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SecurityPack.md
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---
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layout: wiki
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title: SecurityPack
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permalink: /wiki/SecurityPack/
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---
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Qubes Security Pack
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===================
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1. [Qubes Security Pack](#QubesSecurityPack)
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1. [Introduction](#Introduction)
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2. [History and Rationale](#HistoryandRationale)
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3. [How to Obtain, Verify, and Read](#HowtoObtainVerifyandRead)
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Introduction
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------------
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The **Qubes Security Pack (QSP)** is a Git repository which contains:
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- [All Qubes Security Bulletins (QSBs)](/wiki/SecurityBulletins)
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- [All PGP keys](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/)
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- [Warrant canaries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary)
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- Other security-related information and announcements (such as key revocations)
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The QSP is located here:
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``` {.wiki}
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack
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```
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History and Rationale
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---------------------
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On 2013-01-05, Joanna Rutkowska announced the QSP and explained its rationale in an [email](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/twkOEaMLtNI/lZyGx6_jFCEJ) to the qubes-devel list:
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``` {.wiki}
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Hello,
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A new Qubes Security Bulletin has been just released and is available here:
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-013-2015.txt
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As per the previous discussions about recent problems with verifying
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digital signatures on messages sent to Google Groups (thanks to
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automatic footer addition by Google), we have decided to change the way
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we publish Qubes Security Bulletins, as well as other security-related
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info pertinent to the Qubes Project.
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Starting today, we will be maintain a Git repository -- "Qubes Security
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Pack" -- which will contain all the QSBs released so far, all the keys,
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warrant canaries [1], and potentially some additional info or
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announcements (e.g. key revocations). The whole repo can be found here:
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack
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Note that all the keys distributed there should be signed by Qubes
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Master Key. The Master Key is also attached in the repo, but should
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really be obtained/verified using a different channel.
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Additionally, most of the files are signed by core Qubes
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developers (currently by Marek and myself) via detached signatures as
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well as git tag signatures.
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The are several advantages of using Git to distribute all these information:
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1) Git repo is a collection of files, some of which can be detached GPG
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signatures for other files and we can ensure all these files are
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distributed together.
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2) Git makes it easy for people to clone and redistribute these
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collection of files, as well as to easily host them and view on the Web.
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3) Git provides for signed tags mechanisms which is another mean we
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utilize to ensure integrity of the distributed files.
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A few words about the Warrant Canary which we've just introduced today,
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and which can be seen here:
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-001-2015.txt
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Even though we're not providing any kind of services (such as e.g. email
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hosting), that could be searched or tapped by authorities, there are
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other possibilities that worry us [2], in the light of various recent
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law "developments", such as those that might be coercing people to hand
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over their private keys to authorities.
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Until we fully decentralize the root of trust for Qubes, something that
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requires the move to deterministic builds [3], and so won't happen
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very soon, the possibility of having to disclose any of the Qubes
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signing keys to anybody might have pretty serious consequences for those
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who decided to entrust Qubes with anything serious. And we would like to
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somehow minimize these consequences with this canary thing.
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Additionally the canary is a nice way of ensuring "freshness" of our
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messaging to the community.
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Of course the canary doesn't solve all the problems. E.g. if my signing
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keys were somehow stolen without our knowledge, it wouldn't help.
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Neither it could help in case me being or becoming a miscreant. And
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probably it doesn't address many other potential problems, which could
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only be solved one day with a multi-signature scheme. But anyway, until
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that time, this is the best we can do, I think.
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And congrats to Jann for the very interesting clipboard attack (even
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though mostly theoretical, still very cool)!
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Thanks,
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joanna.
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--
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The Qubes Security Team
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http://wiki.qubes-os.org/trac/wiki/SecurityPage
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[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary
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[2] Especially myself, because I'm currently the Root Of Trust for all
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Qubes binaries :/
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[3] Deterministic builds are required because it's the only way we can
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implement multiple signature scheme for distributed binaries.
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```
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How to Obtain, Verify, and Read
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-------------------------------
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The following example demonstrates one method of obtaining the QSP, verifying its contents, and reading them.
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1. Clone the QSP repo.
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``` {.wiki}
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[user@qubes ~]$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
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Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
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remote: Counting objects: 195, done.
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remote: Total 195 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0)
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Receiving objects: 100% (195/195), 130.94 KiB | 207.00 KiB/s, done.
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Resolving deltas: 100% (47/47), done.
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Checking connectivity... done.
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```
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2. Import the included PGP keys.
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``` {.wiki}
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[user@qubes ~]$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
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gpg: directory `/home/user/.gnupg' created
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gpg: new configuration file `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' created
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gpg: WARNING: options in `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' are not yet active during this run
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gpg: keyring `/home/user/.gnupg/secring.gpg' created
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gpg: keyring `/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.gpg' created
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gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
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gpg: key C37BB66B: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 1E30A75D: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 74EADABC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 65EF29CA: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 34898310: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key B298547C: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@mimuw.edu.pl>" imported
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gpg: key AB5EEF90: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key A603BCB6: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-G<>recki (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 15CE40BF: public key "Wojciech Zygmunt Porczyk (Qubes OS signing key) <woju@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
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gpg: key 211093A7: public key "Qubes OS Release 1 Signing Key" imported
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gpg: key 0A40E458: public key "Qubes OS Release 2 Signing Key" imported
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gpg: key 03FA5082: public key "Qubes OS Release 3 Signing Key" imported
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gpg: key 92C7B3DC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 1830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-G<>recki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team <security@qubes-os.org>" imported
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gpg: Total number processed: 17
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gpg: imported: 17 (RSA: 17)
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gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found
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```
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3. Verify and trust the Qubes Master Signing Key.
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``` {.wiki}
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[user@qubes ~]$ gpg --edit-key 36879494
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gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.18; Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
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There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
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pub 4096R/36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
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trust: unknown validity: unknown
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[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
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gpg> fpr
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pub 4096R/36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
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Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
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gpg> trust
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pub 4096R/36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
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trust: unknown validity: unknown
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[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
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Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
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(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
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1 = I don't know or won't say
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2 = I do NOT trust
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3 = I trust marginally
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4 = I trust fully
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5 = I trust ultimately
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m = back to the main menu
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Your decision? 5
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Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
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pub 4096R/36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
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trust: ultimate validity: unknown
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[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
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Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
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unless you restart the program.
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gpg> q
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```
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> **Important!**
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> In order to verify the authenticity of the Qubes Master Signing Key prior to trusting it, you should obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint from a source (ideally, multiple sources) *other than* this website and visually compare it (them) to the fingerprint displayed in the preceding step, ensuring they match.
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1. Verify and read the canaries.
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``` {.wiki}
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[user@qubes ~]$ cd qubes-secpack/canaries/
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[user@qubes canaries]$ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.joanna canary-001-2015.txt
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gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 12:21:40 2015 PST using RSA key ID 92C7B3DC
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gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>"
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[user@qubes canaries]$ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.marmarek canary-001-2015.txt
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gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 12:13:37 2015 PST using RSA key ID 1830E06A
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gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-G<>recki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>"
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[user@qubes canaries]$ cat canary-001-2015.txt
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---===[ Qubes Canary #1 ]===---
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[...]
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```
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2. Verify and read the QSBs.
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``` {.wiki}
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[user@qubes canaries]$ cd ../QSBs/
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[user@qubes QSBs]$ gpg --verify qsb-013-2015.txt.sig.joanna qsb-013-2015.txt
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gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 13:22:14 2015 PST using RSA key ID 92C7B3DC
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gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>"
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[user@qubes QSBs]$ gpg --verify qsb-013-2015.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-013-2015.txt
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gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 13:38:11 2015 PST using RSA key ID 1830E06A
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gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-G<>recki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>"
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[user@qubes QSBs]$ cat qsb-013-2015.txt
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---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin #13 ]===---
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[...]
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```
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