tillitis-key/README.md

[![ci](https://github.com/tillitis/tillitis-key1/actions/workflows/ci.yaml/badge.svg?branch=main&event=push)](https://github.com/tillitis/tillitis-key1/actions/workflows/ci.yaml)

# Tillitis TKey

Read about current work in progress
[here](#current-work-in-progress-in-this-repository).

![TK1 PCB](doc/images/tkey-open-lid.png) *The TK1 PCB, also known as
TKey.*

## Introduction

The Tillitis TKey is an open source, open hardware FPGA-based USB
security token using
[DICE-like](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/dice-architectures/)
unconditional measured boot that can run generic applications while
still guaranteeing the security of its cryptographic assets.

[TKey Threat Model](doc/threat_model/threat_model.md).

With the right application, the TKey can be used for:

- authentication,
- cryptographic signing,
- encryption,
- root of trust,
- and more: it's a general computer!

If you want to know more about Tillitis and the TKey, visit:

- Main web: <https://tillitis.se/>
- Shop: <https://shop.tillitis.se/>
- Developer Handbook: <https://dev.tillitis.se/>
- Officially supported apps: <https://tillitis.se/download/>
- Other known apps: <https://dev.tillitis.se/projects/>

All of the TKey software, firmware, FPGA Verilog code, schematics and
PCB design files are open source, just like all trustworthy security
software and hardware should be.

## Licensing

See [LICENSES](./LICENSES/README.md) for more information about
the projects' licenses.

## Repositories

This repository contains the FPGA design, the source of the
firmware/bootloader, and the source of the USB controller firmware.

Specific documentation regarding implementation is kept close to the
code/design in README files, typically in the same directory.

Note that development is ongoing. To avoid unexpected changes of
derived key material, please use a tagged release. Read the [Release
Notes](doc/release_notes.md) to keep up to date with changes and new
releases.

The TKey PCB [KiCad](https://www.kicad.org/) design files are kept in
a separate repository:

<https://github.com/tillitis/tk1-pcba>

The TP1 (TKey programmer 1) PCB design files and the firmware sources
are kept in:

<https://github.com/tillitis/tp1>

Note that the TP1 is only used for provisioning the FPGA bitstream
into flash or the FPGA configuration memory. It's not necessary if you
just want to develop apps for the TKey.

We use the tkey-libs libraries used for device app development in the
firmware, too:

https://github.com/tillitis/tkey-libs

but keep our own copy of it in the repo. See below.

## Building

Building is probably easiest using make and Podman. Do this to see all
targets:

```
cd contrib
make
```

Build the entire FPGA bitstream, which includes the firmware, using
Podman:

```
cd contrib
make run-make
```

See the [Tillitis Developer Handbook](https://dev.tillitis.se) for
more.

## Updating and working with tkey-libs

A copy of [tkey-libs](https://github.com/tillitis/tkey-libs) is kept
in `hw/application_fpga/tkey-libs`. This is mostly to avoid the
subtleties of Git submodules.

If you want to change something in tkey-libs, always change in the
upstream library at:

https://github.com/tillitis/tkey-libs

You can build with an out-of-tree copy if you set `LIBDIR`, for
example:

```
make LIBDIR=~/git/tkey-libs firmware.elf
```

When it's time to update the in-tree tkey-lib first tag the upstream
repo with an `fw` prefix, like `fw-1` even if it already has an
official version tag.

Easiest is probably to just remove the tkey-libs directory and then
git clone the desired tag. Use the entire repo, but remove the .-files
like `.git`, `.github`, et cetera.

## Measured boot

The key behind guaranteeing security even as a general computer is the
unconditional measured boot. This means that we have a small,
unchangeable, trusted firmware in ROM that creates a unique identity
before starting the application. This identity is used as a seed for
all later cryptographic keys.

We call this identity the Compound Device Identity (CDI). The CDI is a
cryptographic mix of:

1. the Unique Device Secret (UDS), a hardware secret, unique per
   device, something the user *has*,
2. the hash digest of the TKey device application that has been
  loaded, the *integrity* of the application, and,
3. an optional User Supplied Secret (USS), something the user *knows*.

CDI is computed using the BLAKE2s hash function:

CDI = BLAKE2s(UDS, BLAKE2s(application loaded in RAM), USS)

When firmware is about to start the device application it changes the
TKey to a less permissive hardware mode, application mode. In
application mode the UDS and the User Supplied Secret are no longer
available, but the device application can use the CDI as a seed to
deterministically generate any cryptographic keys it needs.

- If the wrong application has been loaded, or the original
  application has been tampered with, the generated keys will be
  different.
- If the USS is not the same, the generated keys will be different.
- If the same USS and device application is used on a different TKey,
  the generated keys will be different.

The TKey unconditional measured boot is inspired by, but not exactly
the same as part of [TCG
DICE](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/dice-architectures/).

# Current Work in Progress in this repository

We are updating the FPGA and firmware on TKey as part of the Castor
release. This update will simplify TKey’s usage, laying the groundwork
for future support of U2F/FIDO authentication.

You can track our progress through this
[milestone](https://github.com/tillitis/tillitis-key1/milestone/1).

Note that main branch is in development. We try to keep status of main
branch updated in the [release notes](/doc/release_notes.md#upcoming-release-castor).