000025,Antidote,https://antidote.ngo/,"""Exit counselors"" or ""de-radicalizers,"" Antidote helps people caught up in cultic ideologies to reconnect with reality",,Civil Society/NGO,Education (public),,Extremism/indoctrination,Societal resilience,,,USA,,,,,,
+G000026,Aos Fatos,https://www.aosfatos.org/,"Aos Fatos conducts fact-checking and provides technology and consulting services to organizations interested in automated fact-checking products and data verification. They also fconduct act-checking for internal reporting. Aos Fatos built Fátima, a fact-checking robot for Facebook messenger. Aos Fatos is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
+G000027,AP Fact Check (Associated Press (AP)),https://www.apnews.com/APFactCheck,AP is an international news conglomerate which addresses global breaking news via quality journalism and reporting. AP Fact Check is the formal public fact-checking service of the organization and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000028,ARD-FaktenFinder,https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/,ARD-FaktenFinder is the fact-checking program of German media organization ARD's online news platform.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000029,Argonne National Laboratory: Decisions and Infrastructure Sciences Division,https://www.anl.gov/dis/gat,The Decisions and Infrastructure Sciences Division at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is currently applying predictive modeling to combat disinformation. They are capable of providing a deep access data analytics system.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000030,Arizona State University: Detecting Frames,http://www.public.asu.edu/~hdavulcu/IJSC16.pdf,"Detecting Frames is a research project at the School of Computing, Informatics and Decision Systems Engineering at Arizona State University. It outlines the utilization of computational power to understand the subliminal framing of topics in the media and within networks. Similar to the way that sentiment analysis understands attitudes based on keyword usage, “Detecting Frames” understands perspective and bias packaging based on sentence annotation.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000031,Article19,https://www.article19.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000032,Asociatia Presei Independente (API),http://api.md/,"API is a resource center and association of newsrooms dedicated to improving the quality of independent journalism in Moldova through advocacy and professional development. The organization is coordinating the ""STOP FALS!"" Campaign to educate news consumers and combat the spread of false or manipulative information.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Moldova,,N,Y,,,
+G000033,Aspen Institute,https://www.aspeninstitute.org/,"The Aspen Institute convenes leaders and thinkers to address challenges to global prosperity and peace. Through its work on communications and culture and security and global affairs, the Aspen Institute has published analysis and hosted events on election security, disinformation, and cybersecurity. It also hosts the Knight Commission Trust, Media and Democracy, which convenes academic, journalistic, technology, and advocacy experts to address the American media landscape.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000034,Assembler,https://jigsaw.google.com/assembler/,Assembler is an experimental platform advancing new detection technology to help fact-checkers and journalists identify manipulated media. The experiment is developed by Jigsaw and Google Research.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000035,Association for International Affairs (Asociace Pro Mezinárodní Otázky) (AMO),http://www.amo.cz/,"AMO conducts research and advocacy on issues in international relations through policy briefings and research papers, conferences and roundtables, educational projects, and collaboration with other public policy organizations. AMO runs a project on Strengthening Public Scrutiny in Ukrainian Regions, which works to address disinformation in Ukraine through research and training. Its partners on this project include the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of Mass Information, stopfake.org, and demagog.cz.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000036,Astroscreen,https://www.astroscreen.com/,Astroscreen counters disinformation and terrorist content spread via “astroturfing” by detecting fake social media accounts and networks of bots.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000037,Athens Technology Center (ATC),https://www.atc.gr/?page=news&ListID=3&RowID=348&Year=2021,Built TruthNest,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Greece,,,,,,
+G000038,Atlantic Council: Digital Forensics Research Lab (DFR Lab),https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/digital-forensic-research-lab/,"The Atlantic Council's Digital Forensics Research Lab (DFR Lab) documents and tracks foreign-backed influence operations and provides analysis on these incidents in order to aid the public in identifying and exposing such activities. DFR Lab also runs 360/OS, an annual conference providing training to journalists and activists on open source, social media, and digital forensic tools for identifying and documenting malign uses of digital technologies. The Atlantic Council also coordinated #ElectionWatch, an effort to monitor foreign influence in elections in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico in 2018.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,Research (primary/secondary),,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000039,Atlantic Council: Disinfo Portal (Eurasia Center),https://disinfoportal.org/about-disinfo-portal/,"The Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center has created Disinfo Portal, which aggregates information about ongoing efforts to counter disinformation and provides a database of partners and experts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000040,Attestiv Inc.,https://www.attestiv.com,"Attestiv provides authenticity for photos, videos and other media, limiting deepfake threats, data tampering, and helping to enable new media protection solutions for businesses and organizations.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000041,attribution.news,https://attribution.news,The attribution.news project is a joint initiative led by First Draft and the Stanford Internet Observatory. The website aims to provide more accessible background explanations to assist reporters in covering attribution.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000042,Australian Associated Press FactCheck,https://factcheck.aap.com.au/,FactCheck is the Australian Associated Press's fact-checking initiative. FactCheck is a signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000043,Australian Department of Home Affairs: Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce,https://www.aec.gov.au/elections/electoral-advertising/electoral-integrity.htm,"Led by the Australian Department of Home Affairs, the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce is composed of members of various government agencies and deals with foreign cyber-enabled threats to election integrity.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,N,Y,,,
+G000044,Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI),https://www.aspi.org.au/program/international-cyber-policy-centre,"ASPI conducts research on issues in international peace and security and Australian foreign policy. Through its International Cyber Policy Centre, members of ASPI have published reports on the topics of disinformation, persuasion-based cyber warfare, and Chinese influence campaigns.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,N,Y,,,
+G000045,Authoritarian Interference Tracker (Alliance for Securing Democracy),https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/toolbox/authoritarian-interference-tracker/,"The Authoritarian Interference Tracker exposes the Russian and Chinese governments’ foreign interference activities in more than 40 transatlantic countries from 2000 to the present across the five tools ASD tracks. These tools are: information manipulation, cyber operations, malign finance, civil society subversion, and economic coercion. The Tracker shines a light on the tactics and trends that define the Russian and Chinese governments’ interference efforts in democracies, and highlights the interconnectivity between different parts of the asymmetric toolkit. Forthcoming iterations of the Tracker will expand to catalog authoritarian interference by other regimes that adopt similar tactics to undermine democracies.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000046,Avaaz,https://secure.avaaz.org/,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
+G000047,Balkan Investigative Reporting Network,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000048,Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (Centro de Barcelona para Asuntos Internacionales) (CIDOB),https://www.cidob.org/,"CIDOB conducts research and policy analysis on global issues in peace and security. As part of its work on security, CIDOB researchers have published on disinformation and EU responses, Russia's Spanish media efforts, and deepfakes. CIDOB works with the German Marshall Fund to organize the Mercator European Dialogue, which convenes members of European parliaments to discuss public policy issues. Through this program, the German Marshall Fund convened policymakers in May 2019 to discuss disinformation and fake news in European elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,Y,,,
+G000049,BBC Media Action ,https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/our-work/covid-19,"Our dedicated teams moved rapidly to adapt our existing projects to address the knock-on effects of COVID-19 – from increased levels of violence against women, to children losing out on an education during lockdown. Through media, we’re helping people understand what they can do, individually and as a community, and how they can hold their leaders to account.We are committed to supporting the international response for the long haul – helping people to survive, cope and recover from COVID-19, meeting their diverse and changing needs, and supporting local media to keep their communities informed. As an independent charity, we are not funded by the BBC TV Licence Fee. We rely on the support of generous donors – governments, foundations, corporations and individuals – to make our work possible. Trusted and accurate information will save lives.",,Civil Society/NGO,Media,,,,,UK,Europe,,,,,,
+G000050,BBC Beyond Fake News,https://www.bbc.co.uk/beyondfakenews/,"BBC reporting, education and training to help you understand the challenges posed by misinformation and fake news",,Media,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000051,Be Internet Citizens (YouTube),https://internetcitizens.withyoutube.com/,"YouTube, a Google company, is addressing disinformation through media literacy. Be Internet Citizens has been designed to teach teenagers about media literacy, critical thinking and digital citizenship, with the aim of encouraging young people to have a positive voice online.",,Technology,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000052,Belgian Expert Group on Disinformation and Fake News,https://www.decroo.belgium.be/nl/expertengroep-formuleert-aanbevelingen-voor-aanpak-fake-news,"In 2018, Digital Agenda Minister Alexander De Croo called for the creation of an expert group composed of academics and journalists to formulate proposals for countering disinformation in Belgium. The expert group delivered its recommendations in July 2018.",,Government,Public Policy,,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000053,Bellingcat,https://www.bellingcat.com,"Bellingcat is an independent international collective of researchers, investigators and citizen journalists using open source and social media investigation to probe a variety of subjects, including online influence operations. It also runs training programs for investigative journalists and publishes training guides in its Online Investigation Toolkit.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,Fact checking,,,Yes,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000054,Berkman Klein Center,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000055,BeWorks,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000056,Bien Chequeado,https://www.tvn-2.com/bien-chequeado/,Bien Chequeado is TVN Noticias's fact-checking initiative.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Panama,,Y,Y,,,
+G000057,BitPress,https://bitpress.news/,Bitpress is a nonpartisan fact-checking organization that uses technology solutions and trained analysts to identify misinformation and prevent its spread.,,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000058,Blackbird,https://www.blackbird.ai/,Blackbird.AI is a company that provides artificial intelligence tools to detect emerging propaganda campaigns and help clients respond.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000059,Bluescreen IT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000060,BOOM,https://www.boomlive.in/,"BOOM is an Indian fact-checking initiative that provides content in English, Hindi, and Bengali. The organization runs a WhatsApp helpline, and it is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000061,Bot Sentinel,https://botsentinel.com/,"Bot Sentinel is a free and open platform and browser plugin that detects likely bots on Twitter. A dashboard lets users explore trending topics, network connections, and data associated with suspicious accounts. The product also provides a “block list” that enables users to block likely bots from their own Twitter spheres.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,Y,N,Y,,,
+G000062,Botometer,https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/faq,"Botometer is a web-based program that uses machine learning to classify Twitter accounts as bot or human by looking at features of a profile including friends, social network structure, temporal activity, language and sentiment. Botometer outputs an overall bot score (0-5) along with several other scores that provides a measure of the likelihood that the account is a bot.",Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,Y,N,Y,,,
+G000063,Botslayer,https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/botslayer/,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000064,Brandpie,https://www.brandpie.com/people,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000065,Brave,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000066,Bridgit,Bridgit.io,,,,Influencer (on policy),,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000067,Brookings Institute: Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology,https://www.brookings.edu/experts/alina-polyakova/,The Brookings Institution's Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology addresses state and non-state technological threats and convenes technology and policy communities around these issues.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000068,Brookings Institution: Center for Technology Innovation,https://www.brookings.edu/center/center-for-technology-innovation/,"The Brookings Institution's Center for Technology Innovation provides research, policy analysis, and advocacy on global technology innovation. Part of its research agenda includes digital media, news, and entertainment. The Cybersecurity and Election Interference Project publishes analysis on election security, foreign interference in elections, and the potential for widespread disinformation and proliferation of deepfakes in electoral contexts. The Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology addresses state and non-state technological threats and convenes technology and policy communities around these issues.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000069,Brookings Institution: Cyber Security and Election Interference,https://www.brookings.edu/series/cybersecurity-and-election-interference/,"The Cyber Security and Election Interference is a series designed to be accessible to policymakers, journalists, and the general public, will explore digital threats to American democracy, cybersecurity risks, and ways to mitigate possible problems. It will also take a look at several examples of the problem, how other democracies are coping with the threats, and how Congress, state officials, political parties, and candidates can protect themselves from cybersecurity attacks.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000070,Brunswick,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000071,BT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000072,Cal State,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000073,Callsign,https://www.callsign.com,"Callsign leverages deep learning and technical/ behavioral forensics to differentiate between legitimate and fraudulent users, allowing companies to keep information secure by adding an additional layer of protection to logins, and potentially disallowing bad actors from accessing secure information and accounts. Callsign technology may ensure that bad actors are not able to hijack legitimate accounts to propagate disinformation. Furthermore, genuine identities could remain safe from account takeovers, account borrowing, and “first person fraud” used to spread adversarial propaganda and disinformation.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000074,Canada,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000075,Captain Fact,https://captainfact.io/,CaptainFact is a collaborative fact-checking project that relies on a browser extension to show fact-checked statements in YouTube videos.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000076,"Cardiff University: Open Source Communications, Analytics Research Development Centre",http://upsi.org.uk/oscar,"The Open Source Communications, Analytics Research (OSCAR) Development Centre is an innovative, multi-disciplinary Centre bringing together academics and police practitioners to develop a research evidence base around the use of open source information for policing and community safety services. Funded by the Home Office / HEFCE / and the College of Policing, the work of the centre will help to develop open source methodologies, technologies and insights that will shape the future of policing.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Investigations,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000077,Cardiff University: Social Data Science Lab,http://socialdatalab.net/ ,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000078,Carnegie Endowment: Partnership for Countering Influence Operations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace),https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/counteringinfluenceoperations,"The Partnership for Countering Influence Operations (PCIO) believes that little progress will be made without a spirit of partnership between governments, the tech industry, media, academia, and civil society. Such collaborations are challenging but necessary in order to accomplish the three aims that PCIO believes are vital: to answer difficult policy problems related to influence operations; to find ways to measure the effect of adversarial influence operations; and to develop methods for measurement and evaluation of countermeasures.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000079,Carnegie Mellon University: Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS),http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/index.php,"CASOS develops and applies computational tools for utilizing data to analyze social phenomena, to explain and predict social behavior using these tools, and to measure and evaluate the impact of policies and procedures affecting social behavior. CASOS has a project on the diffusion of false and misleading information and draws comparisons between community responses to key issues.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000080,Carnegie Mellon University: Center for Informed Democracy and Social Cyber-Security (CIDC / IDEAS),https://www.cmu.edu/ideas-social-cybersecurity/,CIDC studies online disinformation and its impact on democracy. The Center conducts research and connects individuals working on disinformation and related issues in order to educate journalists and policymakers. Its research and teaching focus on identifying disinformation and its sources and countering its spread.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000081,Carnegie Mellon University: Social Cybersecurity Project (Human-Computer Interaction Institute),https://socialcybersecurity.org/,The Social Cybersecurity Project leverages insights from social psychology and other fields to develop novel interventions and strategies for nudging adoption of expert-recommended tools and practices,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000082,Carnegie Trust (UK),https://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000083,CASM Digital Research Lab (Demos),https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,"A joint venture between UK-based Demos and the University of Sussex, the CASM Digital Research Lab is an initiative that utilizes machine learning to interpret natural language data and derive insights about technology policy. CASM has produced reports on information operations, Russian influence operations on Twitter, the future of political campaigning, social media and the 2017 British General Election, social media in Nigerian elections, and digital political advertising.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000084,Cato Institute,https://www.cato.org/,"The Cato Institute conducts research and analysis on American domestic and foreign policy issues. Its scholars have written on social media regulation in the face of disinformation, and the Institute hosts a Project on Emerging Technologies which works on issues at the intersection of new technologies and civil liberties.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000085,Cek Fakta,https://cekfakta.com,Cek Fakta is an Indonesian fact-checking initiative.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000086,"Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy of France (Centre d'analyse, de prévision et de stratégie) (CAPS)",https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/le-ministere-et-son-reseau/le-centre-d-analyse-de-prevision-et-de-strategie/,"CAPS is composed of academic experts and diplomats that provide research and analysis on medium- to long-term trends in international affairs and foreign policy. In partnership with the Institute for Strategic Research, CAPS produced a comprehensive report on influence operations and recommendations for governments, civil society organizations, and private actors for mitigating the impact of hostile influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000087,Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT),https://cdt.org/,CDT provides research and advocacy on public policies designed to preserve freedom and innovation online. CDT's experts provide analysis on legislation and social media platforms' efforts aimed at curbing disinformation and protecting the integrity of elections.,,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000088,Center for Democratic Transition (Centar za Demokratsku Tranziciju) (CDT),http://www.en.cdtmn.org/,"CDT is dedicated to promoting democratic accountability and transparency in Montenegro through advocacy, research, monitoring of institutions and policies. CDT worked with NATO's Public Diplomacy Division to run a project on countering disinformation and propaganda.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Montenegro,,N,Y,,,
+G000089,Center for East European Policy Studies (Austrumeiropas Politikas Pētījumu Centrs) (CEEPS),http://appc.lv/eng/,CEEPS conducts research and analysis on Latvian foreign policy with a focus on Russia's influence in European politics and security. Its scholars have contributed to research on resilience to disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe and participated in expert discussions on Russian influence operations organized by the European Center for Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. CEEPS is also part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Latvia,,N,Y,,,
+G000090,Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (Centar za Evroatlantske Studije) (CEAS),https://www.ceas-serbia.org/,"CEAS conducts research and analysis on public policy, international cooperation, and global security with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe. CEAS is a partner of the Atlantic Council's Disinfo Portal.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
+G000091,Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA),https://www.cepa.org/disinfonet,"The StratCom Program housed at CEPA is ""an innovative, on-the-ground effort to monitor, collate, analyze, rebut and expose Russian disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe."" The program seeks to create analytical toolkits for countering disinformation, host workshops, monitor the effectiveness of Russian propaganda, provide data on ongoing efforts, and provide policy guidance. CEPA also coordinates #DisinfoNet, a coalition of think tanks and organizations working to understand and combat Russia’s information operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000092,Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR),http://www.revealnews.org/,"Through its publishing platform Reveal, CIR seeks to empower the public and hold leaders accountable through investigative journalism. The organization has published an online guide to disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000093,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Defending Democratic Institutions (CSIS),https://www.csis.org/programs/international-security-program/defending-democratic-institutions,"This project seeks to counter Russia, and potentially other adversaries, in their efforts to disrupt democracy and cultivate a public distrust of democratic institutions. A key focus of this initiative is on understanding and countering adversary attacks on America’s justice system, to include courts, judges, prosecutors, and the rule of law. Improving cybersecurity of institutions and individuals is a crucial mechanism for strengthening America’s capacity to guard against threats to democracy. In addition, the initiative will focus on building national resilience against information operations that threaten to undermine public respect for democratic institutions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000094,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Gray Zone Project,https://www.csis.org/grayzone,"CSIS’s International Security Program has analyzes hybrid and Gray Zone threats and aims to identify how the United States can best deter, campaign in, and respond to gray zone approaches.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000095,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Transnational Threats Project (CSIS),https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project,"CSIS coordinates a Transnational Threats Project, which has addressed Russian interference in the U.S. context and U.S. strategies to combat Russian information warfare, within the context of a broader focus on terrorism, insurgency, and crime.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000096,Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD),https://csd.bg/,"CSD conducts research and advocacy on issues related to European integration, political institutions, and economic and political development. The organization's research agenda includes a focus on state capture and russian influence, especially in the Black Sea countries and the Western Balkans, and its experts have written on media capture, propaganda, and Russian economic influence.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Bulgaria,,N,Y,,,
+G000097,Central European Policy Institute,http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/anatomy-info-war-how-russias-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-counter-it,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000098,Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats (Czech Ministry of the Interior),https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/Default.aspx,"Operational since 2017, the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats is a division of the Czech Ministry of the Interior designed to monitor and respond to influence operations with public policies and awareness-raising efforts. The center also deals with terrorism, security aspects of migration, extremism, and other disruptions to public order and safety.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000099,Centre for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH),https://www.counterhate.com/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000100,Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy (CEID),https://www.ceid.hu,"CEID conducts research, publishes analysis, and holds roundtable discussions and conferences on how to strengthen transatlantic relationships. The CEID is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis’s #DisinfoNet and cooperated with Ukrainian Prism and the EAST Center in their work on the Disinformation Resilience Index, with the Centre for International Relations in their work on countering Kremlin-backed disinformation, and with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in their “Fog of Falsehood” report on Russian deception in Ukraine.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,Hungary,,N,Y,,,
+G000101,Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS),https://www.ceps.eu/,"CEPS conducts research and hosts events and discussions on a range of issues affecting European domestic policies. CEPS has produced a number of publications on EU strategies for understanding and countering disinformation and on content moderation strategies online, including a study commissioned by the European Parliament on possible EU actions to address fake news and emerging threats like deepfakes.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000102,Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI),https://www.cigionline.org/,"CIGI is dedicated to conducting research on Canadian and international public policy and security issues. In June 2019, CIGI partnered with the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity to produce an Election Risk Monitor that assesses threats and potential responses to disinformation in the context of Canada’s elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000103,Centre for International Relations (Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych) (CSM),http://www.csm.org.pl/en/,CSM conducts research and analysis on issues in Polish foreign policy and European policy and is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis’s #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
+G000104,Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST),https://crestresearch.ac.uk/,CREST conducts behavioral and social science research to better understand threats to national security and develop strategies for countering them. The organization has addressed conspiracy theories and online behavior in its work.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000105,"Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA)",https://www.istinomer.rs,"CRTA is dedicated to promoting accountability and transparency in democratic politics. The organization runs a project called Istnomer, which conducts fact-checking and reporting in support of free media, institutional transparency, and political accountability.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
+G000106,CEPS,https://www.ceps.eu/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000107,Certified Content Coalition,https://www.certifiedcontentcoalition.org/,The Certified Content Coalition grew out of CableLabs with the goal of developing standards for trustworthy publishers.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,Y,Y,Y,,Dead website?,
+G000108,Channel 4 FactCheck,https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/,FactCheck is the fact-checking initiative run by Channel 4 in the United Kingdom.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000109,Chatham House,https://www.chathamhouse.org/,"Chatham House conducts research and analysis on issues in public policy and international peace and security. Chatham House experts have published research and hosted discussions through the International Security Department on issues related to disinformation, information warfare, elections, and global cybersecurity.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000110,Check My Ads,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000111,Check Your Fact,https://checkyourfact.com/,"Check Your Fact is the fact-checking initiative of the Daily Caller. The site is known for its ties to white nationalists. It is one of six third-party organizations working together to fact-check content for American users. The partnership has already come under intense criticism from climate journalists (among others) who are concerned that the Daily Caller’s editorial stance on issues like climate change, will spread even more misinformation Facebook.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000112,Checkology,,,,,Education (public),Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000113,Chequeado,https://chequeado.com/,,,,Fact checking,Verification,,,,,Argentina,,Y,N,,,
+G000114,Chile Check,,,,,,,,,,,Chile,,Y,N,,,
+G000115,CirroLytix,https://www.cirrolytix.com/,"CirroLytix is a data analytics research company specializing in data ethics and machine learning technologies for social impact. Their tool, ""Troglodyte,"" provides online researchers, journalists and fact checkers with an extensive database for matching sources with information and exposing causal links, conspiracies, and associated disinformation agents.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
+G000116,Cities on the Internet,https://mwi.pl/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Europe,Poland,,N,N,,,
+G000117,Cities on the Internet Association (Stowarzyszenie Miasta w Internecie) (MWI),https://mwi.pl/,"MWI is dedicated to the development of digital competency and literacy in Polish citizens. Through the project Digital Poland of Equal Opportunities, MWI is addressing digital literacy among Polish adults with the help of volunteers that encourage individuals over the age of 50 to engage online. The organization also develops educational materials for and provides training to Polish citizens of all ages.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
+G000118,Citizen Evidence Lab (Amnesty International),https://citizenevidence.org/,"Amnesty International's Citizen Evidence Lab provides resources for researchers, journalists, and activists documenting and exposing human rights abuses using content verification, data science, remote sensing, crowd-sourcing, and digital security tools. One of their projects, called Youtube DataViewer, helps extract information from Youtube videos.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000119,City University of New York: Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism,https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/,The Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism runs the Quality Project in partnership with the World Economic Forum to aggregate efforts to assess the quality of online information and allow users to select a personalized weighting of quality indicators.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000120,Civic online reasoning,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000121,Civil,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000122,Civil Liberties Union for Europe,https://www.liberties.eu/en,"Civil Liberties Union for Europe is network of civil liberties watchdogs that carries out public advocacy and campaigning and that provides research and analysis to policymakers on how to advance civil liberties in law and public policy. Its recent campaigns have concerned censorship, data privacy, the protection of civil society, and migration. The organization has written on efforts to curb disinformation within the European Union and its member states.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000123,ClaimBuster,https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/,ClaimBuster is a tool developed by researchers at the University of Arlington to provide automated live fact-checking.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000124,Clean Up The Internet,https://www.cleanuptheinternet.org.uk,"Clean up the internet is an independent, UK-based organisation concerned about the degradation in online discourse and its implications for democracy. They campaign for evidence-based action to increase civility and respect online, and to reduce online bullying, trolling, intimidation, and misinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000125,Climate Feedback,,,,,Credible content,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000126,Cloudflare,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000127,CNA,https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/cip/information-environment,"Recent CNA work on disinformation topics includes understanding state and non-state malign influence on partners and allies in Europe; identifying and analyzing the range of tools available to state and non-state actors in Africa and the Middle East; examining the use of the cyber domain to conduct information warfare; and analyses of messages, themes, and audiences in the Indo-Pacific region.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000128,Co-inform EU,https://coinform.eu/,Co-Inform brings together universities and small and medium enterprises in Europe to collaborate on tools for digital literacy with the aim of addressing disinformation. The project has put together a glossary on terms related to disinformation and will produce additional tools to be tested in three European countries by 2021.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000129,Cocuyo Chequea,https://efectococuyo.com/category/cocuyo-chequea/,Cucuyo Chequea is the fact-checking arm of Venezuelan media organization Efecto Cucuyo.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Venezuela,,Y,Y,,,
+G000130,CogSecCollab,http://cogsec-collab.org/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,North America,Global,,N,N,,,
+G000131,Colombia Check,https://colombiacheck.com/,Colombiacheck is a Colombian fact-checking project and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Colombia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000132,Columbia Journalism Review,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000133,Columbia University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000134,"Columbia University: Craig Newmark Center for Journalism, Ethics and Security (Graduate School of Journalism)",https://journalism.columbia.edu/craig-newmark-center,"Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism houses the Craig Newmark Center for Journalism Ethics and Security, which received funding in 2019 and will address journalism ethics in the digital age.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000135,Columbia University: Tow Center for Digital Journalism (Graduate School of Journalism),https://towcenter.columbia.edu,"The Tow Center examines digital journalism's industry-wide economic trends, its cultural shifts, and its relationship with the broader, constantly changing world of technology, and houses the Emergent research project.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000136,Combating Russian Disinformation,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000137,Commerce,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000138,Common Cause social media monitoring,https://www.commoncause.org/our-work/voting-and-elections/election-protection/stopping-cyber-suppression-and-voting-disinformation/,"The national, nonpartisan Election Protection coalition works so all voters have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. Made up of more than 100 local, state and national partners, Election Protection works year-round to advance and defend your right to vote",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000139,Competition and Markets Authority (CMA UK),https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority,"The CMA is an independent non-ministerial department which leads the Government’s Digital Markets Taskforce, and seeks to regulate the digital sphere by: enabling disruptors to challenge incumbents; empowering consumers through choice and control; supporting quality services and content online and providing industry, especially SMEs, with fair access to digital markets to be able grow their businesses.",,Government,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000140,Comprobado CNN CHV (Chile Check),https://www.cnnchile.com/chilecheck/,Comprobado CNN is the fact-checking initiative of CNN Chile.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Chile,,N,Y,,,
+G000141,Comprova,https://projetocomprova.com.br,"Comprova is a collaborative fact-checking organization in Brazil that unites journalism partners to investigate, contextualize, and clarify fake news.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000142,Congo Check,http://www.congocheck.net/,Congo Check is a fact-checking and image verification organization based in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,DRC,,Y,Y,,,
+G000143,CONNECT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000144,ConPruebas,http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/conpruebas,"ConPruebas is a fact-checking project run by Plaza Pública at Rafael Landívar University, inspired by Chequeado.",,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Guatemala,,Y,Y,,,
+G000145,Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000146,Content blockchain project,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000147,Correctiv,https://correctiv.org/en/,Correctiv is an investigative journalism outfit that provides training for citizens and journalists aimed at reducing the impact of disinformation. The organization also coordinates an annual Campfire Festival to foster conversation around the future of digital journalism and is developing a hub for nonprofit journalists in Europe. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000148,Cortico,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000149,Council on Foreign Relations (CFR),https://cfr.org,"The CFR provides research and analysis on issues related to international public policy, law, and security. Under the mantle of programs like the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program, National Security and Defense Program, U.S. Foreign Policy Program, and Europe Program, CFR scholars have authored reports on containing and countering Russia’s foreign interference efforts, defending American elections from foreign interference, botnets, and deepfakes, among other topics.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000150,Council on Foreign Relations: Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program,https://cfr.org,"The Digital and Cyberspace Policy program addresses one of the most challenging issues facing the country in the twenty-first century: keeping the global internet open, secure, and resilient in the face of unprecedented threats. Digital technologies have become ubiquitous; nearly five billion people use a cell phone, and approximately 4.5 billion are on the internet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000151,Countering Disinfo,https://counteringdisinformation.org/,A guide to promoting information integrity.  This resource combines the collective wisdom of organizations on the front lines of combatting disinformation globally. This living project provides an outline of what’s being done to address the challenge in key areas and provides a searchable database of the organizations around the world engaged in making the digital landscape safe for democracy,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000152,Craig Newmark Philanthropies,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000153,Credibility Coalition,https://credibilitycoalition.org/,The Credibility Coalition brings people together to develop common standards for information credibility.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,Y,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000154,Credibility Coalition: Misinfosec Working Group (MisinfosecWG),https://misinfocon.com/misinformation-has-stages-7e00bd917108,"The Credibility Coalition’s Misinfosec Working Group (“MisinfosecWG”) maps information security principles onto misinformation. Their current work is to develop a tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) based framework that gives misinformation researchers and responders a common language to discuss and disrupt misinformation incidents.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000155,CREST,crestresearch.ac.uk,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000156,CrowdTangle,https://www.crowdtangle.com/,"CrowdTangle is owned by Facebook and offers digital strategic communications services. Among many of its services, CrowdTangle provides platform access which allows users to report false news.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000157,CS-ISAO,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000158,CTI League Disinformation Team,https://cti-league.com/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,Global,,,N,N,,,
+G000159,CUNY,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000160,CUNY,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000161,CUNY: News Integrity Initiative,https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/centers/tow-knight-center-entrepreneurial-journalism/news-integrity-initiative/,The News Integrity Initiative (NII) at the Newmark J-School was launched in 2017 to advance media literacy and increase trust in journalism.,,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000162,Cyabra,www.cyabra.com,"Cyabra has developed AI-based technologies to identify bots, sockpuppets and trolls in social media platforms, as well as Deep Learning tech against visual manipulations (Deepfakes and GANs) in real-time. Using this technology, Cyabra is able to outline the scope of a disinformation attack within a day rather than the several days it may take human analysts working manually. This elevated timeline provides valuable early detection; an attack identified in real-time offers an opportunity for counter-action or counter-narratives.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000163,Cyan Forensics,https://www.cyanforensics.com,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000164,Czech Elves,https://www.facebook.com/cestielfoveofficial/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,N,,,
+G000165,Czech Pirate Party (Greens/EFA),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000166,Dagens Nyheter (Faktist),https://www.dn.se/,"Faktist is the fact-checking project of Dagens Nyheter, a Swedish newspaper and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,Y,Y,,,
+G000167,DARPA,,,,Defence/military,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000168,Darwin AI,https://www.darwinai.com,"The Darwin AI team has developed an “Automatic Disinformation Assessment” engine. It is a large scale, bidirectional language model that can detect the stance of an article. The project had an accuracy of 90.01%, which surpasses general benchmarks in the industry. The tool was able to determine whether or not a document agrees, disagrees, or takes no stance towards a specific claim.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000169,Data & Society,https://datasociety.net/research/media-manipulation/,"Data & Society’s Media Manipulation & Disinformation research examines how different groups use the participatory culture of the internet to turn the strengths of a free society into vulnerabilities, ultimately threatening expressive freedoms and civil rights. Efforts to exploit technical, social, economic, and institutional configurations of media can catalyze social change, sow dissent, and challenge the stability of social institutions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000170,Data & Society Research Institute: Disinformation Action Lab,https://datasociety.net/research/disinformation-action-lab/,The Disinformation Action Lab (DAL) at Data & Society forges new approaches to address the complex dynamics underpinning the spread of propaganda and disinformation.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000171,Data & Society Research Institute: Media Manipulation Initiative,https://datasociety.net/research/media-manipulation/,"Data & Society's Media Manipulation Initiative looks at how various qualities of media environments and technologies can be exploited to destabilize democratic, social, and economic institutions. The initiative has produced reports on algorithmic accountability, source hacking, weaponized advertising technology, the amplification of extremist content, and alternative facts, among other topics. Its affiliates have also produced a report on deepfakes and the history of audiovisual manipulation.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000172,Datalyrics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000173,dBunk(r),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000174,DCMS,,,,Government,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000175,Debunk EU,http://debunk.eu/,"DEBUNK is a Lithuanian initiative composed of media organizations, strategic communications professionals, researchers, and technologists that have developed an artificial intelligence tool to identify disinformation within 2 minutes.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,Y,Y,,,
+G000176,Deep Freeze,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000177,Deep Trust Alliance,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000178,Deepnews.ai,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000179,DeepSeer,https://deepseer.ai,DeepSeer provides a platform for social media data analysis and visualization by tracking and mapping online influencers. Their toolset can help identify and track the spread of disinformation on the web. DeepSeer offers measurement tools for the impact of online communications and messaging; enabling assessment of the impact and efficacy of counter disinformation campaigns.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000180,Deeptrace,www.Deeptracelabs.com,Deeptrace is a company developing technologies to detect and monitor synethic or manipulated media (deepfakes).,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000181,DeFacto,https://defacto.space,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000182,Defending Democracy,https://defending-democracy.org,"Defending Democracy is an independent, nonpartisan, transatlantic initiative. that works to support and defend basic values and fundamental freedoms and rights. Regarding internal threats, Defending Democracy focuses on defending democracy, rule of law and human rights. Regarding external threats, Defending Democracy focuses on deterring disinformation, cyber-attacks and political warfare.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000183,Delfi Melo Detekto,https://www.delfi.lt/news/melo-detektorius/,,,,,,disinformation,,,,Lithuania,,,,,,
+G000184,Demagog Poland,https://demagog.org.pl/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,disinformation,,,Europe,Poland,,,,,,
+G000185,Demagog.cz,https://demagog.cz/,Demagog.cz conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in the Czech Republic. The project is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,Y,Y,,,
+G000186,Demaskuok,https://demaskuok.lt/en/main-page/,"Demaskuok searches the information ecosystem of the Baltic states for disinformation and propaganda, utilizing an AI tool to flag suspected disinformation, and a network of human fact checkers to verify or discredit flagged content.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
+G000187,Democracy Fund,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000188,Demos - Centre for the Analysis of Social Media,https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000189,Detecteur Rumeurs,https://www.sciencepresse.qc.ca/detecteur-rumeurs,Detecteur Rumeurs is the fact-checking arm of the Montreal-based media company Agence Science Presse.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,Canada,,Y,Y,,,
+G000190,Detector de Mentiras,https://lasillavacia.com/,Detector de Mentiras (Lie Detector) is a Colombian fact-checking project run by La Silla Vacía and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Colombia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000191,DFID,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000192,DHS,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000193,Digit Eye India,https://digiteye.in/,Digiteye India is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000194,Digital Polarization Initiative,https://www.aascu.org/AcademicAffairs/ADP/DigiPo/,"The Digital Polarization Initiative, or “DigiPo”, is AASCU American Democracy Project's national effort to build student civic, information and web literacy by having students participate in a broad, cross-institutional project to fact-check, annotate, and provide context to the different news stories that show up in Twitter and Facebook feeds.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000195,Digital Sisters; Stop Online Violence Against Women (SOVAW),https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shireen_Mitchell,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000196,Dirt Protocol,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000197,Disinfo Cloud,https://disinfocloud.com,"Disinfo Cloud is an open source platform funded and supported by the U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) and maintained by Park Capital Investment Group LLC (Park Advisors), an implementing partner of the GEC. Disinfo Cloud aims to provide relevant stakeholders an overview of the tools and technologies available to help push back against foreign propaganda and disinformation.",Yes,Government,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000198,Disinformation Tracker,https://www.disinformationtracker.org,"Disinformation Tracker is an interactive map that seeks to support human rights defenders in Sub-Saharan Africa by tracking and analysing all laws, policies and other government actions on disinformation across Sub-Saharan Africa.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Africa,,,N,Y,,,
+G000199,Dispute Finder,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000200,Doğruluk Payı,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000201,DoubleVerify,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000202,dpa-Faktencheck,https://www.dpa.com/de/unternehmen/faktencheck/,dpa-Faktencheck is the fact-checking arm of the German news organization Deutsche Presse-Agentur GmbH.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Germany,,Y,Y,,,
+G000203,DQ Institute,https://www.dqinstitute.org/,"With the support of the World Economic Forum, DQ Institute develops global standards for digital intelligence and literacy and develops strategies for education and outreach on these issues. DQI has developed a framework for thinking about digital intelligence and is conducting impact and research assessments to understand the impact of digital technologies and to assess digital intelligence skills around the world.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000204,DROG,https://aboutbadnews.com/,"DROG is a nonprofit that fosters awareness and builds resilience against disinformation through its Bad News game, workshops, and lectures. Bad News is a social impact game that allows individuals to experience the spread of disinformation and see its impact on society.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,Y,Y,,,
+G000205,Dubawa,https://www.dubawa.org/,DUBAWA is a Nigerian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Nigeria,,Y,Y,,,
+G000206,Duke Reporters Lab / Jigsaw,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000207,Duke Share the Facts Widget,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000208,Duke Tech & Check Cooperative,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000209,Duke University: DeWitt Wallace Center for Media & Democracy,https://reporterslab.org/,"The DeWitt Wallace CMD runs the Duke Reporters' Lab, which conducts research on fact-checking and technological tools to aid fact-checkers. The lab maintains a comprehensive list of fact-checking organizations around the world and runs the Duke Tech & Check Cooperative, which aims to automate fact-checking.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000210,e-Enfance (e-E),https://www.e-enfance.org/,"e-E offers training on risks and threats in cyberspace and best practices for navigating digital spaces to kids in school, their parents, and professionals in the workforce. The platform also offers a free and confidential hotline and message service on Net Ecoute where the public can call in to receive assistance and counseling in the face of cyber threats.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000211,East STRATCOM Task Force: EUvsDisinfo,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/,"The East StratCom Task Force was established to respond to Russian influence operations in Eastern Europe. The task force's flagship project, EUvsDisinfo, monitors and catalogues cases of pro-Russian disinformation and conducts research and analysis on the methods and practices of disinformation and emerging technologies like deepfakes. The task force also trains EU and member state institutions and civil society organizations on disinformation and raises awareness about disinformation in the context of European elections.",,Government,Fact checking,Research (primary/secondary),,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000212,Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC),http://www.eesc.lt/en/,EESC conducts research and analysis on policy issues affecting Eastern Europe and engages the policy community in trainings and seminars on democratic transition. EESC administers a Democracy and Development Assistance Fund to support individuals and organizations in Eastern Europe working to support democracy. Its experts have written on Russian influence operations in Eastern European countries. EESC is also part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
+G000213,EastWest Institute: Global Cooperation in Cyberspace (EWI),https://www.eastwest.ngo/,"EWI is a network of experts that engage in conflict resolution and prevention and provide research and analysis on global challenges to peace and security. EWI’s program on Global Cooperation in Cyberspace ""seeks to reduce conflict, crime and other disruptions in cyberspace and promote stability, innovation and inclusion"" by convening multistakeholder summits, organizing collaborative working groups, and mobilizing around the adoption of global norms in cyberspace.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000214,EC,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000215,Ecuador Chequea,http://www.ecuadorchequea.com/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Ecuador,,Y,N,,,
+G000216,EDPS-EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000217,Ekspress Meedia / Eesti Päevaleht,https://epl.delfi.ee/kategooria/86056905/faktikontroll-1,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,disinformation,,,Europe,Estonia,,,,,,
+G000218,El poder de elegir,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000219,El Sabueso,https://www.animalpolitico.com/elsabueso-rss,"El Sabueso is the fact-checking section of Animal Político, a Mexican media organization, and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Mexico,,Y,Y,,,
+G000220,Election Integrity Partnership,https://www.eipartnership.net/,"The Election Integrity Partnership is a coalition of research entities focused on supporting real-time information exchange between the research community, election officials, government agencies, civil society organizations, and social media platforms.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000221,Electoral Commission (UK),https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/,"The Electoral Commission is an independent body which regulates the funding of political parties, individual party members, and candidates, as well as organisations campaigning in referenda. It is distinct from other regulators for being answerable to Parliament. It also enforces inclusion of imprints of printed election material under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.",,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000222,Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),https://www.eff.org/,"EFF is dedicated to advancing digital civil liberties through litigation, policy analysis, activism, and technology development. One of EFF’s issue areas is free speech online, and the organization has produced analysis on the need to balance content moderation strategies aimed at combating misinformation with freedom of expression and on how the United States should think about regulating deepfakes.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000223,Ellinika Hoaxes,https://www.ellinikahoaxes.gr/,"Ellinika Hoaxes conducts fact-checking of Greek online content and has created a web tool to inform users when they visit sites that are likely to be satirical, conspiratorial, or otherwise false and misleading. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Greece,,Y,Y,,,
+G000224,Emergent,http://www.emergent.info/about,Emergent is a real-time rumor tracker and part of a research project with the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University. It focuses on how unverified information and rumor are reported in the media. It aims to develop best practices for debunking misinformation.,Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000225,Estadão Verifica,https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/estadao-verifica,Estadão Verifica is a Brazilian fact-checking initiative housed at Estadão and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
+G000226,Estonia,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000227,Ethical Journalism Network (EJN),https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/supporters/african-media-initiative,"EJN provides training and education to journalists to advance quality media and trust in media institutions. Through its series ""Saving the News: Ethics and the fight for the future of journalism,"" EJN has written on challenges to journalism in an era of declining trust, deepfakes, and journalistic self-regulation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000228,EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000229,EU Disinfo Lab,https://www.disinfo.eu,"EU DisinfoLab is an independent non-profit organisation focused on tackling sophisticated disinformation campaigns targeting the EU, its member states, core institutions, and core values.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000230,EU External Action Service,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000231,EU vs Disinformation,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000232,Eurasia Partnership Foundation,https://epfarmenia.am,,,,,,,,,,Armena,,,,,,Armenia/Eurasia
+G000233,Eurasian States in Transition Research Center (EAST Center),http://east-center.org/,"EAST Center provides research and analysis on influence operations in Central and Eastern European countries and coordinates the Disinformation Resilience Index. Implemented with regional partners, the Disinformation Resilience Index assesses the vulnerability and resilience of fourteen Central and Eastern European countries to foreign (namely, Russian) disinformation campaigns.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000234,Europe fit for the Digital Age,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000235,European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE),https://www.hybridcoe.fi/,"The Hybrid CoE is a platform for EU and NATO member states to coordinate and share best practices on defending against hybrid threats, including influence operations. The Hybrid CoE engages in research to better understand and respond to threats, identify vulnerabilities, and build resilience, and it provides training and education for governments.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
+G000236,European Conservatives and Reformist Group,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000237,European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR),https://www.ecfr.eu/,"ECFR focuses on European foreign policy and security issues and provides research and analysis, convenes experts and leaders, and engages with national country governments on policy development. ECFR has published a paper on European strategic sovereignty that covers hybrid threats, and its scholars have offered commentary on countering online radicalization, strategies for fighting fake news, Russian cyber threats (including disinformation), and information manipulation in Europe.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000238,European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),https://edmo.eu,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000239,European Digital Rights (EDRi),https://edri.org/,"EDRi is a coalition of European digital human rights groups that seeks to provide public policy research and defend the importance of civil and human rights in the digital environment. To this end, EDRi has addressed influence operations through its work with Civil Liberties Union for Europe and Access Now to produce a joint report on the disinformation debate and policy responses in the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000240,European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS),https://epthinktank.eu/,"EPRS is the in-house research arm of the European Parliament. Through the European Parliament Think Tank, EPRS produces reports, briefings, and in-depth analyses meant to drive legislative development. The think tank has produced a number of reports and briefings on disinformation, information warfare, and hybrid threats that examine topics like artificial intelligence's impact on disinformation, the functioning of the rule of law, the EU and the Western Balkans, NATO strategic communications, influence operations in the EU.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
+G000241,European People's Party (Christian Democrats),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000242,European Union: European External Action Service,https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en,"The EEAS is the EU's diplomatic service. Countering disinformation is one of its key focus areas. The Commission put forward a European approach for tackling online disinformation in its Communication of April 2018, seeking to promote a more transparent, trustworthy and accountable online environment. The Communication proposed measures to tackle disinformation online, including a self-regulatory EU-wide Code of Practice on Disinformation, signed by large online platforms and the advertising industry, as well as support for an independent network of fact-checkers.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
+G000243,European Values (Kremlin Watch),https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/,"European Values runs Kremlin Watch, a program designed to provide monitoring and analysis of Kremlin-backed influence operations. Kremlin Watch provides weekly briefings and other opportunities for information-sharing, policy development advice to national governments, and educational activities for members of the public. European Values is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000244,European Values Center for Security Policy,https://www.europeanvalues.net/data/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000245,eWitness Media Inc,https://ewitness.commons.gc.cuny.edu/,"eWitness provides a digital alibi for images and videos. In today’s digitized world, eWitness helps companies stand by their content, to confidently attest to the time, geolocation and content of the media that appears on their platform . This attestation then eliminates questions against the validity of the media, allowing audiences to focus on the truth and context that surround the media.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,no site found,
+G000246,Executive round table on digital journalism ethics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000247,Fabula AI,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fabula_AI,"Fabula AI, was acquired by Twitter in June 2019. The tool evaluates the veracity of an article based on the way it spreads online. This means that it can detect a fake news story within 2-20 hours of publishing.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000248,Facebook,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000249,Facebook (UK),,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000250,Facebook Flagging Fake,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000251,Facebook Third-Party Fact-Check,https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536,"Facebook support the use of both technology and human review to remove fake accounts, promote news literacy and disrupt the financial incentives of spammers. In certain countries, they also work with third-party fact-checkers who are certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network to help identify and review false news.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000252,FacktenFinder,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000253,Fact Check - the journal.ie,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000254,Fact Check EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000255,Fact Checking Chile,http://factchecking.cl/,Fact Checking Chile is a fact-checking initiative based at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile that trains students as fact-checkers and content verifiers.,,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Chile,,Y,Y,,,
+G000256,Factba.se,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000257,FactCheck (The Conversation),https://theconversation.com/us,The Conversation is an online news platform for academics and researchers to share information and evidence in support of sound policy. The organization has a dedicated fact-checking team dedicated to ensuring information integrity.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000258,FactCheck Georgia,https://factcheck.ge/en,FactCheck is an online fact-checking platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Georgian politicians and public figures.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Georgia,,N,Y,,,
+G000259,FactCheck.kz,http://factcheck.kz/,FactCheck.kz is a fact-checking initiative based in Kazakhstan and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Kazakhstan,,Y,Y,,,
+G000260,FactChecker.in,https://factchecker.in/,FactChecker.in is an Indian fact-checking initiative run by the Spending & Policy Research Foundation and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000261,Factcheckers,http://factcheckers.it/,Factcheckers is an Italian media literacy organization that provides resources and training to high schools and universities around the world on fact-checking and critical evaluation of information.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
+G000262,FactCrescendo,https://www.factcrescendo.com/,FactCrescendo is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000263,FactLink,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000264,Factly,https://factly.in/,Factly is an Indian organization that conducts fact-checking and helps make government data and information accessible to citizens. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000265,Factmata,https://factmata.com/,"Factmata is building an API to identify, classify, and build trust scores for online content to help users rate the trustworthiness of a source. The company also provides moderation services to help flag potentially harmful content for trust and safety teams at major online platforms, and they organize a blacklist to help clients know which platforms or websites to avoid entirely.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000266,Fake it to Make it,http://www.fakeittomakeitgame.com,"Fake It To Make It gamifies the experience of spreading false news for public consumption, deepening players’ understanding of the process and motives behind false news dissemination.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000267,Fake News Tracker,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,N,,,
+G000268,Fake Off (20 Minutes),https://www.20minutes.fr/,"Through its Fake Off section, 20 minutes conducts fact-checking, particularly on stories that have gained significant online attention. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
+G000269,FakeHunter,https://fakehunter.pap.pl/en/,"FakeHunter is a community-based project for verifying content published on the Internet, launched by the Polish Press Agency (PAP) together with GovTech Polska. It aims to demystify and refute false information related to the SARS-CoV-2 virus.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
+G000270,FakerFact,https://www.fakerfact.org/,"FakerFact has built an artificial intelligence tool called ""Walt"" to help readers assess the potential biases in news sources, rather than just determining the veracity of the content.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000271,Faking News: Fraudulent News and the Fight for the Truth,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000272,Faktabaari,https://faktabaari.fi/in-english/,Faktabaari is a Finnish fact-checking organization that provides media literacy resources to EU schools.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Finland,,Y,Y,,,
+G000273,Faktisk,https://www.faktisk.no/,Faktisk is a Norweigan fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network. They also run a school project called Think that aims to educate young students about critical thinking.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Norway,,Y,Y,,,
+G000274,Faktograf,https://faktograf.hr/,Faktograf conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in Croatia. The organization is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Croatia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000275,Faktograf.hr,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000276,Fandango,https://fandango-project.eu/,"The FANDANGO (Fake news discovery and propagation from big Data Analysis and artificial intelligence operations) project aggregates a large array of media sources so that big data/Machine Learning tools can analyze data to understand patterns within the ecosystem and provide insight to analysts. This technology can support government stakeholders’ mission by facilitating a high-level overview of the disinformation ecosystem, helping to map out and highlight patterns, connections and detection criteria.",Yes,Government,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000277,Fatabyyano,https://fatabyyano.net/,,,,Fact checking,,,,,Africa,North Africa,,N,N,,,
+G000278,Fatima,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000279,FCO,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000280,Federation of American Scientists,https://fas.org/ncov/disinformation-reports/,"Upon recognition of the threat that false information poses to science, the Federation of American Scientists established the Disinformation Research Group (FAS DRG). FAS DRG is composed of scientists, communications experts, data-scientists, and technologists with the intended purpose of detecting, understanding, and effectively exposing disinformation and false narratives surrounding COVID-19. FAS DRG uses multiple methods, technologies, and resources to execute the mission.",,,,,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000281,FeedReflect,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/feedreflect/bigmeipgaifggglelcnpnpbaefimpooc?hl=en-US,FeedReflect is a browser extension for Google Chrome that urges users to consider the quality of the news content they consume on Twitter,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000282,FiB,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000283,Field guide to fake news,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000284,Finding the truth amongst fakes,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000285,Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA),https://www.fiia.fi/,"FIIA conducts research and policy analysis on international relations and the European Union. The institute has research programs on the European Union, Eastern European countries and their relationship with Russia, and global security, and it has published a number of reports on information warfare, hybrid threats, disinformation, and related concepts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
+G000286,FireEye: Information Operations Intelligence Analysis,https://www.fireeye.com/,,,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000287,First Draft News,https://firstdraftnews.org,"First Draft is a nonprofit that aims to provide practical and ethical guidance for journalists and publishers in the digital age. The organization coordinates an international fact-checking initiative, trains journalists and fact-checkers in countries with upcoming elections, and conducts and disseminates research on best practices for producers and consumers of digital news. The organization recently published a series of guides on responsible reporting, including one on reporting on deepfakes.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000288,Fiskkit,http://fiskkit.com/,"Fiskkit is an online platform where users can assess the credibility of news articles, and the organization has also created a tool designed to help schoolchildren evaluate sources.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000289,Ford Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000290,Fortis AI,https://www.alionscience.com,"Fortis is an information operations (IO) platform that takes data from multiple sources and distills it into insights and actionable results. The system aims to alert analysts to adversarial IO, and to provide meaningful analytics, theme and narrative detections, and support for conducting information operations.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000291,FotoForensics,http://fotoforensics.com,"Fotoforensics displays the underlying forensics data of any image uploaded to their platform, thereby providing a user with visual and other data to help determine whether the image has been altered. Fotoforensics’ underlying tools are integrated with other social media intelligence platforms or by social media platforms themselves to improve content moderation and disinformation identification efforts.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000292,Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS),https://www.feps-europe.eu/,"FEPS conducts research and advocacy on European democracy and public policy. Its experts have been involved in studies on foreign state propaganda and Russian hybrid warfare. FEPS also collaborates with the Istituto Affari Internazionali on the EU Global Strategy Watch, which tracks developments in EU Global Strategy implementation.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000293,France 24 - les Observateurs,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000294,Fraunhofer Institute,https://www.aisec.fraunhofer.de/en/fields-of-expertise/cognitivesecurity.html,,,,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000295,Freedom and Solidarity Foundation (Brīvības un Solidaritātes Fonds) (BSF),http://bsf-latvija.lv/,BSF conducts research and advocacy on issues in Latvian public policy and democracy and international peace and security. Its scholars have written on Russian propaganda and work with other organizations to provide opportunities for discussion and collaboration on these issues.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Latvia,,N,Y,,,
+G000296,Freedom on the Net,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000297,Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES),https://www.fes.de/,"FES conducts advocacy and research on issues related to democracy in Germany and across the world. Through its German headquarters and regional offices, FES has addressed media quality and resilience in Africa, disinformation and propaganda in Ukraine, and disinformation in debates about migration within the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000298,Fsecure,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000299,Full Fact,https://fullfact.org/,Full Fact conducts fact-checking and verification and provides research and training on fact-checking efforts. Full Fact also works with the British government to make government data more available to citizens and to enhance transparency in communication.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000300,Fundação Getúlio Vargas Department of Public Policy Analysis (FGV DAPP),https://observa2018.com.br/,"During the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, FGV DAPP coordinated the Digital Democracy Room to monitor public debate and potential threats to its integrity. Through this initiative, FGV DAPP provided research and analysis on issues related to misinformation online, bot networks, and foreign influence in public discourse and worked with the Consultative Council on Internet and Elections of the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court. FGV has also joined the Atlantic Council's #ElectionWatch project, which monitored foreign influence in Brazilian, Colombian, and Mexican elections in 2018.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Investigations,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000301,Fundación La Voz Pública,https://chequeado.com/,"Fundación La Voz Pública is dedicated to strengthening the quality of public debate in Argentina. The organization runs an initiative called Chequeado, which conducts fact-checking and trains fact-checkers and journalists. The organization also creates innovative tools for improving fact-checking and the dissemination of knowledge.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Research (primary/secondary),,,,South America,Argentina,,N,Y,,,
+G000302,Fundamedios,http://54.85.84.127/,"Fundamedios is an organization committed to promoting freedom of expression, monitor aggressions and risks faced by journalists, and uphold human rights in Latin America. The organization has experience in monitoring, promoting and protecting freedom of expression and freedom of the press; boosting high-quality reporting; training journalists; carrying out studies and research, and promoting open discussion about journalism, media, and democracy in Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, and the USA. Fundamedios also runs Ecuador Chequea, which is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000303,Future Digital Threats to Democracy (Technology for Global Security),https://www.tech4gs.org/future-digital-threats-to-democracy.html,"Tech4GS is a new type of non-profit: part think tank, part incubator, and purely nonpartisan. As part of a two-year, multi-disciplinary effort to address the ways in which democracies and open societies combat high-tech illiberalism, they have partnered with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) to launch the joint project “Future Digital Threats to Democracy.”",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,,,N,Y,,,
+G000304,"Gallup/Knight Foundation Survey on Trust, Media and Democracy (2017)",https://knightfoundation.org/reports/american-views-trust-media-and-democracy/,,,,Education (public),Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000305,GeoPoll,https://www.geopoll.com/,GeoPoll specializes in global and emerging market research. Their work focuses on two main areas: Monitoring and evaluation; and counter-narratives. Their work on counternarratives aims to counter or expose disinformation through targeted messaging as well as gathering information on fake news and identifying the most effective channels to disseminate counter messages.,,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),Credible content,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,Also Kenya,
+G000306,"George Washington University: Institute for Data, Democracy, and Politics",https://iddp.gwu.edu,"The Institute for Data, Democracy & Politics (IDDP)’s mission is to help the public, journalists, and policymakers understand digital media’s influence on public dialogue and opinion, and to develop solutions to disinformation and other challenges that arise in these spaces.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000307,Georgetown University: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,https://isd.georgetown.edu,"SD sponsors working groups in collaboration with other elements of the School and the University as well as non-academic groups that bring together high-level, experienced practitioners and eminent scholars to examine emerging international and statecraft issues and recommend policy solutions. In October 2020, ISD released a report titled ""The New Weapon of Choice: Technology and Information Operations Today""",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000308,Georgetown University: Law School Center on Privacy and Technology (CPT),https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/,"CPT studies the impact of government surveillance and commercial data practices on vulnerable communities, provides intellectual and legal foundations for reforms to U.S. consumer privacy laws, and offers technology-intensive courses that prepare students to be leaders in privacy practice, policy making, and advocacy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000309,German Council on Foreign Relations (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik) (DGAP),https://dgap.org/,DGAP conducts research and advocacy on issues in German public policy and international relations. The organization's experts have published on Russian propaganda efforts in German politics.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000310,German Marshall Fund: Digital Innovation & Democracy Initiative (GMF),https://www.gmfus.org/digital-innovation-and-democracy-initiative,"The German Marshall Fund runs a Digital Innovation & Democracy Initiative, which focuses more broadly on the relationship between technological developments and democratic values.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000311,German Marshall Fund: Mercator European Dialogue (GMF),https://www.gmfus.org/forum/mercator-european-dialogue,"GMF organizes the Mercator European Dialogue, a network of European members of parliaments that meets to discuss public policy issues, in cooperation with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, the Istituto Affari Internazionali, and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Through this program, GMF convened European policymakers in May 2019 to discuss disinformation in European elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000312,Get Bad News (DROG),https://getbadnews.com/#intro,"DROG develops programs and courses and conducts research aimed at recognizing disinformation, especially online. In Get Bad News, you take on the role of fake news-monger. Drop all pretense of ethics and choose a path that builds your persona as an unscrupulous media magnate. But keep an eye on your ‘followers’ and ‘credibility’ meters. Your task is to get as many followers as you can while slowly building up fake credibility as a news site. But watch out: you lose if you tell obvious lies or disappoint your supporters!",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
+G000313,Giant Language Model Test Room (GLTR),http://gltr.io,The Giant Language Model Test Room offers a forensic analysis of and rates the likelihood that a snippet of text was generated by an automated system or written by a human. GLTR can be used to analyze and detect fake text or as an educational tool to allow the public to check the likelihood of whether a piece of content is human-written or machine-generated and demonstrate the capabilities of AI to generate fake news.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000314,GIZ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000315,Global Alliance for Responsible Media (GARM),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000316,Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC),https://cyberstability.org/,"GCSC was created with the goal of promoting mutual awareness and understanding among the various communities addressing international cybersecurity. GCSC has pursued research on the development of global norms in cyberspace, defining the public core of the Internet, and protection of electoral infrastructure, among other issues.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
+G000317,Global Council to Build Trust in Media and Fight Misinformation,https://www.globalmis.info/,"In 2018, the Ethical Journalism Network, European Broadcasting Union, Global Editors Network, Global Forum for Media Development, Online News Association, and World Editor's Forum launched the Global Council to Build Trust in Media and Fight Misinformation. The council's mission is to create a repository of resources and information, connect key stakeholders, identify and implement innovative solutions for newsrooms, and serve as a voice for the media industry in addressing the problem of misinformation and declining trust in newsrooms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,World,,Y,Y,,,
+G000318,Global Disinformation Index (GDI),https://disinformationindex.org/,GDI is developing an artificial intelligence tool to create automated disinformation ratings for news organizations to assess the likelihood that they carry disinformation.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000319,Global Focus,http://www.global-focus.eu/,"Global Focus conducts advocacy, research, and analysis around Romanian public policy issues and international peace and security. The organization has launched an international initiative to combat disinformation and influence operations and has convened a seminar in Bucharest to address ways to build resilience and respond to threats. Global Focus is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Romania,,N,Y,,,
+G000320,Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD),https://gfmd.info,"GFMD is a network of journalism support and media assistance groups committed to advancing free, independent, sustainable and pluralistic news ecosystems. Its Internet Governance Working Group has developed a focus on disinformation and misinformation and focuses its advocacy efforts on how the underlying mechanisms of the digital economy enable the manipulation of online spaces and the proliferation of dis/misinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000321,GLOBSEC Policy Institute,https://www.globsec.org/,"GLOBSEC conducts research and analysis of issues in public policy and international peace and security. The organization runs a program on strategic communication, through which it publishes analysis on disinformation in Europe and resiliency to influence operations. In 2018, GLOBSEC announced a project on hybrid threats meant to support the development of public policies, monitoring threats, and capacity-building within the Slovakian government.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
+G000322,Go Think Initiative,https://www.facebook.com/GoThinkInitiative/,"Go Think Initiative is dedicated to convening European organizations and experts to address changes in the media landscape and cultivate an awareness of the media's role in politics. The organization has held professional media literacy workshops as part of its V4 Think Media project, and it develops games to help citizens understand media, propaganda, and the importance of civic participation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000323,Good of All,http://goodofall.org,"In collaboration with Kansas State University, Good of All has created a modification to a popular video game, Grand Theft Auto, to explore topics of censorship, protection of democracies, and freedom of speech. This modified version of the game, called Grand Theft Democracy, simulates a fictional nation’s presidential election and requires players to strategize to steer a population into voting for a certain candidate. They have stated that this approach could raise awareness of how disinformation/ propaganda may be employed by adversaries.",,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000324,Google,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000325,Google Cloud,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000326,Google News Initiative,https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com,The Google News Initiative works with the news industry to help journalism thrive in the digital age.,,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000327,Google News Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000328,Google/YouTube,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000329,GovLab-NYU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000330,Graphika,https://graphika.com/,"Graphika provides companies with tools to analyze online conversations and detect disinformation campaigns. Its lab division partners with academic institutions to advance its social network analysis, machine learning, and artificial intelligence capabilities.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,Research (primary/secondary),,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000331,Ground News,https://www.ground.news/,"Ground news is a news comparison platform to help the public make sense of stories across the political spectrum. With the rise of mis/disinformation and increasingly polarized news sources, Ground News provides an app that shows side by side comparisons of different sources’ coverage of a story, along with tools for users to analyze and draw their own conclusions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000332,Group M,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000333,Group of the European People's Party: Christian Democrats,,,,,,,,,,Europe,Latvia,,,,,,
+G000334,Grover,https://grover.allenai.org/,"Grover technology works by generating its own ‘neural fake news’, which is then used to detect similar articles. The Grover model can generate an article against a specific news source, author, and date. Users of the tool also give the articles a headline that the content is then based off of.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,not accessible,
+G000335,GTRI,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000336,Guardian,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000337,Hacked off,https://hackinginquiry.org,,,Civil Society/NGO,Influencer (on policy),,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000338,Hacker Factory,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000339,Hacks Hackers,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000340,Hamilton68 dashboard,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000341,Hanns Seidel Stiftung,https://www.hss.de/en/,"Hanns Seidel Stiftung conducts research and training and promotes international cooperation in public policy. Its researchers have published analysis on social media and bots, disinformation, and political campaigning.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000342,Harvard,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000343,Harvard Shorenstein Center,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000344,Harvard University: Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society,https://cyber.harvard.edu,"The Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University is dedicated to exploring, understanding, and shaping the development of the digitally-networked environment. A diverse, interdisciplinary community of scholars, practitioners, technologists, policy experts, and advocates, it seeks to tackle the most important challenges of the digital age while keeping a focus on tangible real-world impact in the public interest. The faculty conducts research, builds tools and platforms, educates others and facilitates dialogue across and among diverse communities.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000345,Harvard University: Defending Digital Democracy (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs),https://www.belfercenter.org/,"Defending Digital Democracy develops solutions to share threat information with technology providers, governments and political organizations. It also provides election administrators, election infrastructure providers, and campaign organizations with practical “playbooks” to improve their cybersecurity. Other activities include develoing strategies for how democracies can credibly deter hostile actors from engaging in cyber and information operations, assessing emerging technologies that may improve the integrity of systems and processes vital to elections and democracy and Convening civic, technology, and media leaders to develop best practices that can shield public discourse from adversarial information operations.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000346,Harvard University: Nieman Foundation for Journalism,https://nieman.harvard.edu/,"The Nieman Foundation for Journalism provides fellowships, publications, and training opportunities around developments in journalism. Through Nieman Lab, the foundation is reporting on how newsrooms are adapting to the digital landscape, including to the threat of disinformation, declining trust in news media, and the proliferation of deepfakes.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000347,"Harvard University: Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy",https://shorensteincenter.org/,"Harvard University's Technology and Social Change Research Project at the Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy investigates the impact of new media on truth and trust. Its researchers have created the Global Media Manipulation Case Book, and the center also publishes the Misinformation Review to track academic research on the topic. The Shorenstein Center also hosts a Digital Platforms & Democracy project that focuses on the ways in which digital platforms shape public debate and regulatory tools for addressing them.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000348,Health Feedback,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000349,Henry Jackson Society (HJS),https://henryjacksonsociety.org/,HJS conducts research and analysis on issues related to international peace and security and democracy promotion abroad. HJS personnel have recently addressed issues of Russian disinformation and fake news as threats to Western democracy.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000350,Hercule,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000351,Heritage Foundation,https://www.heritage.org,"The Heritage Foundation provides research and advocacy on U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Scholars at the Heritage Foundation have authored reports and commentary on Russian disinformation, and the organization has hosted events around this issue. Researchers at Heritage have also written on Chinese psychological warfare.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000352,HO@X,http://hoax.cz/cze/,"HO@X aims to inform the public about digital hoaxes, i.e. widely spread email chain messages that pose some kind of threat to users. HO@X offers a public database that catalogs emails and news stories known to be fraudulent.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000353,Hoaks Atau Fakta?,https://www.kompas.com/,"Hoaks Atau Fakta? Is the fact-checking initiative of Kompas.com, an Indonesian media platform, and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000354,Hoover Institution,https://www.hoover.org/,"The Hoover Institution ""seeks to improve the human condition by advancing ideas that promote economic opportunity and prosperity, while securing and safeguarding peace for America and all mankind."" Scholars affiliated with the institution have published on disinformation, content moderation, information operations, and information warfare, both in academic contexts and in informal commentaries.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000355,Hypothes.is,https://web.hypothes.is/,The Hypothesis Project is an effort to create an open source software that allows users to annotate online content and fact-check the news.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000356,IAB Europe/ OPA Europe,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000357,iAgents Lab,https://iagentntu.github.io/,"Affiliated with National Taiwan University, Intelligent Agents Laboratory (iAgents Lab) is developing technical applications for improving people's lives and proposing available solutions on social problems. Social media users can use iAgents Lab's algorithm to identify disinformation in real time.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
+G000358,IBM Consulting,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000359,IBM CPD Explorer,https://www.ibm.com/watson,The IBM Counter Propaganda and Disinformation (CPD) Explorer retrieves thousands of news articles and social media posts in real-time and analyzes each post to quickly determine instances of disinformation and propaganda and visualizes the results of the analysis and classification within a dynamic cloud-based dashboard.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000360,Identifact,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000361,IDS-Sussex University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000362,IFEX,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000363,Iffy Quotient (University of Michigan),https://csmr.umich.edu/platform-health-metrics/,"The Iffy Quotient is a web-based tool that queries Facebook and Twitter and identifies URLs that are known to be biased or to be frequent reporters of false information. The tool then calculates the percentage of URLs on each site that are ""iffy,"" or known for reporting false or misleading information.",Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000364,Image Verification Assistant (Reveal),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000365,IMPRESS,https://www.impress.press,UK press regulator,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000366,Independent,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000367,Index on Censorship,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000368,India Today Fact Check,https://www.indiatoday.in/fact-check,India Today Fact Check is the fact-checking arm of India Today's website.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000369,Indiana University: Observatory on Social Media (OSoMe),https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/,"OSoMe uses social media data to develop tools for visualizing the diffusion of information and misinformation online. OSoMe's goal is that individuals and journalists will use these tools to make their own assessments about the trustworthiness of news sources and to contribute to the growing field of data journalism.   OSoMe also houses Hoaxy, a web-based tool that visualizes the spread of articles online. Hoaxy searches for claims and fact-checking going back to 2016. It tracks the sharing of links to stories from low-credibility sources and independent fact-checking organizations. It also calculates a bot score, which is a measure of the likely level of automation.",Yes,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000370,Individual - Adam Shostack,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000371,Individual - Dominic Dodd,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000372,Influence Apps,https://startinfluence.com/,"Influence Apps, Inc. is a strategic communications tool that simplifies complex technologies and techniques to help governments counter bad actors online. Powered by ad tech industry and government communications experts, Influence offers a suite of services that provide government operators tools for real-time sentiment analysis and communication campaign management.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000373,Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO UK),,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000374,Information Disorder Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000375,Information Operations Archive,https://www.io-archive.org/#/,The Information Operation Archive hosts publicly available and rigorously attributed datapoints from known Information Operations on social media platforms.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000376,Institute for Public Relations (IPR),https://instituteforpr.org/,"IPR provides research and advocacy around marketing and communications. Its current strategic priorities include restoring reputation in an environment of low trust, and the organization has launched a ""Disinformation in Society"" report in 2019 with plans to release future editions annually.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000377,Institute for Statecraft (Integrity Initiative),https://www.statecraft.org.uk,"The Institute for Statecraft is an independent, Scottish, charitable body whose work seeks to improve governance and enhance national security. They launched the Integrity Initiative in 2015 to defend democracy against disinformation. Its website was temporarily taken down, pending an investigation into the theft of data from the Institute.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000378,Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD),https://isdglobal.org,"ISD provides research, education and advocacy, and policy advising on issues concerning far-right radicalization, Islamist extremism, disinformation, and polarization. The Institute also partners with governments, civil society organizations, and private companies to develop policies and best practices for countering violent extremism both on- and off-line, and provide training to governments and citizens for countering violent extremism.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Education (public),,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000379,Institute for Strategic Research of France (Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire) (IRSEM),https://www.irsem.fr/,"IRSEM is the research arm of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces and provides analysis on issues in defense and security. IRSEM, in partnership with the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, has produced a comprehensive report on influence operations and recommendations for governments, civil society organizations, and private actors for mitigating the impact of hostile influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000380,Institute for the Future: Digital Intelligence Lab,http://www.iftf.org/partner-with-iftf/research-labs/digital-intelligence-lab/,"The Institute for the Future’s Digital Intelligence Lab conducts research on disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of American politics. Its publications include The Human Consequences of Computational Propaganda, a series of eight case studies from the 2018 U.S. midterm elections; Digital Propaganda and the News, a series of three reports concerning how disinformation affects journalism; Principles and Policies to Counter Deceptive Digital Politics; State-Sponsored Trolling; and The Biology of Disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000381,Instituto Igarapé,https://igarape.org.br/,Instituto Igarapé conducts research and analysis on Brazilian and international security and development with a thematic focus on cybersecurity. The organization's experts have written on the role of bots in Brazilian political discourse and disinformation in Latin America more generally. Its researchers also create data visualization tools to help address problems in security and development.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000382,Inter-American Dialogue,https://www.thedialogue.org/,"The Inter-American Dialogue is dedicated to research and analysis on issues of public policy and international affairs affecting North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean. It conducts research and advocacy on issues related to media, elections, and potential foreign influence through its Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000383,International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS),https://icds.ee/,"The ICDS research program on Security and Resilience addresses hostile influence strategies and operations and information warfare through research and advocacy. The organization collaborated on the Disinformation Resilience Index to assess Estonia's resilience to influence operations, and it hosted a development cooperation program supported by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs titled ""Resilient Ukraine: civil society support for strengthening national resilience and security in Ukraine.""",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,Estonia,,N,Y,,,
+G000384,International Fact Checking Network (IFCN),https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,The International Fact-Checking Network is a unit of the Poynter Institute dedicated to bringing together fact-checkers worldwide. The IFCN was launched in September 2015 to support a booming crop of fact-checking initiatives by promoting best practices and exchanges in this field.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,Y,Y,Y,,,
+G000385,International Forum for Democratic Studies (National Endowment for Democracy),https://www.ned.org/international-forum-for-democratic-studies/,The NED's International Forum for Democratic Studies is a leading center for analysis and discussion of the theory and practice of democracy around the world. The forum's areas of focus include authoritarian influence and the information space.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000386,International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA),https://www.idea.int/,"International IDEA conducts research and builds capacity in electoral processes, constitution-building, political participation, and political representation. Through its work on ICT, Elections and Democracy, International IDEA has developed guidance on appropriate uses of social media in electoral contexts and has convened experts to discuss the spread of misinformation about voting registration and practices.",,Government,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000387,International Republican Institute: Beacon Project (IRI),https://www.iribeaconproject.org/,"IRI has established the Beacon Project to address state-sponsored influence operations, particularly those emanating from Russia. The project identifies and exposes false or misleading information and helps facilitate a response with its local partners. The organization has also developed a media monitoring tool called >versus< that it shares with local media partners in Central and Eastern Europe. The Beacon Project is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000388,International Standard Content Code,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000389,Internet Archive TV News Archive,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000390,Internet Association,https://internetassociation.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000391,Internet Health Report,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000392,INTERNETLAB: Law and Technology Research Center,http://www.internetlab.org.br/en/,"Through its project on Electoral Rights in the Digital Era, INTERNETLAB has convened experts in electoral law and experts on the digital environment to address issues like digital propaganda and the use of bots in elections. INTERNETLAB has also produced a guidebook for citizens navigating technology platforms titled ""Surviving on the Networks,"" and it runs a project titled Você na mira meant to empower citizens in the face of digital microtargeting during elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000393,Internews Ukraine,https://internews.org/,"Internews Ukraine supports the development of free and independent media in Ukraine through advocacy, legislative efforts, training for journalists, and countering propaganda and misinformation online. The organization has created a communication strategy for advocating Ukraine's integration in the European Union and countering propaganda created by pro-Russian forces.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Ukraine,,N,Y,,,
+G000394,InVid,https://www.invid-project.eu/,InVid is an EU-funded project dedicated to building a platform for assessing the reliability and authenticity of online video content.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000395,IP2 Location,https://ip2location.com,"P2 Location’s software identifies the geolocation of IP addresses, as well as whether the IP address is an anonymous proxy, VPN, or TOR IP address. It retrieves geolocation information with no explicit permission required from users.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
+G000396,IREX,https://www.irex.org/,"IREX works globally to promote inclusive and democratic societies by creating informed, educated, and civically active citizenries. IREX has partner organizations located around the world to aid in developing capacity for independent media. IREX has implemented a Learn to Discern program for educating citizens in Ukraine about the threat of manipulative information and building digital literacy skills.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000397,ISAO,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000398,ISBA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000399,ISOC,https://www.internetsociety.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000400,Istinomer,https://www.istinomer.rs/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,Y,N,,,
+G000401,Istinomjer,https://istinomjer.ba/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,Y,N,,,
+G000402,Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI),https://www.iai.it/,"IAI provides research and analysis on issues in Italian public policy, international peace and security, and European integration. The organization's experts have published analysis on social media, truth, and European politics. IAI works with the German Marshall Fund to organize the Mercator European Dialogue, a network of members of European parliaments that meets to discuss public policy issues. Through the program, the German Marshall Fund and its partners convened policymakers to discuss disinformation and fake news in European elections in May 2019.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Italy,,N,Y,,,
+G000403,Italian Postal and Communications Police Service (Polizia Postale e delle Comunicazioni),https://www.commissariatodips.it/,"In advance of elections in 2018, the Italian government established an online platform where citizens can report false or misleading information and request verification. The platform is managed by the Postal and Communications Police Service, which is responsible for information and communications technology-related crimes.",,Government,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,N,Y,,,
+G000404,İzlemedeyiz,http://izlemedeyiz.org/en/#intro,"İzlemedeyiz is dedicated to increasing transparency and accountability in the Turkish government through providing information for private sector entities about government activities. The organization also runs Doğruluk Payı, which conducts fact-checking.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Asia,Turkey,,N,Y,,,
+G000405,Jigsaw,https://jigsaw.google.com/,"Jigsaw employs scientists, engineers, researchers, designers, and policy experts to create online tools and platforms dedicated to addressing repressive censorship, online harassment, violent extremism, and injustice and corruption. Jigsaw has contributed data and conducted research on the topic of disinformation, deepfakes, and fake news. They have also partnered with the Duke Reporters' Lab to develop the ""Share the Facts"" widget to help Internet users share fact-checked information.",Yes,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000406,Jordanian Media Credibility Monitor (AKEED),https://akeed.jo/en,The Jordanian Media Credibility Monitor is a project of the Jordan Media Institute that aims to support the development of quality media in Jordan.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Jordan,,Y,Y,,,
+G000407,Journalist,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000408,Keyhole,https://keyhole.co/,"Keyhole provides a platform of tools to measure the impact of social campaigns. The company tracks, measures, and reports on the success of social campaigns. The company offers a real-time dashboard of metrics and analysis points. The solution focuses on hashtag and influencer data, and measures metrics such as reach, impressions, engagement and followers. Using this tool, users can set goals and calculate the impact and success of a social campaign on Twitter, Youtube, Instagram or Facebook.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000409,Kharon,https://www.kharon.com,Kharon is a research and analytics firm that generates insight about sanctions-related risk intelligence. Kharon works with financial services firms and other multinational institutions. Kharon utilizes a proprietary technology and a staff of expert analysts to identify and map connections between individuals and entities that have been sanctioned by different governments and international bodies and their associates.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000410,Kings College London: Centre for Strategic Communications,https://www.centreforstrat.com/,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000411,"Knight commission on trust, media and democracy",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000412,Knight Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000413,Knight Prototype Fund,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000414,Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,https://www.kas.de/,"Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung is a political foundation that provides research and advocacy on German public policy issues. Its researchers have written on influence operations in Europe, fact-checking in Africa, and extremism online, among other topics related to disinformation and foreign interference.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000415,Kosh Archive (Tattle),https://tattle.co.in/products/kosh,"Main archive that contains content scraped from all the different sources- the Tattle Jod telegram bot, Fact-checking sites, social media and chat apps.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,India,,N,N,,,
+G000416,Kremlin Watch,https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000417,KRIK,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,N,,,
+G000418,Krik,https://www.krik.rs/,"OCCRP's Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK) is dedicated to supporting Serbian investigative journalism. Comprised of both non-profit journalism centers and for-profit media organizations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, OCCRP aims to use investigative reporting and fact-checking to expose and deter corruption.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
+G000419,Krypometri,https://kallxo.com/krypometer/,"Krypometri is the fact-checking arm of Kallxo.com, an online platform edicated to reporting on corruption, organized crime, fraud, and abuse in Kosovo. The organization is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Kosovo,,Y,Y,,,
+G000420,La Chistera,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000421,La Voce,https://www.lavoce.info/,La Voce is an Italian online news platform and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
+G000422,Labor of Love,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000423,Latvia,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000424,Le Monde (Les Décodeurs),https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/,Le Monde's Les Décodeurs is the French newspaper's fact-checking platform and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
+G000425,Lead Stories,https://leadstories.com/,Lead Stories is an online platform that tracks trending news stories to identify and debunk false or misleading information as quickly as possible. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000426,Les Decrypteurs,https://ici.radio-canada.ca/decrypteurs,,,,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,N,,,
+G000427,Les Observateurs (France 24),https://observers.france24.com/en/,Les Observateurs is a project of France 24 that is dedicated to empowering citizen journalists by verifying and publishing eyewitness accounts of news stories. The platform is part of the International Fact-Checking Network and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000428,Leviathan,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000429,Libération (Check News),"https://www.liberation.fr/desintox,99721",Libération's CheckNews is the current fact-checking platform for the French newspaper and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
+G000430,Lie Detectors,https://lie-detectors.org,"Lie Detectors' news literacy project aims to turn schoolchildren in Europe aged 10-15 into powerful lie detectors and critical thinkers, empowering them to understand news media, make informed choices and resist peer pressure as they assemble their worldview.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000431,Linterna Verde,https://linternaverde.co/,"Linterna Verde provides research and analysis on issues concerning information and debate online, private and public regulation of the online information space, and civil rights and liberties. One of its ongoing projects concerns the dynamics of political messaging on WhatsApp.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,South America,Colombia,,N,Y,,,
+G000432,Logically,https://www.logically.ai/,"Logically builds products and services to meet modern challenges in combating misinformation, disinformation, propaganda campaigns and identifying problematic content in the digital domain space.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000433,London Institute for Contemporary Christianity (LICC),https://licc.org.uk/,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000434,London School of Economics (LSE),,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000435,London School of Economics: Arena (Institute of Global Affairs),http://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/arena,"Housed at the Institute of Global Affairs, Arena is a programme dedicated to overcoming the challenges of disinformation. The aim of the Arena programme is to use high-quality research, analysis and evaluation to create effective best practices that can then be disseminated to journalists, public diplomacy teams and civic groups.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000436,London School of Economics: Department of Media and Communications,http://www.lse.ac.uk/media-and-communications/truth-trust-and-technology-commission,"The LSE Truth, Trust and Technology (T3) Commission deals with the crisis in public information. They work with experts, practitioners and the public to identify structural causes of media misinformation and set out a new framework for strategic policy in a report. T3 is funded by the LSE Knowledge Exchange & Impact Fund.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000437,"London School of Economics: Truth, Trust and Technology (T3) Commission",,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000438,Loughborough University,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000439,Lui President,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000440,Luminate,,,,,Funders,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000441,Lund University: Department of Strategic Communication (Lunds Universitet Strategisk Kommunikation),https://www.isk.lu.se/en/research/research-projects/countering-disinformation-protecting-elections,"Lund University's Department of Strategic Communication has been commissioned by more than a dozen organizations including the UK Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), EU-NATO Hybrid Centre of Excellence and NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence to produce hands-on guidance, processes and training to counter influence operations.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000442,Mafindo,https://www.mafindo.or.id/,Mafindo is an organization dedicated to fact-checking and exposing hoaxes in Indonesian media and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000443,Main Street One,https://mainstreet.one/,Main Street One is a technology company dedicated to identifying online narratives and producing countermessaging on behalf of clients.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000444,Maldito Bulo,https://maldita.es/malditobulo/,Maldito Bulo conducts fact-checking of stories circulating online and creates web-based tools to help news consumers identify false or misleading information. Maldito Bulo is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network. The organization also runs training programs at universities and other public and private institutions.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
+G000445,Manipulátoři,https://manipulatori.cz/,"Manipulátoři provides perspective and insights on politics and strategic communications at a time of rampant disinformation, misinformation, and fake news.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000446,Markkula Center for Applied Ethics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000447,Marvelous AI,https://marvelous.ai/,Marvelous AI is a technology company that is dedicated to identifying and analyzing online narratives and their imapct on public discourse.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000448,Masaryk University: Department of Political Science (Masarykova Univerzita Katedra Politologie),https://www.fakescape.cz/en,"Masaryk University developed Fakescape, an escape game for high school students designed to teach media literacy and critical thinking skills.",Yes,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000449,McKinsey,,Mike Chui,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000450,Media Cloud,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000451,Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI),https://www.mediadefence.org/,"MLDI is an organization dedicated to providing legal defense in support of freedom of the press around the world. Alongside the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the International Fact-Checking Network, MLDI helped set up the Fact-checkers Legal Support Initiative. MLDI also partners with organizations around the world dedicating to advancing legal protection for journalists and developing independent media organizations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000452,Media Literacy for Citizenship (EAVI),https://eavi.eu/,"EAVI is an organization that conducts research and advocacy on media literacy in Europe. EAVI has conducted research to define and measure media literacy in Europe and provided policy recommendations for advancing media literacy in the bloc, and the organization creates curriculum and online tools for educating young people about media literacy.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Education (public),,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000453,Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000454,Media Monitoring Africa (MMA),"
+https://mediamonitoringafrica.org/","MMA promotes access to media and media freedom and conducts monitoring and evaluation of media quality in South Africa, especially during elections. The organization also provides monitoring assistance to other organizations, media literacy training, training for journalists covering human rights issues, and online tools for citizens seeking to improve media literacy and strengthen journalistic accountability.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,South Africa,,N,Y,,,
+G000455,Media Ownership Monitor,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000456,Media Well,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000457,MediaBias Fact Check,https://mediabiasfactcheck.com,"Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC), founded in 2015, is an independent online media outlet. MBFC is dedicated to educating the public on media bias and deceptive news practices.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000458,MediaLab (Agence France Presse),https://www.afp.com/en/agency/medialab,"AFP is a leading global news agency providing fast, comprehensive and verified coverage of the events shaping our world and of the issues affecting our daily lives. Drawing from an unparalleled news gathering network across 151 countries, AFP is also a world leader in digital verification. With 2,400 staff representing 100 different nationalities, AFP covers the world in six languages, with a unique quality of multimedia storytelling spanning video, text, photos and graphics.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000459,MediaMath,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000460,Medium,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000461,Meedan,https://meedan.com,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000462,Meedan.org,https://meedan.com/,"Meedan.org is a nonprofit that creates tools for journalists and translators. One of its projects, Check, has focused on providing online tools and training resources for journalists to combat the spread of false or misleading information. The organization also runs a Credibility Coalition, aimed at creating a holistic framework for assessing credibility in the media context, and a Content Moderation Project, which addresses technical and theoretical issues related to the practice of content moderation online.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000463,Memex,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000464,Memo 98,http://memo98.sk/,"MEMO 98 is an organization that monitors media, largely during elections, and provides monitoring reports and recommendations on media legislation to international institutions and civil society groups. The organization also provides training and capacity-building support to national organizations conducting media evaluation. Memo 98 works with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on their international election observation efforts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
+G000465,Mention,https://mention.com/en/,"Mention is a social media and web monitoring tool offering real-time alerts for keywords and allowing users to monitor millions of sources.
+ The company monitors popular sites such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Pinterest in order to alert users when keywords are used.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000466,MentionMapp Analytics,https://mentionmapp.com/,"Mentionmapp technology enables visualization of the spread of Twitter trends, including identification of influencers. They also offer services to aid analysis of bot activity.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000467,Metafact,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000468,Metro (Viralgranskaren),https://www.metro.se/viralgranskaren,"Through its Viralgranskaren (Viral Reviewer), Metro conducts fact-checking and organizes a list of sites that produce satirical news that is sometimes mistaken for true information or that produce deliberately false and misleading information. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000469,Mexico,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000470,MGP Fact Check,http://www.mygopen.com,"MGP Fact Check is an independent organization based in Hsinchu, Taiwan. Since 2015, they have been offering free fact checking services to users of Line, a popular messaging app in Taiwan.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
+G000471,Microsoft Belgium: cybersecurity,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000472,Microsoft: Defending Democracy Program,https://news.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/topic/defending-democracy-program/,"The Defending Democracy Program will work with stakeholders including governments, non-government organizations, academics and industry all in democratic countries globally to protect campaigns from hacking; increase political advertising transparency online; explore technological solutions to preserve and protect electoral processes; and defend against disinformation campaigns.",,Technology,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000473,Midstream Technology,http://midstream.us,"Midstream Technology's ""Aletheia"" algorithm is a method for identifying specific patterns and behaviors exhibited by networks of accounts in social media. The Aletheia platform can identify global behaviors indicative of astroturf campaigns. Then, using metadata and account posting patterns, identify which accounts are malicious bots gaming recommendation algorithms and which are genuine human run accounts. It can also pick up on rhetorical cues common in disinformation, such as sensationalization of information or pick up on behaviors from the network pushing the disinformation.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000474,Mimikama,https://www.mimikama.at/,Mimikama conducts fact-checking and provides media literacy resources.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Austria,,N,Y,,,
+G000475,Mind Over Media,https://propaganda.mediaeducationlab.com/node/1,"Mind Over Media: Analyzing Contemporary Propaganda is an online crowdsourced learning platform with over 3,500 examples of current propaganda from more than 40 countries, along with a suite of 9 lesson plans suitable for use in high school, college and with adult learners. The program is fully translated into Polish, Romanian, Croatian, Finnish, Swedish, French and Dutch.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000476,Minnesota,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000477,Misinfocon,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000478,Misinformation Solutions Forum,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000479,MIT: Center for Civic Media,https://civic.mit.edu,"Working at the intersection of participatory media and civic engagement, the Center for Civic Media's mission is to design, create, deploy, and assess tools and processes that support and foster civic participation and the flow of information between and within communities.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000480,MIT: Ethics & Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative (Media Lab),https://aiethicsinitiative.org,"The MIT Media Lab runs the Ethics & Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative in partnership with the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society. The initiative has addressed artificial intelligence's impact on the quality of media and the ethical, political, and technical questions associated with its impact. Through the Ethics & Governance of AI Initiative, MIT has provided financial support to projects at the intersection of media and technology, including a project to develop better tools for detecting deepfakes and a project for detecting misinformation on WhatsApp.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000481,MIT: Laboratory for Social Machines (Media Lab),https://www.media.mit.edu/groups/social-machines/overview/,"The MIT Media Lab's Laboratory for Social Machines conducts research on human networks, natural language processing, network science, and machine learning.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000482,MIT: Viral Communications Research Group (Media Lab),https://www.media.mit.edu/,"The Viral Communication Research Group invents personal devices that contain your data and the rules for its use, and conducts video analysis based on machine learning to understand the subcarriers of information in the news and bottom-up civic mobilization tools that are locally and culturally responsive.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000483,MITRE,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000484,Moat,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000485,Moat/Oracle,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000486,MOST,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Macedonia,,N,N,,,
+G000487,Mozilla,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000488,Mozilla Foundation,https://foundation.mozilla.org/en/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000489,Mozilla information trust initiative,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000490,Myth Detector (Media Development Foundation) (MDF),http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/home,"Through its Myth Detector website, MDF conducts fact-checking and provides quality information and teaching and training opportunities for Georgian youth. Through the Media & Information Literacy Lab, MDF provides media literacy games, curriculum, and training in support of anti-propaganda efforts. MDF also partners with European Values to build civil society capacity to respond to Kremlin-backed disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Georgia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000491,Mythos Labs,http://www.mythoslabs.org/,"Mythos Labs provides a tool called MIDAC to detect disinformation campaigns on social media, measure their impact, and then auto-generate counter narratives.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000492,MyWOT,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000493,National Autonomous University of Mexico: Civic Innovation Lab (UNAM),https://unamcivic.com/index.html,"The UNAM Civic Innovation Lab is a research laboratory at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) that studies real world problems involving citizens, governments, and NGOs; and uses human centered design to create novel computational systems that address these problems to construct improved societies. Their civic tech research involves the areas of crowdsourcing, disinformation, and machine learning.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,Mexico,,N,Y,,,
+G000494,National Chengchi University: Election Study Center,https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/PageFront,"Elections are central to democratic politics. They offer citizens an opportunity to choose representatives and government officials, and provide governments with a legitimate basis for exercising power. The quality of elections has a direct effect on the nature of democracy itself. In recent years, Taiwan's political system has undergone a dramatic transition and has nearly completed the transition from authoritarianism to consolidated democracy. Since elections have played and will continue to play a key role in this process of democratization, it is essential to undertake continuous and systematic research into election practices in order to both strengthen the foundations of democracy and also to raise the quality of elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
+G000495,National Democratic Institute (NDI),https://www.ndi.org/infotegrity,"NDI's INFO/tegrity project provides research on disinformation vulnerability and resilience and emerging technologies, monitors disinformation and computational propaganda in elections, assists social media platforms and tech platforms, shares tools to detect and disrupt disinformation, and rebuilds trust in institutions and processes. In support of these efforts, NDI organized a Digital Disinformation Forum with academic and think tank partners in 2018. NDI has also released guidance for its elections programs concerning disinformation and electoral integrity and an awareness-raising document for staff and local partners.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000496,NATO Stratcom,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000497,NATO: Strategic Communications Center of Excellence (StratCom COE),https://stratcomcoe.org/,"A part of NATO, the StratCom COE provides analysis, practical support, and conducts research and experimentation in communication to support member countries and NATO’s overall aims. This includes, for example, recent reports on disinformation in Sweden, measurement of the Russian Internet Research Agency’s impact in online conversations, strategic communication in the context of elections, a comprehensive study on hybrid threats, and the black market for social media manipulation, among other publications.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
+G000498,NESTA,,UK,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000499,New America: Open Technology Institute,https://www.newamerica.org/oti/,"Through its Open Technology Institute, New America created the Ranking Digital Rights Project, which creates a corporate accountability index to assess technology companies and their commitments to human rights online, including freedom of expression.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000500,New America: Public Interest Technology Initiative,https://www.newamerica.org/public-interest-technology/,New America's Public Interest Technology Initiative published a policy paper in 2018 on digital advertising and its relationship to precision propaganda.,,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000501,New Context,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000502,New Eastern Europe (NEE),http://neweasterneurope.eu/,"NEE is interested in political and policy issues in Eastern European states that were at one time a part of the Soviet Union or a member of the Eastern Bloc. While not a formal scholarly journal, the periodical makes use of journalistic style to provide and explore expert commentary from experts, scholars, historians, and politicians in pertinent areas. NEE authors have increasingly written on the topic of disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000503,New York Times,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000504,New York Times: News Provenance Project,https://www.newsprovenanceproject.com/,The News Provenance Project is dedicated to researching and developing ways to ensure that the context of visual content travels with that content.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000505,New York University,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000506,New York University: Center for Social Media and Politics (CSMaP),https://csmapnyu.org/,CSMaP studies the impact of social media on politics and develops new methods and technology tools to analyze the impact of social media on democracy. The organization houses the Social Media and Political Participation Lab and provides open-source data and tools for other researchers.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000507,New York University: The 100 Questions (GovLab),https://the100questions.org/about.html,"The 100 Questions Initiative seeks to map the world’s 100 most pressing, high-impact questions that could be answered if relevant datasets were leveraged in a responsible manner. The initiative's fifth domain focuses on identifying the top 10 questions related to disinformation:
+ 1) understanding the impact of disinformation on society,
+ 2) understanding disinformation as a social (engineering) phenomenon,
+ 3) improving information quality online and offline and
+ 4) evaluating the efficacy of different types of interventions against it.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000508,Newmark Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000509,News Co/Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000510,News Cube,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000511,News Lab (Google News Initiative),https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com/intl/en_gb/google-news-lab/,"Through the News Lab, the Google News Initiative is developing partnerships and providing training on contemporary issues in journalism. Trust and misinformation are News Lab priorities, and the organization provides support for initiatives like the Trust Project, First Draft, and Cross Check. Through the Digital News Innovation Fund, the Google News Initiative is providing support for European projects tackling challenges in the digital news environment, including a project called Digger, which aims to create audio forensic technologies that can assist in detecting deepfakes. Google is also integrating tagging strategies into Google News articles in some countries and modifying its algorithm to punish hate speech and disinformation in search results.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000512,News Literacy Project (NLP),https://newslit.org/,NLP creates digital media literacy curriculum for American middle and high school students. NLP also provides professional development programming for educators and journalists aimed at improving news literacy education.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000513,News UK,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000514,NewsCheck,https://www.newscheck.com/,NewsCheck is an organization analyzing existing journalistic ethics codes and building an artificial intelligence-enhanced system for reviewing and scoring online content.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000515,NewsFrames at Global Voices,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000516,NewsGuard,https://www.newsguardtech.com/,"Based on the input of journalists and editors, NewsGuard has developed a rating system for assessing the trustworthiness of websites based on nine journalistic criteria. The company also provides a ""nutrition label,"" detailing how websites perform against the criteria. NewsGuard's website also includes free news literacy resources for educators, libraries, and parents.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000517,NewsMobile Fact Checker,http://newsmobile.in/articles/category/nm-fact-checker/,"Fact Checker is the fact-checking arm of NewsMobile, an Indian media organization. Fact Checker is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000518,NewsQ,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000519,NewsTracker,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000520,NewsWhip,https://www.newswhip.com/,"NewsWhip is a social media engagement tracking firm that tracks content by amount and location of user engagement, as well as audience interests and changes in interest over time. NewsWhip specializes in monitoring real-time information about the spread of information and the actors behind it, and can help NGOs, news organizations, universities, and other civil society members to address the challenges of misinformation.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
+G000521,Newtral,https://www.newtral.es/zona-verificacion/fact-check/,,,Civil Society,Factchecking & Journalism,,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,N,,,
+G000522,Newtral para Atresmedia Televisión,https://www.lasexta.com/programas/el-objetivo/,Newtral conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in Spain. The organization is one Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers. El Objetivo de Ana Pastor is a fact checking and data journalism driven television program broadcast on laSexta every Sunday evening.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
+G000523,NewYork Times,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000524,Nisos,https://www.nisos.com,"Nisos offers managed intelligence solutions to help companies mitigate advanced threat actors, stop platform abuse, counter disinformation, mitigate insider threats and conduct due diligence.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000525,Nobias,https://nobias.com/,Nobias is a broswer extension that assesses the potential biases and credibility of news articles.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000526,Nobl Media,https://www.wearenobl.com/,"Formerly Trustium. Trustium is a software-as-a-service company that uses artificial intelligence tools to help advertisers ensure that their ads are placed on trustworthy, credible sites.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000527,Northeastern University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000528,Northeastern University: Network Science Institute (NetSI),https://www.networkscienceinstitute.org/,"NetSI is dedicated to measuring and modeling network properties to better understand physical, social, informational, and technical systems. NetSI received a grant to launch the Center for an Informed Society, which will apply computational social science methods to study Google and Twitter's impact on the online information landscape.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000529,Northern Ireland Foundation: FactCheckNI (NIF),https://factcheckni.org/,"NIF runs FactCheck Northern Ireland (FactCheckNI), an online platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Irish politicians and public figures. FactCheckNI provides interactive training on fact-checking for citizens. FactCheckNI is also part of Co-inform, EU's consortium of experts working to address digital literacy in the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000530,Novetta,https://www.novetta.com/,"Novetta offer cyber analytics to preemptively identify threats, entity analytics to identify bad actors/ influencers, and mission and media analytics to monitor social media and news to identify key patterns and issues in the operating environment. Analysts can use Novetta’s analytics to uncover insights into the dissemination of disinformation on social media platforms and messaging forums. Social platforms can use Novetta’s analytics to identify suspicious posts and accounts associated with disinformation to support their content moderation efforts.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000531,NSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000532,NU.nl,https://www.nu.nl/nucheckt,Nu.nl conducts fact-checking of online content through its NUCheckt page. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
+G000533,NuCheckt,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000534,NuzzleRank,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000535,NYC: Media Lab,https://nycmedialab.org/,"NYC Media Lab is a consortium of private companies and New York universities dedicated to advancing innovation in media and technology. NYC Media Lab runs an annual Machines + Media event and convenes a Machines + Media AI Working Group to address issues like automated content moderation, deepfakes, privacy, and AI-driven publishing and distribution.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000536,NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights,,,,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,N,,,
+G000537,O Truco,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000538,ObserLatInf,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000539,Observador,https://observador.pt/,Observador is an online news platform that conducts fact-checking and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Portugal,,Y,Y,,,
+G000540,OFCOM,https://www.ofcom.org.uk,"Ofcom oversees telecommunications, post, broadcast TV and radio (including the BBC’s output), has duties in relation to broadcast advertising and regulates certain online video services. It has a statutory duty to promote media literacy, under which it carries out research into people’s use of online services such as social media and video sharing platforms. In February 2020 the Government announced it was “minded” to grant new powers to Ofcom as the regulator for online harms.",,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000541,Ojo Bionico,https://ojo-publico.com/ojobionico,"Ojo Biónico is the fact-checking section of Ojo Público, a Peruvian investigative journalism outfit.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Peru,,Y,Y,,,
+G000542,Omelas,https://www.omelas.io/,"Omelas works to prevent violence, terrorism recruitment, and the spread of online propaganda by studying behavioral patterns, applying analytics and strategy, and identifying instances and entities who generate content. Omelas is working to map the online information environment as it pertains to disinformation and propaganda.",,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000543,Online News Association (ONA),https://journalists.org/,"ONA is currently the largest digital journalism association in the world. They seek to support high quality digital journalism through developing best practices for incorporating technology into journalism and reporting, collecting metrics, and developing new revenue models. Recently, ONA has made efforts to grow their efforts to tackle misinformation and fake news. Its 2019 conference featured a session on ""Preparing for the Future of Deepfakes"" alongside other discussions on local news, misinformation, and digital journalism.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000544,Open Government Partnership,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000545,Open Information Partnership,https://www.openinformationpartnership.org,"The Open Information Partnership is a network of organisations and individuals across Europe working in open, independent, fact-based reporting.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000546,Open Society,https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000547,Open Society European Policy Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000548,OpenFacto,https://openfacto.fr/2021/02/14/la-detection-de-la-desinformation-sans-coder/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000549,OpenSources,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000550,OpenX,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000551,Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),https://www.occrp.org/en/about-us,,,,,,,,,Europe,Serbia,,,,,,
+G000552,OSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000553,Oštro,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Slovenia,,N,N,,,
+G000554,Our.News,https://our.news/,"Our.News has created a browser extension that provides users with ""nutrition labels"" for news consumption to help them better assess the quality of information.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000555,Oxford University: Computational Propaganda Project (Internet Institute),https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Computational Propaganda Project conducts research on algorithms, bots, and social media applications and their impacts on the spread of propaganda, the manipulation of conversations online, trust in media institutions, and political campaigns and elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000556,Oxford University: Internet and Society; Public Policy Programme at The Alan Turing Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000557,Oxford University: Junk News Aggregator,https://newsaggregator.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Junk News Aggregator compiles posts by news outlets that have failed to meet a set of criteria, and are thus not deemed to be trustworthy by the technology. It provides users with an overview of such information trending on Facebook and related engagement statistics.",Yes,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000558,Oxford University: Oxford Internet Institute,https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Oxford Internet Institute is a multidisciplinary research and teaching department of the University of Oxford, dedicated to the social science of the Internet.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000559,Oxford University: Oxford Technology and Elections Commission (OxTEC),https://oxtec.oii.ox.ac.uk/,"The Oxford Technology and Elections Commission, (OxTEC) is uniting experts on politics, technology, security and human rights to re-envision what constitutes trusted guidelines for managing a modern election. With the help of policy makers, elections administrators, and both computer and social scientists, OxTEC is exploring how democracies can integrate democratic norms and practices into the use of information technologies, social media, and big data during campaigns, with the goal of protecting the integrity of elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000560,Oxford University: Reuters Institute for Journalism Studies (RIJS),https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/,"RIJS conducts research and provides fellowships to advance high-quality journalism. In support of its Digital News Project, RIJS researchers investigate topics related to journalism and technology, including social media and online news, citizen trust in media institutions, and the spread of false or misleading information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000561,PageFair,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000562,Pagella Politica,https://pagellapolitica.it/,Pagella Politica is an online fact-checking platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Italian politicians. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
+G000563,Palantir,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000564,Park Advisors,https://www.park-advisors.com/,"Park Advisors uses technology and strategic partnerships to advocate for the rights of vulnerable and at-risk populations. In 2019, Park Advisors published the Disinformation Report, in fulfillment of a commissioned request on the part of the U.S. Department of State's Global Engagement Center (GEC). Park Advisors have also partners with GEC to run DisinfoCloud, and online database that evaluates tools that aim to research or counter online disinformation.",,Other,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000565,Park Associates/GEC advisor,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000566,Patikrinta (15min),https://www.15min.lt/tema/patikrinta-15min-62531,"Patikrinta (Lithuanian for ""Checked Out"") is the fact-checking arm of Lithuanian media organization 15min. 15min is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and is a Facebook Third-Party Fact-Checker.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,Y,Y,,,
+G000567,PEN America,https://pen.org/pen_tags/misinformation/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000568,People-centered Internet,https://peoplecentered.net/pci-home-2/about/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000569,Pesa Check,https://pesacheck.org/,"PesaCheck is an African fact-checking organization that concentrates on financial and statistical information reported and promises made by public figures in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. PesaCheck is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Ethiopia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000570,Pew Research Center,https://www.pewresearch.org/topics/trust-facts-and-democracy/,"The Pew Research Center conducts social science research on American attitudes and trends related to politics and public policy, journalism and media, and technology, among other issues. Recently, Pew has devoted additional resources to its research around trust, facts, and democracy in order to inform conversations about the role of information in society.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000571,PGP Stronger,https://stronger.org/,,,,,,,,Y,,,,N,N,,,
+G000572,Ping Digital Network,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000573,Poland,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000574,Poletika,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000575,Policy Change Index,https://policychangeindex.org/,"The Policy Change Index (PCI) is an AI-assisted tool for propaganda analysis. The PCI project is open-source with two key features: It automates the content analysis of propaganda, and it delineates the boundaries between analysts’ objective assessment and subjective judgment.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000576,Polígrafo,https://poligrafo.sapo.pt/,Polígrafo is a Portuguese fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Portugal,,Y,Y,,,
+G000577,Political Capital,https://www.politicalcapital.hu/introduction.php,"Political Capital has been involved in the fight against conspiracy theories, fake news, disinformation and the post-truth phenomenon since 2010. They work to counter the spread of fake news and conspiracy theories. They also raise awareness about the problem and create guidelines on recognising and arguing against manipulative articles, information.",,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Europe,Hungary,,N,Y,,,
+G000578,PolitiFact,https://www.politifact.com,Politifact conducts fact-checking journalism. They aim to give citizens the information they need to govern themselves in a democracy.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000579,Polygraph (BBG),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000580,Pop-Up Newsroom,https://popup.news/,"Pop-Up Newsroom is a media organization that produces innovative reporting to address specific contexts like elections. Pop-Up Newsroom was responsible for Verificado 2018, an anti-misinformation initiative focused on Mexico's 2018 elections and for Riksdagsvalet, a misinformation-tracking initiative focused on Sweden's general elections.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,"Link dead, and there's another, earlier, popup newsroom",
+G000581,Post Facto,https://www.postfactogame.com/,Post Facto is an online game that teaches players to recognize and flag indicators that an article may contain misinformation. The goal of this solution is to educate the public about how to recognize false information.,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,,,N,Y,,,
+G000582,Poynter Institute for Media Studies,https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,"Through its International Fact-Checking Network, the Poynter Institute for Media Studies provides research on trends, best practices, and developments in international fact-checking efforts and supports fact-checking initiatives worldwide. The network provides fellowships, grants, and training for fact-checkers. The Poynter Institute is also the parent organization of PolitiFact, which conducts fact-checking in the United States.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000583,Prague Security Studies Institute (Pražský Institut Bezpečnostních Studií) (PSSI),http://www.pssi.cz/russia-s-influence-activities-in-cee,"PSSI conducts research on international peace and security in European states and provides training to students and professionals through conferences, workshops, and its Security Scholars Program. Part of its research agenda centers around Russian influence activities in Central and Eastern Europe, and PSSI has published analysis and sought to raise awareness about influence operations related to NATO, vaccinations, elections, and other topics. PSSI is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000584,Predata,https://predata.com,"Predata parses open-source data to generate quantitative indicators of risk via machine-learning algorithms that can describe & predict trends. Government agencies can partner with Predata to build a predictive model to notify stakeholders when disinformation activity occurs. Analysts can use Predata algorithms to understand which topics and which actors are most active in spreading online disinformation, as well as better understand and predict disinformation trends and tactics.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000585,Pressland,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000586,Primer.ai,https://primer.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000587,Princeton University: Empirical Studies of Conflict Project,https://esoc.princeton.edu/,"The Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) launched in 2009 to support research on insurgency, civil war, and other politically motivated violence, worldwide. Today, ESOC identifies and compiles a wide range of micro-level data to empower scholarship and to help address pressing security threats. Beyond supporting research, we are committed to enabling policy responses to challenges related to political violence, ranging from civil war to economic development to misinformation campaigns.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000588,Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
+G000589,ProFact Moldova,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000590,Project Domino,https://github.com/TheDataRideAlongs/ProjectDomino,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000591,Propastop,https://www.propastop.org/eng/,Propastop is an independent blog dedicated to exposing propaganda and falsehoods circulating in Estonian media. The organization has also created a monitoring robot called Propamon that searches for mentions of Estonian in Russian media. Propastop is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Estonia,,N,Y,,,
+G000592,Protected Voices Initiative (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation),https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence/protected-voices,"The FBI’s Protected Voices initiative provides tools and resources to political campaigns, companies, and individuals to protect against online foreign influence operations and cybersecurity threats.",Yes,Government,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000593,Public Editor,,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000594,Quantcast,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000595,Quod,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000596,R Street Institute,https://www.rstreet.org/,"R Street engages in policy work to solve often-under addressed social issues. The recipient of a Madison Initiative Grant, they have used the support to sponsor their Governance Project, which aims to bolster the processes of U.S. democracy and institutions, namely the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, in the face of growing political polarization. The organization also runs an Election Security Initiative to help build capacity for state and federal efforts to share information about threats to elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000597,Radware Bot Manager,https://www.radwarebotmanager.com/,Formerly Shieldsquare. Shieldsquare can be used to protect a website or to prevent bots from interfering with a web application by analyzing their behavior and taking actions to thwart the bot.,,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
+G000598,RAND Corporation,https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html,"RAND Corporation provides public policy research and analysis, and its experts have written on influence operations in the context of ""gray zone"" operations below the threshold of war, media literacy, and Russian propaganda and social media influence, among other topics.",Yes,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000599,Rappler,https://www.rappler.com/,Rappler is a news agency based in the Philippines that provides fact-checking services through its Rappler IQ subsection and supports the development of quality journalism worldwide. Rappler also organizes a Move.PH chat series to engage citizens around the issue of responsible and ethical journalism in the digital age. Rappler is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,Y,,,
+G000600,Raskrinkavanje,https://raskrinkavanje.ba/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,Y,N,,,
+G000601,Raskrinkavanje Montenegro,https://www.raskrinkavanje.me/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Montenegro,,N,N,,,
+G000602,rbutr,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000603,Real Instituto Elcano,http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en,"Real Instituto Elcano runs a project called MINDb4ACT, which is a multi-stakeholder effort to combat radicalization and violent extremism in Europe. Part of this work is aimed at countering propaganda and hate speech online and better understanding how online radicalization occurs.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,Y,,,
+G000604,Reality Check,https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cp7r8vgl2rgt/reality-check,Reality Check is the BBC's fact-checking section.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000605,Reality Team,http://realityteam.org/,"Reality Team is powered by a team of communications professionals, technologists, cybersecurity and disinformation analysts from the private and public sector who are committed to pushing back against disinformation. Our content is entirely independent, and non-partisan, focused on dispelling myths, rumors and disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
+G000606,Recorded Future,https://www.recordedfuture.com,"Recorded Future uses machine learning and natural language processing to identify the source of dark web content to enable further investigation. Analysts can use Recorded Future to identify if disinformation is being shared on dark web chat forums, or identify an increase in the dissemination of cyberhacking tools and data that enable the spread of disinformation.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000607,Redacción Fáctica,https://nomada.gt/author/factica/,Redacción Fáctica is a Guatemalan fact-checking project created by Agencia Ocote and Nómada.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Guatemala,,Y,Y,,,
+G000608,Renew Europe Group,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000609,Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press (RCFP),https://factcheckerlegalsupport.org/,"RCFP provides legal resources in support of the U.S. First Amendment. Through its Fact-checkers Legal Support Initiative, developed with the International Fact-Checking Network and the Media Legal Defence Initiative, RCFP has created legal guides for fact-checkers. The organization also supports transparency in journalism and has written about the need to protect journalists from potential unintended consequences of laws aimed at curbing influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000610,Reporters Without Borders: Information & Democracy Commission,https://rsf.org/en,RSF gathered an International Commission on Information & Democracy in 2018 and is working to implement the principles outlined in the resulting International Declaration on Information & Democracy that support Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and efforts to protect freedom of expression online.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000611,Reporters Without Borders: Journalism Trust Initiative (RSF),https://rsf.org/en,"Through its Journalism Trust Initiative (in partnership with Agence France Presse, the European Broadcasting Union, and the Global Editors Network), Reporters without Borders (RSF) is developing a set of trust and transparency standards for journalism outlets with input from stakeholders in media, policy, technology, and academia. RSF also gathered an International Commission on Information & Democracy in 2018 and is working to implement the principles outlined in the resulting International Declaration on Information & Democracy that support Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and efforts to protect freedom of expression online.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,France,Y,Y,Y,,,
+G000612,Research Innovations,http://www.researchinnovations.com/,"Research Innovations develops a variety of software for government and military clients. Their expertise includes AI, big data, machine learning and analytics. Users can monitor messaging, disinformation campaigns, and malign influence tactics.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000613,Research Institutes of Sweden (Sveriges Forskningsinstitut) (RISE),https://www.ri.se/en/what-we-do/projects/skilled-online-understanding-disinformation,RISE's Skilled Online project develops and tests curriculum and teaching tools related to disinformation online. Students participate in a workshop where they navigate online interactions based on their personal identities and vulnerabilities and learn skills for identifying and responding to false or misleading information.,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000614,Reuters Digital News Institute,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000615,Reuters Fact Check Team,,US; UK,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000616,Reuters Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000617,REVEAL,https://revealproject.eu/,"REVEAL is an EU-funded project to develop technologies for verification of content online. The company will focus on social media analysis, understanding information flows, and generating an effective picture of how content travels online.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000618,Reveal (Media Verification Assistant),http://reveal-mklab.iti.gr/reveal/index.html,"The Media Verification Assistant is an online tool for assessing the source and veracity of images, developed by CERTH-ITI and Deutsche Welle.",Yes,Media,,,,,,Global,Greece,,N,Y,,,
+G000619,Riddle,https://www.ridl.io/en/,"Riddle offers neutral and objective analysis on Russian domestic and foreign engagement. The organization also provides this in-depth analysis in both English and Russian. Recently, Riddle authors have written on topics of fake news and propaganda efforts linked to Russia and the Kremlin.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000620,Right Wing Watch - Muck Rack ,https://muckrack.com/jared-l-holt/articles,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000621,RMIT ABC Fact Check,https://www.abc.net.au/news/factcheck/,"In partnership with RMIT University, ABC has a dedicated fact-checking team called RMIT ABC Fact Check to help assess claims made by politicians, public figures, and others engaged in public debate.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000622,RoBhat Labs,https://www.robhat.com/,"RoBhat Lab's products include Botcheck, which is used to detect and track Twitter propaganda, and SurfSafe, which is a fake news browser extension for Chrome.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000623,Rocket Technology,https://www.rocket-technology.com,"Rocket Technology's solution set, SocioTrust enables analysis of social media disinformation in platforms with text, audio, pictures, photos, and video to determine what individual, corporate, or state actors are injecting into societies and how. It can also create counter-propaganda programs.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000624,Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),https://rusi.org/,RUSI provides research and analysis on influence operations through the lens of defense and security and has published analysis on issues like Russia's influence operations in Central and Eastern Europe and how democracies should respond to influence operations.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000625,RSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000626,Ryerson University: Social Media Lab,https://socialmedialab.ca/,"The Social Media Lab is a multi- and interdisciplinary research laboratory at Ted Rogers School of Management at Ryerson University. The lab studies how social media is changing the way people and organizations communicate, share information, conduct business and form communities online, and how these changes impact society. The lab’s research seeks to advance the public’s understanding of the benefits and pitfalls of social media adoption.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000627,SaferNet,https://new.safernet.org.br/#mobile,SaferNet is a Brazilian non-governmental organization that combats Internet crime in partnership with the Federal Public Ministry. It facilitates anonymous reporting and provides information and training about Internet safety and security.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000628,Schema Claim Review,https://schema.org/ClaimReview,"Schema.org is a website dedicated to the vocabulary of structured data on the internet. If a web page contains content that reviews claims, ClaimReview structured data can enable a summarized version of the fact check to be displayed in search engine results.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000629,Schema.org,https://schema.org,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,,,,,
+G000630,Science Feedback,http://sciencefeedback.co/,"Science Feedback is a community of scientists that provide context and commentary for scientific information reported in the news. The project has specific sections dedicated to health issues and to climate change issues, called Health Feedback and Climate Feedback.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,World,,Y,Y,,,
+G000631,Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force,https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/protecting-democracy/security-task-force.html,"Leading up to the 2019 election, the Canadian government established a Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force to outline the responsibilities of various government agencies in monitoring, investigating, and responding to foreign threats to the integrity of Canadian elections.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000632,SEEcheck,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,N,,,
+G000633,Sensity,https://sensity.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000634,Serelay,https://www.serelay.com/,Serelay has created a product called Trusted Media Capture that conducts point-of-capture verification to enable customers that rely on photographs and videos to authenticate their content.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000635,Servicio de Information Publica,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000636,Sheffield University Natural Language Processing,https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/dcs,,Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000637,Shout Out UK,https://www.shoutoutuk.org/,Shout Out UK creates and sells curriculum on political and media literacy to schools with the goal of empowering students to engage in the political process.,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000638,SIDA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000639,Signal,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000640,Sleeping Giants,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000641,Slovak Foreign Policy Association (Slovenská Asociácia Zahraničnej Politiky) (SFPA),http://www.sfpa.sk/en/,"SFPA provides a space for discussion of foreign policy issues affecting Slovakia and the European Union. SFPA has organized projects on information warfare on the Internet and Russian information warfare and Ukraine, and it hosts the Slovak Forum Against Propaganda to create a space for discussion about influence operations and their impact on the European Union and NATO.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
+G000642,Snopes,https://www.snopes.com/,Snopes.com utilizes high quality and reliable investigative reporting to provide a documented fact-checking service that allows their readers to become informed and draw their own independent conclusions.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000643,SNV,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000644,Social Cyber-Security Working Group (Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems),https://sites.google.com/view/social-cybersec/home?authuser=0,"The Social Cyber-Security Working Group develops new metrics, technologies and algorithms for analyzing human socio-cultural behavior given vast quantities of data. It forecasts and explains changes in the socio-cultural behavior using agent-based model and network science and assesses the impact of, and provides support for, the development of new social and organizational policies and procedures.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000645,Social Media Guide,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000646,Social Media Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA),https://www.disinfobservatory.org/,"SOMA is a European Union-funded project aimed at creating a network of experts in disinformation, providing media literacy training program, and developing tools and standards for evaluating the impact of media programs and the quality of information sources.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Greece,,Y,Y,,,
+G000647,Social Science One,https://socialscience.one/,"Social Science One is running an inaugural project on ""the effects of social media on democracy and elections"" that will make data from Facebook available to researchers to study the interaction of media, technology, and democracy that can inform future policy recommendations.",,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000648,South Asia Check,http://southasiacheck.org/,South Asia Check is a fact-checking organization that covers South Asian news and the promises of public officials. South Asia Check is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Nepal,,Y,Y,,,
+G000649,Spanish news,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000650,Sparks & Honey,https://www.sparksandhoney.com/,sparks & honey employs big data and human expertise to develop cultural intelligence. Their proprietary technology inputs data from a wide variety of sources and couples these with expert analysis to create structured data that highlights large-scale cultural trends.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000651,Squint,https://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/squint-sharpens-officials-perspective-to-combat-election-distortion,"SQUINT by MITRE, also known as “Social See Something, Say Something”, is a mobile app and browser plugin that enables crowdsourced reporting of disinformation. The tool allows a user (among the crowd) to quickly and easily submit a screenshot and page metadata of supposed disinformation to state and local officials with the click of an icon.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000652,SSRC Social Media Democracy Research Grants,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000653,"SSRC: Disinformation Research Initiative (Media & Democracy Network, Social Science Research Council)",https://www.ssrc.org/programs/component/media-democracy/the-media-democracy-network/#overview,"SSRC hosts a Program on Media & Democracy that promotes research on the relationship between media technologies and democratic practices. The program conducts the Disinformation Research Initiative to track scholarly research on the topic and manages the Media & Democracy Network as a place to share information and collaborate on scholarly projects related to misinformation/disinformation, polarization, hate speech, media consolidation, and other topics. Through its Social Data Initiative, SSRC also provides grants to organizations working with Social Science One on projects concerning social media and the flow of information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000654,SSRC: Program on Media & Democracy (Social Science Research Council),https://www.ssrc.org/programs/view/media-democracy/,"SSRC hosts a Program on Media & Democracy that promotes research on the relationship between media technologies and democratic practices. The program conducts the Disinformation Research Initiative to track scholarly research on the topic and manages the Media & Democracy Network as a place to share information and collaborate on scholarly projects related to misinformation/disinformation, polarization, hate speech, media consolidation, and other topics.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000655,SSRC: Social Data Initiative (Social Science Research Council),https://www.ssrc.org/programs/view/social-data-initiative/,"Through its Social Data Initiative, SSRC also provides grants to organizations working with Social Science One on projects concerning social media and the flow of information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000656,Stanford,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000657,Stanford University: Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC),https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Housed at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs, CISAC coordinates an Information Warfare Working Group and runs the Project on Russian Power and Purpose, which addresses Russian influence operations in the broader context of Russia's strategic aims and their impact on democracies worldwide.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000658,"Stanford University: Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)",https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs, CDDRL is dedicated to studying the interaction of the political, economic, social, and legal dimensions of democratic development. The center studies and teaches on poverty, instability, abusive rule, authoritarian resurgence, technology, populism, and globalization.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000659,Stanford University: Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society (PACS),https://pacscenter.stanford.edu/research/program-on-democracy-and-the-internet/,"PACS runs the Program on Democracy and the Internet, which conducts multidisciplinary research on ways to maximize the benefits of the Internet while minimizing the threats it poses to democratic processes. Its scholars focus on social media and democracy, algorithmic bias and automated social engineering, the deterioration of digital information ecosystems, and political framing in media.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000660,Stanford University: Cyber Policy Center,https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Cyber Policy Center houses the Global Digital Policy Incubator, a forum for multi-stakeholder collaboration on policies concerning the application of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in an increasingly digital ecosystem.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000661,Stanford University: Information Warfare Working Group; European Security Initiative (Center for International Security and Cooperation) ,https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/information-warfare-working-group,The Information Warfare Working Group is housed at The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. It is a multidisciplinary group of Stanford University scholars that meet quarterly to discuss the issue of cyber-enabled information warfare.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000662,Stanford University: Internet Observatory,https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/about,"Stanford University's Internet Observatory is a program of the Cyber Policy Center. It is a cross-disciplinary program of research, teaching and policy engagement for the study of abuse in current information technologies, with a focus on social media.",,Education/academia,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000663,Stanford University: Journalism and Democracy Initiative (JDI),https://jdi.stanford.edu,"JDI seeks to improve journalism with the use of data and algorithms; combat misinformation; address challenges in reporting, storytelling, news distribution and consumption; and launch a ""Trust and Verify"" project to focus on defending against manipulated photos and videos.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000664,Stanford University: Program on Democracy and the Internet,https://pacscenter.stanford.edu,"The Program on Democracy and the Internet (PDI) is housed at Stanford University. PDI creates and shares original empirical research around how digital technologies are impacting democracy to inform and educate decision-makers in the field, including the next generation of technologists, business leaders, and policymakers. This effort is intended to bring together scholars from a diverse set of disciplines to study the challenges and opportunities the Internet poses for democracies. The project also benefits from existing relationships with technology companies that serve as the new information intermediaries and the platforms for the new public square for modern democracy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000665,State Department,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000666,Stiftung Neue Verantwortung (SNV),https://www.stiftung-nv.de/en/project/strengthening-digital-public-sphere,"Through its ""Strengthening the Digital Public Sphere"" project, SNV is working with the German Federal Foreign Office to build government capacity to deal with disinformation. SNV also conducts research to better understand the spread of disinformation in society, levels of news literacy, and public policy solutions for addressing contemporary information environments.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000667,StopFake,https://www.stopfake.org/ru/glavnaya-2/,StopFake conducts fact-checking and research on influence operations in Central and Eastern European countries. It also provides resources to inform the public about verifying information and conducts trainings for interested parties upon request.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,Y,Y,,,
+G000668,"Study: trust, facts and democracy: public attitudes about the role of information in society",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000669,Sussex University CASM,https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000670,Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap) (MSB),https://www.msb.se/en/,"MSB is the agency of the Swedish government charged with helping prepare for accidents, crises, and the consequences of war. In the area of influence operations, MSB commissioned Lund University researchers to put together a research report and a handbook on countering information influence activities, and the organization has integrated countermeasures into its preparations for Swedish elections and its educational efforts.",,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000671,Tadaweb,https://www.tadaweb.com/,"Tadaweb is a platform for discovering and analyzing information on the web, which allows users to perform analysis of a specific topic to retrospectively derive insights about the spread of propaganda and disinformation. Analysts can monitor specific, suspicious online activity to address and counter disinformation in real-time.",Yes,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Europe,Luxembourg,,N,Y,,,
+G000672,Taiwan AI Labs,https://ailabs.tw/,"Taiwan AI Labs’ technology is the “Islander System,” which takes a three-pronged approach to analyzing news and social media content: news content monitoring; news source inspection; and social media user behavioral analysis. The multidimensional analysis of news content will be available online so that users can see how different news outlets report the same story.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
+G000673,Taiwan FactCheck Center,https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/,Taiwan FactCheck Center is a Taiwanese fact-checking organization run by the Association for Quality Journalism and the Taiwan Media Watch and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,Y,Y,,,
+G000674,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/faq/,Tattle is a project that aims to address misinformation on chat apps and encrypted messaging platforms.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000675,Team Defence,,,,Defence/military,,,,,Yes,,UK,,,,,,
+G000676,Tech Media & Democracy (new york city universities partnership),https://www.techmediademocracy.nyc,"A partnership of New York City universities, Tech Media & Democracy aims to strengthen journalism in the digital environment and support democracy through research, teaching and training for individuals in journalism, design, and engineering.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000677,Terbium Labs,https://terbiumlabs.com/,Terbium Lab’s Matchlight dark web crawler provides visibility into information that has been exposed on the dark web. An API can connect Terbium’s data pipeline with analysis tools.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000678,Teyit.org,https://teyit.org/,Teyit.org conducts fact-checking and hosts fact-checking workshops to promote media literacy. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network and is a Facebook Third-Party Fact-Checker.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Turkey,,N,Y,,,
+G000679,The Advertising Association,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000680,The Alan Turing Institute - Public Policy Programme,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000681,The Center for Humane Technology,https://www.humanetech.com/,,,,,,,,,,US,,,,,,
+G000682,The Conversation Australia,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000683,The Democracy Labs,https://thedemlabs.org/,"Democracy Labs is a hub for ongoing technology and creative innovation in service of a healthy democracy at the national, state, and local levels.  We focus on long term, sustainable and affordable solutions. An approach that is longer than an election cycle, and isn’t purely dependent on volunteers, can enable more qualified candidates to run for office and for more issue groups to bring about positive social change with little funds.",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000684,The Engine Room,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000685,The Factual,https://www.thefactual.com/static/about.html,"The Factual is a technology company that assesses the partisanship, bias, and credibility of online news articles.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000686,The Hague Center for Strategic Studies (HCSS),https://hcss.nl,"HCSS conducts research on issues in defense and security and provides policy recommendations, surveys, analyses, risk assessments, and other products to both public and private sector organizations, including the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. Its research has included analysis of hybrid conflict and Russian influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
+G000687,The IndiaSpend Foundation,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000688,The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,icij.org,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000689,The Journal,http://thejournal.ie,The Journal is an Irish online news source that conducts fact-checking. The organization is one Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
+G000690,The Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000691,The Media Bias Chart,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000692,The Nevada Independent Fact Checks,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000693,The News Hero,https://www.thenewshero.org/,The News Hero game gamifies the experience of discerning false news for public consumption. The goal of this solution is to educate the public on how to recognize disinformation.,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
+G000694,The Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,The Pro-Truth Pledge is an initiative that aims to encourage public figures to be truthful in their communications and citizens to hold one another accountable for sharing truthful information.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Global,USA,Y,Y,Y,,,
+G000695,The Propaganda Game,https://propagandagame.org,"The Propaganda Game is a free, publicly accessible social media literacy tool that aims to educate players on disinformation and its spread. It features the ability to upload and explore instances of propaganda found online, as well as functionality to facilitate teachers using the game in their classrooms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000696,The Thinkin Project,https://www.thethinkinproject.com/,"A global movement to increase resilience to disinformation, and help QAnon believers find a way out",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000697,The Trade Desk,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000698,The Trust Project,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,Y,Y,N,,,
+G000699,The Trusting News Project,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000700,The Verification Handbook (EJC),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000701,The Washington Post Fact-Checker,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000702,The Washington Post: Fact Checker,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/,The Washington Post's Fact Checker is the official fact-checking service of the U.S. newspaper.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000703,The Whistle,https://www.thewhistle.co.il/feed,The Whistle is an Israeli media monitoring and fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Israel,,Y,Y,,,
+G000704,Thompson Reuters Special Services,https://www.trssllc.com/,Thomson Reuters Special Services offers data-driven consulting in national security intelligence; the group has created a visualization tool capable of mapping a group or government's influence as it pertains to foreign investments and disinformation.,,Media,Investigations,,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000705,Thomson Reuters,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000706,Thomson Reuters Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000707,TinEye,https://tineye.com/,"TinEye offers a suite of computer vision-based tools that support image search, reverse image search, duplicate/modified image finding, image tracking alerts, and image verification. TinEye also offers an API that enables developers to integrate reverse search functionality into their own platforms or products.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000708,TopNet,http://eng.thu.edu.tw/,TopNet is a tool to identify fake social media accounts developed by Tunghai University in Taiwan.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
+G000709,Transatlantic Council on Election Integrity (TCEI) Alliance of Democracies,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/transatlantic-commission-on-election-integrity/,"The Alliance of Democracies runs the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity (TCEI), which convenes individuals from media and government to prevent foreign interference in elections. TCEI advocates for campaigns to adopt its Pledge for Election Integrity, conducts monitoring in countries with upcoming elections, and promotes public policy solutions addressing deepfakes and other emerging technologies that threaten the integrity of elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000710,Transparency Map,https://www.transparentjournalism.org/journalist/,"A project of Spanish media organization Público, Transparency Map has designed the TJ Tool, a software that allows users to trace news information based on eight editorial indicators.",Yes,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
+G000711,Transparency Task Force,https://www.transparencytaskforce.org/what-does-the-ttf-do/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000712,Trive,https://trive.news/,Trive is a browser extension designed to alert users visiting sites that are not sufficiently credible.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000713,Troll Factory,https://trollfactory.yle.fi/,"Troll factory is a free, publicly accessible social media literacy tool that aims to educate players on disinformation and its spread by asking players to choose which in-game inflammatory content to share as a “troll.”",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
+G000714,Truepic,https://www.truepic.com,"Truepic's technology verifies that an image or video hasn’t been altered or edited, and watermarks it with a time-stamp, geocode, and other metadata. Truepic stores a version of the photo in its digital vault and assigns it a six-digit code and URL for retrieving it. Truepic also immediately logs the image or video onto the Bitcoin blockchain.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000715,Trust & Safety Professional Association,https://www.tspa.info,"The Trust & Safety Professional Association curates a collection of links, which trust and safety professionals may find useful in efforts such as developing policies, supporting moderators, and building systems to detect platform violations.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000716,Trust Metrics,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000717,Trust Project,thetrustproject.org,"The Trust Project offers a set of ""Trust Indicators"" to help audiences better understand an organization's ethics, fairness, accuracy, background, and reporting processes. The project also offers ""Trust Marks"" for any organization that works with the project to meet the standards outlined by the Trust Indicators.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000718,Trusted News,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000719,Trusted Times,https://trustedtimes.org,"Trusted Times uses a browser extension to identify fake and unreliable news and presents additional analysis through machine learning of any news article to show a reporter’s and news source’s bias, if any. Trusted Times screens thousands of news websites in the United States.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000720,TrustServista,https://www.trustservista.com/,"TrustServista provides artificial intelligence-based software to help media organizations and content creators determine the trustworthiness of news sources, analyze text, and track online information flows.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Romania,,Y,Y,,,
+G000721,Truth and Trust Online,truthandtrustonline.com,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000722,Truth Nest,https://www.truthnest.com,"TruthNest offers an accessible, user-friendly dashboard for Twitter analytics to discern an account’s credibility based on their activity, network, and influence. Additionally, TruthNest offers a score of likelihood that the account is a bot.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Greece,,N,Y,,,
+G000723,Truth or Fiction,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000724,Truth Tests,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000725,"Truth, Trust and Technology Commission - London School of Economics",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000726,TruthBuzz by IFCJ,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000727,Trutheum,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000728,Tsek,https://tsek.ph/,,,,,,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,N,,,
+G000729,Tufts University: Edward R. Murrow Center for a Digital World,https://sites.tufts.edu/murrowcenter/,"Housed at the Fletcher School of International Affairs, the Edward R. Murrow Center for a Digital World was established to examine the role that news media, multinational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations play in international relations. The Center focuses on international media, public diplomacy, and the political and cultural impact of the digital media sphere.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000730,Twitter,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000731,Twitter Elections Integrity Archive,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000732,Twitter Trails,http://twittertrails.com/,TwitterTrails is an online tool used to track the spread of stories on Twitter and measure how users perceive the veracity of the stories.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000733,Twitter UK,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000734,U.S. Department of Justice: Cyber-Digital Task Force (DOJ),https://www.ojp.gov/,"In 2018, DOJ established a Cyber-Digital Task Force to address global cyber threats. The task force produced a report categorizing types of malign foreign influence operations and describing DOJ's responses to these threats.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000735,U.S. Department of State: Global Engagement Center,https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/,"DOS oversees the Global Engagement Center, which leads the U.S. government's efforts to identify and counter foreign and non-state influence operations. The center works with allied governments, civil society and nongovernmental organizations, and private companies to develop best practices, and it oversees the Information Access Fund, intended to provide grant support to organizations countering disinformation. The center's Technology Engagement Team works with stakeholders to develop, test, and demonstrate technological solutions to the problem of foreign influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000736,U.S. Department of State: Technology Engagement Team,https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/,"The Technology Engagement Team directs, leads, synchronizes, integrates, and coordinates efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States and its allies and partner nations",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000737,U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation: Foreign Influence Task Force,https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence,"In 2017, FBI established a Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) to identify and combat foreign influence operations in the United States. FITF collects and shares information about ongoing influence operations and works with field offices on countermeasures.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000738,UCLA,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000739,UK Cabinet office,https://sharechecklist.gov.uk/ ,,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000740,UK Government - DCMS - Online harms,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000741,UK Government: DCMS subcommittee on online harms and disinformation,https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/438/digital-culture-media-and-sport-subcommittee-on-online-harms-and-disinformation/,,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000742,UK Parliament - House of Lords,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000743,UK Safer Internet Centre,https://www.saferinternet.org.uk/safer-internet-day/2021,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000744,Ukraine Crisis Media Center (UCMC),http://ucmc.org.ua/,"UCMC is dedicated to defending Ukraine's sovereignty in the face of Russian influence and serving as a hub for strategic communications within the country. UCMC houses a Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group that convenes experts to provide research and analysis in support of the Ukrainian government's efforts to counter Russian influence, and the organization has also developed a program on Strategic Communication to reassert control over the information space. UCMC is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,Y,Y,,,
+G000745,Ukrainian Prism,http://prismua.org,"Ukrainian Prism provides research and analysis on defense and security policy issues. The organization runs a Russian Disinformation Resilience Index in partnership with EAST Center, meant to assess the strength of Central and Eastern European countries in resisting Russian influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,N,Y,,,
+G000746,UMass,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000747,UN Verified project,https://shareverified.com/en,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Global,,,N,N,,,
+G000748,Uni Arkansas at Little Rock,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000749,Uni Maryland,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000750,Unilever,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000751,Unisys,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000752,Unitary,https://www.unitary.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000753,United for News,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000754,"United Kingdom Parliamentary Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport",https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/sub-committee-on-disinformation/,"The UK Parliamentary Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport hosts a Sub-Committee on Disinformation to explore legislative solutions to the issue of disinformation in the United Kingdom. The sub-committee grew out of an initial inquiry on disinformation and fake news that began in 2018 and conclusion in February 2019 with the publication of a formal report on the landscape of disinformation, political advertising, foreign influence, media literacy programs, and potential solutions.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000755,University of Arkansas at Little Rock: COSMOS,http://cosmos.ualr.edu/,"The Collaboratorium for Social Media and Online Behavioral Studies (COSMOS) Lab uses analytic methodologies to study online behaviors and sentiments, such as network reactions to certain types of content, and how false information spreads through a network.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000756,University of Cambridge,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000757,University of Florida: Consortium on Trust in Media & Technology (CTMT),https://www.jou.ufl.edu/consortium-on-trust-in-media-and-technology/,"The CTMT is a multidisciplinary research initiative centered around ""the crisis of trust affecting the nation and world."" The consortium creates a space for researchers at the university to collaborate, develop insights into how media and technology can become more trustworthy, and explore potential new policies and laws.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000758,University of Indiana,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000759,University of Liverpool,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000760,University of Michigan,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000761,University of Munich: Center for Applied Policy Research (Universität München Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung) (CAP),https://www.cap-lmu.de/,"CAP conducts research on issues in public policy and international peace and security with the goal of bridging the gap between politicians and academics. CAP has addressed issues concerning cybersecurity, online campaigning, and other technological developments impacting democracy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000762,"University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Center for Information, Technology, and Public Life (CITAP)",https://citap.unc.edu/,"CITAP is dedicated to creating a foundational understanding of information environments in order to conduct research on misinformation, partisanship, polarization, propaganda, and political institutions. The group plans to make its data publicly available to inform additional research on the topic.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000763,University of Pennsylvania: Center for Media at Risk (Annenberg School for Communication),https://www.ascmediarisk.org/about/,The Center for Media at Risk strategizes in response to threatening political conditions. Knowing how media practitioners work under authoritarian regimes and circumstances of creeping authoritarianism can help free/defend/empower/protect/save the media.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000764,University of Pennsylvania: FactCheck.org (Annenberg Public Policy Center) (APPC),https://www.factcheck.org/,"Housed at APPC, Factcheck.org fact-checks statements made by American politicians during election cycles. Factcheck.org is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000765,University of Texas at Arlington,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000766,University of Texas at Austin: Propaganda Program (Center for Media Engagement),https://mediaengagement.org/propaganda-2/,"Under the direction of Dr. Samuel Woolley, the propaganda program at the Center for Media Engagement focuses on how emergent technologies are used in and around global political communication. Woolley’s work on computational propaganda—the use of social media and other digital tools in attempts to manipulate public opinion—has revealed the ways in which a wide variety of political groups in the United States and abroad have leveraged tech such as bots and trending algorithms and tactics of disinformation and trolling in efforts to control information flows online.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000767,University of Texas: Center for Media Engagement (CME),https://mediaengagement.org/,"The Center for Media Engagement conducts research on journalism, media ethics, and science communication to develop strategies for more effective engagement with the public. The Center’s signature approach is one of “connective democracy,” which ""unites newsrooms, scholars, platforms, and public policy entities in a methodical approach toward bridging gaps in our society."" Their research has covered content moderation, building trust in news organizations, mitigating polarization, the ethics of deepfakes, and clickbait, among other topics.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000768,University of Toronto: Citizen Lab,https://citizenlab.ca,"The Citizen Lab conducts research and policy engagement at the intersection of technology and international peace and security. Part of this agenda concerns ""targeted threats,"" or ""investigations into the prevalence and impact of digital espionage operations against civil society groups.""",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000769,University of Virginia: Democracy Initiative (DI),http://democracyinitiative.virginia.edu/,"The Democracy Initiative (DI) is dedicated to the study of democracy and challenges to democracy, both past and present. In 2019, DI announced two new labs: The Deliberative Media Initiative Lab will address the factionalism in the current media ecosystem and the undermining of norms and trust in institutions, and the Democratic Statecraft Lab will address growing authoritarianism around the world and its challenges to democratic institutions.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000770,University of Washington,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000771,University of Washington: Center for an Informed Public,https://ischool.uw.edu/research/center-informed-public,"The CIP is an interdisciplinary, non-partisan effort to convene industry, government, nonprofit, and academic stakeholders around developing strategies to resist misinformation and support an informed public in order to strengthen democracy. The Center is supported by the University of Washington Information School, Human Centered Design and Engineering Program, School of Law, and Communication Leadership Program.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000772,University of Washington: Cybersecurity Initiative (International Policy Institute),https://jsis.washington.edu/research/ipi/ipi-cybersecurity/,"The Cybersecurity Initiative produces written research, cultivates a network of professionals for the exchange of expertise, hosts events on cybersecurity policy, develops and teaches courses on cybersecurity and mentors students interested in cybersecurity policy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000773,University of Washington: Emerging Capacities of Mass Participation Lab (emCOMP) (Human Centered Design and Engineering),https://depts.washington.edu/emcomp/people/,"Housed at the School of Human-Centered Design & Engineering at the University of Washington, the Emerging Capacities of Mass Participation (emCOMP) Lab conducts research on new and social media and the changing dynamics of interaction in digital environments. With a particular focus on crisis events, emCOMP is investigating the spread of rumors and false or misleading information on social media platforms.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000774,University of Washington: International Policy Institute (IPI),https://jsis.washington.edu/research/ipi/ipi-cybersecurity/,"IPI's Cybersecurity Initiative provides research and teaching on international cybersecurity politics and policy. The initiative produces written research, cultivates a network of professionals for the exchange of expertise, and develops and teaches courses on cybersecurity policy. The faculty and fellows affiliated with the Cybersecurity Initiative have addressed disinformation in their research on elections integrity, deepfakes, and Russia’s cyber strategy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000775,University of Wisconsin-Madison: Center for Communication and Civic Renewal (CCCR),https://mcrc.journalism.wisc.edu/groups/cccr/,"CCCR convenes faculty from multiple disciplines to study how state and regional communication systems affect political polarization. Its affiliates utilize public opinion research, computational content analysis, and qualitative interviews to conduct comparative studies of Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina in order to help local media combat political polarization.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000776,US Congress,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8rOMntep8w,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000777,US DOD,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000778,US DoS GEC,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000779,Userfeeds,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000780,VERA Files Fact Check,http://verafiles.org/specials/fact-check,"VERA Files Fact Check is a Filipino fact-checking organization, a member of the International Fact-Checking Network, and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,Y,,,
+G000781,Verifica,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000782,Verificado 2018,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000783,Verificador,https://larepublica.pe/verificador,,,,Fact checking,,,,,South America,Peru,,N,N,,,
+G000784,Verificalo,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000785,Verity,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000786,Vilnius Institute of Policy Analysis (VIPA),http://www.vilniusinstitute.lt/,"VIPA conducts research and analysis on political institutions and public policy in Lithuania. The organization hosts scholars that study disinformation, information security, and media literacy, and it runs the #PackOfLies project, dedicated to revealing specific instances of disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
+G000787,Vinesight,https://www.vinesight.com/,Vinesight fights misinformation on social media channels by detecting trending campaigns and providing analytics and alerts about viral misinformation.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,Israel,,N,Y,,,
+G000788,Viralgranskaren,https://www.facebook.com/viralgranskaren/,"Metro's Viral Reviewer helps you find out if the story spread on social media is true. Let's review before you share. viralgranskaren@metro.se
+You probably do not think about it, but every time you share a link, write a status or instagram a picture, you tell a little story. About yourself, about your contemporaries, about Sweden. Thanks to the internet, today we tell more stories than ever before. We tell about our world, and thereby we shape it.
+Not infrequently, these stories are widely disseminated. A Facebook status that is starting to be shared can suddenly have reached thousands of people, leading to leaflets and hot debates. But since over 4.7 million Swedes have Facebook, texts can be shared tens of thousands of times without ever passing a journalist's feed. And that's a problem. Because when a story about something sensitive or important, something that places itself in the middle of contemporary currents, is read by many people, they often shape their picture of reality after it. Whether it's true.",,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,Y,N,,,
+G000789,Vishvas News,http://www.vishvasnews.com/,Vishvas News is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000790,Vistinomer,http://vistinomer.mk/,Vistinomer is a Macedonian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Macedonia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000791,Voice of San Diego - Fact Check,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,,,Y,N,,,
+G000792,W3C,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000793,W3C Credible Web Community Group,https://www.w3.org/community/credibility/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,World,,Y,N,,,
+G000794,Watchdog Sri Lanka,https://watchdog.team/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,Asia,Sri Lanka,,N,N,,,
+G000795,WatchDog.md,https://watchdog.md,WatchDog.md conducts research and analysis on public policy in Moldova with the goal of strengthening democratic development within the country. Its experts have published on Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe and the integrity of Moldovan elections in the face of potential foreign influence. WatchDog.md is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Moldova,,N,Y,teamwatchdog,,
+G000796,We Verify,https://weverify.eu/about/,"WeVerify is an EU-funded project designed to create a platform for collaborative content verification. InVID, a video content verification tool, is one product developed by the initiative.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000797,Web Literacy for Student Fact Checkers,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000798,WebQoof,https://www.thequint.com/news/webqoof,WebQoof is the fact-checking section of Indian media outlet The Quint and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000799,WFA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000800,WhiteOps,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000801,Who Targets Me?,https://whotargets.me/en/about-who-targets-me/,"Who Targets Me? is a browser extension that scrapes the ads from a user’s Facebook account in order to observe what political advertisements they receive. These ads are added to a database, where they are stored and analyzed. After continued use, the technology provides the user with a breakdown of posts and information about why the user was targeted with specific political content. Ads within the database can be studied for insights.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
+G000802,Wikimedia Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000803,Wikimedia Germany,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000804,Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies,https://martenscentre.eu,"The official think tank of the European People's Party, the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Policy produces research and analysis on European Union policy. Scholars affiliated with the center have published policy papers and reports on influence operations in relation to social media, content moderation, and European Parliament elections, among other topics.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000805,Wilson Center,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000806,Wilson Center: Digital Futures Project,https://www.wilsoncenter.org,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000807,Wilson Center: Science & Technology Innovation Program,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/science-and-technology-innovation-program,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000808,WITNESS,https://www.witness.org/,"WITNESS is dedicated to helping individuals use media to document human rights abuses. WITNESS has developed technological tools for verifying the authenticity of content, and through its Media Lab, the organization focuses on deepfakes and the need to develop strategies to verify the authenticity of content in order to secure freedom of expression.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000809,Witness,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000810,World Economic Forum: Center for Cybersecurity,https://www.weforum.org/platforms/the-centre-for-cybersecurity,"The Center for Cybersecurity convenes experts around issues including cyber warfare, law, and norms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
+G000811,World Economic Forum: Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution,https://www.weforum.org/,"Through the Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, WEF develops policy frameworks for emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning, and the Center for Cybersecurity convenes experts around issues including cyber warfare, law, and norms. The Strategic Intelligence Center offers insights and contextual intelligence in the areas of AI, behavioral psychology, civic participation, cybersecurity, digital communications, digital identity, geopolitics, and global governance.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
+G000812,"World Economic Forum: Shaping the Future of Media, Entertainment and Culture",https://www.weforum.org/platforms/shaping-the-future-of-media-entertainment-and-sport,"Through its Shaping the Future of Media, Entertainment and Culture Project, WEF is working to rebuild trust in media institutions. Its Quality Project is creating a tool that aggregates data from other initiatives assessing media quality and allows users to make personalized decisions about how to weight factors of media quality in their own assessments. Additionally, Project Meridio aims at creating an open-source tool to empower users to manage their personal data. WEF is also supporting local independent news through its United for News program and helped launch the DQ Institute, which seeks to improve digital literacy.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
+G000813,World Economic Forum: Strategic Intelligence Center,https://www.weforum.org/strategic-intelligence,"The Strategic Intelligence Center offers insights and contextual intelligence in the areas of AI, behavioral psychology, civic participation, cybersecurity, digital communications, digital identity, geopolitics, and global governance.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
+G000814,Xandr,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000815,Yale University: Information Society Project (Law School),https://law.yale.edu/isp,"Based at Yale Law School, the Information Society Project is an interdisciplinary research center dedicated to exploring issues at the intersection of technology and law. It houses the Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere, and the Knight Law and Media Program and the Media Freedom & Information Access Clinic, which trains students interested in careers in media law and provides free legal services to defend freedom of speech, freedom of the press and access to information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000816,Yale University: Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere,https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/balkin-receives-funding-knight-foundation-study-digital-public-sphere,The Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere will produce legal and policy recommendations to improve the functioning of the digital public sphere. The initiative studies topics from antitrust and privacy to content moderation and digital propaganda.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000817,Yonder,https://www.yonder-ai.com,"Yonder provides artificial intelligence tools to detect, monitor, and mitigate online influence operations. The company also publishes research on information integrity and digital influence operations. Was New Knowledge",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000818,YOTI,https://www.yoti.com,,Yes,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000819,YouTube data viewer (Amnesty International),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000820,Zašto ne (Why Not),https://zastone.ba/en/,"Zašto ne (Why Not) is an organization that works on the creation of a safe, secure, healthy, active, efficient and accountable BiH society through increasing civic participation, influencing government accountability, use of new technology tools and promotion of socially engaged culture on the whole territory of BiH together with other interested groups, organizations, institutions and individuals.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,N,Y,,,
+G000821,ZeroFox,https://www.zerofox.com/,"ZeroFox has developed a social media risk management platform. It claims to manage risk on social networks, the dark web, and external channels. It also claims to offer protection from fraud and hacking; and provides alerts of physical attacks on specific people, locations, and assets.",Yes,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000822,Zignal Labs,https://zignallabs.com/,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000823,ZimFact,http://zimfact.org/,ZimFact is a Zimbabwean fact-checking organization.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Zimbabwe,,Y,Y,,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/forums.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/forums.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a811e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/forums.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+name,externalgroup,focus,accessibility,url,summary,notes
+CogSecCollab incubator,CogSecCollab,,private slack,,,
+Memetics: hacking belief systems,,,public facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/memetics.hacking,,
+Strategic communication engineering,,,public facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/949960748352854,,
+Digital investigations for journalists,Knight Foundation,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/328713905036655,course group,
+Computational social science,,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/523771471380181,,
+Political depolarization at the Commons,BuildUp,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/thecommonspolitics,,
+r/DisinformationWatch,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/DisinformationWatch/,,
+r/ActiveMeasures,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/ActiveMeasures/,,
+r/DigitalManipulation,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/Digital_Manipulation/,,
+r/TrollFare,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/trollfare/,,
+r/Propaganda,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/propaganda/,,
+CMU IDEAS slack,,,private slack,https://cmuideas.slack.com/,,
+ArtIntoScience slack,,,private slack,https://artintoscience.slack.com/,,
+TTO Slack,,,private slack,https://tto-conference.slack.com/,,
+Misinfocon slack,,,private slack,https://misinfocon.slack.com/,,
+Fake News Challenge slack,,,private slack,https://fakenewschallenge.slack.com/,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/frameworks.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/frameworks.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0336d22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/frameworks.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+disarm_id,name,name_DE,summary,summary_DE,longname
+FW01,DISARM Red,,"incident creation framework. All the things that an incident creator will need to do to create, run, and assess the effectiveness of a disinformation incident.",,FW01 - DISARM Red
+FW02,DISARM Blue,,"incident counters framework. All the things that a response team, people outside the team, and organisations outside the team, will need to do to mitigate the effects of an incident, slow down an incident, stop an incident etc.",,FW02 - DISARM Blue
+FW03,DISARM Green,,"counter counters framework. All the things that an incident creation team might do to reduce the effectiveness of mitigations, counters, and responders to an incident. This framework doesn't officially exist yet: this id is for future work. ",,FW03 - DISARM Green
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/incidents.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/incidents.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..34c7e64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/incidents.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+disarm_id,name,objecttype,summary,year_started,attributions_seen,found_in_country,urls,notes,when_added,found_via,longname
+I00001,Blacktivists facebook group,incident,Internet Research Agency created fake @blacktivists facebook group and twitter account. ,2016,Russia,USA,https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/media/blacktivist-russia-facebook-twitter/index.html,,2019-02-24,,I00001 - Blacktivists facebook group
+I00002,#VaccinateUS,campaign,use both pro- and anti- topic messaging to create an artificial argument online. ,2014,Russia,World,https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/08/23/russian-trolls-twitter-bots-exploit-vaccine-controversy/,,2019-02-24,,I00002 - #VaccinateUS
+I00003,Beyonce protest rallies,incident,use both pro- and anti- topic messaging to create an artificial argument in real life. ,2016,Russia,USA,https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/10/russia-facebook-ads-us-elections-congress,,2019-02-24,,I00003 - Beyonce protest rallies
+I00004,#Macrongate,incident,amplified document dump failed because France was prepared for it.,2017,Russia,France,http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/,,2019-02-24,,I00004 - #Macrongate
+I00005,Brexit vote,campaign,"In early 2014, then UK PM David Cameron outlined the changes he aimed to bring about in the EU and in the UK's relationship with it. These were: additional immigration controls, especially for citizens of new EU member states; tougher immigration rules for present EU citizens; new powers for national parliaments collectively to veto proposed EU laws; new free-trade agreements and a reduction in bureaucracy for businesses; a lessening of the influence of the European Court of Human Rights on British police and courts; more power for individual member states, and less for the central EU; and abandonment of the EU notion of ""ever closer union"".He intended to bring these about during a series of negotiations with other EU leaders and then, if re-elected, to announce a referendum.
+European Union Referendum Act was passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It extended to include and take legislative effect in Gibraltar,and received royal assent on 17 December 2015.
+
+Conservative-led Department for Culture, Media and Sport select committee concluded (2018) Russia engaged in ‘unconventional warfare’ during the Brexit campaign. This included ‘156,252 Russian accounts tweeting about #Brexit’ and posting ‘over 45,000 Brexit messages in the last 48 hours of the campaign.’ As it said, Kremlin-controlled media, ‘RT and Sputnik had more reach on Twitter for anti-EU content than either Vote Leave or Leave.EU, during the referendum campaign’.
+
+The report by Democrats on the Senate foreign relations committee, titled Putin’s asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: implications for US national security, pinpoints the way in which UK campaign finance laws do not require disclosure of political donations if they are from “the beneficial owners of non-British companies that are incorporated in the EU and carry out business in the UK”.
+
+The senators point out that Ukip and its then-leader, Nigel Farage, did not just fan anti-EU sentiment but also “criticised European sanctions on Russia, and provided flattering assessments of Russian President Putin”.
+
+The report adds that although officially the Russian government asserted its neutrality on Brexit, its English-language media outlets RT and Sputnik covered the referendum campaign extensively and offered ‘’systematically one-sided coverage’’.",2016,Russia,UK,https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2018/11/01/russian-trolls-used-islamophobia-to-whip-up-support-for-brexit/#1369afb665f2,,2019-02-24,,I00005 - Brexit vote
+I00006,Columbian Chemicals,incident,Early Russian (IRA) “fake news” stories. Completely fabricated; very short lifespan. ,2014,Russia,USA,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbian_Chemicals_Plant_explosion_hoax,,2019-02-24,,I00006 - Columbian Chemicals
+I00007,Incirlik terrorists,incident,Fake story transmitted from Russian media to Trump campaign,2016,Russia,USA,https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/16/paul-manafort/trump-campaign-chair-misquotes-russian-media-makes/,,2019-02-24,,I00007 - Incirlik terrorists
+I00008,Bujic,incident,,2017,Russia,Serbia,https://www.stopfake.org/en/vencislav-the-virgin-hostile-operation-by-vencislav-bujic-seas-foundation-and-its-network-of-collaborators/,Serbia pro-Kremlin disinfo campaign by Vencislav Bujic,2019-02-24,,I00008 - Bujic
+I00009,PhilippinesExpert,incident,"President of the Philippine visited Moscow and forged ties on information strategy in 2017, and afterwards a series of disinformation campaign was noted in Philippine social media and mainstream media, mostly in favor of Philippine president and promoting Russian propaganda. Among this is the appearance of an unknown-before expert on global affairs who was cited frequently in Russian IRA-connected outlets. ",2017,Russia,Philippines,https://codastory.com/disinformation/how-a-little-known-pro-kremlin-analyst-became-a-philippine-expert-overnight/,Philippines Social Media: Russian Disinformation by fake “expert”,2019-02-24,,I00009 - PhilippinesExpert
+I00010,ParklandTeens,incident,IRA trolls amplified the far right messaging around the attack. Most notably they amplified social media speculation that many of the teens involved were “crisis actors” nefariously injected into the conversation by outside actors with an anti-gun poltical agenda. Other amplifications included ongoing harassment of survivors and claims that the event is a hoax from the right; and fatalist cynicism about gun reform from the left.,2018,Unknown,USA,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/us/parkland-students-hogg-gonzalez.html,Parkland survivors,2019-02-01,,I00010 - ParklandTeens
+I00011,CovingtonTeen,incident,,2019,Unknown,USA,https://www.wcpo.com/news/national/fact-check-viral-misinformation-about-covington-catholic-nathan-phillips-infects-the-internet,MAGA kid (Covington),2019-02-01,,I00011 - CovingtonTeen
+I00012,ChinaSmog,incident,,2011,China,China,https://www.cjr.org/innovations/memes-pollution-censorship-china-beijing.php,"China smog (not an attack, but a counter to disinformation)",2019-02-24,,I00012 - ChinaSmog
+I00013,FranceBlacktivists,incident,,2014,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-glimpse-into-a-french-operation-f78dcae78924,France blacktivists,2019-02-24,,I00013 - FranceBlacktivists
+I00014,GiletsJaunePileon,incident,,2018,Russia,France,https://www.wired.com/story/co-opting-french-unrest-spread-disinformation/,Russian pile-onto #GiletsJaune (and expansion to other countries),2019-02-24,,I00014 - GiletsJaunePileon
+I00015,ConcordDiscovery,incident,"The Office of Special Counsel accused Concord Management (an IRA funder/handler) and its counsel of abusing the discovery process by leaking discovery materials under false pretences: the documents were altered; the documents were portrayed as material obtained by hacking, rather than legal process; the released documents are selected to maximize exposure targets and methods. ",2019,Russia,USA,https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/02/new-mueller-filing-shows-how-russia-misuses-us-courts/581884/,,2019-02-01,,I00015 - ConcordDiscovery
+I00016,LithuanianElves,campaign,,2014,Russia,Lithuania,https://www.ft.com/content/b3701b12-2544-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf,,2019-02-01,,I00016 - LithuanianElves
+I00017,US presidential elections,campaign,"Make Clinton look bad or unpopular, and Trump look good over a long period, to change individuals’ voting intentions. ",2016,Russia,USA,https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf,,2019-02-24,OII,I00017 - US presidential elections
+I00018,DNC email leak incident,tactic,,2016,Russia,USA,,"Channels: RU domestic, RU multilingual (RT/Sputnik), trolls. OII",2019-02-24,OII,I00018 - DNC email leak incident
+I00019,MacronTiphaine,incident,Far-right trolls on 4chan and Twitter spreading misinformation about French candidate Macron and spur support for rival candidate Le Pen.,2017,,France,https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/heres-how-far-right-trolls-are-spreading-hoaxes-about,Trolls OII,2019-02-24,OII,I00019 - MacronTiphaine
+I00020,3000 tanks,incident,,2017,Russia,World,https://medium.com/@DFRLab/three-thousand-fake-tanks-575410c4f64d,,2019-02-24,OII,I00020 - 3000 tanks
+I00021,Armenia elections,campaign,,2017,Russia,Armenia,https://medium.com/dfrlab/fakes-bots-and-blockings-in-armenia-44a4c87ebc46,,2019-02-24,OII,I00021 - Armenia elections
+I00022,#Macronleaks,incident,"Countering the spreading of an alleged 9GB of “leaked”, fake documents of Macron campaign",2017,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/hashtag-campaign-macronleaks-4a3fb870c4e8,,2019-02-24,OII,I00022 - #Macronleaks
+I00023,#dislikemacron,incident,,2017,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/russian-and-french-twitter-mobs-in-election-push-bca327aa41a5,unsuccessful,2019-02-24,OII,I00023 - #dislikemacron
+I00024,#syriahoax,incident,,2017,Syria,USA,https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-the-alt-right-brought-syriahoax-to-america-47745118d1c9,,2019-02-24,OII,I00024 - #syriahoax
+I00025,EU Army,incident,"Traces back to 2016: Guardian “Is there a secret plan to create an EU army?” French President Emmanuel Macron has warned that Europeans cannot be protected without a ""true, European army"", as he marks the centenary of the World War One Armistice. On a visit to the former Western Front in Verdun, he said Russia had shown it could be a threat and Europe had to be able ""to defend itself better alone"". German Chancellor Angela Merkel backed the idea of an intervention force in June, but said it would have to be part of ""the structure of defence co-operation"".
+
+Verdict: “An EU army marching out to war under Brussels’ command is a fantasy shared by Eurosceptics and a small number of federalists. Europe will continue down the road of defence cooperation in a halting way, but an EU army is only for armchair generals.”",2018,Russia,EU,https://medium.com/dfrlab/spread-it-on-reddit-3170a463e787,,2019-02-24,OII,I00025 - EU Army
+I00026,Netherlands referendum on Ukraine,incident,,2016,Russia,Netherlands,https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russias-influence-in-western-elections/2016/04/08/b427602a-fcf1-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00026 - Netherlands referendum on Ukraine
+I00027,crucifiedboy,incident,,2014,Russia,Ukraine,https://helda.helsinki.fi//bitstream/handle/10138/233374/KhaldarovaPanttiFakeNews.pdf?sequence=1,,2019-02-24,OII,I00027 - crucifiedboy
+I00028,mh17 downed,incident,,2014,Russia,Ukraine,https://www.stopfake.org/en/lies-spanish-flight-operations-officer-from-kiev-informed-about-ukrainian-planes-involved-in-boeing-tragedy/%20https:/globalvoices.org/2014/07/20/the-russian-governments-7000-wikipedia-edits/%20https:/foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/29/how-mh17-gave-birth-to-the-modern-russian-spin-machine-putin-ukraine/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00028 - mh17 downed
+I00029,MH17 investigation,campaign,"Since the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur on 17 July 2014 while flying over eastern Ukraine, killing all 283 passengers and 15 crew on board… wreckage of the aircraft fell near Hrabove in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, 40 km (25 mi) from the border.The shoot-down occurred in the War in Donbass, during the Battle of Shakhtarsk, in an area controlled by pro-Russian rebels. This has proven to be an ongoing example of Russia and their proxies ability to wage a disinformation campaign, and exemplify the use of the 4 D’s (dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay) ",2016,Russia,Ukraine,https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/05/07/112052-facebook-zablokiroval-sergeya-parhomenko-za-kommentariy-doklada-o-sbitom-171-boinge-187%20 https://news.online.ua/754036/v-sotssetyah-na-paltsah-pokazali-kak-rabotayut-boty-kremlya-opublikovany-foto/ https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/ukraine-involved-mh17-downing-claims-14184413,"Changed to campaign (still in the news, and still Russia accusing Ukraine... TASS 03/25/19 and UK Daily Mirror (see URL's). It's links to overall campaign directed against Ukraine",2019-02-24,OII,I00029 - MH17 investigation
+I00030,LastJedi,incident,,2018,Russia,World,https://slate.com/culture/2018/10/last-jedi-star-wars-twitter-backlash-russia-trolls.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00030 - LastJedi
+I00031,antivax,apt,,2018,Russia,World,https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304567,,2019-02-24,OII,I00031 - antivax
+I00032,Kavanaugh,incident,"Before the Senate SCOTUS confirmation hearings of Brett Kavanaugh, professor Christine Blasey Ford--first anonymously, then publicly--accused Kavanaugh of inappropriate or criminal sexual behavior. Amplified by Russian trolls Right wing operatives first tried to doxx Ford, then to discredit her. Many observers suggest that the Kavanaugh hearings were the largest anti-US Russian online operation for months. ",2018,Russia,USA,https://qz.com/1409102/russian-trolls-and-bots-are-flooding-twitter-with-ford-kavanaugh-disinformation/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00032 - Kavanaugh
+I00033,China 50cent Army,apt,"50cent Army is a CCP “tool” - “massive secret operation” in China pumping out an estimated 488 million fabricated social media posts per year, part of an effort to “regularly distract the public and change the subject” from any policy-related issues that threaten to anger citizens enough to turn them out onto the streets. But the research finds no evidence these 50-centers are, in fact, paid 50 cents, nor does it find they engage in direct and angry argument with their opponents. Instead, they are mostly bureaucrats already on the public payroll, responding to government directives at a time of heightened tension to flood social media with pro-government cheerleading.",2014,China,China,https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/how_the_chinese_government_fabricates_social_media_posts_for_strategic_distraction_not_engaged_argument.pdf https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-that-chinese-troll/3540663.html,"campaign (multiple incidents, e.g. Shanshan riots)",2019-02-24,OII,I00033 - China 50cent Army
+I00034,DibaFacebookExpedition,incident,"In the Expedition, Diba engaged in a highly organized cyber-attack of a Taiwanese political leader. On January 20, 2016 (the day of President Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration) featuring the posting of an overwhelming number of social media comments in support of a PRC-sanctioned message. Netizens from one of the largest discussion forums in China, known as Diba, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message, a cyberattack referred to as the “Diba Expedition to Facebook.” 
+
+Unique for taking place outside of the Chinese Internet system, both transgressing technical and political norms while exposing their actions to an international audience. In spite of the transgressive nature of the action, “Diba Expedition” was highly praised by Chinese official media, in contrast to comparable activities in the past that lacked its explicit pro-government ideology. Yet—reflecting the complexity of Diba’s relationship with the PRC government—the Expedition was shut down after a few days.",2016,China,Taiwan,https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/96746 https://qz.com/598812/an-army-of-chinese-trolls-has-jumped-the-great-firewall-to-attack-taiwanese-independence-on-facebook/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00034 - DibaFacebookExpedition
+I00035,Brazilelections,campaign,Bot activity in Brazil elections,2014,Brazil,Brazil,https://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/politicalbots/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Brazil-1.pdf,,2019-02-24,OII,I00035 - Brazilelections
+I00036,BrazilPresDebate,incident,,2014,Brazil,Brazil,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/bots-brazil-the-activity-social-media-bots-brazilian-elections,,2019-02-24,OII,I00036 - BrazilPresDebate
+I00037,Rioelections,incident,,2016,Brazil,Brazil,https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/eleicoes-2016/2016/10/1823713-eleicao-no-rio-tem-tatica-antiboato-e-suspeita-de-uso-de-robos.shtml,,2019-02-24,OII,I00037 - Rioelections
+I00038,Brazilimpeachment,incident,,2016,Brazil,Brazil,http://www.labic.net/cartografia/a-rede-das-imagens-da-vaiadilma-novas-relacoes/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300415619_The_Influence_of_Retweeting_Robots_During_Brazilian_Protests,,2019-02-24,OII,I00038 - Brazilimpeachment
+I00039,MerkelFacebook,incident,"Top stories about Merkel in both German and English were negative and misleading, most published from fake news sites.",2017,Unknown,Germany,https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/hyperpartisan-sites-and-facebook-pages-are-publishing-false,,2019-02-24,OII,I00039 - MerkelFacebook
+I00040,modamaniSelfie,incident,,2015,Unknown,Germany,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/syria-refugee-anas-modamani-germany-facebook.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00040 - modamaniSelfie
+I00041,Refugee crime map,incident,,2017,Unknown,Germany,https://uebermedien.de/11488/kartenlegen-mit-kriminellen-auslaendern/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00041 - Refugee crime map
+I00042,Saudi/Qatar bot dispute,incident,"In the summer of 2017, Twitter bots—automated accounts—were deployed to boost messaging on both sides of the diplomatic dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.” Calling this a “diplomatic dispute” understates the complexity of regional dynamics, at the center is an alleged report that Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, had made an astonishing speech, and alleged “hack” of Qatar’s official news agency, and further woven into concerns Saudi Arabia has about the influence of public perception, the role of Al Jazeera. ",2017,SaudiArabia,Qatar,https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/robot-wars-how-bots-joined-battle-gulf,"robot wars how bots joined battle in the gulf""",2019-02-24,MIS,I00042 - Saudi/Qatar bot dispute
+I00043,FCC comments,incident,,2017,Unknown,USA,https://gizmodo.com/how-an-investigation-of-fake-fcc-comments-snared-a-prom-1832788658,"does this count as an incident, or is it just hacking as usual?",2019-02-24,MIS,I00043 - FCC comments
+I00044,JadeHelm exercise,incident,"In the summer of 2015, thousands of troops from the US Army Special Operations command conducted and multi-state, weeks-long training operation across the southwest. Russian trolls amplified conspiracy theories promoted by far right media operatives such as Alex Jones, specifically: the Jade Helm 15 exercise was a precursor to domestic invasion and subsequent martial law by the Obama Administration in coordination with China. Some versions have deus ex machina such as an asteroid strike. Ultimately the Governor of Texas, Greg Abbot, was forced to speak out on the conspiracy theory, but he hedged on Obama’s motives.",2015,Russia,USA,https://www.politifact.com/texas/article/2018/may/03/jade-helm-15-greg-abbott-texas-state-guard-hayden-/,,2019-02-25,MIS,I00044 - JadeHelm exercise
+I00045,Skripal,incident,"On 4 March 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and double agent for the UK's intelligence services, and his daughter Yulia Skripal were poisoned in Salisbury, England, with a Novichok nerve agent known as A-234, according to official UK sources and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)",2018,Russia,UK,https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/skripal/ https://euvsdisinfo.eu/conspiracy-mania-marks-one-year-anniversary-of-the-skripal-poisoning/,This is Beliingcat's full library of Skirpal related reporting,2019-03-20,,I00045 - Skripal
+I00046,North Macedonia,incident,,2018,Russia,Macedonia,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/16/world/europe/macedonia-referendum-russia-nato.html https://www.polygraph.info/a/disinfo-analysis-macedonia-nato-russia/29770631.html,disinformation directed by Russian-backed groups trying to stoke fears and depress turnout in a vote that could put this Balkan nation on a path to join NATO.,2019-03-20,,I00046 - North Macedonia
+I00047,Sea of Azov,incident,"An international incident occurred on 25 November 2018 when the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coast guard fired upon and captured three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to pass from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait on their way to the port of Mariupol. In 2014, Russia had annexed the nearby Crimean Peninsula, which is dominantly internationally recognised as Ukrainian territory. It later constructed the Crimean Bridge across the strait. Under a 2003 treaty, the strait and the Azov Sea are intended to be the shared territorial waters of both countries, and freely accessible.
+The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is also responsible for border protection, claims that the ships illegally entered Russian waters. The FSB alleges that crews did not comply with demands to stop. In the scuffle, a Russian border patrol ship rammed and damaged a Ukrainian Navy tugboat. Russian forces later seized all three Ukrainian ships, confiscating them for violating Russia's border. Six Ukrainian navy soldiers were injured, the Ukrainian navy reported. ",2018,Russia,World,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/wave-of-disinformation-from-the-azov-sea/,,2019-03-20,,I00047 - Sea of Azov
+I00048,White Helmets,campaign,,2015,Russia,World,https://thesyriacampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/KillingtheTruth.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/syria-white-helmets-conspiracy-theories,,2019-03-20,,I00048 - White Helmets
+I00049,White Helmets: Chemical Weapons,incident,"On 7 April 2018, a high number of civilians were killed in the besieged Syrian city of Douma, with evidence pointing towards another chemical attack by the regime, according to the EU. Subsequent to this event, a series of images ""prove"" that the White Helmets ""staged"" the chemical attack in Syria.",2017,Russia,World,http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingghouta/disinformation-2/ https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/12/18/chemical-weapons-and-absurdity-the-disinformation-campaign-against-the-white-helmets/ https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/10/16/why-assad-and-russia-target-the-white-helmets/,,2019-03-20,,I00049 - White Helmets: Chemical Weapons
+I00050,#HandsOffVenezuela,incident,"Venezuela has been thrown into turmoil after Guaidó declared himself interim president Jan. 23. The 35-year-old president of the National Assembly says Venezuela's constitution grants him power to take control of the government because Maduro was re-elected last year by fraud. Guaidó has called for Maduro to leave office and call new elections.
+
+More than 50 nations, including the United States and most of Latin America, concluded that Maduro's re-election last year was a fraud. They have recognized Juan Guaidó, president of the opposition-led National Assembly, as Venezuela's legitimate head of state, endorsing his mission to establish a transitional government and hold fresh elections.
+Maduro has remained defiant in the face of domestic and international pressure, securing the support of the governments of Iran and Russia, as well as the loyalty of the Venezuelan military.",2019,Russia,World,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/twitter-as-an-information-battlefield-venezuela-a-case-study/,,2019-03-20,,I00050 - #HandsOffVenezuela
+I00051,Integrity Initiative,incident,"The UK Foreign Office has accused Russian state media of trying to discredit a government-funded body that works to counter Kremlin disinformation. A spokesperson said the Institute for Statecraft was hacked several weeks ago and documents were ""published and amplified by Kremlin news channels"".
+The FCO comments on the IfS were issued after a news report said the group had retweeted stories critical of Labour. Western officials believe the group involved in the hack is linked to the Russian state. Since then internal documents have been leaked to the Russian media about the organisation's activities, including lists of journalists it had contacted. The Foreign Office has provided £2.2m in funding to the institute over the last two years supported its work to counter disinformation overseas and not in the UK",2018,Russia,World,https://eaworldview.com/2019/01/counter-russia-disinformation-integrity-initiative/ https://www.stopfake.org/en/kremlin-watch-briefing-the-eu-has-to-start-taking-pro-kremlin-disinformation-seriously/,"This is an excellent example of the tables getting turned, and how we need to carefully work through offensive measures",2019-03-20,,I00051 - Integrity Initiative
+I00052,China overiew,campaign,,2015,China,World,https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/,"global strategic goals for China different from those President Vladimir Putin has for Russia; as a result, the social media influence techniques used by China are different from those used by Russia.",2019-03-20,,I00052 - China overiew
+I00053,China Huawei CFO Arrest,incident,"Dec. 1: Canadian authorities arrest Huawei's chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou at Vancouver’s airport while she is en route from Hong Kong to Mexico, after an extradition request from the Americans. The news becomes public on Dec. 5. Dec. 7: In Vancouver, Meng appears in court, where allegations of fraud are laid out. The U.S. alleges Meng misled American banks in a bid to get around American sanctions on Iran. 
+Geopolitically complex issue combines US/China trade; Security concerns/issues related to Huawei’s 5G wireless equipment; diplomacy between Canada & China as Chinese subsequently arrest Canadian citizens.",2018,China,World,https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/czech-zeman-babis-huawei-xi-trump/584158/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-chinas-envoy-says-white-supremacy-played-part-in-canadas-arrest-of/,"“The Chinese have been very active here,” said General Andor Šándor, a former chief of the Czech military-intelligence service who is now a security consultant. “They don’t want to undermine our relationship with NATO, or the EU, unlike the Russians. What they are really keen on is to squeeze as much technological information from us as possible.”",2019-03-20,,I00053 - China Huawei CFO Arrest
+I00054,China Muslims,incident,,2018,China,World,https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/china-says-foreign-concerns-over-muslim-rights-unwarranted-1.4178042 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/,"China rejects the allegations that it has locked up large numbers of Muslims in re-education camps. The facilities, it says, are vocational training centers that emphasize “rehabilitation and redemption” and are part of its efforts to combat terrorism and religious extremism.",2019-03-20,,I00054 - China Muslims
+I00055,50 Cent Army,campaign,,2008,China,World,https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-that-chinese-troll/3540663.html,,2019-03-20,,I00055 - 50 Cent Army
+I00056,Iran Influence Operations,campaign,"Iranian interference in the politics of Arab countries has become more self-evident since the Arab Spring of 2011. Iran has been trying to widen its influence in the region in a political confrontation with Saudi Arabia. Factor long-held hostility to US (Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil”) & Isreal; it’s funding of proxies (Hezbolla) and Shia militia’s in Iraq; and most recently having the Revolutionary Guard being designated a terror organization; the seeming collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (nuclear programme) and expanding economic sanctions all add up to an increased likihood of Iran expanding their information operations.
+While there is history to Iran’s information/influence operations, starting with FireEye’s report about Iranian “fake news” websites, and subsequent reports by DFRLab (Jan 31, 2019 and March 26, 2019) we have strong document proof and assets that highlight Iran’s activities.",2012,Iran,World,https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/suspected-iranian-influence-operation.html https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/08/irans-disinformation-campaigns.html https://medium.com/dfrlab/takedown-details-of-the-iranian-propaganda-network-d1fad32fdf30 https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8dhttps://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/04/Iran-Memo.pdf,"FireEye has identified a suspected influence operation that appears to originate from Iran aimed at audiences in the U.S., U.K., Latin America, and the Middle East.",2019-03-20,,I00056 - Iran Influence Operations
+I00057,Mexico Election,incident,,2018,"Russia,Mexico",Mexico,https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/misinformation-seeded-by-bots-and-trolls-invades-mexico-s-election-20180502-p4zctx.html https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-russian-bots-in-mexico-46003fcab4,,2019-03-20,,I00057 - Mexico Election
+I00058,Chemnitz,incident,,2018,Russia,Germany,https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2018-09-04/chemnitz-far-right-alternative-news http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-facing-turbulence-after-right-wing-unrest-a-1228121.html,,2019-03-20,,I00058 - Chemnitz
+I00059,Myanmar - Rohingya ,campaign,,2014,Myanmar,Myanmar,https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/ https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-role-genocide-myanmar-new-reporting-complicates-narrative,Personal note (see Reuters side bar... end of article) JFG contributed research re: Twitter,2019-03-20,,I00059 - Myanmar - Rohingya 
+I00060,White Genocide,campaign,,2018,Russia,World,https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/the-high-price-of-white-genocide-politics-for-australia-20180724-p4zt9k.html https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/trump-white-nationalism/568393/ https://www.iafrikan.com/2018/11/20/social-media-usa-south-africa-fake-news-disinformation/,Personal note (see Reuters side bar... end of article) JFG contributed research re: Twitter,2019-03-20,,I00060 - White Genocide
+I00061,Military veterans Targetting,campaign,,2017,Russia,US,https://www.stripes.com/congressmen-urge-fbi-to-investigate-bots-targeting-veterans-with-fake-news-1.573284 https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-influence-operations-taking-aim-at-us-military/4640751.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/09/russian-operatives-used-twitter-and-facebook-to-target-veterans-and-military-personnel-study-says/?utm_term=.d6fa34d4819c https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/working-papers/vetops/,,2019-03-20,,I00061 - Military veterans Targetting
+I00062,Brexit/UK ongoing,campaign,,2015,"Russia,UK",UK,https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-nationalist-dark-web-populism-tommy-robinson/? http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2019)634414,"This is current, and offers very good ""Anatomy of an ecosystem"" / EuroParl Think tank study... this is good CASE STUDY I: THE BREXIT CAMPAIGN and this Polarisation by manipulation",2019-03-20,,I00062 - Brexit/UK ongoing
+I00063,Olympic Doping Scandal,campaign,"On 18 July 2016, Richard McLaren, a Canadian attorney retained by WADA to investigate Grigor Rodchenkov (the former head of Russia's national anti-doping laboratory, the Anti-Doping Center, which was suspended by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in November 2015 for facilitating Russia's elaborate state-sponsored doping program. Rodchenkov helped develop and distribute banned performance-enhancing substances for thousands of Russian Olympians from 2005 to 2015. He made headlines in 2016 as a whistleblower, helping expose the complex and extensive nature of Russia's doping program. His revelations lead to Russia's partial ban from the 2016 Summer Olympics and total ban from the 2018 Winter Olympics.). These allegations led to a 97-page report covering significant state-sponsored doping in Russia. 
+
+The investigation found corroborating evidence after conducting witness interviews, reviewing thousands of documents, analysis of hard drives, forensic analysis of urine sample collection bottles, and laboratory analysis of individual athlete samples, with ""more evidence becoming available by the day."" The report concluded that it was shown ""beyond a reasonable doubt"" that Russia's Ministry of Sport, the Centre of Sports Preparation of the National Teams of Russia, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the WADA-accredited laboratory in Moscow had ""operated for the protection of doped Russian athletes"" within a ""state-directed failsafe system"" using ""the disappearing positive [test] methodology"" (DPM) after the country's poor medal count during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver. McLaren stated that urine samples were opened in Sochi in order to swap them ""without any evidence to the untrained eye"". The official producer of BEREG-KIT security bottles used for anti-doping tests, Berlinger Group, stated, ""We have no knowledge of the specifications, the methods or the procedures involved in the tests and experiments conducted by the McLaren Commission.""",2016,Russia,World,https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html?module=inline,,2019-04-06,,I00063 - Olympic Doping Scandal
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/incidenttechniques.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/incidenttechniques.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2745cd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/incidenttechniques.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+disarm_id,name,incident_id,technique_ids,summary
+IT00000001,buy FB targeted ads,I00002,T0018,
+IT00000002,"Promote ""funding"" campaign",I00002,T0017,
+IT00000003,create web-site - information pollution,I00002,T0019,
+IT00000004,create web-site - information pollution,I00002,T0056,
+IT00000005,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00002,T0046,
+IT00000006,legacy web content,I00002,T0058,
+IT00000007,hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit TOS,I00002,T0058,
+IT00000008,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00005,T0054,
+IT00000009,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00005,T0053,
+IT00000010,Targeted FB paid ads,I00005,T0018,
+IT00000011,Fake FB groups + dark content,I00005,T0007,
+IT00000012,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events?",I00005,T0057,
+IT00000013,"manipulate social media ""online polls""? ",I00005,T0029,
+IT00000014,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00005,T0019,
+IT00000015,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00005,T0056,
+IT00000016,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00005,T0010,
+IT00000017,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0031,
+IT00000018,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0032,
+IT00000019,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0034,
+IT00000020,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0035,
+IT00000021,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0036,
+IT00000022,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00005,T0046,
+IT00000023,"Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fear, outrage, conspiracy narratives",I00005,T0021,Meme that ISIS was responsible for a local chemical explosion. 
+IT00000024,Backstop personas,I00005,T0030,"Wikipedia fake persona ""AmandaGray91"". "
+IT00000025,Use SMS/text messages,I00006,T0043,SMS messages sent to local residents
+IT00000026,Fake video/images,I00006,T0024,Fake youtube video of ISIS claiming responsibility for the chemical attack. Faked screenshot of local newspaper website article on the explosion. 
+IT00000027,Create and use hashtag,I00006,T0015,Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals
+IT00000028,Create and use hashtag,I00006,T0055,Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals
+IT00000029,Fake twitter profiles to amplify,I00006,T0007,Twitter bots used to drive visbility
+IT00000030,bait journalists/media/politicians,I00006,T0039,
+IT00000031,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (report an unreported false story/event),I00007,T0019,
+IT00000032,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (report an unreported false story/event),I00007,T0056,
+IT00000033,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (in the case Paul Manafort)",I00007,T0010,
+IT00000034,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00007,T0054,
+IT00000035,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00007,T0053,
+IT00000036,"Using ""expert""",I00009,T0045,
+IT00000037,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution ,I00009,T0019,
+IT00000038,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution ,I00009,T0056,
+IT00000039,FB pages,I00009,T0007,
+IT00000040,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00009,T0052,
+IT00000041,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00010,T0054,
+IT00000042,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00010,T0053,
+IT00000043,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00010,T0046,
+IT00000044,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories; false flags, crisis actors)",I00010,T0010,
+IT00000045,FB pages/groups/profiles,I00010,T0007,
+IT00000046,YouTube; Reddit,I00010,T0031,
+IT00000047,YouTube; Reddit,I00010,T0032,
+IT00000048,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00010,T0020,
+IT00000049,journalist/media baiting,I00010,T0039,
+IT00000050,Forge ('release' altered hacked documents),I00015,T0025,
+IT00000051,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00015,T0025,
+IT00000052,"Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly",I00015,T0044,
+IT00000053,journalist/media baiting,I00015,T0039,
+IT00000054,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00017,T0025,
+IT00000055,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00017,T0054,
+IT00000056,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00017,T0053,
+IT00000057,Targeted FB paid ads,I00017,T0018,
+IT00000058,Fake FB groups + dark content,I00017,T0007,
+IT00000059,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events",I00017,T0057,
+IT00000060,"manipulate social media ""online polls""? ",I00017,T0029,
+IT00000061,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00017,T0019,
+IT00000062,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00017,T0056,
+IT00000063,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00017,T0010,
+IT00000064,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0031,
+IT00000065,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0032,
+IT00000066,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0033,
+IT00000067,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0034,
+IT00000068,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0035,
+IT00000069,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0036,
+IT00000070,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00017,T0020,
+IT00000071,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00017,T0046,
+IT00000072,"Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fear, outrage, conspiracy narratives",I00017,T0021,
+IT00000073,Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (ie: Denver Guardian; Macedonian teens),I00017,T0016,
+IT00000074,Backstop personas,I00017,T0030,
+IT00000075,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00022,T0025,
+IT00000076,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00022,T0054,
+IT00000077,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00022,T0053,
+IT00000078,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content,I00022,T0007,
+IT00000079,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00029,T0054,
+IT00000080,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00029,T0053,
+IT00000081,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00029,T0001,
+IT00000082,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00029,T0019,
+IT00000083,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00029,T0056,
+IT00000084,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00029,T0010,
+IT00000085,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00029,T0046,
+IT00000086,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00029,T0052,
+IT00000087,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00029,T0031,
+IT00000088,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00029,T0032,
+IT00000089,Demand insurmountable proof,I00029,T0040,
+IT00000090,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00032,T0054,
+IT00000091,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00032,T0053,
+IT00000092,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles ,I00032,T0007,
+IT00000093,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events?",I00032,T0057,
+IT00000094,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00032,T0019,
+IT00000095,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00032,T0056,
+IT00000096,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0031,
+IT00000097,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0032,
+IT00000098,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0033,
+IT00000099,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0034,
+IT00000100,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0035,
+IT00000101,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0036,
+IT00000102,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00032,T0020,
+IT00000103,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00032,T0046,
+IT00000104,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories)",I00032,T0010,
+IT00000105,"2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/sponsored astroturfing",I00033,T0049,
+IT00000106,fabricated social media comment,I00033,T0051,
+IT00000107,domestic social media influence operations focus primarily on “cheerleading” or presenting or furthering a positive narrative about the Chinese state,I00033,T0050,
+IT00000108,"cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force",I00033,T0047,
+IT00000109,"cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force",I00033,T0048,
+IT00000110,facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises,I00033,T0002,
+IT00000111,"Netizens from one of the largest discussion forums in China, known as Diba, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall",I00034,T0002,
+IT00000112,flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message,I00034,T0049,
+IT00000113,"Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted nearly 40,000 Facebook comments in just eight hours.",I00034,T0049,
+IT00000114,“hack” of Qatar’s official news agency,I00042,T0011,
+IT00000115,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00042,T0054,
+IT00000116,photoshopped/fake images,I00042,T0024,
+IT00000117,memes,I00042,T0021,
+IT00000118,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00044,T0054,
+IT00000119,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00044,T0053,
+IT00000120,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00044,T0019,
+IT00000121,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00044,T0056,
+IT00000122,YouTube; Reddit,I00044,T0031,
+IT00000123,YouTube; Reddit,I00044,T0032,
+IT00000124,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00044,T0020,
+IT00000125,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00044,T0046,
+IT00000126,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories)",I00044,T0010,
+IT00000127,Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and scary) titles,I00044,T0009,
+IT00000128,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00047,T0001,
+IT00000129,"Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine for sparking the clashes, saying their ""irrefutable"" evidence would ""soon be made public",I00047,T0001,
+IT00000130,(Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov suggesting that Ukraine deliberately provoked Russia in hopes of gaining additional support from the United States and Europe.,I00047,T0023,
+IT00000131,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00047,T0054,
+IT00000132,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00047,T0053,
+IT00000133,Demand insurmountable proof,I00047,T0040,
+IT00000134,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00049,T0054,
+IT00000135,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00049,T0053,
+IT00000136,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00049,T0001,
+IT00000137,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00049,T0019,
+IT00000138,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00049,T0056,
+IT00000139,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Roger Waters; Venessa Beeley...)",I00049,T0010,
+IT00000140,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00049,T0046,
+IT00000141,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00049,T0052,
+IT00000142,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00049,T0031,
+IT00000143,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00049,T0032,
+IT00000144,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00050,T0054,
+IT00000145,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00050,T0053,
+IT00000146,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00050,T0019,
+IT00000147,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00050,T0056,
+IT00000148,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Roger Waters)",I00050,T0010,
+IT00000149,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00050,T0046,
+IT00000150,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mint Press News, globalresearch.ca)",I00050,T0052,
+IT00000151,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00050,T0031,
+IT00000152,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00050,T0032,
+IT00000153,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00051,T0025,
+IT00000154,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00051,T0054,
+IT00000155,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00051,T0053,
+IT00000156,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00051,T0019,
+IT00000157,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00051,T0056,
+IT00000158,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00051,T0010,
+IT00000159,YouTube; Reddit,I00051,T0031,
+IT00000160,YouTube; Reddit,I00051,T0032,
+IT00000161,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00051,T0046,
+IT00000162,State-run media seeds foreign influence environment,I00053,T0056,
+IT00000163,"Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese State and Party",I00053,T0023,
+IT00000164,Events coordinated and promoted across media platforms,I00053,T0057,
+IT00000165,Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ie: support for Meng outside courthouse,I00053,T0050,
+IT00000166,Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ie: support for Meng outside courthouse,I00053,T0057,
+IT00000167,"China also plays victim, innocence, plays by rules, misunderstood narrative",I00053,T0001,
+IT00000168,"Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of applying a double standard, and has decried what he sees as “Western egotism and white supremacy” in the treatment of detained Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou.” ",I00053,T0001,
+IT00000169,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00056,T0054,
+IT00000170,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00056,T0053,
+IT00000171,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (non-paid advertising),I00056,T0007,
+IT00000172,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00056,T0046,
+IT00000173,"Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narratives",I00056,T0021,
+IT00000174,"Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narratives",I00056,T0022,
+IT00000175,Fake news/synthetic web-sites,I00056,T0008,
+IT00000176,legacy web content,I00056,T0058,
+IT00000177,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00063,T0054,
+IT00000178,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00063,T0053,
+IT00000179,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Putin himself; Embassies & Sports Ministry; TASS",I00063,T0001,
+IT00000180,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00063,T0019,
+IT00000181,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00063,T0056,
+IT00000182,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots ",I00063,T0010,
+IT00000183,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00063,T0046,
+IT00000184,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00063,T0052,
+IT00000185,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00063,T0031,
+IT00000186,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00063,T0032,
+IT00000187,,I00002,C00155,
+IT00000188,,I00004,C00053,
+IT00000189,,I00004,C00211,
+IT00000190,,I00004,C00202,
+IT00000191,,I00022,C00202,
+IT00000192,,I00005,C00107,
+IT00000193,,I00009,C00107,
+IT00000194,,I00056,C00107,
+IT00000195,,I00005,C00107,
+IT00000196,,I00009,C00107,
+IT00000197,,I00056,C00107,
+IT00000198,,I00010,C00184,
+IT00000199,,I00015,C00184,
+IT00000200,,I00032,C00184,
+IT00000201,,I00044,C00184,
+IT00000202,,I00015,C00165,
+IT00000203,,I00022,C00154,
+IT00000204,,I00022,C00197,
+IT00000205,,I00022,C00203,
+IT00000206,,I00035,C00172,
+IT00000207,,I00042,C00207,
+IT00000208,,I00044,C00200,
+IT00000209,,I00049,C00008,
+IT00000210,,I00050,C00008,
+IT00000211,,I00029,F00067,
+IT00000212,,I00045,F00067,
+IT00000213,,I00002,F00092,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/metatechniques.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/metatechniques.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6cb9c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/metatechniques.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,longname
+M001,resilience,Increase the resilience to disinformation of the end subjects or other parts of the underlying system,M001 - resilience
+M002,diversion,"Create alternative channels, messages etc in disinformation-prone systems",M002 - diversion
+M003,daylight,"Make disinformation objects, mechanisms, messaging etc visible",M003 - daylight
+M004,friction,"Slow down transmission or uptake of disinformation objects, messaging etc",M004 - friction
+M005,removal,Remove disinformation objects from the system,M005 - removal
+M006,scoring,Use a rating system,M006 - scoring
+M007,metatechnique,,M007 - metatechnique
+M008,data pollution,Add artefacts to the underlying system that deliberately confound disinformation monitoring,M008 - data pollution
+M009,dilution,Dilute disinformation artefacts and messaging with other content (kittens!),M009 - dilution
+M010,countermessaging,Create and distribute alternative messages to disinformation,M010 - countermessaging
+M011,verification,"Verify objects, content, connections etc. Includes fact-checking",M011 - verification
+M012,cleaning,Clean unneeded resources (accounts etc) from the underlying system so they can't be used in disinformation,M012 - cleaning
+M013,targeting,Target the components of a disinformation campaign,M013 - targeting
+M014,reduce resources,Reduce the resources available to disinformation creators,M014 - reduce resources
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/narratives.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/narratives.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a7efb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/narratives.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,main topic,subtopic,notes
+N00001,gargling with bleach will prevent/cure – also appears as satire,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00002,drinking corona beer will prevent/cure – also appears as satire,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00003,taking acetic acid will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00004,taking steroids will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00005,taking colloidal silver will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00006,taking MMS (which contains chlorine dioxide) can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00007,using essential oils will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00008,gargling with salt water will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00009,gargling with ethanol will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00010,eating raw garlic will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00011,garlic will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00012,spraying normal drinking alcohol on body will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00013,spraying chlorine on body prevents coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00014,drinking or washing in sesame oil prevents coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00015,using a hand dryer will kill corona virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00016,drinking water every 15 minutes will wash virus to the stomach where it will die,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00017,drinking hot water will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00018,avoiding eating ice cream will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00019,rinsing your nose with saline will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00020,aspirating boiling water vapor for five minutes deactivates the coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00021,having a pneumonia shot will prevent you from getting the disease,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00022,having a flu shot will prevent you from getting the disease,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00023,using cocaine prevents/cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00024,Asians are more likely to get Covid 19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00025,Wearing more than one mask will help prevent the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00026,It is dangerous to receive packages from china,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00027,It is dangerous to eat in a Chinese restaurant (more so than other restaurants),,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00028,Cold weather and snow can kill off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00029,Warmer weather will kill off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00030,Taking a hot bath prevents COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00031,Hand dryers are effective in killing off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00032,Antibiotics are effective in preventing and treating the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00033,Vinegar is more effective than hand sanitizer,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00034,Gargling with Vinegar prevents covid-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00035,Hand sanitizer does not work,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00036,Shuanghuanglian (Chinese medical herb) can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00037,drinking cow urine and applying cow dung on the body can cure coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00038,there is no risk to mass public gatherings as the virus is impossible to contract outdoors,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00039,drinking water every 15 minutes will prevent coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00040,Miracle Mineral Supplement cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00041,silver-infused toothpaste will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00042,Kenneth Copeland can cure the virus directly from his tv studio,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00043,you have to be with someone for 10 minutes to catch the virus from them,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00044,"taking ibuprofen makes COVID-19 worse, especially in new patients",,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00045,reading the Quran will make you immune,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00046,you can kill the virus by holding a blow dryer up to your nose,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00047,Sheep head’s soup is a preventative,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00048,Lemon and bicarbonate kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00049,Lemon juice with salt is a cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00050,Lemon juice with Chinese mesona is a cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00051,Lemon juice with turmeric prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00052,Consuming alcoholic beverages may help reduce the risk of infection by the novel coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00053,Coronavirus will be cured after 14 hours of curfew,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00054,Bitter gourd juice can cure coronavirus in two hours,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00055,“Gale of the wind” and neem tree leaves can prevent corona virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00056,Sitting in the sunlight will cure COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00057,Coronavirus can be cured by sniffing clove and camphor,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00058,Green chiretta can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00059,Eating bananas will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00060,15 minutes in Sauna will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00061,Morel mushrooms increase risk by 200%,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00062,Eating onions with salt will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00063,Propolis cures COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00064,Arsenic album-30 homeopathic medicine can prevent coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00065,Drinking boiled garlic water cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00066,A bovine vaccine can be used to inoculate people against coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00067,Shaving your beard prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00068,Turkish raki prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00069,Constant sex kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00070,An alkaline diet prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00071,Volcanic ash kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00072,Ketamine can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00073,Putting an opinion in your room can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00074,Black tea can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00075,Pu’er tea can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00076,Environmental enzymes can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00077,Cocaine kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00078,Corona virus is just a cold,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00079,Covid 19 is a normal flu and is no more dangerous than that,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00080,Children cannot catch corona virus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00081,SARS-CoV-2 is mutating faster than normal viruses,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00082,Pregnant women who have Covid 19 can pass the virus through the placenta to the unborn child,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00083,Covid 19 only affects the elderly,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00084,The SARS-CoV-2 virus can be transmitted through mosquito bite,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00085,Africans are immune,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00086,Vegetarians are immune,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00087,People in India can resist the coronavirus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00088,People with type-A blood are more prone to get coronavirus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00089,Everyone with Covid 19 dies,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00090,There is no corona (virus),,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00091,This is “fake news” invented by Trump to strengthen the dollar,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00092,Chloroquine in any amount can cure Covid 19,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00093,The outbreak of covid 19 is not real,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00094,COVID-19 breeds rapidly in toilet paper,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00095,Turks area immune to covid-19,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00096,Coronavirus is caused by snakes,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00097,Coronavirus activates all bacterias and viruses in your body,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00098,It was created in a lab,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00099,It is a US/CIA created bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00100,It is a Chinese bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00101,It is a Russian bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00102,It leaked from a bio-weapons lab in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00103,It leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00104,It was caused by an infected rat biting a student in the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00105,"March 12, Ayatollah Khamenei falsely claimed that there is evidence that COVID-19 might be a “biological attack.”",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00106,Electromagnetic fields and the introduction of 5G wireless technologies led to Covid 19 outbreaks,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00107,Washing hands is propaganda by soap companies,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00108,This was a plan from Gate Foundation to increase the Gate’s wealth,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00109,Qatar knew abut Covid-19 since 2015 and Doha paid billions to China to “grow the virus”,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00110,Corona virus is being spread by Coca-Cola,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00111,US military brought the virus to Wuhan on October 2019,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00112,Bill Gates and Vatican have a plan to depopulate world with coronavirus vaccine,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00113,Saddam Hussein in 90s told his cabinet that US threatened to spread coronavirus if he didn’t follow US commands,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00114,Cuba gave a vaccine to China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00115,Cuba has a vaccine called Interferon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00116,Israel found the cure,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00117,China finds a vaccine 3/17,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00118,Institut Pasteur in France invented COVID-19,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00119,"COVID-19 is no worse than other outbreaks, it is just being hyped to hurt Trump",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00120,COVID-19 is a scripted narrative to justify closed borders,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00121,COVID-19 is a scripted narrative to force people to stay at home,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00122,Egypt developed cure (doctor developed a fluid),,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00123,Egypt gave China the vaccine,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00124,US has 40 thousands troops immune to COVID-19 conducting an invasion of Europe,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00125,CDC admits coronavirus originated in the US,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00126,Cow urine and feces can cure,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00127,COVID-19 was created in 2014 by an English Institute,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00128,Ecuadorean doctor develops vaccine 3/3,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00129,Filipino student develops vaccine and gets 5million US from Alibaba founder Jack Ma,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00130,"Raúl Rodolfo Abhduz Khan, biochemical engineer from Karmalah Laboratories, is the creator of coronavirus.",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00131,If you can hold your breath for 10 seconds you don’t have Covid 19,,covid19,False Diagnostic Procedures,
+N00132,NYC is under martial law 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00133,Only people who have tested positive need to stay home and isolate themselves,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00134,Only large gatherings have to be stopped,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00135,All human interaction needs to be stopped,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00136,Coronavirus is spread only by coughing and sneezing,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00137,Social distancing will lead to dramatic immediate results,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00138,1 month of social distancing will stop the epidemic permanently,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00139,Friend/relative at Pentagon said the US is going on total lockdown,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00140,Friend/relative at White House said the US is going on total lockdown,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00141,Russia has unleashed over 500 lions to ensure that people stay inside their homes amid the coronavirus outbreak,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00142,In Spain – free internet during 60 days due to quarantine,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00143,Polish telecommunications company used quarantine as a cover up to put 100 5G antennas in Gdynia,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00144,Riots in London due to unavailability of food leading to lockdown and martial law 3/22,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00145,In USA Helicopters are spraying disinfectants to try to eradicate coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00146,Bangalore Municipal body will be spraying medicine in the air to kill coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00147,Homeland Security is mobilizing the national guard to combat coronavirus 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00148,Janta curfew in India will break the chain of transmission,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00149,Elderly people in Brazil who are caught wandering outside with have their pensions cancelled by the government,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00150,People in Spain are committing suicide due to quarantine 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00151,Parks in Adra Spain are being fumigated with poison,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00152,Spanish helicopters are spreading medicines against coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00153,Oman helicopters are spraying pesticides to eliminate coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00154,Venezuela helicopters are going to spread chemicals against coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00155,Trump will impose a nationwide mandatory quarantine in 38 to 72 hours 3/16,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00156,Military in Philadelphia are preparing to invoke martial law and bring citizens to FEMA camps,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00157,Supermarkets are recalling coronavirus-infected toilet paper,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00158,Pence urges people with coronavirus to go to police 3/2,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00159,Police in China kill covid-19 patients 3/2,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00160,Chinese coronavirus patients are being cremated alive 2/25,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00161,Pandemic caused Venice’s water to be clear so the swans returned,,covid19,Good News Stories,
+N00162,Pandemic caused Venice’s water to be clear so the dolphins returned,,covid19,Good News Stories,
+N00163,Elephants break into a village due to social distancing and get drunk on corn wine,,covid19,Good News Stories,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/phases.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/phases.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..284c31b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/phases.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+disarm_id,name,name_DE,rank,summary,summary_DE,longname
+P01,Plan,Planung,1,"Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effective ways of achieving it. Communicate the vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on expected results.",,P01 - Plan
+P02,Prepare,Vorbereitung,2,"Activities conducted before execution to improve the ability to conduct the action. Examples include: development of the ecosystem needed to support the action: people, network, channels, content etc.",,P02 - Prepare
+P03,Execute,Durchführung,3,"Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-up and/or maintaining presence etc.",,P03 - Execute
+P04,Assess,Auswertung,4,"Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in future plans ",,P04 - Assess
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/playbooks.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/playbooks.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da8ca12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/playbooks.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+disarm_id,object_id,name,summary
+PB00001,C00011,Game Mechanics: show examples of fake news and train the user to identify them on the basis of various types of indicators,
+PB00002,C00011,Game mechanics: use a crowd-sourced mechanism so that the public can categorize newly spreading news sources or articles a la Re-Captcha,
+PB00003,C00012,Develop a regulatory body like the CFPB to regulate and enforce regulation for digital organizations. ,
+PB00004,C00012,Government regulation,
+PB00005,C00012,Government shutdown. ,
+PB00006,C00017,Use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . ,
+PB00007,C00019,"Spread Infographics & Training Material teaching ways to identify and counter divisive rhetorical techniques and content, by stimulating their sense of outrage at being manipulated. Show them how to address the rhetorical technique rather than the content",
+PB00008,C00019,Twitter hashtags & paid advertising,
+PB00009,C00019,Teach people to identify non-civil/unconstructive conversations and call them out,
+PB00010,C00019,"Popularize (via memes, infographics) and get the centrists demographic who are tired of polarization to identify such messaging, call it out and display their outrage on the basis of divisive rhetorical techniques rather than merely arguing about the content",
+PB00011,C00027,Recruit respected thought leaders to model behavior,
+PB00012,C00027,Feature established respected thought leaders to model behavior,
+PB00013,C00027,Promote dialog from communities with disparate viewpoints,
+PB00014,C00027,"Establish facilitation guidelines for ""civil"" interaction.",
+PB00015,C00029,Identify ignorant agents (ex: anti-vaxx people willing to pay money to advertise their cause),
+PB00016,C00029,Sell physical merchandise that has instructive counter-effect,
+PB00017,C00029,"Secondary Objective: Obtain real-life identity of ignorant agents, to further disrupt their influence activities",
+PB00018,C00031,Create multiple versions of the narrative and amplify. ,
+PB00019,C00031,"Dissect narrative, piecemeal the components and then amplify",
+PB00020,C00032,Hijack hashtag and redirect conversation to truth based content. ,
+PB00021,C00032,Hijack (man in the middle) redirect from bad content to good content,
+PB00022,C00036,-Discredit via backstopped blogs/websites showing their past activity and opinions as being opposite to their current ingroup,
+PB00023,C00036,Create a trail of commentary about their idea of infiltrating the enemy (current in-group),
+PB00024,C00036,Publicize this by targeting their in-group competitors (ignorant agents),
+PB00025,C00040,Verify personal credentials ,
+PB00026,C00040,Syndicated reputation management (fact-checking syndication),
+PB00027,C00040,Academia ISAO,
+PB00028,C00044,Rate restrict via regulation posting above a statistical threshold,
+PB00029,C00044,Unless account is de-anonymized and advertised as automated messaging,
+PB00030,C00048,"Identify the accounts, the real person's name and shame them on social media.",
+PB00031,C00053,Social media companies remove inactive accounts,
+PB00032,C00053,Account holders remove accounts they're no longer using. ,
+PB00033,C00053,"Influencers encourage people to remove their inactive accounts ""Do you really need that old account"" campaign, world-war-two poster-style. ",
+PB00034,C00053,"Create alternative memorial websites for accounts of deceased people, so their accounts can't be reactivated on 'live' sites. ",
+PB00035,C00053,Educate/scare users on the risks of losing control over a dormant account (would their employer be forgiving if an account associated with the user suddenly starting posting extremist content?).,
+PB00036,C00074,Platform adds a hash of the post to the post metadata and make it publicly available (content addressing). Scrape for duplicate content and deplatform the content/users across affected. In all cases some checks need to prevent deplatforming of highly correlated organic traffic such as a community group copy/pasting their bake sale advert. ,
+PB00037,C00074,Platform adds plagiarism score metadata to a post and makes it publicly available. Scrape for duplicate content and deplatform the content/users across affected platforms.,
+PB00038,C00074,Use message hashing and fuzzy hashing to detect identical/similar content.,
+PB00039,C00074,Use plagiarism algorithm to detect similar blog posts.,
+PB00040,C00074,"Use basic web scraping techniques, Google dorks, etc to identify similar head lines, uniques phrases, authorship, embedded links and any other correlating data point.",
+PB00041,C00098,Affected person contacts platform for action,
+PB00042,C00136,"Work with platform to identify active target audiences through finanical data and messaging.
+",
+PB00043,C00136,Use a platform's publicly available advertising/targeting capabilities to enumerate a list of possible microtargeted demographics. Compare these to known TAs of past/ongoing influence ops to identify the vulnerable demographics. ,
+PB00044,C00140,"DDoS adversary link shorteners by spamming real links.
+",
+PB00045,C00140,Compromise service and reroute links to benign content or counter messaging.,
+PB00046,C00148,Degrade TA engagement using bots; direct the adversary to engage insular bot communities-within-communities rather than the authentic target audience.,
+PB00047,C00148,Degrade MOEs/MOPs by faking inter-community sharing.,
+PB00048,C00149,"Distort TA demographics by posting irrelevant content, misleading demogaphic data, etc.",
+PB00049,C00149,"Work with the media platform to distort publicly available metrics. Can we work with Twitter to get crappy off-brand memes artificially bumped without needing to create fake accounts, etc.?",
+PB00050,C00149,"Use adtech to promote content inconsistent with TA demographics. If the adversary is reverse engineering a groups demographics by analyzing ads placed on the platform/group, by spamming ads for out-group stuff it may distort analysis of the group.",
+PB00051,C00149,"Distort Google Trends and other publicly available source of metrics using bots, cyborgs, adtech.",
+PB00052,C00149,Distort TA emotional response to content/narratives.,
+PB00053,C00149,Promote damp squibs. Within a known TA promote/inflate crappy off-brand memes which are unlikley to resonate.,
+PB00054,C00149,"Detect early trending/engagement and undermine the content by responding with 5Ds, toxic community behaviour, satirical responses, etc.",
+PB00055,C00149,"If adtech is used, fake clicks and engagements on the content.",
+PB00056,C00174,Elected officials lead return to First Amendment norms that embrace free and fair media as central to democracy.,
+PB00057,C00188,"TechCamp bringing together local journalists, with a several-day training program that includes a sponsored yearlong investigative project",
+PB00058,C00197,"Create a standard reporting format and method for social platforms for reporting false accounts. 
+",
+PB00059,C00197,Determine whether account might be compromised,"Questions: - Is the account compromised? 
+- Is it known to be associated with threat actors 
+- common/random name 
+- Names violate terms of service 
+- Dormant account 
+- Change of country IP
+- Social network growth patterns (number of friends etc) 
+- Evidence of linguistic artifacts (multiple fingerprints, terms/idiosyncrasies )
+- Community vs. narrative vs. individuals "
+PB00060,C00197,Report suspected bots.,
+PB00061,C00197,"Report ToS violations. In all playbooks the platform must force user verification, credential reset and enable MFA. Suspend the account if it cannot be verified.",
+PB00062,C00197,Use sites like https://haveibeenpwned.com to detect compromised and at risk user accounts. ,
+PB00063,C00197,"Monitor for unusual account usage (use of VPN, new geographic location, unusual usage hours, etc). ",
+PB00064,C00197,Detect sudden deviation in user sentiment such as suddenly dropping hashtags linked to extremist content.,
+PB00065,C00197,"Purchase ""likes"", ""retweets"" and other vehicles which identify a bot and/or hijacked account. Ban the account.",
+PB00066,C00197,"Detect hijacked account and spam their posts. ""OP is a known disinformation bot. http://link.to.proof[.]com""",
+PB00067,C00219,Add date and source to images,
+PB00068,F00002,"Develop a baseline virality per platform, monitor trends, trigger alert for anomalies.",
+PB00069,F00003,"Destroy Desire to Work for Propaganda Businesses
+","-Identify non-committed actors (ie. IRA 2$/h employees)
+-Identify where they reside (ie. postal code level)
+-Send a viral message that clarifies the risk of working in influence ops. "
+PB00070,F00003,"Hack personal accounts
+-Send inflammatory messages on their behalf",
+PB00071,F00004,Identify target and entice individual to reveal insider information,
+PB00072,F00005,"-Model communities on the basis of behavior and identity, etc
+-Model different online behaviors in terms of how these groups interact with propaganda
+-Model how these group-based behaviors are affected by the tech platform they are using
+-This research can feed into later-stage playbooks to adapt them to communities/platforms",
+PB00073,F00006,Model each major platform,"Determine:
+a) Moderation Method (global, subcommunity level, none -ie. twitter, reddit, 8chan)
+b) Access Model (friend request, open, real-life identity)
+c) Communication Model (global, friends only, subcommunity, hybrid)
+Determine how the combination of the above (and other characteristics) allow different technical methods to communicate and influence various audiences
+This will allow to adapt playbooks to specific platforms"
+PB00074,F00013,"- Trace money and financing 
+- Trace connections to known operations",
+PB00075,F00014,"- Hashes
+- Data voids
+- User handles 
+- Domains + link shortener
+- TinEye For video (visual artifact)",
+PB00076,F00017,Create standard scoring for emptional content,
+PB00077,F00018,"Ad tech 
+- De-platform funding sites 
+- Blockchain transaction 
+- Sell items
+- Identify manufacturers 
+- Pay to play meetings ",
+PB00078,F00018,"Identify ad tech on platforms 
+- Selling merch? 
+- Financial platform
+- Bitcoin etc.. .",
+PB00079,F00018,"Identify re-use of ads
+","Look at Ad trackers, Tracking ids, Tracking ads, Re-use of as features (language, name, themes, plug-in, re-use/versions)"
+PB00080,F00018,track funding sources,
+PB00081,F00077,Build and update a model bot behaviour. ,
+PB00082,F00077,Build network of companies that model / rate bots. Build standards around data sharing and exchange,
+PB00083,F00092,"Build a reporting system for the public, so they can report disinformation artefacts and have them available to channels etc for action. ",
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/removed_externalgroups.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/removed_externalgroups.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52e1ebb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/removed_externalgroups.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+name,url,description,provides_tools,sector,primary_role,secondary_role,primary_subject,secondary_subject,volunteers,region,country,rand_list,credco_list,carnegie_list,twitter_handle
+4Facts,,,,,,,"Blockchain, Media",,,,,,Y,N,
+BS Detector,https://www.producthunt.com/alternatives/b-s-detector,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
+Buscador: an OSINT linux virtual machine,https://inteltechniques.com/buscador/,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
+Remarrk,twitter.com/remarrk,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
+WikiTribune,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiTribune,,,,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,N,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/removed_tools.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/removed_tools.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01b3071
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/removed_tools.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Active,name,externalgroup,artifacts,automation,function,platform,accessibility,url,code_url,description,notes
+retired,BotCheck.me,RoBhat,accounts,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
+retired,FactCheck.me,RoBhat,,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
+retired,NewsBotAI,RoBhat,,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
+retired,SurfState.me,RoBhat,,,,browser extension,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/resources.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/resources.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47e3f9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/resources.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,resource_type,longname
+R001,datastreams ,Access to streaming data,data,R001 - datastreams 
+R002,funding ,"Money to keep the lights on: for resources, time etc",money,R002 - funding 
+R003,money ,Money for specific resources,money,R003 - money 
+R004,platform algorithms ,Access to the algorithms used in a platform.,algorithms,R004 - platform algorithms 
+R005,slang translation,Translations of slang terms,knowledge,R005 - slang translation
+R006,disinformation datasets,Access to datasets containing disinformation,data,R006 - disinformation datasets
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/responsetypes.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/responsetypes.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60f3d85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/responsetypes.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,longname
+D01,Detect,"Discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems.",D01 - Detect
+D02,Deny,"Prevent disinformation creators from accessing and using critical information, systems, and services. Deny is for an indefinite time period. ",D02 - Deny
+D03,Disrupt,"Completely break or interrupt the flow of information, for a fixed amount of time. (Deny, for a limited time period).  Not allowing any efficacy, for a short amount of time. ",D03 - Disrupt
+D04,Degrade,"Reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of disinformation creators’ command and control or communications systems, and information collection efforts or means, either indefinitely, or for a limited time period. ",D04 - Degrade
+D05,Deceive,Cause a person to believe what is not true. military deception seeks to mislead adversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality.,D05 - Deceive
+D06,Destroy,"Damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. Destroy is permanent, e.g. you can rebuild a website, but it’s not the same website. ",D06 - Destroy
+D07,Deter,Discourage.,D07 - Deter
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/sectors.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/sectors.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74b899d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/sectors.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,longname,Jon's comments
+S001,Nonprofit,,S001 - Nonprofit,"Nonprofit and civil society are not mutually exclusive - in fact, to many, they are the same"
+S002,Civil Society,,S002 - Civil Society,"Nonprofit and civil society are not mutually exclusive - in fact, to many, they are the same"
+S003,Government,,S003 - Government,agree
+S004,Academic,,S004 - Academic,"""Education"" is more the sector - academic is more the term for an individual"
+S005,Activist,,S005 - Activist,Not a sector
+S006,General Public,,S006 - General Public,Not a sector
+S007,Social Media Company,,S007 - Social Media Company,"Social media (delete unecessary ""company"")"
+S008,Other Tech Company,,S008 - Other Tech Company,Technology (excluding social media)
+S009,Other Company,,S009 - Other Company,"Other (delete unecessary ""company"")"
+S010,Media,,S010 - Media,Media (excluding social media)
+,,,,"There are so many industry sectors
+Do we need to just highlight those most relevant to red/blue ttps?
+If so, what about journalism? Fact checking?
+Sub-sectors of government: Law enforcement? Defence?"
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/suggested_externalgroups.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/suggested_externalgroups.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3078b52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/suggested_externalgroups.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+Added?,Name,URL,Has volunteers?,Their description,Notes,Country,Source,Unnamed: 8,Unnamed: 9,Unnamed: 10,Unnamed: 11,Unnamed: 12,Unnamed: 13
+y,Federation of American Scientists,https://fas.org/ncov/disinformation-reports/,y,"Upon recognition of the threat that false information poses to science, the Federation of American Scientists established the Disinformation Research Group (FAS DRG). FAS DRG is composed of scientists, communications experts, data-scientists, and technologists with the intended purpose of detecting, understanding, and effectively exposing disinformation and false narratives surrounding COVID-19. FAS DRG uses multiple methods, technologies, and resources to execute the mission.",,USA,,,,,,,
+y,RealityTeam,http://realityteam.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,CogSecCollab,http://cogsec-collab.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,CTI League Disinformation Team,https://cti-league.com/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,Bellingcat,https://www.bellingcat.com/author/bellingcat/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,Credibility Coalition,https://credibilitycoalition.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,AVAAZ,https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/disinfo_volunteer_231/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,UN Verified project,https://shareverified.com/en,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,Cities on the Internet,https://mwi.pl/,y,,,Poland,,,,,,,
+y,PGP Stronger,https://stronger.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,Czech Elves,https://www.facebook.com/cestielfoveofficial/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+,Iffy News,https://iffy.news/fact-check-search/,,,,,,,,,,,
+,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+cloudflare/circl: CIRCL: Cloudflare Interoperable ... - GitHub,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+"https://github.com/cloudflare/circlCIRCL (Cloudflare Interoperable, Reusable Cryptographic Library) is a collection of cryptographic primitives written in Go. The goal of this library is to be used as ...",,,,,,,,,,,,,
+CIRCL – The Center for Innovative Research in Cyberlearning,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+https://circlcenter.org/Please visit the new Center for Integrative Research in Computing and Learning Sciences (CIRCLS) website to learn about the new Research on Emerging ...,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,name,url,country,operates_in,description,focus,sector,primary_role,notes,provides_tools,volunteers,region,noideawhatthisis
+,Balkan Investigative Reporting Network,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Baltic Internet Policy Initiative,,,,Check this,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
+,BBC Media Action ,https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/our-work/covid-19,UK,Global ,"In a crisis, people need the right information to help keep themselves and their families safe. When the COVID-19 outbreak began, we responded quickly – training and working with partners to produce trusted, accurate and timely content for social media, radio and television, to help slow the spread of the novel coronavirus and counter harmful mis- and dis-information...In a crisis, people need the right information to help keep themselves and their families safe. When the COVID-19 outbreak began, we responded quickly – training and working with partners to produce trusted, accurate and timely content for social media, radio and television, to help slow the spread of the novel coronavirus and counter harmful mis- and dis-information.",Disinformation,Charity,,"Our dedicated teams moved rapidly to adapt our existing projects to address the knock-on effects of COVID-19 – from increased levels of violence against women, to children losing out on an education during lockdown. Through media, we’re helping people understand what they can do, individually and as a community, and how they can hold their leaders to account.",,,Europe,
+,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,,,,,,,,,"We are committed to supporting the international response for the long haul – helping people to survive, cope and recover from COVID-19, meeting their diverse and changing needs, and supporting local media to keep their communities informed.",,,,
+,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,,,,,,,,,"As an independent charity, we are not funded by the BBC TV Licence Fee. We rely on the support of generous donors – governments, foundations, corporations and individuals – to make our work possible.",,,,
+,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,,,,,,,,,Trusted and accurate information will save lives.,,,,
+,Delfi Melo Detekto,https://www.delfi.lt/news/melo-detektorius/,Lithuania,,,disinformation,,,,,,,
+,Demagog Poland,https://demagog.org.pl/,Poland,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
+,DPA,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,ECDC,,,Europe,,,,,,,,,
+,Ekspress Meedia / Eesti Päevaleht,https://epl.delfi.ee/kategooria/86056905/faktikontroll-1,Estonia,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
+,Eurasia Partnership Foundation,https://epfarmenia.am,Armena,Armenia/Eurasia,,,,,,,,,
+,European External Action Service,https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en,EU,EU,,Disinformation,,;Public policy;,"""Disinformation is 'verifiably false or misleading information created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public'. Misinformation is verifiably false information that is spread without the intention to mislead, and often shared because the user believes it to be true.""                                      -(action plan):https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54866/action-plan-against-disinformation_en",,,Europe,
+,Fact and Furious ,https://factandfurious.com,France,Europe,recently reported on paid influencers campaigns to descredit AZ vaccine,Disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Journalism;Fact checking;,,,,Europe,
+,Facta,https://facta.news/,Italy,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,,,,Europe,
+,Factcheck Vlaanderen,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Factchecking Finland,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Faktoje.al,https://faktoje.al/,Albania,Albania,,,,,,,,,
+,Freedom of Information Center of Armenia ,http://www.foi.am/en/,Armenia,Armenia,"online fact-checking courses, capacity building in media literacy for range of audiences",,,,,,,,
+,Georgia's Reforms Associates (GRASS),https://factcheck.ge/ka,Georgia,Georgia,,,,,,,,,
+,Influence,https://startinfluence.com/,USA,USA,"Influence Apps, Inc. is a strategic communications tool that simplifies complex technologies and techniques to help governments counter bad actors online. Powered by ad tech industry and government communications experts, Influence offers a suite of services that provide government operators tools for real-time sentiment analysis and communication campaign management.",,Technology,,,,,North America,Yes
+,Internews,,,,,,,,,,,Europe,
+,Maldita,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Media Checker,https://www.mediachecker.ge/,Georgia,Georgia,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
+,Media Development Foundation,http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/home,Georgia,Georgia,,,,,,,,,
+,Media Initiatives Centre,https://mediainitiatives.am/,Armenia,Armenia,Training. Runs the “Verified” section of the media.am website,,,,,,,,
+,MisInfoCon,https://misinfocon.com/about,,Global ,"MisinfoCon is a global movement focused on building solutions to online trust, verification, fact checking, and reader experience in the interest of addressing misinformation in all of its forms. MisinfoCon started as a large gathering at MIT in February 2017. That conference brought together ambassadors from technology platforms, news organizations, as well as experts in social science, media literacy, policy, advocacy and cybersecurity. Ever since then, MisinfoCon has focused on bringing people together in similar meetups, while facilitating online community and resource sharing.",Disinformation,NGO,;Network;,,,,Europe,
+,OECD,https://disinformation.the100questions.org,France ?,Global ,"100 questions initiative ""bilinguals"" (people with expertise in topical field and data science) to ID the 10 most pertinent disinformation questions to then be addressed",Disinformation,civil Society/NGO,Disinformation;Research (primary/secondary);,,,,Europe,
+,On the other side of the news,https://coronafakes.com,Ukraine,Ukraine,,disinformation,civil society,,,,,Europe,
+,Ostro,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Pledge to Pause,https://www.takecarebeforeyoushare.org/,,,Not checked yet,,,,,,,,
+,Raskrikavanje,https://www.raskrikavanje.rs/,Serbia,Serbia,Site run by Krik,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking; journalism,,,,Europe,
+,Reuters Fact Check,,UK,Global ,"Reuters Fact Check monitors digital platforms for misinformation that is linked to news events and to subjects that are being discussed by the communities we serve. We actively seek out groups and accounts that represent opposing viewpoints and apply the same standards of assessment to all content. Our choice of material to fact check is broad, and is based on the following criteria: [Could the material potentially cause real-world harm, if it is inaccurate?; Editorial value: is the topic timely and of public interest?; Reach: how far has the claim travelled? We examine the level of interactions on individual posts, as well as the visibility of the claim across different platforms.; Potential reach: is the information likely to be shared further? We examine how quickly the post is generating interaction and consider whether it may be repeated by others.; Balance of fact vs opinion: is it possible to isolate certain claims from the material?; After we have identified the content we aim to fact-check, we will first identify and summarize the key claims made in the content.; ",Disinformation,,;Fact checking ;,,,,Europe,
+,Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA),https://www.disinfobservatory.org/about-us/,Belgium,EU (members of the Observatory),"Offer fact checking tools, collaboartive  investigation ",Disinformation,,;Disinformation monitoring ;,,,,Europe,
+,Stanford University: Information Warfare Working Group; European Security Initiative (Center for International Security and Cooperation),https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/information-warfare-working-group,USA,USA,The Information Warfare Working Group is housed at The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. It is a multidisciplinary group of Stanford University scholars that meet quarterly to discuss the issue of cyber-enabled information warfare.,,Education/academia,,,,,North America,
+,Stop Fake ,https://www.stopfake.org/en/main/,Ukraine,Russia/Ukraine,,Disinformation,NGO,;fact checking  ;,Member of International Fact-Checking Network,,,Europe,
+,Stop Fals,https://stopfals.md/,Moldova,Moldova,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
+,Teyit,https://teyit.org/,Turkey,Turkey,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
+,The Goethe insititut with International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA),https://www.goethe.de/en/kul/bib/ser/lib/eiv.html,Germany ,Global ,,Disinformation,civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
+,Tjek det,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Translators without Borders,,World,World,,,,,,,,World,
+,Trolless,https://www.facebook.com/trolless/,Moldova,Moldova,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
+,UNDP,https://www1.undp.org/content/oslo-governance-centre/en/home/our-focus/Information-Integrity.html,,Regional/Global,,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);","""Information integrity""",,,Europe,
+,UNESCO,,World,World,,,,,,,,World,
+,UNICEF/ECARO,https://www.unicef.org/eca/,Geneva,Regional,no IDM page available,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);",Main focus on Vaccine Confidence Project (VCP). https://worldhealthorg.sharepoint.com/:w:/r/sites/WHERegionalOfficeforEurope/_layouts/15/Doc.aspx?sourcedoc=%7B3176E00E-9252-4DAB-946E-895288D3071B%7D&file=UNICEF%20-%20Social%20Listening%20Capacity%20Building%20Plan%202021.docx&action=default&mobileredirect=true,,,Europe,
+,Valent Projects,,UK,,Not checked yet.  Analyses misinformation for UK govt. ,,,,,,,Europe,
+,VoxCheck,https://voxukraine.org/uk/voxcheck/,Ukraine,Ukraine,,disinformation,civil society,,,,,Europe,
+,VoxUkraine,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,WHO Epidemic and Pandemic Intelligence Hub,,Germany,Global ,,Disinformation,WHO,;disinformation;,,,,Europe,
+,WHO-EPI WiN,https://www.who.int/teams/risk-communication/infodemic-management,Geneva,,,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);",,,,Europe,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/tactics.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/tactics.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..179135b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/tactics.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+disarm_id,name,name_DE,phase_id,rank,summary,summary_DE,changes from v0.1,longname
+TA01,Plan Strategy,,P01,1,"Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all objectives.",,no change,TA01 - Plan Strategy
+TA02,Plan Objectives,,P01,2,"Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievable objectives. Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the desired end state. There are four primary considerations: 
+- Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives 
+- The effect should be measurable 
+- The objective statement should not specify the way and means of accomplishment 
+- The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task.",,no change,TA02 - Plan Objectives
+TA05,Microtarget,,P02,8,Target very specific populations of people,,no change,TA05 - Microtarget
+TA06,Develop Content,,P02,5,"Create or acquire text, images, and other content",,no change,TA06 - Develop Content
+TA07,Select Channels and Affordances,,P02,9,"Selecting platforms and affordances assesses which online or offline platforms and their associated affordances maximize an influence operation’s  ability to reach its target audience. To select the most appropriate platform(s), an operation may  assess the technological affordances including platform algorithms, terms of service, permitted content types, or other attributes that  determine platform usability and accessibility. Selecting platforms includes both choosing platforms on which the operation will publish its own  content and platforms on which the operation will attempt to restrict adversarial content.",,no change,TA07 - Select Channels and Affordances
+TA08,Conduct Pump Priming,,P03,10,"Release content on a targetted small scale, prior to general release, including releasing seed. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. ",,no change,TA08 - Conduct Pump Priming
+TA09,Deliver Content,,P03,11,Release content to general public or larger population,,no change,TA09 - Deliver Content
+TA10,Drive Offline Activity,,P03,14,"Move incident/campaign from online to offline. Encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage in the physical information space or offline world. This may include operation-aligned rallies or protests, radio, newspaper, or billboards. An influence  operation may drive to physical forums to diversify its information channels and facilitate spaces where the target audience can engage with both operation content and like-minded individuals offline.  ",,no change,TA10 - Drive Offline Activity
+TA11,Persist in the Information Environment,,P03,15,Persist in the Information Space refers to taking measures that allow an operation to maintain its presence and avoid takedown by an external entity. Techniques in Persist in the Information Space help campaigns operate without detection and appear legitimate to the target audience and platform monitoring services. Influence operations on social media often persist online by varying the type of information  assets and platforms used throughout the campaign.,,no change,TA11 - Persist in the Information Environment
+TA12,Assess Effectiveness,,P04,16,"Assess effectiveness of action, for use in future plans ",,no change,TA12 - Assess Effectiveness
+TA13,Target Audience Analysis,,P01,3,"Identifying and analyzing the target audience examines target audience member locations,  political affiliations, financial situations, and other attributes that an influence operation may incorporate into its messaging strategy. During this tactic, influence operations may also identify  existing similarities and differences between target audience members to unite like groups and  divide opposing groups. Identifying and analyzing target audience members allows influence operations to tailor  operation strategy and content to their analysis. ",,no change,TA13 - Target Audience Analysis
+TA14,Develop Narratives,,P02,4,"The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a """"whole of society"""" perspective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion constitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level. Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline.",,new,TA14 - Develop Narratives
+TA15,Establish Social Assets,,P02,6,"Establishing information assets generates messaging tools, including social media accounts,  operation personnel, and organizations, including directly and indirectly managed assets. For assets under their direct control, the operation can add,  change, or remove these assets at will.  
+Establishing information assets allows an influence operation to promote messaging directly to  the target audience without navigating through external entities. Many online influence operations create or compromise social media accounts as a primary vector of information  dissemination.",,new,TA15 - Establish Social Assets
+TA16,Establish Legitimacy,,P02,7,Establish assets that create trust,,new,TA16 - Establish Legitimacy
+TA17,Maximize Exposure,,P03,12,"Maximize exposure of the target audience to incident/campaign content via flooding, amplifying, and cross-posting.",,new,TA17 - Maximize Exposure
+TA18,Drive Online Harms,,P03,13,"Actions taken by an influence operation to harm their opponents in online spaces through harassment, suppression, releasing private information, and controlling the information space through offensive cyberspace operations. ",,new,TA18 - Drive Online Harms
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/tasks.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/tasks.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5adf47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/tasks.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+disarm_id,name,name_DE,tactic_id,summary,summary_DE,framework_id,longname
+TK0001,Goal setting,,TA01,Set the goals for this incident. ,,FW01,TK0001 - Goal setting
+TK0002,Population research / audience analysis (centre of gravity),,TA01,"Research intended audience.  Includes audience segmentation, hot-button issues etc. ",,FW01,TK0002 - Population research / audience analysis (centre of gravity)
+TK0003,Campaign design (objective design),,TA01,Design the campaign(s) needed to meet the incident goals,,FW01,TK0003 - Campaign design (objective design)
+TK0031,OPSEC for TA01,,TA01,OPSEC for TA01,,FW02,TK0031 - OPSEC for TA01
+TK0004,Identify target subgroups,,TA02,Identify groups that can best be used to meet incident goals,,FW01,TK0004 - Identify target subgroups
+TK0005,Analyse subgroups,,TA02,Analyse subgroups,,FW01,TK0005 - Analyse subgroups
+TK0006,create master narratives,,TA02,create master narratives,,FW01,TK0006 - create master narratives
+TK0007,Decide on techniques (4Ds etc),,TA02,Decide on techniques (4Ds etc),,FW01,TK0007 - Decide on techniques (4Ds etc)
+TK0008,Create subnarratives,,TA02,Create subnarratives,,FW01,TK0008 - Create subnarratives
+TK0009,4chan/8chan coordinating content,,TA02,4chan/8chan coordinating content,,FW01,TK0009 - 4chan/8chan coordinating content
+TK0032,OPSEC for TA02,,TA02,OPSEC for TA02,,FW02,TK0032 - OPSEC for TA02
+TK0010,Create personas,,TA15,Create personas,,FW01,TK0010 - Create personas
+TK0011,Recruit contractors,,TA15,Recruit contractors,,FW01,TK0011 - Recruit contractors
+TK0012,Recruit partisans,,TA15,Recruit partisans,,FW01,TK0012 - Recruit partisans
+TK0013,find influencers,,TA15,find influencers,,FW01,TK0013 - find influencers
+TK0033,OPSEC for TA15,,TA15,OPSEC for TA15,,FW02,TK0033 - OPSEC for TA15
+TK0014,Network building,,TA15,Network building,,FW01,TK0014 - Network building
+TK0015,Network infiltration,,TA15,Network infiltration,,FW01,TK0015 - Network infiltration
+TK0016,identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks,,TA15,identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks,,FW01,TK0016 - identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks
+TK0034,OPSEC for TA15,,TA15,OPSEC for TA15,,FW02,TK0034 - OPSEC for TA15
+TK0035,OPSEC for TA05,,TA05,OPSEC for TA05,,FW02,TK0035 - OPSEC for TA05
+TK0017,content creation,,TA06,content creation,,FW01,TK0017 - content creation
+TK0018,content appropriation,,TA06,content appropriation,,FW01,TK0018 - content appropriation
+TK0036,OPSEC for TA06,,TA06,OPSEC for TA06,,FW02,TK0036 - OPSEC for TA06
+TK0037,OPSEC for TA07,,TA07,OPSEC for TA07,,FW02,TK0037 - OPSEC for TA07
+TK0019,anchor trust / credibility,,TA08,anchor trust / credibility,,FW01,TK0019 - anchor trust / credibility
+TK0020,insert themes,,TA08,insert themes,,FW01,TK0020 - insert themes
+TK0038,OPSEC for TA08,,TA08,OPSEC for TA08,,FW02,TK0038 - OPSEC for TA08
+TK0021,"deamplification (suppression, censoring)",,TA09,"deamplification (suppression, censoring)",,FW01,"TK0021 - deamplification (suppression, censoring)"
+TK0022,amplification,,TA09,amplification,,FW01,TK0022 - amplification
+TK0039,OPSEC for TA09,,TA09,OPSEC for TA09,,FW02,TK0039 - OPSEC for TA09
+TK0040,OPSEC for TA10,,TA10,OPSEC for TA10,,FW02,TK0040 - OPSEC for TA10
+TK0023,retention,,TA11,retention,,FW01,TK0023 - retention
+TK0024,customer relationship,,TA11,customer relationship,,FW01,TK0024 - customer relationship
+TK0025,advocacy/ zealotry,,TA11,advocacy/ zealotry,,FW01,TK0025 - advocacy/ zealotry
+TK0026,conversion,,TA11,conversion,,FW01,TK0026 - conversion
+TK0027,keep recruiting/prospecting,,TA11,keep recruiting/prospecting,,FW01,TK0027 - keep recruiting/prospecting
+TK0041,OPSEC for TA11,,TA11,OPSEC for TA11,,FW02,TK0041 - OPSEC for TA11
+TK0028,evaluation,,TA12,evaluation,,FW01,TK0028 - evaluation
+TK0029,post-mortem,,TA12,post-mortem,,FW01,TK0029 - post-mortem
+TK0030,after-action analysis,,TA12,after-action analysis,,FW01,TK0030 - after-action analysis
+TK0042,OPSEC for TA12,,TA12,OPSEC for TA12,,FW02,TK0042 - OPSEC for TA12
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/techniques.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/techniques.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd8edc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/techniques.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+disarm_id,name,name_DE,tactic_id,summary,summary_DE,changes from v0.1,longname
+T0002,Facilitate State Propaganda,,TA02,Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.,,no change,T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003,Leverage Existing Narratives,,TA14,"Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. ",,no change,T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0004,Develop Competing Narratives,,TA14,"Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the ""firehose of misinformation"" approach.",,no change,T0004 - Develop Competing Narratives
+T0007,Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups,,TA15,"Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.",,no change,T0007 - Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups
+T0009,Create fake experts,,TA16,"Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. ",,no change,T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0009.001,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications,,TA16,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications,,no change,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications - 
+T0010,Cultivate ignorant agents,,TA15,"Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as ""useful idiots"" or ""unwitting agents"".",,no change,T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0011,Compromise legitimate accounts,,TA16,Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.,,no change,T0011 - Compromise legitimate accounts
+T0013,Create inauthentic websites,,TA15,"Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.",,no change,T0013 - Create inauthentic websites
+T0014,Prepare fundraising campaigns,,TA15,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial  support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote  operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged  in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation  may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to  promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.  ",,no change,T0014 - Prepare fundraising campaigns
+T0014.001,Raise funds from malign actors,,TA15,"Raising funds from malign actors may include contributions from foreign agents, cutouts or proxies, shell companies, dark money groups, etc. ",,no change,Raise funds from malign actors - 
+T0014.002,Raise funds from ignorant agents,,TA15,"Raising funds from ignorant agents may include scams, donations intended for one stated purpose but then used for another, etc. ",,no change,Raise funds from ignorant agents - 
+T0015,Create hashtags and search artifacts,,TA06,"Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only ""real"" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage ""conversation"" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). ",,no change,T0015 - Create hashtags and search artifacts
+T0016,Create Clickbait,,TA05,"Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.",,no change,T0016 - Create Clickbait
+T0017,Conduct fundraising,,TA10,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial  support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote  operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged  in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation  may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.  ",,no change,T0017 - Conduct fundraising
+T0017.001,Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns,,TA10,"An influence operation may Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns on platforms such as GoFundMe, GiveSendGo, Tipeee, Patreon, etc.",,no change,Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns - 
+T0018,Purchase Targeted Advertisements,,TA05,Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations,,no change,T0018 - Purchase Targeted Advertisements
+T0019,Generate information pollution,,TA06,"Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. ""Nothing is true, but everything is possible."" Akin to astroturfing campaign.",,no change,T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0019.001,Create fake research,,TA06,"Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx",,no change,Create fake research - 
+T0019.002,Hijack Hashtags,,TA06,"Hashtag hijacking occurs when users “[use] a trending hashtag to promote topics that are substantially different from its recent context” (VanDam and Tan, 2016) or “to promote one’s own social media agenda” (Darius and Stephany, 2019).",,no change,Hijack Hashtags - 
+T0020,Trial content,,TA08,"Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates",,no change,T0020 - Trial content
+T0022,Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"""Conspiracy narratives"" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model. ",,no change,T0022 - Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
+T0022.001,Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"An influence operation may amplify an existing conspiracy theory narrative that aligns with its incident or campaign goals. By amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, operators can leverage the power of the existing communities that support and propagate those theories without needing to expend resources creating new narratives or building momentum and buy in around new narratives. ",,no change,Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives - 
+T0022.002,Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"While this requires more resources than amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, an influence operation may develop original conspiracy theory narratives in order to achieve greater control and alignment over the narrative and their campaign goals. Prominent examples include the USSR's Operation INFEKTION disinformation campaign run by the KGB in the 1980s to plant the idea that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as part of a biological weapons research project at Fort Detrick, Maryland. More recently, Fort Detrick featured prominently in a new conspiracy theory narratives around the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic. ",,no change,Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives - 
+T0023,Distort facts,,TA06,"Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content",,no change,T0023 - Distort facts
+T0023.001,Reframe Context,,TA06,"Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its  intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in  a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions. ",,no change,Reframe Context - 
+T0023.002,Edit Open-Source Content,,TA06,"An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or  encyclopedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without  dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets. ",,no change,Edit Open-Source Content - 
+T0029,Online polls,,TA07,"Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well",,no change,T0029 - Online polls
+T0039 ,Bait legitimate influencers,,TA08,"Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. ""Influencers"" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.",,no change,T0039  - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0040,Demand insurmountable proof,,TA14,"Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the ""firehose of misinformation"". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of ""questions"" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.",,no change,T0040 - Demand insurmountable proof
+T0042,Seed Kernel of truth,,TA08,"Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.",,no change,T0042 - Seed Kernel of truth
+T0043,Chat apps,,TA07,"Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.",,no change,T0043 - Chat apps
+T0043.001,Use Encrypted Chat Apps,,TA07,"Examples include Signal, WhatsApp, Discord, Wire, etc.",,no change,Use Encrypted Chat Apps - 
+T0043.002,Use Unencrypted Chats Apps,,TA07,"Examples include SMS, etc.",,no change,Use Unencrypted Chats Apps - 
+T0044,Seed distortions,,TA08,"Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. ",,no change,T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0045,Use fake experts,,TA08,"Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give ""credility"" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias",,no change,T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0046,Use Search Engine Optimization,,TA08,"Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka ""Black-hat SEO"" ",,no change,T0046 - Use Search Engine Optimization
+T0047,Censor social media as a political force,,TA18,Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).,,no change,T0047 - Censor social media as a political force
+T0048,Harass,,TA18,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation  techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their  dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to  deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.  ",,no change,T0048 - Harass
+T0048.001,"Boycott/""Cancel"" Opponents",,TA18,"Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from  supporting an individual, organization, business, or other entity, usually following a real or  falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasizing an  adversary’s problematic or disputed behavior and presenting its own content as an alternative. ",,no change,"Boycott/""Cancel"" Opponents - "
+T0048.002,Harass People Based on Identities,,TA18,"Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.",,no change,Harass People Based on Identities - 
+T0048.003,Threaten to Dox,,TA18,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information  about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family  members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to  encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals  themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating  conflicting content. ",,no change,Threaten to Dox - 
+T0048.004,Dox,,TA18,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information  about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family  members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to  encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals  themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating  conflicting content. ",,no change,Dox - 
+T0049,Flooding the Information Space,,TA17,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,,no change,T0049 - Flooding the Information Space
+T0049.001,Trolls amplify and manipulate,,TA17,"Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).",,no change,Trolls amplify and manipulate - 
+T0049.002,Hijack existing hashtag,,TA17,Take over an existing hashtag to drive exposure.,,no change,Hijack existing hashtag - 
+T0049.003,Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting,,TA17,"Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using  automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may  use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including  personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. 
+Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more ""popular"" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.",,no change,Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting - 
+T0049.004,Utilize Spamoflauge,,TA17,"Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to  the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk.  Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based  email spam filters, for example, ""you've w0n our jackp0t!"". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting  messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages  in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience  receiving operation messaging. ",,no change,Utilize Spamoflauge - 
+T0049.005,Conduct Swarming,,TA17,"Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with  operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centers exclusively around a specific  event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication”  between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach. ",,no change,Conduct Swarming - 
+T0049.006,Conduct Keyword Squatting,,TA17,"Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social  media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results  of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience  members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around  the term.  ",,no change,Conduct Keyword Squatting - 
+T0049.007,Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives,,TA17,"Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.",,no change,Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives - 
+T0057,Organize Events,,TA10,"Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.",,no change,T0057 - Organize Events
+T0057.001,Pay for Physical Action,,TA10,"Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the  physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations  and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of  people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest. ",,no change,Pay for Physical Action - 
+T0057.002,Conduct Symbolic Action,,TA10,"Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by  signaling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative  of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified  evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space.  ",,no change,Conduct Symbolic Action - 
+T0059,Play the long game,,TA11,Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.,,no change,T0059 - Play the long game
+T0060,Continue to Amplify,,TA11,continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished,,no change,T0060 - Continue to Amplify
+T0061,Sell Merchandise,,TA10,Sell mechandise refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world while making money,,no change,T0061 - Sell Merchandise
+T0065,Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities,,TA15,"Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).",,no change,T0065 - Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities
+T0066,Degrade Adversary,,TA02,Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.,,no change,T0066 - Degrade Adversary
+T0068,Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis,,TA14,"Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. ",,no change,T0068 - Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis
+T0072,Segment Audiences,,TA13,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",,no change,T0072 - Segment Audiences
+T0072.001,Geographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a  region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create  Localized Content (see: Establish Legitimacy).  ",,no change,Geographic Segmentation - 
+T0072.002,Demographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including  age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations  aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence  operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S.  voters over 65 years of age. ",,no change,Demographic Segmentation - 
+T0072.003,Economic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other  financial or economic division. ",,no change,Economic Segmentation - 
+T0072.004,Psychographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses  audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather  psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from  social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes.  ",,no change,Psychographic Segmentation - 
+T0072.005,Political Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially  when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.",,no change,Political Segmentation - 
+T0073,Determine Target Audiences,,TA01,Determining the target audiences (segments of the population) who will receive campaign narratives and artifacts intended to achieve the strategic ends.,,new,T0073 - Determine Target Audiences
+T0074,Determine Strategic Ends,,TA01,"Determining the campaigns goals or objectives. Examples include achieving achieving geopolitical advantage like undermining trust in an adversary, gaining domestic political advantage, achieving financial gain, or attaining a policy change, ",,new,T0074 - Determine Strategic Ends
+T0075,Dismiss,,TA02,Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.,,Split from T0001,T0075 - Dismiss
+T0075.001,Discredit Credible Sources,,TA02,"Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.",,no change,Discredit Credible Sources - 
+T0076,Distort,,TA02,"Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.",,Split from T0001,T0076 - Distort
+T0077,Distract,,TA02,"Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).",,Split from T0001,T0077 - Distract
+T0078,Dismay,,TA02,"Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.",,Split from T0001,T0078 - Dismay
+T0079,Divide,,TA02,"Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community",,Split from T0001,T0079 - Divide
+T0080,Map Target Audience Information Environment,,TA13,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself,  including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information  environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular  information channels to reach its target audience. 
+Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining  the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",,new,T0080 - Map Target Audience Information Environment
+T0080.001,Monitor Social Media Analytics,,TA13,"An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase  the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including  views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform  itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics.  ",,no change,Monitor Social Media Analytics - 
+T0080.002,Evaluate Media Surveys,,TA13,"An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type  of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s  political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.",,no change,Evaluate Media Surveys - 
+T0080.003,Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags,,TA13,An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in  boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol  (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public  posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralized page dedicated to the word or  phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity. ,,no change,Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags - 
+T0080.004,Conduct Web Traffic Analysis,,TA13,"An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines,  keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.",,no change,Conduct Web Traffic Analysis - 
+T0080.005,Assess Degree/Type of Media Access,,TA13,"An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media  freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and  on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information  environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent  media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties. ",,no change,Assess Degree/Type of Media Access - 
+T0081,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,,TA13,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience  information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues,  weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.  
+Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified  weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",,new,T0081 - Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+T0081.001,Find Echo Chambers,,TA13,"Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with. ",,no change,Find Echo Chambers - 
+T0081.002,Identify Data Voids,,TA13,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search  engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity  aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a  high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation  may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.  
+A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news”  data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an  influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to  publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data  void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their  keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated  terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for  recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas,  isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use  “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote  messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.  ",,no change,Identify Data Voids - 
+T0081.003,Identify Existing Prejudices,,TA13,"An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarize its target audience from the rest of the public.",,no change,Identify Existing Prejudices - 
+T0081.004,Identify Existing Fissures,,TA13,"An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one  another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer"" approach to tailor operation narratives along the  divides.",,no change,Identify Existing Fissures - 
+T0081.005,Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions,,TA13,An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population  to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives.  ,,no change,Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions - 
+T0081.006,Identify Wedge Issues,,TA13,"A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that  divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by  intentionally polarizing the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition  between factions.",,no change,Identify Wedge Issues - 
+T0081.007,Identify Target Audience Adversaries,,TA13,"An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to center operation  narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while  imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies,  run the state behind public view. ",,no change,Identify Target Audience Adversaries - 
+T0081.008,Identify Media System Vulnerabilities,,TA13,"An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These  weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news  agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust  among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an  influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content. ",,no change,Identify Media System Vulnerabilities - 
+T0082,Develop New Narratives,,TA14,"Actors may develop new narratives to further strategic or tactical goals, especially when existing narratives adequately align with the campaign goals. New narratives provide more control in terms of crafting the message to achieve specific goals. However, new narratives may require more effort to disseminate than adapting or adopting existing narratives. ",,new,T0082 - Develop New Narratives
+T0083,Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative,,TA14,"An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the  target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating  existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already  weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new  vulnerabilities in the environment.",,new,T0083 - Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative
+T0084,Reuse Existing Content,,TA06,When an operation recycles content from its own previous  operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to  conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,,new,T0084 - Reuse Existing Content
+T0084.001,Use Copypasta,,TA06,"Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text. ",,no change,Use Copypasta - 
+T0084.002,Plagiarize Content,,TA06,An influence operation may take content from other sources without proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources. ,,no change,Plagiarize Content - 
+T0084.003,Deceptively Labeled or Translated,,TA06,An influence operation may take authentic content from other sources and add deceptive labels or deceptively translate the content into other langauges. ,,no change,Deceptively Labeled or Translated - 
+T0084.004,Appropriate Content,,TA06,An influence operation may take content from other sources with proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources. Examples include the appropriation of content from one inauthentic news site to another inauthentic news site or network in ways that align with the originators licensing or terms of service.,,no change,Appropriate Content - 
+T0085,Develop Text-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading text-based artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign.",,new,T0085 - Develop Text-based Content
+T0085.001,Develop AI-Generated Text,,TA06,"AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI  technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human  input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents  the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated  journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to  quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Text - 
+T0085.002,Develop False or Altered Documents,,TA06,Develop False or Altered Documents,,no change,Develop False or Altered Documents - 
+T0085.003,Develop Inauthentic News Articles,,TA06,An influence operation may develop false or misleading news articles aligned to their campaign goals or narratives. ,,no change,Develop Inauthentic News Articles - 
+T0086,Develop Image-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading visual artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include photographing staged real-life situations, repurposing existing digital images, or using image creation and editing technologies.",,new,T0086 - Develop Image-based Content
+T0086.001,Develop Memes,,TA06,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",,no change,Develop Memes - 
+T0086.002,Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes) - 
+T0086.003,Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap fakes) - 
+T0086.004,Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages,,TA06,Image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan),,no change,Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages - 
+T0087,Develop Video-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading video artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include staging videos of purportedly real situations, repurposing existing video artifacts, or using AI-generated video creation and editing technologies (including deepfakes).",,new,T0087 - Develop Video-based Content
+T0087.001,Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes) - 
+T0087.002,Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes) - 
+T0088,Develop Audio-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading audio artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include creating completely new audio content, repurposing existing audio artifacts (including cheap fakes), or using AI-generated audio creation and editing technologies (including deepfakes).",,new,T0088 - Develop Audio-based Content
+T0088.001,Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes) - 
+T0088.002,Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes) - 
+T0089,Obtain Private Documents,,TA06,"Procuring documents that are not publicly available, by whatever means -- whether legal or illegal, highly-resourced or less so. These documents can include authentic non-public documents, authentic non-public documents have been altered, or inauthentic documents intended to appear as if they are authentic non-public documents. All of these types of documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,new,T0089 - Obtain Private Documents
+T0089.001,Obtain Authentic Documents,,TA06,"Procure authentic documents that are not publicly available, by whatever means -- whether legal or illegal, highly-resourced or less so. These documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Obtain Authentic Documents - 
+T0089.002,Create Inauthentic Documents,,TA06,"Create inauthentic documents intended to appear as if they are authentic non-public documents. These documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Create Inauthentic Documents - 
+T0089.003,Alter Authentic Documents,,TA06,"Alter authentic documents (public or non-public) to achieve campaign goals. The altered documents are intended to appear as if they are authentic can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Alter Authentic Documents - 
+T0090,Create Inauthentic Accounts,,TA15,"Inauthentic accounts include bot accounts, cyborg accounts, sockpuppet accounts, and anonymous accounts.",,new,T0090 - Create Inauthentic Accounts
+T0090.001,Create Anonymous Accounts,,TA15,Anonymous accounts or anonymous users refer to users that access network resources without  providing a username or password. An influence operation may use anonymous accounts to spread content without direct attribution to the operation. ,,no change,Create Anonymous Accounts - 
+T0090.002,Create Cyborg Accounts,,TA15,"Cyborg accounts refer to partly manned, partly automated social media accounts. Cyborg  accounts primarily act as bots, but a human operator periodically takes control of the account to  engage with real social media users by responding to comments and posting original content.  Influence operations may use cyborg accounts to reduce the amount of direct human input  required to maintain a regular account but increase the apparent legitimacy of the cyborg account  by occasionally breaking its bot-like behavior with human interaction. ",,no change,Create Cyborg Accounts - 
+T0090.003,Create Bot Accounts,,TA15,"Bots refer to autonomous internet users that interact with systems or other users while imitating  traditional human behavior. Bots use a variety of tools to stay active without direct human  operation, including artificial intelligence and big data analytics. For example, an individual may  program a Twitter bot to retweet a tweet every time it contains a certain keyword or hashtag. An  influence operation may use bots to increase its exposure and artificially promote its content  across the internet without dedicating additional time or human resources.  
+Amplifier bots promote operation content through reposts, shares, and likes to increase the  content’s online popularity. Hacker bots are traditionally covert bots running on computer  scripts that rarely engage with users and work primarily as agents of larger cyberattacks, such as  a Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Spammer bots are programmed to post content on  social media or in comment sections, usually as a supplementary tool. Impersonator bots102 pose as real people by mimicking human behavior, complicating their detection.  ",,no change,Create Bot Accounts - 
+T0090.004,Create Sockpuppet Accounts,,TA15,Sockpuppet accounts refer to falsified accounts that either promote the influence operation’s  own material or attack critics of the material online. Individuals who control sockpuppet  accounts also man at least one other user account.67 Sockpuppet accounts help legitimize  operation narratives by providing an appearance of external support for the material and  discrediting opponents of the operation. ,,no change,Create Sockpuppet Accounts - 
+T0091,Recruit malign actors,,TA15,"Operators recruit bad actors paying recruiting, or exerting control over individuals includes trolls, partisans, and contractors.",,new,T0091 - Recruit malign actors
+T0091.001,Recruit Contractors,,TA15,Operators recruit paid contractor to support the campaign.,,no change,Recruit Contractors - 
+T0091.002,Recruit Partisans,,TA15,Operators recruit partisans (ideologically-aligned individuals) to support the campaign.,,no change,Recruit Partisans - 
+T0091.003,Enlist Troll Accounts,,TA15,"An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke  others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit  an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate.  
+Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or  boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly  affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organization, and post content with a specific ideological  goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalized or less organized and work for a  single individual. ",,no change,Enlist Troll Accounts - 
+T0092,Build Network,,TA15,"Operators build their own network, creating links between accounts -- whether authentic or inauthentic -- in order amplify and promote narratives and artifacts, and encourage further growth of ther network, as well as the ongoing sharing and engagement with operational content.",,new,T0092 - Build Network
+T0092.001,Create Organizations,,TA15,"Influence operations may establish organizations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities.",,no change,Create Organizations - 
+T0092.002,Use Follow Trains,,TA15,"A follow train is a group of people who follow each other on a social media platform, often as a way for an individual or campaign to grow its social media following. Follow trains may be a violation of platform Terms of Service. They are also known as follow-for-follow groups.  ",,no change,Use Follow Trains - 
+T0092.003,Create Community or Sub-group,,TA15,"When there is not an existing community or sub-group that meets a campaign's goals, an influence operation may seek to create a community or sub-group. ",,no change,Create Community or Sub-group - 
+T0093,Acquire/Recruit Network,,TA15,"Operators acquire an existing network by paying, recruiting, or exerting control over the leaders of the existing network. ",,new,T0093 - Acquire/Recruit Network
+T0093.001,Fund Proxies,,TA15,"An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An  operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives  and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including: 
+- Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution  
+- Reducing the workload for direct operation assets  ",,no change,Fund Proxies - 
+T0093.002,Acquire Botnets,,TA15,A botnet is a group of bots that can function in coordination with each other. ,,no change,Acquire Botnets - 
+T0094,Infiltrate Existing Networks,,TA15,Operators deceptively insert social assets into existing networks as group members in order to influence the members of the network and the wider information environment that the network impacts.,,new,T0094 - Infiltrate Existing Networks
+T0094.001,Identify susceptible targets in networks,,TA15,"When seeking to infiltrate an existing network, an influence operation may identify individuals and groups that might be susceptible to being co-opted or influenced.",,no change,Identify susceptible targets in networks - 
+T0094.002,Utilize Butterfly Attacks,,TA15,"Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually  a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert  controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to  infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organizations, and media campaigns.  ",,no change,Utilize Butterfly Attacks - 
+T0095,Develop Owned Media Assets,,TA15,"An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation  may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites,  blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and  organization of content.",,new,T0095 - Develop Owned Media Assets
+T0096,Leverage Content Farms,,TA15,Using the services of large-scale content providers for creating and amplifying campaign artifacts at scale.,,new,T0096 - Leverage Content Farms
+T0096.001,Create Content Farms,,TA15,An influence operation may create an organization for creating and amplifying campaign artifacts at scale.,,no change,Create Content Farms - 
+T0096.002,Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations,,TA15,"An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid  attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organization that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed  organizations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content  farms for high volumes of targeted media.  ",,no change,Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations - 
+T0097,Create personas,,TA16,"Creating fake people, often with accounts across multiple platforms. These personas can be as simple as a name, can contain slightly more background like location, profile pictures, backstory, or can be effectively backstopped with indicators like fake identity documents. ",,new,T0097 - Create personas
+T0097.001,Backstop personas ,,TA16,"Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability",,no change,Backstop personas  - 
+T0098,Establish Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,"Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.",,new,T0098 - Establish Inauthentic News Sites
+T0098.001,Create Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,Create Inauthentic News Sites,,no change,Create Inauthentic News Sites - 
+T0098.002,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites,,no change,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites - 
+T0099,Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,,TA16,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its  network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely  believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites.  Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state  entities.  
+An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate  entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a  domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional  typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation  of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to  confirm that the URL is correct.  ",,new,T0099 - Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities
+T0099.001,Astroturfing,,TA16,"Astroturfing occurs when an influence operation disguises itself as grassroots movement or  organization that supports operation narratives. Unlike butterfly attacks, astroturfing aims to  increase the appearance of popular support for the operation cause and does not infiltrate existing  groups to discredit their objectives.  ",,no change,Astroturfing - 
+T0099.002,Spoof/parody account/site,,TA16,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its  network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely  believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites.  Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state  entities.  ",,no change,Spoof/parody account/site - 
+T0100,Co-opt Trusted Sources,,TA16,"An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to  reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources  may include:  
+- National or local new outlets  
+- Research or academic publications  
+- Online blogs or websites ",,new,T0100 - Co-opt Trusted Sources
+T0100.001,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals,,TA16,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals,,no change,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals - 
+T0100.002,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups,,TA16,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups,,no change,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups - 
+T0100.003,Co-opt Influencers,,TA16,Co-opt Influencers,,no change,Co-opt Influencers - 
+T0101,Create Localized Content,,TA05,"Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.",,new,T0101 - Create Localized Content
+T0102,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,"An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where  individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly  engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may  create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals  into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other  characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to  the same target audience members. ",,new,T0102 - Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles
+T0102.001,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,no change,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles - 
+T0102.002,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,no change,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles - 
+T0102.003,Exploit Data Voids,,TA05,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search  engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity  aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a  high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation  may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.  
+A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news”  data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an  influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to  publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data  void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their  keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated  terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for  recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas,  isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use  “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote  messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.  ",,no change,Exploit Data Voids - 
+T0103,Livestream,,TA07,A livestream refers to an online broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,new,T0103 - Livestream
+T0103.001,Video Livestream,,TA07,A video livestream refers to an online video broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,no change,Video Livestream - 
+T0103.002,Audio Livestream,,TA07,An audio livestream refers to an online audio broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,no change,Audio Livestream - 
+T0104,Social Networks,,TA07,"Social media are interactive digital channels that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, interests, and other forms of expression through virtual communities and networks.",,new,T0104 - Social Networks
+T0104.001,Mainstream Social Networks,,TA07,"Examples include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.",,no change,Mainstream Social Networks - 
+T0104.002,Dating Apps,,TA07,"A video livestream refers to an online video broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks. Examples include Facebook Live, Instagram, Youtube, Tik Tok, and Twitter. ",,no change,Dating Apps - 
+T0104.003,Private/Closed Social Networks,,TA07,"An audio livestream refers to an online audio broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks. Examples include Twitter Spaces, ",,no change,Private/Closed Social Networks - 
+T0104.004,Interest-Based Networks,,TA07,"Examples include smaller and niche networks including Gettr, Truth Social, Parler, etc.",,no change,Interest-Based Networks - 
+T0104.005,Use hashtags,,TA07,"Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident.",,no change,Use hashtags - 
+T0104.006,Create dedicated hashtag,,TA07,Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag.,,no change,Create dedicated hashtag - 
+T0105,Media Sharing Networks,,TA07,"Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.",,new,T0105 - Media Sharing Networks
+T0105.001,Photo Sharing,,TA07,"Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, Flickr, etc",,no change,Photo Sharing - 
+T0105.002,Video Sharing,,TA07,"Examples include Youtube, TikTok, ShareChat, Rumble, etc",,no change,Video Sharing - 
+T0105.003,Audio sharing,,TA07,"Examples include podcasting apps, Soundcloud, etc.",,no change,Audio sharing - 
+T0106,Discussion Forums,,TA07,"Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.",,new,T0106 - Discussion Forums
+T0106.001,Anonymous Message Boards,,TA07,Examples include the Chans,,no change,Anonymous Message Boards - 
+T0107,Bookmarking and Content Curation,,TA07,"Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc.",,new,T0107 - Bookmarking and Content Curation
+T0108,Blogging and Publishing Networks,,TA07,"Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. ",,new,T0108 - Blogging and Publishing Networks
+T0109,Consumer Review Networks,,TA07,"Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc.  Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.",,new,T0109 - Consumer Review Networks
+T0110,Formal Diplomatic Channels,,TA07,"Leveraging formal, traditional, diplomatic channels to communicate with foreign governments (written documents, meetings, summits, diplomatic visits, etc). This type of diplomacy is conducted by diplomats of one nation with diplomats and other officials of another nation or international organization.",,new,T0110 - Formal Diplomatic Channels
+T0111,Traditional Media,,TA07,"Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.",,new,T0111 - Traditional Media
+T0111.001,TV,,TA07,TV,,no change,TV - 
+T0111.002,Newspaper,,TA07,Newspaper,,no change,Newspaper - 
+T0111.003,Radio,,TA07,Radio,,no change,Radio - 
+T0112,Email,,TA07,Delivering content and narratives via email. This can include using list management or high-value individually targeted messaging.,,new,T0112 - Email
+T0113,Employ Commercial Analytic Firms,,TA08,"Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to  detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ  commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences.  ",,new,T0113 - Employ Commercial Analytic Firms
+T0114,Deliver Ads,,TA09,Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.,,new,T0114 - Deliver Ads
+T0114.001,Social media,,TA09,Social Media,,no change,Social media - 
+T0114.002,Traditional Media,,TA09,"Examples include TV, Radio, Newspaper, billboards",,no change,Traditional Media - 
+T0115,Post Content,,TA09,Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,,new,T0115 - Post Content
+T0115.001,Share Memes,,TA09,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",,no change,Share Memes - 
+T0115.002,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash,,TA09,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash.,,no change,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash - 
+T0115.003,One-Way Direct Posting,,TA09,"Direct posting refers to a method of posting content via a one-way messaging service, where the  recipient cannot directly respond to the poster’s messaging. An influence operation may post  directly to promote operation narratives to the target audience without allowing opportunities for  fact-checking or disagreement, creating a false sense of support for the narrative. ",,no change,One-Way Direct Posting - 
+T0116,Comment or Reply on Content,,TA09,Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,,new,T0116 - Comment or Reply on Content
+T0116.001,Post inauthentic social media comment,,TA09,"Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums.",,no change,Post inauthentic social media comment - 
+T0117,Attract Traditional Media,,TA09,Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media).,,new,T0117 - Attract Traditional Media
+T0118,Amplify Existing Narrative,,TA17,An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. ,,new,T0118 - Amplify Existing Narrative
+T0119,Cross-Posting,,TA17,"Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content  online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the  target audience. ",,new,T0119 - Cross-Posting
+T0119.001,Post Across Groups,,TA17,An influence operation may post content across groups to spread narratives and content to new communities within the target audiences or to new target audiences. ,,no change,Post Across Groups - 
+T0119.002,Post Across Platform,,TA17,"An influence operation may post content across platforms to spread narratives and content to new communities within the target audiences or to new target audiences. Posting across platforms can also remove opposition and context, helping the narrative spread with less opposition on the cross-posted platform. ",,no change,Post Across Platform - 
+T0119.003,Post Across Disciplines,,TA17,Post Across Disciplines,,no change,Post Across Disciplines - 
+T0120,Incentivize Sharing,,TA17,"Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves,  reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.",,new,T0120 - Incentivize Sharing
+T0120.001,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs,,TA17,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs,,no change,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs - 
+T0120.002,Use Contests and Prizes,,TA17,Use Contests and Prizes,,no change,Use Contests and Prizes - 
+T0121,Manipulate Platform Algorithm,,TA17,"Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that  intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select  Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content  exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an  influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes  engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines.  ",,new,T0121 - Manipulate Platform Algorithm
+T0121.001,Bypass Content Blocking,,TA17,"Bypassing content blocking refers to actions taken to circumvent network security measures that  prevent users from accessing certain servers, resources, or other online spheres. An influence  operation may bypass content blocking to proliferate its content on restricted areas of the  internet. Common strategies for bypassing content blocking include:
+- Altering IP addresses to avoid IP filtering  
+- Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to avoid IP filtering 
+- Using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to avoid IP filtering 
+- Enabling encryption to bypass packet inspection blocking 
+- Manipulating text to avoid filtering by keywords 
+- Posting content on multiple platforms to avoid platform-specific removals - Using local facilities or modified DNS servers to avoid DNS filtering ",,no change,Bypass Content Blocking - 
+T0122,Direct Users to Alternative Platforms,,TA17,"Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the  platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate  information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An  operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial  platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content.  ",,new,T0122 - Direct Users to Alternative Platforms
+T0123,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,,TA18,Controlling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of  content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,,new,T0123 - Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations
+T0123.001,Delete Opposing Content,,TA18,"Deleting opposing content refers to the removal of content that conflicts with operational  narratives from selected platforms. An influence operation may delete opposing content to  censor contradictory information from the target audience, allowing operation narratives to take  priority in the information space.",,no change,Delete Opposing Content - 
+T0123.002,Block Content,,TA18,Content blocking refers to actions taken to restrict internet access or render certain areas of the  internet inaccessible. An influence operation may restrict content based on both network and  content attributes. ,,no change,Block Content - 
+T0123.003,Destroy Information Generation Capabilities,,TA18,"Destroying information generation capabilities refers to actions taken to limit, degrade, or  otherwise incapacitate an actor’s ability to generate conflicting information. An influence operation may destroy an actor’s information generation capabilities by physically dismantling  the information infrastructure, disconnecting resources needed for information generation, or  redirecting information generation personnel. An operation may destroy an adversary’s  information generation capabilities to limit conflicting content exposure to the target audience  and crowd the information space with its own narratives. ",,no change,Destroy Information Generation Capabilities - 
+T0123.004,Conduct Server Redirect,,TA18,"A server redirect, also known as a URL redirect, occurs when a server automatically forwards a  user from one URL to another using server-side scripting languages. An influence operation may  conduct a server redirect to divert target audience members from one website to another without  their knowledge. The redirected website may pose as a legitimate source, host malware, or  otherwise aid operation objectives.",,no change,Conduct Server Redirect - 
+T0124,Suppress Opposition,,TA18,Operators can suppress the opposition by exploiting platform content moderation tools and processes like reporting non-violative content to platforms for takedown and goading opposition actors into taking actions that result in platform action or target audience disapproval. ,,new,T0124 - Suppress Opposition
+T0124.001,Report Non-Violative Opposing Content,,TA18,"Reporting opposing content refers to notifying and providing an instance of a violation of a  platform’s guidelines and policies for conduct on the platform. In addition to simply reporting  the content, an operation may leverage copyright regulations to trick social media and web  platforms into removing opposing content by manipulating the content to appear in violation of  copyright laws. Reporting opposing content facilitates the suppression of contradictory  information and allows operation narratives to take priority in the information space. ",,no change,Report Non-Violative Opposing Content - 
+T0124.002,Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself),,TA18,Goad people into actions that violate terms of service or will lead to having their content or accounts taken down. ,,no change,Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself) - 
+T0124.003,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation,,TA18,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation,,no change,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation - 
+T0125,Platform Filtering,,TA18,Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation),,new,T0125 - Platform Filtering
+T0126,Encourage Attendance at Events,,TA10,Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.,,new,T0126 - Encourage Attendance at Events
+T0126.001,Call to action to attend ,,TA10,Call to action to attend an event,,no change,Call to action to attend  - 
+T0126.002,Facilitate logistics or support for attendance,,TA10,"Facilitate logistics or support for travel, food, housing, etc.",,no change,Facilitate logistics or support for attendance - 
+T0127,Physical Violence,,TA10,"Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value.  ",,new,T0127 - Physical Violence
+T0127.001,Conduct Physical Violence,,TA10,An influence operation may directly Conduct Physical Violence to achieve campaign goals. ,,no change,Conduct Physical Violence - 
+T0127.002,Encourage Physical Violence,,TA10,An influence operation may Encourage others to engage in Physical Violence to achieve campaign goals. ,,no change,Encourage Physical Violence - 
+T0128,Conceal People,,TA11,Conceal the identity or provenance of a campaign account and people assets to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0128 - Conceal People
+T0128.001,Use Pseudonyms,,TA11,"An operation may use pseudonyms, or fake names, to mask the identity of operation accounts,  publish anonymous content, or otherwise use falsified personas to conceal identity of the  operation. An operation may coordinate pseudonyms across multiple platforms, for example, by  writing an article under a pseudonym and then posting a link to the article on social media on an  account with the same falsified name.  ",,no change,Use Pseudonyms - 
+T0128.002,Conceal Network Identity,,TA11,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network  completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of  any sort of organization. ",,no change,Conceal Network Identity - 
+T0128.003,Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation,,TA11,"Distancing reputable individuals from the operation occurs when enlisted individuals, such as  celebrities or subject matter experts, actively disengage themselves from operation activities and  messaging. Individuals may distance themselves from the operation by deleting old posts or  statements, unfollowing operation information assets, or otherwise detaching themselves from  the operation’s timeline. An influence operation may want reputable individuals to distance  themselves from the operation to reduce operation exposure, particularly if the operation aims to remove all evidence.",,no change,Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation - 
+T0128.004,Launder Accounts,,TA11,Account laundering occurs when an influence operation acquires control of previously legitimate  online accounts from third parties through sale or exchange and often in contravention of terms  of use. Influence operations use laundered accounts to reach target audience members from an  existing information channel and complicate attribution.  ,,no change,Launder Accounts - 
+T0128.005,Change Names of Accounts,,TA11,Changing names of accounts occurs when an operation changes the name of an existing social  media account. An operation may change the names of its accounts throughout an operation to  avoid detection or alter the names of newly acquired or repurposed accounts to fit operational  narratives.  ,,no change,Change Names of Accounts - 
+T0129,Conceal Operational Activity,,TA11,Conceal the campaign's operational activity to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0129 - Conceal Operational Activity
+T0129.001,Conceal Network Identity,,TA11,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network  completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of  any sort of organization. ",,no change,Conceal Network Identity - 
+T0129.002,Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative,,TA11,"An influence operation may mix its own operation content with legitimate news or external  unrelated content to disguise operational objectives, narratives, or existence. For example, an  operation may generate ""lifestyle"" or ""cuisine"" content alongside regular operation content.  ",,no change,Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative - 
+T0129.003,Break Association with Content,,TA11,"Breaking association with content occurs when an influence operation actively separates itself  from its own content. An influence operation may break association with content by  unfollowing, unliking, or unsharing its content, removing attribution from its content, or  otherwise taking actions that distance the operation from its messaging. An influence operation may break association with its content to complicate attribution or regain credibility for a new operation.  ",,no change,Break Association with Content - 
+T0129.004,Delete URLs,,TA11,"URL deletion occurs when an influence operation completely removes its website registration,  rendering the URL inaccessible. An influence operation may delete its URLs to complicate  attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred.",,no change,Delete URLs - 
+T0129.005,Coordinate on encrypted/closed networks,,TA11,Coordinate on encrypted/ closed networks,,no change,Coordinate on encrypted/closed networks - 
+T0129.006,Deny involvement,,TA11,"Without ""smoking gun"" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in ""Demand insurmountable proof"", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a ""firehose of misinformation"" environment.",,no change,Deny involvement - 
+T0129.007,Delete Accounts/Account Activity,,TA11,"Deleting accounts and account activity occurs when an influence operation removes its online  social media assets, including social media accounts, posts, likes, comments, and other online  artifacts. An influence operation may delete its accounts and account activity to complicate  attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred.  ",,no change,Delete Accounts/Account Activity - 
+T0129.008,Redirect URLs,,TA11,"An influence operation may redirect its falsified or typosquatted URLs to legitimate websites to  increase the operation's appearance of legitimacy, complicate attribution, and avoid detection.  ",,no change,Redirect URLs - 
+T0129.009,Remove Post Origins,,TA11,"Removing post origins refers to the elimination of evidence that indicates the initial source of  operation content, often to complicate attribution. An influence operation may remove post  origins by deleting watermarks, renaming files, or removing embedded links in its content.  ",,no change,Remove Post Origins - 
+T0129.010,Misattribute Activity,,TA11,"Misattributed activity refers to incorrectly attributed operation activity. For example, a state sponsored influence operation may conduct operation activity in a way that mimics another state  so that external entities misattribute activity to the incorrect state. An operation may misattribute  their activities to complicate attribution, avoid detection, or frame an adversary for negative  behavior. ",,no change,Misattribute Activity - 
+T0130,Conceal Infrastructure,,TA11,Conceal the campaign's infrastructure to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0130 - Conceal Infrastructure
+T0130.001,Conceal Sponsorship,,TA11,"Concealing sponsorship aims to mislead or obscure the identity of the hidden sponsor behind an operation rather than entity publicly running the operation. Operations that conceal sponsorship  may maintain visible falsified groups, news outlets, non-profits, or other organizations, but seek  to mislead or obscure the identity sponsoring, funding, or otherwise supporting these entities.  
+Influence operations may use a variety of techniques to mask the location of their social media  accounts to complicate attribution and conceal evidence of foreign interference. Operation  accounts may set their location to a false place, often the location of the operation’s target  audience, and post in the region’s language",,no change,Conceal Sponsorship - 
+T0130.002,Utilize Bulletproof Hosting,,TA11,"Hosting refers to services through which storage and computing resources are provided to an  individual or organization for the accommodation and maintenance of one or more websites and  related services. Services may include web hosting, file sharing, and email distribution.  Bulletproof hosting refers to services provided by an entity, such as a domain hosting or web  hosting firm, that allows its customer considerable leniency in use of the service. An influence  operation may utilize bulletproof hosting to maintain continuity of service for suspicious, illegal,  or disruptive operation activities that stricter hosting services would limit, report, or suspend. ",,no change,Utilize Bulletproof Hosting - 
+T0130.003,Use Shell Organizations,,TA11,Use Shell Organizations to conceal sponsorship.,,no change,Use Shell Organizations - 
+T0130.004,Use Cryptocurrency,,TA11,"Use Cryptocurrency to conceal sponsorship. Examples include Bitcoin, Monero, and Etherium. ",,no change,Use Cryptocurrency - 
+T0130.005,Obfuscate Payment,,TA11,Obfuscate Payment,,no change,Obfuscate Payment - 
+T0131,Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,,TA11,Exploiting weaknesses in platforms' terms of service and content moderation policies to avoid takedowns and platform actions.,,new,T0131 - Exploit TOS/Content Moderation
+T0131.001,Legacy web content,,TA11,"Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.",,no change,Legacy web content - 
+T0131.002,Post Borderline Content,,TA11,Post Borderline Content,,no change,Post Borderline Content - 
+T0132,Measure Performance,,TA12,A metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions. “Are the actions being executed as planned?”,,new,T0132 - Measure Performance
+T0132.001,People Focused,,TA12,Measure the performance individuals in achieving campaign goals,,no change,People Focused - 
+T0132.002,Content Focused,,TA12,Measure the performance of campaign content,,no change,Content Focused - 
+T0132.003,View Focused,,TA12,View Focused,,no change,View Focused - 
+T0133,Measure Effectiveness,,TA12,A metric used to measure a current system state. “Are we on track to achieve the intended new system state within the planned timescale?”,,new,T0133 - Measure Effectiveness
+T0133.001,Behavior changes,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from misinformation incidents. ,,no change,Behavior changes - 
+T0133.002,Content,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of campaign content. ,,no change,Content - 
+T0133.003,Awareness,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing awareness. ,,no change,Awareness - 
+T0133.004,Knowledge,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing knowledge. ,,no change,Knowledge - 
+T0133.005,Action/attitude,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing action/attitude. ,,no change,Action/attitude - 
+T0134,Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),,TA12,"Ensuring that Key Performace Indicators are identified and tracked, so that the performance and effectivess of campaigns, and elements of campaigns, can be measured, during and after their execution",,new,T0134 - Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)
+T0134.001,Message reach,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinformation incidents. ,,no change,Message reach - 
+T0134.002,Social media engagement,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate social media engagement in misinformation incidents.,,no change,Social media engagement - 
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/tools.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/tools.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6f8481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/00_earlier_datasets/2022-08-24_DISARM_0_1_b/tools.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+disarm_id,name,externalgroup,url,category,disinformation_use,cogseccollab_use,function,summary,notes,code_url,artifacts,automation,platform,accessibility
+TL00002,Ad Observer,New York University,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ad-observer/enliecaalhkhhihcmnbjfmmjkljlcinl,Advertising Analysis,Designed for disinfo,,Collect and share ads,,,,ads,human,browser extension,
+TL00035,Exodus,Exodus tool,https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/,Advertising Analysis,,,Exodus tool to evaluate a mobile app’s permissions and ad trackers,,,,,,,
+TL00036,Facebook political/issue ads database,Facebook,https://www.facebook.com/ads/archive/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US,Advertising Analysis,,,Facebook political/issue ads database,,,,,,,
+TL00054,Google political ads database,Google,http://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/home,Advertising Analysis,,,Google political ads database,,,,,,,
+TL00080,Moat,Moat,https://moat.com/,Advertising Analysis,,,Moat ad analytics tool,,,,,,,
+TL00093,Pathmatics,Pathmatics,https://www.pathmatics.com/,Advertising Analysis,,,Pathmatics display and Facebook ads tracking tool (paid),,,,,,,
+TL00148,Who Targets Me,,https://whotargets.me/en/about-who-targets-me/,Advertising Analysis,,,political ad scraper,,,https://github.com/WhoTargetsMe/,ads,,browser extension,open source
+TL00019,Check My Ads,Check My Ads,https://www.checkmyads.org/,Advertising Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00010,Bot Sentinel,,https://botsentinel.com/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,yes,,,,,accounts,,,
+TL00011,Botometer,University of Indiana,https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,,,,Was BotOrNot,,accounts,,,
+TL00012,Botslayer,University of Indiana,https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/botslayer/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,accounts,,,
+TL00052,Ghostery,Ghostery,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ghostery-%E2%80%93-privacy-ad-blo/mlomiejdfkolichcflejclcbmpeaniij,Browser Plugin,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00144,WayBack Machine,WayBack Machine,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/wayback-machine/fpnmgdkabkmnadcjpehmlllkndpkmiak,Browser Plugin,Commonly used,,,,,,,,,
+TL00022,Corporate registrars list,Kanton St.Gallen,https://www.commercial-register.sg.ch/home/worldwide.html,Corporate/Business Tools,,,List of corporate registrars around the world,,,,,,,
+TL00023,Corporation Wiki,Corporation Wiki,https://www.corporationwiki.com/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00062,ICIJ Offshoreleaks Database,The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00066,Investigative Dashboard,Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),https://investigativedashboard.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00075,Little Sis database,Little Sis database,https://littlesis.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,"Relationships between people, companies etc.",,,,,,,
+TL00089,Open Corporates,Open Corporates,https://opencorporates.com/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00090,Opensanctions,Opensanctions,https://www.opensanctions.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,"Global database of persons and companies of political, criminal, or economic interest. It combines the most important sanctions lists, databases of politically exposed persons etc",,,,,,,
+TL00091,Orbis directory,Orbis,https://orbisdirectory.bvdinfo.com/version-2018619/OrbisDirectory/Companies,Corporate/Business Tools,,,Paid corporate search,,,,,,,
+TL00060,Hooyu,Hooyu Business,https://hooyubusiness.com,Finding People,,,Hooyu is a great paid tool for identifying connections between people and entities in the UK,,,,,,,
+TL00081,Name2email,Name2email,https://name2email.com/,Finding People,,,Name2email browser extension that helps you find a person’s correct email,,,,,,,
+TL00095,Pipl,Pipl,https://pipl.com/,Finding People,,,Pipl people Search,,,,,,,
+TL00111,Skopenow,Skopenow,https://www.skopenow.com/,Finding People,,,Skopenow (an excellent paid tool),,,,,,,
+TL00115,Spokeo,Spokeo,http://www.spokeo.com/,Finding People,,,Spokeo people search (good for the US only),,,,,,,
+TL00120,Thats Them,Thats Them,https://thatsthem.com/,Finding People,,,Thats Them people search,,,,,,,
+TL00007,Assembler,,https://projectassembler.org/,Image analysis,Designed for disinfo,,image analysis,,,,images,,,
+TL00033,e-witness,CUNY,https://ewitness.commons.gc.cuny.edu/,Image analysis,Potentially useful,,image provenance,"eWitness uses blockchain to establish provenance of images and videos taken from a smart phone camera. eWitness can be used to gather evidence of crime, human rights violation, domestic violence, corruption, traffic violations and more. An eWitness user is protected behind a pseudo-identity which is hidden even from the eWitness backend, until the user is ready to reveal themselves or to quietly pass the evidence on to their case-worker, trusted friend or sponsor. The purpose of eWitness is to create images and videos that can be trusted. The technology behind eWitness, provides the proof of location and time the media was taken and the proof that the media was not altered to misinform or deform the fact in any manner.",,,images,,,
+TL00041,FindClone,FindClone,https://findclone.ru/,Image analysis,,,Reverse image/facial recognition,,,,,,,
+TL00046,Foto Forensics,Hacker Factory,http://fotoforensics.com,Image analysis,Useful,,image forensics,,,,images,,,
+TL00047,FotoForensics,FotoForensics,http://fotoforensics.com/,Image analysis,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00048,Free Online OCR,NewOCR,https://www.newocr.com/,Image analysis,,,Take an image and convert characters to text,,,,,,,
+TL00067,InVid,InVid,https://www.invid-project.eu/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,image and video verification,,,,images,,,
+TL00068,Jeffrey Friedl's Image Metadata Viewer,EXIF Reader,http://exif.regex.info/,Image analysis,Useful,,,,,,,,,
+TL00101,Reality Defender,AI Foundation,https://rd2020.org/,Image analysis,,,detect synthetic media,,,,images,,,request access
+TL00104,Remove.bg,Remove,https://www.remove.bg/,Image analysis,,,"Free tool that helps remove background images from a photo, to help with reverse image search",,,,,,,
+TL00105,Reverse image search,Karmadecay,http://karmadecay.com/,Image analysis,,,Reverse image search tool for Reddit,,,,,,,
+TL00106,Reverse image search,Yandex,https://yandex.com/images/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,,,,,,,,
+TL00108,Sensity tool for detecting GAN generated faces,Sensity,https://platform.sensity.ai/deepfake-detection,Image analysis,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00124,TinEye,TinEye,https://tineye.com/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,reverse image search,,,,images,,browser extension,
+TL00125,TinEye,,tineye.com,Image analysis,,,search for images,,,,images,,,
+TL00129,Truepic,,https://www.truepic.com,Image analysis,,,image verification,,,,images,,,
+TL00153,YouTube Data Viewer,Citizen Evidence Lab (Amnesty International),https://citizenevidence.org/2014/07/01/youtube-dataviewer/,Image analysis,,,Extract hidden data from videos hosted on YouTube. Useful for tracking down original content,,,,,,,
+TL00003,Aletheia,Midstream Technology,http://midstream.us,Network analysis,Designed for disinfo,,social network analysis; astroturf,,,,accounts,,,
+TL00050,Gephi,,https://gephi.org/users/install/,Network analysis,Commonly used,,network visualisation,,,,,,Install on PC,
+TL00077,MentionMapp,MentionMapp Analytics,https://mentionmapp.com/,Network analysis,Commonly used,,social network visualisation,,,,,,,
+TL00063,Iffy Quotient,University of Michigan,https://csmr.umich.edu/platform-health-metrics/,Ratings,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
+TL00132,Trustium,,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/trustium/fkcccoomlgbfmhcgcepbdfjmofckejgo?hl=en,Ratings,Designed for disinfo,,site rating for advertisers,,,,webpages,,browser extension,
+TL00001,Account Analysis,Account Analysis,https://accountanalysis.app/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Account Analysis is another great Twitter account analysis tool,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00015,Buzzweb,,https://buzzweb.pro/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Buzzweb Instagram analysis tool,,,,instagram,,,
+TL00038,FakeSpot,,https://www.fakespot.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Tool to analyze whether reviews on amazon/Yelp/TripAdvisor etc. are fake,,,,,,,
+TL00039,FBstalker,,https://fbstalker.thao.pw/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Facebook profile investigator,,,,facebook,,,
+TL00043,Foller.me ,,https://foller.me/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Foller.me Analytics for Twitter,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00044,Followerwonk ,,https://followerwonk.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Followerwonk Twitter tool for searching bios, user analysis etc.",,,,twitter,,,
+TL00056,Gramspy,,http://gramspy.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Gramspy Instagram analysis tool,,,,instagram,,,
+TL00057,Graph.tips,,http://graph.tips/beta,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,Facebook Graph search interface,,,,facebook,,,
+TL00082,NameChk,,https://namechk.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Tool to see if a username is used across different online services,,,,,,,
+TL00107,SearchUsers,,https://searchusers.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,A tool to search for Instagram users by name or username without having to login,,,,instagram,,,
+TL00113,SocialBlade,,https://socialblade.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"SocialBlade tool for analyzing YouTube, Twitter, Insta, Twitch accounts",,,,"youtube,twitter,instagram,twitch,facebook,tiktok,dailymotion,odysee,trovo,mixer,dlive,storyfire",,,
+TL00119,TGStat,Telegram Analytics,http://tgstat.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,A tool for analyzing a Telegram account/channel,,,,telegram,,,
+TL00126,Tinfoleak,Tinfoleak,https://tinfoleak.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Get useful overview related to a Twitter account,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00134,TweetBeaver,TweetBeaver,https://tweetbeaver.com/index.php,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,TweetBeaver account tools,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00135,Twiangulate,,http://twiangulate.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Twiangulate.com for mapping connections between accounts,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00136,Twitonomy,Twitonomy,https://www.twitonomy.com/go-premium.php,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Analyzing a twitter account, hashtags, etc.",,,,twitter,,,
+TL00137,Twitter advanced search,,https://twitter.com/search-advanced,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Twitter advanced search,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00139,Twren,,https://twren.ch/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Tool that lists the accounts that retweeted a specific account, with lots of sorting and filtering options",,,,,,,
+TL00145,Webmii,,http://webmii.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Webmii social media profile search,,,,,,,
+TL00147,WhatsMyName,,https://whatsmyname.app/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,An even more comprehensive tool for searching a username across platforms,,,,,,,
+TL00150,WhoPostedWhat,,http://whopostedwhat.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,Search for dates and date ranges on Facebook,,,,facebook,,,
+TL00025,Crowdtangle (chrome extension),Facebook,https://apps.crowdtangle.com/chrome-extension,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Commonly used,yes,,,,,socialmedia,,browser extension,Free
+TL00026,Crowdtangle (full),Facebook,https://www.crowdtangle.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Commonly used,,,,,,socialmedia,,,request access
+TL00069,Jod Bot,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/jod-bot,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Telegram archiver,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,telegram,,,open source
+TL00073,Khoj,Tattle,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,message verification,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,telegram,,,open source
+TL00074,Kosh,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/kosh/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,archive,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/kosh,messageapps,,,open source
+TL00102,Reaper,,https://reaper.social/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,,,,https://github.com/ScriptSmith/reaper,,,,
+TL00112,Social Media Analysis Toolkit (SMAT),,https://www.smat-app.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,trends,,,,"gab,parler,4chan,8kun,win,poal,telegram,gettr,rumble,bitchute,lbry,mewe,wimkin,minds,Vkontakte",,,
+TL00133,TruthNest,Athens Technology Centre (ATC),https://www.truthnest.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Designed for disinfo,,twitter analytics,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00138,Twitter Trails,,http://twittertrails.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,twitter tracking,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00146,WhatsApp archiver,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/whatsapp-archiver,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,WhatsApp archiver,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/whatsapp-scraper/tree/master/python_scraper,whatsapp,,,open source
+TL00117,Squint,MITRE,https://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/squint-sharpens-officials-perspective-to-combat-election-distortion,Tipline,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,browser extension;mobile app,
+TL00029,Disinformation Diaries,,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/initiatives/the-campaign/the-disinformation-diaries/,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
+TL00051,Get Bad News,DROG,https://getbadnews.com/#intro,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
+TL00121,The News Hero,NATO Stratcom,https://www.thenewshero.org/,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
+TL00122,The propaganda game,,https://propagandagame.org,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
+TL00004,Alexa,Alexa,https://www.alexa.com,Web Traffic Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00008,Backlink Watch,Backlink Watch,http://www.backlinkwatch.com/,Web Traffic Analysis,,,Backlink checker,,,,,,,
+TL00110,SimilarWeb,SimilarWeb,http://similarweb.com/,Web Traffic Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00005,AnalyzeID,,http://analyzeid.com/,Website Analysis,Useful,,AnalyzeID find related websites through ad codes,,,,,,,
+TL00006,Archive.is,,http://archive.is/,Website Analysis,,,Archive.is often used for social media profiles as well,,,,,,,
+TL00016,Carbon Date,,http://carbondate.cs.odu.edu/,Website Analysis,,,A tool that tries to guess when a webpage first went online,,,,,,,
+TL00027,Deep Duck Dive,,https://deepdiveduck.com,Website Analysis,,,Paid tool to monitor changes to specific webpages,,,,,,,
+TL00030,DNSlytics,,https://dnslytics.com/,Website Analysis,,,"DNSlytics is another great tool for connecting websites together via AdSense, Google Analytics, IP etc. Reasonably-priced paid verison, too",,,,,,,
+TL00031,Domain Big Data,,https://domainbigdata.com/,Website Analysis,,,Domain Big Data free whois/domain name search,,,,,,,
+TL00032,DomainTools,,https://whois.domaintools.com/,Website Analysis,,,DomainTools paid whois search and investigations tool,,,,,,,
+TL00042,FOCA,,https://www.elevenpaths.com/labstools/foca/index.html,Website Analysis,,,FOCA tool for analyzing metadata in documents on the web (Windows only),,,,,,,
+TL00065,Internet Archive,Internet Archive,https://archive.org/web/,Website Analysis,,,Internet Archive/Wayback Machine,,,,,,,
+TL00083,NerdyData,NerdyData,https://nerdydata.com/search,Website Analysis,,,NerdyData source code search,,,,,,,
+TL00099,Publicwww,,https://publicwww.com/,Website Analysis,,,"Publicwww, search to see how many websites have the same source code or snippet of text (looks in HTML, JS and CSS code as well as webpages)",,,,,,,
+TL00116,Spy On Web,,http://www.spyonweb.com/,Website Analysis,,,Spy On Web search for tracking Google Analytics and AdSense,,,,,,,
+TL00140,URLScan,,https://urlscan.io/,Website Analysis,,,"URLScan is a free tool that gives an overview of a site, the tools used to build it, and other useful info",,,,,,,
+TL00141,Viewcached.com,,http://viewcached.com/,Website Analysis,,,Viewcached.com tool for retrieving cached pages from multiple search engines,,,,,,,
+TL00142,ViewDNS,,https://viewdns.info/reverseip/,Website Analysis,,,ViewDNS is another useful tool for analyzing domain names.,,,,,,,
+TL00149,Whoisology,,https://whoisology.com/,Website Analysis,,,Whoisology whois-domain search,,,,,,,
+TL00009,Blackbird Constellation Engine,Blackbird,https://www.blackbird.ai/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,paid
+TL00013,Builtwith,,Builtwith.com,Website Analysis,Designed for disinfo,yes,"website details, links to other websites",,,,webpages,,,Freemium
+TL00014,Buzzsumo,,https://buzzsumo.com/,,Commonly used,,trends; social listening,,,,,,,paid
+TL00017,Check,Meedan,https://meedan.com/check,Analysis tracking and support,Designed for disinfo,,,,,https://github.com/meedan/check,,human,,open source
+TL00018,Check browser add-on,Meedan,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/check/pjfgpbclkfjkfiljlcfehjmpafeoafdi?hl=en,Analysis tracking and support,Designed for disinfo,,,"Browse the internet, and find a Tweet, YouTube video, Facebook post or an Instagram photo that you want your team to fact-check and investigate. Click the Check icon, choose one of the projects you want to add this item to, and save it",,,artifacts,,browser extension,
+TL00020,Claim Review,Schema.org,https://schema.org/ClaimReview,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
+TL00021,ClaimBuster,University of Texas at Arlington,https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
+TL00024,Counter propaganda and disinformation explorer (CPD),IBM,https://www.ibm.com/watson,,Designed for disinfo,,summarisation?,,,,,,,
+TL00028,Disinfo Busters,,http://disinfobusters.eu,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00034,Emergent,Columbia University: Tow Center,http://www.emergent.info/about,,Designed for disinfo,,rumor tracker,Emergent is a real-time rumor tracker. It's part of a research project with the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University that focuses on how unverified information and rumor are reported in the media. It aims to develop best practices for debunking misinformation.,,,,,,
+TL00037,Fakebook Experiment,Avaaz,https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/disinfo_volunteer_231/,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00040,Feed Reflect (browser extension),,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/feedreflect/bigmeipgaifggglelcnpnpbaefimpooc?hl=en-US,,Potentially useful,,,Browser extension designed to promote awareness when reading news on Twitter. This browser extension changes twitter feed by making posts more or less visible and help users distinguish news with differing level of reliability. ,,,,,browser extension,
+TL00045,Fortis AI,Alion,https://www.alionscience.com,,Potentially useful,,IO platform,,,,,,,
+TL00049,GenSynth,Darwin AI,https://www.darwinai.com,,Potentially useful,,explainable AI - relevant?,,I think they're talking about the tool in here: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.11951,,,,,
+TL00053,Giant Language Model Test Room (GLTR),,http://gltr.io,,Designed for disinfo,,text forensics,"The aim of GLTR is to take the same models that are used to generated fake text as a tool for detection. GLTR has access to the GPT-2 117M language model from OpenAI, one of the largest publicly available models. It can use any textual input and analyze what GPT-2 would have predicted at each position. Since the output is a ranking of all of the words that the model knows, we can compute how the observed following word ranks. We use this positional information to overlay a colored mask over the text that corresponds to the position in the ranking. A word that ranks within the most likely words is highlighted in green (top 10), yellow (top 100), red (top 1,000), and the rest of the words in purple. Thus, we can get a direct visual indication of how likely each word was under the model.",,,text,,,
+TL00055,Google Trends,,https://trends.google.com/trends,,Commonly used,,trends,,,,,,,free
+TL00058,Ground News,Ground News,https://www.ground.news/about,,,,bias tags on news articles,,,,,,browser extension,
+TL00059,Hoaxy,University of Indiana,https://hoaxy.osome.iu.edu/,,Designed for disinfo,,network analysis of twitter data,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00061,Hypothes.is,Hypothes.is,https://web.hypothes.is/,Analysis tracking and support,Commonly used,,webpage markup,,,,webpages,human,,
+TL00064,Influence apps,Influence,https://startinfluence.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,paid
+TL00071,KeyHole,KeyHole,https://keyhole.co/,,,,impact measurement,,,,,,,
+TL00072,Kharon,Kharon,https://www.kharon.com,,,,data and analytics tools,,Not sure this is in area?,,,,,
+TL00076,Meltwater Explore,,https://www.meltwater.com/en/solutions/social-listening,,,,trends; social listening,,,,,,,paid
+TL00078,MIDAC,Mythos Labs,http://www.mythoslabs.org/,,Designed for disinfo,,countering with humour,,,,,,,
+TL00079,Misp,,https://www.misp-project.org/,,Useful,,,,,,,,,open source
+TL00084,NewsCheck,NewsCheck,https://www.newscheck.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
+TL00085,NewsGuard,NewsGuard,https://www.newsguardtech.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,trust rating system for urls,,,,webpages,,,
+TL00086,NewsWhip,NewsWhip,https://www.newswhip.com/,,,,soclal media analytics,,,,,,,
+TL00087,Nobias,Nobias,https://nobias.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,browser extension,
+TL00092,Our.News,Our.News,https://our.news/,,,,,,,,,,browser extension,
+TL00094,PimEyes: Face Recognition Search Engine and Reverse Image Search,PimEyes,https://pimeyes.com/en,,,,"Advanced face recognition search engine, a reverse image search tool, and a photo search mechanism used to find out where your face appears online",,,,,,,
+TL00096,Policy Change Index,Policy Change Index,https://policychangeindex.org/,,,,automated content analysis,,,https://github.com/PSLmodels,,,,open source
+TL00097,PR Aegis,Cosmetheus,https://cosmetheus.com/,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00098,Predata Platform,Predata,https://predata.com,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00100,Q,Sparks&Honey,https://www.sparksandhoney.com/,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00103,Recorded Future,Recorded Future,https://www.recordedfuture.com,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00109,Share The Facts,Duke Reporters Lab / Jigsaw,,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
+TL00114,SocialReaper,,,,,,,"scrapes Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Youtube, Pinterest, Tumblr APIs",,https://github.com/ScriptSmith/socialreaper,,,,
+TL00118,Tattle,Labor of Love,https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=studio.laboroflove.tattle&hl=en_GB&gl=US,,,,WhatsApp message forwarding,,,,messageapps,,,
+TL00123,TIES,Facebook,https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/facebook-outlines-new-system-for-detecting-fake-accounts-and-misinformation/584228/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,closed
+TL00127,Trendolizer,,http://get.trendolizer.com/,,,,trending stories,,,,,,,
+TL00128,Trive,Trive,https://trive.news/,,,,"""human swarming""",,,,,,browser extension,
+TL00130,Truly Media,Athens Technology Centre (ATC),https://www.truly.media/,,Designed for disinfo,,crowdsourced verification,,,,,,,
+TL00131,Trusted Times,,https://trustedtimes.org,,,,news article analysis,,,,webpages,,browser extension,
+TL00143,Vortimo,,,Analysis tracking and support,Useful,,,,,,,,,
+TL00151,Wolf Totem,Omelas,https://www.omelas.io/wolf-totem-product,,Designed for disinfo,,dashboard,,,,,,,
+TL00152,Yonder,Yonder,https://www.yonder-ai.com,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72125e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_DATA_README.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Unnamed: 0,Unnamed: 1,Unnamed: 2,Unnamed: 3,Unnamed: 4,Unnamed: 5
+"Spreadsheet created by initially combining CredCo's CredWeb and the Carnegie Endowment lists of disinformation initiatives with CSC's Rolodex, Disinfo Cloud list and a list compiled by Jon B",,,,,
+Further work needed to assimilate addition data from the lists below...,,,,,
+,DATASETS,,No. of entries,Categorisation,
+,Carnegie post,https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/14/mapping-worldwide-initiatives-to-counter-influence-operations-pub-83435 ,Commentary on Carnegie list,,
+,"Carnegie list, created from credweb, rand, disinfocloud",https://ceip.knack.com/pcio-baseline-datasets#initiatives/ ,460,Added. See below,
+,CredCo's CredWeb catalogue:,https://credibilitycoalition.org/credcatalog/,252,Added. Theory; Practice; Content; Infrastructure,
+,Rand list of tools,https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/fighting-disinformation.html,90,Bot/spam detection; Codes and standards; Credibility scoring; Disinformation tracking; Education/training; Verification; Whitelisting,
+,Disinfocloud list of technologies:,https://disinfocloud.com/about-us,265,Need to sign in with org name - CSC has an account,
+,Disinfocloud has a useful list of tool categories:,https://disinfocloud.com/tools-overview/,,,
+,Facebook map of fact checkers,https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-checking/partner-map,,"I've checked Africa, South America, Central America.  Everything else still to do",
+,WHO covid19 disinfo note,https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ucor7vU81HbBbxvre2QI5Rv08Ys1VvX2JrWtNSGk4XY/edit#,,NEED TO CHECK THROUGH THIS,
+,IRI list of european groups,https://dash-iribeaconproject.org/,,ADD TO LISTS,
+,"DCMS index of companies - safe-tech issues, incl disinfo",https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/directory-of-uk-safety-tech-providers,,ADD TO LISTS,
+,Duke Reporters Lab of Fact Checkers,https://reporterslab.org/fact-checking/,,ADD TO LISTS,
+,ISACs/ISAOs,https://www.nationalisacs.org/member-isacs-3,,ADD TO LISTS?,
+,Turing online hate research hub,https://www.turing.ac.uk/research/research-programmes/public-policy/online-hate-research-hub,,ADD TO LISTS?,
+,Internationl Fact Checking Network (Poynter),https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,,,
+,European Union report list,https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/624278/EPRS_STU(2019)624278_EN.pdf,,,ADD TO LISTS
+,Ryerson Uni covid19 factcheckers list ,https://covid19misinfo.org/fact-checking/covid-19-fact-checkers/ and https://dataverse.scholarsportal.info/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5683/SP2/IMISPE,,,
+,Countering Disinformation list,https://counteringdisinformation.org/interventions/,,TRIAGE LISTS,
+,,,,,
+,,,,,
+MAP,https://datastudio.google.com/u/2/reporting/a8491164-6aa8-45d0-b609-c70339689127/page/ierzB ,,597,,
+,,,,,
+QUESTIONS,,,,,
+,Suggested corrections in form:,https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScnjgJg2lGw3FB_xGaZPrZuKEZSY1OOy9-UosMS9T2yWAtm3A/viewform,,,
+,,,,,
+CODES,,,,,
+,Initiatives Studying Influence Operations Code Book,,,,
+,Field,Description,,,
+,Name,"Name of the initiative, with any larger host organization listed in brackets after the name. e.g.: Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project (American Press Institute)",,,
+,Organization Type,"Academia – initiative is housed at a university
+Civil Society – initiative is led by a think tank, non-governmental organization, non-profit or charity.
+Government & Intergovernmental – initiative is run by a single government or government-level international organization such as NATO, the UN or EU.
+Media – initiative is run by a media outlet
+Tech – initiative is led by a social media platform or technology company",,,
+,Initiative Focus,"Countermeasures – seeks to counter or disrupt influence operations.
+Democracy & Civil Liberties –aims to support the democratic process by identifying attempts to subvert or influence elections, factchecking political statements and/or engaging in cross-sector engagement to build understanding of the threat.
+Factchecking & Journalism –conducts fact checking (e.g., of media reporting or political statements), verifies videos and images, detects disinformation narratives, verifies the credibility of websites, or supports journalism more broadly;
+Investigations –conducts research into ongoing or recent influence operations to expose them, reveal hidden networks and nodes, highlight tactics, and make attributions, typically on tight deadlines. 
+Public Policy – develops new policy and regulatory proposals and/or evaluates the effectiveness of existing ones
+Research – conducts longer-term academic-level research on influence operations, including campaigns, their effects and countermeasures.
+Societal Resilience – initiative aims to build public resilience to influence operations narratives and improve the information ecosystem through education, media literacy, and/or promoting responsible journalism
+Tools – provides tools to help researchers and end-users to understand or control their experience within the information environment",,,
+,Self- Description,Description of main activities as per the initiative’s publicly available information,,,
+,Location,"Geographic location by continent. Presence on 3 or more continents counts as global
+North America
+South America
+Europe
+Asia
+Africa
+Australia and Oceania
+Global",,,
+,URL,Link to the website of the initiative,,,
+,,,,,
+,,,,,
+,76,on the tools sheet,,,
+,130,with 'tool provider' checked on the org sheet,,,
+,811,organisations,,,
+,297,contacts,,,
+,,,,,
+CRUNCHBASE,,,,,
+,Deb gives this as an example model,https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/lookup-2,,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a395af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK CODES.csv	
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+disarm_object,id_prefix,id_digits,next number on stack
+actortype,A,3,
+countermeasure,C,5,
+responsetype,D,2,
+example,E,6,
+detection,F,5,
+framework,FW,2,
+group,G,6,
+incident,I,5,
+metatechnique,M,3,
+moe,ME,5,
+mop,MP,5,
+narrative,N,5,
+phase,P,2,P05
+playbook,PB,5,
+resource,R,3,
+sector,S,3,
+technique,T,4,T0073
+tactic,TA,2,TA19
+task,TK,4,
+tool,TL,5,
+subtechnique,ST,4,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eca32b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/ADMIN_FRAMEWORK_README.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+MASTER COPY OF DISARM TTPS,Unnamed: 1,Unnamed: 2,Unnamed: 3
+,,,
+HISTORY OF THIS SPREADSHEET,,,
+,,,
+Date,Who,Description,Comments
+2019-11-15 00:00:00,ALL,"""Blue Team"" workshop, Washington DC 15-16 Nov 2019",
+2019-12-05 00:00:00,SJT,copied all wall post-its into spreadsheet,
+2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,Took copy for cleaning,
+2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,Put notes here if you spot something unusual or do something you want crosschecking,
+2019-12-06 00:00:00,SJT,"First task: look for the techniques for each row in the spreadsheet, and add them to the ""techniques"" column. A list of Technique numbers is best; if it applies to all techniques in a tactic, put the tactic number; if it applies to all techniques, put “all”.",
+2019-12-21 00:00:00,Eric D.,"I am unsure to what extent content dissemination is included in the ""Develop"" phases or Channel Selection, compared to belonging more or less solely within Pump Priming, Exposure, Go Physical and Persistence.",
+2020-01-07 00:00:00,SJT,"Content dissemination is generally right of boom, but might be needed as part of eg. creating convincing sockpuppets or groups in a channel",
+2020-01-10 00:00:00,SJT,"New copy of spreadsheet. Going to put all counters in here, as a playbook",
+2020-01-12 00:00:00,SJT,"Included post-it notes from 2019-11 workshop. Included incident-counters from 2019-11 preparation worksheet. Included general-counters from 2019-11 preparation worksheet. Added References worksheet, to hold URLs to references (excel only allows 1 URL per cell, which wipes data if we're not careful)",
+2020-01-13 00:00:00,SJT,"Included counters and playbooks from teams 1,2,3,4,D",
+2020-01-14 00:00:00,SJT,"Took copy of spreadsheet, so we have a snapshot of all the inputs into it. Now it's time to get cleaning!",
+2020-01-20 00:00:00,SJT,"Started the cleanup. First, gave every counter an id. ",
+2020-01-31 00:00:00,SJT,"Split output report into two: ""finding ways to counter disinformation campaigns"" and ""Disinformation counters"" so we can publish the first part faster",
+2020-02-10 00:00:00,Roger J.,"Add ""Measure of Effectiveness"" and ""Measure of Performance"" sheet. This is a requirement for effective data pollution where the objective is to degrade the adversary's ability to measure their affect.",
+2020-05-14 00:00:00,SJT,"Clean up tactic and response names in countermeasures sheet, so they don’t mess up the generators",
+,,,
+,,,
+SUGGESTED TASKS,,,
+,,,
+Date,Suggested by,Suggested Task,Comments
+,SJT,"Add links to references with each counter in, to the rows for those counters. Add each document to the REFERENCES tab, and its [ref] to the column ""References"" in the Countermeasures sheet. ",
+,SJT,"Check through spreadsheet for duplicate counters, and counters at the wrong level of details (e.g. work out what should be at the counter level, and what should be at the playbook level). Clean up accordingly.",
+,SJT,"Create code similar to the DISARM github code, that creates: a page for each technique, listing the counters relevant to that technique; a page for each tactic, listing the counters relevant to that tactic, by response type then alphabetically; a COA grid with the number of responses for each tactic/response combination ",done
+,SJT,"Create a chapter in the summary document for each tactic, describing the types of counter relevant at that tactic stage. ",Done
+,SJT,Write a document chapter on viewing disinformation as an ecosystem and potential solution space to be explored. ,
+2021-07-17 00:00:00,SJT,"Look at SG note for wording, counters we haven't listed https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-misinformation-advisory.pdf",
+REFERENCES USED,,,
+,,,
+ID,URL,Reference,Comments
+RAND2237,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2237.html,"Helmus et al, ""Russian Social Media Influence: understanding Russian propaganda in Eastern Europe"", Rand Corporation 2018",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
+Corker18,https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf,"Corker et al, ""Putin's asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: implications for US national security"", 2018",
+Hicks19,https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-i-campaigning-gray-zone,"Hicks et al, ""By other means part 1: campaigning in the gray zone"", 2019",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
+Dalton19,csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-ii-adapting-compete-gray-zone,"Dalton et al, ""By other means part 2: adapting to compete in the gray zone"", 2019",Scraped before 2019-11 workshop
+Taylor81,http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2742/ToP.pdf,"Philip M. Taylor (1981): Techniques of persuasion: basic ground rules of British propaganda during the Second World War, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 1:1, 57 – 66",https://web.archive.org/web/20170226100346/http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2742/ToP.pdf
+,https://www.psywar.org/content/irdSpecialOperations,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOE.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOE.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc9e08f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOE.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+disarm_id,info_category,info_type,meta,name,brainstorm,phase,tactic,counter,summary,longname
+ME00001,,,,,,TA06 - Develop Content,T0008 - Create fake or imposter news sites,Identify affilliated imposter accounts,,ME00001
+ME00002,,,,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,T0009 - Create fake experts,Verify published research accreditation,,ME00002
+ME00003,,,,,"-measure credibility of expert, credibility of each media company, their amplification factor, as a metric of the value the expert provides.
+
+
+
+X media power, measure whether actor can be knocked off one class of ""credible media"" down to the next in the ladder",TA15 - Establish Social Assets,T0009 - Create fake experts,Publicly deplatform fake experts,,ME00003
+ME00004,,,,,-MOE = predictive value of differentiation by intent via other counters related to polls?,TA07 - Channel Selection,T0029 - Manipulate online polls,Categorize polls by intent,,ME00004
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOP.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOP.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00717ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/MOP.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+disarm_id,info_category,data_type,Unnamed: 3,name,Unnamed: 5,Unnamed: 6,summary,longname
+MP00001,,,social_media,Likes,,,,MP00001
+MP00002,,,social_media,Shares,,,,MP00002
+MP00003,,,social_media,Comments,,,,MP00003
+MP00004,,,social_media,Follows,,,,MP00004
+MP00005,,,social_media,Retweets,,,,MP00005
+MP00006,,,social_media,Clicks,,,,MP00006
+MP00007,,,social_media,Active Followers,,,,MP00007
+MP00008,,,social_media,Relevance Score,,,see: facebook relevance algo,MP00008
+MP00009,,,social_media,Follwers vs. Following Ratio,,,,MP00009
+MP00010,,,social_media,Inter-Community Posting ,,,4chan to Reddit,MP00010
+MP00011,,,social_media,Intra-Community Posting,,,crossposting between boards,MP00011
+MP00012,,,social_media,Reach vs. Impressions,,,,MP00012
+MP00013,,,social_media,Direct Messages,,,,MP00013
+MP00014,,,,,,,,MP00014
+MP00015,,,,Web Site Traffic Growth,,,,MP00015
+MP00016,,,,Search Engine Ranking,,,,MP00016
+MP00017,,,mobile,Mobile App Downloads,,,,MP00017
+MP00018,,,mobile,SMS/Push Notification List,,,,MP00018
+MP00019,,,,,,,,MP00019
+MP00020,,,target_audience,Audience Demographics,,,,MP00020
+MP00021,,,target_audience,Audience Mentions,,,,MP00021
+MP00022,,,,,,,,MP00022
+MP00023,,,,,,,,MP00023
+MP00024,,,,,,,,MP00024
+MP00025,,,adtech,Ad Conversions,,,,MP00025
+MP00026,,,,,,,,MP00026
+MP00027,,,,,,,,MP00027
+MP00028,,,,,,,,MP00028
+MP00029,,,,,,,,MP00029
+MP00030,,,,Adversary intelligence system fails to detect,,,,MP00030
+MP00031,,,,,,,,MP00031
+MP00032,,,email,Email List,,,,MP00032
+MP00033,,,email,Email Open Rate,,,,MP00033
+MP00034,,,email,Email Click-Through Rate,,,,MP00034
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/actortypes.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/actortypes.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cdfa82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/actortypes.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,sector_ids,framework_ids,longname,Jon's comments/questions
+A001,data scientist ,"Person who can wrangle data, implement machine learning algorithms etc","S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010","FW01, FW02",A001 - data scientist ,"What actual actions do data scientists execute? Do we not need a clearer idea of this, to help up map ttps (actions) to actortypes (who execute the action)"
+A002,target,Person being targeted by disinformation campaign,"S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010",FW02,A002 - target,"Both red and blue framework users will refer to A002? So in FW01, as well as FW02?"
+A003,trusted authority ,Influencer,"S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010","FW01, FW02",A003 - trusted authority ,"Is A003 best summarised by the word ""Inluencer""? Is an influencer not a separate actortype?
+Just seen below, A016"
+A004,activist,,S002,FW02,A004 - activist,What does this actortype do?
+A005,community group,,S002,FW02,A005 - community group,What does this actortype do?
+A006,educator,,S002,FW02,A006 - educator,
+A007,factchecker,Someone with the skills to verify whether information posted is factual,S002,FW02,A007 - factchecker,
+A008,library,,S002,FW02,A008 - library,"Is this an actortype? A sub-sector, yes. But what is the 'action type' to help describe the 'actortype'?"
+A009,NGO,,S002,FW02,A009 - NGO,"This is a sector, not an actortype"
+A010,religious organisation ,,S002,FW02,A010 - religious organisation ,"""Faith communities"" are a sub-sector of the Civil Society sector. I think we need clear differentiation between the 'Sector' object (where an actor sits) vs 'Actortype' object (what an actor does)"
+A011,school ,,S002,FW02,A011 - school ,"This is a subsector of S004 - not an actortype, or is there a clear role for a school? If teaching, is this not A006"
+A012,account owner,Anyone who owns an account online,S006,"FW01
+FW02",A012 - account owner,
+A013,content creator ,,S006,"FW01
+FW02",A013 - content creator ,
+A014,elves,,S006,FW02,A014 - elves,"??? SJ, you have told me, but I've forgotten"
+A015,general public,,S006,FW02,A015 - general public,"Duplication of a field in the sector object. But I'm querying if this belongs under sector either. Aren't we talking here about ""individuals"". And, then again, what do these individuals do? They are a target. Or an influencer. Or something else. But being an individual doesn't seem to help describe their applicability to an action"
+A016,influencer,,S006,"FW01
+FW02",A016 - influencer,
+A017,coordinating body,For example the DHS,S003,FW02,A017 - coordinating body,"""Response coordinator""? Or just 'Coordinator"""
+A018,government ,Government agencies,S003,"FW01
+FW02",A018 - government ,"DHS (A017) is ""government"". Again, this is a field/value of the sector object"
+A019,military ,,S003,FW02,A019 - military ,"A019 is a sub-sector of ""government"". Again, this is a field/value of the sector object"
+A020,policy maker,,S003,FW02,A020 - policy maker,
+A021,media organisation,,S010,"FW01
+FW02",A021 - media organisation,"Not an actortype. The actor is perhaps as the owner, or the journalist, or the ad buyer, ad seller etc"
+A022,company,,S009,FW02,A022 - company,
+A023,adtech provider,,S008,FW02,A023 - adtech provider,"Should Adtech be a called-out subsector of S008? Separate question: is ""provider"" relevant? What action does it imply? Or what TTP does it map to?"
+A024,developer,,S008,FW02,A024 - developer,
+A025,funding_site_admin,Funding site admin,S008,FW02,A025 - funding_site_admin,What is this?
+A026,games designer,,S008,"FW01, FW02",A026 - games designer,"Just ""Designer""? Would the TTP context not make it clear the context was 'gaming'?"
+A027,information security,,S008,FW02,A027 - information security,
+A028,platform administrator,,S008,FW02,A028 - platform administrator,"Just ""Administrator""?"
+A029,server admininistrator ,,S008,FW02,A029 - server admininistrator ,"Just ""Administrator""? (de-duplicating A028)"
+A030,platforms ,,S007,FW02,A030 - platforms ,"The same as S007? If there is an action here, is it done by actortype = ""algorithm""? Maybe ""Platform"" is right"
+A031,social media platform adminstrator,"Person with the authority to make changes to algorithms, take down content etc. ",S007,FW02,A031 - social media platform adminstrator,"Not needed, given A028. The sector selection does the differentiation"
+A032,social media platform outreach ,,S007,FW02,A032 - social media platform outreach ,What does this do?
+A033,social media platform owner,Person with authority to make changes to a social media company’s business model,S007,FW02,A033 - social media platform owner,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/comments.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/comments.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..045fb69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/comments.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,1755 @@
+0,1,2
+"counter","C00066","
+
+New content.  
+
+If a group has the ability - e.g. enough dedicated person-hours - it can hijack the artifacts and narratives of a disinformation incident, by flooding them with counter-content.   This has been seen in the past as accidental hashtag flooding - e.g. a new disinformation hashtag was unknowingly chosen that was the same as a children's swim team, which became active during a swim meet.  In 2020, kPop stans flooded disinformation-carrying hashtags including #whitelivesmatter, and gay men flooded the #proudboys hashtag. 
+
+This is an example of a countertechnique that mirrors an existing disinformation technique - in this case T0049.  
+"
+"incident","I00002","
+
+Actor: IRA, individuals (e.g. Larry Cook).
+
+Timeframe: 
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals:
+Physical damage to country? 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Targetted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targetting Washington State mothers, $1,776 to boost posts over 9 months). 
+* Gofundme campaigns to pay for ads (Larry Cook)
+
+Effects:
+
+* “The U.S. anti-vax movement has been blamed for two outbreaks of measles that have infected some 300 people—mostly children—in New York and the Pacific Northwest.”
+
+Counters:
+
+* American Medical Association “warned social-media giants, including Amazon, Facebook, Google, Pinterest, Twitter, and YouTube, that they were helping to amplify the propaganda and confuse parents.”
+* Gofundme banned antivaxxers: “Campaigns raising money to promote misinformation about vaccines violate GoFundMe’s terms of service and will be removed from the platform”.  Less than 10 campaigns reported as removed.
+
+Related incidents:
+
+Artefacts:
+
+Search terms vaccination, anti-vaccination, “vaccine choice”. 
+
+Notes:
+
+Started by looking for vaccine-related content in my misinformation datasets
+Then did google search for “antivax misinformation” to get references etc. 
+Larry Cook runs “Stop Mandatory Vaccination”: “donations go “directly” to his bank account and funds “may be used to pay [his] personal bills.”
+
+
+References;
+
+* https://www.thedailybeast.com/brooklyn-hasidic-community-is-in-the-midst-of-a-dire-measles-outbreak
+* https://www.thedailybeast.com/amazon-wont-take-a-stand-in-war-over-forrest-maready-book-the-autism-vaccine
+* https://www.bmj.com/content/362/bmj.k3739
+* https://hub.jhu.edu/2018/08/24/russian-trolls-bots-spread-vaccine-misinformation/
+* https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304567 
+* Arciga, [GoFundMe Bans Anti-Vaxxers Who Raise Money to Spread Misinformation](https://www.thedailybeast.com/gofundme-bans-anti-vaxxers-who-raise-money-to-spread-misinformation), Daily Beast 2019-03-22
+* Arciga, [Anti-Vaxxer Larry Cook Has Weaponized Facebook Ads in War Against Science](https://www.thedailybeast.com/anti-vaxxer-larry-cook-has-weaponized-facebook-ads-in-war-against-science), Daily Beast 2019-02-15
+* Gofundmes (removed, but check archives) https://www.gofundme.com/help-save-vaccine-exemptions-in-washington-state https://www.gofundme.com/parents-wake-up-vaccines-kill 
+* Markay, [Anti-Vaccine Facebook Ads Target Women in Measles-Stricken States](https://www.thedailybeast.com/anti-vaccine-facebook-ads-target-women-in-measles-stricken-states/), Daily Beast 2019-02-14
+
+Data
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00053","
+
+Actor: China
+
+Timeframe: December 5, 2018 - still active on 04/03/2019
+
+Date: December 5, 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Unlike Russia, Chinese state has employed a plethora of state-run media to exploit the openness of American democratic society in an effort to insert an intentionally distorted and biased narrative portraying a utopian view of the Chinese government and party. 
+
+Method: 
+
+* China’s state-run social media operations are largely positive and coordinated because those techniques support Chinese strategic goals. State-run media seeds foreign influence environment
+* Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese State and Party
+* Events coordinated and promoted across media platforms
+* Extend from digital into physical space with gatherings, ie: support for Meng outside courthouse
+
+* In the case of Chinese state-run information manipulation campaigns — to distinguish the political intent and national strategies underlying these campaigns as different from simply another perspective on the news. China also play’s victim, innocence, plays by rules, misunderstood narrative… they too have their version of the 4D’s. Examples: “Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye has accused Canada of applying a double standard, and has decried what he sees as “Western egotism and white supremacy” in the treatment of detained Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou.” - Op-Ed in Globe & Mail. The Chinese embassy in Canada says the Vancouver arrest of a top Huawei executive amounts to a “political conspiracy” to undermine the telecom giant and it dismisses Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s assertion that he had no role in the high-profile case. Canada's arrest of a senior Huawei executive was the ""backstabbing"" of a friend, Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye said Thursday, and he warned of repercussions if the federal government bars her telecom company from building a Canadian 5G network.
+
+Counters: none identified/researched
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* See Poland (arrest of Huawei employee); Czech republic; 
+* Five Eyes to ban or not ban Huawei 5G network equipment 
+
+
+References: 
+
+* https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-chinas-envoy-says-white-supremacy-played-part-in-canadas-arrest-of/
+* https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews
+* https://twitter.com/UserExperienceU
+* https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190125061623487
+* https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-universities-continuing-rd-funding-partnerships-with/
+* http://fortune.com/2019/01/18/oxford-university-huawei-research-funding/
+* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-security-universities-insig/u-s-universities-unplug-from-chinas-huawei-under-pressure-from-trump-idUSKCN1PI0GV
+
+
+* Beyond Hybrid War: How China Exploits Social Media to Sway American Opinion
+https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-china-says-arrest-of-huawei-cfo-part-of-political-conspiracy-by/
+* https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/czech-zeman-babis-huawei-xi-trump/584158
+* https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/04/installing-chinese-5g-gear-dangerous-and-probably-inevitable-nato-report/156007/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
+* https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-s-arrest-of-huawei-exec-an-act-of-backstabbing-chinese-ambassador-says-1.4258201
+* https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/09/asia/china-canada-meng-huawei-intl/index.html
+* https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-on-china-has-canada-lost-its-sense-of-justice/
+* https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/proper-news-or-propaganda-chinas-social-media-manipulations-exposed
+* https://globalnews.ca/news/4758109/china-bully-canada-release-huawei-cfo/
+* https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-will-pay-chinese-state-media-threaten-repercussions-over-huawei-arrest-1.4216293
+* https://business.financialpost.com/telecom/inside-huaweis-rather-awkward-charm-offensive-to-convince-the-world-its-ok
+* https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3001272/despite-us-allegations-huawei-has-done-nothing-wrong-why-should-it
+
+Datasets: none identified (mining more Twitter data, Reddit, and comment forums could be valuable research)
+
+Notes: 
+
+While a hypothesis and not related to Meng’s arrest, research done by John Gray (using  Mentionmapp data from January 13, 2019) also suggests the need to look at adjecent/tangential flow of social data. In this case (could be coincidence) simutatneaous flow of tweets via State Media @globaltimesnews (reporting on Poland arrest) and of “influencer” (using bots to amplify content) @UserExperienceU tweeting favorable about Huawei technology. Need to consider the amplifiers/influencers operate to support/put the happy face on Huawei. More work needs to be done researching social behavior outside the “Great Firewall” using trolls, bots, cyborgs, and “willing/unwitting” idiots. Just like Russia, we also need to give more consideration to how bots/automation (low-volume in particular) is operating to amplify State Media in order to gain higher fidelity in search engines.  
+
+We should also recognize another form of Huawei/China manipulation in the form of research programs in Universities across North America and Europe
+https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190125061623487
+https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-universities-continuing-rd-funding-partnerships-with/
+fortune.com/2019/01/18/oxford-university-huawei-research-funding/
+https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-security-universities-insig/u-s-universities-unplug-from-chinas-huawei-under-pressure-from-trump-idUSKCN1PI0GV
+
+Timeline of events
+
+Dec. 6: China demands Canada release Meng and “immediately correct the mistake” officials made in arresting her. The Chinese also say they were not briefed on the reasons for Meng’s arrest.
+In Ottawa, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau says Meng’s case is part of an independent legal process with no outside political influence.
+Dec. 7: In Vancouver, Meng appears in court, where allegations of fraud are laid out. The U.S. alleges Meng misled American banks in a bid to get around American sanctions on Iran.
+Dec. 8: Canada’s ambassador to China, John McCallum, is summoned to a meeting with China’s assistant foreign minister so the country can register complaints about Meng’s arrest. “China strongly urges the Canadian side to immediately release the detained Huawei executive … or face grave consequences that the Canadian side should be held accountable for,” the assistant minister, Le Yucheng, says in a statement.
+
+Dec. 12: China’s foreign ministry says it has no information about Kovrig, but says the organization he worked with – the International Crisis Group – was not registered in China, making its activities in the country illegal.
+
+Dec. 13: China’s foreign ministry says Kovrig and Spavor have been detained on suspicion of “endangering national security.”
+
+Dec. 20: Indictments unsealed in the United States allege two Chinese citizens targeted companies in Canada and around the world as part of a years-long hacking campaign to steal data.
+
+Dec. 24: China’s foreign ministry calls out the U.S., Britain and EU, saying the trio should be condemning Canada for Meng’s arrest. Spokeswoman Hua Chunying says Canada should “correct its mistakes” and stop acting at the behest of the United States. She says Kovrig and Spavor’s rights are being respected in custody.
+
+Jan. 9: China’s envoy in Ottawa suggests Canada and its Western allies are white supremacists for calling for the release of two Canadians imprisoned last month by his country’s communist government. Ambassador Lu Shaye makes the accusation in an op-ed in the Hill Times.
+
+Jan. 15: China expresses its “strong dissatisfaction” with Trudeau over his criticism of Schellenberg’s sentence. Trudeau should “respect the rule of law, respect China’s judicial sovereignty, correct mistakes and stop making irresponsible remarks,” foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying says.
+
+Jan. 17: Ambassador Shaye says Canada’s arrest of Meng was an act of “backstabbing” by a friend. Lu warns of “repercussions” if Canada bars the firm from its new 5G network for security reasons, as have three of its intelligence-sharing allies.
+
+Jan. 22: China demands the U.S. drop a request that Canada extradite Meng. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said Meng’s case was out of the ordinary and Canada’s extradition treaty with the U.S. infringed on the “safety and legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens.”
+Jan. 28: The U.S. Department of Justice formally levels criminal charges against Huawei, two subsidiaries and Meng. The charges, contained in two newly unsealed indictments, allege that Huawei misrepresented its ownership of a Hong Kong-based subsidiary to circumvent American sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, they say Huawei stole telecommunications technology, trade secrets and equipment from U.S. cellphone provider T-Mobile USA. Meng is charged with bank fraud, wire fraud and two counts of conspiracy to commit both. In a statement, Huawei denied committing any of the violations cited in the indictment.
+
+Jan. 29:China calls on the U.S. to “stop the unreasonable crackdown” on Huawei, saying it will “firmly defend” its companies.
+
+March 6: A lawyer for Meng tells a judge the United States’ bid for extradition raises serious concerns about the political motivations behind the case as the matter is scheduled to return to court on May 8 to set hearing dates.
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00032","
+
+Summary:  
+
+Actors: 
+
+* IRA; other Russian state actors; 
+* Roger Stone, Alex Jones, gamergaters
+
+Timeframe: Fall 2018
+
+Date: September-October 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Divide the American public on gender and party lines; Harass and intimidate anti-Trump voices; 
+* Promote epistemic confusion; 
+* Seed the narrative terrain for future operations; 
+* Promote “both sides” relativism; 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Amplify extreme and hyper-partisan rhetoric; 
+* Promote divisive conspiracy theories; 
+* Re-up debunked theories in new contexts (e.g. hashtags); 
+* Re-center debates on emotional, rather than rational, content; 
+* Alter “ground-truth” resources, such as Wikipedia
+
+Counters: None / Media exposure
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* gamergate; 
+* 2016 election
+
+References
+
+* [Russian trolls and bots are flooding Twitter with Ford-Kavanaugh disinformation](https://qz.com/1409102/russian-trolls-and-bots-are-flooding-twitter-with-ford-kavanaugh-disinformation/)
+* [Brett Kavanaugh and the information terrorists trying to reshape America](https://www.wired.com/story/information-terrorists-trying-to-reshape-america/)
+* [How the Kavanaugh information war mirrors real warzones](https://www.wired.com/story/how-the-kavanaugh-information-war-mirrors-real-warzones/)
+* [How Facebook polarized us during the Kavanaugh hearings](https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/6/17943680/facebook-polarization-kavanaugh-partisan-news-groups)
+* [Brett Kavanaugh has huge opposition in the U.S. - but Russian state propaganda loves Donald Trump's nominee](https://www.newsweek.com/brett-kavanaugh-has-huge-opposition-us-russian-state-propaganda-loves-donald-1155046)
+
+Details
+
+Last month, the attorney of Christine Blasey Ford, the California professor who has accused Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh of sexual assault at a long-ago high school party, revealed that Blasey Ford and her family were in hiding and had hired private security after Blasey Ford received death threats over email and social media. Among those cheering on the hate-trollers were many familiar faces from the sewers of the modern far-right disinformation metropolis: dandified Republican rogue (and likely Mueller investigee) Roger Stone, his alt-media protégés Mike Cernovich and Jack Posobiec, anarchist turned Kremlin propaganda employee turned Bernie backer turned Trump backer Cassandra Fairbanks, and breathless Infowars conspiracist-in-chief Alex Jones. And not surprisingly, alt-right super-troll Chuck Johnson had his own connection to players in the scandal.
+
+This is an operational unit of information terrorists helping to transform the way Americans consume news in the age of Trump—some of the central nodes that give order to the information deluge and around which bot armies and human amplification networks can be organized, wiped out, reconstituted, and armed for attack.
+
+The attacks on Blasey Ford aimed to discredit and silence her using the same tactics that have been deployed to discredit and silence others over the past few years. As others have come forward to accuse Kavanaugh of wrongdoing—including Deborah Ramirez and Julie Swetnick—they have been similarly harassed and smeared by the same machinery and themes.
+
+Online Twitter accounts tied to Russia are heavily involved in discussing the Supreme Court nominee and allegations against him online. Hamilton68, a project run by the German Marshall Fund think tank that tracks tweets “tied to Russia-linked influence networks,” listed Kavanaugh, Trump, the FBI, and Ford as the top four topics mentioned by Russia-linked accounts on the evening of Oct.1.
+
+The Russia-linked accounts are largely lending their support to Kavanaugh, says Jonathon Morgan, CEO of New Knowledge, the company that built the software behind Hamilton68. Morgan, who is currently tracking a set of around 1,000 accounts he believes are tied to Russia, says the Kavanaugh hearings have unleashed more US domestic-focused propaganda from foreign-linked networks than his firm has seen in months.
+
+Posts about Ford and Kavanaugh are “really cluttered and confused,” with various pieces of clear fabrication from both sides, says Decker.
+
+The effort to introduce a doppelganger aligned with another key method used in LikeWars around the world: muddying the debate by throwing out alternative theories. Russia has long been the master of this disinformation tactic. After its 2014 shootdown of the MH-17 airliner over Ukraine, for instance, Russia spread over a dozen different theories of what had really happened. Many were contradictory and debunked previous claims. But the goal wasn’t to find the truth—it was to obscure it behind a smokescreen of lies.
+
+Similarly, the Kavanaugh debate has given rise to false claims and ridiculous photoshopped images, often spread under fake identities. There have been debunked rumors that Kavanaugh had ruled against Ford’s parents in a house foreclosure and that Ford’s brother was part of the Russia investigation. There was even a flurry of unsubstantiated sexual assault charges leveled against Kavanaugh in the hours before the hearing. His supporters were outraged; those opposed to Kavanaugh's nomination speculated that they were placed so that his defenders could point to the media’s unreliability and cast doubt on Ford's credibility.
+
+The state-funded outlet RT, which was recently obligated to register its U.S. branch under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, trumpeted the news that the White House had found no proof of sexual misconduct by Kavanaugh after reviewing the findings of a time-limited FBI investigation into the allegations.
+
+The same outlet also called attention to the arrest of several high-profile celebrities, actress and comedian Amy Schumer and model Emily Ratajkowski, who were protesting Kavanaugh’s potential appointment in front of the Supreme Court on Thursday. “Obstruction of Justice?” the outlet asked.
+
+Pro-Kavanaugh accounts have pushed out false smears aimed at discrediting Ford. One notable anti-Kavanaugh post picked up more than 11,000 retweets while purporting to to cite a Wall Street Journal article that in fact didn’t exist.
+
+Other accounts are using popular interest in the Ford-Kavanaugh dispute to push unrelated disinformation. A common tactic is to re-up a conspiracy theory or previously debunked story and add tags related to Kavanaugh so the tweet gains more traction.
+
+Examples include re-circulating debunked sexual assault allegations against Democrats like representative Keith Ellison, senator Cory Booker, and former vice president Joe Biden; or against Republicans like senator Lindsey Graham. “Both sides are coopting matters that may have been killed off and never gained traction, and using the Kavanaugh incident to rehash these different claims,” Decker said.
+
+Morgan says the Russian bots he’s tracking are largely using this latter method, seemingly with the broad aim of making Kavanaugh seem no worse than Democrats. The approach differs from Russian activity during the 2016 election, where influence campaigns aimed to sow discontent among both liberals and conservatives by pushing propaganda that appealed to both sides.
+
+This has all taken on a new heady energy as pushback to #MeToo—and riding the coattails of the conspiracy bandwagon. But the intent is the same: to demonize the opponent, define identity, activate the base around emotional rather than rational concepts, and build a narrative that can be used to normalize marginal and radical political views. It is, after all, very convenient to have a narrative positing that all your political opponents are part of a secret cabal of sexual predators, which thus exonerates your side by default.
+
+Daily Wire’s top story about Kavanaugh confirmation was published Oct. 1 with the headline “Prosecutor Who Questioned Ford Shreds Her Case In Five-Page Memo.” It’s generated more than 205,000 engagements. The site also received just under 180,000 engagements for the story, “Bill Clinton Rape Accuser Juanita Broaddrick Crashes Kavanaugh Hearing, Slams Dems For ‘Biggest Double Standard.’”
+
+Occupy Democrats’ top story about Kavanaugh-Ford is headlined “Matt Damon just DESTROYED Kavanaugh and Senate Republicans in hilarious SNL cold open.” It had just under 70,000 engagements. Another story about the Kavanaugh confirmation, “Bernie Sanders just demanded the FBI investigate five lies Kavanaugh told at his hearing,” generated over 44,000 engagements.
+
+This is the ideological landscape that has been so swiftly leveraged in the defense of Brett Kavanaugh.
+
+The cadre and their followers knew exactly what to do when the allegations made against Kavanaugh by Christine Blasey Ford became public. They did not disappoint. Rapid efforts by far-right blogs and personalities to dox and troll Blasey Ford resulted in the targeting of the wrong Christine Blasey Ford; Posobiec was one of those reportedly amping this misguided doxxing. Cernovich said Blasey Ford was a ""far left wing activist"" who had been ""scrubbing"" her social media profile, so her accusations were ""activism."" Alex Jones made a joke of the whole thing, with Infowars saying Blasey Ford is a ""leftist"" whose accusations were a ""political ploy."" Fairbanks: ""She can't prove it… Her clothes were on… Fuck that lady."" That's a particularly strong comment from a one-time anti-rape activist. Stone: ""This is a woman looking for her Anita Hill moment.""
+
+This is the information that flowed through the architecture the Stone cadre popularized and mainstreamed over the past few years, moving it from the fringe to a central pillar of the conservative agenda, cartoonifying legitimate issues of conservative concern and recruiting new supporters as they went. The narrative was set long ago—allegations are false, men (especially white men) are oppressed, the people who stand against you are corrupt perverts worthy of demonization, and everything that is the America you know will fall apart if you don't fight for some notion of the way things were and should be again. And the best way to achieve this, since the system will fight back, is viciousness.
+
+This architecture is established, and permanently in transmit mode.
+
+Consider the now-infamous and disavowed (but archived here) Ed Whelan twitter thread, an odd diversionary narrative hyped as an alternate theory of the night Blasey Ford describes. Its gist: mistaken identity of the perpetrator. Potential defamation issues aside, it seemed to build on the groundwork being laid by Senate Republicans and the White House to carefully insinuate that Blasey Ford wasn't lying, merely mistaken about who attacked her. But Whelan transformed it into a bonkers Twitterverse conspiracy theory about the bedroom at the top of the stairs.
+
+An analysis of the accounts that retweeted Whelan's teaser for his conspiracy most frequently post content from right and far-right media, several of which are anchors in the far-right disinformation ecosphere (and Russian disinformation, to boot).
+
+Posted for less than 24 hours, Whelan's mistaken-identity theory sparked a wave of blog posts and discussions on far-right sites that live on even after Whelan backed off. This post, for example, repeats Whelan's claims and suggests they all but vindicate Kavanaugh. It was a top-trending piece on disinformation trackers and was still being circulated on Twitter days after the source was deleted. And so was this one, this one, and this one. Some 1.5 million ""Fox and Friends"" viewers heard all about the mistaken-identity theory live on TV. Once it's out there, you can't pull it back.
+
+The narratives to defend Kavanaugh were mostly about discrediting Blasey Ford: that she was part of a secret CIA mind-control project (the CIA connection was also alluded to by Kremlin disinformation purveyors); that George Soros was behind her allegations; that her lawyer was linked to Hillary Clinton; that she was motivated by profit; that she did this as revenge for a foreclosure case where Kavanaugh's mother, also a judge, ruled against Blasey Ford's parents (only, she didn't—she ruled in their favor); that she had also made false allegations against Neil Gorsuch; and many more.
+
+In the course of his angry self-defense, Kavanaugh stamped a lot of bingo squares: attempted rape allegations as a political tool, false allegations, Clinton, secret conspiracies. By going out and taking the big swing, he elicited a powerful emotional response in his defense—an activated response from a hardened base. #ConfirmKavanaugh was trending—with support of far-right and Russian-linked accounts—after the hearing.
+
+Not even history itself is safe—at least the online version of it, which we increasingly depend on. When Kavanaugh testified that Devil's Triangle, as mentioned on his high school yearbook page, was a drinking game, there was no online evidence to back up his claim. (Other sources asserted it was a known sexual term.) So an anonymous person immediately updated Wikipedia to support Kavanaugh's definition. It was a near perfect parallel to how Russian operatives repeatedly edited the Wikipedia entry for “MH17” in the hours after the airliner was shot down to try to provide an alternative history.
+
+Examples
+
+"
+"incident","I00063","
+
+Actor: Russia
+
+Timeframe: July 18, 2016 - ongoing
+
+Date: July 18, 2016
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Sports ie the Olympics is another platform to project power, and bans on Russian athletes, the stripping of medals is serious business. Deflect from negative West perspective as state-run cheats/crooks; World/West plot against us; Proclaim Russian innocence & image to domestic audience; 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Some Russians described the allegations as an anti-Russian plot while others stated that Russia was ""just doing what the rest of the world does"" Just like MH17 and Skripal, Russia gets caught and goes into 4-D mode… ie: the above comment - dismiss/”what-aboutism”
+* Deny - Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia had ""never supported any violations in sport, we have never supported it at the state level, and we will never support this"" and that the allegations were part of an ""anti-Russia policy"" by the West.
+* Dismiss - Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, commented that the United States ""fears honest competition"", affirming Vladimir Putin's position that the United States used its influence within the IOC to ""orchestrate the doping scandal""
+* Many Russians believed that the IOC was retaliating against Russia for their discriminatory anti-gay law which provoked considerable controversy with the IOC during the 2014 Winter Olympics. Russian MP Dmitry Svishchev, who is also the head of Russia's Curling Federation, was quoted by Ria Novosti news agency as saying: ""This is what we expected. There's nothing new, only empty allegations against all of us. If you are Russian, you'll get accused of every single sin."" Aleksei Pushkov, chairman of Russia's parliamentary foreign affairs committee, said that the IAAF's decision to uphold its ban was ""an act of political revenge against Russia for its independent foreign policy."" A member of Russia's parliament, Vadim Dengin, stated, ""The entire doping scandal is a pure falsification, invented to discredit and humiliate Russia
+Talking points as above are futher amplifed/spun via Russian media, and public apologists; while this happened prior to 2016 US Elections, suggesting the IRA along with trolls & bots operating in the social space (Twitter, FB, YouTube, Reddit) could be deemed naive. 
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents:  
+
+* Prelude to 2016
+* the end of the 2014 Sochi Olympics where Russian athletes dominate (in combination with Euromaiden “crisis”)  “emboldens” Putin/Russia to make move on Ukraine invasion. 
+* Russians allegedly tried to hack the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)... The Justice Department filed criminal charges against seven members of the GRU, Russia's main military intelligence unit, accusing them of hacking into the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency in Colorado Springs, Colorado, as well as four international sports governing bodies. A grand jury indictment said the operation was in retaliation for the exposure of Russia's state-sponsored athlete doping program that resulted in a ban from the 2016 summer Olympics in Brazil.
+
+References: 
+
+* https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/international-olympic-committee-bars-russia-2018-winter-games-over-doping-n826671
+
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html?module=inline
+* https://www.bbc.com/sport/38261608
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doping_in_Russia
+* https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/22/russian-hackers-world-anti-doping-agency-dnc-hack-fancy-bear
+* https://www.dw.com/en/two-russians-probed-for-hacking-anti-doping-agency-wada/a-45502397
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/sports/olympics/russian-hackers-emails-doping.html
+* https://qz.com/1413474/all-of-the-victims-named-in-the-latest-russian-hacking-scandal/
+* https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/7-russians-indicted-hacking-related-olympic-doping-scandal-nerve-agent-n916656
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00006","
+
+Actor: probably IRA (source: recordedfuture)
+
+Timeframe: 1 day
+
+Date: Sept 11 2014
+
+Presumed goals: test deployment
+
+Method: 
+* Artefacts: text messages, images, video
+* Create messages. e.g. “A powerful explosion heard from miles away happened at a chemical plant in Centerville, Louisiana #ColumbianChemicals”
+* Post messages from fake twitter accounts; include handles of local and global influencers (journalists, media, politicians, e.g. @senjeffmerkley)
+* Amplify, by repeating messages on twitter via fake twitter accounts
+* Not seen: interaction, refutation etc. 
+* TL;DR: early attempts to create fake incidents had limited traction. 
+
+Counters:
+
+* None seen.  Fake stories were debunked very quickly. 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* BP oil spill tsunami
+* #PhosphorusDisaster - fake story about water contamination scare
+* #EbolaInAtlanta -  fake story about Ebola outbreak in Atlanta
+* #shockingmurderinatlanta -  fake story about unarmed black woman killed by police in Atlanta
+
+These were all well-produced fake news stories, promoted on Twitter to influencers through a single dominant hashtag (the single hashtag might have been something learned from crisismapping practice of forcing a single hashtag for each disaster because it was easier to track)
+
+References:
+
+* [RecordedFuture trace of attack]()
+
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbian_Chemicals_Plant_explosion_hoax 
+* https://www.recordedfuture.com/columbianchemicals-hoax-analysis/
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=0 
+* https://twitter.com/hashtag/PhosphorusDisaster?src=hash
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00047","
+
+Actor: Russia
+
+Timeframe: November 25, 2018 - ongoing
+
+Date: November 25, 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Russian media,quoted authorities who accused Kyiv of seeking to “create a conflict situation.” 
+“The same Moscow spokespeople who assured us in 2014 that the little green men who seized Crimea were not Russian soldiers—until Vladimir Putin himself spilled the beans weeks later—are now telling the world that volatile maneuvers of Ukrainian ships led to the collision November 25. 
+* Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine for sparking the clashes, saying their ""irrefutable"" evidence would ""soon be made public"". Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on the next day that Ukraine had violated international legal norms by failing to obtain authorisation for its vessels.  Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy warned of the danger of a war.
+* The goal of this campaign is to create confusion, to portray Ukraine as the culprit for both the Kerch Strait incident and the deteriorating security situation in the region, and to exonerate Russia of any responsibility.
+
+Method: 
+
+* (Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov suggesting that Ukraine deliberately provoked Russia in hopes of gaining additional support from the United States and Europe.
+distracting the audience from the main issue – Russia shooting at Ukrainian boats and capturing the vessels and crews. Instead they target the president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko: “Washington incited Poroshenko to launch this “sea provocation” against Russia in order to “thwart the Putin -Trump meeting”” and “President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko uses the Kerch provocation for a coup d’état“. But in reality, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a resolution scheduling the presidential elections for 31 March 2019.
+Dismissing the critic has also found its place under the sun of Kremlin info-war. Claims were spread that the Russian ships have moved so far ahead “in their technological development” that they “do not use ramming as a tactic“.
+
+* Attempts to pollute the German Twitter: Russian disinformation does not only rely on its own resources to spread its narratives about Ukraine. Twitter has been used so heavily that Russia Today and Sputnik are scoring more engagement than some of the German quality media combined. Between Sunday and Tuesday, more than 10,000 German-language Tweets from 3,000 unique accounts mentioned Ukraine, almost all of them relating to the confrontation in the Sea of Azov. Despite the large overall number of tweeters, a small group of 30 accounts has been driving a significant share of the debate so far.
+ 
+* Dmitry Peskov described Ukrainian navy’s actions as “an invasion of foreign military ships into Russia’s territorial waters.” Belittling Ukraine’s navy; Ridiculing and dehumanising Ukrainians - This ridiculing of Ukraine’s navy echoes other cases when disinformation has been used to show Ukraine as weak and dependent.
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* This is not the first time the Kremlin has used the four-D tactics. 
+* @DFRLab has documented the Kremlin’s use of the 4Ds of disinformation to deny its involvement in the downing of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine, the Skripal poisoning, and the interference in the U.S. Presidential elections in 2016.
+
+References: 
+
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/washington-incited-poroshenko-to-launch-a-sea-provocation-to-thwart-the-putin-trump-meeting/
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/kerch-confrontation-part-of-poroshenkos-plan-to-postpone-the-ukrainian-elections/
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/russia-does-not-shirk-international-law/
+* https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/11/26/how-russia-captured-three-ukrainian-ships-in-the-black-sea
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/uk-poisoning-russia-recycles-responses-77e1d357b777
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/propaganda-pushed-around-indictment-f63b85ac0587
+* https://www.dw.com/en/the-scars-of-ukraines-war-in-mariupol/a-19430738
+* https://www.dw.com/en/crimea-applies-for-annexation-by-moscow-after-secession-referendum-wins-968-approval/a-17500659
+
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/wave-of-disinformation-from-the-azov-sea/
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/minskmonitor-disinformation-tactics-extend-to-kerch-c32351c7c293
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/11/30/investigating-the-kerch-strait-incident/
+* https://www.justsecurity.org/61835/rogue-kremlin-push-international-law/
+* https://www.stopfake.org/en/denigrating-ukraine-with-disinformation/
+
+* https://www.dw.com/en/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-conflict-in-the-sea-of-azov/a-46461361
+* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-ukraine-feud-heats-up-the-sea-of-azov
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerch_Strait_incident
+
+
+Datasets: 
+
+Notes: 
+
+Given anything related to the ukraine is a key testing ground/flashpoint for Russia narrative manipultion & anti-democracy disinformation, the incident and geographic chokepoint will be an ongoing issue. 
+
+The Kerch Strait is the only connection between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and the only way to reach two important Ukrainian ports, Mariupol and Berdiansk. The route is vital for Mariupol's two large metallurgical plants. Russia has controlled the strait since annexing Crimea in 2014, which has made traffic significantly more difficult for Ukrainian ships. The consequences of Russian control have become particularly noticeable since the completion of the Crimean Bridge in May 2018. The bridge connects the Russian mainland with the occupied peninsula. The FSB inspects all ships bound for Ukraine, sometimes taking days, which has aggravated the situation. The volume of freight has steadily declined since then. The war in Ukraine's Donbass region is also problematic for Ukraine's ports.
+
+this most recent escalation in the Kerch Strait is aggravating the already existing conflict between Ukraine and Russia that began after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
+ 
+On the evening of 28 November, Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Volodymyr Omelyan said that vessels bound for the ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol awaited entrance to the Sea of Azov and vessels were also waiting to go southbound. He characterised this as a virtual blockade. No vessels were identified as Ukrainian. On 4 December Omelyan stated that Russia did let ships reach Berdyansk and Mariupol again. The same day the Ukrainian Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs claimed that the accumulation of ships waiting to go to the Ukrainian ports had led to several accidents. Russia denied it ever blocked vessels from sailing to Ukrainian ports and asserted that any possible disruptions were due to bad weather
+On 19 January 2019, USS Donald Cook entered the Black Sea, being the second American vessel to arrive in the Black Sea after the Kerch Strait incident after USS Fort McHenry entered in 10 January 2019
+In March 2019, Canada, the United States and the EU imposed sanctions on Russian citizens and companies for their participation in the incident and activities in Crimea and separatist-controlled eastern Ukraine
+
+"
+"incident","I00022","
+
+Actor: 
+
+* 4chan user with Latvian IP address, 
+* pro-Trump Twitter accounts
+
+Timeframe: a few days
+
+Date: Two days before the second round of French 2017 election (May 5, 2017)
+
+Presumed goals: sabotaging Macron campaign in the last stage of the election.
+
+Method:
+
+* Hashtag campaign: #MacronLeaks with use of bots. 
+* Hashtags initially launched in the US, then got publicized by alt-right influencer, Le Pen’s supporters, Wikileaks.
+
+Counters:
+
+* French agencies that monitor cybersecurity, electoral integrity.
+* Technical precautions: ending e-voting.
+* Facebook removed 70,000 suspicious accounts in France 10 days before the vote.
+* Campaign staff responding to social media posts and comments.
+* Technically, placing traps along the way, using fake passwords, email addresses, documents to trap hackers.
+* Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets.
+* Use encrypted apps for confidential communication.
+* Requesting the media not to report false information.
+
+Related incidents:
+
+References:
+
+* https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/
+* https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/heres-how-far-right-trolls-are-spreading-hoaxes-about
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/hashtag-campaign-macronleaks-4a3fb870c4e8
+"
+"incident","I00033","
+
+Actor: China
+
+Timeframe: 2011
+
+Date:
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Commentators’ duty to guide public opinion in a “constructive” way and engage the internet as “an important battlefield of ideology.” The vice minister of public security said that the police should use microblogs as a communication platform to “release correct information and dispel misunderstandings.”
+* Accounts describing the operations of progovernment commentators that have emerged in recent years indicate that they are also involved in identifying and recommending content for deletion. Other testimonies highlight the fact that the posts do not only praise or support the CCP and government policy, but also target government critics with negative remarks. Other forms of misdirection involve deliberate attempts to muddy the facts of a particular incident—for example, a false eyewitness can contradict the account of a netizen reporting a case of police abuse.
+* The Chinese government has long been suspected of hiring as many as 2,000,000 people to surreptitiously insert huge numbers of pseudonymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of real social media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many academics, and most journalists and activists, claim that these so-called “50c party” posts vociferously argue for the government’s side in political and policy debates.
+
+Method: 
+
+* Astroturfing: “surreptitiously post large numbers of fabricated social media comments, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary Chinese people""
+* Cow online opinion leaders into submission
+* Bombard Taiwan social media (Facebook, twitter, chat groups) with ani-DPP, anti-Tsai content.
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+Notes: 
+
+(Recorded Future) The term “Great Firewall” was coined in a June 1997 Wired magazine article in which an anonymous Communist Party official stated that the firewall was “designed to keep Chinese cyberspace free of pollutants of all sorts, by the simple means of requiring ISPs [internet service providers] to block access to ‘problem’ sites abroad.”
+
+Our research focused on the English-language social media activity of six major state-run propaganda organizations from October 1, 2018 through January 21, 2019, which included over 40,000 posts. We selected these six organizations — Xinhua, People’s Daily, China Global Television (CGTN), China Central Television (CCTV), China Plus News, and the Global Times — because they: Are highly digitized; Possess accounts on multiple English language social media platforms; Are associated with Chinese intelligence agencies and/or English language propaganda systems
+
+Because our intent was to map out Chinese state-run influence campaigns targeting the American public, we evaluated only English language posts and comments, as the posts in Chinese were unlikely to affect most Americans. Further, our research focused on answering two fundamental questions about Chinese influence operations: Does China employ the same influence tactics in the English-language social media space as it does domestically? How do Chinese state-run influence operations differ from Russian ones? In what ways are they similar and different, and why?
+
+The information-control regime in China has evolved to include a dizzying array of techniques, technologies, and resources: Blocking traffic via IP address and domain; Mobile application bans; Protocol blocking, specifically Virtual Private Network protocols and applications; Filtering and blocking keywords in domains (URL filtering); Resetting TCP connections; Packet filtering; Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks (the so-called Great Cannon); Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks; Search engine keyword filtering; Government-paid social media commenters and astroturfers; Social media account blocking, topic filtering, content censorship; State-run media monopoly and censorship; Social Credit System; Mandatory real-name account registration; 
+
+This tool set, combined with the now-ubiquitous mass physical surveillance systems, place China at the forefront of integrating information technology, influence operations, surveillance, and censorship in a model referred to by two scholars from MERICS as “IT-based authoritarianism.”
+
+In addition to the constraints imposed by the Great Firewall and content censorship, the Chinese state also employs a series of active disinformation and distortion measures to influence domestic social media users. One of the most widely studied has been the so-called “50 Cent Party.” The 50 Cent Party is a group of people hired by the Chinese government to “surreptitiously post large numbers of fabricated social media comments, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary Chinese people.” The name is derivative of a rumor that these fake commentators were paid 50 Chinese cents per comment (this has been largely disproven). This fabrication of social media comments and sentiment is largely known by the term “astroturfing.” Among scholars of the Chinese domestic social media environment, there is much disagreement regarding what the goals or objectives of government-paid astroturfers are. One study by professors at Harvard, Stanford, and UC San Diego, published in April 2017, determined that one in every 178 social media posts are fabricated by the government and that comments and campaigns are focused and directed against specific topics or issues. Additionally, these scholars have assessed that domestic social media influence operations focus primarily on “cheerleading” or presenting or furthering a positive narrative about the Chinese state. Conversely, a separate set of scholars at the University of Michigan, who also examined posts from the 50 Cent Party astroturfers, determined that at least one in every six posts on Chinese domestic social media was fabricated by the government. Further, these scholars argued that less than 40 percent of astroturfed comments could be classified as “cheerleading” and that the rest were a combination of vitriol, racism, insults, and rage against events or individuals. They additionally argue that censors and state-sponsored influence campaigns focus much of their resources on “opinion leaders” and users with large numbers of followers as opposed to simply intervening based on content.
+
+ Chinese government has used a combination of muscle and guile to cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force, and leaching public dialogue of much of its independence. But beneath the peppy, pablum-filled surface that has resulted, Chinese social media remains a contested space.
+
+(Taiwan election) Tsai futilely urged Taiwanese citizens to see Beijing’s effort for what it was — a Russian-style influence campaign. The island’s 23 million citizens were bombarded with anti-Tsai and anti-DPP content through Facebook, Twitter and online chat groups, promoted by China’s “50-cent army” of paid social media trolls. There are also dozens of investigations into allegations that Chinese money went to fund Taiwanese candidates opposing Tsai and the DPP.
+After the elections, Chinese state media pointed to Tsai’s losses as evidence that her tough stance vis-à-vis China was unpopular and wrongheaded. Beijing’s overall goal is to replace her with a more malleable leader in Taipei as part of its broad effort to exert control over Taiwan and weaken Taipei’s relationships with the international community.
+The Chinese government is bribing or coercing foreign governments to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan, pressuring them to evict Taiwan from international organizations. Beijing is also threatening foreign companies unless they literally erase Taiwan from their websites. Their ultimate goal is to dissolve the U.S.-Taiwan partnership and subjugate the island to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
+
+There are numerous agencies sponsoring internet commentators, including local propaganda offices, ministries and even schools and state-owned enterprises. For instance, China’s largest oil and gasoline producer, Sinopec, was found to be running an astroturfing campaign justifying rising gasoline prices in 2011 (Wang 2011). 
+The following excerpt from a recruiting flyer from the Propaganda Department of the Zhengding Party Committee, Hebei, provides an example of what online commentators are expected to do (Zhonggong Zhengding Xianwei Xuanchuanbu 2009): 
+compose original postings and carry out positive publicity online to promote the priorities and major deployments of the party committee and the government; 
+release authoritative information on major incidents to hinder the spread of rumours and ensure correct direction of online opinion; 
+answer questions and clarify confusion for netizens on hotbutton incidents, interpret the policies of and measures taken by the party and the government and divert netizens’ emotions; 
+strengthen information management on the internet and tightly integrate the analysis of online opinion, disposing of harmful information and guiding online opinion. 
+
+These instructions show that besides monitoring public opinion, the primary mission for online commentators is to facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises. In online propaganda campaigns, commentators work to attract public attention and fabricate an audience, if necessary. 
+
+ “American Cent Party” (美分党) who express western democratic values and criticize the Chinese communist regime online, and the “internet water army” (网络水军), which refers to for-hire astroturfers working for and advancing the interests of companies and other actors willing to pay their fees.
+Prominent dissident Ai Weiwei said “If you oppose the US and Japan [online], you are a member of the 50 cents army” (Strafella and Berg, 2015). 50c party members “combat hostile energy,” defined as posts that “go against socialist core values,” or “are not amenable to the unity of the people.” Such information should be “resolutely resisted, proactively refuted, and eagerly reported to Internet authorities.” 4 (Haley, 2010). Through active engagement of opposition views, they try to “sway public opinion” (Editors, 2016; Jason Ng, 2011), “influence public opinion. . . pretending to be ordinary citizens and defending or promoting the government’s point of view” (O. Lam, 2013), or “steer conversations in the right direction” (Editors, 2013). Estimates by journalists of the size of the 50c party is between 500,000 to 2 million (Philipp, 2015).
+
+References:
+
+* https://www.wired.com/1997/06/china-3/
+* https://en.greatfire.org/analyzer
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/business/media/new-york-times-apps-apple-china.html
+* https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/29/apple-removes-vpn-apps-from-the-app-store-in-china/
+* https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9fc1/d1815a678583c1e73233bb93aaaab7d0fd4f.pdf
+* https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf
+* https://citizenlab.ca/2015/04/chinas-great-cannon/
+* https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xjHWI0Ih3abONxL0WoXj2swlcBuiRCXO/view
+* https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2738325
+* http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-s-xinjiang-province-a-surveillance-state-unlike-any-the-world-has-ever-seen-a-1220174.html
+* https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/MPOC_ChinasCoreExecutive_web.pdf
+* https://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=691&cmb=34#Vice
+* http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/05/09/12125
+* http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/05/chinese-bloggers-on-the-history-and-influence-of-the-fifty-cent-party/
+* http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/50c.pdf?m=1463587807
+* http://blakeapm.com/
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/21/can-the-chinese-government-really-control-the-internet-we-found-cracks-in-the-great-firewall/
+* https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xjHWI0Ih3abONxL0WoXj2swlcBuiRCXO/view
+* https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/whisper-together/
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/world/asia/taiwan-elections-meddling.html
+* http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/10/23/2003702864
+* https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/news-rattles-taiwan-elections-181123005140173.html
+* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-politics/china-heaps-pressure-on-taiwan-president-after-poll-defeat-idUSKCN1NV02X
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-is-failing-to-counter-chinas-diplomatic-assault-on-taiwan/2018/09/06/e744f97c-b20c-11e8-9a6a-565d92a3585d_story.html
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/05/05/white-house-calls-chinas-threats-to-airlines-orwellian-nonsense/
+* https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/how_the_chinese_government_fabricates_social_media_posts_for_strategic_distraction_not_engaged_argument.pdf 
+* https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-that-chinese-troll/3540663.html
+* https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/850/851
+* https://www.scmp.com/culture/books/article/2144692/how-china-censors-its-internet-and-controls-information-great-firewall
+* https://freedomhouse.org/blog/china%E2%80%99s-growing-army-paid-internet-commentators
+* https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/
+* https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/19/meet-the-chinese-internet-trolls-pumping-488-million-posts-harvard-stanford-ucsd-research/
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/18/chinas-interference-elections-succeeded-taiwan/
+
+"
+"incident","I00062","
+
+See also I00005."
+"incident","I00056","
+
+Actor: Iran
+
+Timeframe: 2012 - ongoing
+
+Date: Aug 21, 20198
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Iran’s meddling in the politics of the Arab states has become more conspicuous since the Arab Spring of 2011. Iran has been trying to widen its influence in the region in its political jousting against Saudi Arabia which is sometimes referred to as “the Arab Cold War”. Although the two regional rivals have never declared war, the two players have been involved in proxy wars in the region including Syria and Yemen.
+* Pages promoted or amplified views in line with Iranian government’s international stances. The pages posted content with strong bias for the government in Tehran and against the “West” and regional neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Israel.The operation was noteworthy, however, that more than 30 percent of the removed assets were active for five or more years, indicating that Iranian entities have been engaged in social media influence campaigns since as early as 2010 (DFRLab)
+
+
+Method:  
+
+* In August 2018, Facebook removed 652 pages, groups, and accounts on Facebook and Instagram originating from Iran for engaging in a “coordinated inauthentic behaviour”. 15 These operations targeted people in the Middle East, Latin America, the UK, and the US. In October 2018, Facebook announced the removal of another 82 pages, groups, and accounts on Facebook and Instagram. This time the company announced that these accounts and pages targeted people in the US and the UK.16 Some of these accounts masqueraded as American citizens pushing anti-Saudi and anti-Israel narratives.
+* In October 2018, Twitter published two data sets comprising 3,841 accounts affiliated with the Internet Research Agency (IRA), and 770 accounts that could be traced back to Iran. These accounts were suspended by Twitter in August 2018 for engaging in coordinated manipulation on the platform. Twitter believes that the information operations linked to Iran are potentially backed by the state
+* 70 websites found by Reuters which push Iranian propaganda to 15 countries, in an operation that cybersecurity experts, social media firms and journalists are only starting to uncover. The sites found by Reuters are visited by more than half a million people a month, and have been promoted by social media accounts with more than a million followers… the sites in the campaign have been active at different times since 2012. They look like normal news and media outlets,but only a couple disclose any Iranian ties.
+* The social media companies have closed hundreds of accounts that promoted the sites or pushed Iranian messaging. Facebook said last month it had taken down 82 pages, groups and accounts linked to the Iranian campaign; these had gathered more than one million followers in the United States and Britain. But the sites uncovered by Reuters have a much wider scope. They have published in 16 different languages, from Azerbaijani to Urdu, targeting Internet users in less-developed countries. That they reached readers in tightly controlled societies such as Egypt, which has blocked hundreds of news websites since 2017, highlights the campaign’s reach.
+* Ten outlets targeting readers in Yemen, where Iran and U.S. ally Saudi Arabia have been fighting a proxy conflict since civil war broke out in 2015; A media outlet offering daily news and satirical cartoons in Sudan. Reuters could not reach any of its staff; A website called Realnie Novosti, or “Real News,” for Russian readers. It offers a downloadable mobile phone app but its operator could not be traced.
+* One of IUVM’s most popular users is a site called Sudan Today, which SimilarWeb data shows receives almost 150,000 unique visitors each month. On Facebook, it tells its 57,000 followers that it operates without political bias. Its 18,000 followers on Twitter have included the Italian Embassy in Sudan, and its work has been cited in a report by the Egyptian Electricity Ministry.
+The office address registered for Sudan Today in 2016 covers a whole city district in north Khartoum, according to archived website registration details provided by WhoisAPI Inc and DomainTools LLC. The phone number listed in those records does not work.
+* We have observed inauthentic social media personas, masquerading as American liberals supportive of U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders, heavily promoting Quds Day, a holiday established by Iran in 1979 to express support for Palestinians and opposition to Israel. (FireEye)
+* Broadly speaking, the intent behind this activity appears to be to promote Iranian political interests, including anti-Saudi, anti-Israeli, and pro-Palestinian themes, as well as to promote support for specific U.S. policies favorable to Iran, such as the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). In the context of the U.S.-focused activity, this also includes significant anti-Trump messaging and the alignment of social media personas with an American liberal identity. However, it is important to note that the activity does not appear to have been specifically designed to influence the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, as it extends well beyond U.S. audiences and U.S. politics. (FireEye)
+* All 17 of the pages containing information about manager location had managers from Iran. Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Syria were other common locations of page managers. (DFRLab)
+Promoting Shi’a Political and Militant Views
+* One of the removed pages — @alalsadrr1 — promoted Moqtada al-Sadr, an influential Shi’a cleric and militia leader from Iraq and leader of the Mahdi Army. According to the Wilson Center, in the mid-2000’s, the Mahdi Army received weapons and training from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah agents. In May 2018, The Atlantic reported that the “controversial” leader and his followers had committed brutal atrocities in Iraq, fought the U.S. military in Sadr City and Basra, and were known for corruption. (DfRLab)
+* In January, Facebook took down 783 accounts and pages, which it assessed as “directed from Iran, in some cases repurposing Iranian state media content.” (DFRLab - March 26, 2019)
+The operation strongly resembled the earlier IUVM operation. Facebook did not attribute it to IUVM directly, but the latest network used the same techniques and pointed to some of the same websites, making attribution to the same network likely, although not confirmed.
+In particular, pages across the network reproduced IUVM content, as well as content from other websites which have featured in earlier exposés and takedowns.
+The network functioned by steering users towards ostensibly independent news websites, which amplified Iranian regime propaganda, often copied verbatim from regime assets. The social media content therefore served as a secondary amplifier, rather than a direct audience-engagement tool.
+Despite the heterogeneous nature of the assets — they were spread across many countries, languages, and cultures — their messaging was largely homogeneous. It dealt with issues of importance to the Iranian government, supporting Palestinians and Shia Muslims on one hand, and attacking Israel, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the conduct of the military campaign in Yemen on the other.
+The focus on South Asia was noteworthy. Indonesia and India had the most pages targeted at them; African countries also featured prominently. This expands the known area of Iranian influence operations, which have thus far been primarily exposed in the Middle East and in the West.
+
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Facebook and Twitter content take-downs
+
+Related incidents:  
+
+* See Venezuela:
+https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-01/iran-slams-u-s-over-venezuela-secretly-some-may-be-relieved
+https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/02/hezbollah-is-in-venezuela-to-stay.html
+
+
+References: 
+
+* http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/
+* http://www.arabnews.com/node/1329971/middle-east
+* https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/part-2-pro-iran-militias-iraq
+* https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/iraq-moqtada-sadr/559499/
+* https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/10/iraq-evidence-war-crimes-government-backed-shi-militias/
+* http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/18/AR2008041803429.html
+* https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1498970/UK-troops-left-isolated-as-Mahdi-Army-weaves-a-web-of-official-corruption.html
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8d
+* https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/01/removing-cib-iran/
+* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT
+* https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/08/irans-disinformation-campaigns.html
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/takedown-details-of-the-iranian-propaganda-network-d1fad32fdf30
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8d
+* https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/04/Iran-Memo.pdf
+* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/suspected-iranian-influence-operation.html
+
+"
+"incident","I00007","
+
+Actor: RT/Sputnik
+
+Timeframe: 2 weeks
+
+Date: July-August 2016
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+Method: 
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents:  
+
+* Jade Helm exercise
+* Black Lives Matter protests
+* Bundy Ranch standoff
+
+Notes:
+
+Story was that the Incirlik NATO base in Turkey was under attack by terrorists. 
+2016-08-14 Paul Manafort cited that the Incirlik NATO base in Turkey was under attack by terrorists, as an example of an unreported true story. 
+“The weekend of July 30, RT.com and Sputnik reported 7,000 armed police with heavy vehicles had surrounded Incirlik air base in Adana, Turkey, where 2,500 U.S. troops are stationed and some 50 U.S. nuclear weapons are stored. The two Kremlin-funded outlets suggested that the lockdown was in response to another coup attempt after a faction of the Turkish military failed to overthrow Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.”
+“On the evening of 30 July 2016, my colleagues and I watched as RT and Sputnik news simultaneously launched false stories about the U.S. air base in Incirlik, Turkey being overrun by terrorists,” he told the committee. Within minutes pro-Russian social media aggregators and automated bots amplified this false news story,” Watts said. “There were more than 4,000 tweets in the first 75 to 78 minutes after launching this false story. Perhaps the most stunning development for Watt and his companions was that the rapid proliferation of that story was linked back to the active measures accounts (Russian bots) they had tracked for the preceding two years. These previously identified accounts almost simultaneously appearing from different geographic locations and communities amplified the big news story in unison,” Watts said. The hashtags promoted by the bots, according to Watts, were “nuclear, media, Trump and Benghazi. The most common words, he said found in English speaking Twitter user profiles were “God, military Trump, family, country, conservative, Christian, America and constitution. The objective of the messages, Watts said, “clearly sought to convince Americans that U.S. military bases being overrun in a terrorist attack.”
+
+Data
+
+* Looked at Twitter for these dates: https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=incirlik%20until%3A2014-08-14&src=typd
+https://twitter.com/ElectionLawCtr/status/492850603039522816
+
+
+References: 
+* https://www.rt.com/news/354042-turkish-police-incirlik-nato-coup/
+* https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20160731/1043797161/incirlik-turkey-erdogan-nato-nukes.html
+* https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/16/paul-manafort/trump-campaign-chair-misquotes-russian-media-makes/
+* https://wtop.com/j-j-green-national/2017/09/anatomy-russian-attack-first-signs/slide/1/ 
+"
+"incident","I00017","
+
+Actor: IRA
+
+Timeframe: 2 years
+
+Date: December 2015 - 2017
+
+Presumed goals: “Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency” - James Clapper
+
+Method:
+
+* Facebook ads promoting minor candidates (Jill Stein)
+
+References:
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-beyond-russian-impact-2f5777677cc0
+* https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-secret-documents-from-russias-election-trolls-leak
+
+Notes:
+
+DailyBeast article gives sizings and method - 80 people on this.  If they were working 8-6, that gives us a sizing on how much trolling they could do. 
+
+"
+"incident","I00003","
+
+Actor: IRA
+
+Timeframe: 
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals:
+
+Method: 
+
+Counters:
+
+Related incidents:
+
+
+References:
+
+* https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/994704834577215495 
+* https://twitter.com/donie/status/957246815056908288 
+* https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/10/russia-facebook-ads-us-elections-congress
+"
+"incident","I00042","
+
+Actor: 
+
+* Saudi Arabia / Qatar /Turkey. 
+* While the dispute is between these two Kingdoms, it’s with certainty that one can suggest Iran (both projection and the containment of its power/influence in the region) is at the center of it.
+
+Timeframe: May - September 2017 
+
+Date: May, 2017
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* The programmatic/synthetic amplification of respective “positions and/or plights.” 
+* The respective hashtags can not be categorized as organic in nature, but launched in conjunction with the botnet deployments. As well, none of the identified bot related activity points to an effort to drown out/flood the opponents. 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Twitter campaign; bots/botnets seriously distorted the conversation on Twitter.
+* Commercial botnets (these are created en masse and rented out to any user who is willing to pay for retweets, likes, and follow—either for their own account or for somebody else’s. They are thus the easiest and quickest way to obtain artificial amplification)
+* On 24 May 2017, for example, pro-Qatar users launched the hashtag or “Qatar is not alone.”
+* Supporters of Saudi Arabia also turned to apparently commercial bots to promote their messages. On 21 July, supporters of Qatar launched another hashtag, or “Tamim the Glorious,” in honor of the Emir. In response, supporters ,#تميم_المج ُد of Saudi Arabia used a botnet to attack the hashtag. The attack began when an account called @al_muhairiuae posted a photoshopped image of the Emir designed to make him look foolish.
+* Combined with the Korean imagery, this suggests they were a commercial botnet that an unknown user rented to amplify the anti-Qatar tweet and to subvert the pro-Qatar hashtag, which had only just started to trend.
+* At least one botnet seemed based in Turkey, joining the fray in mid-September in a bid to support Qatar.”
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Essentially the was a tit-for-tat campaign with a brief “incursion”/support/spike of activity most likely (but not officially verified) from Turkey in support of Qatar
+
+* Global Research (Pro-Kremlin publication/organization located in Montreal, QC) contributed anti-Saudi spin via their blog. Global Research (anti-Saudi… campaign); Global Research (more)
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* Jamal Khashoggi incident will bear hallmarks of the incident, but moves beyond a regional information operation into one of global significance. In 2018 the NY Times investigates Saudi Arabia’s Troll Army
+
+References: 
+
+* https://www.globalresearch.ca/saudi-arabias-march-towards-civil-war/5616699
+* https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-machiavellian-plot-to-provoke-saudi-arabia-and-qatar-into-a-blood-border-war/5593870
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/20/us/politics/saudi-image-campaign-twitter.html
+* https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/robot-wars-how-bots-joined-battle-gulf
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/07/hacking-bots-and-information-wars-in-the-qatar-spat/
+* https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/russian-hackers-qatar-fake-news-gulf-diplomatic-row-fbi-doha-saudi-arabia-bahrain-uae-egypt-a7776446.html
+* https://qz.com/1107023/the-inside-story-of-the-hack-that-nearly-started-another-middle-east-war/
+* https://theconversation.com/the-world-cup-in-digital-and-social-the-viewers-the-tweets-and-the-trolls-99625
+
+* https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-44294826
+* https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/robot-wars-how-bots-joined-battle-gulf
+
+Datasets:  Mining and analyzing Twitter data is unlikely to “prove” or offer much more insight than Ben Nimmo’s work.
+
+Notes: 
+
+Given the apparent use of commercial botnets, it’s difficult to attribute much of the activity to state actors, however it is fair to suggest some of this behavior would undoubtedly needed tacit state support… private “patriots” of the state?
+
+This article https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/robot-wars-how-bots-joined-battle-gulf highlights the mechanics and dynamics of the bot operations/amplification in some cases to short life span of the activity and assets (quickly deleted from the platform), but doesn’t communicate the underlying political issues that drove these incidents.
+ 
+The focus of these Arabic-language hashtags was clearly local and regional rather than international; this was a question of messaging to the domestic population and to Arabic-language rivals, rather than the non-Arabic-speaking world.
+Claims of Russian involvement/hack are reported by both the Washington Post and the Independent UK (cites CNN as source). Quartz as well cites the Russian connection, further citing documentation shared with them via Qatar (flimsy at best) and further point blame for the affair at President Trump. 
+
+Post incident - Given Qatar is hosting the 2022 World Cup of Soccer, the World Cup 2018, was a “test” ground for this ongoing online “war” while subtle was evident (Mentionmapp Analytics… John’s research) "
+"incident","I00008","
+
+Actor: 
+
+Timeframe: 
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals:
+
+Method: 
+
+Counters:
+
+Related incidents:
+
+References:
+
+* https://www.ceas-serbia.org/images/2018/201803_CEAS_Report.pdf
+* https://www.stopfake.org/en/vencislav-the-virgin-hostile-operation-by-vencislav-bujic-seas-foundation-and-its-network-of-collaborators/
+* https://seas.foundation/en/2018/03/15/155
+
+"
+"incident","I00049","
+
+Actor: Russia, Syrian Government and Iran
+
+Timeframe: April-June
+
+Date: April 8, 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* can’t trust anyone who is reporting about it & fit into the “false flag,” commonly used conspiracy trope positing that mass casualty incidents are engineered internally to provide pretext for either government repression or military action 
+
+Method: 
+
+* One novel attack on the White Helmets in the wake of the Douma attacks featured the claim that the group had run a film studio in the besieged city, and used it to stage propaganda videos. This was initially reported by Lebanon-based Al-Aahed News[81] and Iran’s Fars News,[82] each of which attributed it to the other. It was then picked up by Russian state outlets in both Russian[83] and English.[84] As Bellingcat was quick to point out, the images of the studio were actually taken from the Facebook page of a film called Revolution Man.[85] The way in which this demonstrably false claim was amplified on pro-Assad channels reinforces the conclusion that its purpose was to discredit the White Helmets because their reporting was accurate—not because it was false.
+* A separate line of argument focused on the Western response to the Douma attack, and the conclusion that the chemical attack had indeed been launched by Assad’s forces. This argument claimed, in essence, that the West’s response was hasty, ill-judged, and went beyond the evidence.[86]
+* A third line of attack focused on accusing the West of condoning or staging chemical attacks, including the Douma one, and thus delegitimizing Western outrage. On April 13, the Russian Ministry of Defense said that it had “evidence proving the United Kingdom’s direct involvement in the organization of this provocation in eastern Ghouta,”[91]
+* A fourth tactic featured apocalyptic warnings that any Western strike into Syria that harmed Russians could trigger World War III. On April 8, for example, the Russian Foreign Ministry warned of “very grave consequences” of an American strike.[93]
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Fact checking (Snopes & Bellingcat)
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* foundation to Russia ramping up chemical weapon disinformation leading-op to Idlib offensive 
+
+References: 
+
+* https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/42657/syria-eu-calls-accountability-after-yet-another-chemical-attack_en
+* This is the most detailed article/resource helps lay the background, details, players, tactics http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingghouta/disinformation-2/
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/17/russia-is-gearing-up-to-misinform-the-u-s-public-about-syria-heres-our-cheat-sheet-to-identify-twitter-trolls/?utm_term=.7d3c56b0b03a
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/bbc-admits-that-reason-for-bombing-syria-was-fake/
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/12/18/chemical-weapons-and-absurdity-the-disinformation-campaign-against-the-white-helmets/
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/08/30/russian-chem-disinfo-idlib/
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/chlorine/
+* https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/10/16/why-assad-and-russia-target-the-white-helmets/
+* https://www.snopes.com/news/2018/04/12/disinformation-conspiracy-trolling-syrian-chemical-attack/
+* https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/is-this-proof-white-helmets-staged-chemical-attack/
+* https://www.dw.com/en/russias-syria-chemical-weapons-attack-warning-dubious-experts-say/a-45250441
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/new-chemical-attack-to-be-staged-by-the-white-helmets-in-idlib/
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-attack-ghouta.html
+
+Datasets: 
+
+Notes: 
+
+For the Syrian opposition, the use of these weapons in high-casualty attacks now brought the possibility of US military intervention. For the Syrian government and Russia, that same possibility brought an urgent need to sow doubt around the veracity of any claims of chemical weapons use—including by claiming that the reports of chemical weapons use were a conspiracy launched by foreign enemies to trigger more strikes.
+In parallel, perhaps in an attempt to deflect potential consequences, Russian government sources began claiming that rebel groups and the White Helmets rescue organization, backed by Western powers, were planning “false flag” chemical attacks, designed to kill civilians and point the blame at the Syrian government. Against the background of the 2017 US strikes that followed the Khan Sheikhoun attack, such claims introduced the idea of American complicity in any future attacks, suggesting that such attacks would be a false flag to cover an already-decided US engagement, rather than a consequence of the regime or Russia’s decision to use chemical weapons. This seeded a narrative that could later be passed on to anti-interventionist media outlets and campaigners in the West.
+The claim that a given incident was a false flag attack, designed to discredit the Russian government, has regularly been deployed by Kremlin supporters—for example, over the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine and the poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in England, as well as in Syria. Such claims have been repeated and disseminated through a complex ecosystem of blogs and social media posts, largely written in English by self-styled “investigative journalists” with ties to Kremlin-operated media outlets.[18] These provided vital validation to the Syrian/Russian narrative, and played an important role in its dissemination.
+The disinformation campaign waged by the Syrian and Russian regimes was large scale, persistent, and supported by a range of Western commentators. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, its impact was limited, and the bulk of mainstream reporting focused on establishing the series of events. According to an online scan of Twitter mentions of the word “Douma” conducted with the Sysomos online service, none of the ten most-retweeted tweets posted on April 7-9 contained pro-Assad content, indicating that the conversation was dominated by other voices.[110] In all, the scan collected some 435,000 tweets. Progressively, however, the mainstream media shifted their focus to other issues, while the supporters of the Syrian and Russian regimes kept their focus on Douma; thus, the overall volume of traffic declined, and the share of the conversation dominated by pro-Assad voices increased. In a similar scan of the period from April 10-16, six of the ten most-retweeted posts came from Assad supporters, out of a total of 487,000 posts.[111]
+This analysis also reveals the integration of government-funded media (RT, SputnikNews) and geopolitical think tanks (GlobalResearch) as source content for anti-WH [anti-White Helmet] narratives.”[120]
+Pro-Assad and pro-Russian disinformation was further amplified by a group of ostensibly independent news websites that have since been demonstrated to have Iranian links,[121] and which systematically promoted pro-Iranian regime messaging.[122] These sites included IUVMPress.com, an apparent news site that reproduced content from Iranian regime and pro-regime sources, stripped it of its attribution, and passed it onto other sites; institutomanquehue.org, ostensibly a think tank focused on Latin America; and britishleft.com, apparently a site dedicated to left-wing British politics
+Commentators such as Beeley, Bartlett, and 21st Century Wire colleague Patrick Henningsen bridged the gap between the “alt-right” movement in the United States and the Russian state communications network, being cited both on sites such as RT, and alt-right hubs such as Infowars. Beeley and Bartlett contribute to both 21st Century Wire[129] and RT;[130] Henningsen formerly wrote for Infowars,[131] writes for 21st Century Wire, and is featured as a contributor on RT’s site.[132] Their contributions helped to spread pro-Assad and pro-Kremlin messaging into US audiences, very much in the manner described by Simonyan, when she spoke of the need for “English-speaking talking heads” to validate the Kremlin’s view.
+
+On at least one occasion, their messaging broke into the mainstream. On April 13, 2018, rock guitarist Roger Waters told a concert in Barcelona that he thought the White Helmets were a “fake organization that is creating propaganda for jihadists and terrorists”—a very similar misrepresentation to that publicized by the Kremlin disinformation networks.[134
+A video clip of his comments was repeatedly uploaded to YouTube by Kremlin and pro-Kremlin users, including RT UK,[136]Beeley,[137] Hands Off Syria,[138] and Clarity of Signal.[139] Together, these totalled more than 140,000 views by September 19, 2018
+
+When incidents such as the Waters amplification are taken into account, the reason that Russia’s General Dvornikov spoke so highly of information operations becomes clear. The combination of state-funded outlets, covert outlets such as IUVMPress, official statements, and supporting bloggers and trolls allowed the pro-Assad narrative to dominate the online conversation for extended periods, especially during times when the credible media outlets were focusing on other issues.
+"
+"incident","I00039","
+
+Actor:
+
+* Right-wing FB pages
+* Fake news sites e.g. yesimright.com; shoebat.com; endingthefed.com; truthfeed.com; yournewswire.com.
+* British tabloids: Express, MailOnline.
+
+Timeframe: Data was collected and analyzed in 2016.
+
+Date: 2016.
+
+Presumed goals:
+* To attack Merkel’s liberal position on the refugee crisis.
+
+Method:
+* Fake news sites mix legitimate partisan political content with false and conspiratorial information.
+* Large right-wing FB pages in the US also share anti-Merkel content.
+* Most popular Merkel articles on Facebook also come from legitimate, but negative and right-wing news sources.
+* German links that generated most engagement in 2016 spread conspiratorial claims about Merkel’s mental health.
+
+Counters:
+* No counter actions were taken.
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* Defamation of Modamani – a Syrian refugee - who took a selfie with Merkel and was accused on social media as having links to terrorism.
+
+References:
+
+* Source: Buzzfeed analysis
+* https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/hyperpartisan-sites-and-facebook-pages-are-publishing-false
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/syria-refugee-anas-modamani-germany-facebook.html
+ "
+"incident","I00029","
+
+Actor: Russia 
+
+Timeframe: July 2014 - still active
+
+Date: July 17, 2014
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Ongoing campaign to discredit/undermine Ukraine & NATO & Democracy
+
+Method: 
+
+* Multi-pronged media & source driven campaign… ie: 
+* Russian state sources military, embassy, media (RT, Sputnik, TASS); 
+* Kremlin’s “witting idiots” ie: 21Wire, Global research; trolls & bots. 
+* “All” media platforms… ie: Youtube; Twitter; Reddit
+* See collection of visual assets 
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Bellingcat; Dutch gov’t, DFRLab
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* Anything related to Ukraine
+* Donetsk
+* Crimea
+* Sea of Azov
+* Ukrainian election (2019)
+
+References:
+
+* [Bellingcat (collection of related investigations)](https://www.bellingcat.com/?s=MH17) 
+Ie: [“The Kremlin’s Shifting, Self-Contradicting Narratives on MH17”](https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/01/05/kremlins-shifting-self-contradicting-narratives-mh17/)
+
+* [DFRLab MH17 4D's ""playbook""](https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-dismissing-mh17-8268d2968b9) 
+* [In social networks on the fingers showed how the Kremlin bots work](https://news.online.ua/754036/v-sotssetyah-na-paltsah-pokazali-kak-rabotayut-boty-kremlya-opublikovany-foto/):
+“Censoring” the news (Facebook page “takedown”) [Facebook blocked Sergey Parkhomenko for commenting on the report of the downed ""Boeing""](https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/05/07/112052-facebook-zablokiroval-sergeya-parhomenko-za-kommentariy-doklada-o-sbitom-171-boinge-187%20)
+* [The most comprehensive guide ever to MH17 conspiracies](http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/10/14/confuse-and-obfuscate-the-most-comprehensive-guide-ever-to-mh17-conspiracies/)
+
+* http://tass.com/world/1050324
+* https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/ukraine-involved-mh17-downing-claims-14184413
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2014/07/17/geolocating-the-missile-launcher-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/
+* https://globalnews.ca/news/4993120/russia-rising-part-5-maskirovka/
+* http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/12/06/ukraine-related-narratives-dominate-russian-propaganda/
+
+Datasets: none searched for
+
+Notes:
+
+Russia still accusing Ukraine (03.25.2019)... TASS and UK Daily Mirror 
+
+First Bellingcat report: Efforts to Geolocate the Launcher 07/17/14
+Countless example of Elliot Higgins & team getting trolled since, popular hashtag is #bellingcrap
+
+This is a good summary: 
+“But not only did Russia fiercely deny those accusations, a number of Russian leaders, officials and broadcasters responded by offering dozens of different alternative explanations, “including quite outlandish theories,” says Nilsson.
+
+“For instance, that an airplane would’ve been loaded with already dead people and that Ukrainian airplanes would then have shot it down to make it look like Russia was shooting down passenger airplanes,” he explains.
+
+“There were tons of these stories going around, quite a few of them coming from official Russian sources. And they were not meant to be taken seriously. They were simply supposed to occupy the attention span of the world for a while, to the extent that everyone would lose track of the original explanation, which turned out to be quite the right one.” https://globalnews.ca/news/4993120/russia-rising-part-5-maskirovka/
+
+Topics of Ukraine-related narratives
+http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/12/06/ukraine-related-narratives-dominate-russian-propaganda/
+Back in 2016, StopFake co-founder Yevhen Fedchenko identified 18 major Ukraine-related fake narrative topics spread by Russian propaganda by analyzing 500 debunked disinformation items.
+The Euromaidan Revolution as a “coup d’état“
+Ukraine as a “fascist state“
+Ukraine as a “failed state“
+“Russia is not a part of the occupation/war in Ukraine“
+Discrediting the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF)
+Discrediting the volunteer battalions (which officially became a part of UAF in 2015)
+Donbas and Crimean internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees
+Territorial disintegration of Ukraine
+“Territorial claims” for parts of Ukraine from neighboring Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia
+Fake “international legitimization” of annexation and occupation of Crimea
+The war in Ukraine “conducted by the US, NATO or Western private contractors”
+The West’s “Ukraine fatigue“
+Manipulating international organizations
+Fakes about EU-Ukraine relations
+“Decay” of the US and West in general, and the “disintegration of the EU”
+Flight MH17 crash fakes
+The West “uses biological weapons” in Ukraine
+Mix-ups of the fake narratives about Ukraine, Syria, ISIS terrorists (e.g., Crimean Tatars being depicted as jihadists or Ukraine as a training ground for terrorists)
+For post-Maidan Ukraine, Russian propaganda’s most used narratives were the Euromaidan as “coup d’etat” which brought a “Western-backed junta” (mostly “US-backed”) to power, and “fascism” as the main ideology of the post-Maidan government, Fedchenko notes.
+
+"
+"incident","I00009"," 
+
+Suspected actors:
+
+* Attacker: IRA or more broadly Russian state-sponsored disinformation campaign.
+* Amplifiers: through the persona of “Adam Garrie” (who first appeared on RT (Russian Today) and pro-Russia sites, with no background in Asia and Philippine affairs but suddenly rose to become a global affairs expert).
+* Garrie was then promoted by pro-Duterte officials, social media pages and news outlets.
+ 
+Timeframe: After Putin and Philippine’s president Duterte met in Russia in May 2017 and forged a partnership in information dissemination. Duterte and Putin signed a number of national security agreements, including a deal on intelligence sharing, an “MOU on Cooperation in Mass Communications.”
+ 
+Date: 2017- ongoing
+
+Presumed goals:
+
+* To spread pro-Duterte and Russian propaganda through collaborative effort of both Philippine and Russian disinformation actors.
+
+Method:
+ 
+* Footprint of Garrie on the Philippine media scene started from his connection with Russian IRA websites and pages (GI Analytics Facebook page, Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca.)
+ 
+* RT, one of media outlets that interviewed Garrie, was identified by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence in January 2017 as the primary source of propaganda that the Russians used to further their interests in the 2016 US elections.
+ 
+* Also has appearance on Iran’s IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), which was identified by the US Department of the Treasury in 2013 as a network that broadcasts false reports and forced confessions of political detainees and has ties with “politically motivated phishing” accounts on Google.
+ 
+* The Daily Sentry, a Philippine news site emerged at the start of 2018 (no ownership information), started citing Adam Garrie as a global expert after Philippine-Russian ties grew stronger. Between Feb 2018 and Jan 2019, The Daily Sentry cited Garrie in 41% of posts on Facebook that mentioned experts.
+ 
+* By March 2018, Garrie started to come to the mainstream: The Manila Times – a supporter outlet of the Philippine president, cited by pro-Duterte social media pages.
+ 
+* Philippine online groups and pages began to spread Russian propaganda. Some sites link to Duterte officials and supporters including Duterte’s former assistant secretary. For example, Duterte’s former assistant secretary shared content from Trending News Portal site.
+ 
+Counters:
+
+* Facebook took down 220 pages and 73 Philippine accounts for spam, including pages of The Daily Sentry and its affiliates, TNP page and related pages.
+ 
+Related incidents:
+
+References:
+
+* http://www.interaksyon.com/breaking-news/2017/05/30/75431/ph-russia-communication-offices-to-partner-in-info-dissemination/
+* https://www.rappler.com/nation/188378-ph-russia-sign-bilateral-agreements
+* https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf
+* 
+* https://codastory.com/disinformation/how-a-little-known-pro-kremlin-analyst-became-a-philippine-expert-overnight/
+* https://www.rappler.com/technology/social-media/220741-facebook-remove-trending-news-portal-twinmark-media-enterprises
+* https://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/221422-facebook-maria-ressa-rappler-philippines
+* https://www.rappler.com/nation/194814-maria-ressa-pcoo-training-china-russia
+* http://www.interaksyon.com/breaking-news/2017/05/30/75431/ph-russia-communication-offices-to-partner-in-info-dissemination/
+
+"
+"incident","I00019","
+
+Actor: 
+
+* individual accounts on 4chan (IP addresses indicate locations of Sweden, US, France), 
+* accounts on Twitter (both identifiable and anonymous).
+
+Timeframe: a few days
+
+Date: few hours after Macron and Le Pen were declared winners of the first round of France’s presidential election (April 23, 2017).
+
+Presumed goals: creating and spreading hoaxes and misinformation related to Macron’s personal life, marriage, sexuality, position on terrorism, etc. to spur support for Le Pen in the second round of voting.
+
+Method: posts and memes started on 4chan and later shared in Twitter
+
+Counters: no actions noted.
+
+Related incidents:
+
+* #MacronGate and #MacronCacheCash: fake documents on 4chan about Macron’s alleged offshore account.
+
+References:
+* https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/heres-how-far-right-trolls-are-spreading-hoaxes-about
+* https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/
+"
+"incident","I00004","
+
+Actor: IRA
+
+Timeframe: 1 day (plus preparation)
+
+Date: May 2017
+
+Presumed goals: reduce Emmanuel Macron’s chance of winning French presidential election
+
+Method:
+
+* fake documents posted on 4chan about Macron’s alleged offshore account, 
+* amplified by pro-Trump Twitter accounts using #MacronGate and #MacronCacheCash
+
+Counters: 
+
+* preparation (resilience, account removals), 
+* honeytraps, 
+* counter-response with humour.
+
+Related incidents:
+
+* DNC document release, US presidential elections, 2016
+
+
+References:
+
+* Source: https://www.patreon.com/posts/macrongate-tied-11940855 
+* http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/
+* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/08/macron-hackers-linked-to-russian-affiliated-group-behind-us-attack 
+"
+"incident","I00045","
+
+Actor: Russia
+
+Timeframe: March 4, 2018 - ongoing
+
+Date: March 4, 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Russian officials have sought to exploit holes in the complicated narrative of the poisoning to suggest an anti-Russian conspiracy. Mark Galeotti, an expert on the Russian intelligence services, wrote in an op-ed in The Moscow Times… “The Kremlin is enjoying the reputation of being a swashbuckling maverick, ruthless, dangerous and decisive,” he wrote. “This has a certain value, not least in deterring the fainthearted.”
+* Reuters: Commentary: For Putin’s Russia, a poisoned spy sends a political message “the poisoning as a sign of just how committed Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin has become to eradicating its enemies – and reminding others it can do so.”
+
+Method: 
+
+* Multi-source/channel/media response 
+* highlighting conspiracies: It was a British “false flag” operation; It could be the CIA; Because of Donald Trump; There’s always Ukraine
+* The conspiracy theories did not stop here. Multiple special-interest groups have attempted to lay the blame for the Skripals’ poisoning at the door of their chosen enemies. A UKIP branch in High Wycombe, in the English Home Counties, tweeted to accuse “a third party such as the EU” of “trying to interfere in UK Russian relations.” Sputnik even misquoted former Kremlin advisor Alexander Nekrassov as accusing “rouge agents” [sic] of carrying out the attack, “for some sort agenda [sic] such as slander or tarnish Russia [sic] or cause friction between Britain and Russia.” Matteo Salvini, Italian politician and member of the Italian senate, shared an article on his Facebook page, titled “The Skripal Case is a hoax, the war of the West against Russia is terribly true”. His post was liked 3,800 times and generated over 800 shares.
+* Here are 20 different narratives offered by Russian media and officials for the poisoning: The United Kingdom did it to fuel anti-Russian sentiment (source: Russia 1 TV channel); Ukraine did it to frame Russia (Russia 1); The United States did it to destabilize the world (Russia 1); Theresa May helped orchestrate the attack because she is a friend of CIA director Gina Haspel (Zvezda); It was an attempted suicide (Russia 1)
+It was an accidental overdose (RIA Novosti); It was due to accidental exposure from Britain’s Porton Down research facility (Russia 24 TV channel); The Porton Down lab carried out illicit human testing and is lying about not producing Novichok (RT); Skripal’s future mother-in-law did it (Moskovsky Komsomolets: mk.ru)
+Terrorists did it (Russian ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson); American-British financier Bill Browder — blacklisted in Russia for denouncing corruption — did it (Russia 1); A drone did it (Zvezda and Russian defense ministry); Skripal was a chemical weapons smuggler (Pravda); The West is using the case to deflect attention from Russia’s successes in Syria (Russian ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson); Britain is using the case to deflect attention from Brexit (Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian UN ambassador, Russian OSCE ambassador); The attack was an attempt by a rival faction to undermine Vladimir Putin (state TV); Russia has destroyed all its stockpiles of Novichok (Sputnik); Russia never developed Novichok (Interfax); Only the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Sweden have Novichok (Russian ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson). All three countries have denied the claim.; There is no evidence that the nerve agent used against the Skripals was Novichok, Porton Down lab is struggling to identify the substance (RT)
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Bellingcat; 
+* DFRLab; 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* ties to ongoing campaigns/narrative - Ukraine; NATO; EU; Brexit
+
+References:
+
+* https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/03/a-year-after-the-skripal-poisoning-how-much-has-really-changed-a64677
+* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-poisoning-commentary/commentary-for-putins-russia-a-poisoned-spy-sends-a-political-message-idUSKCN1GK309
+* https://twitter.com/UKIPHighWycombe/status/971773863230164992
+* https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201803141062498438-uk-novichok-nerve-agent-skripal/
+* https://www.facebook.com/salviniofficial/posts/10155663618083155
+* http://www.linkiesta.it/it/article/2018/03/28/il-caso-skripal-e-una-bufala-la-guerra-delloccidente-alla-russia-e-ter/37595/
+* https://www.rt.com/news/452946-skripal-anniversary-truth-novichok/
+* https://disinfoportal.org/sputnik-abkhazias-disinformation-about-porton-down-allegedly-denying-russian-trace-in-skripal-poisoning/
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/world/europe/russia-skripal-poisoning-britain.html
+
+
+* https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/skripal/
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/skripal-poisoning-if-not-russia-then-1d49f086e3e0
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/uk-poisoning-russia-recycles-responses-77e1d357b777
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-social-media-surge-on-skripal-b5132db6f439
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/conspiracy-mania-marks-one-year-anniversary-of-the-skripal-poisoning/
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/world/europe/russia-skripal-poisoning-britain.html
+* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-skripal/third-suspect-in-skripal-poisoning-is-russian-gru-agent-bellingcat-idUSKCN1Q32BZ
+* http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/04/11/five-ways-russia-is-generating-a-conspiracy-smokescreen-around-the-skripal-poisoning/
+* http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/03/30/russian-media-have-published-20-different-narratives-on-skripal-poisoning/
+* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poisoning_of_Sergei_and_Yulia_Skripal
+
+Visual assets (Google Drive)
+
+Datasets: 
+
+Notes: 
+
+On 6 March 2018 Andrey Lugovoy, deputy of Russia's State Duma (the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) and alleged killer of Alexander Litvinenko, in his interview with the Echo of Moscow said: ""Something constantly happens to Russian citizens who either run away from Russian justice, or for some reason choose for themselves a way of life they call a change of their Motherland. So the more Britain accepts on its territory every good-for-nothing, every scum from all over the world, the more problems they will have.""
+Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 9 March rejected Britain's claim of Russia's involvement in Skripal's poisoning and accused the United Kingdom of spreading ""propaganda"". Lavrov said that Russia was ""ready to cooperate"" and demanded access to the samples of the nerve-agent which was used to poison Skripal. The request was rejected by the British government.
+
+Ongoing… one year later
+https://disinfoportal.org/sputnik-abkhazias-disinformation-about-porton-down-allegedly-denying-russian-trace-in-skripal-poisoning/
+On February 7, 2019, Sputnik-Abkhazia released an article headlined “Scotland Yard about the third suspect in the Skripal case: the investigation continues.” According to Sputnik-Abkhazia, the Russian Foreign Ministry caught British Prime Minister Theresa May in a lie, because the Porton Down Laboratory denied that a nerve agent that poisoned Russian ex-spy, Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia had been produced in Russia
+
+https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/world/europe/russia-skripal-poisoning-britain.html
+Rather than ignoring the anniversary, however, Russia punctuated the occasion on Monday with an hourlong news conference at the United Nations and a 52-page report rehashing the episode in detail, amplified by extensive coverage on its English-language government channel, RT.
+ 
+Russian officials also have tried to turn the tables, accusing Britain of violating international law by refusing to provide Russian consular officials access to the Skripals, who survived and whose whereabouts has not been made public. 
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00051","
+
+Actor: Russia
+
+Timeframe: December 2018 - (ongoing)
+
+Date: December 10, 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Russian disinformation intended to confuse audiences and discredit an organisation (Integrity Inititative)which is working independently to tackle the threat of disinformation. Russia’s state-owned media outlets have seized on the posted materials, with the government’s RT and Sputnik news sites writing dozens of stories claiming that the materials prove that the British government, rather than Russia, is trying to poison internet discourse with propaganda.
+ 
+Method: 
+
+* Hack (email), leak, amplify, smear MSM
+
+Counters: none identified
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* The campaign also threads other organization into the “conspiracy” such as Britsh Military, NATO and the CIA.
+* With it, efforts to further discredit MH17 for instance; tie-in Soro’s (dog-whistle for the far-right); 
+* yet at the same defend the far-left alleging Integrity Initiative was running a smear campaign again UK Labour/Jeremy Corbyn
+
+References: 
+* https://eaworldview.com/2019/01/counter-russia-disinformation-integrity-initiative/
+* https://www.stopfake.org/en/kremlin-watch-briefing-the-eu-has-to-start-taking-pro-kremlin-disinformation-seriously/
+* https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kevincollier/russian-hackers-british-institute
+* https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-46509956
+* https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/anti-propaganda-website-forced-offline-by-hacking-b0ds2bkbp
+* https://eaworldview.com/2019/01/counter-russia-disinformation-integrity-initiative/
+* https://news.sky.com/story/highly-likely-moscow-hacked-uk-agency-countering-russian-disinformation-11656539
+* http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/01/17/russian-attack-on-the-integrity-initiative-what-makes-the-mafia-different-from-the-police/
+
+Datasets: 
+
+Notes: 
+
+RT and Sputnik claim that the Integrity Initiative hack was the work of freelancers aligned with the online Anonymous collective and who were not affiliated with the Russian government. The primary evidence for that, according to RT and Sputnik, is that the stolen Integrity Initiative material was posted to the website of a hacktivist collective called CyberGuerrilla, alongside manifestos claiming “We are Anonymous” and posts saying “We have warned the UK government that it must conduct an honest and transparent investigation into the activity of the Integrity Initiative and the Institute for Statecraft.”
+
+The Integrity Initiative has pulled down its website, replacing it with a reiteration of its mission, a description of the hack, and a call for tips.
+“This international public programme was set up in 2015 to counter disinformation and other forms of malign influence being conducted by states and sub-state actors seeking to interfere in democratic processes and to undermine public confidence in national political institutions,” a spokesperson said in a statement.
+
+ 
+
+"
+"incident","I00034","
+
+Actor: China
+
+Timeframe: 72 hours?
+
+Date: January 20th, 2016
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* The trolls planned their attack for 7pm, China time, on January 20. Members of Di Ba—one of the largest message boards on the internet—would organize into groups, leap over the Great Firewall to reach Facebook, and flood it with the message that Taiwan is part of China. The anti-independence and pro-China posts started to take over the Facebook page of Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s newly elected president
+
+Method: 
+
+* Tsai’s latest Facebook post, about a meeting she had with leaders from her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted nearly 40,000 Facebook comments in just eight hours.
+* News of the attack spread far and wide, with a number of posts making their way around social network WeChat. * For most of the day “Di Ba’s Facebook battle” has been at the top of the list of searched terms on Weibo, a Chinese microblog site similar to Twitter. News outlets in Taiwan covered the story (link in Chinese).
+* Information also spread suggesting that Di Ba’s battle was organized and well-prepared. Screenshots showed that attackers were separated into six “columns,” in the military sense: information gathering; posting; writing opinions and creating images; translation; miscellaneous Facebook tasks such as liking posts; and a vanguard to head things up.
+* The majority of the 26K comments consisted of lines copied and pasted from the officially designated messages
+*  more than 42,000 people had made comments on a single post of Ms Tsai's Facebook page, demanding her self-ruled island be brought under Chinese control.
+* Beginning at 7 pm on January 20, 2016 CST (China Standard Time), tens of thousands of
+comments against Taiwan independence appeared in posts of Taiwan President-elect Ms. Tsai Ing-Wen’s Facebook page as well as news media’s such as Sanli News and Apple Daily. While the organizers claim to taking further steps on issues against Taiwan independence, the event lasted for less than two days due to Chinese government’s intervention, leaving tens of thousands of comments either deleted or unattended.
+* Within this most active group, every username posted 6 comments at least and 12 comments
+on average. The most productive one posted 192 comments during this period. Two interesting
+findings come from the discrepant mapping result of Facebook usernames and IDs, which imply
+participants’ strategy. First, users might share account. We found five IDs, each of which is
+associated with different usernames. According to one internal document downloaded from the
+QQ group, some participants would register Facebook accounts in advance, and then give them to those responsible for attack. Since Facebook allows users to change their usernames anytime, we speculate whether this may be due to the sharing of accounts but changing the name to differentiate the identity.
+* Second, users shared some usernames to maintain the consistency of their identities. The total
+number of IDs is more than the number of unique usernames. Many usernames are shared by
+different IDs, which account for 2.82% of all 16,891 IDs. One possible reason for this practice is
+that during the attack, reporting and blocking accounts is a prevalent tactic used by both sides as defense. Once the account is “dead”, the user has to register for a new account to keep fighting. One commenter said that he/she was blocked over 3 times, but kept registering new accounts to fight. It is thus not surprising to see a small percentage of users who have more than one ID while maintaining the same username.
+* More notable is the case where one username is shared by more than 10 IDs. One possible
+explanation is that someone dedicates himself/herself to this event and intends to increase their
+visibility. However, for those usernames associated with over 30 IDs, we argue that it might be a
+unique strategy for attacking or trolling, because it is difficult to log into multiple accounts and
+post comments by a single user.
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+References:
+
+* https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/96746
+* https://qz.com/598812/an-army-of-chinese-trolls-has-jumped-the-great-firewall-to-attack-taiwanese-independence-on-facebook/
+* https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-21/chinese-facebook-users-flooding-taiwan-president-elect-account/7105228
+* https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-people-are-flooding-the-internet-with-a-campaign-against-taiwan-2016-1
+
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00010","
+
+Actors: IRA, Alex Jones, far right and far left trolls
+
+Timeframe: Ongoing
+
+Date: February 2018
+
+Presumed goals: Divide the American public on the issues of guns, race, generational politics and activism
+
+Method: Amplification via sockpuppet and cyborg accounts
+
+Counters: None / Media exposure
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* Sandy Hook hoaxers / Sandy Hook fatalists
+
+References
+
+* [How Russian trolls exploited Parkland mass shooting on social media](https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2018/feb/22/how-russian-trolls-exploited-parkland-mass-shootin/)
+* [PRO-GUN RUSSIAN BOTS FLOOD TWITTER AFTER PARKLAND SHOOTING](https://www.wired.com/story/pro-gun-russian-bots-flood-twitter-after-parkland-shooting/)
+* [Russian trolls flood Twitter after Parkland shooting](https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/russian-trolls-flood-twitter-after-parkland-shooting-n848471)
+* [Russian Trolls Are Tweeting Propaganda After Stoneman Shooting](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/02/russian-trolls-tweet-propaganda-after-florida-shooting.html)
+
+Details
+
+Following the Feb. 14 shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School that left 17 dead, an army of human-controlled and automated accounts spread related content across Twitter. 
+
+Hamilton 68, a website created by Alliance for Securing Democracy, tracks Twitter activity from accounts it has identified as linked to Russian influence campaigns. As of morning, shooting-related terms dominated the site’s trending hashtags and topics, including Parkland, guncontrolnow, Florida, guncontrol, and Nikolas Cruz, the name of the alleged shooter. Popular trending topics among the bot network include shooter, NRA, shooting, Nikolas, Florida, and teacher.
+
+According to the German Marshall Fund, which tracks Russian-linked Twitter activity, the following are some of the more popular narratives, themes and articles.
+The 'crisis actor' conspiracy
+'False flag' and other conspiracy hashtags
+Meanwhile, some accounts with large bot followings are already spreading misinformation about the shooter's ties to far-left group Antifa, even though the Associated Press reported that he was a member of a local white nationalist group.
+One theory associated with these hashtags is that Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School was targeted because the school’s namesake was opposed to ""draining the swamp"" of the Florida Everglades. Under this theory, the Parkland shooting was a cryptic message to Trump, who vowed during his campaign to ""drain the swamp"" in Washington by hollowing out its infrastructure of career politicians, insiders and influence peddlers.
+Sowing discord
+Experts say the goal of Russian troll propagandists isn't to sway people's opinions in one way or another. Instead, the accounts seek to exploit divisions in order to break down society into smaller, warring groups. Trolls drum up persona accounts on every side of the ideological spectrum and take advantage of high-impact events to spread confusion and disarray. In particular, they're able to take advantage of how Twitter doesn't require users to verify their identity.
+Russian accounts boosted erroneous content concerning the motives of the alleged shooter Nikolas Cruz.
+According to the German Marshall Fund, one of the top links shared by Russia-linked accounts in the aftermath of the shooting was our 2014 article that largely debunked a statistic cited by pro-gun control group Everytown for Gun Safety.
+A survey of tweets using the top hashtags flagged by the Hamilton 68 dashboard showed tweets adamantly in favor of gun control and saying the NRA had taken ""blood money."" Other tweets attacked liberals, the media and lawmakers.
+Another top link shared by the network covers the “deranged” Instagram account of the shooter, showing images of him holding guns and knives, wearing army hats, and a screenshot of a Google search of the phrase “Allahu Akbar.” Characterizing shooters as deranged lone wolves with potential terrorist connections is a popular strategy of pro-gun groups because of the implication that new gun laws could not have prevented their actions.
+The use of pro-gun control hashtags like #guncontrolnow, along with the spread of anti-gun control links like the Politifact article, appear at first to show the Russian strategy of promoting discord on both sides of a debate.
+In other cases, the bots jump on existing hashtags to take control of the conversation and amplify a message. That’s likely what is happening with the Parkland shooting and the hashtag guncontrolnow.
+Public awareness that antagonistic bots flood the Twitter debate hasn’t stopped them from achieving their goals of ratcheting up the vitriol—even amid a live tragedy like the Parkland shooting. The goal, after all, isn't to help one side or the other of the gun control debate win. It's to amplify the loudest voices in that fight, deepening the divisions between us.
+
+Examples
+
+"
+"incident","I00050","
+
+Actor: Russia, Cuba, China, Iran
+
+Timeframe: January 23, 2019
+
+Date: January 29, 2019 - ongoing
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Given the history (going back to the Monroe Doctrine) the US is easily characterized with “imperialist” aspirations. Of course there’s the connected issue of oil and Venezuela’s indebtedness to Russia and China. The relationship between Cuba and Venezuela can not be underscored going back to Castro & Chavez’s relationship.
+
+* Search (google) #handsofvenezuela the results are largely linking to articles denouncing the US and those countries opposed to the Maduro regime. “There's been a lot of misinformation in the international media about whether what is happening in Venezuela is a brazen US-led power grab or a constitutional …”  Jan 13, 2019 - An attempt at an imperialist coup d'état is underway in Venezuela. It must ... Most likely this is another attempt by Washington to spread misinformation and ... socialist and anti-imperialist, is to reject this scandalous imperialist …
+
+* Activists to Trump: 'Hands Off Venezuela' - Truthdig
+https://www.truthdig.com/articles/activists-to-trump-hands-off-venezuela/
+Mar 17, 2019 - medeabenjamin “We are absolutely opposed to economic sanctions in Venezuela” at the #HandsOffVenezuela rally. pic.twitter.com/ ... Packed London meeting says: “US-UK, hands off Venezuela!""
+https://www.marxist.com/packed-london-meeting-says-us-uk-hands-off-venezuela.htm
+Jan 31, 2019 - Nearly 100 people packed the #HandsOffVenezuela meeting in London on 30 January, and heard Venezuelan ambassador Rocío Manero, ...
+
+Method: 
+
+* From efforts via blogs, “news” sites and media supporting the left/socialism/stateism positioning anti-Maduro efforts as “imperialisitic” it’s noteworthy to documented the efforts in February to deliver aid to the country. For instance this case study - analysis demonstrates that the depiction of Russia’s role as “peacekeeper” and “defender” has had a big impact on the networks. We filtered all mentions to include only those containing the words “Russia”, “Moscow” or “Putin” in reference to Venezuela. This resulted in a total number of 60,315 tweets for the period. A few peaks can be noticed at times when Russian sources, mainly RT and Sputnik, forward Venezuela-related news.
+A: Russia expresses an adamant position that Maduro is the legitimate president of Venezuela
+B: Russia will defend the Venezuelan Constitution
+C: The US is massing troops at the Venezuelan border
+E: Russia is sending humanitarian aid to Venezuela
+* The Trojan Horse. The most striking success of the Russian disinformation campaign is the impact of the Trojan Horse Narrative. The first case of describing US and EU humanitarian aid to Venezuela as a Trojan horse, in Spanish Caballo de Troya, appeared in Spanish language networks on 24 January:
+From February 23, 2019 - Billionaire businessman Richard Branson says he hopes his Live Aid-inspired concert to raise funds for Venezuelans will persuade members of the country's military to defy President Nicolas Maduro and allow humanitarian aid to cross the border.
+Branson, who will host ""Venezuela Aid Live"" on Friday in the Colombian border town of Cucuta, said he is aiming to raise about $100 million to buy food and medicine, essential supplies for the country, which is gripped by a political and humanitarian crisis.
+In reaction to - Maduro’s government announced that it would accept contributions from China and Cuba, but called Guaidó-organized aid, which includes contributions from the United States, a “handout.” In an interview with the Associated Press this week, Maduro blamed U.S. sanctions for Venezuela’s economic woes, saying “the infected hand of Donald Trump is hurting Venezuela.”
+* Like the White Helmets (Musician) Roger Waters (willing idiot) weighs in - In a two-minute video posted on Twitter, the musician says Mr Branson's ""Live-Aid-ish"" concert has ""nothing to do with humanitarian aid at all"". ""It has to do with Richard Branson, and I'm not surprised by this, having bought the US saying: 'We have decided to take over Venezuela, for whatever our reasons may be,'"" Mr Waters says. ""But it has nothing to do with the needs of the Venezuelan people, it has nothing to do with democracy, it has nothing to do with freedom, and it has nothing to do with aid."" He adds that he has ""friends that are in Caracas"" who claim there is ""no civil war, no mayhem, no murder, no apparent dictatorship, no suppression of the press""
+Maduro government holds their own concert to counter Branson’s efforts
+https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/19/richard-branson-maduro-concert-on-venezuela-border.html
+https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/19/maduro-government-richard-branson-rival-venezuela-concerts
+Just 300 metres away, the first of some 150 artists began performing at Maduro's Hands off Venezuela festival. 
+https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/rival-concerts-backdrop-venezuela-power-struggle-190222142807321.html
+
+* The Russian official line - (talking points for trolls & willing/unwitting idiots)
+On Tuesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov criticized the U.S. sanctions, which meant that proceeds from the sale of Venezuelan oil would be withheld from Maduro’s government.
+In a press conference, Lavrov dubbed the U.S. sanctions “illegitimate” and “cynical,” adding that Russia “along with other responsible members of the global community will do everything to support the legal government of the president,” RIA Novosti reported.
+There is concern in Moscow about the level of debt Caracas owes Russia. Russian Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak said the sanctions may mean Venezuela will have problems servicing sovereign debt to Russia.
+Venezuela has two months to pay Russian $100 million and there is uncertainty as to whether PDVSA can service its debt to Russia’s state energy giant Rosneft, Radio Free Europe reported
+The evolution/spread of talking points 
+But while the Canadian government, which accused Maduro of seizing power through fraudulent elections, has expressed full support for Guaido, some Canadian protesters are calling it out for what they say is an attack on Venezuela’s sovereignty.
+“What is brewing, what is being organized is an actual military intervention of Venezuela,” said Margaret Villamizar, who attended a protest in Windsor, Ont. “If it doesn’t turn out to be full-scale military, what’s being called diplomacy is really an attack on Venezuela’s sovereignty.”
+ 
+* Also - In an interview with Foreign Policy, Adm. Craig Faller, the four-star military officer who heads U.S. Southern Command, pointed to a Chinese disinformation campaign designed to blame the United States for the blackouts that devastated Venezuela in recent weeks. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/08/us-military-wary-of-chinas-foothold-in-venezuela-maduro-faller-guaido-trump-pentagon/
+A Chinese plane loaded with 65 tons of medical supplies landed in Venezuela's capital of Caracas on Friday amid a power struggle between President Nicolas Maduro and opposition leader Juan Guaido.
+Maduro welcomed the arrival of the humanitarian aid on Twitter, saying ""Venezuela is breaking the imperialist siege and advancing with a victory.""
+He shared photos showing the arrival of the aid as well as a photo of him taken with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping during his visit to China last year.
+China's move came after Russia sent humanitarian aid to Caracas last week.
+Venezuela has been rocked by protests since Jan. 10, when Maduro was sworn in for a second term following a vote boycotted by the opposition.
+https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/venezuela-welcomes-arrival-of-chinese-medical-aid/1435166
+ 
+Counters: 
+
+* Every report suggesting that Venezuela is mired in a humanitarian crisis.
+April 10, 2019 The UN reports “There is a very real humanitarian problem in Venezuela,” said Mark Lowcock, the UN humanitarian chief. “We estimate that 7 million people in Venezuela need humanitarian assistance. That is some 25 per cent of the population,”
+April 10, 2019 NY Times ‘You Shouldn’t Be Here’: U.S. Pushes U.N. to Pull Venezuela Envoy’s Credentials
+Go back to October 2018 Washington Post: A humanitarian crisis in Venezuela? Nothing to see here, government says. Human Rights Watch Report
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* Speculation but research worthy… right/left regional binary pitting new right wing governments in Brazil & Columbia and hosility/percieved hosility to regimes like Venezuela & Ecuador
+
+References: 
+
+* https://www.truthdig.com/articles/activists-to-trump-hands-off-venezuela/
+* https://www.marxist.com/packed-london-meeting-says-us-uk-hands-off-venezuela.htm
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/twitter-as-an-information-battlefield-venezuela-a-case-study/
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-venezuela-humanitarian-aid-has-become-a-political-weapon/2019/02/14/5eab781a-3089-11e9-8781-763619f12cb4_story.html
+* https://www.apnews.com/21b641f6def1400894125e3a8117f66c
+* https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/19/richard-branson-maduro-concert-on-venezuela-border.html
+* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/19/maduro-government-richard-branson-rival-venezuela-concerts
+* https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/rival-concerts-backdrop-venezuela-power-struggle-190222142807321.html
+* https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/08/us-military-wary-of-chinas-foothold-in-venezuela-maduro-faller-guaido-trump-pentagon/
+* https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/venezuela-welcomes-arrival-of-chinese-medical-aid/1435166
+* https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/04/1036441
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/world/americas/pence-venezuela-un-envoy.html
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/a-humanitarian-crisis-in-venezuela-nothing-to-see-here-government-says/2018/10/12/6ebd1aa6-c2ac-11e8-9451-e878f96be19b_story.html
+* https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/venezuela
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/twitter-as-an-information-battlefield-venezuela-a-case-study/
+* https://www.npr.org/2019/03/25/706635580/venezuelas-maduro-faces-pressure-from-much-of-the-world-yet-he-persists
+* https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2019/02/26/venezuela-protests-in-tucson/
+* https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-told-hands-venezuela-countrys-president-who-has-full-backing-1309188
+* https://www.dw.com/cda/en/venezuela-juan-guaido-urges-army-to-let-aid-through/a-47651164
+* https://www.npr.org/2019/04/02/709306132/maduro-allies-move-against-rival-juan-guaid-in-venezuela
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/02/trump-has-russia-problem-venezuela/?utm_term=.9233de48de14
+* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-s-venezuela-challenge
+* https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-venezuelas-maduro-seeks-to-restore-power-stem-looting-as-china/
+* https://www.npr.org/tags/587365601/venezuela-crisis
+* https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/02/16/richard-bransons-goal-million-venezuela-could-face-an-obstacle-maduro/?utm_term=.8a5ad46a730a
+* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47271182
+
+Notes:
+
+
+ 
+
+"
+"incident","I00001","
+
+Actor: 
+
+Timeframe: 
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals: “Russian-linked social media accounts saw racial tensions as something to be exploited in order to achieve the broader Russian goal of dividing Americans and creating chaos in U.S. politics during a campaign in which race repeatedly became an issue.”
+
+Method: 
+Possibly linked: black lives matter facebook ads, targetted at Baltimore, Ferguson, Missouri https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/27/media/facebook-black-lives-matter-targeting/index.html?iid=EL 
+
+Counters:
+
+Related incidents:
+
+* Txrebels facebook group
+* MuslimAmerica facebook group
+* Patriotus facebook group
+* SecuredBorders facebook group
+* Lgbtun facebook group
+* Black Matters facebook group
+
+References:
+* https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/media/blacktivist-russia-facebook-twitter/index.html
+* https://news.docnow.io/blacktivists-in-the-archive-71c807aa247e
+* https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-secret-documents-from-russias-election-trolls-leak
+
+
+
+Datasets
+
+* https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1OZcRCZuz83bMpxVjpUYEALiS4OtKU-pTVtTveG_Ljs0/edit#gid=0 - from https://news.docnow.io/blacktivists-in-the-archive-71c807aa247e are the @blacktivists tweets that used the #blacklivesmatter hashtag
+* Jonathan Albright got the facebook text: https://data.world/d1gi/missing-fb-posts-w-share-stats/workspace/file?filename=Blacktivist+Facebook+Page+%28Text%29.pdf https://data.world/d1gi/missing-fb-posts-w-share-stats/workspace/file?filename=Blacktivist+Facebook+Page+%28Text%29-2.docx 
+
+Notes
+
+First i read the cnn article, then did a twitter search to see if there are traces of the accounts left online.  Only discussion about the IRA operation seem to be on Twitter.  Also searched twitter for some of the text found later (in datasets) - nothing matches. 
+Reading the docnow.io post showed some interesting behavours.  Also that there was no central data repo for the blacktivists posts.  Classic was the tweets being sent only in 8am-6pm Moscow time. Also interesting: the followers grew over time, but they grew and dropped friends (people they followed) in batches periodically - was this to avoid hitting limits? 
+Reading the dailybeast.com article (on an IRA leak), it seems specific individuals were targetted.  Thinking about the places we need to search: if it’s Russia, seems like we need to check twitter, facebook, youtube, reddit, tumblr, instagram, 9gag. 
+Names some of the people contacted, e.g. Craig Carson, a Rochester, New York, attorney and civil rights activist; maybe Shanall LaRay Logan—who lives in Sacramento, California; 
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00035","
+
+Summary:  
+
+Actor: 
+
+Timeframe: 
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+Method:
+
+* Bot activity that inflates the visibility of and perceived support for certain candidates and ideologies in 2014 elections.
+* Campaigns use bots or spread content favorable to their respective candidates in 2014. Neves’ operation used bots on a much larger scale than the Rousseff’s campaign (on FB, Twitter and WhatsApp).
+
+Counters:
+
+* Facebook removed 200 pages run by individuals connected to the right-wing activist organization Movimento Brasil Livre related to the Brazil elections.
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+References:
+* https://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/politicalbots/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Brazil-1.pdf
+* https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/bots-brazil-the-activity-social-media-bots-brazilian-elections
+ 
+
+"
+"incident","I00025","
+
+Actor: Russia
+
+Timeframe: November 6, 2018 - end of November 2018
+
+Date: November 6, 2018
+
+Presumed goals:
+
+* Include - Leave campaigners have claimed that the UK would be forced into an ‘EU army’ under the rules allowing for these activities. https://fullfact.org/europe/hunt-eu-army/
+* Baltic states are frightened by the single European army. The new European security system will be anti-American. To the leadership of the Baltic states, based on Russophobia, this doesn’t look good.
+
+Method: 
+
+* “Limited” engagement & channels. In this case Reddit was key forum. 
+* Could not find examples of engagement from “usual suspects” ie: Russian embassy; military or broad mentions via RT & Sputnik
+
+Counters: 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+References: 
+
+* https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/27/is-there-a-secret-plan-to-create-an-eu-army
+* https://medium.com/dfrlab/spread-it-on-reddit-3170a463e787
+* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-european-army-eminently-defensible-but-not-probable-for-a-long-time-to-come
+* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46108633
+* https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-emmanuel-macron-eu-army-to-complement-nato/
+* https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/baltic-states-frightened-by-the-single-european-army/
+* https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/25/brexiters-european-army-myths-franco-german
+* https://fullfact.org/europe/hunt-eu-army/
+* https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/27/is-there-a-secret-plan-to-create-an-eu-army
+
+
+Datasets: 
+
+Notes:
+Worth noting the Breitbart commentary (see visual assets); compared to campaigns against NATO for instance, this incident didn’t seemingly have much traction/momentum, and seemed more of a potential wedge for the pro-Brexit audience.
+
+Visual Assets
+
+"
+"incident","I00060","
+
+Actors: 
+
+Timeframe:
+
+Date: 
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+Method: 
+
+Counters:
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+References:
+* (Trump’s White-Nationalist Pipeline)[https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/trump-white-nationalism/568393/] 
+* (Parallels between social media misinformation campaigns in the USA and South Africa)[https://www.iafrikan.com/2018/11/20/social-media-usa-south-africa-fake-news-disinformation/]
+* (The high price of 'white genocide' politics for Australia)[https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/the-high-price-of-white-genocide-politics-for-australia-20180724-p4zt9k.html]
+"
+"incident","I00005","
+
+Actor: Russia/ Internet Research Agency (IRA)
+
+Timeframe: December 2015 - ongoing
+
+Date: June 23, 2016
+
+Presumed goals: Change Brexit vote to ‘leave’; continue to divide/undermine EU; drive Eurosceptic narrative/agenda
+
+Method:
+* (From The European Values Think-Tank)
+* Before Brexit, Russia Today and Sputnik released more anti-EU articles than the official Vote Leave website and Leave.EU website. The British version of Sputnik has an annual budget of £ 1.8 million from the Russian government. Kremlin-owned channels potentially influenced 134 million impressions during the Brexit campaign
+* Method: The data that was used by 89up was derived from the Twitter Search API, Buzzsumo, the Facebook API and other scraping methods. In the timeframe from January 2016 to the day of the British referendum, analysts identified and analysed 261 of the most shared and popular articles that were clearly anti-European. The two main media outlets were RT and Sputnik. Costs: The total value of Kremlin media for the Leave campaign in the six months before the EU referendum was £1,353,000. The PR value for the Leave campaign, based on the 261 heavily pro-Leave articles published by RT and Sputnik, is estimated at nearly £1,500,000based on figures from a leading media monitoring tool. This excludes the significant social media value of these news articles. Estimated value of Russian media Facebook impressions is around $102,000 and the estimated value of Russian media’s potential impressions on Twitter is between $47,000 - $100,000. 
+* Content: The analysis also shows that the overwhelming majority of articles published by RT and Sputnik (131 of the 200 most shared) were clearly for Leave; 59 articles were Neutral and only 10 were set to Remain. When the neutral articles are filtered out, numbers show that the negative articles of RT/Sputnik, together, elicited nearly the same number of engagements as the official Vote Leave website.
+* Social reach: The report shows the social reach of these anti-EU articles published by the Kremlin-owned channels was 134 million potential impressions, in comparison with a total social reach of just 33 million and 11 million potential impressions for all content shared from the Vote Leave website and Leave.EU website respectively.
+* (Jane Mayer, staff writer at The New Yorker, via NPR) Role of - Cambridge Analytica, which is a big data company that worked for the Trump campaign in the end - and it was owned principally by one of Trump's largest backers, Robert Mercer - was also involved in helping the early stages of the Brexit campaign in England.
+And the man who spanned both countries and pushed for both, really, was Steve Bannon, it seems there was actually a lot of Russian money offered to Arron Banks, who was one of the major political figures leading the Brexit campaign. The Russian money was offered to him in the form of business opportunities and gold mines and diamond mines by the Russian ambassador to England. So there seems to be financial incentives that were dangled. 
+* There are bots and trolls and posts that are coming from the same Russian Internet agency in St. Petersburg. So in both countries, we see pushing Brexit and pushing Trump at the same time by the same trolls and bots. research conducted by a joint team of experts from the University of California at Berkeley and Swansea University reportedly identified 150,000 Twitter accounts with various Russian ties that disseminated messages about Brexit.
+* A cache of posts from 2016, seen by WIRED, shows how a coordinated network of Russian-based Twitter accounts spread racial hatred in an attempt to disrupt politics in the UK and Europe.
+A network of accounts posted pro and anti-Brexit, anti-immigration and racist tweets around the EU referendum vote while also targeting posts in response to terrorist attacks across the continent. 
+* More broadly, a Russian espionage operation funneling money into a political campaign aimed at unwinding European integration would be entirely consistent with the Kremlin’s perceived political interests and tactics of hybrid warfare. Covert financial infiltration is part of a toolkit Moscow uses to interfere in European and American politics. Another tool deployed ahead of the 2016 referendum was pro-Brexit messaging pumped out by RT, Sputnik, and the Internet Research Agency.
+* From 1 to 8 February 2016, Sputnik ran 14 stories on the “Brexit” issue. Eight of them had negative headlines, either featuring criticism of the deal or focusing on the difficulties Cameron faces; five headlines were broadly factual; one reported a positive comment that the Bank of England had “not yet seen” an impact on investor sentiment, but gave it a negative slant by headlining, “Bank of England on Brexit: No need to panic, yet.” (The word “panic” did not appear in the story.) Not one headline reported reactions supporting the deal. Both Sputnik and RT quoted a disproportionate number of reactions from “Out” campaigners. RT, for example, quoted five “Out” partisans: MP Liam Fox; the founder of Leave.EU; London Mayor Boris Johnson; MEP Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK Independence Party; and UKIP member Paul Nuttall.
+* anti-immigrant adverts were targeted at Facebook users in the UK and the US. One – headlined “You’re not the only one to despise immigration”, which cost 4,884 roubles (£58) and received 4,055 views – was placed in January 2016. Another, which accused immigrants of stealing jobs, cost 5,514 roubles and received 14,396 impressions
+* A study of social media during the Brexit campaign by 89Up, a consultancy, found that Russian bots delivered 10m potential Twitter impressions—about a third of the number generated by the Vote Leave campaign’s Twitter account. Such echoing amplifies the effect of RT and Sputnik stories, which are in general not much watched.
+
+Counters: FB & Twitter content take-downs
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* 2016 US Election… pick ‘em
+
+References:
+
+* https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/363/36308.htm#_idTextAnchor033
+* https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf
+* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/russian-troll-factories-researchers-damn-twitters-refusal-to-share-data
+* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/congress-should-explain-how-dark-russian-money-infiltrates-western-democracies
+* http://sputniknews.com/search/?query=Brexit
+* http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160202/1034093305/cameron-tusk-brexit-deal.html
+* http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160203/1034124763/tusk-eu-reform.html
+* http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160204/1034209396/cameron-eu-brexit-talks.html
+* http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160205/1034290031/business-investments-brexit-europe.html
+* https://www.rt.com/uk/331734-cameron-calais-jungle-brexit/
+* https://www.rt.com/uk/331161-eu-referendum-date-brexit/
+* https://www.rt.com/uk/330977-tusk-eu-deal-brexit/
+* https://twitter.com/brexit_sham/status/994982969705189377
+
+* https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/europe/russia-brexit-twitter-facebook.html 
+* https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2018/11/01/russian-trolls-used-islamophobia-to-whip-up-support-for-brexit/#11ee8dd465f2
+* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/10/russian-influence-brexit-vote-detailed-us-senate-report
+* https://www.npr.org/2019/01/19/686830510/senate-finds-russian-bots-bucks-helped-push-brexit-vote-through
+* https://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Influence-of-Russian-Disinformation-Operations-Specific-examples-in-data-and-numbers.pdf
+* https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/11/14/the-extent-of-russian-backed-fraud-means-the-referendum-is-invalid/
+* https://www.wired.co.uk/article/brexit-russia-influence-twitter-bots-internet-research-agency
+* https://www.buzzfeed.com/jamesball/a-suspected-network-of-13000-twitter-bots-pumped-out-pro?utm_term=.ipWGa5zK#.oeeKD58v
+* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/use-brexit-delay-to-investigate-russian-money
+* http://www.interpretermag.com/putins-media-are-pushing-britain-for-the-brexit/
+* https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/12/facebook-brexit-russia-unresolved-40-questions
+* https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/02/22/russian-disinformation-distorts-american-and-european-democracy
+
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00044","
+
+Actors: 
+
+* SVR and IRA; 
+* Alex Jones; 
+* Global Research; 
+* anti-gov trolls; rapture trolls; alt-right trolls;
+
+Timeframe: Most of 2015
+
+Date: May - Oct 2015
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* US operational dry run; 
+* Test 2016 themes; 
+* Promote paranoia in right wing US populations; 
+* Establish and prime anti-government narratives for future use. 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Amplification via sockpuppet and cyborg accounts; 
+* Social media groups and meetups; 
+* Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and scary) titles; 
+* Amplify US media derision of message “carriers” in Russian state media;
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Media exposure; 
+* Texas Governor disavows 
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* 2016 US election; 
+* QAnon; 
+* Texas secession
+
+References
+
+* [That 'Jade Helm' Conspiracy Freakout Was Spurred By Russian Bots, Ex-Intel Chief Says](https://taskandpurpose.com/jade-helm-conspiracy-russian-bots)
+* [Russians Sowed Divisions in Texas Politics, Says U.S. Senate Report](https://www.texasmonthly.com/news/russians-sowed-divisions-texas-politics-says-u-s-senate-report/)
+* [Case Analysis: Jade Helm 15 and Russian Active Measures](https://toinformistoinfluence.com/2015/11/16/case-analysis-jade-helm-15-and-russian-active-measures/)
+* [Trolling for Trump: how Russia is trying to destroy our democracy](https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/trolling-for-trump-how-russia-is-trying-to-destroy-our-democracy/)
+* [Anatomy of a Russian attack: First signs of the Kremlin’s attempt to influence the 2016 election](https://wtop.com/j-j-green-national/2017/09/anatomy-russian-attack-first-signs/slide/1/)
+
+Details
+
+Even before the 2016 presidential election, the Russians had been testing disinformation in Texas by stirring up the controversy surrounding the Jade Helm military maneuver in the summer of 2015. Conspiracy theorists had created the idea that a joint military training exercise in Texas was cover for President Obama to declare martial law and seize Texas. The conspiracy theory gained traction when Abbott ordered the Texas State Guard to monitor the U.S. military. Earlier this year, a former head of the National Security Agency and the CIA—Air Force General Michael Hayden—said the Jade Helm disinformation campaign was pivotal to the Russians’ decision to try to influence the U.S. presidential campaign. “At that point, I’m figuring the Russians are saying, ‘We can go big-time.’ And at that point, I think they made the decision, ‘We’re going to play in the electoral process,’” Hayden said.
+
+When thousands of troops from Army Special Operations Command descended on the American southwest for the totally normal eight-week training exercise Jade Helm 15, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott — goaded on by anti-government ideologues, rapture-predicting ministries and alt-right internet famewhores — ordered the state's volunteer guard to ""monitor"" the U.S. service members on their land to make sure they didn't start kidnapping undesirables and grabbing people's guns.
+
+It was a precursor to martial law, they said. It was ""way worse than you realize: police, military working together toward population control,"" they said. It was ""secretly using recently closed Wal-Marts to stockpile supplies for Chinese troops who will be arriving to disarm Americans,"" they said. It was preparation for Obama's takeover after an impending asteroid impact that would begin the global apocalypse, they said. It mobilized right-wing activists to prepare to fight their government — their uniformed soldiers! — to the death.
+
+Russian intelligence, state media, and trolls under President Vladimir Putin sought to bum steer U.S. domestic reactions to Jade Helm 15, the multi-state U.S.-based military training exercise concludedSeptember 15th. Russia has invested tens to hundreds of millions to infiltrate U.S. media markets with English language news, opinion, conspiracy, and troll content, often interlocking with the most popular U.S. conspiracy theory websites on the net.
+
+On July 2015, at a community meeting in Bastrop, some Texans were up in arms about hosting part of a multi-state U.S. military training exercise named Jade Helm 15. While most locals were unswayed by the conspiracy theories of Jade Helm 15 ushering in martial law, the video of  the crowd at the link records aspects of U.S. social and cognitive vulnerability to Russian “active measures.”
+
+It's an age-old problem; during the Cold War, Soviet agencies worked to whip up leftist anger at the U.S. government, highlighting America's race and inequality problems. But today, they've found that the most effective, salient mode of fuckery in U.S. affairs is to push right-wing conspiracy theories — ""deep state,"" Hillary emails, Pizzagate, Seth Rich, Soros, Islamists sneaking over the Mexico-U.S. border, Benghazi — that reinforce the idea that anyone to the left of, say, President Donald Trump, is a robotic foreign-paid human-trafficking overlord doing the bidding of the Rothschilds or Trilaterals or Freemasons or Kellers some other inane shit.
+
+The Russian SVR (Sluzhba vneshney razvedki) has chief responsibility for conducting active measures outside of Russia. The SVR’s active measures surrounding Jade Helm 15 generated fear to ignite a range of behaviors serving Russian foreign policy objectives, from feeding cynicism about the U.S. governing system and its people, to inciting violence and sabotage in the U.S.
+
+One example of how this messaging worked in ramping up fear of Jade Helm 15 was found at “Global Research,” a media outlet for a Canadian non-profit called Centre for Research on Globalization. Entitled, Towards a Militarized Police State in America? Explosive New Revelations over “Jade Helm 15 Exercise” and Potential False Flags, the online article was posted May 27, 2015, roughly 48 days before the Jade Helm 15 training exercise was to begin. Such a lead would give the piece time to disseminate to conspiracist sites and gullible readers ample time to organize a response.
+
+The idea is to get Americans thinking other Americans are the real enemies of humanity and progress. And it works, because a lot of Americans are already disposed to that way of thinking.
+
+On the other hand, it’s an easy cop-out to blame the Russians for every insecure dumbass idea that excitable Americans run with.
+
+Considering their interlocking content and links, Global Research and Alex Jones’s InfoWars.com (one of the most popular conspiracy websites on the internet) have a de facto alliance. Both sites published conspiracy pieces about Jade Helm 15 in advance of the exercise, as did many other conspiracist websites that link with one or both.
+
+The blizzard of conspiracy has had an effect. By May 2015, a Rasmussen poll on Jade Helm 15 found that “45% of voters are concerned that the government will use U.S. military training operations to impose greater control over some states,” with 19% “Very Concerned.” Rasmussen also reported that “21% believe the government’s decision to conduct military training exercises in some states is an infringement on the rights of the citizens in those states.”
+
+Some debate the effectiveness of Russian active measures, propaganda, and trolling. Russia Today (RT) is a more sophisticated Kremlin media outlet, with slick television, internet, and periodical output. RT’s portrayal of Jade Helm 15was to depict Americans as prone to conspiracy theory, and to amplify left-leaning U.S. media derision of Texas demographics disturbed by Jade Helm 15, while casting doubt on the government operation with headlines and sub-headlines. Russia Today’s approach had accentuated personal caricatures and distrust driving partisan anger in the U.S.
+
+On social media however, Kremlin-linked and other conspiracists sometimes represent themselves as insiders or experts whose content can be frightening and inciting.
+
+For example, on LinkedIn.com, many Pulse posts have focused on Jade Helm 15. Below I profile two examples of Pulse writers who hit Jade Helm 15 theme especially hard, one of them naming himself a “Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME” and the other a “Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author”
+
+Are apocalyptic conspiracies harmless despite their over-the-top claims?
+
+Apparently not. One ominous event may have turned Jade Helm 15 Active measures into a high-yield victory for Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin. Three North Carolina men amassed arms, munitions, and weapons and had been actively preparing to ambush Jade Helm 15 troops in training. Fortunately, the FBI received a tip from a gun and surplus store owner and arrested the would-be domestic-terrorists who feared that Jade Helm 15 was a prelude to martial law in the U.S.
+
+The Russian SVR and Putin’s media have aimed at Texas before. Did Putin foresee that Texas politicians might respond to popular conspiracist fears ramped up by the Kremlin itself and so cause strife in the partisan divide? That happened when Governor Greg Abbot tried to reassure Texans about Jade Helm 15, and opposition media lampooned him.
+
+Yet according to the San Antonio Express News, Governor Abbot, who is also a former Texas Supreme Court Justice not of the conspiracist mold, had initially a milder approach. Yet the opposing partisan media did more than just embarrass Gov. Abbot over his response, it called some of his constituents who had been moved by conspiracy propaganda “dumb,” which further tends to divide U.S. demographics along stereotypical lines. Mr. Putin must have been pleased.
+
+Examples
+
+
+"
+"incident","I00015","
+
+Actors: Russian state actors, Concord Management
+
+Timeframe: Fall 2018 - Winter 2019
+
+Date: October 2018
+
+Presumed goals: 
+
+* Discredit Mueller findings; 
+* sow doubt about Russian active measures; 
+* expose investigatory sources, priorities and methods; 
+
+Method: 
+
+* Release non-public documents with favorable amendments; 
+* Disguise document provenance as hacking (i.e. revelation); 
+* Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly 
+
+Counters: 
+
+* Media exposure; 
+* motions to limit future discovery
+
+Related incidents: 
+
+* 2016 US election
+
+References
+
+* [Document: Concord Management Used Discovery for Disinformation Campaign, Mueller Says](https://www.lawfareblog.com/document-concord-management-used-discovery-disinformation-campaign-mueller-says)
+* [Mueller says some private case files were used in 'disinformation campaign' to discredit Russia probe](https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/427723-mueller-says-some-of-his-private-case-files-were-used-in)
+* [Mueller says Russians are using his discovery materials in disinformation effort](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/mueller-says-russians-using-his-discovery-materials-disinformation-effort-n964811)
+* [Mueller says discovery materials in case against Russian firm were used in a cyber-disinformation campaign](https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/mueller-says-discovery-materials-in-case-against-russian-firm-were-used-in-a-cyber-disinformation-campaign/2019/01/30/9fd60218-24c9-11e9-81fd-b7b05d5bed90_story.html?utm_term=.4b814db9f811)
+* [Mueller's Team Questions How Files in Russia Case Ended Up Online](https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/01/30/muellers-team-questions-how-files-in-russia-case-ended-up-online/?slreturn=20190231112904)
+* https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5700929-Concord-Discovery-Opposition.html
+
+Details
+
+The special counsel's office has filed a memorandum in U.S. v. Concord Management and Consulting, LLC in opposition to Concord's motion to disclose documents identified as ""sensitive"" by the Special Counsel to certain Concord officers and employees. The memo alleges that subsequent investigations into Concord have ""revealed that certain non-sensitive discovery materials in the defense’s possession appear to have been altered and disseminated as part of a disinformation campaign"" apparently aimed at discrediting the special counsel's investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election.
+
+That discovery — evidence and documents traded between both sides of a lawsuit — appears to have been altered and disseminated as part of a disinformation campaign apparently aimed at discrediting the ongoing investigations in Russian interference in the U.S. political system, according to the documents.
+
+Prosecutors said sensitive evidence also could reveal government investigative techniques and identify cooperating individuals and companies.
+
+Concord is among 13 Russian individuals and entities charged last February in connection with Mueller’s probe. Concord is alleged to have funded the operation of the Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll farm that spread divisive content to U.S. audiences on social media as part of broader effort to meddle in the 2016 vote.
+
+Prosecutors said that some nonpublic files supplied to Concord’s defense attorneys were apparently altered and disseminated using the Twitter account @HackingRedstone, which has since been suspended on the platform.
+
+On Thursday, Mueller's team updated their filing with precise dates for the actions taken on Twitter, noting that the account @HackingRedstone started sending direct messages to members of the media on October 22, before making a public tweet on October 30 in regards to the supposed discovery documents.
+
+The filing cites an Oct. 22, 2018, tweet in which the account claimed, “We’ve got access to the Special Counsel Mueller’s probe database as we hacked Russian server with info from the Russian troll case Concord LLC v. Mueller. You can view all the files Mueller had about the IRA and Russia collusion. Enjoy the reading!” 
+
+The tweet linked to a webpage with folders containing scores of files that mimicked names and folder structures of materials produced by the special counsel’s office in discovery, the filing states.
+
+The prosecutors’ filing said the matching files included images of political memes from Facebook and other social media accounts used online by the Internet Research Agency, many of which are presumably still available elsewhere on the Internet, but not with the unique identifiers used in materials turned over by prosecutors.
+
+Prosecutors said in their filing that an FBI review found no evidence of a hack of the special counsel’s office. The filing also said that defense lawyers told the Mueller team that the vendor it was using reported no unauthorized access to the nonsensitive files. Under a court protective order, sensitive evidence in the case must be reviewed by a U.S. government “firewall” counsel, and then a judge must give permission before the evidence can be given to any non-U.S. national.
+
+The facts “establish that the person(s) who created the Web page had access to at least some of the nonsensitive discovery produced by the government in this case,” wrote Justice Department national security division attorney Heather N. Alpino for a team including prosecutors with Mueller’s office and the U.S. attorney’s office of the District.
+
+
+Mueller’s team firmly pushed back on the request in the filing Wednesday, asserting releasing the files to the firm’s employees in Russia – including Prigozhin – would risk U.S. national security. 
+
+“Concord’s request to send the discovery to the Russian Federation unreasonably risks the national security interests of the United States,” the filing states.  “The government’s concerns are only heightened by the apparent release and manipulation of information produced to Concord as ‘non-sensitive’ discovery in this case.” 
+
+The filing also notes that the discovery files labeled ""sensitive"" identify ""uncharged individuals"" who government investigators believe are ""continuing to engage in operations to interfere with lawful U.S. government functions like those activities charged in the indictment.” 
+
+Mueller’s prosecutors did not oppose allowing Concord employees to view the files at their defense attorney’s offices under security protections, noting that “appearance in the United States would allow them to stand trial.”
+"
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/countermeasures.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/countermeasures.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86f9e44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/countermeasures.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+disarm_id,name,metatechnique,summary,how_found,references,incident_ids,tactic,responsetype,notes,tags,longname
+C00022,Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety,M001 - resilience,Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,C00022 - Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety
+C00006,Charge for social media,M004 - friction,"Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information.  There are examples of this not working, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,C00006 - Charge for social media
+C00008,Create shared fact-checking database,M006 - scoring,"Share fact-checking resources - tips, responses, countermessages, across respose groups.  ","2019-11-workshop
+2019-11-search",,"I00049,I00050",TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,information,C00008 - Create shared fact-checking database
+C00009,Educate high profile influencers on best practices,M001 - resilience,"Find online influencers. Provide training in the mechanisms of disinformation, how to spot campaigns, and/or how to contribute to responses by countermessaging, boosting information sites etc. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,education,C00009 - Educate high profile influencers on best practices
+C00010,Enhanced privacy regulation for social media,M004 - friction,"Implement stronger privacy standards, to reduce the ability to microtarget community members. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,regulation,C00010 - Enhanced privacy regulation for social media
+C00011,Media literacy. Games to identify fake news,M001 - resilience,"Create and use games to show people the mechanics of disinformation, and how to counter them. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,education,C00011 - Media literacy. Games to identify fake news
+C00012,Platform regulation,M007 - metatechnique,"Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy.  Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media.  The U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,regulation,C00012 - Platform regulation
+C00013,Rating framework for news,M006 - scoring,"This is ""strategic innoculation"", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body.  Include full transcripts, link source, add items. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,information,C00013 - Rating framework for news
+C00014,Real-time updates to fact-checking database,M006 - scoring,Update fact-checking databases and resources in real time.  Especially import for time-limited events like natural disasters. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,C00014 - Real-time updates to fact-checking database
+C00016,Censorship,M005 - removal,Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of information controlled by disinformation creators. Not recommended. ,grugq,Taylor81,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,C00016 - Censorship
+C00017,Repair broken social connections,M010 - countermessaging,"For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00017 - Repair broken social connections
+C00019,Reduce effect of division-enablers,M003 - daylight,"includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00019 - Reduce effect of division-enablers
+C00021,Encourage in-person communication,M001 - resilience,Encourage offline communication,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,action,C00021 - Encourage in-person communication
+C00024,Promote healthy narratives,M001 - resilience,"Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA).  Includes promoting identity neutral narratives. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,C00024 - Promote healthy narratives
+C00026,Shore up democracy based messages,M010 - countermessaging,"Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,narrative,C00026 - Shore up democracy based messages
+C00027,Create culture of civility,M001 - resilience,This is passive.  Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,narrative,C00027 - Create culture of civility
+C00029,Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise,M002 - diversion,Create websites in disinformation voids - spaces where people are looking for known disinformation. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,narrative,C00029 - Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise
+C00028,Make information provenance available,M011 - verification,"Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments.  Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted.
+
+This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,information,C00028 - Make information provenance available
+C00030,Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based),M002 - diversion,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,narrative,C00030 - Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)
+C00031,"Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify",M009 - dilution,"Create competing narratives. Included ""Facilitate State Propaganda"" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,CAVEAT: some element of disinformation is simply filling the information space with so much data that it overwhelms people and they shutdown. Any swarm-counter-narrative needs to be cautious of this outcome.,narrative,"C00031 - Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify"
+C00042,Address truth contained in narratives,M010 - countermessaging,"Focus on and boost truths in misinformation narratives, removing misinformation from them. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,narrative,C00042 - Address truth contained in narratives
+C00032,Hijack content and link to truth- based info,M002 - diversion,Link to platform,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,C00032 - Hijack content and link to truth- based info
+C00034,Create more friction at account creation,M004 - friction,Counters fake account,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,C00034 - Create more friction at account creation
+C00036,Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide),M013 - targeting,All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,C00036 - Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)
+C00040,third party verification for people,M011 - verification,counters fake experts,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,C00040 - third party verification for people
+C00067,Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding),M013 - targeting,Reduce the credibility of groups behind misinformation-linked funding campaigns. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,narrative,C00067 - Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)
+C00044,Keep people from posting to social media immediately,M004 - friction,"Platforms can introduce friction to slow down activities, force a small delay between posts, or replies to posts.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,C00044 - Keep people from posting to social media immediately
+C00046,Marginalise and discredit extremist groups,M013 - targeting,Reduce the credibility of extremist groups posting misinformation.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,C00046 - Marginalise and discredit extremist groups
+C00047,Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics,M008 - data pollution,"Flood disinformation spaces with obviously fake content, to dilute core misinformation narratives in them. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D05,,action,C00047 - Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics
+C00048,Name and Shame Influencers,M003 - daylight,"Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account.  Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”.  Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual.  Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts.  Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - ""Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237 and Dalton19,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D07,,information,C00048 - Name and Shame Influencers
+C00051,Counter social engineering training,M001 - resilience,"Includes anti-elicitation training, phishing prevention education. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,education,C00051 - Counter social engineering training
+C00052,Infiltrate platforms,M013 - targeting,Detect and degrade,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,C00052 - Infiltrate platforms
+C00053,Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts,M012 - cleaning,"remove or remove access to (e.g. stop the ability to update) old social media accounts, to reduce the pool of accounts available for takeover, botnets etc. ","2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search",,I00004,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,action,C00053 - Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts
+C00056,Encourage people to leave social media,M004 - friction,Encourage people to leave spcial media.  We don't expect this to work,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,C00056 - Encourage people to leave social media
+C00058,Report crowdfunder as violator,M005 - removal,counters crowdfunding. Includes ‘Expose online funding as fake”. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,C00058 - Report crowdfunder as violator
+C00059,Verification of project before posting fund requests,M011 - verification,third-party verification of projects posting funding campaigns before those campaigns can be posted. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,information,C00059 - Verification of project before posting fund requests
+C00060,Legal action against for-profit engagement factories,M013 - targeting,"Take legal action against for-profit ""factories"" creating misinformation. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,regulation,C00060 - Legal action against for-profit engagement factories
+C00062,Free open library sources worldwide,M010 - countermessaging,"Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as DISARM can be created to counter the adversarial efforts.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D04,,information,C00062 - Free open library sources worldwide
+C00065,Reduce political targeting,M005 - removal,Includes “ban political micro targeting” and “ban political ads”,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D03,,action,C00065 - Reduce political targeting
+C00066,Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back),M009 - dilution,Flood a disinformation-related hashtag with other content. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D03,,information,C00066 - Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)
+C00080,Create competing narrative,M002 - diversion,"Create counternarratives, or narratives that compete in the same spaces as misinformation narratives.  Could also be degrade",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,narrative,C00080 - Create competing narrative
+C00070,Block access to disinformation resources,M005 - removal,"Resources = accounts, channels etc.  Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker.
+
+TA02*: DDOS at the critical time, to deny an adversary's time-bound objective.
+
+T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy.
+
+Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag.
+
+T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as ""blocking access to a platform"".",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D02,,action,C00070 - Block access to disinformation resources
+C00071,Block source of pollution,M005 - removal,"Block websites, accounts, groups etc connected to misinformation and other information pollution. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00071 - Block source of pollution
+C00072,Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended,M005 - removal,"Check special-interest groups (e.g. medical, knitting) for unrelated and misinformation-linked content, and remove it. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00072 - Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended
+C00073,Inoculate populations through media literacy training,M001 - resilience,"Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution.  Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit.  Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting.  Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language.   Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value.   Concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training.  Covers detect, deny, and degrade. ","2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,education,C00073 - Inoculate populations through media literacy training
+C00074,Identify and delete or rate limit identical content,M012 - cleaning,C00000,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00074 - Identify and delete or rate limit identical content
+C00075,normalise language,M010 - countermessaging,normalise the language around disinformation and misinformation; give people the words for artifact and effect types. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,information,C00075 - normalise language
+C00076,Prohibit images in political discourse channels,M005 - removal,Make political discussion channels text-only. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00076 - Prohibit images in political discourse channels
+C00077,"Active defence: run TA15 ""develop people” - not recommended",M013 - targeting,Develop networks of communities and influencers around counter-misinformation. Match them to misinformation creators ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,"C00077 - Active defence: run TA15 ""develop people” - not recommended"
+C00078,Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content,M002 - diversion,Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side”,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,action,C00078 - Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content
+C00084,"Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them",M002 - diversion,"Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”.  Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with ""far-up/down/left/right"" actors. ""Long Game"" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations.  Can also replay technique T0003. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,narrative,"C00084 - Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them"
+C00081,"Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations",M003 - daylight,"Discredit by pointing out the ""noise"" and informing public that ""flooding"" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of ""noise""",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,"C00081 - Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations"
+C00082,Ground truthing as automated response to pollution,M010 - countermessaging,Also inoculation.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,C00082 - Ground truthing as automated response to pollution
+C00087,Make more noise than the disinformation,M009 - dilution,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,narrative,C00087 - Make more noise than the disinformation
+C00085,Mute content,M003 - daylight,"Rate-limit disinformation content.  Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns.
+
+Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,action,C00085 - Mute content
+C00086,Distract from noise with addictive content,M002 - diversion,"Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a ""conversion rate"" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's ""information bubble"" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,C00086 - Distract from noise with addictive content
+C00112,"""Prove they are not an op!""",M004 - friction,Challenge misinformation creators to prove they're not an information operation.  ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,narrative,"C00112 - ""Prove they are not an op!"""
+C00090,Fake engagement system,M002 - diversion,"Create honeypots for misinformation creators to engage with, and reduce the resources they have available for misinformation campaigns. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D05,,action,C00090 - Fake engagement system
+C00091,Honeypot social community,M002 - diversion,"Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D05,,action,C00091 - Honeypot social community
+C00092,Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers,M006 - scoring,"Includes ""Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”.  Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D07,,information,C00092 - Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers
+C00093,Influencer code of conduct,M001 - resilience,Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers.  Can be platform code of conduct; can also be community code.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D07,,information,C00093 - Influencer code of conduct
+C00094,Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research,M003 - daylight,Accountability move: make sure research is published with its funding sources. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,C00094 - Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research
+C00096,Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers,M006 - scoring,"Increase credibility, visibility, and reach of positive influencers in the information space. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,information,C00096 - Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers
+C00097,Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment,M004 - friction,Reduce poll flooding by online taking comments or poll entries from verified accounts. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,C00097 - Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment
+C00098,"Revocation of allowlisted or ""verified"" status",M004 - friction,remove blue checkmarks etc from known misinformation accounts. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,action,"C00098 - Revocation of allowlisted or ""verified"" status"
+C00099,Strengthen verification methods,M004 - friction,"Improve content veerification methods available to groups, individuals etc.  ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,C00099 - Strengthen verification methods
+C00100,Hashtag jacking,M002 - diversion,Post large volumes of unrelated content on known misinformation hashtags ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,information,C00100 - Hashtag jacking
+C00101,Create friction by rate-limiting engagement,M004 - friction,"Create participant friction.  Includes Make repeat voting hard, and throttle number of forwards. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D04,,action,C00101 - Create friction by rate-limiting engagement
+C00103,Create a bot that engages / distract trolls,M002 - diversion,"This is reactive, not active measure (honeypots are active).  It's a platform controlled measure.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D05,,action,C00103 - Create a bot that engages / distract trolls
+C00105,Buy more advertising than misinformation creators,M009 - dilution,Shift influence and algorithms by posting more adverts into spaces than misinformation creators. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D03,,information,C00105 - Buy more advertising than misinformation creators
+C00106,Click-bait centrist content,M002 - diversion,Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D03,,information,C00106 - Click-bait centrist content
+C00107,Content moderation,"M006 - scoring, M005 - removal","includes social media content take-downs, e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",,"I00005,I00009,I00056",TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00107 - Content moderation
+C00109,Dampen Emotional Reaction,M001 - resilience,"Reduce emotional responses to misinformation through calming messages, etc. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,C00109 - Dampen Emotional Reaction
+C00111,Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views,M001 - resilience,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D04,,information,C00111 - Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views
+C00118,Repurpose images with new text,M010 - countermessaging,Add countermessage text to iamges used in misinformation incidents. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,narrative,C00118 - Repurpose images with new text
+C00113,Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.,M003 - daylight,"Debunk fake experts, their credentials, and potentially also their  audience quality",2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,C00113 - Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.
+C00114,Don't engage with payloads,M004 - friction,Stop passing on misinformation,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,C00114 - Don't engage with payloads
+C00115,Expose actor and intentions,M003 - daylight,Debunk misinformation creators and posters. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,C00115 - Expose actor and intentions
+C00116,Provide proof of involvement,M003 - daylight,Build and post information about groups etc's involvement in misinformation incidents. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,C00116 - Provide proof of involvement
+C00117,Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people,M010 - countermessaging,Label promote counter to disinformation,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,information,C00117 - Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people
+C00125,Prebunking,M001 - resilience,"Produce material in advance of misinformation incidents, by anticipating the narratives used in them, and debunking them. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,narrative,C00125 - Prebunking
+C00119,Engage payload and debunk.,M010 - countermessaging,debunk misinformation content.  Provide link to facts. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,information,C00119 - Engage payload and debunk.
+C00120,Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes,M007 - metatechnique,Redesign platforms and algorithms to reduce the effectiveness of disinformation,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,action,C00120 - Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes
+C00121,Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. ,M001 - resilience,"Make algorithms in platforms explainable, and visible to people using those platforms. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D07,,information,C00121 - Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. 
+C00122,Content moderation,M004 - friction,Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,C00122 - Content moderation
+C00123,Remove or rate limit botnets,M004 - friction,reduce the visibility of known botnets online. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,C00123 - Remove or rate limit botnets
+C00124,Don't feed the trolls,M004 - friction,Don't engage with individuals relaying misinformation. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,C00124 - Don't feed the trolls
+C00211,Use humorous counter-narratives,M010 - countermessaging,,2019-11-search,,I00004,TA09 Exposure,D03,,narrative,C00211 - Use humorous counter-narratives
+C00126,Social media amber alert,M003 - daylight,"Create an alert system around disinformation and misinformation artifacts, narratives, and incidents ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,C00126 - Social media amber alert
+C00128,"Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other ""decelerants""",M009 - dilution,"Repost or comment on misinformation artifacts, using ridicule or other content to reduce the likelihood of reposting. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,"C00128 - Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other ""decelerants"""
+C00129,Use banking to cut off access ,M014 - reduce resources,fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,C00129 - Use banking to cut off access 
+C00130,"Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.",M001 - resilience,Train local influencers in countering misinformation. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D07,,education,"C00130 - Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously."
+C00131,Seize and analyse botnet servers,M005 - removal,Take botnet servers offline by seizing them. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D02,,action,C00131 - Seize and analyse botnet servers
+C00133,Deplatform Account*,M005 - removal,Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,C00133 - Deplatform Account*
+C00135,Deplatform message groups and/or message boards,M005 - removal,Merged two rows here. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,C00135 - Deplatform message groups and/or message boards
+C00136,Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages,M010 - countermessaging,"Find communities likely to be targetted by misinformation campaigns, and send them countermessages or pointers to information sources. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,information,C00136 - Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages
+C00138,Spam domestic actors with lawsuits,M014 - reduce resources,"File multiple lawsuits against known misinformation creators and posters, to distract them from disinformation creation. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,regulation,C00138 - Spam domestic actors with lawsuits
+C00139,Weaponise youtube content matrices,M004 - friction,God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,information,C00139 - Weaponise youtube content matrices
+C00140,"""Bomb"" link shorteners with lots of calls",M008 - data pollution,"Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except ""T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics",2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D03,,action,"C00140 - ""Bomb"" link shorteners with lots of calls"
+C00142,Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content,M004 - friction,"Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “""Hey this story is old"" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice.  Includes “mark clickbait visually”. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,C00142 - Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content
+C00143,(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time,M013 - targeting,Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D04,,regulation,C00143 - (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time
+C00144,Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs,M014 - reduce resources,Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days.  Not recommended,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D04,,action,C00144 - Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs
+C00147,Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days),M004 - friction,"Stop new community activity (likes, comments) on old social media posts.  ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D03,,action,C00147 - Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)
+C00148,Add random links to network graphs,M008 - data pollution,"If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which DISARM techniques.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D04,,action,C00148 - Add random links to network graphs
+C00149,Poison the monitoring & evaluation data,M008 - data pollution,Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA12 Measure Effectiveness,D04,,action,C00149 - Poison the monitoring & evaluation data
+C00153,Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure,M013 - targeting,"Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate.",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00153 - Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure
+C00154,Ask media not to report false information,M005 - removal,"Train media to spot and respond to misinformation, and ask them not to post or transmit misinformation they've found. ",2019-11-search,,I00022,TA08 Pump Priming,D02,,information,C00154 - Ask media not to report false information
+C00155,Ban incident actors from funding sites,M005 - removal,Ban misinformation creators and posters from funding sites,2019-11-search,,I00002,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,C00155 - Ban incident actors from funding sites
+C00156,Better tell your country or organization story,M010 - countermessaging,"Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces.  NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. ",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,information,C00156 - Better tell your country or organization story
+C00159,Have a disinformation response plan,M007 - metatechnique,"e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort.  It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict.",2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00159 - Have a disinformation response plan
+C00160,find and train influencers,M001 - resilience,"Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,education,C00160 - find and train influencers
+C00161,Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements,M007 - metatechnique,"Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad.",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,action,C00161 - Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements
+C00162,Unravel/target the Potemkin villages,M013 - targeting,"Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,information,C00162 - Unravel/target the Potemkin villages
+C00164,compatriot policy,M013 - targeting,"protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,action,C00164 - compatriot policy
+C00165,Ensure integrity of official documents,M004 - friction,"e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions",2019-11-search,,I00015,TA06 Develop Content,D02,,information,C00165 - Ensure integrity of official documents
+C00169,develop a creative content hub,M010 - countermessaging,"international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,action,C00169 - develop a creative content hub
+C00170,elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft,M007 - metatechnique,"Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly.",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00170 - elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft
+C00172,social media source removal,M005 - removal,"Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal",2019-11-search,,I00035,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,C00172 - social media source removal
+C00174,Create a healthier news environment,"M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion","Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom.  Note difference between news and editorialising.  Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle.  includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search","Hicks19, p143 of Corker18, Rand2237",,TA01 Strategic Planning,D02,,action,C00174 - Create a healthier news environment
+C00176,Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private,M007 - metatechnique,"Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations. ",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D07,,action,C00176 - Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private
+C00178,Fill information voids with non-disinformation content,"M009 - dilution, M008 - data pollution","1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation.  ","2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA05 Microtargeting,D04,,information,C00178 - Fill information voids with non-disinformation content
+C00182,Redirection / malware detection/ remediation,M005 - removal,"Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete.  ",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA09 Exposure,D02,,action,C00182 - Redirection / malware detection/ remediation
+C00184,Media exposure,M003 - daylight,highlight misinformation activities and actors in media,2019-11-search,,"I00010,I00015,I00032,I00044",TA08 Pump Priming,D04,,information,C00184 - Media exposure
+C00188,Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves,M001 - resilience,"Includes SEO influence.   Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community.  Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. ",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA08 Pump Priming,D03,,education,C00188 - Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves
+C00189,Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts,M003 - daylight,"Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of ""flagged"" profiles.  Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D06,,action,C00189 - Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts
+C00190,open engagement with civil society,M001 - resilience,"Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.",2019-11-search,"Dalton19, Hicks19",,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00190 - open engagement with civil society
+C00195,Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content ,M002 - diversion,Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or propaganda themes. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content. ,"2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search",Rand2237,,TA07 Channel Selection,D02,,information,C00195 - Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content 
+C00197,remove suspicious accounts,M005 - removal,"Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues).  Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners. ","2019-11-search, 2019-11-workshop",,I00022,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D02,,action,C00197 - remove suspicious accounts
+C00200,Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo,M010 - countermessaging,FIXIT: standardize language used for influencer/ respected figure. ,2019-11-search,,I00044,TA09 Exposure,D03,,information,C00200 - Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo
+C00202,Set data 'honeytraps',M002 - diversion,Set honeytraps in content likely to be accessed for disinformation. ,2019-11-search,,"I00004,I00022",TA06 Develop Content,D02,,action,C00202 - Set data 'honeytraps'
+C00203,Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets,M004 - friction,Remove access to official press events from known misinformation actors. ,2019-11-search,,I00022,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D03,,action,C00203 - Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets
+C00205,strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting,M007 - metatechnique,Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. ,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00205 - strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting
+C00207,Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended,M013 - targeting,,2019-11-search,,I00042,TA02 Objective Planning,D07,,action,C00207 - Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended
+C00212,build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant,M001 - resilience,"Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education.",2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00212 - build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant
+C00216,Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors,M014 - reduce resources,Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D02,,action,C00216 - Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors
+C00219,Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators,M003 - daylight,"Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc. ",grugq,,,TA06 Develop Content,D04,,information,C00219 - Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators
+C00220,Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan,M007 - metatechnique,"Create a plan for misinformation and disinformation response, before it's needed.  Include connections / contacts needed, expected counteremessages etc. ",Counters cleanup,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00220 - Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan
+C00221,"Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors",M007 - metatechnique,"Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency",Counters cleanup,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,"C00221 - Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors"
+C00222,Tabletop simulations,M007 - metatechnique,"Simulate misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and responses to them, before campaigns happen. ",,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D03,,education,C00222 - Tabletop simulations
+C00223,Strengthen Trust in social media platforms,M001 - resilience,Improve trust in the misinformation responses from social media and other platforms.  Examples include creating greater transparancy on their actions and algorithms. ,,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D03,,action,C00223 - Strengthen Trust in social media platforms
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_actortype.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_actortype.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7648960
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_actortype.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
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diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_resource.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_resource.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0716be2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_resource.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_technique.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_technique.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0adcf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_counter_technique.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,882 @@
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diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_actortype.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_actortype.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3ecd62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_actortype.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+disarm_id,actortype_id
+F00020,A015
+F00020,A001
+F00020,A031
+F00043,A031
+F00043,A015
+F00067,A001
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diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_resource.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_resource.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ddc7bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_resource.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+disarm_id,resource_id
+F00020,R004
+F00082,R005
+F00092,R006
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_technique.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_technique.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f1b8b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_detection_technique.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+disarm_id,technique_id
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diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_externalgroup_counter.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_externalgroup_counter.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb12b45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_externalgroup_counter.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,824 @@
+disarm_id,externalgroup_id,activity_id,summary
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diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_incident_technique.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_incident_technique.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2745cd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/cross_incident_technique.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+disarm_id,name,incident_id,technique_ids,summary
+IT00000001,buy FB targeted ads,I00002,T0018,
+IT00000002,"Promote ""funding"" campaign",I00002,T0017,
+IT00000003,create web-site - information pollution,I00002,T0019,
+IT00000004,create web-site - information pollution,I00002,T0056,
+IT00000005,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00002,T0046,
+IT00000006,legacy web content,I00002,T0058,
+IT00000007,hard to remove content and/or campaign/exploit TOS,I00002,T0058,
+IT00000008,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00005,T0054,
+IT00000009,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00005,T0053,
+IT00000010,Targeted FB paid ads,I00005,T0018,
+IT00000011,Fake FB groups + dark content,I00005,T0007,
+IT00000012,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events?",I00005,T0057,
+IT00000013,"manipulate social media ""online polls""? ",I00005,T0029,
+IT00000014,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00005,T0019,
+IT00000015,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00005,T0056,
+IT00000016,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00005,T0010,
+IT00000017,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0031,
+IT00000018,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0032,
+IT00000019,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0034,
+IT00000020,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0035,
+IT00000021,YouTube; Reddit; LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?,I00005,T0036,
+IT00000022,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00005,T0046,
+IT00000023,"Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fear, outrage, conspiracy narratives",I00005,T0021,Meme that ISIS was responsible for a local chemical explosion. 
+IT00000024,Backstop personas,I00005,T0030,"Wikipedia fake persona ""AmandaGray91"". "
+IT00000025,Use SMS/text messages,I00006,T0043,SMS messages sent to local residents
+IT00000026,Fake video/images,I00006,T0024,Fake youtube video of ISIS claiming responsibility for the chemical attack. Faked screenshot of local newspaper website article on the explosion. 
+IT00000027,Create and use hashtag,I00006,T0015,Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals
+IT00000028,Create and use hashtag,I00006,T0055,Main hashtag used was #ColumbianChemicals
+IT00000029,Fake twitter profiles to amplify,I00006,T0007,Twitter bots used to drive visbility
+IT00000030,bait journalists/media/politicians,I00006,T0039,
+IT00000031,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (report an unreported false story/event),I00007,T0019,
+IT00000032,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (report an unreported false story/event),I00007,T0056,
+IT00000033,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (in the case Paul Manafort)",I00007,T0010,
+IT00000034,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00007,T0054,
+IT00000035,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00007,T0053,
+IT00000036,"Using ""expert""",I00009,T0045,
+IT00000037,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution ,I00009,T0019,
+IT00000038,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution ,I00009,T0056,
+IT00000039,FB pages,I00009,T0007,
+IT00000040,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00009,T0052,
+IT00000041,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00010,T0054,
+IT00000042,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00010,T0053,
+IT00000043,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00010,T0046,
+IT00000044,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories; false flags, crisis actors)",I00010,T0010,
+IT00000045,FB pages/groups/profiles,I00010,T0007,
+IT00000046,YouTube; Reddit,I00010,T0031,
+IT00000047,YouTube; Reddit,I00010,T0032,
+IT00000048,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00010,T0020,
+IT00000049,journalist/media baiting,I00010,T0039,
+IT00000050,Forge ('release' altered hacked documents),I00015,T0025,
+IT00000051,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00015,T0025,
+IT00000052,"Circulate to media via DM, then release publicly",I00015,T0044,
+IT00000053,journalist/media baiting,I00015,T0039,
+IT00000054,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00017,T0025,
+IT00000055,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00017,T0054,
+IT00000056,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00017,T0053,
+IT00000057,Targeted FB paid ads,I00017,T0018,
+IT00000058,Fake FB groups + dark content,I00017,T0007,
+IT00000059,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events",I00017,T0057,
+IT00000060,"manipulate social media ""online polls""? ",I00017,T0029,
+IT00000061,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00017,T0019,
+IT00000062,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00017,T0056,
+IT00000063,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00017,T0010,
+IT00000064,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0031,
+IT00000065,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0032,
+IT00000066,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0033,
+IT00000067,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0034,
+IT00000068,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0035,
+IT00000069,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00017,T0036,
+IT00000070,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00017,T0020,
+IT00000071,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00017,T0046,
+IT00000072,"Memes... anti-immigration; euroskepticism; fear, outrage, conspiracy narratives",I00017,T0021,
+IT00000073,Click-bait (economic actors) fake news sites (ie: Denver Guardian; Macedonian teens),I00017,T0016,
+IT00000074,Backstop personas,I00017,T0030,
+IT00000075,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00022,T0025,
+IT00000076,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00022,T0054,
+IT00000077,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00022,T0053,
+IT00000078,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content,I00022,T0007,
+IT00000079,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00029,T0054,
+IT00000080,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00029,T0053,
+IT00000081,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00029,T0001,
+IT00000082,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00029,T0019,
+IT00000083,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00029,T0056,
+IT00000084,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00029,T0010,
+IT00000085,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00029,T0046,
+IT00000086,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00029,T0052,
+IT00000087,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00029,T0031,
+IT00000088,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00029,T0032,
+IT00000089,Demand insurmountable proof,I00029,T0040,
+IT00000090,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00032,T0054,
+IT00000091,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00032,T0053,
+IT00000092,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles ,I00032,T0007,
+IT00000093,"Digital to physical ""organize+promote"" rallies & events?",I00032,T0057,
+IT00000094,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00032,T0019,
+IT00000095,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00032,T0056,
+IT00000096,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0031,
+IT00000097,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0032,
+IT00000098,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0033,
+IT00000099,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0034,
+IT00000100,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0035,
+IT00000101,"YouTube; Reddit; (Instagram, LinkedIn; Pinterest; WhatsApp?)",I00032,T0036,
+IT00000102,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00032,T0020,
+IT00000103,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00032,T0046,
+IT00000104,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories)",I00032,T0010,
+IT00000105,"2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/sponsored astroturfing",I00033,T0049,
+IT00000106,fabricated social media comment,I00033,T0051,
+IT00000107,domestic social media influence operations focus primarily on “cheerleading” or presenting or furthering a positive narrative about the Chinese state,I00033,T0050,
+IT00000108,"cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force",I00033,T0047,
+IT00000109,"cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force",I00033,T0048,
+IT00000110,facilitate state propaganda and defuse crises,I00033,T0002,
+IT00000111,"Netizens from one of the largest discussion forums in China, known as Diba, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall",I00034,T0002,
+IT00000112,flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message,I00034,T0049,
+IT00000113,"Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted nearly 40,000 Facebook comments in just eight hours.",I00034,T0049,
+IT00000114,“hack” of Qatar’s official news agency,I00042,T0011,
+IT00000115,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00042,T0054,
+IT00000116,photoshopped/fake images,I00042,T0024,
+IT00000117,memes,I00042,T0021,
+IT00000118,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00044,T0054,
+IT00000119,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00044,T0053,
+IT00000120,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00044,T0019,
+IT00000121,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00044,T0056,
+IT00000122,YouTube; Reddit,I00044,T0031,
+IT00000123,YouTube; Reddit,I00044,T0032,
+IT00000124,4Chan/8Chan - trial content,I00044,T0020,
+IT00000125,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00044,T0046,
+IT00000126,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Alex Jones... drives conspiracy theories)",I00044,T0010,
+IT00000127,Promote fake “experts” with impressive (and scary) titles,I00044,T0009,
+IT00000128,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00047,T0001,
+IT00000129,"Russian FSB security service blamed Ukraine for sparking the clashes, saying their ""irrefutable"" evidence would ""soon be made public",I00047,T0001,
+IT00000130,(Distort) Kremlin-controlled RT cited Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov suggesting that Ukraine deliberately provoked Russia in hopes of gaining additional support from the United States and Europe.,I00047,T0023,
+IT00000131,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00047,T0054,
+IT00000132,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00047,T0053,
+IT00000133,Demand insurmountable proof,I00047,T0040,
+IT00000134,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00049,T0054,
+IT00000135,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00049,T0053,
+IT00000136,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Embassies & Defence Ministry; TASS",I00049,T0001,
+IT00000137,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00049,T0019,
+IT00000138,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00049,T0056,
+IT00000139,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Roger Waters; Venessa Beeley...)",I00049,T0010,
+IT00000140,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00049,T0046,
+IT00000141,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00049,T0052,
+IT00000142,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00049,T0031,
+IT00000143,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00049,T0032,
+IT00000144,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00050,T0054,
+IT00000145,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00050,T0053,
+IT00000146,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00050,T0019,
+IT00000147,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00050,T0056,
+IT00000148,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots (Roger Waters)",I00050,T0010,
+IT00000149,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00050,T0046,
+IT00000150,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Mint Press News, globalresearch.ca)",I00050,T0052,
+IT00000151,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00050,T0031,
+IT00000152,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00050,T0032,
+IT00000153,hack/leak/manipulate/distort,I00051,T0025,
+IT00000154,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00051,T0054,
+IT00000155,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00051,T0053,
+IT00000156,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00051,T0019,
+IT00000157,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution,I00051,T0056,
+IT00000158,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots",I00051,T0010,
+IT00000159,YouTube; Reddit,I00051,T0031,
+IT00000160,YouTube; Reddit,I00051,T0032,
+IT00000161,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00051,T0046,
+IT00000162,State-run media seeds foreign influence environment,I00053,T0056,
+IT00000163,"Distorted, saccharine “news” about the Chinese State and Party",I00053,T0023,
+IT00000164,Events coordinated and promoted across media platforms,I00053,T0057,
+IT00000165,Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ie: support for Meng outside courthouse,I00053,T0050,
+IT00000166,Extend digital the physical space… gatherings ie: support for Meng outside courthouse,I00053,T0057,
+IT00000167,"China also plays victim, innocence, plays by rules, misunderstood narrative",I00053,T0001,
+IT00000168,"Chinese ambassador Lu Shaye accused Canada of applying a double standard, and has decried what he sees as “Western egotism and white supremacy” in the treatment of detained Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou.” ",I00053,T0001,
+IT00000169,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00056,T0054,
+IT00000170,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00056,T0053,
+IT00000171,Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (non-paid advertising),I00056,T0007,
+IT00000172,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00056,T0046,
+IT00000173,"Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narratives",I00056,T0021,
+IT00000174,"Memes... anti-Isreal/USA/West, conspiracy narratives",I00056,T0022,
+IT00000175,Fake news/synthetic web-sites,I00056,T0008,
+IT00000176,legacy web content,I00056,T0058,
+IT00000177,Twitter bots amplify & manipulate,I00063,T0054,
+IT00000178,Twitter trolls amplify & manipulate,I00063,T0053,
+IT00000179,"4 D's (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay...Official channels ie: Putin himself; Embassies & Sports Ministry; TASS",I00063,T0001,
+IT00000180,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00063,T0019,
+IT00000181,RT & Sputnik generate information pollution (synthetic media),I00063,T0056,
+IT00000182,"cultivate, manipulate, exploit useful idiots ",I00063,T0010,
+IT00000183,"SEO optimisation/manipulation (""key words"")",I00063,T0046,
+IT00000184,"News circulated/amplifed by tertiary sites (Russia Insider, The Duran, Geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca)",I00063,T0052,
+IT00000185,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00063,T0031,
+IT00000186,YouTube; Reddit; ,I00063,T0032,
+IT00000187,,I00002,C00155,
+IT00000188,,I00004,C00053,
+IT00000189,,I00004,C00211,
+IT00000190,,I00004,C00202,
+IT00000191,,I00022,C00202,
+IT00000192,,I00005,C00107,
+IT00000193,,I00009,C00107,
+IT00000194,,I00056,C00107,
+IT00000195,,I00005,C00107,
+IT00000196,,I00009,C00107,
+IT00000197,,I00056,C00107,
+IT00000198,,I00010,C00184,
+IT00000199,,I00015,C00184,
+IT00000200,,I00032,C00184,
+IT00000201,,I00044,C00184,
+IT00000202,,I00015,C00165,
+IT00000203,,I00022,C00154,
+IT00000204,,I00022,C00197,
+IT00000205,,I00022,C00203,
+IT00000206,,I00035,C00172,
+IT00000207,,I00042,C00207,
+IT00000208,,I00044,C00200,
+IT00000209,,I00049,C00008,
+IT00000210,,I00050,C00008,
+IT00000211,,I00029,F00067,
+IT00000212,,I00045,F00067,
+IT00000213,,I00002,F00092,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/detections.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/detections.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10d784e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/detections.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+disarm_id,name,metatechnique,summary,how_found,references,incidents,tactic,responsetype,notes,longname
+F00001,Analyse aborted / failed campaigns,,Examine failed campaigns. How did they fail? Can we create useful activities that increase these failures? ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00001 - Analyse aborted / failed campaigns
+F00002,Analyse viral fizzle,,We have no idea what this means.  Is it something to do with the way a viral story spreads? ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00002 - Analyse viral fizzle
+F00003,Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00003 - Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors
+F00004,"Recruit like-minded converts ""people who used to be in-group"" ",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,"F00004 - Recruit like-minded converts ""people who used to be in-group"" "
+F00005,SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups,,"Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis of groups and audience segments. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00005 - SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups
+F00006,SWOT analysis of tech platforms,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00006 - SWOT analysis of tech platforms
+F00007,Monitor account level activity in social networks,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA02 Objective Planning,D01,,F00007 - Monitor account level activity in social networks
+F00008,Detect abnormal amplification,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00008 - Detect abnormal amplification
+F00009,Detect abnormal events,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00009 - Detect abnormal events
+F00010,Detect abnormal groups,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00010 - Detect abnormal groups
+F00011,Detect abnormal pages,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00011 - Detect abnormal pages
+F00012,"Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ people",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"F00012 - Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ people"
+F00013,Identify fake news sites,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00013 - Identify fake news sites
+F00014,Trace connections,,for e.g. fake news sites,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00014 - Trace connections
+F00015,Detect anomalies in membership growth patterns,,I include Fake Experts as they may use funding campaigns such as Patreon to fund their operations and so these should be watched.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00015 - Detect anomalies in membership growth patterns
+F00016,Identify fence-sitters,,"Note: In each case, depending on the platform there may be a way to identify a fence-sitter. For example, online polls may have a neutral option or a ""somewhat this-or-that"" option, and may reveal who voted for that to all visitors. This information could be of use to data analysts.
+
+In TA08-11, the engagement level of victims could be identified to detect and respond to increasing engagement.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00016 - Identify fence-sitters
+F00017,Measure emotional valence,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00017 - Measure emotional valence
+F00018,Follow the money,,track funding sources,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00018 - Follow the money
+F00019,Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated),,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00019 - Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated)
+F00020,Detect anomalous activity,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00020 - Detect anomalous activity
+F00021,AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planning,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,Automated Detection of Campaign,F00021 - AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planning
+F00022,Digital authority - regulating body (united states),,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00022 - Digital authority - regulating body (united states)
+F00023,Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account),,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00023 - Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account)
+F00024,Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniors,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00024 - Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniors
+F00025,Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detection,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,F00025 - Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detection
+F00026,Language anomoly detection,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,F00026 - Language anomoly detection
+F00027,Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topics,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,F00027 - Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topics
+F00028,Associate a public key signature with government documents,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00028 - Associate a public key signature with government documents
+F00029,"Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, Sputnik",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,"F00029 - Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, Sputnik"
+F00030,Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect content,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00030 - Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect content
+F00031,Educate on how to identify information pollution,,Strategic planning included as innoculating population has strategic value.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00031 - Educate on how to identify information pollution
+F00032,Educate on how to identify to pollution,,DUPLICATE - DELETE ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00032 - Educate on how to identify to pollution
+F00033,Fake websites: add transparency on business model,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00033 - Fake websites: add transparency on business model
+F00034,Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effort,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00034 - Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effort
+F00035,Identify repeated narrative DNA,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00035 - Identify repeated narrative DNA
+F00036,Looking for AB testing in unregulated channels,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00036 - Looking for AB testing in unregulated channels
+F00037,News content provenance certification. ,,"Original Comment: Shortcomings: intentional falsehood. Doesn't solve accuracy. Can't be mandatory. 
+
+Technique should be in terms of ""strategic innoculation"", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00037 - News content provenance certification. 
+F00038,Social capital as attack vector,,"Unsure I understood the original intention or what it applied to. Therefore the techniques listed (10, 39, 43, 57, 61) are under my interpretation - which is that we want to track ignorant agents who fall into the enemy's trap and show a cost to financing/reposting/helping the adversary via public shaming or other means.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00038 - Social capital as attack vector
+F00039,standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industry,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00039 - standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industry
+F00040,Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenance,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA06 Develop Content,D01,,F00040 - Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenance
+F00041,Bias detection,,Not technically left of boom,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,F00041 - Bias detection
+F00042,Categorize polls by intent,,"Use T00029, but against the creators",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,F00042 - Categorize polls by intent
+F00043,Monitor for creation of fake known personas,,Platform companies and some information security companies (e.g. ZeroFox) do this. ,2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,F00043 - Monitor for creation of fake known personas
+F00044,Forensic analysis,,Can be used in all phases for all techniques.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00044 - Forensic analysis
+F00045,Forensic linguistic analysis,,Can be used in all phases for all techniques.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00045 - Forensic linguistic analysis
+F00046,Pump priming analytics,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00046 - Pump priming analytics
+F00047,trace involved parties,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00047 - trace involved parties
+F00048,Trace known operations and connection,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00048 - Trace known operations and connection
+F00049,trace money,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00049 - trace money
+F00050,Web cache analytics,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA08 Pump Priming,D01,,F00050 - Web cache analytics
+F00051,Challenge expertise,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00051 - Challenge expertise
+F00052,Discover sponsors,,"Discovering the sponsors behind a campaign, narrative, bot, a set of accounts, or a social media comment, or anything else is useful.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00052 - Discover sponsors
+F00053,Government rumour control office (what can we learn?),,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00053 - Government rumour control office (what can we learn?)
+F00054,Restrict people who can @ you on social networks,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00054 - Restrict people who can @ you on social networks
+F00055,Verify credentials,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00055 - Verify credentials
+F00056,Verify organisation legitimacy,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00056 - Verify organisation legitimacy
+F00057,Verify personal credentials of experts,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00057 - Verify personal credentials of experts
+F00058,Deplatform (cancel culture),,"*Deplatform People: This technique needs to be a bit more specific to distinguish it from ""account removal"" or DDOS and other techniques that get more specific when applied to content.
+
+For example, other ways of deplatforming people include attacking their sources of funds, their allies, their followers, etc.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,F00058 - Deplatform (cancel culture)
+F00059,Identify susceptible demographics,,"All techniques provide or are susceptible to being countered by, or leveraged for, knowledge about user demographics.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,F00059 - Identify susceptible demographics
+F00060,Identify susceptible influencers,,"I assume this was a transcript error. Otherwise, ""Identify Susceptible Influences"" as in the various methods of influences that may work against a victim could also be a technique. Nope, wasn't a transcript error: original note says influencers, as in find people of influence that might be targetted. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,F00060 - Identify susceptible influencers
+F00061,Microtargeting,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA10 Go Physical,D01,,F00061 - Microtargeting
+F00062,Detect when Dormant account turns active,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,F00062 - Detect when Dormant account turns active
+F00063,Linguistic change analysis,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,F00063 - Linguistic change analysis
+F00064,Monitor reports of account takeover,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,F00064 - Monitor reports of account takeover
+F00065,Sentiment change analysis,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,F00065 - Sentiment change analysis
+F00066,"Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilities",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D01,,"F00066 - Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilities"
+F00067,Data forensics,,,2019-11-search,,"I00029,I00045",,D01,,F00067 - Data forensics
+F00068,Resonance analysis,,"a developing methodology for identifying statistical differences in how social groups use language and quantifying how common those statistical differences are within a larger population. In essence, it hypothesizes how much affinity might exist for a specific group within a general population, based on the language its members employ",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00068 - Resonance analysis
+F00069,Track Russian media and develop analytic methods.,,"To effectively counter Russian propaganda, it will be critical to track Russian influence efforts. The information requirements are varied and include the following: • Identify fake-news stories and their sources. • Understand narrative themes and content that pervade various Russian media sources. • Understand the broader Russian strategy that underlies tactical propaganda messaging.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00069 - Track Russian media and develop analytic methods.
+F00070,Full spectrum analytics,,,2019-11-workshop,,,ALL,D01,,F00070 - Full spectrum analytics
+F00071,Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers,,"Local influencers detected via Twitter networks are likely local influencers in other online and off-line channels as well. In addition, the content and themes gleaned from Russia and Russia-supporting populations, as well as anti-Russia activists, likely swirl in other online and off-line mediums as well.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00071 - Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers
+F00072,network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community.,,It is possible that some of these are bots or trolls and could be flagged for suspension for violating Twitter’s terms of service.,2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00072 - network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community.
+F00073,collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators,,"Players at the level of covert attribution, referred to as “black” in the grayscale of deniability, produce content on user-generated media, such as YouTube, but also add fear-mongering commentary to and amplify content produced by others and supply exploitable content to data dump websites. These activities are conducted by a network of trolls, bots, honeypots, and hackers. ",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00073 - collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators
+F00074,identify relevant fence-sitter communities,,"brand ambassador programs could be used with influencers across a variety of social media channels. It could also target other prominent experts, such as academics, business leaders, and other potentially prominent people. Authorities must ultimately take care in implementing such a program given the risk that contact with U.S. or NATO authorities might damage influencer reputations. Engagements must consequently be made with care, and, if possible, government interlocutors should work through local NGOs.",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00074 - identify relevant fence-sitter communities
+F00075,leverage open-source information,,"significant amounts of quality open-source information are now available and should be leveraged to build products and analysis prior to problem prioritization in the areas of observation, attribution, and intent. Successfully distinguishing the gray zone campaign signal through the global noise requires action through the entirety of the national security community. Policy, process, and tools must all adapt and evolve to detect, discern, and act upon a new type of signal",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,D01,,F00075 - leverage open-source information
+F00076,Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots”,,"Target audience connected to ""useful idiots rather than the specific profiles because - The active presence of such sources complicates targeting of Russian propaganda, given that it is often difficult to discriminate between authentic views and opinions on the internet and those disseminated by the Russian state.
+",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,,D01,,F00076 - Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots”
+F00077,Model for bot account behavior,,"Bot account: action based, people. Unsure which DISARM techniques.",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00077 - Model for bot account behavior
+F00078,Monitor account level activity in social networks,,All techniques benefit from careful analysis and monitoring of activities on social network.,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00078 - Monitor account level activity in social networks
+F00079,Network anomaly detection,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA05 Microtargeting,D01,,F00079 - Network anomaly detection
+F00080,Hack the polls/ content yourself,,"Two wrongs don't make a right? But if you hack your own polls, you do learn how it could be done, and learn what to look for",2019-11-workshop,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,F00080 - Hack the polls/ content yourself
+F00081,Need way for end user to report operations,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00081 - Need way for end user to report operations
+F00082,"Control the US ""slang"" translation boards",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D03,,"F00082 - Control the US ""slang"" translation boards"
+F00083,"Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contents",,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA11 Persistence,D05,,"F00083 - Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contents"
+F00084,Track individual bad actors,,,2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00084 - Track individual bad actors
+F00085,detection of a weak signal through global noise,,"Gray zone threats are challenging given that warning requires detection of a weak signal through global noise and across threat vectors and regional boundaries.Three interconnected gray zone elements characterize the nature of the activity: 
+Temporality: The nature of gray zone threats truly requires a “big picture view” over long timescales and across regions and functional topics.
+Attribution: requiring an “almost certain” or “nearly certain analytic assessment before acting costs time and analytic effort
+Intent: judgement of adversarial intent to conduct gray zone activity. Indeed, the purpose of countering gray zone threats is to deter adversaries from fulfilling their intent to act. While attribution is one piece of the puzzle, closing the space around intent often means synthesizing multiple relevant indicators and warnings, including the state’s geopolitical ambitions, military ties, trade and investment, level of corruption, and media landscape, among others.",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,,,F00085 - detection of a weak signal through global noise
+F00086,Outpace Competitor Intelligence Capabilities,,"Develop an intelligence-based understanding of foreign actors’ motivations, psychologies, and societal and geopolitical contexts. Leverage artificial intelligence to identify patterns and infer competitors’ intent",2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA02 Objective planning,D01,,F00086 - Outpace Competitor Intelligence Capabilities
+F00087,Improve Indications and Warning,,"United States has not adequately adapted its information indicators and thresholds for warning policymakers to account for gray zone tactics. Competitors have undertaken a marked shift to slow-burn, deceptive, non-military, and indirect challenges to U.S. interests. Relative to traditional security indicators and warnings, these are more numerous and harder to detect and make it difficult for analysts to infer intent.",2019-11-search,Hicks19,,,D01,,F00087 - Improve Indications and Warning
+F00088,"Revitalize an “active measures working group,”",,"Recognize campaigns from weak signals, including rivals’ intent, capability, impact, interactive effects, and impact on U.S. interests... focus on adversarial covert action aspects of campaigning.",2019-11-search,Dalton19,,,D01,,"F00088 - Revitalize an “active measures working group,”"
+F00089,"target/name/flag ""grey zone"" website content",,"""Gray zone"" is second level of content producers and circulators, composed of outlets with uncertain attribution. This category covers conspiracy websites, far-right or far-left websites, news aggregators, and data dump websites",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA15 Establish Social Assets,D01,,"F00089 - target/name/flag ""grey zone"" website content"
+F00090,Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements,,Bring private sector and civil society into accord on U.S. interests,2019-11-search,Hicks19,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00090 - Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements
+F00091,Partner to develop analytic methods & tools,,"This might include working with relevant technology firms to ensure that contracted analytic support is available. Contracted support is reportedly valuable because technology to monitor social media data is continually evolving, and such firms can provide the expertise to help identify and analyze trends, and they can more effectively stay abreast of the changing systems and develop new models as they are required",2019-11-search,Rand2237,,TA01 Strategic Planning,D01,,F00091 - Partner to develop analytic methods & tools
+F00092,daylight,,Warn social media companies about an ongoing campaign (e.g. antivax sites).  Anyone with datasets or data summaries can help with this,2019-11-search,,I00002,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00092 - daylight
+F00093,S4d detection and re-allocation approaches,M004 - friction,"S4D is a way to separate out different speakers in text, audio. ",2019-11-workshop,,,TA15 - Establish Social Assets,D01,,F00093 - S4d detection and re-allocation approaches
+F00094,Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together,M003 - daylight,,grugq,,,TA07 Channel Selection,D01,,F00094 - Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together
+F00095,Fact checking,,"Process suspicious artifacts, narratives, and incidents",SJ,,,TA09 Exposure,D01,,F00095 - Fact checking
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/examples.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/examples.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b10b48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/examples.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+disarm_id,object_id,name,summary
+E000001,T0002,Diba Facebook Expedition,"2016 Diba Facebook Expedition, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall, to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message)."
+E000002,T0003,Narrative examples,"Midwesterners are generous, Russia is under attack from outside."
+E000003,T0004,MH17 competing narratives,"""Russian Foreign Ministry again claimed that “absolutely groundless accusations are put forward against the Russian side, which are aimed at discrediting Russia in the eyes of the international community"" (deny); ""The Dutch MH17 investigation is biased, anti-Russian and factually inaccurate"" (dismiss). "
+E000004,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers," ""Huawei is determined to build trustworthy networks"""
+E000005,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers,Russia is the victim of bullying by NATO powers
+E000006,T0006,Master narratives promoted by major powers,USA is guided by its founding principles of liberty and egalitarianism
+E000007,T0007,Paying for access to existing accounts,Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook’s new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages. 
+E000008,T0007,Avaaz-reported pages and groups,EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe. 
+E000009,T0007,Fakes listed in the US Mueller report,"Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami. "
+E000010,T0008,Denver Guardian,"A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton."
+E000011,T0009,Jade Helm fake experts,"For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a “Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME” and the other a “Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author”--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn."
+E000012,T0011,White House explosions,Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
+E000013,T0012,Ten_GOP,"2016 @TEN_GOP profile where the actual Tennessee Republican Party tried unsuccessfully for months to get Twitter to shut it down, and 2019 Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic personas and social media accounts that spreads falsehoods and amplifies narratives critical of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel."
+E000014,T0014,VaccinateUS gofundme,"2016: #VaccinateUS Gofundme campaigns to pay for Targetted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targetting Washington State mothers, $1,776 to boost posts over 9 months)."
+E000015,T0015,ColumbianChemicals hashtag,#ColumbianChemicals to promote a fake story about a chemical spill in Louisiana. 
+E000016,T0016,Pope endorses Trump,"2016: “Pope Francis shocks world, endorses Donald Trump for president.” "
+E000017,T0016,FBI director rumours,"2016: ""FBI director received millions from Clinton Foundation, his brother’s law firm does Clinton’s taxes”."
+E000018,T0022,Qanon conspiracy,"Example: QAnon: conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful actors, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable """
+E000019,T0024,Slowed-down Pelosi video,Pelosi video (making her appear drunk)
+E000020,T0024,Shark on streets,Photoshopped shark on flooded streets of Houston TX.
+E000021,T0025,Sekondary Infektion,"2019: DFRLab report ""Secondary Infektion” highlights incident with key asset being a forged “letter” created by the operation to provide ammunition for far-right forces in Europe ahead of the election."
+E000022,T0029,FCC comments,Flooding FCC with comments
+E000023,T0029,fake engagement metrics,Creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of given issue. 
+E000024,T0044,Canadians arrested for spying,"(2019) China formally arrests Canadians Spavor and Kovrig, accuses them of spying (in retaliation to detention of Hauwei CFO). "
+E000025,T0044,Rumour about syrian rebels gassing their own people,"(2018) The Russian ministry of defence put out a press release, claiming that they had intelligence Syrian rebel forces were about to gas their own people in Idlib province as part of a “false flag” operation to frame the Syrian government."
+E000026,T0047,Singapore act,"2019 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread ""false statements of fact"" in Singapore, where that information is ""prejudicial"" to Singapore's security or ""public tranquility."" "
+E000027,T0047,Social media cut off in Kashmir,"India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and ""anti-national"" purposes."
+E000028,T0048,Rappler,"Philippines, Maria Ressa and Rappler journalists targeted Duterte regime, lawsuits, trollings, banned from the presidential palace where press briefings take place. "
+E000029,T0048,ProPublica,2017 bot attack on five ProPublica Journalists.
+E000030,T0049,Saudi bots,2018: bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi’s death.
+E000031,T0050,50 Cent army,"popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the ""Great Firewall"") "
+E000032,T0050,Positive images of China,"technique used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China. "
+E000033,T0051,FCC comments,2017: the FCC was inundated with nearly 22 million public comments on net neutrality (many from fake accounts)
+E000034,T0052,Tertiary sites,"Examples of tertiary sites include Russia Insider, The Duran, geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca."
+E000035,T0052,Star News Digital Media,"2019, US Domestic news: Snopes reveals Star News Digital Media, Inc. may look like a media company that produces local news, but operates via undisclosed connections to political activism. "
+E000036,T0052,Iranian sites including Liberty Front Press,"(2018) FireEye reports on Iranian campaign that created between April 2018 and March 2019 sites used to spread inauthentic content from websites such as Liberty Front Press (LFP), US Journal, and Real Progressive Front during the 2018 US mid-terms."
+E000037,T0053,Issues that can be politicised,"BlackLivesMatter, MeToo"
+E000038,T0054,TrudeauMustGo,2019: #TrudeauMustGo 
+E000039,T0055,PhosphorusDisaster hashtag,#PhosphorusDisaster
+E000040,T0056,RT/Sputnik,RT/Sputnik or antivax websites seeding stories.
+E000041,T0057,IRA organising US political rallies,"(Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 election"
+E000042,T0057,Facebook groups coordinating public space activities,Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and actvities into the public space.
+E000043,T0059,China messaging on Taiwan and Hong Kong,China constant messaging that Taiwan and Hong Kong are part of one China.
+E000044,C00008,Snopes,Snopes is best-known example of fact-checking sites. 
+E000045,C00012,2018 EU regulations,"In 2018, the European Union created significant new regulations on the role of social media in media"
+E000046,C00012,German social media content regulations,German model: facebook forced to police content by law
+E000047,C00014,Buzzfeed rumour list,Buzzfeed real-time disaster rumour list
+E000048,C00014,FEMA rumour list,FEMA real-time disaster rumour list
+E000049,C00030,counter narrative handbook,Handbook at https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf 
+E000050,C00030,Reality Team,Realityteam.org
+E000051,C00048,USAID programs,"USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations.  Note that USAID operations were at a different level."
+E000052,C00066,kPop hashtag flooding,kPop stans flooding extremist hashtags with pop videos and images. 
+E000053,C00070,2018 DDOS of troll farms,midterm-2018 elections DDOS against troll farms
+E000054,C00073,Learn to Discern,"The ""Learn to Discern"" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.” "
+E000055,C00073,Baltic Center for Media Excellence,"NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.”"
+E000056,C00082,Reality Team ground truthing,RealityTeam work that adds clear information to spaces with disinformation in.  
+E000057,C00086,Reddit channels flooded with jokes,"This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes."
+E000058,C00087,kPop hashtag flooding,
+E000059,C00087,LGBT flooding of #proudboys,
+E000060,C00093,Pro-Truth Pledge,community code of conduct
+E000061,C00111,The Commons Project,The Commons Project from BuildUp. 
+E000062,C00156,US Forces in Latvia,"In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.”"
+E000063,C00178,Current Time videos,"Using Current Time videos (viewed 40 million times online) to draw viewers away from Russian TV programming in RT and Sputnik. POtential content for this includes conventional entertainment programming (source: The conomist, “America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017)."
+E000064,C00182,Bedep Trojan,"(2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia"
+E000065,C00188,2014 Russian poll in France,"August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015)."
+E000066,C00188,Latvian newsrooms,"Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”"
+E000067,C00195,Using Adwords to redirect ISIS content readers,"Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Can apply this method to Russian propaganda.  "
+E000068,C00200,India,Indian influencers and aunties countering misinformation. 
+E000069,C00202,Macron election in France,Macron election team modified docs to spike a hack and leak. 
+E000070,C00207,Saudi tit for tat campaign,
+E000071,C00211,Baltic Elves,"Baltic Elves.
+https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/07/disinformation-nation-the-slovaks-fighting-in-defence-of-facts/ "
+E000072,C00211,Taiwan humor over rumor, Taiwan humor over rumor strategy.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/feb/17/humour-over-rumour-taiwan-fake-news and https://internews.org/story/using-comedy-and-social-media-educate-disinformation 
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e2c42c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,832 @@
+disarm_id,name,url,summary,provides_tools,sector,primary_role,secondary_role,primary_subject,secondary_subject,volunteers,region,country,rand_list,credco_list,carnegie_list,twitter_handle,notes,Unnamed: 18
+G000001,5Rights,https://5rightsframework.com/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000002,AACC (Association des Agences Conseils en Communication),https://www.aacc.fr/,,,,,,,,,Europe,France,,,,,,
+G000003,ABT Shield by Edge NPD,https://abtshield.com,"ABT SHIELD technology is an AI-based tool, designed to limit the impact of bots and trolls on readers’ experience and limit the spread of online disinformation. ABT SHIELD is a product designed in close cooperation with publishers, advertisers, academic institutions, think tanks and EU institutions.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000004,Access Now,https://www.accessnow.org/,"Access Now is dedicated to protecting digital rights through a 24/7 Digital Security Helpline, legal support, advocacy campaigns and cross-sector partnerships, and policy analysis and recommendations. Access Now works on issues related to freedom of expression and has responded to proposals aimed at curbing disinformation online by stressing the need to develop evidence-based solutions that protect online users.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000005,Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project (American Press Institute),https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/category/fact-checking-project/,The American Press Institute’s Accountability Journalism and Fact-Checking Project aims to increase and improve fact-checking and other accountability journalism practices.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000006,Ad Fontes Media,https://www.adfontesmedia.com/interactive-media-bias-chart-2/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000007,Ad Observer (New York University),https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ad-observer/enliecaalhkhhihcmnbjfmmjkljlcinl,Ad Observer is a crowdsourcing Chrome browser extension that will gather ads from a user's Facebook news feed—to enable investigative journalism and research.The project is run by the Online Political Ads Transparency Project at New York University.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000008,"Advertising Standards Authority (ASA, UK)",https://www.asa.org.uk/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000009,AFP Medialab,https://www.afp.com/en/agency/medialab,"The AFP Medialab is a multi-disciplinary team of journalists and engineers. Since the 1st of January 2016, the Medialab has participated in the InVID project (social media video content verification on social networks), funded by the European Union Horizon 2020 framework.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000010,Africa Check,https://africacheck.org/,Africa Check promotes accuracy in public debate and the media in Africa. The goal of their work is to raise the quality of information available to society across the continent.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000011,Agence France Presse (AFP),https://www.afp.com/en,"AFP is a global news agency that worked with First Draft to implement the CrossCheck Project during the 2017 French presidential elections. The organization has since started its own fact-checking blog and helped set up the Journalism Trust Initiative with Reporters Without Borders, the European Broadcasting Union, and the Global Editors Network. AFP is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers. AFP also runs a Medialab, where it develops innovative tools for verifying content and understanding information flows.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
+G000012,Agência Lupa,https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/lupa,"Agência Lupa is a Brazilian fact-checking organization. A member of the Trust Project, the organization also provides training to students and professionals to contribute to the prevalence of fact-checking techniques and tools.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
+G000013,Agência Pública (Truco Project),https://apublica.org/truco-antigo/,Agência Pública is an investigative journalism outfit that conducts fact-checking through its Truco project.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000014,AI Foundation,http://www.aifoundation.com,"Reality Defender is a browser extension that scans every piece of media content appearing in the browser to check for known fakes, and uses AI algorithms to check the content for signs of alterations. Reality Defender also allows for users to report media as fake, which builds their database of known fakes and improves the browser extension’s accuracy.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000015,Alethea Group,https://www.aletheagroup.com/,"We protect clients from the threat of disinformation that targets brands, reputations, employee safety, or financial bottom lines through our industry-leading investigation and remediation services.",,Other,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000016,Alion,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000017,Alliance for Europe: Social Media Intelligence Unit,https://www.alliance4europe.eu/digital-intelligence/,"The Social Media Intelligence Unit (SMIU) collects and analyses social media data from across Europe. The platform enables tracking disinformation and hate-speech, aiming to develop a predictive model of its spread.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,Europe,Belgium,,N,N,,,
+G000018,Alliance for Securing Democracy (German Marshall Fund) (GMF),https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/,"Housed at GMF, the Alliance for Securing Democracy convenes policymakers and technical experts to provide analysis and policy recommendations concerning authoritarian interference in democracies. The Alliance for Securing Democracy runs an Authoritarian Interference Tracker and the Hamilton 2.0 interactive dashboard, which provides information on Russian state-funded narratives.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000019,Alliance of Democracies,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/transatlantic-commission-on-election-integrity/,"The Alliance of Democracies runs the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity (TCEI), which convenes individuals from media and government to prevent foreign interference in elections. TCEI advocates for campaigns to adopt its Pledge for Election Integrity, conducts monitoring in countries with upcoming elections, and promotes public policy solutions addressing deepfakes and other emerging technologies that threaten the integrity of elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000020,American Press Institute (API),https://www.americanpressinstitute.org,"Through its Fact-checking and Accountability Journalism Project, API provides research and training to help journalists and publishers improve their political fact-checking work. In collaboration with the Donald W. Reynolds Journalism Institute,",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000021,American Press Institute: Trusting News project,https://trustingnews.org,"API hosts the Trusting News project, which seeks to build trust in newsrooms through newsroom coaching and research on transparency, consumer news decisions, and social media.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000022,Amnesty International,https://www.amnesty.org,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000023,Amped Software,https://ampedsoftware.com/authenticate,"Amped Software offers image and video forensics and authentication tools that enable users to detect whether images or videos have been manipulated or altered. Amped uses peer-reviewed, scientific techniques for its product, and law enforcement agencies have used the tool for rigorous use cases such as discerning whether an image can be used in court.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000024,Analiziraj,https://analiziraj.ba/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,N,N,,,
+G000025,Antidote,https://antidote.ngo/,"""Exit counselors"" or ""de-radicalizers,"" Antidote helps people caught up in cultic ideologies to reconnect with reality",,Civil Society/NGO,Education (public),,Extremism/indoctrination,Societal resilience,,,USA,,,,,,
+G000026,Aos Fatos,https://www.aosfatos.org/,"Aos Fatos conducts fact-checking and provides technology and consulting services to organizations interested in automated fact-checking products and data verification. They also fconduct act-checking for internal reporting. Aos Fatos built Fátima, a fact-checking robot for Facebook messenger. Aos Fatos is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
+G000027,AP Fact Check (Associated Press (AP)),https://www.apnews.com/APFactCheck,AP is an international news conglomerate which addresses global breaking news via quality journalism and reporting. AP Fact Check is the formal public fact-checking service of the organization and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000028,ARD-FaktenFinder,https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/,ARD-FaktenFinder is the fact-checking program of German media organization ARD's online news platform.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000029,Argonne National Laboratory: Decisions and Infrastructure Sciences Division,https://www.anl.gov/dis/gat,The Decisions and Infrastructure Sciences Division at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is currently applying predictive modeling to combat disinformation. They are capable of providing a deep access data analytics system.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000030,Arizona State University: Detecting Frames,http://www.public.asu.edu/~hdavulcu/IJSC16.pdf,"Detecting Frames is a research project at the School of Computing, Informatics and Decision Systems Engineering at Arizona State University. It outlines the utilization of computational power to understand the subliminal framing of topics in the media and within networks. Similar to the way that sentiment analysis understands attitudes based on keyword usage, “Detecting Frames” understands perspective and bias packaging based on sentence annotation.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000031,Article19,https://www.article19.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000032,Asociatia Presei Independente (API),http://api.md/,"API is a resource center and association of newsrooms dedicated to improving the quality of independent journalism in Moldova through advocacy and professional development. The organization is coordinating the ""STOP FALS!"" Campaign to educate news consumers and combat the spread of false or manipulative information.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Moldova,,N,Y,,,
+G000033,Aspen Institute,https://www.aspeninstitute.org/,"The Aspen Institute convenes leaders and thinkers to address challenges to global prosperity and peace. Through its work on communications and culture and security and global affairs, the Aspen Institute has published analysis and hosted events on election security, disinformation, and cybersecurity. It also hosts the Knight Commission Trust, Media and Democracy, which convenes academic, journalistic, technology, and advocacy experts to address the American media landscape.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000034,Assembler,https://jigsaw.google.com/assembler/,Assembler is an experimental platform advancing new detection technology to help fact-checkers and journalists identify manipulated media. The experiment is developed by Jigsaw and Google Research.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000035,Association for International Affairs (Asociace Pro Mezinárodní Otázky) (AMO),http://www.amo.cz/,"AMO conducts research and advocacy on issues in international relations through policy briefings and research papers, conferences and roundtables, educational projects, and collaboration with other public policy organizations. AMO runs a project on Strengthening Public Scrutiny in Ukrainian Regions, which works to address disinformation in Ukraine through research and training. Its partners on this project include the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of Mass Information, stopfake.org, and demagog.cz.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000036,Astroscreen,https://www.astroscreen.com/,Astroscreen counters disinformation and terrorist content spread via “astroturfing” by detecting fake social media accounts and networks of bots.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000037,Athens Technology Center (ATC),https://www.atc.gr/?page=news&ListID=3&RowID=348&Year=2021,Built TruthNest,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Greece,,,,,,
+G000038,Atlantic Council: Digital Forensics Research Lab (DFR Lab),https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/digital-forensic-research-lab/,"The Atlantic Council's Digital Forensics Research Lab (DFR Lab) documents and tracks foreign-backed influence operations and provides analysis on these incidents in order to aid the public in identifying and exposing such activities. DFR Lab also runs 360/OS, an annual conference providing training to journalists and activists on open source, social media, and digital forensic tools for identifying and documenting malign uses of digital technologies. The Atlantic Council also coordinated #ElectionWatch, an effort to monitor foreign influence in elections in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico in 2018.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,Research (primary/secondary),,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000039,Atlantic Council: Disinfo Portal (Eurasia Center),https://disinfoportal.org/about-disinfo-portal/,"The Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center has created Disinfo Portal, which aggregates information about ongoing efforts to counter disinformation and provides a database of partners and experts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000040,Attestiv Inc.,https://www.attestiv.com,"Attestiv provides authenticity for photos, videos and other media, limiting deepfake threats, data tampering, and helping to enable new media protection solutions for businesses and organizations.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000041,attribution.news,https://attribution.news,The attribution.news project is a joint initiative led by First Draft and the Stanford Internet Observatory. The website aims to provide more accessible background explanations to assist reporters in covering attribution.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000042,Australian Associated Press FactCheck,https://factcheck.aap.com.au/,FactCheck is the Australian Associated Press's fact-checking initiative. FactCheck is a signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000043,Australian Department of Home Affairs: Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce,https://www.aec.gov.au/elections/electoral-advertising/electoral-integrity.htm,"Led by the Australian Department of Home Affairs, the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce is composed of members of various government agencies and deals with foreign cyber-enabled threats to election integrity.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,N,Y,,,
+G000044,Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI),https://www.aspi.org.au/program/international-cyber-policy-centre,"ASPI conducts research on issues in international peace and security and Australian foreign policy. Through its International Cyber Policy Centre, members of ASPI have published reports on the topics of disinformation, persuasion-based cyber warfare, and Chinese influence campaigns.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,N,Y,,,
+G000045,Authoritarian Interference Tracker (Alliance for Securing Democracy),https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/toolbox/authoritarian-interference-tracker/,"The Authoritarian Interference Tracker exposes the Russian and Chinese governments’ foreign interference activities in more than 40 transatlantic countries from 2000 to the present across the five tools ASD tracks. These tools are: information manipulation, cyber operations, malign finance, civil society subversion, and economic coercion. The Tracker shines a light on the tactics and trends that define the Russian and Chinese governments’ interference efforts in democracies, and highlights the interconnectivity between different parts of the asymmetric toolkit. Forthcoming iterations of the Tracker will expand to catalog authoritarian interference by other regimes that adopt similar tactics to undermine democracies.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000046,Avaaz,https://secure.avaaz.org/,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
+G000047,Balkan Investigative Reporting Network,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000048,Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (Centro de Barcelona para Asuntos Internacionales) (CIDOB),https://www.cidob.org/,"CIDOB conducts research and policy analysis on global issues in peace and security. As part of its work on security, CIDOB researchers have published on disinformation and EU responses, Russia's Spanish media efforts, and deepfakes. CIDOB works with the German Marshall Fund to organize the Mercator European Dialogue, which convenes members of European parliaments to discuss public policy issues. Through this program, the German Marshall Fund convened policymakers in May 2019 to discuss disinformation and fake news in European elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,Y,,,
+G000049,BBC Media Action ,https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/our-work/covid-19,"Our dedicated teams moved rapidly to adapt our existing projects to address the knock-on effects of COVID-19 – from increased levels of violence against women, to children losing out on an education during lockdown. Through media, we’re helping people understand what they can do, individually and as a community, and how they can hold their leaders to account.We are committed to supporting the international response for the long haul – helping people to survive, cope and recover from COVID-19, meeting their diverse and changing needs, and supporting local media to keep their communities informed. As an independent charity, we are not funded by the BBC TV Licence Fee. We rely on the support of generous donors – governments, foundations, corporations and individuals – to make our work possible. Trusted and accurate information will save lives.",,Civil Society/NGO,Media,,,,,UK,Europe,,,,,,
+G000050,BBC Beyond Fake News,https://www.bbc.co.uk/beyondfakenews/,"BBC reporting, education and training to help you understand the challenges posed by misinformation and fake news",,Media,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000051,Be Internet Citizens (YouTube),https://internetcitizens.withyoutube.com/,"YouTube, a Google company, is addressing disinformation through media literacy. Be Internet Citizens has been designed to teach teenagers about media literacy, critical thinking and digital citizenship, with the aim of encouraging young people to have a positive voice online.",,Technology,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000052,Belgian Expert Group on Disinformation and Fake News,https://www.decroo.belgium.be/nl/expertengroep-formuleert-aanbevelingen-voor-aanpak-fake-news,"In 2018, Digital Agenda Minister Alexander De Croo called for the creation of an expert group composed of academics and journalists to formulate proposals for countering disinformation in Belgium. The expert group delivered its recommendations in July 2018.",,Government,Public Policy,,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000053,Bellingcat,https://www.bellingcat.com,"Bellingcat is an independent international collective of researchers, investigators and citizen journalists using open source and social media investigation to probe a variety of subjects, including online influence operations. It also runs training programs for investigative journalists and publishes training guides in its Online Investigation Toolkit.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,Fact checking,,,Yes,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000054,Berkman Klein Center,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000055,BeWorks,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000056,Bien Chequeado,https://www.tvn-2.com/bien-chequeado/,Bien Chequeado is TVN Noticias's fact-checking initiative.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Panama,,Y,Y,,,
+G000057,BitPress,https://bitpress.news/,Bitpress is a nonpartisan fact-checking organization that uses technology solutions and trained analysts to identify misinformation and prevent its spread.,,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000058,Blackbird,https://www.blackbird.ai/,Blackbird.AI is a company that provides artificial intelligence tools to detect emerging propaganda campaigns and help clients respond.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000059,Bluescreen IT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000060,BOOM,https://www.boomlive.in/,"BOOM is an Indian fact-checking initiative that provides content in English, Hindi, and Bengali. The organization runs a WhatsApp helpline, and it is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000061,Bot Sentinel,https://botsentinel.com/,"Bot Sentinel is a free and open platform and browser plugin that detects likely bots on Twitter. A dashboard lets users explore trending topics, network connections, and data associated with suspicious accounts. The product also provides a “block list” that enables users to block likely bots from their own Twitter spheres.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,Y,N,Y,,,
+G000062,Botometer,https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/faq,"Botometer is a web-based program that uses machine learning to classify Twitter accounts as bot or human by looking at features of a profile including friends, social network structure, temporal activity, language and sentiment. Botometer outputs an overall bot score (0-5) along with several other scores that provides a measure of the likelihood that the account is a bot.",Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,Y,N,Y,,,
+G000063,Botslayer,https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/botslayer/,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000064,Brandpie,https://www.brandpie.com/people,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000065,Brave,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000066,Bridgit,Bridgit.io,,,,Influencer (on policy),,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000067,Brookings Institute: Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology,https://www.brookings.edu/experts/alina-polyakova/,The Brookings Institution's Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology addresses state and non-state technological threats and convenes technology and policy communities around these issues.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000068,Brookings Institution: Center for Technology Innovation,https://www.brookings.edu/center/center-for-technology-innovation/,"The Brookings Institution's Center for Technology Innovation provides research, policy analysis, and advocacy on global technology innovation. Part of its research agenda includes digital media, news, and entertainment. The Cybersecurity and Election Interference Project publishes analysis on election security, foreign interference in elections, and the potential for widespread disinformation and proliferation of deepfakes in electoral contexts. The Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology addresses state and non-state technological threats and convenes technology and policy communities around these issues.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000069,Brookings Institution: Cyber Security and Election Interference,https://www.brookings.edu/series/cybersecurity-and-election-interference/,"The Cyber Security and Election Interference is a series designed to be accessible to policymakers, journalists, and the general public, will explore digital threats to American democracy, cybersecurity risks, and ways to mitigate possible problems. It will also take a look at several examples of the problem, how other democracies are coping with the threats, and how Congress, state officials, political parties, and candidates can protect themselves from cybersecurity attacks.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000070,Brunswick,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000071,BT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000072,Cal State,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000073,Callsign,https://www.callsign.com,"Callsign leverages deep learning and technical/ behavioral forensics to differentiate between legitimate and fraudulent users, allowing companies to keep information secure by adding an additional layer of protection to logins, and potentially disallowing bad actors from accessing secure information and accounts. Callsign technology may ensure that bad actors are not able to hijack legitimate accounts to propagate disinformation. Furthermore, genuine identities could remain safe from account takeovers, account borrowing, and “first person fraud” used to spread adversarial propaganda and disinformation.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000074,Canada,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000075,Captain Fact,https://captainfact.io/,CaptainFact is a collaborative fact-checking project that relies on a browser extension to show fact-checked statements in YouTube videos.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000076,"Cardiff University: Open Source Communications, Analytics Research Development Centre",http://upsi.org.uk/oscar,"The Open Source Communications, Analytics Research (OSCAR) Development Centre is an innovative, multi-disciplinary Centre bringing together academics and police practitioners to develop a research evidence base around the use of open source information for policing and community safety services. Funded by the Home Office / HEFCE / and the College of Policing, the work of the centre will help to develop open source methodologies, technologies and insights that will shape the future of policing.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Investigations,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000077,Cardiff University: Social Data Science Lab,http://socialdatalab.net/ ,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000078,Carnegie Endowment: Partnership for Countering Influence Operations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace),https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/counteringinfluenceoperations,"The Partnership for Countering Influence Operations (PCIO) believes that little progress will be made without a spirit of partnership between governments, the tech industry, media, academia, and civil society. Such collaborations are challenging but necessary in order to accomplish the three aims that PCIO believes are vital: to answer difficult policy problems related to influence operations; to find ways to measure the effect of adversarial influence operations; and to develop methods for measurement and evaluation of countermeasures.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000079,Carnegie Mellon University: Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS),http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/index.php,"CASOS develops and applies computational tools for utilizing data to analyze social phenomena, to explain and predict social behavior using these tools, and to measure and evaluate the impact of policies and procedures affecting social behavior. CASOS has a project on the diffusion of false and misleading information and draws comparisons between community responses to key issues.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000080,Carnegie Mellon University: Center for Informed Democracy and Social Cyber-Security (CIDC / IDEAS),https://www.cmu.edu/ideas-social-cybersecurity/,CIDC studies online disinformation and its impact on democracy. The Center conducts research and connects individuals working on disinformation and related issues in order to educate journalists and policymakers. Its research and teaching focus on identifying disinformation and its sources and countering its spread.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000081,Carnegie Mellon University: Social Cybersecurity Project (Human-Computer Interaction Institute),https://socialcybersecurity.org/,The Social Cybersecurity Project leverages insights from social psychology and other fields to develop novel interventions and strategies for nudging adoption of expert-recommended tools and practices,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000082,Carnegie Trust (UK),https://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000083,CASM Digital Research Lab (Demos),https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,"A joint venture between UK-based Demos and the University of Sussex, the CASM Digital Research Lab is an initiative that utilizes machine learning to interpret natural language data and derive insights about technology policy. CASM has produced reports on information operations, Russian influence operations on Twitter, the future of political campaigning, social media and the 2017 British General Election, social media in Nigerian elections, and digital political advertising.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000084,Cato Institute,https://www.cato.org/,"The Cato Institute conducts research and analysis on American domestic and foreign policy issues. Its scholars have written on social media regulation in the face of disinformation, and the Institute hosts a Project on Emerging Technologies which works on issues at the intersection of new technologies and civil liberties.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000085,Cek Fakta,https://cekfakta.com,Cek Fakta is an Indonesian fact-checking initiative.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000086,"Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy of France (Centre d'analyse, de prévision et de stratégie) (CAPS)",https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/le-ministere-et-son-reseau/le-centre-d-analyse-de-prevision-et-de-strategie/,"CAPS is composed of academic experts and diplomats that provide research and analysis on medium- to long-term trends in international affairs and foreign policy. In partnership with the Institute for Strategic Research, CAPS produced a comprehensive report on influence operations and recommendations for governments, civil society organizations, and private actors for mitigating the impact of hostile influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000087,Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT),https://cdt.org/,CDT provides research and advocacy on public policies designed to preserve freedom and innovation online. CDT's experts provide analysis on legislation and social media platforms' efforts aimed at curbing disinformation and protecting the integrity of elections.,,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000088,Center for Democratic Transition (Centar za Demokratsku Tranziciju) (CDT),http://www.en.cdtmn.org/,"CDT is dedicated to promoting democratic accountability and transparency in Montenegro through advocacy, research, monitoring of institutions and policies. CDT worked with NATO's Public Diplomacy Division to run a project on countering disinformation and propaganda.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Montenegro,,N,Y,,,
+G000089,Center for East European Policy Studies (Austrumeiropas Politikas Pētījumu Centrs) (CEEPS),http://appc.lv/eng/,CEEPS conducts research and analysis on Latvian foreign policy with a focus on Russia's influence in European politics and security. Its scholars have contributed to research on resilience to disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe and participated in expert discussions on Russian influence operations organized by the European Center for Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. CEEPS is also part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Latvia,,N,Y,,,
+G000090,Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (Centar za Evroatlantske Studije) (CEAS),https://www.ceas-serbia.org/,"CEAS conducts research and analysis on public policy, international cooperation, and global security with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe. CEAS is a partner of the Atlantic Council's Disinfo Portal.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
+G000091,Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA),https://www.cepa.org/disinfonet,"The StratCom Program housed at CEPA is ""an innovative, on-the-ground effort to monitor, collate, analyze, rebut and expose Russian disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe."" The program seeks to create analytical toolkits for countering disinformation, host workshops, monitor the effectiveness of Russian propaganda, provide data on ongoing efforts, and provide policy guidance. CEPA also coordinates #DisinfoNet, a coalition of think tanks and organizations working to understand and combat Russia’s information operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000092,Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR),http://www.revealnews.org/,"Through its publishing platform Reveal, CIR seeks to empower the public and hold leaders accountable through investigative journalism. The organization has published an online guide to disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000093,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Defending Democratic Institutions (CSIS),https://www.csis.org/programs/international-security-program/defending-democratic-institutions,"This project seeks to counter Russia, and potentially other adversaries, in their efforts to disrupt democracy and cultivate a public distrust of democratic institutions. A key focus of this initiative is on understanding and countering adversary attacks on America’s justice system, to include courts, judges, prosecutors, and the rule of law. Improving cybersecurity of institutions and individuals is a crucial mechanism for strengthening America’s capacity to guard against threats to democracy. In addition, the initiative will focus on building national resilience against information operations that threaten to undermine public respect for democratic institutions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000094,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Gray Zone Project,https://www.csis.org/grayzone,"CSIS’s International Security Program has analyzes hybrid and Gray Zone threats and aims to identify how the United States can best deter, campaign in, and respond to gray zone approaches.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000095,Center for Strategic & International Studies: Transnational Threats Project (CSIS),https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project,"CSIS coordinates a Transnational Threats Project, which has addressed Russian interference in the U.S. context and U.S. strategies to combat Russian information warfare, within the context of a broader focus on terrorism, insurgency, and crime.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000096,Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD),https://csd.bg/,"CSD conducts research and advocacy on issues related to European integration, political institutions, and economic and political development. The organization's research agenda includes a focus on state capture and russian influence, especially in the Black Sea countries and the Western Balkans, and its experts have written on media capture, propaganda, and Russian economic influence.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Bulgaria,,N,Y,,,
+G000097,Central European Policy Institute,http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/anatomy-info-war-how-russias-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-counter-it,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000098,Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats (Czech Ministry of the Interior),https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/Default.aspx,"Operational since 2017, the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats is a division of the Czech Ministry of the Interior designed to monitor and respond to influence operations with public policies and awareness-raising efforts. The center also deals with terrorism, security aspects of migration, extremism, and other disruptions to public order and safety.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000099,Centre for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH),https://www.counterhate.com/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000100,Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy (CEID),https://www.ceid.hu,"CEID conducts research, publishes analysis, and holds roundtable discussions and conferences on how to strengthen transatlantic relationships. The CEID is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis’s #DisinfoNet and cooperated with Ukrainian Prism and the EAST Center in their work on the Disinformation Resilience Index, with the Centre for International Relations in their work on countering Kremlin-backed disinformation, and with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in their “Fog of Falsehood” report on Russian deception in Ukraine.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,Hungary,,N,Y,,,
+G000101,Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS),https://www.ceps.eu/,"CEPS conducts research and hosts events and discussions on a range of issues affecting European domestic policies. CEPS has produced a number of publications on EU strategies for understanding and countering disinformation and on content moderation strategies online, including a study commissioned by the European Parliament on possible EU actions to address fake news and emerging threats like deepfakes.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000102,Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI),https://www.cigionline.org/,"CIGI is dedicated to conducting research on Canadian and international public policy and security issues. In June 2019, CIGI partnered with the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity to produce an Election Risk Monitor that assesses threats and potential responses to disinformation in the context of Canada’s elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000103,Centre for International Relations (Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych) (CSM),http://www.csm.org.pl/en/,CSM conducts research and analysis on issues in Polish foreign policy and European policy and is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis’s #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
+G000104,Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST),https://crestresearch.ac.uk/,CREST conducts behavioral and social science research to better understand threats to national security and develop strategies for countering them. The organization has addressed conspiracy theories and online behavior in its work.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000105,"Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA)",https://www.istinomer.rs,"CRTA is dedicated to promoting accountability and transparency in democratic politics. The organization runs a project called Istnomer, which conducts fact-checking and reporting in support of free media, institutional transparency, and political accountability.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
+G000106,CEPS,https://www.ceps.eu/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000107,Certified Content Coalition,https://www.certifiedcontentcoalition.org/,The Certified Content Coalition grew out of CableLabs with the goal of developing standards for trustworthy publishers.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,Y,Y,Y,,Dead website?,
+G000108,Channel 4 FactCheck,https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/,FactCheck is the fact-checking initiative run by Channel 4 in the United Kingdom.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000109,Chatham House,https://www.chathamhouse.org/,"Chatham House conducts research and analysis on issues in public policy and international peace and security. Chatham House experts have published research and hosted discussions through the International Security Department on issues related to disinformation, information warfare, elections, and global cybersecurity.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000110,Check My Ads,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000111,Check Your Fact,https://checkyourfact.com/,"Check Your Fact is the fact-checking initiative of the Daily Caller. The site is known for its ties to white nationalists. It is one of six third-party organizations working together to fact-check content for American users. The partnership has already come under intense criticism from climate journalists (among others) who are concerned that the Daily Caller’s editorial stance on issues like climate change, will spread even more misinformation Facebook.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000112,Checkology,,,,,Education (public),Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000113,Chequeado,https://chequeado.com/,,,,Fact checking,Verification,,,,,Argentina,,Y,N,,,
+G000114,Chile Check,,,,,,,,,,,Chile,,Y,N,,,
+G000115,CirroLytix,https://www.cirrolytix.com/,"CirroLytix is a data analytics research company specializing in data ethics and machine learning technologies for social impact. Their tool, ""Troglodyte,"" provides online researchers, journalists and fact checkers with an extensive database for matching sources with information and exposing causal links, conspiracies, and associated disinformation agents.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
+G000116,Cities on the Internet,https://mwi.pl/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Europe,Poland,,N,N,,,
+G000117,Cities on the Internet Association (Stowarzyszenie Miasta w Internecie) (MWI),https://mwi.pl/,"MWI is dedicated to the development of digital competency and literacy in Polish citizens. Through the project Digital Poland of Equal Opportunities, MWI is addressing digital literacy among Polish adults with the help of volunteers that encourage individuals over the age of 50 to engage online. The organization also develops educational materials for and provides training to Polish citizens of all ages.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
+G000118,Citizen Evidence Lab (Amnesty International),https://citizenevidence.org/,"Amnesty International's Citizen Evidence Lab provides resources for researchers, journalists, and activists documenting and exposing human rights abuses using content verification, data science, remote sensing, crowd-sourcing, and digital security tools. One of their projects, called Youtube DataViewer, helps extract information from Youtube videos.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000119,City University of New York: Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism,https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/,The Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism runs the Quality Project in partnership with the World Economic Forum to aggregate efforts to assess the quality of online information and allow users to select a personalized weighting of quality indicators.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000120,Civic online reasoning,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000121,Civil,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000122,Civil Liberties Union for Europe,https://www.liberties.eu/en,"Civil Liberties Union for Europe is network of civil liberties watchdogs that carries out public advocacy and campaigning and that provides research and analysis to policymakers on how to advance civil liberties in law and public policy. Its recent campaigns have concerned censorship, data privacy, the protection of civil society, and migration. The organization has written on efforts to curb disinformation within the European Union and its member states.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000123,ClaimBuster,https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/,ClaimBuster is a tool developed by researchers at the University of Arlington to provide automated live fact-checking.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000124,Clean Up The Internet,https://www.cleanuptheinternet.org.uk,"Clean up the internet is an independent, UK-based organisation concerned about the degradation in online discourse and its implications for democracy. They campaign for evidence-based action to increase civility and respect online, and to reduce online bullying, trolling, intimidation, and misinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000125,Climate Feedback,,,,,Credible content,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000126,Cloudflare,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000127,CNA,https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/cip/information-environment,"Recent CNA work on disinformation topics includes understanding state and non-state malign influence on partners and allies in Europe; identifying and analyzing the range of tools available to state and non-state actors in Africa and the Middle East; examining the use of the cyber domain to conduct information warfare; and analyses of messages, themes, and audiences in the Indo-Pacific region.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000128,Co-inform EU,https://coinform.eu/,Co-Inform brings together universities and small and medium enterprises in Europe to collaborate on tools for digital literacy with the aim of addressing disinformation. The project has put together a glossary on terms related to disinformation and will produce additional tools to be tested in three European countries by 2021.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000129,Cocuyo Chequea,https://efectococuyo.com/category/cocuyo-chequea/,Cucuyo Chequea is the fact-checking arm of Venezuelan media organization Efecto Cucuyo.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Venezuela,,Y,Y,,,
+G000130,CogSecCollab,http://cogsec-collab.org/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,North America,Global,,N,N,,,
+G000131,Colombia Check,https://colombiacheck.com/,Colombiacheck is a Colombian fact-checking project and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Colombia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000132,Columbia Journalism Review,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000133,Columbia University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000134,"Columbia University: Craig Newmark Center for Journalism, Ethics and Security (Graduate School of Journalism)",https://journalism.columbia.edu/craig-newmark-center,"Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism houses the Craig Newmark Center for Journalism Ethics and Security, which received funding in 2019 and will address journalism ethics in the digital age.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000135,Columbia University: Tow Center for Digital Journalism (Graduate School of Journalism),https://towcenter.columbia.edu,"The Tow Center examines digital journalism's industry-wide economic trends, its cultural shifts, and its relationship with the broader, constantly changing world of technology, and houses the Emergent research project.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000136,Combating Russian Disinformation,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000137,Commerce,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000138,Common Cause social media monitoring,https://www.commoncause.org/our-work/voting-and-elections/election-protection/stopping-cyber-suppression-and-voting-disinformation/,"The national, nonpartisan Election Protection coalition works so all voters have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. Made up of more than 100 local, state and national partners, Election Protection works year-round to advance and defend your right to vote",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000139,Competition and Markets Authority (CMA UK),https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority,"The CMA is an independent non-ministerial department which leads the Government’s Digital Markets Taskforce, and seeks to regulate the digital sphere by: enabling disruptors to challenge incumbents; empowering consumers through choice and control; supporting quality services and content online and providing industry, especially SMEs, with fair access to digital markets to be able grow their businesses.",,Government,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000140,Comprobado CNN CHV (Chile Check),https://www.cnnchile.com/chilecheck/,Comprobado CNN is the fact-checking initiative of CNN Chile.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Chile,,N,Y,,,
+G000141,Comprova,https://projetocomprova.com.br,"Comprova is a collaborative fact-checking organization in Brazil that unites journalism partners to investigate, contextualize, and clarify fake news.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000142,Congo Check,http://www.congocheck.net/,Congo Check is a fact-checking and image verification organization based in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,DRC,,Y,Y,,,
+G000143,CONNECT,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000144,ConPruebas,http://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/conpruebas,"ConPruebas is a fact-checking project run by Plaza Pública at Rafael Landívar University, inspired by Chequeado.",,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Guatemala,,Y,Y,,,
+G000145,Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000146,Content blockchain project,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000147,Correctiv,https://correctiv.org/en/,Correctiv is an investigative journalism outfit that provides training for citizens and journalists aimed at reducing the impact of disinformation. The organization also coordinates an annual Campfire Festival to foster conversation around the future of digital journalism and is developing a hub for nonprofit journalists in Europe. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000148,Cortico,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000149,Council on Foreign Relations (CFR),https://cfr.org,"The CFR provides research and analysis on issues related to international public policy, law, and security. Under the mantle of programs like the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program, National Security and Defense Program, U.S. Foreign Policy Program, and Europe Program, CFR scholars have authored reports on containing and countering Russia’s foreign interference efforts, defending American elections from foreign interference, botnets, and deepfakes, among other topics.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000150,Council on Foreign Relations: Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program,https://cfr.org,"The Digital and Cyberspace Policy program addresses one of the most challenging issues facing the country in the twenty-first century: keeping the global internet open, secure, and resilient in the face of unprecedented threats. Digital technologies have become ubiquitous; nearly five billion people use a cell phone, and approximately 4.5 billion are on the internet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000151,Countering Disinfo,https://counteringdisinformation.org/,A guide to promoting information integrity.  This resource combines the collective wisdom of organizations on the front lines of combatting disinformation globally. This living project provides an outline of what’s being done to address the challenge in key areas and provides a searchable database of the organizations around the world engaged in making the digital landscape safe for democracy,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000152,Craig Newmark Philanthropies,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000153,Credibility Coalition,https://credibilitycoalition.org/,The Credibility Coalition brings people together to develop common standards for information credibility.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,Y,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000154,Credibility Coalition: Misinfosec Working Group (MisinfosecWG),https://misinfocon.com/misinformation-has-stages-7e00bd917108,"The Credibility Coalition’s Misinfosec Working Group (“MisinfosecWG”) maps information security principles onto misinformation. Their current work is to develop a tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) based framework that gives misinformation researchers and responders a common language to discuss and disrupt misinformation incidents.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000155,CREST,crestresearch.ac.uk,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000156,CrowdTangle,https://www.crowdtangle.com/,"CrowdTangle is owned by Facebook and offers digital strategic communications services. Among many of its services, CrowdTangle provides platform access which allows users to report false news.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000157,CS-ISAO,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000158,CTI League Disinformation Team,https://cti-league.com/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,Global,,,N,N,,,
+G000159,CUNY,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000160,CUNY,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000161,CUNY: News Integrity Initiative,https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/centers/tow-knight-center-entrepreneurial-journalism/news-integrity-initiative/,The News Integrity Initiative (NII) at the Newmark J-School was launched in 2017 to advance media literacy and increase trust in journalism.,,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000162,Cyabra,www.cyabra.com,"Cyabra has developed AI-based technologies to identify bots, sockpuppets and trolls in social media platforms, as well as Deep Learning tech against visual manipulations (Deepfakes and GANs) in real-time. Using this technology, Cyabra is able to outline the scope of a disinformation attack within a day rather than the several days it may take human analysts working manually. This elevated timeline provides valuable early detection; an attack identified in real-time offers an opportunity for counter-action or counter-narratives.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000163,Cyan Forensics,https://www.cyanforensics.com,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000164,Czech Elves,https://www.facebook.com/cestielfoveofficial/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,N,,,
+G000165,Czech Pirate Party (Greens/EFA),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000166,Dagens Nyheter (Faktist),https://www.dn.se/,"Faktist is the fact-checking project of Dagens Nyheter, a Swedish newspaper and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,Y,Y,,,
+G000167,DARPA,,,,Defence/military,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000168,Darwin AI,https://www.darwinai.com,"The Darwin AI team has developed an “Automatic Disinformation Assessment” engine. It is a large scale, bidirectional language model that can detect the stance of an article. The project had an accuracy of 90.01%, which surpasses general benchmarks in the industry. The tool was able to determine whether or not a document agrees, disagrees, or takes no stance towards a specific claim.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000169,Data & Society,https://datasociety.net/research/media-manipulation/,"Data & Society’s Media Manipulation & Disinformation research examines how different groups use the participatory culture of the internet to turn the strengths of a free society into vulnerabilities, ultimately threatening expressive freedoms and civil rights. Efforts to exploit technical, social, economic, and institutional configurations of media can catalyze social change, sow dissent, and challenge the stability of social institutions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000170,Data & Society Research Institute: Disinformation Action Lab,https://datasociety.net/research/disinformation-action-lab/,The Disinformation Action Lab (DAL) at Data & Society forges new approaches to address the complex dynamics underpinning the spread of propaganda and disinformation.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000171,Data & Society Research Institute: Media Manipulation Initiative,https://datasociety.net/research/media-manipulation/,"Data & Society's Media Manipulation Initiative looks at how various qualities of media environments and technologies can be exploited to destabilize democratic, social, and economic institutions. The initiative has produced reports on algorithmic accountability, source hacking, weaponized advertising technology, the amplification of extremist content, and alternative facts, among other topics. Its affiliates have also produced a report on deepfakes and the history of audiovisual manipulation.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000172,Datalyrics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000173,dBunk(r),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000174,DCMS,,,,Government,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000175,Debunk EU,http://debunk.eu/,"DEBUNK is a Lithuanian initiative composed of media organizations, strategic communications professionals, researchers, and technologists that have developed an artificial intelligence tool to identify disinformation within 2 minutes.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,Y,Y,,,
+G000176,Deep Freeze,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000177,Deep Trust Alliance,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000178,Deepnews.ai,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000179,DeepSeer,https://deepseer.ai,DeepSeer provides a platform for social media data analysis and visualization by tracking and mapping online influencers. Their toolset can help identify and track the spread of disinformation on the web. DeepSeer offers measurement tools for the impact of online communications and messaging; enabling assessment of the impact and efficacy of counter disinformation campaigns.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000180,Deeptrace,www.Deeptracelabs.com,Deeptrace is a company developing technologies to detect and monitor synethic or manipulated media (deepfakes).,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000181,DeFacto,https://defacto.space,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000182,Defending Democracy,https://defending-democracy.org,"Defending Democracy is an independent, nonpartisan, transatlantic initiative. that works to support and defend basic values and fundamental freedoms and rights. Regarding internal threats, Defending Democracy focuses on defending democracy, rule of law and human rights. Regarding external threats, Defending Democracy focuses on deterring disinformation, cyber-attacks and political warfare.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000183,Delfi Melo Detekto,https://www.delfi.lt/news/melo-detektorius/,,,,,,disinformation,,,,Lithuania,,,,,,
+G000184,Demagog Poland,https://demagog.org.pl/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,disinformation,,,Europe,Poland,,,,,,
+G000185,Demagog.cz,https://demagog.cz/,Demagog.cz conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in the Czech Republic. The project is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,Y,Y,,,
+G000186,Demaskuok,https://demaskuok.lt/en/main-page/,"Demaskuok searches the information ecosystem of the Baltic states for disinformation and propaganda, utilizing an AI tool to flag suspected disinformation, and a network of human fact checkers to verify or discredit flagged content.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
+G000187,Democracy Fund,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000188,Demos - Centre for the Analysis of Social Media,https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000189,Detecteur Rumeurs,https://www.sciencepresse.qc.ca/detecteur-rumeurs,Detecteur Rumeurs is the fact-checking arm of the Montreal-based media company Agence Science Presse.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,Canada,,Y,Y,,,
+G000190,Detector de Mentiras,https://lasillavacia.com/,Detector de Mentiras (Lie Detector) is a Colombian fact-checking project run by La Silla Vacía and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Colombia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000191,DFID,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000192,DHS,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000193,Digit Eye India,https://digiteye.in/,Digiteye India is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000194,Digital Polarization Initiative,https://www.aascu.org/AcademicAffairs/ADP/DigiPo/,"The Digital Polarization Initiative, or “DigiPo”, is AASCU American Democracy Project's national effort to build student civic, information and web literacy by having students participate in a broad, cross-institutional project to fact-check, annotate, and provide context to the different news stories that show up in Twitter and Facebook feeds.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000195,Digital Sisters; Stop Online Violence Against Women (SOVAW),https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shireen_Mitchell,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000196,Dirt Protocol,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000197,Disinfo Cloud,https://disinfocloud.com,"Disinfo Cloud is an open source platform funded and supported by the U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) and maintained by Park Capital Investment Group LLC (Park Advisors), an implementing partner of the GEC. Disinfo Cloud aims to provide relevant stakeholders an overview of the tools and technologies available to help push back against foreign propaganda and disinformation.",Yes,Government,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000198,Disinformation Tracker,https://www.disinformationtracker.org,"Disinformation Tracker is an interactive map that seeks to support human rights defenders in Sub-Saharan Africa by tracking and analysing all laws, policies and other government actions on disinformation across Sub-Saharan Africa.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Africa,,,N,Y,,,
+G000199,Dispute Finder,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000200,Doğruluk Payı,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000201,DoubleVerify,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000202,dpa-Faktencheck,https://www.dpa.com/de/unternehmen/faktencheck/,dpa-Faktencheck is the fact-checking arm of the German news organization Deutsche Presse-Agentur GmbH.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Germany,,Y,Y,,,
+G000203,DQ Institute,https://www.dqinstitute.org/,"With the support of the World Economic Forum, DQ Institute develops global standards for digital intelligence and literacy and develops strategies for education and outreach on these issues. DQI has developed a framework for thinking about digital intelligence and is conducting impact and research assessments to understand the impact of digital technologies and to assess digital intelligence skills around the world.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000204,DROG,https://aboutbadnews.com/,"DROG is a nonprofit that fosters awareness and builds resilience against disinformation through its Bad News game, workshops, and lectures. Bad News is a social impact game that allows individuals to experience the spread of disinformation and see its impact on society.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,Y,Y,,,
+G000205,Dubawa,https://www.dubawa.org/,DUBAWA is a Nigerian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Nigeria,,Y,Y,,,
+G000206,Duke Reporters Lab / Jigsaw,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000207,Duke Share the Facts Widget,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000208,Duke Tech & Check Cooperative,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000209,Duke University: DeWitt Wallace Center for Media & Democracy,https://reporterslab.org/,"The DeWitt Wallace CMD runs the Duke Reporters' Lab, which conducts research on fact-checking and technological tools to aid fact-checkers. The lab maintains a comprehensive list of fact-checking organizations around the world and runs the Duke Tech & Check Cooperative, which aims to automate fact-checking.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000210,e-Enfance (e-E),https://www.e-enfance.org/,"e-E offers training on risks and threats in cyberspace and best practices for navigating digital spaces to kids in school, their parents, and professionals in the workforce. The platform also offers a free and confidential hotline and message service on Net Ecoute where the public can call in to receive assistance and counseling in the face of cyber threats.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000211,East STRATCOM Task Force: EUvsDisinfo,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/,"The East StratCom Task Force was established to respond to Russian influence operations in Eastern Europe. The task force's flagship project, EUvsDisinfo, monitors and catalogues cases of pro-Russian disinformation and conducts research and analysis on the methods and practices of disinformation and emerging technologies like deepfakes. The task force also trains EU and member state institutions and civil society organizations on disinformation and raises awareness about disinformation in the context of European elections.",,Government,Fact checking,Research (primary/secondary),,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000212,Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC),http://www.eesc.lt/en/,EESC conducts research and analysis on policy issues affecting Eastern Europe and engages the policy community in trainings and seminars on democratic transition. EESC administers a Democracy and Development Assistance Fund to support individuals and organizations in Eastern Europe working to support democracy. Its experts have written on Russian influence operations in Eastern European countries. EESC is also part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
+G000213,EastWest Institute: Global Cooperation in Cyberspace (EWI),https://www.eastwest.ngo/,"EWI is a network of experts that engage in conflict resolution and prevention and provide research and analysis on global challenges to peace and security. EWI’s program on Global Cooperation in Cyberspace ""seeks to reduce conflict, crime and other disruptions in cyberspace and promote stability, innovation and inclusion"" by convening multistakeholder summits, organizing collaborative working groups, and mobilizing around the adoption of global norms in cyberspace.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000214,EC,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000215,Ecuador Chequea,http://www.ecuadorchequea.com/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Ecuador,,Y,N,,,
+G000216,EDPS-EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000217,Ekspress Meedia / Eesti Päevaleht,https://epl.delfi.ee/kategooria/86056905/faktikontroll-1,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,disinformation,,,Europe,Estonia,,,,,,
+G000218,El poder de elegir,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000219,El Sabueso,https://www.animalpolitico.com/elsabueso-rss,"El Sabueso is the fact-checking section of Animal Político, a Mexican media organization, and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Mexico,,Y,Y,,,
+G000220,Election Integrity Partnership,https://www.eipartnership.net/,"The Election Integrity Partnership is a coalition of research entities focused on supporting real-time information exchange between the research community, election officials, government agencies, civil society organizations, and social media platforms.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000221,Electoral Commission (UK),https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/,"The Electoral Commission is an independent body which regulates the funding of political parties, individual party members, and candidates, as well as organisations campaigning in referenda. It is distinct from other regulators for being answerable to Parliament. It also enforces inclusion of imprints of printed election material under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.",,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000222,Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),https://www.eff.org/,"EFF is dedicated to advancing digital civil liberties through litigation, policy analysis, activism, and technology development. One of EFF’s issue areas is free speech online, and the organization has produced analysis on the need to balance content moderation strategies aimed at combating misinformation with freedom of expression and on how the United States should think about regulating deepfakes.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000223,Ellinika Hoaxes,https://www.ellinikahoaxes.gr/,"Ellinika Hoaxes conducts fact-checking of Greek online content and has created a web tool to inform users when they visit sites that are likely to be satirical, conspiratorial, or otherwise false and misleading. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Greece,,Y,Y,,,
+G000224,Emergent,http://www.emergent.info/about,Emergent is a real-time rumor tracker and part of a research project with the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University. It focuses on how unverified information and rumor are reported in the media. It aims to develop best practices for debunking misinformation.,Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000225,Estadão Verifica,https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/estadao-verifica,Estadão Verifica is a Brazilian fact-checking initiative housed at Estadão and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Brazil,,Y,Y,,,
+G000226,Estonia,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000227,Ethical Journalism Network (EJN),https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/supporters/african-media-initiative,"EJN provides training and education to journalists to advance quality media and trust in media institutions. Through its series ""Saving the News: Ethics and the fight for the future of journalism,"" EJN has written on challenges to journalism in an era of declining trust, deepfakes, and journalistic self-regulation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000228,EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000229,EU Disinfo Lab,https://www.disinfo.eu,"EU DisinfoLab is an independent non-profit organisation focused on tackling sophisticated disinformation campaigns targeting the EU, its member states, core institutions, and core values.",,Civil Society/NGO,Investigations,,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000230,EU External Action Service,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000231,EU vs Disinformation,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000232,Eurasia Partnership Foundation,https://epfarmenia.am,,,,,,,,,,Armena,,,,,,Armenia/Eurasia
+G000233,Eurasian States in Transition Research Center (EAST Center),http://east-center.org/,"EAST Center provides research and analysis on influence operations in Central and Eastern European countries and coordinates the Disinformation Resilience Index. Implemented with regional partners, the Disinformation Resilience Index assesses the vulnerability and resilience of fourteen Central and Eastern European countries to foreign (namely, Russian) disinformation campaigns.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000234,Europe fit for the Digital Age,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000235,European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE),https://www.hybridcoe.fi/,"The Hybrid CoE is a platform for EU and NATO member states to coordinate and share best practices on defending against hybrid threats, including influence operations. The Hybrid CoE engages in research to better understand and respond to threats, identify vulnerabilities, and build resilience, and it provides training and education for governments.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
+G000236,European Conservatives and Reformist Group,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000237,European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR),https://www.ecfr.eu/,"ECFR focuses on European foreign policy and security issues and provides research and analysis, convenes experts and leaders, and engages with national country governments on policy development. ECFR has published a paper on European strategic sovereignty that covers hybrid threats, and its scholars have offered commentary on countering online radicalization, strategies for fighting fake news, Russian cyber threats (including disinformation), and information manipulation in Europe.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000238,European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),https://edmo.eu,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000239,European Digital Rights (EDRi),https://edri.org/,"EDRi is a coalition of European digital human rights groups that seeks to provide public policy research and defend the importance of civil and human rights in the digital environment. To this end, EDRi has addressed influence operations through its work with Civil Liberties Union for Europe and Access Now to produce a joint report on the disinformation debate and policy responses in the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000240,European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS),https://epthinktank.eu/,"EPRS is the in-house research arm of the European Parliament. Through the European Parliament Think Tank, EPRS produces reports, briefings, and in-depth analyses meant to drive legislative development. The think tank has produced a number of reports and briefings on disinformation, information warfare, and hybrid threats that examine topics like artificial intelligence's impact on disinformation, the functioning of the rule of law, the EU and the Western Balkans, NATO strategic communications, influence operations in the EU.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
+G000241,European People's Party (Christian Democrats),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000242,European Union: European External Action Service,https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en,"The EEAS is the EU's diplomatic service. Countering disinformation is one of its key focus areas. The Commission put forward a European approach for tackling online disinformation in its Communication of April 2018, seeking to promote a more transparent, trustworthy and accountable online environment. The Communication proposed measures to tackle disinformation online, including a self-regulatory EU-wide Code of Practice on Disinformation, signed by large online platforms and the advertising industry, as well as support for an independent network of fact-checkers.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
+G000243,European Values (Kremlin Watch),https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/,"European Values runs Kremlin Watch, a program designed to provide monitoring and analysis of Kremlin-backed influence operations. Kremlin Watch provides weekly briefings and other opportunities for information-sharing, policy development advice to national governments, and educational activities for members of the public. European Values is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000244,European Values Center for Security Policy,https://www.europeanvalues.net/data/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000245,eWitness Media Inc,https://ewitness.commons.gc.cuny.edu/,"eWitness provides a digital alibi for images and videos. In today’s digitized world, eWitness helps companies stand by their content, to confidently attest to the time, geolocation and content of the media that appears on their platform . This attestation then eliminates questions against the validity of the media, allowing audiences to focus on the truth and context that surround the media.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,no site found,
+G000246,Executive round table on digital journalism ethics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000247,Fabula AI,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fabula_AI,"Fabula AI, was acquired by Twitter in June 2019. The tool evaluates the veracity of an article based on the way it spreads online. This means that it can detect a fake news story within 2-20 hours of publishing.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000248,Facebook,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000249,Facebook (UK),,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000250,Facebook Flagging Fake,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000251,Facebook Third-Party Fact-Check,https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536,"Facebook support the use of both technology and human review to remove fake accounts, promote news literacy and disrupt the financial incentives of spammers. In certain countries, they also work with third-party fact-checkers who are certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network to help identify and review false news.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000252,FacktenFinder,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000253,Fact Check - the journal.ie,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000254,Fact Check EU,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000255,Fact Checking Chile,http://factchecking.cl/,Fact Checking Chile is a fact-checking initiative based at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile that trains students as fact-checkers and content verifiers.,,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Chile,,Y,Y,,,
+G000256,Factba.se,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000257,FactCheck (The Conversation),https://theconversation.com/us,The Conversation is an online news platform for academics and researchers to share information and evidence in support of sound policy. The organization has a dedicated fact-checking team dedicated to ensuring information integrity.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000258,FactCheck Georgia,https://factcheck.ge/en,FactCheck is an online fact-checking platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Georgian politicians and public figures.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Georgia,,N,Y,,,
+G000259,FactCheck.kz,http://factcheck.kz/,FactCheck.kz is a fact-checking initiative based in Kazakhstan and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Kazakhstan,,Y,Y,,,
+G000260,FactChecker.in,https://factchecker.in/,FactChecker.in is an Indian fact-checking initiative run by the Spending & Policy Research Foundation and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000261,Factcheckers,http://factcheckers.it/,Factcheckers is an Italian media literacy organization that provides resources and training to high schools and universities around the world on fact-checking and critical evaluation of information.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
+G000262,FactCrescendo,https://www.factcrescendo.com/,FactCrescendo is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000263,FactLink,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000264,Factly,https://factly.in/,Factly is an Indian organization that conducts fact-checking and helps make government data and information accessible to citizens. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000265,Factmata,https://factmata.com/,"Factmata is building an API to identify, classify, and build trust scores for online content to help users rate the trustworthiness of a source. The company also provides moderation services to help flag potentially harmful content for trust and safety teams at major online platforms, and they organize a blacklist to help clients know which platforms or websites to avoid entirely.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000266,Fake it to Make it,http://www.fakeittomakeitgame.com,"Fake It To Make It gamifies the experience of spreading false news for public consumption, deepening players’ understanding of the process and motives behind false news dissemination.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000267,Fake News Tracker,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,N,,,
+G000268,Fake Off (20 Minutes),https://www.20minutes.fr/,"Through its Fake Off section, 20 minutes conducts fact-checking, particularly on stories that have gained significant online attention. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
+G000269,FakeHunter,https://fakehunter.pap.pl/en/,"FakeHunter is a community-based project for verifying content published on the Internet, launched by the Polish Press Agency (PAP) together with GovTech Polska. It aims to demystify and refute false information related to the SARS-CoV-2 virus.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Poland,,N,Y,,,
+G000270,FakerFact,https://www.fakerfact.org/,"FakerFact has built an artificial intelligence tool called ""Walt"" to help readers assess the potential biases in news sources, rather than just determining the veracity of the content.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000271,Faking News: Fraudulent News and the Fight for the Truth,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000272,Faktabaari,https://faktabaari.fi/in-english/,Faktabaari is a Finnish fact-checking organization that provides media literacy resources to EU schools.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Finland,,Y,Y,,,
+G000273,Faktisk,https://www.faktisk.no/,Faktisk is a Norweigan fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network. They also run a school project called Think that aims to educate young students about critical thinking.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Norway,,Y,Y,,,
+G000274,Faktograf,https://faktograf.hr/,Faktograf conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in Croatia. The organization is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Croatia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000275,Faktograf.hr,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000276,Fandango,https://fandango-project.eu/,"The FANDANGO (Fake news discovery and propagation from big Data Analysis and artificial intelligence operations) project aggregates a large array of media sources so that big data/Machine Learning tools can analyze data to understand patterns within the ecosystem and provide insight to analysts. This technology can support government stakeholders’ mission by facilitating a high-level overview of the disinformation ecosystem, helping to map out and highlight patterns, connections and detection criteria.",Yes,Government,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000277,Fatabyyano,https://fatabyyano.net/,,,,Fact checking,,,,,Africa,North Africa,,N,N,,,
+G000278,Fatima,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000279,FCO,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000280,Federation of American Scientists,https://fas.org/ncov/disinformation-reports/,"Upon recognition of the threat that false information poses to science, the Federation of American Scientists established the Disinformation Research Group (FAS DRG). FAS DRG is composed of scientists, communications experts, data-scientists, and technologists with the intended purpose of detecting, understanding, and effectively exposing disinformation and false narratives surrounding COVID-19. FAS DRG uses multiple methods, technologies, and resources to execute the mission.",,,,,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000281,FeedReflect,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/feedreflect/bigmeipgaifggglelcnpnpbaefimpooc?hl=en-US,FeedReflect is a browser extension for Google Chrome that urges users to consider the quality of the news content they consume on Twitter,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000282,FiB,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000283,Field guide to fake news,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000284,Finding the truth amongst fakes,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000285,Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA),https://www.fiia.fi/,"FIIA conducts research and policy analysis on international relations and the European Union. The institute has research programs on the European Union, Eastern European countries and their relationship with Russia, and global security, and it has published a number of reports on information warfare, hybrid threats, disinformation, and related concepts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
+G000286,FireEye: Information Operations Intelligence Analysis,https://www.fireeye.com/,,,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000287,First Draft News,https://firstdraftnews.org,"First Draft is a nonprofit that aims to provide practical and ethical guidance for journalists and publishers in the digital age. The organization coordinates an international fact-checking initiative, trains journalists and fact-checkers in countries with upcoming elections, and conducts and disseminates research on best practices for producers and consumers of digital news. The organization recently published a series of guides on responsible reporting, including one on reporting on deepfakes.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000288,Fiskkit,http://fiskkit.com/,"Fiskkit is an online platform where users can assess the credibility of news articles, and the organization has also created a tool designed to help schoolchildren evaluate sources.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000289,Ford Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000290,Fortis AI,https://www.alionscience.com,"Fortis is an information operations (IO) platform that takes data from multiple sources and distills it into insights and actionable results. The system aims to alert analysts to adversarial IO, and to provide meaningful analytics, theme and narrative detections, and support for conducting information operations.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000291,FotoForensics,http://fotoforensics.com,"Fotoforensics displays the underlying forensics data of any image uploaded to their platform, thereby providing a user with visual and other data to help determine whether the image has been altered. Fotoforensics’ underlying tools are integrated with other social media intelligence platforms or by social media platforms themselves to improve content moderation and disinformation identification efforts.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000292,Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS),https://www.feps-europe.eu/,"FEPS conducts research and advocacy on European democracy and public policy. Its experts have been involved in studies on foreign state propaganda and Russian hybrid warfare. FEPS also collaborates with the Istituto Affari Internazionali on the EU Global Strategy Watch, which tracks developments in EU Global Strategy implementation.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000293,France 24 - les Observateurs,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000294,Fraunhofer Institute,https://www.aisec.fraunhofer.de/en/fields-of-expertise/cognitivesecurity.html,,,,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000295,Freedom and Solidarity Foundation (Brīvības un Solidaritātes Fonds) (BSF),http://bsf-latvija.lv/,BSF conducts research and advocacy on issues in Latvian public policy and democracy and international peace and security. Its scholars have written on Russian propaganda and work with other organizations to provide opportunities for discussion and collaboration on these issues.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Latvia,,N,Y,,,
+G000296,Freedom on the Net,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000297,Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES),https://www.fes.de/,"FES conducts advocacy and research on issues related to democracy in Germany and across the world. Through its German headquarters and regional offices, FES has addressed media quality and resilience in Africa, disinformation and propaganda in Ukraine, and disinformation in debates about migration within the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000298,Fsecure,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000299,Full Fact,https://fullfact.org/,Full Fact conducts fact-checking and verification and provides research and training on fact-checking efforts. Full Fact also works with the British government to make government data more available to citizens and to enhance transparency in communication.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000300,Fundação Getúlio Vargas Department of Public Policy Analysis (FGV DAPP),https://observa2018.com.br/,"During the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, FGV DAPP coordinated the Digital Democracy Room to monitor public debate and potential threats to its integrity. Through this initiative, FGV DAPP provided research and analysis on issues related to misinformation online, bot networks, and foreign influence in public discourse and worked with the Consultative Council on Internet and Elections of the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court. FGV has also joined the Atlantic Council's #ElectionWatch project, which monitored foreign influence in Brazilian, Colombian, and Mexican elections in 2018.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Investigations,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000301,Fundación La Voz Pública,https://chequeado.com/,"Fundación La Voz Pública is dedicated to strengthening the quality of public debate in Argentina. The organization runs an initiative called Chequeado, which conducts fact-checking and trains fact-checkers and journalists. The organization also creates innovative tools for improving fact-checking and the dissemination of knowledge.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Research (primary/secondary),,,,South America,Argentina,,N,Y,,,
+G000302,Fundamedios,http://54.85.84.127/,"Fundamedios is an organization committed to promoting freedom of expression, monitor aggressions and risks faced by journalists, and uphold human rights in Latin America. The organization has experience in monitoring, promoting and protecting freedom of expression and freedom of the press; boosting high-quality reporting; training journalists; carrying out studies and research, and promoting open discussion about journalism, media, and democracy in Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, and the USA. Fundamedios also runs Ecuador Chequea, which is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,,,N,Y,,,
+G000303,Future Digital Threats to Democracy (Technology for Global Security),https://www.tech4gs.org/future-digital-threats-to-democracy.html,"Tech4GS is a new type of non-profit: part think tank, part incubator, and purely nonpartisan. As part of a two-year, multi-disciplinary effort to address the ways in which democracies and open societies combat high-tech illiberalism, they have partnered with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) to launch the joint project “Future Digital Threats to Democracy.”",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,,,N,Y,,,
+G000304,"Gallup/Knight Foundation Survey on Trust, Media and Democracy (2017)",https://knightfoundation.org/reports/american-views-trust-media-and-democracy/,,,,Education (public),Research (primary/secondary),,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000305,GeoPoll,https://www.geopoll.com/,GeoPoll specializes in global and emerging market research. Their work focuses on two main areas: Monitoring and evaluation; and counter-narratives. Their work on counternarratives aims to counter or expose disinformation through targeted messaging as well as gathering information on fake news and identifying the most effective channels to disseminate counter messages.,,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),Credible content,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,Also Kenya,
+G000306,"George Washington University: Institute for Data, Democracy, and Politics",https://iddp.gwu.edu,"The Institute for Data, Democracy & Politics (IDDP)’s mission is to help the public, journalists, and policymakers understand digital media’s influence on public dialogue and opinion, and to develop solutions to disinformation and other challenges that arise in these spaces.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000307,Georgetown University: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,https://isd.georgetown.edu,"SD sponsors working groups in collaboration with other elements of the School and the University as well as non-academic groups that bring together high-level, experienced practitioners and eminent scholars to examine emerging international and statecraft issues and recommend policy solutions. In October 2020, ISD released a report titled ""The New Weapon of Choice: Technology and Information Operations Today""",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000308,Georgetown University: Law School Center on Privacy and Technology (CPT),https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/,"CPT studies the impact of government surveillance and commercial data practices on vulnerable communities, provides intellectual and legal foundations for reforms to U.S. consumer privacy laws, and offers technology-intensive courses that prepare students to be leaders in privacy practice, policy making, and advocacy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000309,German Council on Foreign Relations (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik) (DGAP),https://dgap.org/,DGAP conducts research and advocacy on issues in German public policy and international relations. The organization's experts have published on Russian propaganda efforts in German politics.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000310,German Marshall Fund: Digital Innovation & Democracy Initiative (GMF),https://www.gmfus.org/digital-innovation-and-democracy-initiative,"The German Marshall Fund runs a Digital Innovation & Democracy Initiative, which focuses more broadly on the relationship between technological developments and democratic values.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000311,German Marshall Fund: Mercator European Dialogue (GMF),https://www.gmfus.org/forum/mercator-european-dialogue,"GMF organizes the Mercator European Dialogue, a network of European members of parliaments that meets to discuss public policy issues, in cooperation with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, the Istituto Affari Internazionali, and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Through this program, GMF convened European policymakers in May 2019 to discuss disinformation in European elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000312,Get Bad News (DROG),https://getbadnews.com/#intro,"DROG develops programs and courses and conducts research aimed at recognizing disinformation, especially online. In Get Bad News, you take on the role of fake news-monger. Drop all pretense of ethics and choose a path that builds your persona as an unscrupulous media magnate. But keep an eye on your ‘followers’ and ‘credibility’ meters. Your task is to get as many followers as you can while slowly building up fake credibility as a news site. But watch out: you lose if you tell obvious lies or disappoint your supporters!",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
+G000313,Giant Language Model Test Room (GLTR),http://gltr.io,The Giant Language Model Test Room offers a forensic analysis of and rates the likelihood that a snippet of text was generated by an automated system or written by a human. GLTR can be used to analyze and detect fake text or as an educational tool to allow the public to check the likelihood of whether a piece of content is human-written or machine-generated and demonstrate the capabilities of AI to generate fake news.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000314,GIZ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000315,Global Alliance for Responsible Media (GARM),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000316,Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC),https://cyberstability.org/,"GCSC was created with the goal of promoting mutual awareness and understanding among the various communities addressing international cybersecurity. GCSC has pursued research on the development of global norms in cyberspace, defining the public core of the Internet, and protection of electoral infrastructure, among other issues.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
+G000317,Global Council to Build Trust in Media and Fight Misinformation,https://www.globalmis.info/,"In 2018, the Ethical Journalism Network, European Broadcasting Union, Global Editors Network, Global Forum for Media Development, Online News Association, and World Editor's Forum launched the Global Council to Build Trust in Media and Fight Misinformation. The council's mission is to create a repository of resources and information, connect key stakeholders, identify and implement innovative solutions for newsrooms, and serve as a voice for the media industry in addressing the problem of misinformation and declining trust in newsrooms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,World,,Y,Y,,,
+G000318,Global Disinformation Index (GDI),https://disinformationindex.org/,GDI is developing an artificial intelligence tool to create automated disinformation ratings for news organizations to assess the likelihood that they carry disinformation.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000319,Global Focus,http://www.global-focus.eu/,"Global Focus conducts advocacy, research, and analysis around Romanian public policy issues and international peace and security. The organization has launched an international initiative to combat disinformation and influence operations and has convened a seminar in Bucharest to address ways to build resilience and respond to threats. Global Focus is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Romania,,N,Y,,,
+G000320,Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD),https://gfmd.info,"GFMD is a network of journalism support and media assistance groups committed to advancing free, independent, sustainable and pluralistic news ecosystems. Its Internet Governance Working Group has developed a focus on disinformation and misinformation and focuses its advocacy efforts on how the underlying mechanisms of the digital economy enable the manipulation of online spaces and the proliferation of dis/misinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000321,GLOBSEC Policy Institute,https://www.globsec.org/,"GLOBSEC conducts research and analysis of issues in public policy and international peace and security. The organization runs a program on strategic communication, through which it publishes analysis on disinformation in Europe and resiliency to influence operations. In 2018, GLOBSEC announced a project on hybrid threats meant to support the development of public policies, monitoring threats, and capacity-building within the Slovakian government.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
+G000322,Go Think Initiative,https://www.facebook.com/GoThinkInitiative/,"Go Think Initiative is dedicated to convening European organizations and experts to address changes in the media landscape and cultivate an awareness of the media's role in politics. The organization has held professional media literacy workshops as part of its V4 Think Media project, and it develops games to help citizens understand media, propaganda, and the importance of civic participation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000323,Good of All,http://goodofall.org,"In collaboration with Kansas State University, Good of All has created a modification to a popular video game, Grand Theft Auto, to explore topics of censorship, protection of democracies, and freedom of speech. This modified version of the game, called Grand Theft Democracy, simulates a fictional nation’s presidential election and requires players to strategize to steer a population into voting for a certain candidate. They have stated that this approach could raise awareness of how disinformation/ propaganda may be employed by adversaries.",,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000324,Google,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000325,Google Cloud,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000326,Google News Initiative,https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com,The Google News Initiative works with the news industry to help journalism thrive in the digital age.,,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000327,Google News Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000328,Google/YouTube,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000329,GovLab-NYU,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000330,Graphika,https://graphika.com/,"Graphika provides companies with tools to analyze online conversations and detect disinformation campaigns. Its lab division partners with academic institutions to advance its social network analysis, machine learning, and artificial intelligence capabilities.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,Research (primary/secondary),,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000331,Ground News,https://www.ground.news/,"Ground news is a news comparison platform to help the public make sense of stories across the political spectrum. With the rise of mis/disinformation and increasingly polarized news sources, Ground News provides an app that shows side by side comparisons of different sources’ coverage of a story, along with tools for users to analyze and draw their own conclusions.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000332,Group M,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000333,Group of the European People's Party: Christian Democrats,,,,,,,,,,Europe,Latvia,,,,,,
+G000334,Grover,https://grover.allenai.org/,"Grover technology works by generating its own ‘neural fake news’, which is then used to detect similar articles. The Grover model can generate an article against a specific news source, author, and date. Users of the tool also give the articles a headline that the content is then based off of.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,not accessible,
+G000335,GTRI,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000336,Guardian,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000337,Hacked off,https://hackinginquiry.org,,,Civil Society/NGO,Influencer (on policy),,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000338,Hacker Factory,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000339,Hacks Hackers,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000340,Hamilton68 dashboard,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000341,Hanns Seidel Stiftung,https://www.hss.de/en/,"Hanns Seidel Stiftung conducts research and training and promotes international cooperation in public policy. Its researchers have published analysis on social media and bots, disinformation, and political campaigning.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000342,Harvard,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000343,Harvard Shorenstein Center,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000344,Harvard University: Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society,https://cyber.harvard.edu,"The Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University is dedicated to exploring, understanding, and shaping the development of the digitally-networked environment. A diverse, interdisciplinary community of scholars, practitioners, technologists, policy experts, and advocates, it seeks to tackle the most important challenges of the digital age while keeping a focus on tangible real-world impact in the public interest. The faculty conducts research, builds tools and platforms, educates others and facilitates dialogue across and among diverse communities.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000345,Harvard University: Defending Digital Democracy (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs),https://www.belfercenter.org/,"Defending Digital Democracy develops solutions to share threat information with technology providers, governments and political organizations. It also provides election administrators, election infrastructure providers, and campaign organizations with practical “playbooks” to improve their cybersecurity. Other activities include develoing strategies for how democracies can credibly deter hostile actors from engaging in cyber and information operations, assessing emerging technologies that may improve the integrity of systems and processes vital to elections and democracy and Convening civic, technology, and media leaders to develop best practices that can shield public discourse from adversarial information operations.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000346,Harvard University: Nieman Foundation for Journalism,https://nieman.harvard.edu/,"The Nieman Foundation for Journalism provides fellowships, publications, and training opportunities around developments in journalism. Through Nieman Lab, the foundation is reporting on how newsrooms are adapting to the digital landscape, including to the threat of disinformation, declining trust in news media, and the proliferation of deepfakes.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000347,"Harvard University: Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy",https://shorensteincenter.org/,"Harvard University's Technology and Social Change Research Project at the Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy investigates the impact of new media on truth and trust. Its researchers have created the Global Media Manipulation Case Book, and the center also publishes the Misinformation Review to track academic research on the topic. The Shorenstein Center also hosts a Digital Platforms & Democracy project that focuses on the ways in which digital platforms shape public debate and regulatory tools for addressing them.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000348,Health Feedback,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000349,Henry Jackson Society (HJS),https://henryjacksonsociety.org/,HJS conducts research and analysis on issues related to international peace and security and democracy promotion abroad. HJS personnel have recently addressed issues of Russian disinformation and fake news as threats to Western democracy.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000350,Hercule,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000351,Heritage Foundation,https://www.heritage.org,"The Heritage Foundation provides research and advocacy on U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Scholars at the Heritage Foundation have authored reports and commentary on Russian disinformation, and the organization has hosted events around this issue. Researchers at Heritage have also written on Chinese psychological warfare.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000352,HO@X,http://hoax.cz/cze/,"HO@X aims to inform the public about digital hoaxes, i.e. widely spread email chain messages that pose some kind of threat to users. HO@X offers a public database that catalogs emails and news stories known to be fraudulent.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000353,Hoaks Atau Fakta?,https://www.kompas.com/,"Hoaks Atau Fakta? Is the fact-checking initiative of Kompas.com, an Indonesian media platform, and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000354,Hoover Institution,https://www.hoover.org/,"The Hoover Institution ""seeks to improve the human condition by advancing ideas that promote economic opportunity and prosperity, while securing and safeguarding peace for America and all mankind."" Scholars affiliated with the institution have published on disinformation, content moderation, information operations, and information warfare, both in academic contexts and in informal commentaries.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000355,Hypothes.is,https://web.hypothes.is/,The Hypothesis Project is an effort to create an open source software that allows users to annotate online content and fact-check the news.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000356,IAB Europe/ OPA Europe,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000357,iAgents Lab,https://iagentntu.github.io/,"Affiliated with National Taiwan University, Intelligent Agents Laboratory (iAgents Lab) is developing technical applications for improving people's lives and proposing available solutions on social problems. Social media users can use iAgents Lab's algorithm to identify disinformation in real time.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
+G000358,IBM Consulting,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000359,IBM CPD Explorer,https://www.ibm.com/watson,The IBM Counter Propaganda and Disinformation (CPD) Explorer retrieves thousands of news articles and social media posts in real-time and analyzes each post to quickly determine instances of disinformation and propaganda and visualizes the results of the analysis and classification within a dynamic cloud-based dashboard.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000360,Identifact,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000361,IDS-Sussex University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000362,IFEX,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000363,Iffy Quotient (University of Michigan),https://csmr.umich.edu/platform-health-metrics/,"The Iffy Quotient is a web-based tool that queries Facebook and Twitter and identifies URLs that are known to be biased or to be frequent reporters of false information. The tool then calculates the percentage of URLs on each site that are ""iffy,"" or known for reporting false or misleading information.",Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000364,Image Verification Assistant (Reveal),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000365,IMPRESS,https://www.impress.press,UK press regulator,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000366,Independent,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000367,Index on Censorship,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000368,India Today Fact Check,https://www.indiatoday.in/fact-check,India Today Fact Check is the fact-checking arm of India Today's website.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000369,Indiana University: Observatory on Social Media (OSoMe),https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/,"OSoMe uses social media data to develop tools for visualizing the diffusion of information and misinformation online. OSoMe's goal is that individuals and journalists will use these tools to make their own assessments about the trustworthiness of news sources and to contribute to the growing field of data journalism.   OSoMe also houses Hoaxy, a web-based tool that visualizes the spread of articles online. Hoaxy searches for claims and fact-checking going back to 2016. It tracks the sharing of links to stories from low-credibility sources and independent fact-checking organizations. It also calculates a bot score, which is a measure of the likely level of automation.",Yes,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000370,Individual - Adam Shostack,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000371,Individual - Dominic Dodd,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000372,Influence Apps,https://startinfluence.com/,"Influence Apps, Inc. is a strategic communications tool that simplifies complex technologies and techniques to help governments counter bad actors online. Powered by ad tech industry and government communications experts, Influence offers a suite of services that provide government operators tools for real-time sentiment analysis and communication campaign management.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000373,Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO UK),,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000374,Information Disorder Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000375,Information Operations Archive,https://www.io-archive.org/#/,The Information Operation Archive hosts publicly available and rigorously attributed datapoints from known Information Operations on social media platforms.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000376,Institute for Public Relations (IPR),https://instituteforpr.org/,"IPR provides research and advocacy around marketing and communications. Its current strategic priorities include restoring reputation in an environment of low trust, and the organization has launched a ""Disinformation in Society"" report in 2019 with plans to release future editions annually.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000377,Institute for Statecraft (Integrity Initiative),https://www.statecraft.org.uk,"The Institute for Statecraft is an independent, Scottish, charitable body whose work seeks to improve governance and enhance national security. They launched the Integrity Initiative in 2015 to defend democracy against disinformation. Its website was temporarily taken down, pending an investigation into the theft of data from the Institute.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000378,Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD),https://isdglobal.org,"ISD provides research, education and advocacy, and policy advising on issues concerning far-right radicalization, Islamist extremism, disinformation, and polarization. The Institute also partners with governments, civil society organizations, and private companies to develop policies and best practices for countering violent extremism both on- and off-line, and provide training to governments and citizens for countering violent extremism.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Education (public),,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000379,Institute for Strategic Research of France (Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire) (IRSEM),https://www.irsem.fr/,"IRSEM is the research arm of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces and provides analysis on issues in defense and security. IRSEM, in partnership with the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, has produced a comprehensive report on influence operations and recommendations for governments, civil society organizations, and private actors for mitigating the impact of hostile influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000380,Institute for the Future: Digital Intelligence Lab,http://www.iftf.org/partner-with-iftf/research-labs/digital-intelligence-lab/,"The Institute for the Future’s Digital Intelligence Lab conducts research on disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of American politics. Its publications include The Human Consequences of Computational Propaganda, a series of eight case studies from the 2018 U.S. midterm elections; Digital Propaganda and the News, a series of three reports concerning how disinformation affects journalism; Principles and Policies to Counter Deceptive Digital Politics; State-Sponsored Trolling; and The Biology of Disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000381,Instituto Igarapé,https://igarape.org.br/,Instituto Igarapé conducts research and analysis on Brazilian and international security and development with a thematic focus on cybersecurity. The organization's experts have written on the role of bots in Brazilian political discourse and disinformation in Latin America more generally. Its researchers also create data visualization tools to help address problems in security and development.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000382,Inter-American Dialogue,https://www.thedialogue.org/,"The Inter-American Dialogue is dedicated to research and analysis on issues of public policy and international affairs affecting North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean. It conducts research and advocacy on issues related to media, elections, and potential foreign influence through its Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000383,International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS),https://icds.ee/,"The ICDS research program on Security and Resilience addresses hostile influence strategies and operations and information warfare through research and advocacy. The organization collaborated on the Disinformation Resilience Index to assess Estonia's resilience to influence operations, and it hosted a development cooperation program supported by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs titled ""Resilient Ukraine: civil society support for strengthening national resilience and security in Ukraine.""",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,Estonia,,N,Y,,,
+G000384,International Fact Checking Network (IFCN),https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,The International Fact-Checking Network is a unit of the Poynter Institute dedicated to bringing together fact-checkers worldwide. The IFCN was launched in September 2015 to support a booming crop of fact-checking initiatives by promoting best practices and exchanges in this field.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,Y,Y,Y,,,
+G000385,International Forum for Democratic Studies (National Endowment for Democracy),https://www.ned.org/international-forum-for-democratic-studies/,The NED's International Forum for Democratic Studies is a leading center for analysis and discussion of the theory and practice of democracy around the world. The forum's areas of focus include authoritarian influence and the information space.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000386,International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA),https://www.idea.int/,"International IDEA conducts research and builds capacity in electoral processes, constitution-building, political participation, and political representation. Through its work on ICT, Elections and Democracy, International IDEA has developed guidance on appropriate uses of social media in electoral contexts and has convened experts to discuss the spread of misinformation about voting registration and practices.",,Government,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000387,International Republican Institute: Beacon Project (IRI),https://www.iribeaconproject.org/,"IRI has established the Beacon Project to address state-sponsored influence operations, particularly those emanating from Russia. The project identifies and exposes false or misleading information and helps facilitate a response with its local partners. The organization has also developed a media monitoring tool called >versus< that it shares with local media partners in Central and Eastern Europe. The Beacon Project is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Research (primary/secondary),Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000388,International Standard Content Code,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000389,Internet Archive TV News Archive,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000390,Internet Association,https://internetassociation.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000391,Internet Health Report,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000392,INTERNETLAB: Law and Technology Research Center,http://www.internetlab.org.br/en/,"Through its project on Electoral Rights in the Digital Era, INTERNETLAB has convened experts in electoral law and experts on the digital environment to address issues like digital propaganda and the use of bots in elections. INTERNETLAB has also produced a guidebook for citizens navigating technology platforms titled ""Surviving on the Networks,"" and it runs a project titled Você na mira meant to empower citizens in the face of digital microtargeting during elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000393,Internews Ukraine,https://internews.org/,"Internews Ukraine supports the development of free and independent media in Ukraine through advocacy, legislative efforts, training for journalists, and countering propaganda and misinformation online. The organization has created a communication strategy for advocating Ukraine's integration in the European Union and countering propaganda created by pro-Russian forces.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Ukraine,,N,Y,,,
+G000394,InVid,https://www.invid-project.eu/,InVid is an EU-funded project dedicated to building a platform for assessing the reliability and authenticity of online video content.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000395,IP2 Location,https://ip2location.com,"P2 Location’s software identifies the geolocation of IP addresses, as well as whether the IP address is an anonymous proxy, VPN, or TOR IP address. It retrieves geolocation information with no explicit permission required from users.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
+G000396,IREX,https://www.irex.org/,"IREX works globally to promote inclusive and democratic societies by creating informed, educated, and civically active citizenries. IREX has partner organizations located around the world to aid in developing capacity for independent media. IREX has implemented a Learn to Discern program for educating citizens in Ukraine about the threat of manipulative information and building digital literacy skills.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000397,ISAO,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000398,ISBA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000399,ISOC,https://www.internetsociety.org/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000400,Istinomer,https://www.istinomer.rs/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,Y,N,,,
+G000401,Istinomjer,https://istinomjer.ba/,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,Y,N,,,
+G000402,Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI),https://www.iai.it/,"IAI provides research and analysis on issues in Italian public policy, international peace and security, and European integration. The organization's experts have published analysis on social media, truth, and European politics. IAI works with the German Marshall Fund to organize the Mercator European Dialogue, a network of members of European parliaments that meets to discuss public policy issues. Through the program, the German Marshall Fund and its partners convened policymakers to discuss disinformation and fake news in European elections in May 2019.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Italy,,N,Y,,,
+G000403,Italian Postal and Communications Police Service (Polizia Postale e delle Comunicazioni),https://www.commissariatodips.it/,"In advance of elections in 2018, the Italian government established an online platform where citizens can report false or misleading information and request verification. The platform is managed by the Postal and Communications Police Service, which is responsible for information and communications technology-related crimes.",,Government,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,N,Y,,,
+G000404,İzlemedeyiz,http://izlemedeyiz.org/en/#intro,"İzlemedeyiz is dedicated to increasing transparency and accountability in the Turkish government through providing information for private sector entities about government activities. The organization also runs Doğruluk Payı, which conducts fact-checking.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Asia,Turkey,,N,Y,,,
+G000405,Jigsaw,https://jigsaw.google.com/,"Jigsaw employs scientists, engineers, researchers, designers, and policy experts to create online tools and platforms dedicated to addressing repressive censorship, online harassment, violent extremism, and injustice and corruption. Jigsaw has contributed data and conducted research on the topic of disinformation, deepfakes, and fake news. They have also partnered with the Duke Reporters' Lab to develop the ""Share the Facts"" widget to help Internet users share fact-checked information.",Yes,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000406,Jordanian Media Credibility Monitor (AKEED),https://akeed.jo/en,The Jordanian Media Credibility Monitor is a project of the Jordan Media Institute that aims to support the development of quality media in Jordan.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Jordan,,Y,Y,,,
+G000407,Journalist,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000408,Keyhole,https://keyhole.co/,"Keyhole provides a platform of tools to measure the impact of social campaigns. The company tracks, measures, and reports on the success of social campaigns. The company offers a real-time dashboard of metrics and analysis points. The solution focuses on hashtag and influencer data, and measures metrics such as reach, impressions, engagement and followers. Using this tool, users can set goals and calculate the impact and success of a social campaign on Twitter, Youtube, Instagram or Facebook.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000409,Kharon,https://www.kharon.com,Kharon is a research and analytics firm that generates insight about sanctions-related risk intelligence. Kharon works with financial services firms and other multinational institutions. Kharon utilizes a proprietary technology and a staff of expert analysts to identify and map connections between individuals and entities that have been sanctioned by different governments and international bodies and their associates.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000410,Kings College London: Centre for Strategic Communications,https://www.centreforstrat.com/,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000411,"Knight commission on trust, media and democracy",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000412,Knight Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000413,Knight Prototype Fund,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000414,Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,https://www.kas.de/,"Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung is a political foundation that provides research and advocacy on German public policy issues. Its researchers have written on influence operations in Europe, fact-checking in Africa, and extremism online, among other topics related to disinformation and foreign interference.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000415,Kosh Archive (Tattle),https://tattle.co.in/products/kosh,"Main archive that contains content scraped from all the different sources- the Tattle Jod telegram bot, Fact-checking sites, social media and chat apps.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,India,,N,N,,,
+G000416,Kremlin Watch,https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000417,KRIK,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,N,,,
+G000418,Krik,https://www.krik.rs/,"OCCRP's Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK) is dedicated to supporting Serbian investigative journalism. Comprised of both non-profit journalism centers and for-profit media organizations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, OCCRP aims to use investigative reporting and fact-checking to expose and deter corruption.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Serbia,,N,Y,,,
+G000419,Krypometri,https://kallxo.com/krypometer/,"Krypometri is the fact-checking arm of Kallxo.com, an online platform edicated to reporting on corruption, organized crime, fraud, and abuse in Kosovo. The organization is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Kosovo,,Y,Y,,,
+G000420,La Chistera,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000421,La Voce,https://www.lavoce.info/,La Voce is an Italian online news platform and a former member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
+G000422,Labor of Love,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000423,Latvia,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000424,Le Monde (Les Décodeurs),https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/,Le Monde's Les Décodeurs is the French newspaper's fact-checking platform and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
+G000425,Lead Stories,https://leadstories.com/,Lead Stories is an online platform that tracks trending news stories to identify and debunk false or misleading information as quickly as possible. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000426,Les Decrypteurs,https://ici.radio-canada.ca/decrypteurs,,,,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,N,,,
+G000427,Les Observateurs (France 24),https://observers.france24.com/en/,Les Observateurs is a project of France 24 that is dedicated to empowering citizen journalists by verifying and publishing eyewitness accounts of news stories. The platform is part of the International Fact-Checking Network and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000428,Leviathan,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000429,Libération (Check News),"https://www.liberation.fr/desintox,99721",Libération's CheckNews is the current fact-checking platform for the French newspaper and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,Y,Y,,,
+G000430,Lie Detectors,https://lie-detectors.org,"Lie Detectors' news literacy project aims to turn schoolchildren in Europe aged 10-15 into powerful lie detectors and critical thinkers, empowering them to understand news media, make informed choices and resist peer pressure as they assemble their worldview.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000431,Linterna Verde,https://linternaverde.co/,"Linterna Verde provides research and analysis on issues concerning information and debate online, private and public regulation of the online information space, and civil rights and liberties. One of its ongoing projects concerns the dynamics of political messaging on WhatsApp.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,South America,Colombia,,N,Y,,,
+G000432,Logically,https://www.logically.ai/,"Logically builds products and services to meet modern challenges in combating misinformation, disinformation, propaganda campaigns and identifying problematic content in the digital domain space.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000433,London Institute for Contemporary Christianity (LICC),https://licc.org.uk/,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000434,London School of Economics (LSE),,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000435,London School of Economics: Arena (Institute of Global Affairs),http://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/arena,"Housed at the Institute of Global Affairs, Arena is a programme dedicated to overcoming the challenges of disinformation. The aim of the Arena programme is to use high-quality research, analysis and evaluation to create effective best practices that can then be disseminated to journalists, public diplomacy teams and civic groups.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000436,London School of Economics: Department of Media and Communications,http://www.lse.ac.uk/media-and-communications/truth-trust-and-technology-commission,"The LSE Truth, Trust and Technology (T3) Commission deals with the crisis in public information. They work with experts, practitioners and the public to identify structural causes of media misinformation and set out a new framework for strategic policy in a report. T3 is funded by the LSE Knowledge Exchange & Impact Fund.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000437,"London School of Economics: Truth, Trust and Technology (T3) Commission",,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000438,Loughborough University,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000439,Lui President,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000440,Luminate,,,,,Funders,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000441,Lund University: Department of Strategic Communication (Lunds Universitet Strategisk Kommunikation),https://www.isk.lu.se/en/research/research-projects/countering-disinformation-protecting-elections,"Lund University's Department of Strategic Communication has been commissioned by more than a dozen organizations including the UK Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), EU-NATO Hybrid Centre of Excellence and NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence to produce hands-on guidance, processes and training to counter influence operations.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000442,Mafindo,https://www.mafindo.or.id/,Mafindo is an organization dedicated to fact-checking and exposing hoaxes in Indonesian media and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Indonesia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000443,Main Street One,https://mainstreet.one/,Main Street One is a technology company dedicated to identifying online narratives and producing countermessaging on behalf of clients.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000444,Maldito Bulo,https://maldita.es/malditobulo/,Maldito Bulo conducts fact-checking of stories circulating online and creates web-based tools to help news consumers identify false or misleading information. Maldito Bulo is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network. The organization also runs training programs at universities and other public and private institutions.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
+G000445,Manipulátoři,https://manipulatori.cz/,"Manipulátoři provides perspective and insights on politics and strategic communications at a time of rampant disinformation, misinformation, and fake news.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000446,Markkula Center for Applied Ethics,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000447,Marvelous AI,https://marvelous.ai/,Marvelous AI is a technology company that is dedicated to identifying and analyzing online narratives and their imapct on public discourse.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000448,Masaryk University: Department of Political Science (Masarykova Univerzita Katedra Politologie),https://www.fakescape.cz/en,"Masaryk University developed Fakescape, an escape game for high school students designed to teach media literacy and critical thinking skills.",Yes,Education/academia,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Czech Republic,,N,Y,,,
+G000449,McKinsey,,Mike Chui,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000450,Media Cloud,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000451,Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI),https://www.mediadefence.org/,"MLDI is an organization dedicated to providing legal defense in support of freedom of the press around the world. Alongside the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the International Fact-Checking Network, MLDI helped set up the Fact-checkers Legal Support Initiative. MLDI also partners with organizations around the world dedicating to advancing legal protection for journalists and developing independent media organizations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000452,Media Literacy for Citizenship (EAVI),https://eavi.eu/,"EAVI is an organization that conducts research and advocacy on media literacy in Europe. EAVI has conducted research to define and measure media literacy in Europe and provided policy recommendations for advancing media literacy in the bloc, and the organization creates curriculum and online tools for educating young people about media literacy.",,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,Education (public),,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000453,Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000454,Media Monitoring Africa (MMA),"
+https://mediamonitoringafrica.org/","MMA promotes access to media and media freedom and conducts monitoring and evaluation of media quality in South Africa, especially during elections. The organization also provides monitoring assistance to other organizations, media literacy training, training for journalists covering human rights issues, and online tools for citizens seeking to improve media literacy and strengthen journalistic accountability.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,South Africa,,N,Y,,,
+G000455,Media Ownership Monitor,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000456,Media Well,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000457,MediaBias Fact Check,https://mediabiasfactcheck.com,"Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC), founded in 2015, is an independent online media outlet. MBFC is dedicated to educating the public on media bias and deceptive news practices.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000458,MediaLab (Agence France Presse),https://www.afp.com/en/agency/medialab,"AFP is a leading global news agency providing fast, comprehensive and verified coverage of the events shaping our world and of the issues affecting our daily lives. Drawing from an unparalleled news gathering network across 151 countries, AFP is also a world leader in digital verification. With 2,400 staff representing 100 different nationalities, AFP covers the world in six languages, with a unique quality of multimedia storytelling spanning video, text, photos and graphics.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000459,MediaMath,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000460,Medium,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000461,Meedan,https://meedan.com,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000462,Meedan.org,https://meedan.com/,"Meedan.org is a nonprofit that creates tools for journalists and translators. One of its projects, Check, has focused on providing online tools and training resources for journalists to combat the spread of false or misleading information. The organization also runs a Credibility Coalition, aimed at creating a holistic framework for assessing credibility in the media context, and a Content Moderation Project, which addresses technical and theoretical issues related to the practice of content moderation online.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000463,Memex,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000464,Memo 98,http://memo98.sk/,"MEMO 98 is an organization that monitors media, largely during elections, and provides monitoring reports and recommendations on media legislation to international institutions and civil society groups. The organization also provides training and capacity-building support to national organizations conducting media evaluation. Memo 98 works with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on their international election observation efforts.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
+G000465,Mention,https://mention.com/en/,"Mention is a social media and web monitoring tool offering real-time alerts for keywords and allowing users to monitor millions of sources.
+ The company monitors popular sites such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Pinterest in order to alert users when keywords are used.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000466,MentionMapp Analytics,https://mentionmapp.com/,"Mentionmapp technology enables visualization of the spread of Twitter trends, including identification of influencers. They also offer services to aid analysis of bot activity.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000467,Metafact,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000468,Metro (Viralgranskaren),https://www.metro.se/viralgranskaren,"Through its Viralgranskaren (Viral Reviewer), Metro conducts fact-checking and organizes a list of sites that produce satirical news that is sometimes mistaken for true information or that produce deliberately false and misleading information. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000469,Mexico,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000470,MGP Fact Check,http://www.mygopen.com,"MGP Fact Check is an independent organization based in Hsinchu, Taiwan. Since 2015, they have been offering free fact checking services to users of Line, a popular messaging app in Taiwan.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
+G000471,Microsoft Belgium: cybersecurity,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000472,Microsoft: Defending Democracy Program,https://news.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/topic/defending-democracy-program/,"The Defending Democracy Program will work with stakeholders including governments, non-government organizations, academics and industry all in democratic countries globally to protect campaigns from hacking; increase political advertising transparency online; explore technological solutions to preserve and protect electoral processes; and defend against disinformation campaigns.",,Technology,,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000473,Midstream Technology,http://midstream.us,"Midstream Technology's ""Aletheia"" algorithm is a method for identifying specific patterns and behaviors exhibited by networks of accounts in social media. The Aletheia platform can identify global behaviors indicative of astroturf campaigns. Then, using metadata and account posting patterns, identify which accounts are malicious bots gaming recommendation algorithms and which are genuine human run accounts. It can also pick up on rhetorical cues common in disinformation, such as sensationalization of information or pick up on behaviors from the network pushing the disinformation.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000474,Mimikama,https://www.mimikama.at/,Mimikama conducts fact-checking and provides media literacy resources.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Austria,,N,Y,,,
+G000475,Mind Over Media,https://propaganda.mediaeducationlab.com/node/1,"Mind Over Media: Analyzing Contemporary Propaganda is an online crowdsourced learning platform with over 3,500 examples of current propaganda from more than 40 countries, along with a suite of 9 lesson plans suitable for use in high school, college and with adult learners. The program is fully translated into Polish, Romanian, Croatian, Finnish, Swedish, French and Dutch.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000476,Minnesota,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000477,Misinfocon,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000478,Misinformation Solutions Forum,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000479,MIT: Center for Civic Media,https://civic.mit.edu,"Working at the intersection of participatory media and civic engagement, the Center for Civic Media's mission is to design, create, deploy, and assess tools and processes that support and foster civic participation and the flow of information between and within communities.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000480,MIT: Ethics & Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative (Media Lab),https://aiethicsinitiative.org,"The MIT Media Lab runs the Ethics & Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative in partnership with the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society. The initiative has addressed artificial intelligence's impact on the quality of media and the ethical, political, and technical questions associated with its impact. Through the Ethics & Governance of AI Initiative, MIT has provided financial support to projects at the intersection of media and technology, including a project to develop better tools for detecting deepfakes and a project for detecting misinformation on WhatsApp.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000481,MIT: Laboratory for Social Machines (Media Lab),https://www.media.mit.edu/groups/social-machines/overview/,"The MIT Media Lab's Laboratory for Social Machines conducts research on human networks, natural language processing, network science, and machine learning.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000482,MIT: Viral Communications Research Group (Media Lab),https://www.media.mit.edu/,"The Viral Communication Research Group invents personal devices that contain your data and the rules for its use, and conducts video analysis based on machine learning to understand the subcarriers of information in the news and bottom-up civic mobilization tools that are locally and culturally responsive.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000483,MITRE,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000484,Moat,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000485,Moat/Oracle,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000486,MOST,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Macedonia,,N,N,,,
+G000487,Mozilla,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000488,Mozilla Foundation,https://foundation.mozilla.org/en/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000489,Mozilla information trust initiative,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000490,Myth Detector (Media Development Foundation) (MDF),http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/home,"Through its Myth Detector website, MDF conducts fact-checking and provides quality information and teaching and training opportunities for Georgian youth. Through the Media & Information Literacy Lab, MDF provides media literacy games, curriculum, and training in support of anti-propaganda efforts. MDF also partners with European Values to build civil society capacity to respond to Kremlin-backed disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Georgia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000491,Mythos Labs,http://www.mythoslabs.org/,"Mythos Labs provides a tool called MIDAC to detect disinformation campaigns on social media, measure their impact, and then auto-generate counter narratives.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000492,MyWOT,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000493,National Autonomous University of Mexico: Civic Innovation Lab (UNAM),https://unamcivic.com/index.html,"The UNAM Civic Innovation Lab is a research laboratory at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) that studies real world problems involving citizens, governments, and NGOs; and uses human centered design to create novel computational systems that address these problems to construct improved societies. Their civic tech research involves the areas of crowdsourcing, disinformation, and machine learning.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,Mexico,,N,Y,,,
+G000494,National Chengchi University: Election Study Center,https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/PageFront,"Elections are central to democratic politics. They offer citizens an opportunity to choose representatives and government officials, and provide governments with a legitimate basis for exercising power. The quality of elections has a direct effect on the nature of democracy itself. In recent years, Taiwan's political system has undergone a dramatic transition and has nearly completed the transition from authoritarianism to consolidated democracy. Since elections have played and will continue to play a key role in this process of democratization, it is essential to undertake continuous and systematic research into election practices in order to both strengthen the foundations of democracy and also to raise the quality of elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
+G000495,National Democratic Institute (NDI),https://www.ndi.org/infotegrity,"NDI's INFO/tegrity project provides research on disinformation vulnerability and resilience and emerging technologies, monitors disinformation and computational propaganda in elections, assists social media platforms and tech platforms, shares tools to detect and disrupt disinformation, and rebuilds trust in institutions and processes. In support of these efforts, NDI organized a Digital Disinformation Forum with academic and think tank partners in 2018. NDI has also released guidance for its elections programs concerning disinformation and electoral integrity and an awareness-raising document for staff and local partners.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000496,NATO Stratcom,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000497,NATO: Strategic Communications Center of Excellence (StratCom COE),https://stratcomcoe.org/,"A part of NATO, the StratCom COE provides analysis, practical support, and conducts research and experimentation in communication to support member countries and NATO’s overall aims. This includes, for example, recent reports on disinformation in Sweden, measurement of the Russian Internet Research Agency’s impact in online conversations, strategic communication in the context of elections, a comprehensive study on hybrid threats, and the black market for social media manipulation, among other publications.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
+G000498,NESTA,,UK,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000499,New America: Open Technology Institute,https://www.newamerica.org/oti/,"Through its Open Technology Institute, New America created the Ranking Digital Rights Project, which creates a corporate accountability index to assess technology companies and their commitments to human rights online, including freedom of expression.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000500,New America: Public Interest Technology Initiative,https://www.newamerica.org/public-interest-technology/,New America's Public Interest Technology Initiative published a policy paper in 2018 on digital advertising and its relationship to precision propaganda.,,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000501,New Context,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000502,New Eastern Europe (NEE),http://neweasterneurope.eu/,"NEE is interested in political and policy issues in Eastern European states that were at one time a part of the Soviet Union or a member of the Eastern Bloc. While not a formal scholarly journal, the periodical makes use of journalistic style to provide and explore expert commentary from experts, scholars, historians, and politicians in pertinent areas. NEE authors have increasingly written on the topic of disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000503,New York Times,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000504,New York Times: News Provenance Project,https://www.newsprovenanceproject.com/,The News Provenance Project is dedicated to researching and developing ways to ensure that the context of visual content travels with that content.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000505,New York University,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000506,New York University: Center for Social Media and Politics (CSMaP),https://csmapnyu.org/,CSMaP studies the impact of social media on politics and develops new methods and technology tools to analyze the impact of social media on democracy. The organization houses the Social Media and Political Participation Lab and provides open-source data and tools for other researchers.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000507,New York University: The 100 Questions (GovLab),https://the100questions.org/about.html,"The 100 Questions Initiative seeks to map the world’s 100 most pressing, high-impact questions that could be answered if relevant datasets were leveraged in a responsible manner. The initiative's fifth domain focuses on identifying the top 10 questions related to disinformation:
+ 1) understanding the impact of disinformation on society,
+ 2) understanding disinformation as a social (engineering) phenomenon,
+ 3) improving information quality online and offline and
+ 4) evaluating the efficacy of different types of interventions against it.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000508,Newmark Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000509,News Co/Lab,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000510,News Cube,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000511,News Lab (Google News Initiative),https://newsinitiative.withgoogle.com/intl/en_gb/google-news-lab/,"Through the News Lab, the Google News Initiative is developing partnerships and providing training on contemporary issues in journalism. Trust and misinformation are News Lab priorities, and the organization provides support for initiatives like the Trust Project, First Draft, and Cross Check. Through the Digital News Innovation Fund, the Google News Initiative is providing support for European projects tackling challenges in the digital news environment, including a project called Digger, which aims to create audio forensic technologies that can assist in detecting deepfakes. Google is also integrating tagging strategies into Google News articles in some countries and modifying its algorithm to punish hate speech and disinformation in search results.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000512,News Literacy Project (NLP),https://newslit.org/,NLP creates digital media literacy curriculum for American middle and high school students. NLP also provides professional development programming for educators and journalists aimed at improving news literacy education.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000513,News UK,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000514,NewsCheck,https://www.newscheck.com/,NewsCheck is an organization analyzing existing journalistic ethics codes and building an artificial intelligence-enhanced system for reviewing and scoring online content.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000515,NewsFrames at Global Voices,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000516,NewsGuard,https://www.newsguardtech.com/,"Based on the input of journalists and editors, NewsGuard has developed a rating system for assessing the trustworthiness of websites based on nine journalistic criteria. The company also provides a ""nutrition label,"" detailing how websites perform against the criteria. NewsGuard's website also includes free news literacy resources for educators, libraries, and parents.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000517,NewsMobile Fact Checker,http://newsmobile.in/articles/category/nm-fact-checker/,"Fact Checker is the fact-checking arm of NewsMobile, an Indian media organization. Fact Checker is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000518,NewsQ,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000519,NewsTracker,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000520,NewsWhip,https://www.newswhip.com/,"NewsWhip is a social media engagement tracking firm that tracks content by amount and location of user engagement, as well as audience interests and changes in interest over time. NewsWhip specializes in monitoring real-time information about the spread of information and the actors behind it, and can help NGOs, news organizations, universities, and other civil society members to address the challenges of misinformation.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
+G000521,Newtral,https://www.newtral.es/zona-verificacion/fact-check/,,,Civil Society,Factchecking & Journalism,,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,N,,,
+G000522,Newtral para Atresmedia Televisión,https://www.lasexta.com/programas/el-objetivo/,Newtral conducts fact-checking of statements made by politicians and public figures in Spain. The organization is one Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers. El Objetivo de Ana Pastor is a fact checking and data journalism driven television program broadcast on laSexta every Sunday evening.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
+G000523,NewYork Times,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000524,Nisos,https://www.nisos.com,"Nisos offers managed intelligence solutions to help companies mitigate advanced threat actors, stop platform abuse, counter disinformation, mitigate insider threats and conduct due diligence.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000525,Nobias,https://nobias.com/,Nobias is a broswer extension that assesses the potential biases and credibility of news articles.,Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000526,Nobl Media,https://www.wearenobl.com/,"Formerly Trustium. Trustium is a software-as-a-service company that uses artificial intelligence tools to help advertisers ensure that their ads are placed on trustworthy, credible sites.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000527,Northeastern University,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000528,Northeastern University: Network Science Institute (NetSI),https://www.networkscienceinstitute.org/,"NetSI is dedicated to measuring and modeling network properties to better understand physical, social, informational, and technical systems. NetSI received a grant to launch the Center for an Informed Society, which will apply computational social science methods to study Google and Twitter's impact on the online information landscape.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000529,Northern Ireland Foundation: FactCheckNI (NIF),https://factcheckni.org/,"NIF runs FactCheck Northern Ireland (FactCheckNI), an online platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Irish politicians and public figures. FactCheckNI provides interactive training on fact-checking for citizens. FactCheckNI is also part of Co-inform, EU's consortium of experts working to address digital literacy in the European Union.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000530,Novetta,https://www.novetta.com/,"Novetta offer cyber analytics to preemptively identify threats, entity analytics to identify bad actors/ influencers, and mission and media analytics to monitor social media and news to identify key patterns and issues in the operating environment. Analysts can use Novetta’s analytics to uncover insights into the dissemination of disinformation on social media platforms and messaging forums. Social platforms can use Novetta’s analytics to identify suspicious posts and accounts associated with disinformation to support their content moderation efforts.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000531,NSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000532,NU.nl,https://www.nu.nl/nucheckt,Nu.nl conducts fact-checking of online content through its NUCheckt page. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
+G000533,NuCheckt,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000534,NuzzleRank,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000535,NYC: Media Lab,https://nycmedialab.org/,"NYC Media Lab is a consortium of private companies and New York universities dedicated to advancing innovation in media and technology. NYC Media Lab runs an annual Machines + Media event and convenes a Machines + Media AI Working Group to address issues like automated content moderation, deepfakes, privacy, and AI-driven publishing and distribution.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000536,NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights,,,,Education/academia,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,N,,,
+G000537,O Truco,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000538,ObserLatInf,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000539,Observador,https://observador.pt/,Observador is an online news platform that conducts fact-checking and is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Portugal,,Y,Y,,,
+G000540,OFCOM,https://www.ofcom.org.uk,"Ofcom oversees telecommunications, post, broadcast TV and radio (including the BBC’s output), has duties in relation to broadcast advertising and regulates certain online video services. It has a statutory duty to promote media literacy, under which it carries out research into people’s use of online services such as social media and video sharing platforms. In February 2020 the Government announced it was “minded” to grant new powers to Ofcom as the regulator for online harms.",,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000541,Ojo Bionico,https://ojo-publico.com/ojobionico,"Ojo Biónico is the fact-checking section of Ojo Público, a Peruvian investigative journalism outfit.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Peru,,Y,Y,,,
+G000542,Omelas,https://www.omelas.io/,"Omelas works to prevent violence, terrorism recruitment, and the spread of online propaganda by studying behavioral patterns, applying analytics and strategy, and identifying instances and entities who generate content. Omelas is working to map the online information environment as it pertains to disinformation and propaganda.",,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000543,Online News Association (ONA),https://journalists.org/,"ONA is currently the largest digital journalism association in the world. They seek to support high quality digital journalism through developing best practices for incorporating technology into journalism and reporting, collecting metrics, and developing new revenue models. Recently, ONA has made efforts to grow their efforts to tackle misinformation and fake news. Its 2019 conference featured a session on ""Preparing for the Future of Deepfakes"" alongside other discussions on local news, misinformation, and digital journalism.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000544,Open Government Partnership,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000545,Open Information Partnership,https://www.openinformationpartnership.org,"The Open Information Partnership is a network of organisations and individuals across Europe working in open, independent, fact-based reporting.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000546,Open Society,https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000547,Open Society European Policy Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000548,OpenFacto,https://openfacto.fr/2021/02/14/la-detection-de-la-desinformation-sans-coder/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000549,OpenSources,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000550,OpenX,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000551,Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),https://www.occrp.org/en/about-us,,,,,,,,,Europe,Serbia,,,,,,
+G000552,OSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000553,Oštro,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Slovenia,,N,N,,,
+G000554,Our.News,https://our.news/,"Our.News has created a browser extension that provides users with ""nutrition labels"" for news consumption to help them better assess the quality of information.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000555,Oxford University: Computational Propaganda Project (Internet Institute),https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Computational Propaganda Project conducts research on algorithms, bots, and social media applications and their impacts on the spread of propaganda, the manipulation of conversations online, trust in media institutions, and political campaigns and elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000556,Oxford University: Internet and Society; Public Policy Programme at The Alan Turing Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000557,Oxford University: Junk News Aggregator,https://newsaggregator.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Junk News Aggregator compiles posts by news outlets that have failed to meet a set of criteria, and are thus not deemed to be trustworthy by the technology. It provides users with an overview of such information trending on Facebook and related engagement statistics.",Yes,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000558,Oxford University: Oxford Internet Institute,https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk,"The Oxford Internet Institute is a multidisciplinary research and teaching department of the University of Oxford, dedicated to the social science of the Internet.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000559,Oxford University: Oxford Technology and Elections Commission (OxTEC),https://oxtec.oii.ox.ac.uk/,"The Oxford Technology and Elections Commission, (OxTEC) is uniting experts on politics, technology, security and human rights to re-envision what constitutes trusted guidelines for managing a modern election. With the help of policy makers, elections administrators, and both computer and social scientists, OxTEC is exploring how democracies can integrate democratic norms and practices into the use of information technologies, social media, and big data during campaigns, with the goal of protecting the integrity of elections.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000560,Oxford University: Reuters Institute for Journalism Studies (RIJS),https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/,"RIJS conducts research and provides fellowships to advance high-quality journalism. In support of its Digital News Project, RIJS researchers investigate topics related to journalism and technology, including social media and online news, citizen trust in media institutions, and the spread of false or misleading information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000561,PageFair,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000562,Pagella Politica,https://pagellapolitica.it/,Pagella Politica is an online fact-checking platform dedicated to assessing statements made by Italian politicians. The organization is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Italy,,Y,Y,,,
+G000563,Palantir,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000564,Park Advisors,https://www.park-advisors.com/,"Park Advisors uses technology and strategic partnerships to advocate for the rights of vulnerable and at-risk populations. In 2019, Park Advisors published the Disinformation Report, in fulfillment of a commissioned request on the part of the U.S. Department of State's Global Engagement Center (GEC). Park Advisors have also partners with GEC to run DisinfoCloud, and online database that evaluates tools that aim to research or counter online disinformation.",,Other,Public Policy,,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000565,Park Associates/GEC advisor,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000566,Patikrinta (15min),https://www.15min.lt/tema/patikrinta-15min-62531,"Patikrinta (Lithuanian for ""Checked Out"") is the fact-checking arm of Lithuanian media organization 15min. 15min is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network and is a Facebook Third-Party Fact-Checker.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,Y,Y,,,
+G000567,PEN America,https://pen.org/pen_tags/misinformation/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000568,People-centered Internet,https://peoplecentered.net/pci-home-2/about/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000569,Pesa Check,https://pesacheck.org/,"PesaCheck is an African fact-checking organization that concentrates on financial and statistical information reported and promises made by public figures in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. PesaCheck is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Ethiopia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000570,Pew Research Center,https://www.pewresearch.org/topics/trust-facts-and-democracy/,"The Pew Research Center conducts social science research on American attitudes and trends related to politics and public policy, journalism and media, and technology, among other issues. Recently, Pew has devoted additional resources to its research around trust, facts, and democracy in order to inform conversations about the role of information in society.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000571,PGP Stronger,https://stronger.org/,,,,,,,,Y,,,,N,N,,,
+G000572,Ping Digital Network,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000573,Poland,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000574,Poletika,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000575,Policy Change Index,https://policychangeindex.org/,"The Policy Change Index (PCI) is an AI-assisted tool for propaganda analysis. The PCI project is open-source with two key features: It automates the content analysis of propaganda, and it delineates the boundaries between analysts’ objective assessment and subjective judgment.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000576,Polígrafo,https://poligrafo.sapo.pt/,Polígrafo is a Portuguese fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Portugal,,Y,Y,,,
+G000577,Political Capital,https://www.politicalcapital.hu/introduction.php,"Political Capital has been involved in the fight against conspiracy theories, fake news, disinformation and the post-truth phenomenon since 2010. They work to counter the spread of fake news and conspiracy theories. They also raise awareness about the problem and create guidelines on recognising and arguing against manipulative articles, information.",,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Europe,Hungary,,N,Y,,,
+G000578,PolitiFact,https://www.politifact.com,Politifact conducts fact-checking journalism. They aim to give citizens the information they need to govern themselves in a democracy.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000579,Polygraph (BBG),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000580,Pop-Up Newsroom,https://popup.news/,"Pop-Up Newsroom is a media organization that produces innovative reporting to address specific contexts like elections. Pop-Up Newsroom was responsible for Verificado 2018, an anti-misinformation initiative focused on Mexico's 2018 elections and for Riksdagsvalet, a misinformation-tracking initiative focused on Sweden's general elections.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,"Link dead, and there's another, earlier, popup newsroom",
+G000581,Post Facto,https://www.postfactogame.com/,Post Facto is an online game that teaches players to recognize and flag indicators that an article may contain misinformation. The goal of this solution is to educate the public about how to recognize false information.,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,,,N,Y,,,
+G000582,Poynter Institute for Media Studies,https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/,"Through its International Fact-Checking Network, the Poynter Institute for Media Studies provides research on trends, best practices, and developments in international fact-checking efforts and supports fact-checking initiatives worldwide. The network provides fellowships, grants, and training for fact-checkers. The Poynter Institute is also the parent organization of PolitiFact, which conducts fact-checking in the United States.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000583,Prague Security Studies Institute (Pražský Institut Bezpečnostních Studií) (PSSI),http://www.pssi.cz/russia-s-influence-activities-in-cee,"PSSI conducts research on international peace and security in European states and provides training to students and professionals through conferences, workshops, and its Security Scholars Program. Part of its research agenda centers around Russian influence activities in Central and Eastern Europe, and PSSI has published analysis and sought to raise awareness about influence operations related to NATO, vaccinations, elections, and other topics. PSSI is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,,,N,Y,,,
+G000584,Predata,https://predata.com,"Predata parses open-source data to generate quantitative indicators of risk via machine-learning algorithms that can describe & predict trends. Government agencies can partner with Predata to build a predictive model to notify stakeholders when disinformation activity occurs. Analysts can use Predata algorithms to understand which topics and which actors are most active in spreading online disinformation, as well as better understand and predict disinformation trends and tactics.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000585,Pressland,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000586,Primer.ai,https://primer.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000587,Princeton University: Empirical Studies of Conflict Project,https://esoc.princeton.edu/,"The Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) launched in 2009 to support research on insurgency, civil war, and other politically motivated violence, worldwide. Today, ESOC identifies and compiles a wide range of micro-level data to empower scholarship and to help address pressing security threats. Beyond supporting research, we are committed to enabling policy responses to challenges related to political violence, ranging from civil war to economic development to misinformation campaigns.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000588,Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
+G000589,ProFact Moldova,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000590,Project Domino,https://github.com/TheDataRideAlongs/ProjectDomino,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000591,Propastop,https://www.propastop.org/eng/,Propastop is an independent blog dedicated to exposing propaganda and falsehoods circulating in Estonian media. The organization has also created a monitoring robot called Propamon that searches for mentions of Estonian in Russian media. Propastop is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Estonia,,N,Y,,,
+G000592,Protected Voices Initiative (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation),https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence/protected-voices,"The FBI’s Protected Voices initiative provides tools and resources to political campaigns, companies, and individuals to protect against online foreign influence operations and cybersecurity threats.",Yes,Government,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000593,Public Editor,,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000594,Quantcast,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000595,Quod,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000596,R Street Institute,https://www.rstreet.org/,"R Street engages in policy work to solve often-under addressed social issues. The recipient of a Madison Initiative Grant, they have used the support to sponsor their Governance Project, which aims to bolster the processes of U.S. democracy and institutions, namely the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, in the face of growing political polarization. The organization also runs an Election Security Initiative to help build capacity for state and federal efforts to share information about threats to elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000597,Radware Bot Manager,https://www.radwarebotmanager.com/,Formerly Shieldsquare. Shieldsquare can be used to protect a website or to prevent bots from interfering with a web application by analyzing their behavior and taking actions to thwart the bot.,,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Asia,,,N,Y,,,
+G000598,RAND Corporation,https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html,"RAND Corporation provides public policy research and analysis, and its experts have written on influence operations in the context of ""gray zone"" operations below the threshold of war, media literacy, and Russian propaganda and social media influence, among other topics.",Yes,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000599,Rappler,https://www.rappler.com/,Rappler is a news agency based in the Philippines that provides fact-checking services through its Rappler IQ subsection and supports the development of quality journalism worldwide. Rappler also organizes a Move.PH chat series to engage citizens around the issue of responsible and ethical journalism in the digital age. Rappler is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,Y,,,
+G000600,Raskrinkavanje,https://raskrinkavanje.ba/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,Y,N,,,
+G000601,Raskrinkavanje Montenegro,https://www.raskrinkavanje.me/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Montenegro,,N,N,,,
+G000602,rbutr,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000603,Real Instituto Elcano,http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en,"Real Instituto Elcano runs a project called MINDb4ACT, which is a multi-stakeholder effort to combat radicalization and violent extremism in Europe. Part of this work is aimed at countering propaganda and hate speech online and better understanding how online radicalization occurs.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,Europe,Spain,,N,Y,,,
+G000604,Reality Check,https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cp7r8vgl2rgt/reality-check,Reality Check is the BBC's fact-checking section.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000605,Reality Team,http://realityteam.org/,"Reality Team is powered by a team of communications professionals, technologists, cybersecurity and disinformation analysts from the private and public sector who are committed to pushing back against disinformation. Our content is entirely independent, and non-partisan, focused on dispelling myths, rumors and disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Countermeasures/response,,,,Y,North America,,,N,N,,,
+G000606,Recorded Future,https://www.recordedfuture.com,"Recorded Future uses machine learning and natural language processing to identify the source of dark web content to enable further investigation. Analysts can use Recorded Future to identify if disinformation is being shared on dark web chat forums, or identify an increase in the dissemination of cyberhacking tools and data that enable the spread of disinformation.",Yes,Technology,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000607,Redacción Fáctica,https://nomada.gt/author/factica/,Redacción Fáctica is a Guatemalan fact-checking project created by Agencia Ocote and Nómada.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,South America,Guatemala,,Y,Y,,,
+G000608,Renew Europe Group,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000609,Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press (RCFP),https://factcheckerlegalsupport.org/,"RCFP provides legal resources in support of the U.S. First Amendment. Through its Fact-checkers Legal Support Initiative, developed with the International Fact-Checking Network and the Media Legal Defence Initiative, RCFP has created legal guides for fact-checkers. The organization also supports transparency in journalism and has written about the need to protect journalists from potential unintended consequences of laws aimed at curbing influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000610,Reporters Without Borders: Information & Democracy Commission,https://rsf.org/en,RSF gathered an International Commission on Information & Democracy in 2018 and is working to implement the principles outlined in the resulting International Declaration on Information & Democracy that support Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and efforts to protect freedom of expression online.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,France,,N,Y,,,
+G000611,Reporters Without Borders: Journalism Trust Initiative (RSF),https://rsf.org/en,"Through its Journalism Trust Initiative (in partnership with Agence France Presse, the European Broadcasting Union, and the Global Editors Network), Reporters without Borders (RSF) is developing a set of trust and transparency standards for journalism outlets with input from stakeholders in media, policy, technology, and academia. RSF also gathered an International Commission on Information & Democracy in 2018 and is working to implement the principles outlined in the resulting International Declaration on Information & Democracy that support Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and efforts to protect freedom of expression online.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,France,Y,Y,Y,,,
+G000612,Research Innovations,http://www.researchinnovations.com/,"Research Innovations develops a variety of software for government and military clients. Their expertise includes AI, big data, machine learning and analytics. Users can monitor messaging, disinformation campaigns, and malign influence tactics.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000613,Research Institutes of Sweden (Sveriges Forskningsinstitut) (RISE),https://www.ri.se/en/what-we-do/projects/skilled-online-understanding-disinformation,RISE's Skilled Online project develops and tests curriculum and teaching tools related to disinformation online. Students participate in a workshop where they navigate online interactions based on their personal identities and vulnerabilities and learn skills for identifying and responding to false or misleading information.,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000614,Reuters Digital News Institute,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000615,Reuters Fact Check Team,,US; UK,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000616,Reuters Institute,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000617,REVEAL,https://revealproject.eu/,"REVEAL is an EU-funded project to develop technologies for verification of content online. The company will focus on social media analysis, understanding information flows, and generating an effective picture of how content travels online.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000618,Reveal (Media Verification Assistant),http://reveal-mklab.iti.gr/reveal/index.html,"The Media Verification Assistant is an online tool for assessing the source and veracity of images, developed by CERTH-ITI and Deutsche Welle.",Yes,Media,,,,,,Global,Greece,,N,Y,,,
+G000619,Riddle,https://www.ridl.io/en/,"Riddle offers neutral and objective analysis on Russian domestic and foreign engagement. The organization also provides this in-depth analysis in both English and Russian. Recently, Riddle authors have written on topics of fake news and propaganda efforts linked to Russia and the Kremlin.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000620,Right Wing Watch - Muck Rack ,https://muckrack.com/jared-l-holt/articles,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000621,RMIT ABC Fact Check,https://www.abc.net.au/news/factcheck/,"In partnership with RMIT University, ABC has a dedicated fact-checking team called RMIT ABC Fact Check to help assess claims made by politicians, public figures, and others engaged in public debate.",,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Australia and Oceania,Australia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000622,RoBhat Labs,https://www.robhat.com/,"RoBhat Lab's products include Botcheck, which is used to detect and track Twitter propaganda, and SurfSafe, which is a fake news browser extension for Chrome.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000623,Rocket Technology,https://www.rocket-technology.com,"Rocket Technology's solution set, SocioTrust enables analysis of social media disinformation in platforms with text, audio, pictures, photos, and video to determine what individual, corporate, or state actors are injecting into societies and how. It can also create counter-propaganda programs.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000624,Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),https://rusi.org/,RUSI provides research and analysis on influence operations through the lens of defense and security and has published analysis on issues like Russia's influence operations in Central and Eastern Europe and how democracies should respond to influence operations.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000625,RSF,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000626,Ryerson University: Social Media Lab,https://socialmedialab.ca/,"The Social Media Lab is a multi- and interdisciplinary research laboratory at Ted Rogers School of Management at Ryerson University. The lab studies how social media is changing the way people and organizations communicate, share information, conduct business and form communities online, and how these changes impact society. The lab’s research seeks to advance the public’s understanding of the benefits and pitfalls of social media adoption.",Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000627,SaferNet,https://new.safernet.org.br/#mobile,SaferNet is a Brazilian non-governmental organization that combats Internet crime in partnership with the Federal Public Ministry. It facilitates anonymous reporting and provides information and training about Internet safety and security.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,South America,Brazil,,N,Y,,,
+G000628,Schema Claim Review,https://schema.org/ClaimReview,"Schema.org is a website dedicated to the vocabulary of structured data on the internet. If a web page contains content that reviews claims, ClaimReview structured data can enable a summarized version of the fact check to be displayed in search engine results.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000629,Schema.org,https://schema.org,,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,,,,,
+G000630,Science Feedback,http://sciencefeedback.co/,"Science Feedback is a community of scientists that provide context and commentary for scientific information reported in the news. The project has specific sections dedicated to health issues and to climate change issues, called Health Feedback and Climate Feedback.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,World,,Y,Y,,,
+G000631,Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force,https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/protecting-democracy/security-task-force.html,"Leading up to the 2019 election, the Canadian government established a Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force to outline the responsibilities of various government agencies in monitoring, investigating, and responding to foreign threats to the integrity of Canadian elections.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000632,SEEcheck,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,,,N,N,,,
+G000633,Sensity,https://sensity.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000634,Serelay,https://www.serelay.com/,Serelay has created a product called Trusted Media Capture that conducts point-of-capture verification to enable customers that rely on photographs and videos to authenticate their content.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,,,Y,Y,,,
+G000635,Servicio de Information Publica,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000636,Sheffield University Natural Language Processing,https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/dcs,,Yes,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000637,Shout Out UK,https://www.shoutoutuk.org/,Shout Out UK creates and sells curriculum on political and media literacy to schools with the goal of empowering students to engage in the political process.,,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000638,SIDA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000639,Signal,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000640,Sleeping Giants,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000641,Slovak Foreign Policy Association (Slovenská Asociácia Zahraničnej Politiky) (SFPA),http://www.sfpa.sk/en/,"SFPA provides a space for discussion of foreign policy issues affecting Slovakia and the European Union. SFPA has organized projects on information warfare on the Internet and Russian information warfare and Ukraine, and it hosts the Slovak Forum Against Propaganda to create a space for discussion about influence operations and their impact on the European Union and NATO.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Slovakia,,N,Y,,,
+G000642,Snopes,https://www.snopes.com/,Snopes.com utilizes high quality and reliable investigative reporting to provide a documented fact-checking service that allows their readers to become informed and draw their own independent conclusions.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000643,SNV,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000644,Social Cyber-Security Working Group (Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems),https://sites.google.com/view/social-cybersec/home?authuser=0,"The Social Cyber-Security Working Group develops new metrics, technologies and algorithms for analyzing human socio-cultural behavior given vast quantities of data. It forecasts and explains changes in the socio-cultural behavior using agent-based model and network science and assesses the impact of, and provides support for, the development of new social and organizational policies and procedures.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000645,Social Media Guide,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000646,Social Media Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA),https://www.disinfobservatory.org/,"SOMA is a European Union-funded project aimed at creating a network of experts in disinformation, providing media literacy training program, and developing tools and standards for evaluating the impact of media programs and the quality of information sources.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Education (public),,,,Europe,Greece,,Y,Y,,,
+G000647,Social Science One,https://socialscience.one/,"Social Science One is running an inaugural project on ""the effects of social media on democracy and elections"" that will make data from Facebook available to researchers to study the interaction of media, technology, and democracy that can inform future policy recommendations.",,Technology,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000648,South Asia Check,http://southasiacheck.org/,South Asia Check is a fact-checking organization that covers South Asian news and the promises of public officials. South Asia Check is a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Nepal,,Y,Y,,,
+G000649,Spanish news,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000650,Sparks & Honey,https://www.sparksandhoney.com/,sparks & honey employs big data and human expertise to develop cultural intelligence. Their proprietary technology inputs data from a wide variety of sources and couples these with expert analysis to create structured data that highlights large-scale cultural trends.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000651,Squint,https://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/squint-sharpens-officials-perspective-to-combat-election-distortion,"SQUINT by MITRE, also known as “Social See Something, Say Something”, is a mobile app and browser plugin that enables crowdsourced reporting of disinformation. The tool allows a user (among the crowd) to quickly and easily submit a screenshot and page metadata of supposed disinformation to state and local officials with the click of an icon.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000652,SSRC Social Media Democracy Research Grants,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000653,"SSRC: Disinformation Research Initiative (Media & Democracy Network, Social Science Research Council)",https://www.ssrc.org/programs/component/media-democracy/the-media-democracy-network/#overview,"SSRC hosts a Program on Media & Democracy that promotes research on the relationship between media technologies and democratic practices. The program conducts the Disinformation Research Initiative to track scholarly research on the topic and manages the Media & Democracy Network as a place to share information and collaborate on scholarly projects related to misinformation/disinformation, polarization, hate speech, media consolidation, and other topics. Through its Social Data Initiative, SSRC also provides grants to organizations working with Social Science One on projects concerning social media and the flow of information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000654,SSRC: Program on Media & Democracy (Social Science Research Council),https://www.ssrc.org/programs/view/media-democracy/,"SSRC hosts a Program on Media & Democracy that promotes research on the relationship between media technologies and democratic practices. The program conducts the Disinformation Research Initiative to track scholarly research on the topic and manages the Media & Democracy Network as a place to share information and collaborate on scholarly projects related to misinformation/disinformation, polarization, hate speech, media consolidation, and other topics.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000655,SSRC: Social Data Initiative (Social Science Research Council),https://www.ssrc.org/programs/view/social-data-initiative/,"Through its Social Data Initiative, SSRC also provides grants to organizations working with Social Science One on projects concerning social media and the flow of information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000656,Stanford,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000657,Stanford University: Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC),https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Housed at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs, CISAC coordinates an Information Warfare Working Group and runs the Project on Russian Power and Purpose, which addresses Russian influence operations in the broader context of Russia's strategic aims and their impact on democracies worldwide.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000658,"Stanford University: Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)",https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs, CDDRL is dedicated to studying the interaction of the political, economic, social, and legal dimensions of democratic development. The center studies and teaches on poverty, instability, abusive rule, authoritarian resurgence, technology, populism, and globalization.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000659,Stanford University: Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society (PACS),https://pacscenter.stanford.edu/research/program-on-democracy-and-the-internet/,"PACS runs the Program on Democracy and the Internet, which conducts multidisciplinary research on ways to maximize the benefits of the Internet while minimizing the threats it poses to democratic processes. Its scholars focus on social media and democracy, algorithmic bias and automated social engineering, the deterioration of digital information ecosystems, and political framing in media.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000660,Stanford University: Cyber Policy Center,https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/,"Part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Cyber Policy Center houses the Global Digital Policy Incubator, a forum for multi-stakeholder collaboration on policies concerning the application of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in an increasingly digital ecosystem.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000661,Stanford University: Information Warfare Working Group; European Security Initiative (Center for International Security and Cooperation) ,https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/information-warfare-working-group,The Information Warfare Working Group is housed at The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. It is a multidisciplinary group of Stanford University scholars that meet quarterly to discuss the issue of cyber-enabled information warfare.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000662,Stanford University: Internet Observatory,https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/about,"Stanford University's Internet Observatory is a program of the Cyber Policy Center. It is a cross-disciplinary program of research, teaching and policy engagement for the study of abuse in current information technologies, with a focus on social media.",,Education/academia,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000663,Stanford University: Journalism and Democracy Initiative (JDI),https://jdi.stanford.edu,"JDI seeks to improve journalism with the use of data and algorithms; combat misinformation; address challenges in reporting, storytelling, news distribution and consumption; and launch a ""Trust and Verify"" project to focus on defending against manipulated photos and videos.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000664,Stanford University: Program on Democracy and the Internet,https://pacscenter.stanford.edu,"The Program on Democracy and the Internet (PDI) is housed at Stanford University. PDI creates and shares original empirical research around how digital technologies are impacting democracy to inform and educate decision-makers in the field, including the next generation of technologists, business leaders, and policymakers. This effort is intended to bring together scholars from a diverse set of disciplines to study the challenges and opportunities the Internet poses for democracies. The project also benefits from existing relationships with technology companies that serve as the new information intermediaries and the platforms for the new public square for modern democracy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000665,State Department,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000666,Stiftung Neue Verantwortung (SNV),https://www.stiftung-nv.de/en/project/strengthening-digital-public-sphere,"Through its ""Strengthening the Digital Public Sphere"" project, SNV is working with the German Federal Foreign Office to build government capacity to deal with disinformation. SNV also conducts research to better understand the spread of disinformation in society, levels of news literacy, and public policy solutions for addressing contemporary information environments.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000667,StopFake,https://www.stopfake.org/ru/glavnaya-2/,StopFake conducts fact-checking and research on influence operations in Central and Eastern European countries. It also provides resources to inform the public about verifying information and conducts trainings for interested parties upon request.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,Y,Y,,,
+G000668,"Study: trust, facts and democracy: public attitudes about the role of information in society",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000669,Sussex University CASM,https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/,,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000670,Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap) (MSB),https://www.msb.se/en/,"MSB is the agency of the Swedish government charged with helping prepare for accidents, crises, and the consequences of war. In the area of influence operations, MSB commissioned Lund University researchers to put together a research report and a handbook on countering information influence activities, and the organization has integrated countermeasures into its preparations for Swedish elections and its educational efforts.",,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Sweden,,N,Y,,,
+G000671,Tadaweb,https://www.tadaweb.com/,"Tadaweb is a platform for discovering and analyzing information on the web, which allows users to perform analysis of a specific topic to retrospectively derive insights about the spread of propaganda and disinformation. Analysts can monitor specific, suspicious online activity to address and counter disinformation in real-time.",Yes,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,Europe,Luxembourg,,N,Y,,,
+G000672,Taiwan AI Labs,https://ailabs.tw/,"Taiwan AI Labs’ technology is the “Islander System,” which takes a three-pronged approach to analyzing news and social media content: news content monitoring; news source inspection; and social media user behavioral analysis. The multidimensional analysis of news content will be available online so that users can see how different news outlets report the same story.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
+G000673,Taiwan FactCheck Center,https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/,Taiwan FactCheck Center is a Taiwanese fact-checking organization run by the Association for Quality Journalism and the Taiwan Media Watch and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,Y,Y,,,
+G000674,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/faq/,Tattle is a project that aims to address misinformation on chat apps and encrypted messaging platforms.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000675,Team Defence,,,,Defence/military,,,,,Yes,,UK,,,,,,
+G000676,Tech Media & Democracy (new york city universities partnership),https://www.techmediademocracy.nyc,"A partnership of New York City universities, Tech Media & Democracy aims to strengthen journalism in the digital environment and support democracy through research, teaching and training for individuals in journalism, design, and engineering.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000677,Terbium Labs,https://terbiumlabs.com/,Terbium Lab’s Matchlight dark web crawler provides visibility into information that has been exposed on the dark web. An API can connect Terbium’s data pipeline with analysis tools.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000678,Teyit.org,https://teyit.org/,Teyit.org conducts fact-checking and hosts fact-checking workshops to promote media literacy. The organization is part of the International Fact-Checking Network and is a Facebook Third-Party Fact-Checker.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Turkey,,N,Y,,,
+G000679,The Advertising Association,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000680,The Alan Turing Institute - Public Policy Programme,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000681,The Center for Humane Technology,https://www.humanetech.com/,,,,,,,,,,US,,,,,,
+G000682,The Conversation Australia,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000683,The Democracy Labs,https://thedemlabs.org/,"Democracy Labs is a hub for ongoing technology and creative innovation in service of a healthy democracy at the national, state, and local levels.  We focus on long term, sustainable and affordable solutions. An approach that is longer than an election cycle, and isn’t purely dependent on volunteers, can enable more qualified candidates to run for office and for more issue groups to bring about positive social change with little funds.",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000684,The Engine Room,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000685,The Factual,https://www.thefactual.com/static/about.html,"The Factual is a technology company that assesses the partisanship, bias, and credibility of online news articles.",,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000686,The Hague Center for Strategic Studies (HCSS),https://hcss.nl,"HCSS conducts research on issues in defense and security and provides policy recommendations, surveys, analyses, risk assessments, and other products to both public and private sector organizations, including the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. Its research has included analysis of hybrid conflict and Russian influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Netherlands,,N,Y,,,
+G000687,The IndiaSpend Foundation,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/can-fact-checking-emerge-as-big-and-viable-business/articleshow/69210719.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000688,The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,icij.org,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000689,The Journal,http://thejournal.ie,The Journal is an Irish online news source that conducts fact-checking. The organization is one Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers and is part of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
+G000690,The Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000691,The Media Bias Chart,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000692,The Nevada Independent Fact Checks,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000693,The News Hero,https://www.thenewshero.org/,The News Hero game gamifies the experience of discerning false news for public consumption. The goal of this solution is to educate the public on how to recognize disinformation.,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Europe,,N,Y,,,
+G000694,The Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,The Pro-Truth Pledge is an initiative that aims to encourage public figures to be truthful in their communications and citizens to hold one another accountable for sharing truthful information.,Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Public Policy,,,,,Global,USA,Y,Y,Y,,,
+G000695,The Propaganda Game,https://propagandagame.org,"The Propaganda Game is a free, publicly accessible social media literacy tool that aims to educate players on disinformation and its spread. It features the ability to upload and explore instances of propaganda found online, as well as functionality to facilitate teachers using the game in their classrooms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000696,The Thinkin Project,https://www.thethinkinproject.com/,"A global movement to increase resilience to disinformation, and help QAnon believers find a way out",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000697,The Trade Desk,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000698,The Trust Project,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,Y,Y,N,,,
+G000699,The Trusting News Project,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000700,The Verification Handbook (EJC),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000701,The Washington Post Fact-Checker,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000702,The Washington Post: Fact Checker,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/,The Washington Post's Fact Checker is the official fact-checking service of the U.S. newspaper.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000703,The Whistle,https://www.thewhistle.co.il/feed,The Whistle is an Israeli media monitoring and fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Israel,,Y,Y,,,
+G000704,Thompson Reuters Special Services,https://www.trssllc.com/,Thomson Reuters Special Services offers data-driven consulting in national security intelligence; the group has created a visualization tool capable of mapping a group or government's influence as it pertains to foreign investments and disinformation.,,Media,Investigations,,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000705,Thomson Reuters,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000706,Thomson Reuters Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000707,TinEye,https://tineye.com/,"TinEye offers a suite of computer vision-based tools that support image search, reverse image search, duplicate/modified image finding, image tracking alerts, and image verification. TinEye also offers an API that enables developers to integrate reverse search functionality into their own platforms or products.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000708,TopNet,http://eng.thu.edu.tw/,TopNet is a tool to identify fake social media accounts developed by Tunghai University in Taiwan.,Yes,Education/academia,,,,,,Asia,Taiwan,,N,Y,,,
+G000709,Transatlantic Council on Election Integrity (TCEI) Alliance of Democracies,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/transatlantic-commission-on-election-integrity/,"The Alliance of Democracies runs the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity (TCEI), which convenes individuals from media and government to prevent foreign interference in elections. TCEI advocates for campaigns to adopt its Pledge for Election Integrity, conducts monitoring in countries with upcoming elections, and promotes public policy solutions addressing deepfakes and other emerging technologies that threaten the integrity of elections.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000710,Transparency Map,https://www.transparentjournalism.org/journalist/,"A project of Spanish media organization Público, Transparency Map has designed the TJ Tool, a software that allows users to trace news information based on eight editorial indicators.",Yes,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Spain,,Y,Y,,,
+G000711,Transparency Task Force,https://www.transparencytaskforce.org/what-does-the-ttf-do/,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000712,Trive,https://trive.news/,Trive is a browser extension designed to alert users visiting sites that are not sufficiently credible.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000713,Troll Factory,https://trollfactory.yle.fi/,"Troll factory is a free, publicly accessible social media literacy tool that aims to educate players on disinformation and its spread by asking players to choose which in-game inflammatory content to share as a “troll.”",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Finland,,N,Y,,,
+G000714,Truepic,https://www.truepic.com,"Truepic's technology verifies that an image or video hasn’t been altered or edited, and watermarks it with a time-stamp, geocode, and other metadata. Truepic stores a version of the photo in its digital vault and assigns it a six-digit code and URL for retrieving it. Truepic also immediately logs the image or video onto the Bitcoin blockchain.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000715,Trust & Safety Professional Association,https://www.tspa.info,"The Trust & Safety Professional Association curates a collection of links, which trust and safety professionals may find useful in efforts such as developing policies, supporting moderators, and building systems to detect platform violations.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Global,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000716,Trust Metrics,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000717,Trust Project,thetrustproject.org,"The Trust Project offers a set of ""Trust Indicators"" to help audiences better understand an organization's ethics, fairness, accuracy, background, and reporting processes. The project also offers ""Trust Marks"" for any organization that works with the project to meet the standards outlined by the Trust Indicators.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000718,Trusted News,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000719,Trusted Times,https://trustedtimes.org,"Trusted Times uses a browser extension to identify fake and unreliable news and presents additional analysis through machine learning of any news article to show a reporter’s and news source’s bias, if any. Trusted Times screens thousands of news websites in the United States.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000720,TrustServista,https://www.trustservista.com/,"TrustServista provides artificial intelligence-based software to help media organizations and content creators determine the trustworthiness of news sources, analyze text, and track online information flows.",Yes,Technology,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Romania,,Y,Y,,,
+G000721,Truth and Trust Online,truthandtrustonline.com,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000722,Truth Nest,https://www.truthnest.com,"TruthNest offers an accessible, user-friendly dashboard for Twitter analytics to discern an account’s credibility based on their activity, network, and influence. Additionally, TruthNest offers a score of likelihood that the account is a bot.",Yes,Technology,,,,,,Europe,Greece,,N,Y,,,
+G000723,Truth or Fiction,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000724,Truth Tests,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000725,"Truth, Trust and Technology Commission - London School of Economics",,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000726,TruthBuzz by IFCJ,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000727,Trutheum,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000728,Tsek,https://tsek.ph/,,,,,,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,N,,,
+G000729,Tufts University: Edward R. Murrow Center for a Digital World,https://sites.tufts.edu/murrowcenter/,"Housed at the Fletcher School of International Affairs, the Edward R. Murrow Center for a Digital World was established to examine the role that news media, multinational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations play in international relations. The Center focuses on international media, public diplomacy, and the political and cultural impact of the digital media sphere.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000730,Twitter,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000731,Twitter Elections Integrity Archive,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000732,Twitter Trails,http://twittertrails.com/,TwitterTrails is an online tool used to track the spread of stories on Twitter and measure how users perceive the veracity of the stories.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Global,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000733,Twitter UK,,,,,,,,,,Europe,UK,,,,,,
+G000734,U.S. Department of Justice: Cyber-Digital Task Force (DOJ),https://www.ojp.gov/,"In 2018, DOJ established a Cyber-Digital Task Force to address global cyber threats. The task force produced a report categorizing types of malign foreign influence operations and describing DOJ's responses to these threats.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000735,U.S. Department of State: Global Engagement Center,https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/,"DOS oversees the Global Engagement Center, which leads the U.S. government's efforts to identify and counter foreign and non-state influence operations. The center works with allied governments, civil society and nongovernmental organizations, and private companies to develop best practices, and it oversees the Information Access Fund, intended to provide grant support to organizations countering disinformation. The center's Technology Engagement Team works with stakeholders to develop, test, and demonstrate technological solutions to the problem of foreign influence operations.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000736,U.S. Department of State: Technology Engagement Team,https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/,"The Technology Engagement Team directs, leads, synchronizes, integrates, and coordinates efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States and its allies and partner nations",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Countermeasures/response,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000737,U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation: Foreign Influence Task Force,https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence,"In 2017, FBI established a Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) to identify and combat foreign influence operations in the United States. FITF collects and shares information about ongoing influence operations and works with field offices on countermeasures.",,Government,Investigations,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000738,UCLA,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000739,UK Cabinet office,https://sharechecklist.gov.uk/ ,,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000740,UK Government - DCMS - Online harms,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000741,UK Government: DCMS subcommittee on online harms and disinformation,https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/438/digital-culture-media-and-sport-subcommittee-on-online-harms-and-disinformation/,,,Government,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,UK,,N,N,,,
+G000742,UK Parliament - House of Lords,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000743,UK Safer Internet Centre,https://www.saferinternet.org.uk/safer-internet-day/2021,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000744,Ukraine Crisis Media Center (UCMC),http://ucmc.org.ua/,"UCMC is dedicated to defending Ukraine's sovereignty in the face of Russian influence and serving as a hub for strategic communications within the country. UCMC houses a Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group that convenes experts to provide research and analysis in support of the Ukrainian government's efforts to counter Russian influence, and the organization has also developed a program on Strategic Communication to reassert control over the information space. UCMC is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,Y,Y,,,
+G000745,Ukrainian Prism,http://prismua.org,"Ukrainian Prism provides research and analysis on defense and security policy issues. The organization runs a Russian Disinformation Resilience Index in partnership with EAST Center, meant to assess the strength of Central and Eastern European countries in resisting Russian influence operations.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Ukraine,,N,Y,,,
+G000746,UMass,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000747,UN Verified project,https://shareverified.com/en,,,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Y,Global,,,N,N,,,
+G000748,Uni Arkansas at Little Rock,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000749,Uni Maryland,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000750,Unilever,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000751,Unisys,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000752,Unitary,https://www.unitary.ai,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000753,United for News,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000754,"United Kingdom Parliamentary Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport",https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/sub-committee-on-disinformation/,"The UK Parliamentary Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport hosts a Sub-Committee on Disinformation to explore legislative solutions to the issue of disinformation in the United Kingdom. The sub-committee grew out of an initial inquiry on disinformation and fake news that began in 2018 and conclusion in February 2019 with the publication of a formal report on the landscape of disinformation, political advertising, foreign influence, media literacy programs, and potential solutions.",,Government,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,UK,,N,Y,,,
+G000755,University of Arkansas at Little Rock: COSMOS,http://cosmos.ualr.edu/,"The Collaboratorium for Social Media and Online Behavioral Studies (COSMOS) Lab uses analytic methodologies to study online behaviors and sentiments, such as network reactions to certain types of content, and how false information spreads through a network.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000756,University of Cambridge,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000757,University of Florida: Consortium on Trust in Media & Technology (CTMT),https://www.jou.ufl.edu/consortium-on-trust-in-media-and-technology/,"The CTMT is a multidisciplinary research initiative centered around ""the crisis of trust affecting the nation and world."" The consortium creates a space for researchers at the university to collaborate, develop insights into how media and technology can become more trustworthy, and explore potential new policies and laws.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000758,University of Indiana,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000759,University of Liverpool,,,,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000760,University of Michigan,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000761,University of Munich: Center for Applied Policy Research (Universität München Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung) (CAP),https://www.cap-lmu.de/,"CAP conducts research on issues in public policy and international peace and security with the goal of bridging the gap between politicians and academics. CAP has addressed issues concerning cybersecurity, online campaigning, and other technological developments impacting democracy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,Europe,Germany,,N,Y,,,
+G000762,"University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Center for Information, Technology, and Public Life (CITAP)",https://citap.unc.edu/,"CITAP is dedicated to creating a foundational understanding of information environments in order to conduct research on misinformation, partisanship, polarization, propaganda, and political institutions. The group plans to make its data publicly available to inform additional research on the topic.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000763,University of Pennsylvania: Center for Media at Risk (Annenberg School for Communication),https://www.ascmediarisk.org/about/,The Center for Media at Risk strategizes in response to threatening political conditions. Knowing how media practitioners work under authoritarian regimes and circumstances of creeping authoritarianism can help free/defend/empower/protect/save the media.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000764,University of Pennsylvania: FactCheck.org (Annenberg Public Policy Center) (APPC),https://www.factcheck.org/,"Housed at APPC, Factcheck.org fact-checks statements made by American politicians during election cycles. Factcheck.org is one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact-Checkers.",,Education/academia,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,USA,,Y,Y,,,
+G000765,University of Texas at Arlington,,,Yes,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000766,University of Texas at Austin: Propaganda Program (Center for Media Engagement),https://mediaengagement.org/propaganda-2/,"Under the direction of Dr. Samuel Woolley, the propaganda program at the Center for Media Engagement focuses on how emergent technologies are used in and around global political communication. Woolley’s work on computational propaganda—the use of social media and other digital tools in attempts to manipulate public opinion—has revealed the ways in which a wide variety of political groups in the United States and abroad have leveraged tech such as bots and trending algorithms and tactics of disinformation and trolling in efforts to control information flows online.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000767,University of Texas: Center for Media Engagement (CME),https://mediaengagement.org/,"The Center for Media Engagement conducts research on journalism, media ethics, and science communication to develop strategies for more effective engagement with the public. The Center’s signature approach is one of “connective democracy,” which ""unites newsrooms, scholars, platforms, and public policy entities in a methodical approach toward bridging gaps in our society."" Their research has covered content moderation, building trust in news organizations, mitigating polarization, the ethics of deepfakes, and clickbait, among other topics.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Fact checking,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000768,University of Toronto: Citizen Lab,https://citizenlab.ca,"The Citizen Lab conducts research and policy engagement at the intersection of technology and international peace and security. Part of this agenda concerns ""targeted threats,"" or ""investigations into the prevalence and impact of digital espionage operations against civil society groups.""",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,Canada,,N,Y,,,
+G000769,University of Virginia: Democracy Initiative (DI),http://democracyinitiative.virginia.edu/,"The Democracy Initiative (DI) is dedicated to the study of democracy and challenges to democracy, both past and present. In 2019, DI announced two new labs: The Deliberative Media Initiative Lab will address the factionalism in the current media ecosystem and the undermining of norms and trust in institutions, and the Democratic Statecraft Lab will address growing authoritarianism around the world and its challenges to democratic institutions.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000770,University of Washington,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000771,University of Washington: Center for an Informed Public,https://ischool.uw.edu/research/center-informed-public,"The CIP is an interdisciplinary, non-partisan effort to convene industry, government, nonprofit, and academic stakeholders around developing strategies to resist misinformation and support an informed public in order to strengthen democracy. The Center is supported by the University of Washington Information School, Human Centered Design and Engineering Program, School of Law, and Communication Leadership Program.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,Democracy,Civil Liberties (human rights),,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000772,University of Washington: Cybersecurity Initiative (International Policy Institute),https://jsis.washington.edu/research/ipi/ipi-cybersecurity/,"The Cybersecurity Initiative produces written research, cultivates a network of professionals for the exchange of expertise, hosts events on cybersecurity policy, develops and teaches courses on cybersecurity and mentors students interested in cybersecurity policy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000773,University of Washington: Emerging Capacities of Mass Participation Lab (emCOMP) (Human Centered Design and Engineering),https://depts.washington.edu/emcomp/people/,"Housed at the School of Human-Centered Design & Engineering at the University of Washington, the Emerging Capacities of Mass Participation (emCOMP) Lab conducts research on new and social media and the changing dynamics of interaction in digital environments. With a particular focus on crisis events, emCOMP is investigating the spread of rumors and false or misleading information on social media platforms.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000774,University of Washington: International Policy Institute (IPI),https://jsis.washington.edu/research/ipi/ipi-cybersecurity/,"IPI's Cybersecurity Initiative provides research and teaching on international cybersecurity politics and policy. The initiative produces written research, cultivates a network of professionals for the exchange of expertise, and develops and teaches courses on cybersecurity policy. The faculty and fellows affiliated with the Cybersecurity Initiative have addressed disinformation in their research on elections integrity, deepfakes, and Russia’s cyber strategy.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000775,University of Wisconsin-Madison: Center for Communication and Civic Renewal (CCCR),https://mcrc.journalism.wisc.edu/groups/cccr/,"CCCR convenes faculty from multiple disciplines to study how state and regional communication systems affect political polarization. Its affiliates utilize public opinion research, computational content analysis, and qualitative interviews to conduct comparative studies of Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina in order to help local media combat political polarization.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000776,US Congress,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8rOMntep8w,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000777,US DOD,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000778,US DoS GEC,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000779,Userfeeds,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000780,VERA Files Fact Check,http://verafiles.org/specials/fact-check,"VERA Files Fact Check is a Filipino fact-checking organization, a member of the International Fact-Checking Network, and one of Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checkers.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,Philippines,,Y,Y,,,
+G000781,Verifica,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000782,Verificado 2018,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000783,Verificador,https://larepublica.pe/verificador,,,,Fact checking,,,,,South America,Peru,,N,N,,,
+G000784,Verificalo,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000785,Verity,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000786,Vilnius Institute of Policy Analysis (VIPA),http://www.vilniusinstitute.lt/,"VIPA conducts research and analysis on political institutions and public policy in Lithuania. The organization hosts scholars that study disinformation, information security, and media literacy, and it runs the #PackOfLies project, dedicated to revealing specific instances of disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Lithuania,,N,Y,,,
+G000787,Vinesight,https://www.vinesight.com/,Vinesight fights misinformation on social media channels by detecting trending campaigns and providing analytics and alerts about viral misinformation.,Yes,Technology,,,,,,Asia,Israel,,N,Y,,,
+G000788,Viralgranskaren,https://www.facebook.com/viralgranskaren/,"Metro's Viral Reviewer helps you find out if the story spread on social media is true. Let's review before you share. viralgranskaren@metro.se
+You probably do not think about it, but every time you share a link, write a status or instagram a picture, you tell a little story. About yourself, about your contemporaries, about Sweden. Thanks to the internet, today we tell more stories than ever before. We tell about our world, and thereby we shape it.
+Not infrequently, these stories are widely disseminated. A Facebook status that is starting to be shared can suddenly have reached thousands of people, leading to leaflets and hot debates. But since over 4.7 million Swedes have Facebook, texts can be shared tens of thousands of times without ever passing a journalist's feed. And that's a problem. Because when a story about something sensitive or important, something that places itself in the middle of contemporary currents, is read by many people, they often shape their picture of reality after it. Whether it's true.",,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Sweden,,Y,N,,,
+G000789,Vishvas News,http://www.vishvasnews.com/,Vishvas News is an Indian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000790,Vistinomer,http://vistinomer.mk/,Vistinomer is a Macedonian fact-checking organization and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,Macedonia,,Y,Y,,,
+G000791,Voice of San Diego - Fact Check,,,,,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,North America,,,Y,N,,,
+G000792,W3C,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000793,W3C Credible Web Community Group,https://www.w3.org/community/credibility/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,World,,Y,N,,,
+G000794,Watchdog Sri Lanka,https://watchdog.team/,,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,Y,Asia,Sri Lanka,,N,N,,,
+G000795,WatchDog.md,https://watchdog.md,WatchDog.md conducts research and analysis on public policy in Moldova with the goal of strengthening democratic development within the country. Its experts have published on Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe and the integrity of Moldovan elections in the face of potential foreign influence. WatchDog.md is part of the Center for European Policy Analysis's #DisinfoNet.,,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Moldova,,N,Y,teamwatchdog,,
+G000796,We Verify,https://weverify.eu/about/,"WeVerify is an EU-funded project designed to create a platform for collaborative content verification. InVID, a video content verification tool, is one product developed by the initiative.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Europe,UK,,Y,Y,,,
+G000797,Web Literacy for Student Fact Checkers,,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000798,WebQoof,https://www.thequint.com/news/webqoof,WebQoof is the fact-checking section of Indian media outlet The Quint and a member of the International Fact-Checking Network.,,Media,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Asia,India,,Y,Y,,,
+G000799,WFA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000800,WhiteOps,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000801,Who Targets Me?,https://whotargets.me/en/about-who-targets-me/,"Who Targets Me? is a browser extension that scrapes the ads from a user’s Facebook account in order to observe what political advertisements they receive. These ads are added to a database, where they are stored and analyzed. After continued use, the technology provides the user with a breakdown of posts and information about why the user was targeted with specific political content. Ads within the database can be studied for insights.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,Europe,Ireland,,N,Y,,,
+G000802,Wikimedia Foundation,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000803,Wikimedia Germany,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000804,Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies,https://martenscentre.eu,"The official think tank of the European People's Party, the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Policy produces research and analysis on European Union policy. Scholars affiliated with the center have published policy papers and reports on influence operations in relation to social media, content moderation, and European Parliament elections, among other topics.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Europe,Belgium,,N,Y,,,
+G000805,Wilson Center,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000806,Wilson Center: Digital Futures Project,https://www.wilsoncenter.org,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000807,Wilson Center: Science & Technology Innovation Program,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/science-and-technology-innovation-program,"The Wilson Center conducts research and analysis on national and international public policy issues, including science and technology. Through its Digital Futures Project and Science and Technology Innovation Program, the Wilson Center is conducting research on influence operations and supporting the work of a disinformation fellow who will conduct research, outreach, and capacity-building around countering disinformation.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000808,WITNESS,https://www.witness.org/,"WITNESS is dedicated to helping individuals use media to document human rights abuses. WITNESS has developed technological tools for verifying the authenticity of content, and through its Media Lab, the organization focuses on deepfakes and the need to develop strategies to verify the authenticity of content in order to secure freedom of expression.",Yes,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000809,Witness,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000810,World Economic Forum: Center for Cybersecurity,https://www.weforum.org/platforms/the-centre-for-cybersecurity,"The Center for Cybersecurity convenes experts around issues including cyber warfare, law, and norms.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
+G000811,World Economic Forum: Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution,https://www.weforum.org/,"Through the Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, WEF develops policy frameworks for emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning, and the Center for Cybersecurity convenes experts around issues including cyber warfare, law, and norms. The Strategic Intelligence Center offers insights and contextual intelligence in the areas of AI, behavioral psychology, civic participation, cybersecurity, digital communications, digital identity, geopolitics, and global governance.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
+G000812,"World Economic Forum: Shaping the Future of Media, Entertainment and Culture",https://www.weforum.org/platforms/shaping-the-future-of-media-entertainment-and-sport,"Through its Shaping the Future of Media, Entertainment and Culture Project, WEF is working to rebuild trust in media institutions. Its Quality Project is creating a tool that aggregates data from other initiatives assessing media quality and allows users to make personalized decisions about how to weight factors of media quality in their own assessments. Additionally, Project Meridio aims at creating an open-source tool to empower users to manage their personal data. WEF is also supporting local independent news through its United for News program and helped launch the DQ Institute, which seeks to improve digital literacy.",,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
+G000813,World Economic Forum: Strategic Intelligence Center,https://www.weforum.org/strategic-intelligence,"The Strategic Intelligence Center offers insights and contextual intelligence in the areas of AI, behavioral psychology, civic participation, cybersecurity, digital communications, digital identity, geopolitics, and global governance.",,Civil Society/NGO,Research (primary/secondary),,,,,Global,Switzerland,,N,Y,,,
+G000814,Xandr,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+G000815,Yale University: Information Society Project (Law School),https://law.yale.edu/isp,"Based at Yale Law School, the Information Society Project is an interdisciplinary research center dedicated to exploring issues at the intersection of technology and law. It houses the Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere, and the Knight Law and Media Program and the Media Freedom & Information Access Clinic, which trains students interested in careers in media law and provides free legal services to defend freedom of speech, freedom of the press and access to information.",,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000816,Yale University: Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere,https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/balkin-receives-funding-knight-foundation-study-digital-public-sphere,The Project on Governing the Digital Public Sphere will produce legal and policy recommendations to improve the functioning of the digital public sphere. The initiative studies topics from antitrust and privacy to content moderation and digital propaganda.,,Education/academia,Research (primary/secondary),Public Policy,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000817,Yonder,https://www.yonder-ai.com,"Yonder provides artificial intelligence tools to detect, monitor, and mitigate online influence operations. The company also publishes research on information integrity and digital influence operations. Was New Knowledge",Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000818,YOTI,https://www.yoti.com,,Yes,,,,,,,,UK,,,,,,
+G000819,YouTube data viewer (Amnesty International),,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,,,
+G000820,Zašto ne (Why Not),https://zastone.ba/en/,"Zašto ne (Why Not) is an organization that works on the creation of a safe, secure, healthy, active, efficient and accountable BiH society through increasing civic participation, influencing government accountability, use of new technology tools and promotion of socially engaged culture on the whole territory of BiH together with other interested groups, organizations, institutions and individuals.",,Civil Society/NGO,Societal Resilience,,,,,Europe,Bosnia and Herzegovina,,N,Y,,,
+G000821,ZeroFox,https://www.zerofox.com/,"ZeroFox has developed a social media risk management platform. It claims to manage risk on social networks, the dark web, and external channels. It also claims to offer protection from fraud and hacking; and provides alerts of physical attacks on specific people, locations, and assets.",Yes,Technology,Countermeasures/response,,,,,North America,USA,,N,Y,,,
+G000822,Zignal Labs,https://zignallabs.com/,,Yes,Technology,,,,,,North America,USA,,N,N,,,
+G000823,ZimFact,http://zimfact.org/,ZimFact is a Zimbabwean fact-checking organization.,,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,Journalism,,,,Africa,Zimbabwe,,Y,Y,,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups_removed.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups_removed.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52e1ebb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups_removed.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+name,url,description,provides_tools,sector,primary_role,secondary_role,primary_subject,secondary_subject,volunteers,region,country,rand_list,credco_list,carnegie_list,twitter_handle
+4Facts,,,,,,,"Blockchain, Media",,,,,,Y,N,
+BS Detector,https://www.producthunt.com/alternatives/b-s-detector,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
+Buscador: an OSINT linux virtual machine,https://inteltechniques.com/buscador/,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
+Remarrk,twitter.com/remarrk,,,,,,,,,,,,Y,N,
+WikiTribune,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiTribune,,,,,,,,,North America,USA,,Y,N,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups_suggested.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups_suggested.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3078b52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/externalgroups_suggested.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+Added?,Name,URL,Has volunteers?,Their description,Notes,Country,Source,Unnamed: 8,Unnamed: 9,Unnamed: 10,Unnamed: 11,Unnamed: 12,Unnamed: 13
+y,Federation of American Scientists,https://fas.org/ncov/disinformation-reports/,y,"Upon recognition of the threat that false information poses to science, the Federation of American Scientists established the Disinformation Research Group (FAS DRG). FAS DRG is composed of scientists, communications experts, data-scientists, and technologists with the intended purpose of detecting, understanding, and effectively exposing disinformation and false narratives surrounding COVID-19. FAS DRG uses multiple methods, technologies, and resources to execute the mission.",,USA,,,,,,,
+y,RealityTeam,http://realityteam.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,CogSecCollab,http://cogsec-collab.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,CTI League Disinformation Team,https://cti-league.com/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,Bellingcat,https://www.bellingcat.com/author/bellingcat/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,Credibility Coalition,https://credibilitycoalition.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,Pro-Truth Pledge,https://www.protruthpledge.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,AVAAZ,https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/disinfo_volunteer_231/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,UN Verified project,https://shareverified.com/en,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,Cities on the Internet,https://mwi.pl/,y,,,Poland,,,,,,,
+y,PGP Stronger,https://stronger.org/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+y,Czech Elves,https://www.facebook.com/cestielfoveofficial/,y,,,,,,,,,,
+,Iffy News,https://iffy.news/fact-check-search/,,,,,,,,,,,
+,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+cloudflare/circl: CIRCL: Cloudflare Interoperable ... - GitHub,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+"https://github.com/cloudflare/circlCIRCL (Cloudflare Interoperable, Reusable Cryptographic Library) is a collection of cryptographic primitives written in Go. The goal of this library is to be used as ...",,,,,,,,,,,,,
+CIRCL – The Center for Innovative Research in Cyberlearning,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+https://circlcenter.org/Please visit the new Center for Integrative Research in Computing and Learning Sciences (CIRCLS) website to learn about the new Research on Emerging ...,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,name,url,country,operates_in,description,focus,sector,primary_role,notes,provides_tools,volunteers,region,noideawhatthisis
+,Balkan Investigative Reporting Network,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Baltic Internet Policy Initiative,,,,Check this,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
+,BBC Media Action ,https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/our-work/covid-19,UK,Global ,"In a crisis, people need the right information to help keep themselves and their families safe. When the COVID-19 outbreak began, we responded quickly – training and working with partners to produce trusted, accurate and timely content for social media, radio and television, to help slow the spread of the novel coronavirus and counter harmful mis- and dis-information...In a crisis, people need the right information to help keep themselves and their families safe. When the COVID-19 outbreak began, we responded quickly – training and working with partners to produce trusted, accurate and timely content for social media, radio and television, to help slow the spread of the novel coronavirus and counter harmful mis- and dis-information.",Disinformation,Charity,,"Our dedicated teams moved rapidly to adapt our existing projects to address the knock-on effects of COVID-19 – from increased levels of violence against women, to children losing out on an education during lockdown. Through media, we’re helping people understand what they can do, individually and as a community, and how they can hold their leaders to account.",,,Europe,
+,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,,,,,,,,,"We are committed to supporting the international response for the long haul – helping people to survive, cope and recover from COVID-19, meeting their diverse and changing needs, and supporting local media to keep their communities informed.",,,,
+,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,,,,,,,,,"As an independent charity, we are not funded by the BBC TV Licence Fee. We rely on the support of generous donors – governments, foundations, corporations and individuals – to make our work possible.",,,,
+,,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,,,,,,,,,Trusted and accurate information will save lives.,,,,
+,Delfi Melo Detekto,https://www.delfi.lt/news/melo-detektorius/,Lithuania,,,disinformation,,,,,,,
+,Demagog Poland,https://demagog.org.pl/,Poland,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
+,DPA,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,ECDC,,,Europe,,,,,,,,,
+,Ekspress Meedia / Eesti Päevaleht,https://epl.delfi.ee/kategooria/86056905/faktikontroll-1,Estonia,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
+,Eurasia Partnership Foundation,https://epfarmenia.am,Armena,Armenia/Eurasia,,,,,,,,,
+,European External Action Service,https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en,EU,EU,,Disinformation,,;Public policy;,"""Disinformation is 'verifiably false or misleading information created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public'. Misinformation is verifiably false information that is spread without the intention to mislead, and often shared because the user believes it to be true.""                                      -(action plan):https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54866/action-plan-against-disinformation_en",,,Europe,
+,Fact and Furious ,https://factandfurious.com,France,Europe,recently reported on paid influencers campaigns to descredit AZ vaccine,Disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Journalism;Fact checking;,,,,Europe,
+,Facta,https://facta.news/,Italy,,,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking,,,,Europe,
+,Factcheck Vlaanderen,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Factchecking Finland,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Faktoje.al,https://faktoje.al/,Albania,Albania,,,,,,,,,
+,Freedom of Information Center of Armenia ,http://www.foi.am/en/,Armenia,Armenia,"online fact-checking courses, capacity building in media literacy for range of audiences",,,,,,,,
+,Georgia's Reforms Associates (GRASS),https://factcheck.ge/ka,Georgia,Georgia,,,,,,,,,
+,Influence,https://startinfluence.com/,USA,USA,"Influence Apps, Inc. is a strategic communications tool that simplifies complex technologies and techniques to help governments counter bad actors online. Powered by ad tech industry and government communications experts, Influence offers a suite of services that provide government operators tools for real-time sentiment analysis and communication campaign management.",,Technology,,,,,North America,Yes
+,Internews,,,,,,,,,,,Europe,
+,Maldita,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Media Checker,https://www.mediachecker.ge/,Georgia,Georgia,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
+,Media Development Foundation,http://www.mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/home,Georgia,Georgia,,,,,,,,,
+,Media Initiatives Centre,https://mediainitiatives.am/,Armenia,Armenia,Training. Runs the “Verified” section of the media.am website,,,,,,,,
+,MisInfoCon,https://misinfocon.com/about,,Global ,"MisinfoCon is a global movement focused on building solutions to online trust, verification, fact checking, and reader experience in the interest of addressing misinformation in all of its forms. MisinfoCon started as a large gathering at MIT in February 2017. That conference brought together ambassadors from technology platforms, news organizations, as well as experts in social science, media literacy, policy, advocacy and cybersecurity. Ever since then, MisinfoCon has focused on bringing people together in similar meetups, while facilitating online community and resource sharing.",Disinformation,NGO,;Network;,,,,Europe,
+,OECD,https://disinformation.the100questions.org,France ?,Global ,"100 questions initiative ""bilinguals"" (people with expertise in topical field and data science) to ID the 10 most pertinent disinformation questions to then be addressed",Disinformation,civil Society/NGO,Disinformation;Research (primary/secondary);,,,,Europe,
+,On the other side of the news,https://coronafakes.com,Ukraine,Ukraine,,disinformation,civil society,,,,,Europe,
+,Ostro,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Pledge to Pause,https://www.takecarebeforeyoushare.org/,,,Not checked yet,,,,,,,,
+,Raskrikavanje,https://www.raskrikavanje.rs/,Serbia,Serbia,Site run by Krik,disinformation,Civil Society/NGO,Fact checking; journalism,,,,Europe,
+,Reuters Fact Check,,UK,Global ,"Reuters Fact Check monitors digital platforms for misinformation that is linked to news events and to subjects that are being discussed by the communities we serve. We actively seek out groups and accounts that represent opposing viewpoints and apply the same standards of assessment to all content. Our choice of material to fact check is broad, and is based on the following criteria: [Could the material potentially cause real-world harm, if it is inaccurate?; Editorial value: is the topic timely and of public interest?; Reach: how far has the claim travelled? We examine the level of interactions on individual posts, as well as the visibility of the claim across different platforms.; Potential reach: is the information likely to be shared further? We examine how quickly the post is generating interaction and consider whether it may be repeated by others.; Balance of fact vs opinion: is it possible to isolate certain claims from the material?; After we have identified the content we aim to fact-check, we will first identify and summarize the key claims made in the content.; ",Disinformation,,;Fact checking ;,,,,Europe,
+,Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA),https://www.disinfobservatory.org/about-us/,Belgium,EU (members of the Observatory),"Offer fact checking tools, collaboartive  investigation ",Disinformation,,;Disinformation monitoring ;,,,,Europe,
+,Stanford University: Information Warfare Working Group; European Security Initiative (Center for International Security and Cooperation),https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/information-warfare-working-group,USA,USA,The Information Warfare Working Group is housed at The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. It is a multidisciplinary group of Stanford University scholars that meet quarterly to discuss the issue of cyber-enabled information warfare.,,Education/academia,,,,,North America,
+,Stop Fake ,https://www.stopfake.org/en/main/,Ukraine,Russia/Ukraine,,Disinformation,NGO,;fact checking  ;,Member of International Fact-Checking Network,,,Europe,
+,Stop Fals,https://stopfals.md/,Moldova,Moldova,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
+,Teyit,https://teyit.org/,Turkey,Turkey,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
+,The Goethe insititut with International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA),https://www.goethe.de/en/kul/bib/ser/lib/eiv.html,Germany ,Global ,,Disinformation,civil Society/NGO,,,,,Europe,
+,Tjek det,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,Translators without Borders,,World,World,,,,,,,,World,
+,Trolless,https://www.facebook.com/trolless/,Moldova,Moldova,,disinformation,,,,,,Europe,
+,UNDP,https://www1.undp.org/content/oslo-governance-centre/en/home/our-focus/Information-Integrity.html,,Regional/Global,,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);","""Information integrity""",,,Europe,
+,UNESCO,,World,World,,,,,,,,World,
+,UNICEF/ECARO,https://www.unicef.org/eca/,Geneva,Regional,no IDM page available,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);",Main focus on Vaccine Confidence Project (VCP). https://worldhealthorg.sharepoint.com/:w:/r/sites/WHERegionalOfficeforEurope/_layouts/15/Doc.aspx?sourcedoc=%7B3176E00E-9252-4DAB-946E-895288D3071B%7D&file=UNICEF%20-%20Social%20Listening%20Capacity%20Building%20Plan%202021.docx&action=default&mobileredirect=true,,,Europe,
+,Valent Projects,,UK,,Not checked yet.  Analyses misinformation for UK govt. ,,,,,,,Europe,
+,VoxCheck,https://voxukraine.org/uk/voxcheck/,Ukraine,Ukraine,,disinformation,civil society,,,,,Europe,
+,VoxUkraine,,,,,,,,,,,,
+,WHO Epidemic and Pandemic Intelligence Hub,,Germany,Global ,,Disinformation,WHO,;disinformation;,,,,Europe,
+,WHO-EPI WiN,https://www.who.int/teams/risk-communication/infodemic-management,Geneva,,,Disinformation,,";Liason (webinars, capacity building, guidance, policy recommendations);",,,,Europe,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/forums.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/forums.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a811e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/forums.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+name,externalgroup,focus,accessibility,url,summary,notes
+CogSecCollab incubator,CogSecCollab,,private slack,,,
+Memetics: hacking belief systems,,,public facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/memetics.hacking,,
+Strategic communication engineering,,,public facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/949960748352854,,
+Digital investigations for journalists,Knight Foundation,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/328713905036655,course group,
+Computational social science,,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/523771471380181,,
+Political depolarization at the Commons,BuildUp,,private facebook group,https://www.facebook.com/groups/thecommonspolitics,,
+r/DisinformationWatch,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/DisinformationWatch/,,
+r/ActiveMeasures,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/ActiveMeasures/,,
+r/DigitalManipulation,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/Digital_Manipulation/,,
+r/TrollFare,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/trollfare/,,
+r/Propaganda,,,public reddit group,https://www.reddit.com/r/propaganda/,,
+CMU IDEAS slack,,,private slack,https://cmuideas.slack.com/,,
+ArtIntoScience slack,,,private slack,https://artintoscience.slack.com/,,
+TTO Slack,,,private slack,https://tto-conference.slack.com/,,
+Misinfocon slack,,,private slack,https://misinfocon.slack.com/,,
+Fake News Challenge slack,,,private slack,https://fakenewschallenge.slack.com/,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/frameworks.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/frameworks.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0336d22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/frameworks.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+disarm_id,name,name_DE,summary,summary_DE,longname
+FW01,DISARM Red,,"incident creation framework. All the things that an incident creator will need to do to create, run, and assess the effectiveness of a disinformation incident.",,FW01 - DISARM Red
+FW02,DISARM Blue,,"incident counters framework. All the things that a response team, people outside the team, and organisations outside the team, will need to do to mitigate the effects of an incident, slow down an incident, stop an incident etc.",,FW02 - DISARM Blue
+FW03,DISARM Green,,"counter counters framework. All the things that an incident creation team might do to reduce the effectiveness of mitigations, counters, and responders to an incident. This framework doesn't officially exist yet: this id is for future work. ",,FW03 - DISARM Green
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidents.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidents.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..34c7e64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/incidents.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+disarm_id,name,objecttype,summary,year_started,attributions_seen,found_in_country,urls,notes,when_added,found_via,longname
+I00001,Blacktivists facebook group,incident,Internet Research Agency created fake @blacktivists facebook group and twitter account. ,2016,Russia,USA,https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/media/blacktivist-russia-facebook-twitter/index.html,,2019-02-24,,I00001 - Blacktivists facebook group
+I00002,#VaccinateUS,campaign,use both pro- and anti- topic messaging to create an artificial argument online. ,2014,Russia,World,https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/08/23/russian-trolls-twitter-bots-exploit-vaccine-controversy/,,2019-02-24,,I00002 - #VaccinateUS
+I00003,Beyonce protest rallies,incident,use both pro- and anti- topic messaging to create an artificial argument in real life. ,2016,Russia,USA,https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/10/russia-facebook-ads-us-elections-congress,,2019-02-24,,I00003 - Beyonce protest rallies
+I00004,#Macrongate,incident,amplified document dump failed because France was prepared for it.,2017,Russia,France,http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/,,2019-02-24,,I00004 - #Macrongate
+I00005,Brexit vote,campaign,"In early 2014, then UK PM David Cameron outlined the changes he aimed to bring about in the EU and in the UK's relationship with it. These were: additional immigration controls, especially for citizens of new EU member states; tougher immigration rules for present EU citizens; new powers for national parliaments collectively to veto proposed EU laws; new free-trade agreements and a reduction in bureaucracy for businesses; a lessening of the influence of the European Court of Human Rights on British police and courts; more power for individual member states, and less for the central EU; and abandonment of the EU notion of ""ever closer union"".He intended to bring these about during a series of negotiations with other EU leaders and then, if re-elected, to announce a referendum.
+European Union Referendum Act was passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It extended to include and take legislative effect in Gibraltar,and received royal assent on 17 December 2015.
+
+Conservative-led Department for Culture, Media and Sport select committee concluded (2018) Russia engaged in ‘unconventional warfare’ during the Brexit campaign. This included ‘156,252 Russian accounts tweeting about #Brexit’ and posting ‘over 45,000 Brexit messages in the last 48 hours of the campaign.’ As it said, Kremlin-controlled media, ‘RT and Sputnik had more reach on Twitter for anti-EU content than either Vote Leave or Leave.EU, during the referendum campaign’.
+
+The report by Democrats on the Senate foreign relations committee, titled Putin’s asymmetric assault on democracy in Russia and Europe: implications for US national security, pinpoints the way in which UK campaign finance laws do not require disclosure of political donations if they are from “the beneficial owners of non-British companies that are incorporated in the EU and carry out business in the UK”.
+
+The senators point out that Ukip and its then-leader, Nigel Farage, did not just fan anti-EU sentiment but also “criticised European sanctions on Russia, and provided flattering assessments of Russian President Putin”.
+
+The report adds that although officially the Russian government asserted its neutrality on Brexit, its English-language media outlets RT and Sputnik covered the referendum campaign extensively and offered ‘’systematically one-sided coverage’’.",2016,Russia,UK,https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2018/11/01/russian-trolls-used-islamophobia-to-whip-up-support-for-brexit/#1369afb665f2,,2019-02-24,,I00005 - Brexit vote
+I00006,Columbian Chemicals,incident,Early Russian (IRA) “fake news” stories. Completely fabricated; very short lifespan. ,2014,Russia,USA,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbian_Chemicals_Plant_explosion_hoax,,2019-02-24,,I00006 - Columbian Chemicals
+I00007,Incirlik terrorists,incident,Fake story transmitted from Russian media to Trump campaign,2016,Russia,USA,https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/16/paul-manafort/trump-campaign-chair-misquotes-russian-media-makes/,,2019-02-24,,I00007 - Incirlik terrorists
+I00008,Bujic,incident,,2017,Russia,Serbia,https://www.stopfake.org/en/vencislav-the-virgin-hostile-operation-by-vencislav-bujic-seas-foundation-and-its-network-of-collaborators/,Serbia pro-Kremlin disinfo campaign by Vencislav Bujic,2019-02-24,,I00008 - Bujic
+I00009,PhilippinesExpert,incident,"President of the Philippine visited Moscow and forged ties on information strategy in 2017, and afterwards a series of disinformation campaign was noted in Philippine social media and mainstream media, mostly in favor of Philippine president and promoting Russian propaganda. Among this is the appearance of an unknown-before expert on global affairs who was cited frequently in Russian IRA-connected outlets. ",2017,Russia,Philippines,https://codastory.com/disinformation/how-a-little-known-pro-kremlin-analyst-became-a-philippine-expert-overnight/,Philippines Social Media: Russian Disinformation by fake “expert”,2019-02-24,,I00009 - PhilippinesExpert
+I00010,ParklandTeens,incident,IRA trolls amplified the far right messaging around the attack. Most notably they amplified social media speculation that many of the teens involved were “crisis actors” nefariously injected into the conversation by outside actors with an anti-gun poltical agenda. Other amplifications included ongoing harassment of survivors and claims that the event is a hoax from the right; and fatalist cynicism about gun reform from the left.,2018,Unknown,USA,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/us/parkland-students-hogg-gonzalez.html,Parkland survivors,2019-02-01,,I00010 - ParklandTeens
+I00011,CovingtonTeen,incident,,2019,Unknown,USA,https://www.wcpo.com/news/national/fact-check-viral-misinformation-about-covington-catholic-nathan-phillips-infects-the-internet,MAGA kid (Covington),2019-02-01,,I00011 - CovingtonTeen
+I00012,ChinaSmog,incident,,2011,China,China,https://www.cjr.org/innovations/memes-pollution-censorship-china-beijing.php,"China smog (not an attack, but a counter to disinformation)",2019-02-24,,I00012 - ChinaSmog
+I00013,FranceBlacktivists,incident,,2014,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-glimpse-into-a-french-operation-f78dcae78924,France blacktivists,2019-02-24,,I00013 - FranceBlacktivists
+I00014,GiletsJaunePileon,incident,,2018,Russia,France,https://www.wired.com/story/co-opting-french-unrest-spread-disinformation/,Russian pile-onto #GiletsJaune (and expansion to other countries),2019-02-24,,I00014 - GiletsJaunePileon
+I00015,ConcordDiscovery,incident,"The Office of Special Counsel accused Concord Management (an IRA funder/handler) and its counsel of abusing the discovery process by leaking discovery materials under false pretences: the documents were altered; the documents were portrayed as material obtained by hacking, rather than legal process; the released documents are selected to maximize exposure targets and methods. ",2019,Russia,USA,https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/02/new-mueller-filing-shows-how-russia-misuses-us-courts/581884/,,2019-02-01,,I00015 - ConcordDiscovery
+I00016,LithuanianElves,campaign,,2014,Russia,Lithuania,https://www.ft.com/content/b3701b12-2544-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf,,2019-02-01,,I00016 - LithuanianElves
+I00017,US presidential elections,campaign,"Make Clinton look bad or unpopular, and Trump look good over a long period, to change individuals’ voting intentions. ",2016,Russia,USA,https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf,,2019-02-24,OII,I00017 - US presidential elections
+I00018,DNC email leak incident,tactic,,2016,Russia,USA,,"Channels: RU domestic, RU multilingual (RT/Sputnik), trolls. OII",2019-02-24,OII,I00018 - DNC email leak incident
+I00019,MacronTiphaine,incident,Far-right trolls on 4chan and Twitter spreading misinformation about French candidate Macron and spur support for rival candidate Le Pen.,2017,,France,https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/heres-how-far-right-trolls-are-spreading-hoaxes-about,Trolls OII,2019-02-24,OII,I00019 - MacronTiphaine
+I00020,3000 tanks,incident,,2017,Russia,World,https://medium.com/@DFRLab/three-thousand-fake-tanks-575410c4f64d,,2019-02-24,OII,I00020 - 3000 tanks
+I00021,Armenia elections,campaign,,2017,Russia,Armenia,https://medium.com/dfrlab/fakes-bots-and-blockings-in-armenia-44a4c87ebc46,,2019-02-24,OII,I00021 - Armenia elections
+I00022,#Macronleaks,incident,"Countering the spreading of an alleged 9GB of “leaked”, fake documents of Macron campaign",2017,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/hashtag-campaign-macronleaks-4a3fb870c4e8,,2019-02-24,OII,I00022 - #Macronleaks
+I00023,#dislikemacron,incident,,2017,Russia,France,https://medium.com/dfrlab/russian-and-french-twitter-mobs-in-election-push-bca327aa41a5,unsuccessful,2019-02-24,OII,I00023 - #dislikemacron
+I00024,#syriahoax,incident,,2017,Syria,USA,https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-the-alt-right-brought-syriahoax-to-america-47745118d1c9,,2019-02-24,OII,I00024 - #syriahoax
+I00025,EU Army,incident,"Traces back to 2016: Guardian “Is there a secret plan to create an EU army?” French President Emmanuel Macron has warned that Europeans cannot be protected without a ""true, European army"", as he marks the centenary of the World War One Armistice. On a visit to the former Western Front in Verdun, he said Russia had shown it could be a threat and Europe had to be able ""to defend itself better alone"". German Chancellor Angela Merkel backed the idea of an intervention force in June, but said it would have to be part of ""the structure of defence co-operation"".
+
+Verdict: “An EU army marching out to war under Brussels’ command is a fantasy shared by Eurosceptics and a small number of federalists. Europe will continue down the road of defence cooperation in a halting way, but an EU army is only for armchair generals.”",2018,Russia,EU,https://medium.com/dfrlab/spread-it-on-reddit-3170a463e787,,2019-02-24,OII,I00025 - EU Army
+I00026,Netherlands referendum on Ukraine,incident,,2016,Russia,Netherlands,https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russias-influence-in-western-elections/2016/04/08/b427602a-fcf1-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00026 - Netherlands referendum on Ukraine
+I00027,crucifiedboy,incident,,2014,Russia,Ukraine,https://helda.helsinki.fi//bitstream/handle/10138/233374/KhaldarovaPanttiFakeNews.pdf?sequence=1,,2019-02-24,OII,I00027 - crucifiedboy
+I00028,mh17 downed,incident,,2014,Russia,Ukraine,https://www.stopfake.org/en/lies-spanish-flight-operations-officer-from-kiev-informed-about-ukrainian-planes-involved-in-boeing-tragedy/%20https:/globalvoices.org/2014/07/20/the-russian-governments-7000-wikipedia-edits/%20https:/foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/29/how-mh17-gave-birth-to-the-modern-russian-spin-machine-putin-ukraine/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00028 - mh17 downed
+I00029,MH17 investigation,campaign,"Since the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur on 17 July 2014 while flying over eastern Ukraine, killing all 283 passengers and 15 crew on board… wreckage of the aircraft fell near Hrabove in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, 40 km (25 mi) from the border.The shoot-down occurred in the War in Donbass, during the Battle of Shakhtarsk, in an area controlled by pro-Russian rebels. This has proven to be an ongoing example of Russia and their proxies ability to wage a disinformation campaign, and exemplify the use of the 4 D’s (dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay) ",2016,Russia,Ukraine,https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2015/05/07/112052-facebook-zablokiroval-sergeya-parhomenko-za-kommentariy-doklada-o-sbitom-171-boinge-187%20 https://news.online.ua/754036/v-sotssetyah-na-paltsah-pokazali-kak-rabotayut-boty-kremlya-opublikovany-foto/ https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/ukraine-involved-mh17-downing-claims-14184413,"Changed to campaign (still in the news, and still Russia accusing Ukraine... TASS 03/25/19 and UK Daily Mirror (see URL's). It's links to overall campaign directed against Ukraine",2019-02-24,OII,I00029 - MH17 investigation
+I00030,LastJedi,incident,,2018,Russia,World,https://slate.com/culture/2018/10/last-jedi-star-wars-twitter-backlash-russia-trolls.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00030 - LastJedi
+I00031,antivax,apt,,2018,Russia,World,https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304567,,2019-02-24,OII,I00031 - antivax
+I00032,Kavanaugh,incident,"Before the Senate SCOTUS confirmation hearings of Brett Kavanaugh, professor Christine Blasey Ford--first anonymously, then publicly--accused Kavanaugh of inappropriate or criminal sexual behavior. Amplified by Russian trolls Right wing operatives first tried to doxx Ford, then to discredit her. Many observers suggest that the Kavanaugh hearings were the largest anti-US Russian online operation for months. ",2018,Russia,USA,https://qz.com/1409102/russian-trolls-and-bots-are-flooding-twitter-with-ford-kavanaugh-disinformation/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00032 - Kavanaugh
+I00033,China 50cent Army,apt,"50cent Army is a CCP “tool” - “massive secret operation” in China pumping out an estimated 488 million fabricated social media posts per year, part of an effort to “regularly distract the public and change the subject” from any policy-related issues that threaten to anger citizens enough to turn them out onto the streets. But the research finds no evidence these 50-centers are, in fact, paid 50 cents, nor does it find they engage in direct and angry argument with their opponents. Instead, they are mostly bureaucrats already on the public payroll, responding to government directives at a time of heightened tension to flood social media with pro-government cheerleading.",2014,China,China,https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/how_the_chinese_government_fabricates_social_media_posts_for_strategic_distraction_not_engaged_argument.pdf https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-that-chinese-troll/3540663.html,"campaign (multiple incidents, e.g. Shanshan riots)",2019-02-24,OII,I00033 - China 50cent Army
+I00034,DibaFacebookExpedition,incident,"In the Expedition, Diba engaged in a highly organized cyber-attack of a Taiwanese political leader. On January 20, 2016 (the day of President Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration) featuring the posting of an overwhelming number of social media comments in support of a PRC-sanctioned message. Netizens from one of the largest discussion forums in China, known as Diba, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message, a cyberattack referred to as the “Diba Expedition to Facebook.” 
+
+Unique for taking place outside of the Chinese Internet system, both transgressing technical and political norms while exposing their actions to an international audience. In spite of the transgressive nature of the action, “Diba Expedition” was highly praised by Chinese official media, in contrast to comparable activities in the past that lacked its explicit pro-government ideology. Yet—reflecting the complexity of Diba’s relationship with the PRC government—the Expedition was shut down after a few days.",2016,China,Taiwan,https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/96746 https://qz.com/598812/an-army-of-chinese-trolls-has-jumped-the-great-firewall-to-attack-taiwanese-independence-on-facebook/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00034 - DibaFacebookExpedition
+I00035,Brazilelections,campaign,Bot activity in Brazil elections,2014,Brazil,Brazil,https://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/politicalbots/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Brazil-1.pdf,,2019-02-24,OII,I00035 - Brazilelections
+I00036,BrazilPresDebate,incident,,2014,Brazil,Brazil,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/bots-brazil-the-activity-social-media-bots-brazilian-elections,,2019-02-24,OII,I00036 - BrazilPresDebate
+I00037,Rioelections,incident,,2016,Brazil,Brazil,https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/eleicoes-2016/2016/10/1823713-eleicao-no-rio-tem-tatica-antiboato-e-suspeita-de-uso-de-robos.shtml,,2019-02-24,OII,I00037 - Rioelections
+I00038,Brazilimpeachment,incident,,2016,Brazil,Brazil,http://www.labic.net/cartografia/a-rede-das-imagens-da-vaiadilma-novas-relacoes/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300415619_The_Influence_of_Retweeting_Robots_During_Brazilian_Protests,,2019-02-24,OII,I00038 - Brazilimpeachment
+I00039,MerkelFacebook,incident,"Top stories about Merkel in both German and English were negative and misleading, most published from fake news sites.",2017,Unknown,Germany,https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/hyperpartisan-sites-and-facebook-pages-are-publishing-false,,2019-02-24,OII,I00039 - MerkelFacebook
+I00040,modamaniSelfie,incident,,2015,Unknown,Germany,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/syria-refugee-anas-modamani-germany-facebook.html,,2019-02-24,OII,I00040 - modamaniSelfie
+I00041,Refugee crime map,incident,,2017,Unknown,Germany,https://uebermedien.de/11488/kartenlegen-mit-kriminellen-auslaendern/,,2019-02-24,OII,I00041 - Refugee crime map
+I00042,Saudi/Qatar bot dispute,incident,"In the summer of 2017, Twitter bots—automated accounts—were deployed to boost messaging on both sides of the diplomatic dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.” Calling this a “diplomatic dispute” understates the complexity of regional dynamics, at the center is an alleged report that Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, had made an astonishing speech, and alleged “hack” of Qatar’s official news agency, and further woven into concerns Saudi Arabia has about the influence of public perception, the role of Al Jazeera. ",2017,SaudiArabia,Qatar,https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/robot-wars-how-bots-joined-battle-gulf,"robot wars how bots joined battle in the gulf""",2019-02-24,MIS,I00042 - Saudi/Qatar bot dispute
+I00043,FCC comments,incident,,2017,Unknown,USA,https://gizmodo.com/how-an-investigation-of-fake-fcc-comments-snared-a-prom-1832788658,"does this count as an incident, or is it just hacking as usual?",2019-02-24,MIS,I00043 - FCC comments
+I00044,JadeHelm exercise,incident,"In the summer of 2015, thousands of troops from the US Army Special Operations command conducted and multi-state, weeks-long training operation across the southwest. Russian trolls amplified conspiracy theories promoted by far right media operatives such as Alex Jones, specifically: the Jade Helm 15 exercise was a precursor to domestic invasion and subsequent martial law by the Obama Administration in coordination with China. Some versions have deus ex machina such as an asteroid strike. Ultimately the Governor of Texas, Greg Abbot, was forced to speak out on the conspiracy theory, but he hedged on Obama’s motives.",2015,Russia,USA,https://www.politifact.com/texas/article/2018/may/03/jade-helm-15-greg-abbott-texas-state-guard-hayden-/,,2019-02-25,MIS,I00044 - JadeHelm exercise
+I00045,Skripal,incident,"On 4 March 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and double agent for the UK's intelligence services, and his daughter Yulia Skripal were poisoned in Salisbury, England, with a Novichok nerve agent known as A-234, according to official UK sources and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)",2018,Russia,UK,https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/skripal/ https://euvsdisinfo.eu/conspiracy-mania-marks-one-year-anniversary-of-the-skripal-poisoning/,This is Beliingcat's full library of Skirpal related reporting,2019-03-20,,I00045 - Skripal
+I00046,North Macedonia,incident,,2018,Russia,Macedonia,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/16/world/europe/macedonia-referendum-russia-nato.html https://www.polygraph.info/a/disinfo-analysis-macedonia-nato-russia/29770631.html,disinformation directed by Russian-backed groups trying to stoke fears and depress turnout in a vote that could put this Balkan nation on a path to join NATO.,2019-03-20,,I00046 - North Macedonia
+I00047,Sea of Azov,incident,"An international incident occurred on 25 November 2018 when the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coast guard fired upon and captured three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to pass from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait on their way to the port of Mariupol. In 2014, Russia had annexed the nearby Crimean Peninsula, which is dominantly internationally recognised as Ukrainian territory. It later constructed the Crimean Bridge across the strait. Under a 2003 treaty, the strait and the Azov Sea are intended to be the shared territorial waters of both countries, and freely accessible.
+The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is also responsible for border protection, claims that the ships illegally entered Russian waters. The FSB alleges that crews did not comply with demands to stop. In the scuffle, a Russian border patrol ship rammed and damaged a Ukrainian Navy tugboat. Russian forces later seized all three Ukrainian ships, confiscating them for violating Russia's border. Six Ukrainian navy soldiers were injured, the Ukrainian navy reported. ",2018,Russia,World,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/wave-of-disinformation-from-the-azov-sea/,,2019-03-20,,I00047 - Sea of Azov
+I00048,White Helmets,campaign,,2015,Russia,World,https://thesyriacampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/KillingtheTruth.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/syria-white-helmets-conspiracy-theories,,2019-03-20,,I00048 - White Helmets
+I00049,White Helmets: Chemical Weapons,incident,"On 7 April 2018, a high number of civilians were killed in the besieged Syrian city of Douma, with evidence pointing towards another chemical attack by the regime, according to the EU. Subsequent to this event, a series of images ""prove"" that the White Helmets ""staged"" the chemical attack in Syria.",2017,Russia,World,http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingghouta/disinformation-2/ https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/12/18/chemical-weapons-and-absurdity-the-disinformation-campaign-against-the-white-helmets/ https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/10/16/why-assad-and-russia-target-the-white-helmets/,,2019-03-20,,I00049 - White Helmets: Chemical Weapons
+I00050,#HandsOffVenezuela,incident,"Venezuela has been thrown into turmoil after Guaidó declared himself interim president Jan. 23. The 35-year-old president of the National Assembly says Venezuela's constitution grants him power to take control of the government because Maduro was re-elected last year by fraud. Guaidó has called for Maduro to leave office and call new elections.
+
+More than 50 nations, including the United States and most of Latin America, concluded that Maduro's re-election last year was a fraud. They have recognized Juan Guaidó, president of the opposition-led National Assembly, as Venezuela's legitimate head of state, endorsing his mission to establish a transitional government and hold fresh elections.
+Maduro has remained defiant in the face of domestic and international pressure, securing the support of the governments of Iran and Russia, as well as the loyalty of the Venezuelan military.",2019,Russia,World,https://euvsdisinfo.eu/twitter-as-an-information-battlefield-venezuela-a-case-study/,,2019-03-20,,I00050 - #HandsOffVenezuela
+I00051,Integrity Initiative,incident,"The UK Foreign Office has accused Russian state media of trying to discredit a government-funded body that works to counter Kremlin disinformation. A spokesperson said the Institute for Statecraft was hacked several weeks ago and documents were ""published and amplified by Kremlin news channels"".
+The FCO comments on the IfS were issued after a news report said the group had retweeted stories critical of Labour. Western officials believe the group involved in the hack is linked to the Russian state. Since then internal documents have been leaked to the Russian media about the organisation's activities, including lists of journalists it had contacted. The Foreign Office has provided £2.2m in funding to the institute over the last two years supported its work to counter disinformation overseas and not in the UK",2018,Russia,World,https://eaworldview.com/2019/01/counter-russia-disinformation-integrity-initiative/ https://www.stopfake.org/en/kremlin-watch-briefing-the-eu-has-to-start-taking-pro-kremlin-disinformation-seriously/,"This is an excellent example of the tables getting turned, and how we need to carefully work through offensive measures",2019-03-20,,I00051 - Integrity Initiative
+I00052,China overiew,campaign,,2015,China,World,https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/,"global strategic goals for China different from those President Vladimir Putin has for Russia; as a result, the social media influence techniques used by China are different from those used by Russia.",2019-03-20,,I00052 - China overiew
+I00053,China Huawei CFO Arrest,incident,"Dec. 1: Canadian authorities arrest Huawei's chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou at Vancouver’s airport while she is en route from Hong Kong to Mexico, after an extradition request from the Americans. The news becomes public on Dec. 5. Dec. 7: In Vancouver, Meng appears in court, where allegations of fraud are laid out. The U.S. alleges Meng misled American banks in a bid to get around American sanctions on Iran. 
+Geopolitically complex issue combines US/China trade; Security concerns/issues related to Huawei’s 5G wireless equipment; diplomacy between Canada & China as Chinese subsequently arrest Canadian citizens.",2018,China,World,https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/czech-zeman-babis-huawei-xi-trump/584158/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-chinas-envoy-says-white-supremacy-played-part-in-canadas-arrest-of/,"“The Chinese have been very active here,” said General Andor Šándor, a former chief of the Czech military-intelligence service who is now a security consultant. “They don’t want to undermine our relationship with NATO, or the EU, unlike the Russians. What they are really keen on is to squeeze as much technological information from us as possible.”",2019-03-20,,I00053 - China Huawei CFO Arrest
+I00054,China Muslims,incident,,2018,China,World,https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/china-says-foreign-concerns-over-muslim-rights-unwarranted-1.4178042 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/,"China rejects the allegations that it has locked up large numbers of Muslims in re-education camps. The facilities, it says, are vocational training centers that emphasize “rehabilitation and redemption” and are part of its efforts to combat terrorism and religious extremism.",2019-03-20,,I00054 - China Muslims
+I00055,50 Cent Army,campaign,,2008,China,World,https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-that-chinese-troll/3540663.html,,2019-03-20,,I00055 - 50 Cent Army
+I00056,Iran Influence Operations,campaign,"Iranian interference in the politics of Arab countries has become more self-evident since the Arab Spring of 2011. Iran has been trying to widen its influence in the region in a political confrontation with Saudi Arabia. Factor long-held hostility to US (Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil”) & Isreal; it’s funding of proxies (Hezbolla) and Shia militia’s in Iraq; and most recently having the Revolutionary Guard being designated a terror organization; the seeming collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (nuclear programme) and expanding economic sanctions all add up to an increased likihood of Iran expanding their information operations.
+While there is history to Iran’s information/influence operations, starting with FireEye’s report about Iranian “fake news” websites, and subsequent reports by DFRLab (Jan 31, 2019 and March 26, 2019) we have strong document proof and assets that highlight Iran’s activities.",2012,Iran,World,https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/suspected-iranian-influence-operation.html https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/08/irans-disinformation-campaigns.html https://medium.com/dfrlab/takedown-details-of-the-iranian-propaganda-network-d1fad32fdf30 https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8dhttps://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/04/Iran-Memo.pdf,"FireEye has identified a suspected influence operation that appears to originate from Iran aimed at audiences in the U.S., U.K., Latin America, and the Middle East.",2019-03-20,,I00056 - Iran Influence Operations
+I00057,Mexico Election,incident,,2018,"Russia,Mexico",Mexico,https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/misinformation-seeded-by-bots-and-trolls-invades-mexico-s-election-20180502-p4zctx.html https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-russian-bots-in-mexico-46003fcab4,,2019-03-20,,I00057 - Mexico Election
+I00058,Chemnitz,incident,,2018,Russia,Germany,https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2018-09-04/chemnitz-far-right-alternative-news http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-facing-turbulence-after-right-wing-unrest-a-1228121.html,,2019-03-20,,I00058 - Chemnitz
+I00059,Myanmar - Rohingya ,campaign,,2014,Myanmar,Myanmar,https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/ https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-role-genocide-myanmar-new-reporting-complicates-narrative,Personal note (see Reuters side bar... end of article) JFG contributed research re: Twitter,2019-03-20,,I00059 - Myanmar - Rohingya 
+I00060,White Genocide,campaign,,2018,Russia,World,https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/the-high-price-of-white-genocide-politics-for-australia-20180724-p4zt9k.html https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/trump-white-nationalism/568393/ https://www.iafrikan.com/2018/11/20/social-media-usa-south-africa-fake-news-disinformation/,Personal note (see Reuters side bar... end of article) JFG contributed research re: Twitter,2019-03-20,,I00060 - White Genocide
+I00061,Military veterans Targetting,campaign,,2017,Russia,US,https://www.stripes.com/congressmen-urge-fbi-to-investigate-bots-targeting-veterans-with-fake-news-1.573284 https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-influence-operations-taking-aim-at-us-military/4640751.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/09/russian-operatives-used-twitter-and-facebook-to-target-veterans-and-military-personnel-study-says/?utm_term=.d6fa34d4819c https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/working-papers/vetops/,,2019-03-20,,I00061 - Military veterans Targetting
+I00062,Brexit/UK ongoing,campaign,,2015,"Russia,UK",UK,https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-nationalist-dark-web-populism-tommy-robinson/? http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2019)634414,"This is current, and offers very good ""Anatomy of an ecosystem"" / EuroParl Think tank study... this is good CASE STUDY I: THE BREXIT CAMPAIGN and this Polarisation by manipulation",2019-03-20,,I00062 - Brexit/UK ongoing
+I00063,Olympic Doping Scandal,campaign,"On 18 July 2016, Richard McLaren, a Canadian attorney retained by WADA to investigate Grigor Rodchenkov (the former head of Russia's national anti-doping laboratory, the Anti-Doping Center, which was suspended by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in November 2015 for facilitating Russia's elaborate state-sponsored doping program. Rodchenkov helped develop and distribute banned performance-enhancing substances for thousands of Russian Olympians from 2005 to 2015. He made headlines in 2016 as a whistleblower, helping expose the complex and extensive nature of Russia's doping program. His revelations lead to Russia's partial ban from the 2016 Summer Olympics and total ban from the 2018 Winter Olympics.). These allegations led to a 97-page report covering significant state-sponsored doping in Russia. 
+
+The investigation found corroborating evidence after conducting witness interviews, reviewing thousands of documents, analysis of hard drives, forensic analysis of urine sample collection bottles, and laboratory analysis of individual athlete samples, with ""more evidence becoming available by the day."" The report concluded that it was shown ""beyond a reasonable doubt"" that Russia's Ministry of Sport, the Centre of Sports Preparation of the National Teams of Russia, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the WADA-accredited laboratory in Moscow had ""operated for the protection of doped Russian athletes"" within a ""state-directed failsafe system"" using ""the disappearing positive [test] methodology"" (DPM) after the country's poor medal count during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver. McLaren stated that urine samples were opened in Sochi in order to swap them ""without any evidence to the untrained eye"". The official producer of BEREG-KIT security bottles used for anti-doping tests, Berlinger Group, stated, ""We have no knowledge of the specifications, the methods or the procedures involved in the tests and experiments conducted by the McLaren Commission.""",2016,Russia,World,https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html?module=inline,,2019-04-06,,I00063 - Olympic Doping Scandal
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/metatechniques.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/metatechniques.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6cb9c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/metatechniques.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,longname
+M001,resilience,Increase the resilience to disinformation of the end subjects or other parts of the underlying system,M001 - resilience
+M002,diversion,"Create alternative channels, messages etc in disinformation-prone systems",M002 - diversion
+M003,daylight,"Make disinformation objects, mechanisms, messaging etc visible",M003 - daylight
+M004,friction,"Slow down transmission or uptake of disinformation objects, messaging etc",M004 - friction
+M005,removal,Remove disinformation objects from the system,M005 - removal
+M006,scoring,Use a rating system,M006 - scoring
+M007,metatechnique,,M007 - metatechnique
+M008,data pollution,Add artefacts to the underlying system that deliberately confound disinformation monitoring,M008 - data pollution
+M009,dilution,Dilute disinformation artefacts and messaging with other content (kittens!),M009 - dilution
+M010,countermessaging,Create and distribute alternative messages to disinformation,M010 - countermessaging
+M011,verification,"Verify objects, content, connections etc. Includes fact-checking",M011 - verification
+M012,cleaning,Clean unneeded resources (accounts etc) from the underlying system so they can't be used in disinformation,M012 - cleaning
+M013,targeting,Target the components of a disinformation campaign,M013 - targeting
+M014,reduce resources,Reduce the resources available to disinformation creators,M014 - reduce resources
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/narratives.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/narratives.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a7efb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/narratives.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,main topic,subtopic,notes
+N00001,gargling with bleach will prevent/cure – also appears as satire,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00002,drinking corona beer will prevent/cure – also appears as satire,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00003,taking acetic acid will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00004,taking steroids will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00005,taking colloidal silver will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00006,taking MMS (which contains chlorine dioxide) can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00007,using essential oils will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00008,gargling with salt water will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00009,gargling with ethanol will prevent/cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00010,eating raw garlic will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00011,garlic will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00012,spraying normal drinking alcohol on body will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00013,spraying chlorine on body prevents coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00014,drinking or washing in sesame oil prevents coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00015,using a hand dryer will kill corona virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00016,drinking water every 15 minutes will wash virus to the stomach where it will die,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00017,drinking hot water will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00018,avoiding eating ice cream will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00019,rinsing your nose with saline will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00020,aspirating boiling water vapor for five minutes deactivates the coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00021,having a pneumonia shot will prevent you from getting the disease,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00022,having a flu shot will prevent you from getting the disease,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00023,using cocaine prevents/cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00024,Asians are more likely to get Covid 19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00025,Wearing more than one mask will help prevent the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00026,It is dangerous to receive packages from china,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00027,It is dangerous to eat in a Chinese restaurant (more so than other restaurants),,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00028,Cold weather and snow can kill off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00029,Warmer weather will kill off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00030,Taking a hot bath prevents COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00031,Hand dryers are effective in killing off the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00032,Antibiotics are effective in preventing and treating the SARS-CoV-2 virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00033,Vinegar is more effective than hand sanitizer,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00034,Gargling with Vinegar prevents covid-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00035,Hand sanitizer does not work,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00036,Shuanghuanglian (Chinese medical herb) can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00037,drinking cow urine and applying cow dung on the body can cure coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00038,there is no risk to mass public gatherings as the virus is impossible to contract outdoors,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00039,drinking water every 15 minutes will prevent coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00040,Miracle Mineral Supplement cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00041,silver-infused toothpaste will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00042,Kenneth Copeland can cure the virus directly from his tv studio,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00043,you have to be with someone for 10 minutes to catch the virus from them,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00044,"taking ibuprofen makes COVID-19 worse, especially in new patients",,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00045,reading the Quran will make you immune,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00046,you can kill the virus by holding a blow dryer up to your nose,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00047,Sheep head’s soup is a preventative,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00048,Lemon and bicarbonate kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00049,Lemon juice with salt is a cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00050,Lemon juice with Chinese mesona is a cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00051,Lemon juice with turmeric prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00052,Consuming alcoholic beverages may help reduce the risk of infection by the novel coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00053,Coronavirus will be cured after 14 hours of curfew,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00054,Bitter gourd juice can cure coronavirus in two hours,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00055,“Gale of the wind” and neem tree leaves can prevent corona virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00056,Sitting in the sunlight will cure COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00057,Coronavirus can be cured by sniffing clove and camphor,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00058,Green chiretta can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00059,Eating bananas will prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00060,15 minutes in Sauna will kill the virus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00061,Morel mushrooms increase risk by 200%,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00062,Eating onions with salt will cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00063,Propolis cures COVID-19,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00064,Arsenic album-30 homeopathic medicine can prevent coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00065,Drinking boiled garlic water cures,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00066,A bovine vaccine can be used to inoculate people against coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00067,Shaving your beard prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00068,Turkish raki prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00069,Constant sex kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00070,An alkaline diet prevents,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00071,Volcanic ash kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00072,Ketamine can cure,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00073,Putting an opinion in your room can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00074,Black tea can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00075,Pu’er tea can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00076,Environmental enzymes can prevent,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00077,Cocaine kills coronavirus,,covid19,Preventions and Cures,
+N00078,Corona virus is just a cold,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00079,Covid 19 is a normal flu and is no more dangerous than that,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00080,Children cannot catch corona virus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00081,SARS-CoV-2 is mutating faster than normal viruses,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00082,Pregnant women who have Covid 19 can pass the virus through the placenta to the unborn child,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00083,Covid 19 only affects the elderly,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00084,The SARS-CoV-2 virus can be transmitted through mosquito bite,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00085,Africans are immune,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00086,Vegetarians are immune,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00087,People in India can resist the coronavirus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00088,People with type-A blood are more prone to get coronavirus,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00089,Everyone with Covid 19 dies,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00090,There is no corona (virus),,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00091,This is “fake news” invented by Trump to strengthen the dollar,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00092,Chloroquine in any amount can cure Covid 19,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00093,The outbreak of covid 19 is not real,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00094,COVID-19 breeds rapidly in toilet paper,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00095,Turks area immune to covid-19,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00096,Coronavirus is caused by snakes,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00097,Coronavirus activates all bacterias and viruses in your body,,covid19,Nature of Virus or Disease,
+N00098,It was created in a lab,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00099,It is a US/CIA created bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00100,It is a Chinese bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00101,It is a Russian bioweapon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00102,It leaked from a bio-weapons lab in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00103,It leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00104,It was caused by an infected rat biting a student in the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00105,"March 12, Ayatollah Khamenei falsely claimed that there is evidence that COVID-19 might be a “biological attack.”",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00106,Electromagnetic fields and the introduction of 5G wireless technologies led to Covid 19 outbreaks,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00107,Washing hands is propaganda by soap companies,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00108,This was a plan from Gate Foundation to increase the Gate’s wealth,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00109,Qatar knew abut Covid-19 since 2015 and Doha paid billions to China to “grow the virus”,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00110,Corona virus is being spread by Coca-Cola,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00111,US military brought the virus to Wuhan on October 2019,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00112,Bill Gates and Vatican have a plan to depopulate world with coronavirus vaccine,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00113,Saddam Hussein in 90s told his cabinet that US threatened to spread coronavirus if he didn’t follow US commands,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00114,Cuba gave a vaccine to China,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00115,Cuba has a vaccine called Interferon,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00116,Israel found the cure,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00117,China finds a vaccine 3/17,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00118,Institut Pasteur in France invented COVID-19,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00119,"COVID-19 is no worse than other outbreaks, it is just being hyped to hurt Trump",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00120,COVID-19 is a scripted narrative to justify closed borders,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00121,COVID-19 is a scripted narrative to force people to stay at home,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00122,Egypt developed cure (doctor developed a fluid),,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00123,Egypt gave China the vaccine,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00124,US has 40 thousands troops immune to COVID-19 conducting an invasion of Europe,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00125,CDC admits coronavirus originated in the US,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00126,Cow urine and feces can cure,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00127,COVID-19 was created in 2014 by an English Institute,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00128,Ecuadorean doctor develops vaccine 3/3,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00129,Filipino student develops vaccine and gets 5million US from Alibaba founder Jack Ma,,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00130,"Raúl Rodolfo Abhduz Khan, biochemical engineer from Karmalah Laboratories, is the creator of coronavirus.",,covid19,Conspiracy theories including bioweapons,
+N00131,If you can hold your breath for 10 seconds you don’t have Covid 19,,covid19,False Diagnostic Procedures,
+N00132,NYC is under martial law 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00133,Only people who have tested positive need to stay home and isolate themselves,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00134,Only large gatherings have to be stopped,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00135,All human interaction needs to be stopped,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00136,Coronavirus is spread only by coughing and sneezing,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00137,Social distancing will lead to dramatic immediate results,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00138,1 month of social distancing will stop the epidemic permanently,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00139,Friend/relative at Pentagon said the US is going on total lockdown,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00140,Friend/relative at White House said the US is going on total lockdown,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00141,Russia has unleashed over 500 lions to ensure that people stay inside their homes amid the coronavirus outbreak,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00142,In Spain – free internet during 60 days due to quarantine,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00143,Polish telecommunications company used quarantine as a cover up to put 100 5G antennas in Gdynia,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00144,Riots in London due to unavailability of food leading to lockdown and martial law 3/22,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00145,In USA Helicopters are spraying disinfectants to try to eradicate coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00146,Bangalore Municipal body will be spraying medicine in the air to kill coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00147,Homeland Security is mobilizing the national guard to combat coronavirus 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00148,Janta curfew in India will break the chain of transmission,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00149,Elderly people in Brazil who are caught wandering outside with have their pensions cancelled by the government,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00150,People in Spain are committing suicide due to quarantine 3/20,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00151,Parks in Adra Spain are being fumigated with poison,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00152,Spanish helicopters are spreading medicines against coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00153,Oman helicopters are spraying pesticides to eliminate coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00154,Venezuela helicopters are going to spread chemicals against coronavirus,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00155,Trump will impose a nationwide mandatory quarantine in 38 to 72 hours 3/16,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00156,Military in Philadelphia are preparing to invoke martial law and bring citizens to FEMA camps,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00157,Supermarkets are recalling coronavirus-infected toilet paper,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00158,Pence urges people with coronavirus to go to police 3/2,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00159,Police in China kill covid-19 patients 3/2,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00160,Chinese coronavirus patients are being cremated alive 2/25,,covid19,Emergency Measures,
+N00161,Pandemic caused Venice’s water to be clear so the swans returned,,covid19,Good News Stories,
+N00162,Pandemic caused Venice’s water to be clear so the dolphins returned,,covid19,Good News Stories,
+N00163,Elephants break into a village due to social distancing and get drunk on corn wine,,covid19,Good News Stories,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/phases.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/phases.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..284c31b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/phases.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+disarm_id,name,name_DE,rank,summary,summary_DE,longname
+P01,Plan,Planung,1,"Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effective ways of achieving it. Communicate the vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on expected results.",,P01 - Plan
+P02,Prepare,Vorbereitung,2,"Activities conducted before execution to improve the ability to conduct the action. Examples include: development of the ecosystem needed to support the action: people, network, channels, content etc.",,P02 - Prepare
+P03,Execute,Durchführung,3,"Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-up and/or maintaining presence etc.",,P03 - Execute
+P04,Assess,Auswertung,4,"Evaluate effectiveness of action, for use in future plans ",,P04 - Assess
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/playbooks.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/playbooks.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da8ca12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/playbooks.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+disarm_id,object_id,name,summary
+PB00001,C00011,Game Mechanics: show examples of fake news and train the user to identify them on the basis of various types of indicators,
+PB00002,C00011,Game mechanics: use a crowd-sourced mechanism so that the public can categorize newly spreading news sources or articles a la Re-Captcha,
+PB00003,C00012,Develop a regulatory body like the CFPB to regulate and enforce regulation for digital organizations. ,
+PB00004,C00012,Government regulation,
+PB00005,C00012,Government shutdown. ,
+PB00006,C00017,Use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . ,
+PB00007,C00019,"Spread Infographics & Training Material teaching ways to identify and counter divisive rhetorical techniques and content, by stimulating their sense of outrage at being manipulated. Show them how to address the rhetorical technique rather than the content",
+PB00008,C00019,Twitter hashtags & paid advertising,
+PB00009,C00019,Teach people to identify non-civil/unconstructive conversations and call them out,
+PB00010,C00019,"Popularize (via memes, infographics) and get the centrists demographic who are tired of polarization to identify such messaging, call it out and display their outrage on the basis of divisive rhetorical techniques rather than merely arguing about the content",
+PB00011,C00027,Recruit respected thought leaders to model behavior,
+PB00012,C00027,Feature established respected thought leaders to model behavior,
+PB00013,C00027,Promote dialog from communities with disparate viewpoints,
+PB00014,C00027,"Establish facilitation guidelines for ""civil"" interaction.",
+PB00015,C00029,Identify ignorant agents (ex: anti-vaxx people willing to pay money to advertise their cause),
+PB00016,C00029,Sell physical merchandise that has instructive counter-effect,
+PB00017,C00029,"Secondary Objective: Obtain real-life identity of ignorant agents, to further disrupt their influence activities",
+PB00018,C00031,Create multiple versions of the narrative and amplify. ,
+PB00019,C00031,"Dissect narrative, piecemeal the components and then amplify",
+PB00020,C00032,Hijack hashtag and redirect conversation to truth based content. ,
+PB00021,C00032,Hijack (man in the middle) redirect from bad content to good content,
+PB00022,C00036,-Discredit via backstopped blogs/websites showing their past activity and opinions as being opposite to their current ingroup,
+PB00023,C00036,Create a trail of commentary about their idea of infiltrating the enemy (current in-group),
+PB00024,C00036,Publicize this by targeting their in-group competitors (ignorant agents),
+PB00025,C00040,Verify personal credentials ,
+PB00026,C00040,Syndicated reputation management (fact-checking syndication),
+PB00027,C00040,Academia ISAO,
+PB00028,C00044,Rate restrict via regulation posting above a statistical threshold,
+PB00029,C00044,Unless account is de-anonymized and advertised as automated messaging,
+PB00030,C00048,"Identify the accounts, the real person's name and shame them on social media.",
+PB00031,C00053,Social media companies remove inactive accounts,
+PB00032,C00053,Account holders remove accounts they're no longer using. ,
+PB00033,C00053,"Influencers encourage people to remove their inactive accounts ""Do you really need that old account"" campaign, world-war-two poster-style. ",
+PB00034,C00053,"Create alternative memorial websites for accounts of deceased people, so their accounts can't be reactivated on 'live' sites. ",
+PB00035,C00053,Educate/scare users on the risks of losing control over a dormant account (would their employer be forgiving if an account associated with the user suddenly starting posting extremist content?).,
+PB00036,C00074,Platform adds a hash of the post to the post metadata and make it publicly available (content addressing). Scrape for duplicate content and deplatform the content/users across affected. In all cases some checks need to prevent deplatforming of highly correlated organic traffic such as a community group copy/pasting their bake sale advert. ,
+PB00037,C00074,Platform adds plagiarism score metadata to a post and makes it publicly available. Scrape for duplicate content and deplatform the content/users across affected platforms.,
+PB00038,C00074,Use message hashing and fuzzy hashing to detect identical/similar content.,
+PB00039,C00074,Use plagiarism algorithm to detect similar blog posts.,
+PB00040,C00074,"Use basic web scraping techniques, Google dorks, etc to identify similar head lines, uniques phrases, authorship, embedded links and any other correlating data point.",
+PB00041,C00098,Affected person contacts platform for action,
+PB00042,C00136,"Work with platform to identify active target audiences through finanical data and messaging.
+",
+PB00043,C00136,Use a platform's publicly available advertising/targeting capabilities to enumerate a list of possible microtargeted demographics. Compare these to known TAs of past/ongoing influence ops to identify the vulnerable demographics. ,
+PB00044,C00140,"DDoS adversary link shorteners by spamming real links.
+",
+PB00045,C00140,Compromise service and reroute links to benign content or counter messaging.,
+PB00046,C00148,Degrade TA engagement using bots; direct the adversary to engage insular bot communities-within-communities rather than the authentic target audience.,
+PB00047,C00148,Degrade MOEs/MOPs by faking inter-community sharing.,
+PB00048,C00149,"Distort TA demographics by posting irrelevant content, misleading demogaphic data, etc.",
+PB00049,C00149,"Work with the media platform to distort publicly available metrics. Can we work with Twitter to get crappy off-brand memes artificially bumped without needing to create fake accounts, etc.?",
+PB00050,C00149,"Use adtech to promote content inconsistent with TA demographics. If the adversary is reverse engineering a groups demographics by analyzing ads placed on the platform/group, by spamming ads for out-group stuff it may distort analysis of the group.",
+PB00051,C00149,"Distort Google Trends and other publicly available source of metrics using bots, cyborgs, adtech.",
+PB00052,C00149,Distort TA emotional response to content/narratives.,
+PB00053,C00149,Promote damp squibs. Within a known TA promote/inflate crappy off-brand memes which are unlikley to resonate.,
+PB00054,C00149,"Detect early trending/engagement and undermine the content by responding with 5Ds, toxic community behaviour, satirical responses, etc.",
+PB00055,C00149,"If adtech is used, fake clicks and engagements on the content.",
+PB00056,C00174,Elected officials lead return to First Amendment norms that embrace free and fair media as central to democracy.,
+PB00057,C00188,"TechCamp bringing together local journalists, with a several-day training program that includes a sponsored yearlong investigative project",
+PB00058,C00197,"Create a standard reporting format and method for social platforms for reporting false accounts. 
+",
+PB00059,C00197,Determine whether account might be compromised,"Questions: - Is the account compromised? 
+- Is it known to be associated with threat actors 
+- common/random name 
+- Names violate terms of service 
+- Dormant account 
+- Change of country IP
+- Social network growth patterns (number of friends etc) 
+- Evidence of linguistic artifacts (multiple fingerprints, terms/idiosyncrasies )
+- Community vs. narrative vs. individuals "
+PB00060,C00197,Report suspected bots.,
+PB00061,C00197,"Report ToS violations. In all playbooks the platform must force user verification, credential reset and enable MFA. Suspend the account if it cannot be verified.",
+PB00062,C00197,Use sites like https://haveibeenpwned.com to detect compromised and at risk user accounts. ,
+PB00063,C00197,"Monitor for unusual account usage (use of VPN, new geographic location, unusual usage hours, etc). ",
+PB00064,C00197,Detect sudden deviation in user sentiment such as suddenly dropping hashtags linked to extremist content.,
+PB00065,C00197,"Purchase ""likes"", ""retweets"" and other vehicles which identify a bot and/or hijacked account. Ban the account.",
+PB00066,C00197,"Detect hijacked account and spam their posts. ""OP is a known disinformation bot. http://link.to.proof[.]com""",
+PB00067,C00219,Add date and source to images,
+PB00068,F00002,"Develop a baseline virality per platform, monitor trends, trigger alert for anomalies.",
+PB00069,F00003,"Destroy Desire to Work for Propaganda Businesses
+","-Identify non-committed actors (ie. IRA 2$/h employees)
+-Identify where they reside (ie. postal code level)
+-Send a viral message that clarifies the risk of working in influence ops. "
+PB00070,F00003,"Hack personal accounts
+-Send inflammatory messages on their behalf",
+PB00071,F00004,Identify target and entice individual to reveal insider information,
+PB00072,F00005,"-Model communities on the basis of behavior and identity, etc
+-Model different online behaviors in terms of how these groups interact with propaganda
+-Model how these group-based behaviors are affected by the tech platform they are using
+-This research can feed into later-stage playbooks to adapt them to communities/platforms",
+PB00073,F00006,Model each major platform,"Determine:
+a) Moderation Method (global, subcommunity level, none -ie. twitter, reddit, 8chan)
+b) Access Model (friend request, open, real-life identity)
+c) Communication Model (global, friends only, subcommunity, hybrid)
+Determine how the combination of the above (and other characteristics) allow different technical methods to communicate and influence various audiences
+This will allow to adapt playbooks to specific platforms"
+PB00074,F00013,"- Trace money and financing 
+- Trace connections to known operations",
+PB00075,F00014,"- Hashes
+- Data voids
+- User handles 
+- Domains + link shortener
+- TinEye For video (visual artifact)",
+PB00076,F00017,Create standard scoring for emptional content,
+PB00077,F00018,"Ad tech 
+- De-platform funding sites 
+- Blockchain transaction 
+- Sell items
+- Identify manufacturers 
+- Pay to play meetings ",
+PB00078,F00018,"Identify ad tech on platforms 
+- Selling merch? 
+- Financial platform
+- Bitcoin etc.. .",
+PB00079,F00018,"Identify re-use of ads
+","Look at Ad trackers, Tracking ids, Tracking ads, Re-use of as features (language, name, themes, plug-in, re-use/versions)"
+PB00080,F00018,track funding sources,
+PB00081,F00077,Build and update a model bot behaviour. ,
+PB00082,F00077,Build network of companies that model / rate bots. Build standards around data sharing and exchange,
+PB00083,F00092,"Build a reporting system for the public, so they can report disinformation artefacts and have them available to channels etc for action. ",
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/resources.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/resources.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47e3f9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/resources.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,resource_type,longname
+R001,datastreams ,Access to streaming data,data,R001 - datastreams 
+R002,funding ,"Money to keep the lights on: for resources, time etc",money,R002 - funding 
+R003,money ,Money for specific resources,money,R003 - money 
+R004,platform algorithms ,Access to the algorithms used in a platform.,algorithms,R004 - platform algorithms 
+R005,slang translation,Translations of slang terms,knowledge,R005 - slang translation
+R006,disinformation datasets,Access to datasets containing disinformation,data,R006 - disinformation datasets
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/responsetypes.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/responsetypes.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60f3d85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/responsetypes.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,longname
+D01,Detect,"Discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems.",D01 - Detect
+D02,Deny,"Prevent disinformation creators from accessing and using critical information, systems, and services. Deny is for an indefinite time period. ",D02 - Deny
+D03,Disrupt,"Completely break or interrupt the flow of information, for a fixed amount of time. (Deny, for a limited time period).  Not allowing any efficacy, for a short amount of time. ",D03 - Disrupt
+D04,Degrade,"Reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of disinformation creators’ command and control or communications systems, and information collection efforts or means, either indefinitely, or for a limited time period. ",D04 - Degrade
+D05,Deceive,Cause a person to believe what is not true. military deception seeks to mislead adversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality.,D05 - Deceive
+D06,Destroy,"Damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. Destroy is permanent, e.g. you can rebuild a website, but it’s not the same website. ",D06 - Destroy
+D07,Deter,Discourage.,D07 - Deter
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/sectors.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/sectors.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74b899d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/sectors.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+disarm_id,name,summary,longname,Jon's comments
+S001,Nonprofit,,S001 - Nonprofit,"Nonprofit and civil society are not mutually exclusive - in fact, to many, they are the same"
+S002,Civil Society,,S002 - Civil Society,"Nonprofit and civil society are not mutually exclusive - in fact, to many, they are the same"
+S003,Government,,S003 - Government,agree
+S004,Academic,,S004 - Academic,"""Education"" is more the sector - academic is more the term for an individual"
+S005,Activist,,S005 - Activist,Not a sector
+S006,General Public,,S006 - General Public,Not a sector
+S007,Social Media Company,,S007 - Social Media Company,"Social media (delete unecessary ""company"")"
+S008,Other Tech Company,,S008 - Other Tech Company,Technology (excluding social media)
+S009,Other Company,,S009 - Other Company,"Other (delete unecessary ""company"")"
+S010,Media,,S010 - Media,Media (excluding social media)
+,,,,"There are so many industry sectors
+Do we need to just highlight those most relevant to red/blue ttps?
+If so, what about journalism? Fact checking?
+Sub-sectors of government: Law enforcement? Defence?"
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tactics.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tactics.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..179135b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tactics.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+disarm_id,name,name_DE,phase_id,rank,summary,summary_DE,changes from v0.1,longname
+TA01,Plan Strategy,,P01,1,"Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all objectives.",,no change,TA01 - Plan Strategy
+TA02,Plan Objectives,,P01,2,"Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievable objectives. Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the desired end state. There are four primary considerations: 
+- Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives 
+- The effect should be measurable 
+- The objective statement should not specify the way and means of accomplishment 
+- The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task.",,no change,TA02 - Plan Objectives
+TA05,Microtarget,,P02,8,Target very specific populations of people,,no change,TA05 - Microtarget
+TA06,Develop Content,,P02,5,"Create or acquire text, images, and other content",,no change,TA06 - Develop Content
+TA07,Select Channels and Affordances,,P02,9,"Selecting platforms and affordances assesses which online or offline platforms and their associated affordances maximize an influence operation’s  ability to reach its target audience. To select the most appropriate platform(s), an operation may  assess the technological affordances including platform algorithms, terms of service, permitted content types, or other attributes that  determine platform usability and accessibility. Selecting platforms includes both choosing platforms on which the operation will publish its own  content and platforms on which the operation will attempt to restrict adversarial content.",,no change,TA07 - Select Channels and Affordances
+TA08,Conduct Pump Priming,,P03,10,"Release content on a targetted small scale, prior to general release, including releasing seed. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. ",,no change,TA08 - Conduct Pump Priming
+TA09,Deliver Content,,P03,11,Release content to general public or larger population,,no change,TA09 - Deliver Content
+TA10,Drive Offline Activity,,P03,14,"Move incident/campaign from online to offline. Encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage in the physical information space or offline world. This may include operation-aligned rallies or protests, radio, newspaper, or billboards. An influence  operation may drive to physical forums to diversify its information channels and facilitate spaces where the target audience can engage with both operation content and like-minded individuals offline.  ",,no change,TA10 - Drive Offline Activity
+TA11,Persist in the Information Environment,,P03,15,Persist in the Information Space refers to taking measures that allow an operation to maintain its presence and avoid takedown by an external entity. Techniques in Persist in the Information Space help campaigns operate without detection and appear legitimate to the target audience and platform monitoring services. Influence operations on social media often persist online by varying the type of information  assets and platforms used throughout the campaign.,,no change,TA11 - Persist in the Information Environment
+TA12,Assess Effectiveness,,P04,16,"Assess effectiveness of action, for use in future plans ",,no change,TA12 - Assess Effectiveness
+TA13,Target Audience Analysis,,P01,3,"Identifying and analyzing the target audience examines target audience member locations,  political affiliations, financial situations, and other attributes that an influence operation may incorporate into its messaging strategy. During this tactic, influence operations may also identify  existing similarities and differences between target audience members to unite like groups and  divide opposing groups. Identifying and analyzing target audience members allows influence operations to tailor  operation strategy and content to their analysis. ",,no change,TA13 - Target Audience Analysis
+TA14,Develop Narratives,,P02,4,"The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a """"whole of society"""" perspective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion constitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level. Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline.",,new,TA14 - Develop Narratives
+TA15,Establish Social Assets,,P02,6,"Establishing information assets generates messaging tools, including social media accounts,  operation personnel, and organizations, including directly and indirectly managed assets. For assets under their direct control, the operation can add,  change, or remove these assets at will.  
+Establishing information assets allows an influence operation to promote messaging directly to  the target audience without navigating through external entities. Many online influence operations create or compromise social media accounts as a primary vector of information  dissemination.",,new,TA15 - Establish Social Assets
+TA16,Establish Legitimacy,,P02,7,Establish assets that create trust,,new,TA16 - Establish Legitimacy
+TA17,Maximize Exposure,,P03,12,"Maximize exposure of the target audience to incident/campaign content via flooding, amplifying, and cross-posting.",,new,TA17 - Maximize Exposure
+TA18,Drive Online Harms,,P03,13,"Actions taken by an influence operation to harm their opponents in online spaces through harassment, suppression, releasing private information, and controlling the information space through offensive cyberspace operations. ",,new,TA18 - Drive Online Harms
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tasks.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tasks.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5adf47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tasks.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+disarm_id,name,name_DE,tactic_id,summary,summary_DE,framework_id,longname
+TK0001,Goal setting,,TA01,Set the goals for this incident. ,,FW01,TK0001 - Goal setting
+TK0002,Population research / audience analysis (centre of gravity),,TA01,"Research intended audience.  Includes audience segmentation, hot-button issues etc. ",,FW01,TK0002 - Population research / audience analysis (centre of gravity)
+TK0003,Campaign design (objective design),,TA01,Design the campaign(s) needed to meet the incident goals,,FW01,TK0003 - Campaign design (objective design)
+TK0031,OPSEC for TA01,,TA01,OPSEC for TA01,,FW02,TK0031 - OPSEC for TA01
+TK0004,Identify target subgroups,,TA02,Identify groups that can best be used to meet incident goals,,FW01,TK0004 - Identify target subgroups
+TK0005,Analyse subgroups,,TA02,Analyse subgroups,,FW01,TK0005 - Analyse subgroups
+TK0006,create master narratives,,TA02,create master narratives,,FW01,TK0006 - create master narratives
+TK0007,Decide on techniques (4Ds etc),,TA02,Decide on techniques (4Ds etc),,FW01,TK0007 - Decide on techniques (4Ds etc)
+TK0008,Create subnarratives,,TA02,Create subnarratives,,FW01,TK0008 - Create subnarratives
+TK0009,4chan/8chan coordinating content,,TA02,4chan/8chan coordinating content,,FW01,TK0009 - 4chan/8chan coordinating content
+TK0032,OPSEC for TA02,,TA02,OPSEC for TA02,,FW02,TK0032 - OPSEC for TA02
+TK0010,Create personas,,TA15,Create personas,,FW01,TK0010 - Create personas
+TK0011,Recruit contractors,,TA15,Recruit contractors,,FW01,TK0011 - Recruit contractors
+TK0012,Recruit partisans,,TA15,Recruit partisans,,FW01,TK0012 - Recruit partisans
+TK0013,find influencers,,TA15,find influencers,,FW01,TK0013 - find influencers
+TK0033,OPSEC for TA15,,TA15,OPSEC for TA15,,FW02,TK0033 - OPSEC for TA15
+TK0014,Network building,,TA15,Network building,,FW01,TK0014 - Network building
+TK0015,Network infiltration,,TA15,Network infiltration,,FW01,TK0015 - Network infiltration
+TK0016,identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks,,TA15,identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks,,FW01,TK0016 - identify targets - susceptible audience members in networks
+TK0034,OPSEC for TA15,,TA15,OPSEC for TA15,,FW02,TK0034 - OPSEC for TA15
+TK0035,OPSEC for TA05,,TA05,OPSEC for TA05,,FW02,TK0035 - OPSEC for TA05
+TK0017,content creation,,TA06,content creation,,FW01,TK0017 - content creation
+TK0018,content appropriation,,TA06,content appropriation,,FW01,TK0018 - content appropriation
+TK0036,OPSEC for TA06,,TA06,OPSEC for TA06,,FW02,TK0036 - OPSEC for TA06
+TK0037,OPSEC for TA07,,TA07,OPSEC for TA07,,FW02,TK0037 - OPSEC for TA07
+TK0019,anchor trust / credibility,,TA08,anchor trust / credibility,,FW01,TK0019 - anchor trust / credibility
+TK0020,insert themes,,TA08,insert themes,,FW01,TK0020 - insert themes
+TK0038,OPSEC for TA08,,TA08,OPSEC for TA08,,FW02,TK0038 - OPSEC for TA08
+TK0021,"deamplification (suppression, censoring)",,TA09,"deamplification (suppression, censoring)",,FW01,"TK0021 - deamplification (suppression, censoring)"
+TK0022,amplification,,TA09,amplification,,FW01,TK0022 - amplification
+TK0039,OPSEC for TA09,,TA09,OPSEC for TA09,,FW02,TK0039 - OPSEC for TA09
+TK0040,OPSEC for TA10,,TA10,OPSEC for TA10,,FW02,TK0040 - OPSEC for TA10
+TK0023,retention,,TA11,retention,,FW01,TK0023 - retention
+TK0024,customer relationship,,TA11,customer relationship,,FW01,TK0024 - customer relationship
+TK0025,advocacy/ zealotry,,TA11,advocacy/ zealotry,,FW01,TK0025 - advocacy/ zealotry
+TK0026,conversion,,TA11,conversion,,FW01,TK0026 - conversion
+TK0027,keep recruiting/prospecting,,TA11,keep recruiting/prospecting,,FW01,TK0027 - keep recruiting/prospecting
+TK0041,OPSEC for TA11,,TA11,OPSEC for TA11,,FW02,TK0041 - OPSEC for TA11
+TK0028,evaluation,,TA12,evaluation,,FW01,TK0028 - evaluation
+TK0029,post-mortem,,TA12,post-mortem,,FW01,TK0029 - post-mortem
+TK0030,after-action analysis,,TA12,after-action analysis,,FW01,TK0030 - after-action analysis
+TK0042,OPSEC for TA12,,TA12,OPSEC for TA12,,FW02,TK0042 - OPSEC for TA12
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/techniques.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/techniques.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd8edc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/techniques.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+disarm_id,name,name_DE,tactic_id,summary,summary_DE,changes from v0.1,longname
+T0002,Facilitate State Propaganda,,TA02,Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.,,no change,T0002 - Facilitate State Propaganda
+T0003,Leverage Existing Narratives,,TA14,"Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. ",,no change,T0003 - Leverage Existing Narratives
+T0004,Develop Competing Narratives,,TA14,"Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the ""firehose of misinformation"" approach.",,no change,T0004 - Develop Competing Narratives
+T0007,Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups,,TA15,"Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.",,no change,T0007 - Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups
+T0009,Create fake experts,,TA16,"Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. ",,no change,T0009 - Create fake experts
+T0009.001,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications,,TA16,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications,,no change,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications - 
+T0010,Cultivate ignorant agents,,TA15,"Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as ""useful idiots"" or ""unwitting agents"".",,no change,T0010 - Cultivate ignorant agents
+T0011,Compromise legitimate accounts,,TA16,Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.,,no change,T0011 - Compromise legitimate accounts
+T0013,Create inauthentic websites,,TA15,"Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.",,no change,T0013 - Create inauthentic websites
+T0014,Prepare fundraising campaigns,,TA15,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial  support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote  operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged  in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation  may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to  promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.  ",,no change,T0014 - Prepare fundraising campaigns
+T0014.001,Raise funds from malign actors,,TA15,"Raising funds from malign actors may include contributions from foreign agents, cutouts or proxies, shell companies, dark money groups, etc. ",,no change,Raise funds from malign actors - 
+T0014.002,Raise funds from ignorant agents,,TA15,"Raising funds from ignorant agents may include scams, donations intended for one stated purpose but then used for another, etc. ",,no change,Raise funds from ignorant agents - 
+T0015,Create hashtags and search artifacts,,TA06,"Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only ""real"" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage ""conversation"" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). ",,no change,T0015 - Create hashtags and search artifacts
+T0016,Create Clickbait,,TA05,"Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.",,no change,T0016 - Create Clickbait
+T0017,Conduct fundraising,,TA10,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial  support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote  operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged  in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation  may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.  ",,no change,T0017 - Conduct fundraising
+T0017.001,Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns,,TA10,"An influence operation may Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns on platforms such as GoFundMe, GiveSendGo, Tipeee, Patreon, etc.",,no change,Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns - 
+T0018,Purchase Targeted Advertisements,,TA05,Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations,,no change,T0018 - Purchase Targeted Advertisements
+T0019,Generate information pollution,,TA06,"Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. ""Nothing is true, but everything is possible."" Akin to astroturfing campaign.",,no change,T0019 - Generate information pollution
+T0019.001,Create fake research,,TA06,"Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx",,no change,Create fake research - 
+T0019.002,Hijack Hashtags,,TA06,"Hashtag hijacking occurs when users “[use] a trending hashtag to promote topics that are substantially different from its recent context” (VanDam and Tan, 2016) or “to promote one’s own social media agenda” (Darius and Stephany, 2019).",,no change,Hijack Hashtags - 
+T0020,Trial content,,TA08,"Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates",,no change,T0020 - Trial content
+T0022,Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"""Conspiracy narratives"" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model. ",,no change,T0022 - Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
+T0022.001,Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"An influence operation may amplify an existing conspiracy theory narrative that aligns with its incident or campaign goals. By amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, operators can leverage the power of the existing communities that support and propagate those theories without needing to expend resources creating new narratives or building momentum and buy in around new narratives. ",,no change,Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives - 
+T0022.002,Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,TA14,"While this requires more resources than amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, an influence operation may develop original conspiracy theory narratives in order to achieve greater control and alignment over the narrative and their campaign goals. Prominent examples include the USSR's Operation INFEKTION disinformation campaign run by the KGB in the 1980s to plant the idea that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as part of a biological weapons research project at Fort Detrick, Maryland. More recently, Fort Detrick featured prominently in a new conspiracy theory narratives around the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic. ",,no change,Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives - 
+T0023,Distort facts,,TA06,"Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content",,no change,T0023 - Distort facts
+T0023.001,Reframe Context,,TA06,"Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its  intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in  a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions. ",,no change,Reframe Context - 
+T0023.002,Edit Open-Source Content,,TA06,"An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or  encyclopedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without  dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets. ",,no change,Edit Open-Source Content - 
+T0029,Online polls,,TA07,"Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well",,no change,T0029 - Online polls
+T0039 ,Bait legitimate influencers,,TA08,"Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. ""Influencers"" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.",,no change,T0039  - Bait legitimate influencers
+T0040,Demand insurmountable proof,,TA14,"Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the ""firehose of misinformation"". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of ""questions"" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.",,no change,T0040 - Demand insurmountable proof
+T0042,Seed Kernel of truth,,TA08,"Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.",,no change,T0042 - Seed Kernel of truth
+T0043,Chat apps,,TA07,"Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.",,no change,T0043 - Chat apps
+T0043.001,Use Encrypted Chat Apps,,TA07,"Examples include Signal, WhatsApp, Discord, Wire, etc.",,no change,Use Encrypted Chat Apps - 
+T0043.002,Use Unencrypted Chats Apps,,TA07,"Examples include SMS, etc.",,no change,Use Unencrypted Chats Apps - 
+T0044,Seed distortions,,TA08,"Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. ",,no change,T0044 - Seed distortions
+T0045,Use fake experts,,TA08,"Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give ""credility"" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias",,no change,T0045 - Use fake experts
+T0046,Use Search Engine Optimization,,TA08,"Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka ""Black-hat SEO"" ",,no change,T0046 - Use Search Engine Optimization
+T0047,Censor social media as a political force,,TA18,Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).,,no change,T0047 - Censor social media as a political force
+T0048,Harass,,TA18,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation  techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their  dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to  deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.  ",,no change,T0048 - Harass
+T0048.001,"Boycott/""Cancel"" Opponents",,TA18,"Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from  supporting an individual, organization, business, or other entity, usually following a real or  falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasizing an  adversary’s problematic or disputed behavior and presenting its own content as an alternative. ",,no change,"Boycott/""Cancel"" Opponents - "
+T0048.002,Harass People Based on Identities,,TA18,"Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.",,no change,Harass People Based on Identities - 
+T0048.003,Threaten to Dox,,TA18,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information  about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family  members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to  encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals  themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating  conflicting content. ",,no change,Threaten to Dox - 
+T0048.004,Dox,,TA18,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information  about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family  members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to  encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals  themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating  conflicting content. ",,no change,Dox - 
+T0049,Flooding the Information Space,,TA17,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,,no change,T0049 - Flooding the Information Space
+T0049.001,Trolls amplify and manipulate,,TA17,"Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).",,no change,Trolls amplify and manipulate - 
+T0049.002,Hijack existing hashtag,,TA17,Take over an existing hashtag to drive exposure.,,no change,Hijack existing hashtag - 
+T0049.003,Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting,,TA17,"Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using  automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may  use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including  personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. 
+Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more ""popular"" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.",,no change,Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting - 
+T0049.004,Utilize Spamoflauge,,TA17,"Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to  the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk.  Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based  email spam filters, for example, ""you've w0n our jackp0t!"". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting  messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages  in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience  receiving operation messaging. ",,no change,Utilize Spamoflauge - 
+T0049.005,Conduct Swarming,,TA17,"Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with  operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centers exclusively around a specific  event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication”  between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach. ",,no change,Conduct Swarming - 
+T0049.006,Conduct Keyword Squatting,,TA17,"Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social  media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results  of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience  members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around  the term.  ",,no change,Conduct Keyword Squatting - 
+T0049.007,Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives,,TA17,"Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.",,no change,Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives - 
+T0057,Organize Events,,TA10,"Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.",,no change,T0057 - Organize Events
+T0057.001,Pay for Physical Action,,TA10,"Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the  physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations  and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of  people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest. ",,no change,Pay for Physical Action - 
+T0057.002,Conduct Symbolic Action,,TA10,"Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by  signaling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative  of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified  evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space.  ",,no change,Conduct Symbolic Action - 
+T0059,Play the long game,,TA11,Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.,,no change,T0059 - Play the long game
+T0060,Continue to Amplify,,TA11,continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished,,no change,T0060 - Continue to Amplify
+T0061,Sell Merchandise,,TA10,Sell mechandise refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world while making money,,no change,T0061 - Sell Merchandise
+T0065,Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities,,TA15,"Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).",,no change,T0065 - Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities
+T0066,Degrade Adversary,,TA02,Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.,,no change,T0066 - Degrade Adversary
+T0068,Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis,,TA14,"Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. ",,no change,T0068 - Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis
+T0072,Segment Audiences,,TA13,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",,no change,T0072 - Segment Audiences
+T0072.001,Geographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a  region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create  Localized Content (see: Establish Legitimacy).  ",,no change,Geographic Segmentation - 
+T0072.002,Demographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including  age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations  aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence  operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S.  voters over 65 years of age. ",,no change,Demographic Segmentation - 
+T0072.003,Economic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other  financial or economic division. ",,no change,Economic Segmentation - 
+T0072.004,Psychographic Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses  audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather  psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from  social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes.  ",,no change,Psychographic Segmentation - 
+T0072.005,Political Segmentation,,TA13,"An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially  when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.",,no change,Political Segmentation - 
+T0073,Determine Target Audiences,,TA01,Determining the target audiences (segments of the population) who will receive campaign narratives and artifacts intended to achieve the strategic ends.,,new,T0073 - Determine Target Audiences
+T0074,Determine Strategic Ends,,TA01,"Determining the campaigns goals or objectives. Examples include achieving achieving geopolitical advantage like undermining trust in an adversary, gaining domestic political advantage, achieving financial gain, or attaining a policy change, ",,new,T0074 - Determine Strategic Ends
+T0075,Dismiss,,TA02,Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.,,Split from T0001,T0075 - Dismiss
+T0075.001,Discredit Credible Sources,,TA02,"Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.",,no change,Discredit Credible Sources - 
+T0076,Distort,,TA02,"Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.",,Split from T0001,T0076 - Distort
+T0077,Distract,,TA02,"Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).",,Split from T0001,T0077 - Distract
+T0078,Dismay,,TA02,"Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.",,Split from T0001,T0078 - Dismay
+T0079,Divide,,TA02,"Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community",,Split from T0001,T0079 - Divide
+T0080,Map Target Audience Information Environment,,TA13,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself,  including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information  environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular  information channels to reach its target audience. 
+Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining  the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",,new,T0080 - Map Target Audience Information Environment
+T0080.001,Monitor Social Media Analytics,,TA13,"An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase  the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including  views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform  itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics.  ",,no change,Monitor Social Media Analytics - 
+T0080.002,Evaluate Media Surveys,,TA13,"An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type  of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s  political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.",,no change,Evaluate Media Surveys - 
+T0080.003,Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags,,TA13,An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in  boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol  (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public  posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralized page dedicated to the word or  phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity. ,,no change,Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags - 
+T0080.004,Conduct Web Traffic Analysis,,TA13,"An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines,  keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.",,no change,Conduct Web Traffic Analysis - 
+T0080.005,Assess Degree/Type of Media Access,,TA13,"An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media  freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and  on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information  environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent  media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties. ",,no change,Assess Degree/Type of Media Access - 
+T0081,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,,TA13,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience  information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues,  weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.  
+Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified  weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",,new,T0081 - Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+T0081.001,Find Echo Chambers,,TA13,"Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with. ",,no change,Find Echo Chambers - 
+T0081.002,Identify Data Voids,,TA13,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search  engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity  aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a  high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation  may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.  
+A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news”  data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an  influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to  publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data  void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their  keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated  terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for  recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas,  isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use  “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote  messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.  ",,no change,Identify Data Voids - 
+T0081.003,Identify Existing Prejudices,,TA13,"An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarize its target audience from the rest of the public.",,no change,Identify Existing Prejudices - 
+T0081.004,Identify Existing Fissures,,TA13,"An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one  another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer"" approach to tailor operation narratives along the  divides.",,no change,Identify Existing Fissures - 
+T0081.005,Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions,,TA13,An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population  to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives.  ,,no change,Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions - 
+T0081.006,Identify Wedge Issues,,TA13,"A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that  divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by  intentionally polarizing the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition  between factions.",,no change,Identify Wedge Issues - 
+T0081.007,Identify Target Audience Adversaries,,TA13,"An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to center operation  narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while  imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies,  run the state behind public view. ",,no change,Identify Target Audience Adversaries - 
+T0081.008,Identify Media System Vulnerabilities,,TA13,"An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These  weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news  agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust  among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an  influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content. ",,no change,Identify Media System Vulnerabilities - 
+T0082,Develop New Narratives,,TA14,"Actors may develop new narratives to further strategic or tactical goals, especially when existing narratives adequately align with the campaign goals. New narratives provide more control in terms of crafting the message to achieve specific goals. However, new narratives may require more effort to disseminate than adapting or adopting existing narratives. ",,new,T0082 - Develop New Narratives
+T0083,Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative,,TA14,"An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the  target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating  existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already  weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new  vulnerabilities in the environment.",,new,T0083 - Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative
+T0084,Reuse Existing Content,,TA06,When an operation recycles content from its own previous  operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to  conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,,new,T0084 - Reuse Existing Content
+T0084.001,Use Copypasta,,TA06,"Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text. ",,no change,Use Copypasta - 
+T0084.002,Plagiarize Content,,TA06,An influence operation may take content from other sources without proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources. ,,no change,Plagiarize Content - 
+T0084.003,Deceptively Labeled or Translated,,TA06,An influence operation may take authentic content from other sources and add deceptive labels or deceptively translate the content into other langauges. ,,no change,Deceptively Labeled or Translated - 
+T0084.004,Appropriate Content,,TA06,An influence operation may take content from other sources with proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources. Examples include the appropriation of content from one inauthentic news site to another inauthentic news site or network in ways that align with the originators licensing or terms of service.,,no change,Appropriate Content - 
+T0085,Develop Text-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading text-based artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign.",,new,T0085 - Develop Text-based Content
+T0085.001,Develop AI-Generated Text,,TA06,"AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI  technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human  input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents  the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated  journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to  quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Text - 
+T0085.002,Develop False or Altered Documents,,TA06,Develop False or Altered Documents,,no change,Develop False or Altered Documents - 
+T0085.003,Develop Inauthentic News Articles,,TA06,An influence operation may develop false or misleading news articles aligned to their campaign goals or narratives. ,,no change,Develop Inauthentic News Articles - 
+T0086,Develop Image-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading visual artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include photographing staged real-life situations, repurposing existing digital images, or using image creation and editing technologies.",,new,T0086 - Develop Image-based Content
+T0086.001,Develop Memes,,TA06,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",,no change,Develop Memes - 
+T0086.002,Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes) - 
+T0086.003,Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap fakes) - 
+T0086.004,Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages,,TA06,Image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan),,no change,Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages - 
+T0087,Develop Video-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading video artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include staging videos of purportedly real situations, repurposing existing video artifacts, or using AI-generated video creation and editing technologies (including deepfakes).",,new,T0087 - Develop Video-based Content
+T0087.001,Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes) - 
+T0087.002,Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes) - 
+T0088,Develop Audio-based Content,,TA06,"Creating and editing false or misleading audio artifacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign. This may include creating completely new audio content, repurposing existing audio artifacts (including cheap fakes), or using AI-generated audio creation and editing technologies (including deepfakes).",,new,T0088 - Develop Audio-based Content
+T0088.001,Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes),,TA06,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",,no change,Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes) - 
+T0088.002,Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes),,TA06,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",,no change,Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes) - 
+T0089,Obtain Private Documents,,TA06,"Procuring documents that are not publicly available, by whatever means -- whether legal or illegal, highly-resourced or less so. These documents can include authentic non-public documents, authentic non-public documents have been altered, or inauthentic documents intended to appear as if they are authentic non-public documents. All of these types of documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,new,T0089 - Obtain Private Documents
+T0089.001,Obtain Authentic Documents,,TA06,"Procure authentic documents that are not publicly available, by whatever means -- whether legal or illegal, highly-resourced or less so. These documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Obtain Authentic Documents - 
+T0089.002,Create Inauthentic Documents,,TA06,"Create inauthentic documents intended to appear as if they are authentic non-public documents. These documents can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Create Inauthentic Documents - 
+T0089.003,Alter Authentic Documents,,TA06,"Alter authentic documents (public or non-public) to achieve campaign goals. The altered documents are intended to appear as if they are authentic can be ""leaked"" during later stages in the operation.",,no change,Alter Authentic Documents - 
+T0090,Create Inauthentic Accounts,,TA15,"Inauthentic accounts include bot accounts, cyborg accounts, sockpuppet accounts, and anonymous accounts.",,new,T0090 - Create Inauthentic Accounts
+T0090.001,Create Anonymous Accounts,,TA15,Anonymous accounts or anonymous users refer to users that access network resources without  providing a username or password. An influence operation may use anonymous accounts to spread content without direct attribution to the operation. ,,no change,Create Anonymous Accounts - 
+T0090.002,Create Cyborg Accounts,,TA15,"Cyborg accounts refer to partly manned, partly automated social media accounts. Cyborg  accounts primarily act as bots, but a human operator periodically takes control of the account to  engage with real social media users by responding to comments and posting original content.  Influence operations may use cyborg accounts to reduce the amount of direct human input  required to maintain a regular account but increase the apparent legitimacy of the cyborg account  by occasionally breaking its bot-like behavior with human interaction. ",,no change,Create Cyborg Accounts - 
+T0090.003,Create Bot Accounts,,TA15,"Bots refer to autonomous internet users that interact with systems or other users while imitating  traditional human behavior. Bots use a variety of tools to stay active without direct human  operation, including artificial intelligence and big data analytics. For example, an individual may  program a Twitter bot to retweet a tweet every time it contains a certain keyword or hashtag. An  influence operation may use bots to increase its exposure and artificially promote its content  across the internet without dedicating additional time or human resources.  
+Amplifier bots promote operation content through reposts, shares, and likes to increase the  content’s online popularity. Hacker bots are traditionally covert bots running on computer  scripts that rarely engage with users and work primarily as agents of larger cyberattacks, such as  a Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Spammer bots are programmed to post content on  social media or in comment sections, usually as a supplementary tool. Impersonator bots102 pose as real people by mimicking human behavior, complicating their detection.  ",,no change,Create Bot Accounts - 
+T0090.004,Create Sockpuppet Accounts,,TA15,Sockpuppet accounts refer to falsified accounts that either promote the influence operation’s  own material or attack critics of the material online. Individuals who control sockpuppet  accounts also man at least one other user account.67 Sockpuppet accounts help legitimize  operation narratives by providing an appearance of external support for the material and  discrediting opponents of the operation. ,,no change,Create Sockpuppet Accounts - 
+T0091,Recruit malign actors,,TA15,"Operators recruit bad actors paying recruiting, or exerting control over individuals includes trolls, partisans, and contractors.",,new,T0091 - Recruit malign actors
+T0091.001,Recruit Contractors,,TA15,Operators recruit paid contractor to support the campaign.,,no change,Recruit Contractors - 
+T0091.002,Recruit Partisans,,TA15,Operators recruit partisans (ideologically-aligned individuals) to support the campaign.,,no change,Recruit Partisans - 
+T0091.003,Enlist Troll Accounts,,TA15,"An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke  others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit  an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate.  
+Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or  boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly  affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organization, and post content with a specific ideological  goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalized or less organized and work for a  single individual. ",,no change,Enlist Troll Accounts - 
+T0092,Build Network,,TA15,"Operators build their own network, creating links between accounts -- whether authentic or inauthentic -- in order amplify and promote narratives and artifacts, and encourage further growth of ther network, as well as the ongoing sharing and engagement with operational content.",,new,T0092 - Build Network
+T0092.001,Create Organizations,,TA15,"Influence operations may establish organizations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities.",,no change,Create Organizations - 
+T0092.002,Use Follow Trains,,TA15,"A follow train is a group of people who follow each other on a social media platform, often as a way for an individual or campaign to grow its social media following. Follow trains may be a violation of platform Terms of Service. They are also known as follow-for-follow groups.  ",,no change,Use Follow Trains - 
+T0092.003,Create Community or Sub-group,,TA15,"When there is not an existing community or sub-group that meets a campaign's goals, an influence operation may seek to create a community or sub-group. ",,no change,Create Community or Sub-group - 
+T0093,Acquire/Recruit Network,,TA15,"Operators acquire an existing network by paying, recruiting, or exerting control over the leaders of the existing network. ",,new,T0093 - Acquire/Recruit Network
+T0093.001,Fund Proxies,,TA15,"An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An  operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives  and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including: 
+- Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution  
+- Reducing the workload for direct operation assets  ",,no change,Fund Proxies - 
+T0093.002,Acquire Botnets,,TA15,A botnet is a group of bots that can function in coordination with each other. ,,no change,Acquire Botnets - 
+T0094,Infiltrate Existing Networks,,TA15,Operators deceptively insert social assets into existing networks as group members in order to influence the members of the network and the wider information environment that the network impacts.,,new,T0094 - Infiltrate Existing Networks
+T0094.001,Identify susceptible targets in networks,,TA15,"When seeking to infiltrate an existing network, an influence operation may identify individuals and groups that might be susceptible to being co-opted or influenced.",,no change,Identify susceptible targets in networks - 
+T0094.002,Utilize Butterfly Attacks,,TA15,"Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually  a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert  controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to  infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organizations, and media campaigns.  ",,no change,Utilize Butterfly Attacks - 
+T0095,Develop Owned Media Assets,,TA15,"An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation  may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites,  blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and  organization of content.",,new,T0095 - Develop Owned Media Assets
+T0096,Leverage Content Farms,,TA15,Using the services of large-scale content providers for creating and amplifying campaign artifacts at scale.,,new,T0096 - Leverage Content Farms
+T0096.001,Create Content Farms,,TA15,An influence operation may create an organization for creating and amplifying campaign artifacts at scale.,,no change,Create Content Farms - 
+T0096.002,Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations,,TA15,"An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid  attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organization that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed  organizations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content  farms for high volumes of targeted media.  ",,no change,Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations - 
+T0097,Create personas,,TA16,"Creating fake people, often with accounts across multiple platforms. These personas can be as simple as a name, can contain slightly more background like location, profile pictures, backstory, or can be effectively backstopped with indicators like fake identity documents. ",,new,T0097 - Create personas
+T0097.001,Backstop personas ,,TA16,"Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability",,no change,Backstop personas  - 
+T0098,Establish Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,"Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.",,new,T0098 - Establish Inauthentic News Sites
+T0098.001,Create Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,Create Inauthentic News Sites,,no change,Create Inauthentic News Sites - 
+T0098.002,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites,,TA16,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites,,no change,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites - 
+T0099,Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,,TA16,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its  network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely  believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites.  Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state  entities.  
+An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate  entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a  domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional  typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation  of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to  confirm that the URL is correct.  ",,new,T0099 - Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities
+T0099.001,Astroturfing,,TA16,"Astroturfing occurs when an influence operation disguises itself as grassroots movement or  organization that supports operation narratives. Unlike butterfly attacks, astroturfing aims to  increase the appearance of popular support for the operation cause and does not infiltrate existing  groups to discredit their objectives.  ",,no change,Astroturfing - 
+T0099.002,Spoof/parody account/site,,TA16,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its  network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely  believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites.  Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state  entities.  ",,no change,Spoof/parody account/site - 
+T0100,Co-opt Trusted Sources,,TA16,"An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to  reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources  may include:  
+- National or local new outlets  
+- Research or academic publications  
+- Online blogs or websites ",,new,T0100 - Co-opt Trusted Sources
+T0100.001,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals,,TA16,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals,,no change,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals - 
+T0100.002,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups,,TA16,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups,,no change,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups - 
+T0100.003,Co-opt Influencers,,TA16,Co-opt Influencers,,no change,Co-opt Influencers - 
+T0101,Create Localized Content,,TA05,"Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.",,new,T0101 - Create Localized Content
+T0102,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,"An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where  individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly  engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may  create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals  into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other  characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to  the same target audience members. ",,new,T0102 - Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles
+T0102.001,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,no change,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles - 
+T0102.002,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,TA05,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,no change,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles - 
+T0102.003,Exploit Data Voids,,TA05,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search  engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity  aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a  high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation  may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.  
+A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news”  data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an  influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to  publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data  void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their  keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated  terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for  recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas,  isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use  “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote  messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.  ",,no change,Exploit Data Voids - 
+T0103,Livestream,,TA07,A livestream refers to an online broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,new,T0103 - Livestream
+T0103.001,Video Livestream,,TA07,A video livestream refers to an online video broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,no change,Video Livestream - 
+T0103.002,Audio Livestream,,TA07,An audio livestream refers to an online audio broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks.,,no change,Audio Livestream - 
+T0104,Social Networks,,TA07,"Social media are interactive digital channels that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, interests, and other forms of expression through virtual communities and networks.",,new,T0104 - Social Networks
+T0104.001,Mainstream Social Networks,,TA07,"Examples include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.",,no change,Mainstream Social Networks - 
+T0104.002,Dating Apps,,TA07,"A video livestream refers to an online video broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks. Examples include Facebook Live, Instagram, Youtube, Tik Tok, and Twitter. ",,no change,Dating Apps - 
+T0104.003,Private/Closed Social Networks,,TA07,"An audio livestream refers to an online audio broadcast capability that allows for real-time communication to closed or open networks. Examples include Twitter Spaces, ",,no change,Private/Closed Social Networks - 
+T0104.004,Interest-Based Networks,,TA07,"Examples include smaller and niche networks including Gettr, Truth Social, Parler, etc.",,no change,Interest-Based Networks - 
+T0104.005,Use hashtags,,TA07,"Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident.",,no change,Use hashtags - 
+T0104.006,Create dedicated hashtag,,TA07,Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag.,,no change,Create dedicated hashtag - 
+T0105,Media Sharing Networks,,TA07,"Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.",,new,T0105 - Media Sharing Networks
+T0105.001,Photo Sharing,,TA07,"Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, Flickr, etc",,no change,Photo Sharing - 
+T0105.002,Video Sharing,,TA07,"Examples include Youtube, TikTok, ShareChat, Rumble, etc",,no change,Video Sharing - 
+T0105.003,Audio sharing,,TA07,"Examples include podcasting apps, Soundcloud, etc.",,no change,Audio sharing - 
+T0106,Discussion Forums,,TA07,"Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.",,new,T0106 - Discussion Forums
+T0106.001,Anonymous Message Boards,,TA07,Examples include the Chans,,no change,Anonymous Message Boards - 
+T0107,Bookmarking and Content Curation,,TA07,"Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc.",,new,T0107 - Bookmarking and Content Curation
+T0108,Blogging and Publishing Networks,,TA07,"Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. ",,new,T0108 - Blogging and Publishing Networks
+T0109,Consumer Review Networks,,TA07,"Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc.  Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.",,new,T0109 - Consumer Review Networks
+T0110,Formal Diplomatic Channels,,TA07,"Leveraging formal, traditional, diplomatic channels to communicate with foreign governments (written documents, meetings, summits, diplomatic visits, etc). This type of diplomacy is conducted by diplomats of one nation with diplomats and other officials of another nation or international organization.",,new,T0110 - Formal Diplomatic Channels
+T0111,Traditional Media,,TA07,"Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.",,new,T0111 - Traditional Media
+T0111.001,TV,,TA07,TV,,no change,TV - 
+T0111.002,Newspaper,,TA07,Newspaper,,no change,Newspaper - 
+T0111.003,Radio,,TA07,Radio,,no change,Radio - 
+T0112,Email,,TA07,Delivering content and narratives via email. This can include using list management or high-value individually targeted messaging.,,new,T0112 - Email
+T0113,Employ Commercial Analytic Firms,,TA08,"Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to  detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ  commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences.  ",,new,T0113 - Employ Commercial Analytic Firms
+T0114,Deliver Ads,,TA09,Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.,,new,T0114 - Deliver Ads
+T0114.001,Social media,,TA09,Social Media,,no change,Social media - 
+T0114.002,Traditional Media,,TA09,"Examples include TV, Radio, Newspaper, billboards",,no change,Traditional Media - 
+T0115,Post Content,,TA09,Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,,new,T0115 - Post Content
+T0115.001,Share Memes,,TA09,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",,no change,Share Memes - 
+T0115.002,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash,,TA09,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash.,,no change,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash - 
+T0115.003,One-Way Direct Posting,,TA09,"Direct posting refers to a method of posting content via a one-way messaging service, where the  recipient cannot directly respond to the poster’s messaging. An influence operation may post  directly to promote operation narratives to the target audience without allowing opportunities for  fact-checking or disagreement, creating a false sense of support for the narrative. ",,no change,One-Way Direct Posting - 
+T0116,Comment or Reply on Content,,TA09,Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,,new,T0116 - Comment or Reply on Content
+T0116.001,Post inauthentic social media comment,,TA09,"Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums.",,no change,Post inauthentic social media comment - 
+T0117,Attract Traditional Media,,TA09,Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media).,,new,T0117 - Attract Traditional Media
+T0118,Amplify Existing Narrative,,TA17,An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. ,,new,T0118 - Amplify Existing Narrative
+T0119,Cross-Posting,,TA17,"Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content  online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the  target audience. ",,new,T0119 - Cross-Posting
+T0119.001,Post Across Groups,,TA17,An influence operation may post content across groups to spread narratives and content to new communities within the target audiences or to new target audiences. ,,no change,Post Across Groups - 
+T0119.002,Post Across Platform,,TA17,"An influence operation may post content across platforms to spread narratives and content to new communities within the target audiences or to new target audiences. Posting across platforms can also remove opposition and context, helping the narrative spread with less opposition on the cross-posted platform. ",,no change,Post Across Platform - 
+T0119.003,Post Across Disciplines,,TA17,Post Across Disciplines,,no change,Post Across Disciplines - 
+T0120,Incentivize Sharing,,TA17,"Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves,  reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.",,new,T0120 - Incentivize Sharing
+T0120.001,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs,,TA17,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs,,no change,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs - 
+T0120.002,Use Contests and Prizes,,TA17,Use Contests and Prizes,,no change,Use Contests and Prizes - 
+T0121,Manipulate Platform Algorithm,,TA17,"Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that  intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select  Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content  exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an  influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes  engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines.  ",,new,T0121 - Manipulate Platform Algorithm
+T0121.001,Bypass Content Blocking,,TA17,"Bypassing content blocking refers to actions taken to circumvent network security measures that  prevent users from accessing certain servers, resources, or other online spheres. An influence  operation may bypass content blocking to proliferate its content on restricted areas of the  internet. Common strategies for bypassing content blocking include:
+- Altering IP addresses to avoid IP filtering  
+- Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to avoid IP filtering 
+- Using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to avoid IP filtering 
+- Enabling encryption to bypass packet inspection blocking 
+- Manipulating text to avoid filtering by keywords 
+- Posting content on multiple platforms to avoid platform-specific removals - Using local facilities or modified DNS servers to avoid DNS filtering ",,no change,Bypass Content Blocking - 
+T0122,Direct Users to Alternative Platforms,,TA17,"Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the  platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate  information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An  operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial  platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content.  ",,new,T0122 - Direct Users to Alternative Platforms
+T0123,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,,TA18,Controlling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of  content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,,new,T0123 - Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations
+T0123.001,Delete Opposing Content,,TA18,"Deleting opposing content refers to the removal of content that conflicts with operational  narratives from selected platforms. An influence operation may delete opposing content to  censor contradictory information from the target audience, allowing operation narratives to take  priority in the information space.",,no change,Delete Opposing Content - 
+T0123.002,Block Content,,TA18,Content blocking refers to actions taken to restrict internet access or render certain areas of the  internet inaccessible. An influence operation may restrict content based on both network and  content attributes. ,,no change,Block Content - 
+T0123.003,Destroy Information Generation Capabilities,,TA18,"Destroying information generation capabilities refers to actions taken to limit, degrade, or  otherwise incapacitate an actor’s ability to generate conflicting information. An influence operation may destroy an actor’s information generation capabilities by physically dismantling  the information infrastructure, disconnecting resources needed for information generation, or  redirecting information generation personnel. An operation may destroy an adversary’s  information generation capabilities to limit conflicting content exposure to the target audience  and crowd the information space with its own narratives. ",,no change,Destroy Information Generation Capabilities - 
+T0123.004,Conduct Server Redirect,,TA18,"A server redirect, also known as a URL redirect, occurs when a server automatically forwards a  user from one URL to another using server-side scripting languages. An influence operation may  conduct a server redirect to divert target audience members from one website to another without  their knowledge. The redirected website may pose as a legitimate source, host malware, or  otherwise aid operation objectives.",,no change,Conduct Server Redirect - 
+T0124,Suppress Opposition,,TA18,Operators can suppress the opposition by exploiting platform content moderation tools and processes like reporting non-violative content to platforms for takedown and goading opposition actors into taking actions that result in platform action or target audience disapproval. ,,new,T0124 - Suppress Opposition
+T0124.001,Report Non-Violative Opposing Content,,TA18,"Reporting opposing content refers to notifying and providing an instance of a violation of a  platform’s guidelines and policies for conduct on the platform. In addition to simply reporting  the content, an operation may leverage copyright regulations to trick social media and web  platforms into removing opposing content by manipulating the content to appear in violation of  copyright laws. Reporting opposing content facilitates the suppression of contradictory  information and allows operation narratives to take priority in the information space. ",,no change,Report Non-Violative Opposing Content - 
+T0124.002,Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself),,TA18,Goad people into actions that violate terms of service or will lead to having their content or accounts taken down. ,,no change,Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself) - 
+T0124.003,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation,,TA18,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation,,no change,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation - 
+T0125,Platform Filtering,,TA18,Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation),,new,T0125 - Platform Filtering
+T0126,Encourage Attendance at Events,,TA10,Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.,,new,T0126 - Encourage Attendance at Events
+T0126.001,Call to action to attend ,,TA10,Call to action to attend an event,,no change,Call to action to attend  - 
+T0126.002,Facilitate logistics or support for attendance,,TA10,"Facilitate logistics or support for travel, food, housing, etc.",,no change,Facilitate logistics or support for attendance - 
+T0127,Physical Violence,,TA10,"Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value.  ",,new,T0127 - Physical Violence
+T0127.001,Conduct Physical Violence,,TA10,An influence operation may directly Conduct Physical Violence to achieve campaign goals. ,,no change,Conduct Physical Violence - 
+T0127.002,Encourage Physical Violence,,TA10,An influence operation may Encourage others to engage in Physical Violence to achieve campaign goals. ,,no change,Encourage Physical Violence - 
+T0128,Conceal People,,TA11,Conceal the identity or provenance of a campaign account and people assets to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0128 - Conceal People
+T0128.001,Use Pseudonyms,,TA11,"An operation may use pseudonyms, or fake names, to mask the identity of operation accounts,  publish anonymous content, or otherwise use falsified personas to conceal identity of the  operation. An operation may coordinate pseudonyms across multiple platforms, for example, by  writing an article under a pseudonym and then posting a link to the article on social media on an  account with the same falsified name.  ",,no change,Use Pseudonyms - 
+T0128.002,Conceal Network Identity,,TA11,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network  completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of  any sort of organization. ",,no change,Conceal Network Identity - 
+T0128.003,Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation,,TA11,"Distancing reputable individuals from the operation occurs when enlisted individuals, such as  celebrities or subject matter experts, actively disengage themselves from operation activities and  messaging. Individuals may distance themselves from the operation by deleting old posts or  statements, unfollowing operation information assets, or otherwise detaching themselves from  the operation’s timeline. An influence operation may want reputable individuals to distance  themselves from the operation to reduce operation exposure, particularly if the operation aims to remove all evidence.",,no change,Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation - 
+T0128.004,Launder Accounts,,TA11,Account laundering occurs when an influence operation acquires control of previously legitimate  online accounts from third parties through sale or exchange and often in contravention of terms  of use. Influence operations use laundered accounts to reach target audience members from an  existing information channel and complicate attribution.  ,,no change,Launder Accounts - 
+T0128.005,Change Names of Accounts,,TA11,Changing names of accounts occurs when an operation changes the name of an existing social  media account. An operation may change the names of its accounts throughout an operation to  avoid detection or alter the names of newly acquired or repurposed accounts to fit operational  narratives.  ,,no change,Change Names of Accounts - 
+T0129,Conceal Operational Activity,,TA11,Conceal the campaign's operational activity to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0129 - Conceal Operational Activity
+T0129.001,Conceal Network Identity,,TA11,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network  completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of  any sort of organization. ",,no change,Conceal Network Identity - 
+T0129.002,Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative,,TA11,"An influence operation may mix its own operation content with legitimate news or external  unrelated content to disguise operational objectives, narratives, or existence. For example, an  operation may generate ""lifestyle"" or ""cuisine"" content alongside regular operation content.  ",,no change,Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative - 
+T0129.003,Break Association with Content,,TA11,"Breaking association with content occurs when an influence operation actively separates itself  from its own content. An influence operation may break association with content by  unfollowing, unliking, or unsharing its content, removing attribution from its content, or  otherwise taking actions that distance the operation from its messaging. An influence operation may break association with its content to complicate attribution or regain credibility for a new operation.  ",,no change,Break Association with Content - 
+T0129.004,Delete URLs,,TA11,"URL deletion occurs when an influence operation completely removes its website registration,  rendering the URL inaccessible. An influence operation may delete its URLs to complicate  attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred.",,no change,Delete URLs - 
+T0129.005,Coordinate on encrypted/closed networks,,TA11,Coordinate on encrypted/ closed networks,,no change,Coordinate on encrypted/closed networks - 
+T0129.006,Deny involvement,,TA11,"Without ""smoking gun"" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in ""Demand insurmountable proof"", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a ""firehose of misinformation"" environment.",,no change,Deny involvement - 
+T0129.007,Delete Accounts/Account Activity,,TA11,"Deleting accounts and account activity occurs when an influence operation removes its online  social media assets, including social media accounts, posts, likes, comments, and other online  artifacts. An influence operation may delete its accounts and account activity to complicate  attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred.  ",,no change,Delete Accounts/Account Activity - 
+T0129.008,Redirect URLs,,TA11,"An influence operation may redirect its falsified or typosquatted URLs to legitimate websites to  increase the operation's appearance of legitimacy, complicate attribution, and avoid detection.  ",,no change,Redirect URLs - 
+T0129.009,Remove Post Origins,,TA11,"Removing post origins refers to the elimination of evidence that indicates the initial source of  operation content, often to complicate attribution. An influence operation may remove post  origins by deleting watermarks, renaming files, or removing embedded links in its content.  ",,no change,Remove Post Origins - 
+T0129.010,Misattribute Activity,,TA11,"Misattributed activity refers to incorrectly attributed operation activity. For example, a state sponsored influence operation may conduct operation activity in a way that mimics another state  so that external entities misattribute activity to the incorrect state. An operation may misattribute  their activities to complicate attribution, avoid detection, or frame an adversary for negative  behavior. ",,no change,Misattribute Activity - 
+T0130,Conceal Infrastructure,,TA11,Conceal the campaign's infrastructure to avoid takedown and attribution.,,split from T0012,T0130 - Conceal Infrastructure
+T0130.001,Conceal Sponsorship,,TA11,"Concealing sponsorship aims to mislead or obscure the identity of the hidden sponsor behind an operation rather than entity publicly running the operation. Operations that conceal sponsorship  may maintain visible falsified groups, news outlets, non-profits, or other organizations, but seek  to mislead or obscure the identity sponsoring, funding, or otherwise supporting these entities.  
+Influence operations may use a variety of techniques to mask the location of their social media  accounts to complicate attribution and conceal evidence of foreign interference. Operation  accounts may set their location to a false place, often the location of the operation’s target  audience, and post in the region’s language",,no change,Conceal Sponsorship - 
+T0130.002,Utilize Bulletproof Hosting,,TA11,"Hosting refers to services through which storage and computing resources are provided to an  individual or organization for the accommodation and maintenance of one or more websites and  related services. Services may include web hosting, file sharing, and email distribution.  Bulletproof hosting refers to services provided by an entity, such as a domain hosting or web  hosting firm, that allows its customer considerable leniency in use of the service. An influence  operation may utilize bulletproof hosting to maintain continuity of service for suspicious, illegal,  or disruptive operation activities that stricter hosting services would limit, report, or suspend. ",,no change,Utilize Bulletproof Hosting - 
+T0130.003,Use Shell Organizations,,TA11,Use Shell Organizations to conceal sponsorship.,,no change,Use Shell Organizations - 
+T0130.004,Use Cryptocurrency,,TA11,"Use Cryptocurrency to conceal sponsorship. Examples include Bitcoin, Monero, and Etherium. ",,no change,Use Cryptocurrency - 
+T0130.005,Obfuscate Payment,,TA11,Obfuscate Payment,,no change,Obfuscate Payment - 
+T0131,Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,,TA11,Exploiting weaknesses in platforms' terms of service and content moderation policies to avoid takedowns and platform actions.,,new,T0131 - Exploit TOS/Content Moderation
+T0131.001,Legacy web content,,TA11,"Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.",,no change,Legacy web content - 
+T0131.002,Post Borderline Content,,TA11,Post Borderline Content,,no change,Post Borderline Content - 
+T0132,Measure Performance,,TA12,A metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions. “Are the actions being executed as planned?”,,new,T0132 - Measure Performance
+T0132.001,People Focused,,TA12,Measure the performance individuals in achieving campaign goals,,no change,People Focused - 
+T0132.002,Content Focused,,TA12,Measure the performance of campaign content,,no change,Content Focused - 
+T0132.003,View Focused,,TA12,View Focused,,no change,View Focused - 
+T0133,Measure Effectiveness,,TA12,A metric used to measure a current system state. “Are we on track to achieve the intended new system state within the planned timescale?”,,new,T0133 - Measure Effectiveness
+T0133.001,Behavior changes,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from misinformation incidents. ,,no change,Behavior changes - 
+T0133.002,Content,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of campaign content. ,,no change,Content - 
+T0133.003,Awareness,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing awareness. ,,no change,Awareness - 
+T0133.004,Knowledge,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing knowledge. ,,no change,Knowledge - 
+T0133.005,Action/attitude,,TA12,Measure current system state with respect to the effectiveness of influencing action/attitude. ,,no change,Action/attitude - 
+T0134,Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),,TA12,"Ensuring that Key Performace Indicators are identified and tracked, so that the performance and effectivess of campaigns, and elements of campaigns, can be measured, during and after their execution",,new,T0134 - Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)
+T0134.001,Message reach,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinformation incidents. ,,no change,Message reach - 
+T0134.002,Social media engagement,,TA12,Monitor and evaluate social media engagement in misinformation incidents.,,no change,Social media engagement - 
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6f8481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+disarm_id,name,externalgroup,url,category,disinformation_use,cogseccollab_use,function,summary,notes,code_url,artifacts,automation,platform,accessibility
+TL00002,Ad Observer,New York University,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ad-observer/enliecaalhkhhihcmnbjfmmjkljlcinl,Advertising Analysis,Designed for disinfo,,Collect and share ads,,,,ads,human,browser extension,
+TL00035,Exodus,Exodus tool,https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/,Advertising Analysis,,,Exodus tool to evaluate a mobile app’s permissions and ad trackers,,,,,,,
+TL00036,Facebook political/issue ads database,Facebook,https://www.facebook.com/ads/archive/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US,Advertising Analysis,,,Facebook political/issue ads database,,,,,,,
+TL00054,Google political ads database,Google,http://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/home,Advertising Analysis,,,Google political ads database,,,,,,,
+TL00080,Moat,Moat,https://moat.com/,Advertising Analysis,,,Moat ad analytics tool,,,,,,,
+TL00093,Pathmatics,Pathmatics,https://www.pathmatics.com/,Advertising Analysis,,,Pathmatics display and Facebook ads tracking tool (paid),,,,,,,
+TL00148,Who Targets Me,,https://whotargets.me/en/about-who-targets-me/,Advertising Analysis,,,political ad scraper,,,https://github.com/WhoTargetsMe/,ads,,browser extension,open source
+TL00019,Check My Ads,Check My Ads,https://www.checkmyads.org/,Advertising Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00010,Bot Sentinel,,https://botsentinel.com/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,yes,,,,,accounts,,,
+TL00011,Botometer,University of Indiana,https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,,,,Was BotOrNot,,accounts,,,
+TL00012,Botslayer,University of Indiana,https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/botslayer/,Bot analysis,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,accounts,,,
+TL00052,Ghostery,Ghostery,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ghostery-%E2%80%93-privacy-ad-blo/mlomiejdfkolichcflejclcbmpeaniij,Browser Plugin,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00144,WayBack Machine,WayBack Machine,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/wayback-machine/fpnmgdkabkmnadcjpehmlllkndpkmiak,Browser Plugin,Commonly used,,,,,,,,,
+TL00022,Corporate registrars list,Kanton St.Gallen,https://www.commercial-register.sg.ch/home/worldwide.html,Corporate/Business Tools,,,List of corporate registrars around the world,,,,,,,
+TL00023,Corporation Wiki,Corporation Wiki,https://www.corporationwiki.com/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00062,ICIJ Offshoreleaks Database,The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00066,Investigative Dashboard,Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),https://investigativedashboard.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00075,Little Sis database,Little Sis database,https://littlesis.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,"Relationships between people, companies etc.",,,,,,,
+TL00089,Open Corporates,Open Corporates,https://opencorporates.com/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00090,Opensanctions,Opensanctions,https://www.opensanctions.org/,Corporate/Business Tools,,,"Global database of persons and companies of political, criminal, or economic interest. It combines the most important sanctions lists, databases of politically exposed persons etc",,,,,,,
+TL00091,Orbis directory,Orbis,https://orbisdirectory.bvdinfo.com/version-2018619/OrbisDirectory/Companies,Corporate/Business Tools,,,Paid corporate search,,,,,,,
+TL00060,Hooyu,Hooyu Business,https://hooyubusiness.com,Finding People,,,Hooyu is a great paid tool for identifying connections between people and entities in the UK,,,,,,,
+TL00081,Name2email,Name2email,https://name2email.com/,Finding People,,,Name2email browser extension that helps you find a person’s correct email,,,,,,,
+TL00095,Pipl,Pipl,https://pipl.com/,Finding People,,,Pipl people Search,,,,,,,
+TL00111,Skopenow,Skopenow,https://www.skopenow.com/,Finding People,,,Skopenow (an excellent paid tool),,,,,,,
+TL00115,Spokeo,Spokeo,http://www.spokeo.com/,Finding People,,,Spokeo people search (good for the US only),,,,,,,
+TL00120,Thats Them,Thats Them,https://thatsthem.com/,Finding People,,,Thats Them people search,,,,,,,
+TL00007,Assembler,,https://projectassembler.org/,Image analysis,Designed for disinfo,,image analysis,,,,images,,,
+TL00033,e-witness,CUNY,https://ewitness.commons.gc.cuny.edu/,Image analysis,Potentially useful,,image provenance,"eWitness uses blockchain to establish provenance of images and videos taken from a smart phone camera. eWitness can be used to gather evidence of crime, human rights violation, domestic violence, corruption, traffic violations and more. An eWitness user is protected behind a pseudo-identity which is hidden even from the eWitness backend, until the user is ready to reveal themselves or to quietly pass the evidence on to their case-worker, trusted friend or sponsor. The purpose of eWitness is to create images and videos that can be trusted. The technology behind eWitness, provides the proof of location and time the media was taken and the proof that the media was not altered to misinform or deform the fact in any manner.",,,images,,,
+TL00041,FindClone,FindClone,https://findclone.ru/,Image analysis,,,Reverse image/facial recognition,,,,,,,
+TL00046,Foto Forensics,Hacker Factory,http://fotoforensics.com,Image analysis,Useful,,image forensics,,,,images,,,
+TL00047,FotoForensics,FotoForensics,http://fotoforensics.com/,Image analysis,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00048,Free Online OCR,NewOCR,https://www.newocr.com/,Image analysis,,,Take an image and convert characters to text,,,,,,,
+TL00067,InVid,InVid,https://www.invid-project.eu/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,image and video verification,,,,images,,,
+TL00068,Jeffrey Friedl's Image Metadata Viewer,EXIF Reader,http://exif.regex.info/,Image analysis,Useful,,,,,,,,,
+TL00101,Reality Defender,AI Foundation,https://rd2020.org/,Image analysis,,,detect synthetic media,,,,images,,,request access
+TL00104,Remove.bg,Remove,https://www.remove.bg/,Image analysis,,,"Free tool that helps remove background images from a photo, to help with reverse image search",,,,,,,
+TL00105,Reverse image search,Karmadecay,http://karmadecay.com/,Image analysis,,,Reverse image search tool for Reddit,,,,,,,
+TL00106,Reverse image search,Yandex,https://yandex.com/images/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,,,,,,,,
+TL00108,Sensity tool for detecting GAN generated faces,Sensity,https://platform.sensity.ai/deepfake-detection,Image analysis,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00124,TinEye,TinEye,https://tineye.com/,Image analysis,Commonly used,,reverse image search,,,,images,,browser extension,
+TL00125,TinEye,,tineye.com,Image analysis,,,search for images,,,,images,,,
+TL00129,Truepic,,https://www.truepic.com,Image analysis,,,image verification,,,,images,,,
+TL00153,YouTube Data Viewer,Citizen Evidence Lab (Amnesty International),https://citizenevidence.org/2014/07/01/youtube-dataviewer/,Image analysis,,,Extract hidden data from videos hosted on YouTube. Useful for tracking down original content,,,,,,,
+TL00003,Aletheia,Midstream Technology,http://midstream.us,Network analysis,Designed for disinfo,,social network analysis; astroturf,,,,accounts,,,
+TL00050,Gephi,,https://gephi.org/users/install/,Network analysis,Commonly used,,network visualisation,,,,,,Install on PC,
+TL00077,MentionMapp,MentionMapp Analytics,https://mentionmapp.com/,Network analysis,Commonly used,,social network visualisation,,,,,,,
+TL00063,Iffy Quotient,University of Michigan,https://csmr.umich.edu/platform-health-metrics/,Ratings,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
+TL00132,Trustium,,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/trustium/fkcccoomlgbfmhcgcepbdfjmofckejgo?hl=en,Ratings,Designed for disinfo,,site rating for advertisers,,,,webpages,,browser extension,
+TL00001,Account Analysis,Account Analysis,https://accountanalysis.app/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Account Analysis is another great Twitter account analysis tool,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00015,Buzzweb,,https://buzzweb.pro/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Buzzweb Instagram analysis tool,,,,instagram,,,
+TL00038,FakeSpot,,https://www.fakespot.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Tool to analyze whether reviews on amazon/Yelp/TripAdvisor etc. are fake,,,,,,,
+TL00039,FBstalker,,https://fbstalker.thao.pw/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Facebook profile investigator,,,,facebook,,,
+TL00043,Foller.me ,,https://foller.me/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Foller.me Analytics for Twitter,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00044,Followerwonk ,,https://followerwonk.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Followerwonk Twitter tool for searching bios, user analysis etc.",,,,twitter,,,
+TL00056,Gramspy,,http://gramspy.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Gramspy Instagram analysis tool,,,,instagram,,,
+TL00057,Graph.tips,,http://graph.tips/beta,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,Facebook Graph search interface,,,,facebook,,,
+TL00082,NameChk,,https://namechk.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Tool to see if a username is used across different online services,,,,,,,
+TL00107,SearchUsers,,https://searchusers.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,A tool to search for Instagram users by name or username without having to login,,,,instagram,,,
+TL00113,SocialBlade,,https://socialblade.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"SocialBlade tool for analyzing YouTube, Twitter, Insta, Twitch accounts",,,,"youtube,twitter,instagram,twitch,facebook,tiktok,dailymotion,odysee,trovo,mixer,dlive,storyfire",,,
+TL00119,TGStat,Telegram Analytics,http://tgstat.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,A tool for analyzing a Telegram account/channel,,,,telegram,,,
+TL00126,Tinfoleak,Tinfoleak,https://tinfoleak.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Get useful overview related to a Twitter account,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00134,TweetBeaver,TweetBeaver,https://tweetbeaver.com/index.php,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,TweetBeaver account tools,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00135,Twiangulate,,http://twiangulate.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Twiangulate.com for mapping connections between accounts,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00136,Twitonomy,Twitonomy,https://www.twitonomy.com/go-premium.php,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Analyzing a twitter account, hashtags, etc.",,,,twitter,,,
+TL00137,Twitter advanced search,,https://twitter.com/search-advanced,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Twitter advanced search,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00139,Twren,,https://twren.ch/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,"Tool that lists the accounts that retweeted a specific account, with lots of sorting and filtering options",,,,,,,
+TL00145,Webmii,,http://webmii.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Webmii social media profile search,,,,,,,
+TL00147,WhatsMyName,,https://whatsmyname.app/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,An even more comprehensive tool for searching a username across platforms,,,,,,,
+TL00150,WhoPostedWhat,,http://whopostedwhat.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,Search for dates and date ranges on Facebook,,,,facebook,,,
+TL00025,Crowdtangle (chrome extension),Facebook,https://apps.crowdtangle.com/chrome-extension,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Commonly used,yes,,,,,socialmedia,,browser extension,Free
+TL00026,Crowdtangle (full),Facebook,https://www.crowdtangle.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Commonly used,,,,,,socialmedia,,,request access
+TL00069,Jod Bot,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/jod-bot,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,Telegram archiver,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,telegram,,,open source
+TL00073,Khoj,Tattle,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,message verification,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/archive-telegram-bot,telegram,,,open source
+TL00074,Kosh,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/kosh/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,archive,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/kosh,messageapps,,,open source
+TL00102,Reaper,,https://reaper.social/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,,,,https://github.com/ScriptSmith/reaper,,,,
+TL00112,Social Media Analysis Toolkit (SMAT),,https://www.smat-app.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,trends,,,,"gab,parler,4chan,8kun,win,poal,telegram,gettr,rumble,bitchute,lbry,mewe,wimkin,minds,Vkontakte",,,
+TL00133,TruthNest,Athens Technology Centre (ATC),https://www.truthnest.com,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Designed for disinfo,,twitter analytics,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00138,Twitter Trails,,http://twittertrails.com/,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,,,twitter tracking,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00146,WhatsApp archiver,Tattle,https://tattle.co.in/products/whatsapp-archiver,Social Media Search and Account Analysis,Useful,,WhatsApp archiver,,,https://github.com/tattle-made/whatsapp-scraper/tree/master/python_scraper,whatsapp,,,open source
+TL00117,Squint,MITRE,https://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/squint-sharpens-officials-perspective-to-combat-election-distortion,Tipline,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,browser extension;mobile app,
+TL00029,Disinformation Diaries,,https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/initiatives/the-campaign/the-disinformation-diaries/,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
+TL00051,Get Bad News,DROG,https://getbadnews.com/#intro,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
+TL00121,The News Hero,NATO Stratcom,https://www.thenewshero.org/,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
+TL00122,The propaganda game,,https://propagandagame.org,Training,Designed for disinfo,,training,,,,,,,
+TL00004,Alexa,Alexa,https://www.alexa.com,Web Traffic Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00008,Backlink Watch,Backlink Watch,http://www.backlinkwatch.com/,Web Traffic Analysis,,,Backlink checker,,,,,,,
+TL00110,SimilarWeb,SimilarWeb,http://similarweb.com/,Web Traffic Analysis,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00005,AnalyzeID,,http://analyzeid.com/,Website Analysis,Useful,,AnalyzeID find related websites through ad codes,,,,,,,
+TL00006,Archive.is,,http://archive.is/,Website Analysis,,,Archive.is often used for social media profiles as well,,,,,,,
+TL00016,Carbon Date,,http://carbondate.cs.odu.edu/,Website Analysis,,,A tool that tries to guess when a webpage first went online,,,,,,,
+TL00027,Deep Duck Dive,,https://deepdiveduck.com,Website Analysis,,,Paid tool to monitor changes to specific webpages,,,,,,,
+TL00030,DNSlytics,,https://dnslytics.com/,Website Analysis,,,"DNSlytics is another great tool for connecting websites together via AdSense, Google Analytics, IP etc. Reasonably-priced paid verison, too",,,,,,,
+TL00031,Domain Big Data,,https://domainbigdata.com/,Website Analysis,,,Domain Big Data free whois/domain name search,,,,,,,
+TL00032,DomainTools,,https://whois.domaintools.com/,Website Analysis,,,DomainTools paid whois search and investigations tool,,,,,,,
+TL00042,FOCA,,https://www.elevenpaths.com/labstools/foca/index.html,Website Analysis,,,FOCA tool for analyzing metadata in documents on the web (Windows only),,,,,,,
+TL00065,Internet Archive,Internet Archive,https://archive.org/web/,Website Analysis,,,Internet Archive/Wayback Machine,,,,,,,
+TL00083,NerdyData,NerdyData,https://nerdydata.com/search,Website Analysis,,,NerdyData source code search,,,,,,,
+TL00099,Publicwww,,https://publicwww.com/,Website Analysis,,,"Publicwww, search to see how many websites have the same source code or snippet of text (looks in HTML, JS and CSS code as well as webpages)",,,,,,,
+TL00116,Spy On Web,,http://www.spyonweb.com/,Website Analysis,,,Spy On Web search for tracking Google Analytics and AdSense,,,,,,,
+TL00140,URLScan,,https://urlscan.io/,Website Analysis,,,"URLScan is a free tool that gives an overview of a site, the tools used to build it, and other useful info",,,,,,,
+TL00141,Viewcached.com,,http://viewcached.com/,Website Analysis,,,Viewcached.com tool for retrieving cached pages from multiple search engines,,,,,,,
+TL00142,ViewDNS,,https://viewdns.info/reverseip/,Website Analysis,,,ViewDNS is another useful tool for analyzing domain names.,,,,,,,
+TL00149,Whoisology,,https://whoisology.com/,Website Analysis,,,Whoisology whois-domain search,,,,,,,
+TL00009,Blackbird Constellation Engine,Blackbird,https://www.blackbird.ai/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,paid
+TL00013,Builtwith,,Builtwith.com,Website Analysis,Designed for disinfo,yes,"website details, links to other websites",,,,webpages,,,Freemium
+TL00014,Buzzsumo,,https://buzzsumo.com/,,Commonly used,,trends; social listening,,,,,,,paid
+TL00017,Check,Meedan,https://meedan.com/check,Analysis tracking and support,Designed for disinfo,,,,,https://github.com/meedan/check,,human,,open source
+TL00018,Check browser add-on,Meedan,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/check/pjfgpbclkfjkfiljlcfehjmpafeoafdi?hl=en,Analysis tracking and support,Designed for disinfo,,,"Browse the internet, and find a Tweet, YouTube video, Facebook post or an Instagram photo that you want your team to fact-check and investigate. Click the Check icon, choose one of the projects you want to add this item to, and save it",,,artifacts,,browser extension,
+TL00020,Claim Review,Schema.org,https://schema.org/ClaimReview,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
+TL00021,ClaimBuster,University of Texas at Arlington,https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
+TL00024,Counter propaganda and disinformation explorer (CPD),IBM,https://www.ibm.com/watson,,Designed for disinfo,,summarisation?,,,,,,,
+TL00028,Disinfo Busters,,http://disinfobusters.eu,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00034,Emergent,Columbia University: Tow Center,http://www.emergent.info/about,,Designed for disinfo,,rumor tracker,Emergent is a real-time rumor tracker. It's part of a research project with the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University that focuses on how unverified information and rumor are reported in the media. It aims to develop best practices for debunking misinformation.,,,,,,
+TL00037,Fakebook Experiment,Avaaz,https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/disinfo_volunteer_231/,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00040,Feed Reflect (browser extension),,https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/feedreflect/bigmeipgaifggglelcnpnpbaefimpooc?hl=en-US,,Potentially useful,,,Browser extension designed to promote awareness when reading news on Twitter. This browser extension changes twitter feed by making posts more or less visible and help users distinguish news with differing level of reliability. ,,,,,browser extension,
+TL00045,Fortis AI,Alion,https://www.alionscience.com,,Potentially useful,,IO platform,,,,,,,
+TL00049,GenSynth,Darwin AI,https://www.darwinai.com,,Potentially useful,,explainable AI - relevant?,,I think they're talking about the tool in here: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.11951,,,,,
+TL00053,Giant Language Model Test Room (GLTR),,http://gltr.io,,Designed for disinfo,,text forensics,"The aim of GLTR is to take the same models that are used to generated fake text as a tool for detection. GLTR has access to the GPT-2 117M language model from OpenAI, one of the largest publicly available models. It can use any textual input and analyze what GPT-2 would have predicted at each position. Since the output is a ranking of all of the words that the model knows, we can compute how the observed following word ranks. We use this positional information to overlay a colored mask over the text that corresponds to the position in the ranking. A word that ranks within the most likely words is highlighted in green (top 10), yellow (top 100), red (top 1,000), and the rest of the words in purple. Thus, we can get a direct visual indication of how likely each word was under the model.",,,text,,,
+TL00055,Google Trends,,https://trends.google.com/trends,,Commonly used,,trends,,,,,,,free
+TL00058,Ground News,Ground News,https://www.ground.news/about,,,,bias tags on news articles,,,,,,browser extension,
+TL00059,Hoaxy,University of Indiana,https://hoaxy.osome.iu.edu/,,Designed for disinfo,,network analysis of twitter data,,,,twitter,,,
+TL00061,Hypothes.is,Hypothes.is,https://web.hypothes.is/,Analysis tracking and support,Commonly used,,webpage markup,,,,webpages,human,,
+TL00064,Influence apps,Influence,https://startinfluence.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,paid
+TL00071,KeyHole,KeyHole,https://keyhole.co/,,,,impact measurement,,,,,,,
+TL00072,Kharon,Kharon,https://www.kharon.com,,,,data and analytics tools,,Not sure this is in area?,,,,,
+TL00076,Meltwater Explore,,https://www.meltwater.com/en/solutions/social-listening,,,,trends; social listening,,,,,,,paid
+TL00078,MIDAC,Mythos Labs,http://www.mythoslabs.org/,,Designed for disinfo,,countering with humour,,,,,,,
+TL00079,Misp,,https://www.misp-project.org/,,Useful,,,,,,,,,open source
+TL00084,NewsCheck,NewsCheck,https://www.newscheck.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
+TL00085,NewsGuard,NewsGuard,https://www.newsguardtech.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,trust rating system for urls,,,,webpages,,,
+TL00086,NewsWhip,NewsWhip,https://www.newswhip.com/,,,,soclal media analytics,,,,,,,
+TL00087,Nobias,Nobias,https://nobias.com/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,browser extension,
+TL00092,Our.News,Our.News,https://our.news/,,,,,,,,,,browser extension,
+TL00094,PimEyes: Face Recognition Search Engine and Reverse Image Search,PimEyes,https://pimeyes.com/en,,,,"Advanced face recognition search engine, a reverse image search tool, and a photo search mechanism used to find out where your face appears online",,,,,,,
+TL00096,Policy Change Index,Policy Change Index,https://policychangeindex.org/,,,,automated content analysis,,,https://github.com/PSLmodels,,,,open source
+TL00097,PR Aegis,Cosmetheus,https://cosmetheus.com/,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00098,Predata Platform,Predata,https://predata.com,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00100,Q,Sparks&Honey,https://www.sparksandhoney.com/,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00103,Recorded Future,Recorded Future,https://www.recordedfuture.com,,,,,,,,,,,
+TL00109,Share The Facts,Duke Reporters Lab / Jigsaw,,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
+TL00114,SocialReaper,,,,,,,"scrapes Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Youtube, Pinterest, Tumblr APIs",,https://github.com/ScriptSmith/socialreaper,,,,
+TL00118,Tattle,Labor of Love,https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=studio.laboroflove.tattle&hl=en_GB&gl=US,,,,WhatsApp message forwarding,,,,messageapps,,,
+TL00123,TIES,Facebook,https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/facebook-outlines-new-system-for-detecting-fake-accounts-and-misinformation/584228/,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,closed
+TL00127,Trendolizer,,http://get.trendolizer.com/,,,,trending stories,,,,,,,
+TL00128,Trive,Trive,https://trive.news/,,,,"""human swarming""",,,,,,browser extension,
+TL00130,Truly Media,Athens Technology Centre (ATC),https://www.truly.media/,,Designed for disinfo,,crowdsourced verification,,,,,,,
+TL00131,Trusted Times,,https://trustedtimes.org,,,,news article analysis,,,,webpages,,browser extension,
+TL00143,Vortimo,,,Analysis tracking and support,Useful,,,,,,,,,
+TL00151,Wolf Totem,Omelas,https://www.omelas.io/wolf-totem-product,,Designed for disinfo,,dashboard,,,,,,,
+TL00152,Yonder,Yonder,https://www.yonder-ai.com,,Designed for disinfo,,,,,,,,,
diff --git a/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools_removed.csv b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools_removed.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01b3071
--- /dev/null
+++ b/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/tools_removed.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Active,name,externalgroup,artifacts,automation,function,platform,accessibility,url,code_url,description,notes
+retired,BotCheck.me,RoBhat,accounts,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
+retired,FactCheck.me,RoBhat,,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
+retired,NewsBotAI,RoBhat,,,,,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
+retired,SurfState.me,RoBhat,,,,browser extension,,https://www.robhat.com/,,,
diff --git a/generated_pages/.DS_Store b/generated_pages/.DS_Store
index 26e3671..0183cc7 100644
Binary files a/generated_pages/.DS_Store and b/generated_pages/.DS_Store differ