Revise and update Qubes Security Pack page

* Add instructions for verifying Git tags
* Explain rationale for providing two methods of verification
* Update warrant canary link (Canary Watch has shut down)
* State that the QSP now contains Bitcoin fund info
* Fix "ó" in Marek's name
* Remove full CLI prompt (for uniformity with rest of site)
* Remove instructions for reading text files (unnecessary)
* Reorder list of QSP contents (move PGP keys to top, since
  verification of everything else depends on them)
This commit is contained in:
Andrew David Wong 2016-07-13 04:21:37 -07:00
parent 14b8144fb7
commit ab15b144f8
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 8CE137352A019A17

View File

@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ redirect_from:
- /en/doc/security-pack/
- /doc/SecurityPack/
- /wiki/SecurityPack/
- /qsp/
- /sec-pack/
- /secpack/
- /doc/qsp/
- /doc/sec-pack/
- /doc/secpack/
---
Qubes Security Pack
@ -13,9 +19,10 @@ Qubes Security Pack
The **Qubes Security Pack (QSP)** is a Git repository which contains:
* [Qubes Security Bulletins (QSBs)](/doc/security-bulletins/)
* [Qubes PGP keys](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/)
* [Qubes warrant canaries](https://canarywatch.org/qubesOS/)
* [Qubes Security Bulletins (QSBs)](/doc/security-bulletins/)
* [Qubes warrant canaries](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/tree/master/canaries)
* [Qubes Bitcoin donation fund information](/donate/)
* Security-related information and announcements (e.g., key revocations)
The official location of the QSP is:
@ -126,7 +133,7 @@ its contents, and reading them.
1. Clone the QSP repo.
[user@qubes ~]$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
remote: Counting objects: 195, done.
remote: Total 195 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0)
@ -136,7 +143,7 @@ its contents, and reading them.
2. Import the included PGP keys.
[user@qubes ~]$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
gpg: directory `/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: new configuration file `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' created
gpg: WARNING: options in `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' are not yet active during this run
@ -151,14 +158,14 @@ its contents, and reading them.
gpg: key B298547C: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@mimuw.edu.pl>" imported
gpg: key AB5EEF90: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
gpg: key A603BCB6: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
gpg: key 42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-G<EFBFBD>recki (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
gpg: key 42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
gpg: key 15CE40BF: public key "Wojciech Zygmunt Porczyk (Qubes OS signing key) <woju@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
gpg: key 36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: key 211093A7: public key "Qubes OS Release 1 Signing Key" imported
gpg: key 0A40E458: public key "Qubes OS Release 2 Signing Key" imported
gpg: key 03FA5082: public key "Qubes OS Release 3 Signing Key" imported
gpg: key 92C7B3DC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
gpg: key 1830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-G<EFBFBD>recki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
gpg: key 1830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
gpg: key 3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team <security@qubes-os.org>" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg: imported: 17 (RSA: 17)
@ -166,7 +173,7 @@ its contents, and reading them.
3. Verify and trust the Qubes Master Signing Key.
[user@qubes ~]$ gpg --edit-key 36879494
$ gpg --edit-key 36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.18; Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
@ -215,34 +222,38 @@ its contents, and reading them.
step, ensuring they match. You can read more about digital signatures and
key verification [here](/doc/verifying-signatures/).
4. Verify and read the canaries.
4. Verify signed Git tags.
[user@qubes ~]$ cd qubes-secpack/canaries/
[user@qubes canaries]$ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.joanna canary-001-2015.txt
$ cd qubes-secpack/
$ git tag -v `git describe`
object 2bb7f0b966593d8ed74e140a04d60c68b96b164e
type commit
tag joanna_sec_2bb7f0b9
tagger Joanna Rutkowska <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com> 1468335706 +0000
Tag for commit 2bb7f0b966593d8ed74e140a04d60c68b96b164e
gpg: Signature made 2016-07-12T08:01:46 PDT
gpg: using RSA key 0x4E6829BC92C7B3DC
gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" [full]
(The final line of output confirms that the signature is good.)
5. Verify detached PGP signatures.
$ cd canaries/
$ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.joanna canary-001-2015.txt
gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 20:21:40 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 92C7B3DC
gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>"
[user@qubes canaries]$ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.marmarek canary-001-2015.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.marmarek canary-001-2015.txt
gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 20:13:37 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 1830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-G<>recki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>"
[user@qubes canaries]$ cat canary-001-2015.txt
---===[ Qubes Canary #1 ]===---
[...]
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>"
5. Verify and read the QSBs.
(The fourth and final lines of output confirm that the two signatures are
good.)
The same procedures can be applied to any directory or file in the QSP. Two
methods of verification (signed Git tags and deatched PGP signatures) are
provided to ensure that the system is robust (e.g., against a potential failure
in Git tag-based verification) and to give users more options to verify the
files.
[user@qubes canaries]$ cd ../QSBs/
[user@qubes QSBs]$ gpg --verify qsb-013-2015.txt.sig.joanna qsb-013-2015.txt
gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 21:22:14 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 92C7B3DC
gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>"
[user@qubes QSBs]$ gpg --verify qsb-013-2015.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-013-2015.txt
gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 21:38:11 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 1830E06A
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-G<>recki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>"
[user@qubes QSBs]$ cat qsb-013-2015.txt
---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin #13 ]===---
[...]