mirror of
https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org.git
synced 2024-10-01 01:35:57 -04:00
ca24eb6ba5
Co-authored-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dng@disroot.org>
335 lines
27 KiB
Markdown
335 lines
27 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: "Android"
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icon: 'fontawesome/brands/android'
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---
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These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. We also have additional Android-related information:
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- [General Android Overview and Recommendations :material-arrow-right:](android/overview.md)
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- [GrapheneOS vs CalyxOS Comparison :material-arrow-right:](android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md)
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## AOSP Derivatives
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We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
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!!! note
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End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS or CalyxOS's "extended support" devices) do not have full security patches (firmware updates) due to the OEM discontinuing support. These devices cannot be considered completely secure regardless of installed software.
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### GrapheneOS
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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{ align=right }
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**GrapheneOS** is the best choice when it comes to privacy and security.
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GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) and privacy improvements. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
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[Visit grapheneos.org](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Privacy Policy](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .md-button }
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GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like a regular user app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while having full user control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific work profile or user [profile](android/overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
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Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
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### CalyxOS
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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**CalyxOS** is a system with some privacy features on top of AOSP, including [Datura](https://calyxos.org/docs/tech/datura-details) firewall, [Signal](https://signal.org) integration in the dialer app, and a built in panic button. CalyxOS also comes with firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
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[Visit calyxos.org](https://calyxos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Privacy Policy](https://calyxinstitute.org/legal/privacy-policy){ .md-button }
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To accomodate users who need Google Play Services, CalyxOS optionally includes [microG](https://microg.org/). CalyxOS also includes alternate location services, [Mozilla](https://location.services.mozilla.com/) and [DejaVu](https://github.com/n76/DejaVu).
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CalyxOS only [supports](https://calyxos.org/docs/guide/device-support/) Google Pixel phones. However, support for the OnePlus 8T/9 and Fairphone 4 is [currently in beta](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/04/01/fairphone4-oneplus8t-oneplus9-test-builds/).
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### DivestOS
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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**DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
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DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices.
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[Visit divestos.org](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Privacy Policy](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .md-button }
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DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file, and [F-Droid](https://www.f-droid.org) as the app store. It includes [UnifiedNlp](https://github.com/microg/UnifiedNlp) for network location. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and includes [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning).
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DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
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DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0, 17.1, and 18.1 implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and 18.1 feature GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, and [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
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!!! attention
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DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS or CalyxOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
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Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
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## Android Devices
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Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
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Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
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A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
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- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
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- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
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- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason, so check our [discussions](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions) page.
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### Google Pixel
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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**Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
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Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
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[Visit store.google.com](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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Unless you have a need for specific [CalyxOS features](https://calyxos.org/features/) that are unavailable on GrapheneOS, we strongly recommend GrapheneOS over other operating system choices on Pixel devices.
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The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
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A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
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- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
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- Consider price beating options and specials offered at brick and mortar stores.
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- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
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- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date }-\text{ Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
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### Other Devices
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!!! important
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Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
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Secure Elements are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation and rate limiting but not running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for secrets storage, rate limiting, *and* trusted computing, which results in a larger attack surface.
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The following OEMs are only mentioned as they have phones compatible with the operating systems recommended by us. If you are purchasing a new device, we only recommend purchasing a Google Pixel.
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When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
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#### OnePlus
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If you are unable to obtain a Google Pixel, recent OnePlus devices are the next best option if you want to run a custom OS without privileged Play Services. OnePlus 8 and later devices will receive 4 years of security updates from their initial launch date. CalyxOS has [experimental support](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/04/01/fairphone4-oneplus8t-oneplus9-test-builds/) for the **OnePlus 8T** and **9**.
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DivestOS has support for most OnePlus devices up to the **OnePlus 7T Pro**, with varying levels of support.
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#### Fairphone
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!!! danger
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The Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
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This problem is somewhat mitigated when you install a custom operating system such as CalyxOS or DivestOS and trust the developer's signing keys rather than the stock system keys, however a vulnerability in CalyxOS or DivestOS's recovery environments could still potentially allow an attacker to bypass AVB. **To reiterate, you must install a custom operating system with custom boot keys to use Fairphone devices in a secure manner.**
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CalyxOS has [experimental support](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/04/01/fairphone4-oneplus8t-oneplus9-test-builds/) for the **Fairphone 4**. DivestOS has builds available for the **Fairphone 3**.
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Fairphone markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
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## General Apps
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### Orbot
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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**Orbot** is a free proxy app that routes your connections through the Tor Network.
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[Visit orbot.app](https://orbot.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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??? downloads
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- [:fontawesome-brands-google-play: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
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- [:pg-f-droid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
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- [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot)
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- [:fontawesome-brands-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/guardianproject/orbot)
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Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
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For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Connectivity**. This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
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!!! tip
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Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android) so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot) instead.
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All versions are signed using the same signature so they should be compatible with each other.
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### Shelter
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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**Shelter** is an app that helps you leverage the Android work profile to isolate other apps.
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Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across profiles via the default file manager ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
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[Visit gitea.angry.im](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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??? downloads
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- [:fontawesome-brands-google-play: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
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- [:pg-f-droid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/net.typeblog.shelter)
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- [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/PeterCxy/Shelter)
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- [:fontawesome-brands-git-alt: Source](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter)
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!!! attention
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As CalyxOS includes a device controller, we recommend using their built in work profile instead.
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Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
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When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer as Shelter would be acting as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) for the work profile and has extensive access to the data stored within it.
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### Auditor
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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{ align=right }
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**Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Currently it works with GrapheneOS and the device's stock operating system.
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[Visit attestation.app](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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??? downloads
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- [:fontawesome-brands-google-play: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor)
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- [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor)
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Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
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- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
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- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
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- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
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- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
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- The user will be alerted to the change.
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No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
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If your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) requires privacy you could consider using Orbot or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
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To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
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### Secure Camera
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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{ align=right }
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**Secure Camera** is an camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos, and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.
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[Visit github.com](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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??? downloads
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- [:fontawesome-brands-google-play: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.camera.play)
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- [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases)
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Main privacy features include:
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- Auto removal of [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) metadata (enabled by default)
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- Use of the new [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media) API, therefore [storage permissions](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) are not required
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- Microphone permission not required unless you want to record sound
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!!! note
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Metadata is not currently deleted from video files but that is planned.
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The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Camera) that **won't** be deleted either. If you want to delete that later you will need to use an external app such as [Scrambled Exif](https://gitlab.com/juanitobananas/scrambled-exif/).
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### Secure PDF Viewer
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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{ align=right }
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**Secure PDF Viewer** is a PDF viewer based on [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) that doesn't require any permissions. The PDF is fed into a [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)) [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview). This means that it doesn't require permission directly to access content or files.
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[Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
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[Visit github.com](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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??? downloads
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- [:fontawesome-brands-google-play: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.pdfviewer.play)
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- [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases)
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### PrivacyBlur
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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**PrivacyBlur** is a free app which can blur sensitive portions of pictures before sharing them online.
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[Visit privacyblur.app](https://privacyblur.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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??? downloads
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- [:fontawesome-brands-google-play: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur)
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- [:pg-f-droid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/de.mathema.privacyblur/)
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- [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur)
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!!! warning
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You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this we suggest [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid) or [Imagepipe](https://codeberg.org/Starfish/Imagepipe).
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## App Stores
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### GrapheneOS's App Store
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GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
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### Aurora Store
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The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. The [Aurora Store](https://auroraoss.com/download/AuroraStore/) (a Google Play Store proxy) does not, and works most of the time.
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### F-Droid
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F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications, and is dedicated to free and open source software. However, there are problems with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign and deliver packages, outlined in this [post](https://wonderfall.dev/fdroid-issues/).
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*[walled garden]: A walled garden (or closed platform) is one in which the service provider has control over applications, content, and/or media, and restricts convenient access to non-approved applicants or content.
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Sometimes the official F-Droid repository may fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it does give the F-Droid team ultimate trust. The Google Play version of some apps may contain unwanted telemetry or lack features that are available in the F-Droid version.
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We have these general tips:
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- Check if the app developers have their own F-Droid repository first, e.g. [Bitwarden](https://bitwarden.com/), [Samourai Wallet](https://www.samouraiwallet.com/), or [Newpipe](https://newpipe.net/), which have their own repositories with less telemetry, additional features or faster updates. This is the ideal situation and you should be using these repositories if possible.
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- Check if an app is available on the [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repository. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. We recommend that you download the GitHub builds and install them manually first, then use IzzyOnDroid for any subsequent updates. This will ensure that the signature of the applications you get from IzzyOnDroid matches that of the developer and the packages have not been tampered with.
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- Check if there are any differences between the F-Droid version and the Google Play Store version. Some applications like [IVPN](https://www.ivpn.net/) do not include certain features (eg [AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/antitracker-faq/)) in their Google Play Store build out of fear of censorship by Google.
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Evaluate whether the additional features in the F-Droid build are worth the slower updates. Also think about whether faster updates from the Google Play Store are worth the potential privacy issues in your [threat model](threat-modeling.md).
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#### Droid-ify
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The official F-Droid client targets a [low API level](https://wonderfall.dev/fdroid-issues/#3-low-target-api-level-sdk-for-client--apps) and does not utilize the [seamless updates](https://www.androidcentral.com/google-will-finally-bring-seamless-app-updates-alternative-app-stores-android-12) feature introduced in Android 12. Targeting lower API levels means that the F-Droid client cannot take advantage of the new improvements in the application sandboxes that comes with higher API levels. For automatic updates to work, the F-Droid client requires that the [Privileged Extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged/) be included in the operating system, granting it more privileges than what a normal app would have, which is not great for security.
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To mitigate these problems, we recommend [Droid-ify](https://github.com/Iamlooker/Droid-ify) as it supports seamless updates on Android 12 and above without needing any special privileges and targets a higher API level.
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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**Droid-ify** is a modern F-Droid client made with MaterialUI, forked from [Foxy Droid](https://github.com/kitsunyan/foxy-droid).
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Unlike the official F-Droid client, Droid-ify supports seamless updates on Android 12 and above without the need for a privileged extension. If your Android distribution is on Android 12 or above and does not include the [F-Droid privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged/), it is highly recommended that you use Droid-ify instead of the official client.
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??? downloads
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- [:fontawesome-brands-android: APK Download](https://android.izzysoft.de/repo/apk/com.looker.droidify)
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- [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Iamlooker/Droid-ify)
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--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.en.md"
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