qubes-doc/project-security/security-pack.md

---
layout: doc
title: Security Pack
permalink: /security/pack/
redirect_from:
- /doc/security-pack/
- /en/doc/security-pack/
- /doc/SecurityPack/
- /wiki/SecurityPack/
- /qsp/
- /sec-pack/
- /secpack/
- /doc/qsp/
- /doc/sec-pack/
- /doc/secpack/
---

Qubes Security Pack
===================

The **Qubes Security Pack** (`qubes-secpack`) is a Git repository that contains:

 * [Qubes PGP keys](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/)
 * [Qubes Security Bulletins (QSBs)](/security/bulletins/)
 * [Qubes warrant canaries](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/tree/master/canaries)
 * [Qubes Bitcoin fund information](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/tree/master/fund)
 * Security-related information and announcements (e.g., key revocations)

While `qubes-secpack` itself is independent of any particular host, its current
official location is:

<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack>


History and Rationale
---------------------

On 2013-01-05, Joanna Rutkowska announced the `qubes-secpack` and explained its
rationale in an
[email](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/twkOEaMLtNI/lZyGx6_jFCEJ)
to the Qubes mailing lists:

    Hello,
    
    A new Qubes Security Bulletin has been just released and is available here:
    
    https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-013-2015.txt
    
    As per the previous discussions about recent problems with verifying
    digital signatures on messages sent to Google Groups (thanks to
    automatic footer addition by Google), we have decided to change the way
    we publish Qubes Security Bulletins, as well as other security-related
    info pertinent to the Qubes Project.
    
    Starting today, we will be maintain a Git repository -- "Qubes Security
    Pack" -- which will contain all the QSBs released so far, all the keys,
    warrant canaries [1], and potentially some additional info or
    announcements (e.g. key revocations). The whole repo can be found here:
    
    https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack
    
    Note that all the keys distributed there should be signed by Qubes
    Master Key. The Master Key is also attached in the repo, but should
    really be obtained/verified using a different channel.
    
    Additionally, most of the files are signed by core Qubes
    developers (currently by Marek and myself) via detached signatures as
    well as git tag signatures.
    
    The are several advantages of using Git to distribute all these information:
    
    1) Git repo is a collection of files, some of which can be detached GPG
    signatures for other files and we can ensure all these files are
    distributed together.
    
    2) Git makes it easy for people to clone and redistribute these
    collection of files, as well as to easily host them and view on the Web.
    
    3) Git provides for signed tags mechanisms which is another mean we
    utilize to ensure integrity of the distributed files.
    
    A few words about the Warrant Canary which we've just introduced today,
    and which can be seen here:
    
    https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-001-2015.txt
    
    Even though we're not providing any kind of services (such as e.g. email
    hosting), that could be searched or tapped by authorities, there are
    other possibilities that worry us [2], in the light of various recent
    law "developments", such as those that might be coercing people to hand
    over their private keys to authorities.
    
    Until we fully decentralize the root of trust for Qubes, something that
    requires the move to deterministic builds [3], and so won't happen
    very soon, the possibility of having to disclose any of the Qubes
    signing keys to anybody might have pretty serious consequences for those
    who decided to entrust Qubes with anything serious. And we would like to
    somehow minimize these consequences with this canary thing.
    
    Additionally the canary is a nice way of ensuring "freshness" of our
    messaging to the community.
    
    Of course the canary doesn't solve all the problems. E.g. if my signing
    keys were somehow stolen without our knowledge, it wouldn't help.
    Neither it could help in case me being or becoming a miscreant. And
    probably it doesn't address many other potential problems, which could
    only be solved one day with a multi-signature scheme. But anyway, until
    that time, this is the best we can do, I think.
    
    And congrats to Jann for the very interesting clipboard attack (even
    though mostly theoretical, still very cool)!
    
    Thanks,
    joanna.
    
    --
    The Qubes Security Team
    https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/SecurityPage
    
    
    [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary
    
    [2] Especially myself, because I'm currently the Root Of Trust for all
    Qubes binaries :/
    
    [3] Deterministic builds are required because it's the only way we can
    implement multiple signature scheme for distributed binaries.


How to Obtain, Verify, and Read
-------------------------------

The following example demonstrates one method of obtaining the `qubes-secpack`,
verifying its contents, and reading them.

 1. Clone the `qubes-secpack` repo.

        $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
        Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
        remote: Counting objects: 195, done.
        remote: Total 195 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0)
        Receiving objects: 100% (195/195), 130.94 KiB | 207.00 KiB/s, done.
        Resolving deltas: 100% (47/47), done.
        Checking connectivity... done.

 2. Import the included PGP keys.

        $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
        gpg: directory `/home/user/.gnupg' created
        gpg: new configuration file `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' created
        gpg: WARNING: options in `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' are not yet active during this run
        gpg: keyring `/home/user/.gnupg/secring.gpg' created
        gpg: keyring `/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.gpg' created
        gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
        gpg: key C37BB66B: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key 1E30A75D: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key 74EADABC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key 65EF29CA: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key 34898310: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key B298547C: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@mimuw.edu.pl>" imported
        gpg: key AB5EEF90: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key A603BCB6: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key 42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key 15CE40BF: public key "Wojciech Zygmunt Porczyk (Qubes OS signing key) <woju@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key 36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
        gpg: key 211093A7: public key "Qubes OS Release 1 Signing Key" imported
        gpg: key 0A40E458: public key "Qubes OS Release 2 Signing Key" imported
        gpg: key 03FA5082: public key "Qubes OS Release 3 Signing Key" imported
        gpg: key 92C7B3DC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key 1830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
        gpg: key 3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team <security@qubes-os.org>" imported
        gpg: Total number processed: 17
        gpg:               imported: 17  (RSA: 17)
        gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found

 3. Verify and trust the Qubes Master Signing Key.

        $ gpg --edit-key 36879494
        gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.18; Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
        This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
        There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
                                                                               
                                                                               
        pub  4096R/36879494  created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC  
                             trust: unknown       validity: unknown
        [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
                                                                               
        gpg> fpr
        pub   4096R/36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
         Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
                                                                               
        gpg> trust
        pub  4096R/36879494  created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC  
                             trust: unknown       validity: unknown
        [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
                                                                               
        Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
        (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
                                                                               
          1 = I don't know or won't say
          2 = I do NOT trust
          3 = I trust marginally
          4 = I trust fully
          5 = I trust ultimately
          m = back to the main menu
                                                                               
        Your decision? 5
        Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
                                                                               
        pub  4096R/36879494  created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC  
                             trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
        [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
        Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
        unless you restart the program.
                                                                               
        gpg> q

    **Important!**
   
    In order to verify the authenticity of the Qubes Master Signing Key prior to
    trusting it, you should obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint from
    a trustworthy source (ideally, multiple sources) *other than* this website
    and visually compare it (them) to the fingerprint displayed in the preceding
    step, ensuring they match. You can read more about digital signatures and
    key verification [here](/security/verifying-signatures/).

 4. Verify signed Git tags.

        $ cd qubes-secpack/
        $ git tag -v `git describe`
        object 2bb7f0b966593d8ed74e140a04d60c68b96b164e
        type commit
        tag joanna_sec_2bb7f0b9
        tagger Joanna Rutkowska <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com> 1468335706 +0000
        
        Tag for commit 2bb7f0b966593d8ed74e140a04d60c68b96b164e
        gpg: Signature made 2016-07-12T08:01:46 PDT
        gpg:                using RSA key 0x4E6829BC92C7B3DC
        gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" [full]

    (The final line of output confirms that the signature is good.)

 5. Verify detached PGP signatures.

        $ cd canaries/                                     
        $ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.joanna canary-001-2015.txt
        gpg: Signature made Mon Jan  5 20:21:40 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 92C7B3DC
        gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>"
        $ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.marmarek canary-001-2015.txt
        gpg: Signature made Mon Jan  5 20:13:37 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 1830E06A
        gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>"

    (The fourth and final lines of output confirm that the two signatures are
    good.)

The same procedures can be applied to any directory or file in the
`qubes-secpack`. Two methods of verification (signed Git tags and detached PGP
signatures) are provided to ensure that the system is robust (e.g., against a
potential failure in Git tag-based verification) and to give users more options
to verify the files.