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Make the Android pages more consistent (#1086)
Co-authored-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dng@disroot.org>
This commit is contained in:
Tommy
Daniel Gray
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maxim
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## AOSP Derivatives
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Generally speaking we recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems. If you are unable to run any of the following operating systems on your device, you are likely going to be best off sticking with your stock Android installation (as opposed to an operating system not listed here such as LineageOS), but we would recommend upgrading to a new device if at all possible.
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We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
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!!! note
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@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Generally speaking we recommend installing one of these custom Android operating
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[Visit grapheneos.org](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Privacy Policy](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .md-button }
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Notably, GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play). Google Play Services can be run fully sandboxed like a regular user app and contained in a work profile or user [profile](#android-security-privacy) of your choice. This means that you can run apps dependant on Play Services, such as those that require push notifications using Google's [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/) service. GrapheneOS allows you to take advantage of most [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) whilst having full user control over their permissions and access.
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GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like a regular user app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while having full user control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific work profile or user [profile](android/overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
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Currently, only [Pixel phones](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support) meet its hardware security requirement and are supported.
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Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
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### CalyxOS
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@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ Currently, only [Pixel phones](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support) meet i
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[Visit calyxos.org](https://calyxos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Privacy Policy](https://calyxinstitute.org/legal/privacy-policy){ .md-button }
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To accomodate users who need Google Play Services, CalyxOS optionally includes [MicroG](https://microg.org/). With MicroG, CalyxOS also bundles in the [Mozilla](https://location.services.mozilla.com/) and [DejaVu](https://github.com/n76/DejaVu) location services.
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To accomodate users who need Google Play Services, CalyxOS optionally includes [microG](https://microg.org/). CalyxOS also includes alternate location services, [Mozilla](https://location.services.mozilla.com/) and [DejaVu](https://github.com/n76/DejaVu).
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Currently, CalyxOS only supports [Pixel phones](https://calyxos.org/docs/guide/device-support/).
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CalyxOS only [supports](https://calyxos.org/docs/guide/device-support/) Google Pixel phones. However, support for the OnePlus 8T/9 and Fairphone 4 is [currently in beta](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/04/01/fairphone4-oneplus8t-oneplus9-test-builds/).
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### DivestOS
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@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
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DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
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DivestOS 16.0, 17.1, and 18.1 implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and 18.1 feature GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, and [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features). All branches additionally have various miscellaneous patches courtesy of GrapheneOS.
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DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0, 17.1, and 18.1 implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and 18.1 feature GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, and [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
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!!! attention
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DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) varies across the devices it supports. For Pixel phones, we still recommend using GrapheneOS or CalyxOS. For other supported devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
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DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS or CalyxOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
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Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
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@ -94,9 +94,7 @@ A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
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[Visit store.google.com](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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Unless you know you have a specific need for [CalyxOS/microG features](https://calyxos.org/features/) that are unavailable on GrapheneOS, we strongly recommend GrapheneOS over other operating system choices on Pixel devices.
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[More about GrapheneOS vs CalyxOS](android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md){ .md-button }
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Unless you have a need for specific [CalyxOS features](https://calyxos.org/features/) that are unavailable on GrapheneOS, we strongly recommend GrapheneOS over other operating system choices on Pixel devices.
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The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
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@ -105,23 +103,23 @@ A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
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- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
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- Consider price beating options and specials offered at brick and mortar stores.
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- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
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- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EoL Date }-\text{ Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
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- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date }-\text{ Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
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### Other Devices
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!!! important
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Google Pixel phones are the only devices which are fully supported by all of our recommended Android distributions. Additionally, Pixel devices have stronger hardware security than any other Android device currently on the market, due to Google's custom Titan security chips acting as the Secure Element for secrets storage and rate limiting. Secure Elements are more limited and have a smaller attack surface than the Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones, which is also used to run "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for secrets storage, rate limiting, *and* trusted computing."
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Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
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If you are unable to purchase a Pixel device, any device which is supported by CalyxOS should be reasonably secure and private enough for most users after installing CalyxOS.
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Secure Elements are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation and rate limiting but not running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for secrets storage, rate limiting, *and* trusted computing, which results in a larger attack surface.
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In any case, when purchasing a device we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
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The following OEMs are only mentioned as they have phones compatible with the operating systems recommended by us. If you are purchasing a new device, we only recommend purchasing a Google Pixel.
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We do not recommend the following devices over a Google Pixel device, but we do have some notes on devices from other manufacturers:
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When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
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#### OnePlus
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If you are unable to obtain a Google Pixel, recent OnePlus devices provide a good balance of security with custom operating systems and longevity, with OnePlus 8 and later devices receiving 4 years of security updates. CalyxOS has [experimental support](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/04/01/fairphone4-oneplus8t-oneplus9-test-builds/) for the **OnePlus 8T** and **9**.
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If you are unable to obtain a Google Pixel, recent OnePlus devices are the next best option if you want to run a custom OS without privileged Play Services. OnePlus 8 and later devices will receive 4 years of security updates from their initial launch date. CalyxOS has [experimental support](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/04/01/fairphone4-oneplus8t-oneplus9-test-builds/) for the **OnePlus 8T** and **9**.
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DivestOS has support for most OnePlus devices up to the **OnePlus 7T Pro**, with varying levels of support.
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!!! danger
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The Fairphone by default is not secure as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11), meaning any system can be installed and the phone will trust it as if it is the stock system. This essentially breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device.
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The Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
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This problem is solved when you install a custom operating system such as CalyxOS or DivestOS and trust the developer's signing keys rather than the stock system's. To reiterate, **you must install a custom operating system with custom boot keys to use Fairphone devices in a secure manner.**
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This problem is somewhat mitigated when you install a custom operating system such as CalyxOS or DivestOS and trust the developer's signing keys rather than the stock system keys, however a vulnerability in CalyxOS or DivestOS's recovery environments could still potentially allow an attacker to bypass AVB. **To reiterate, you must install a custom operating system with custom boot keys to use Fairphone devices in a secure manner.**
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CalyxOS has [experimental support](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/04/01/fairphone4-oneplus8t-oneplus9-test-builds/) for the **Fairphone 4**. DivestOS has builds available for the **Fairphone 3**.
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While Fairphone markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support, the SOC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably sooner EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
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Fairphone markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
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## General Apps
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- [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot)
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- [:fontawesome-brands-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/guardianproject/orbot)
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Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch (:gear: Settings → Network & internet → VPN → :gear: → Block connections without VPN).
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Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
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For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* ( :material-menu: →Settings → Connectivity). This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
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For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Connectivity**. This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
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!!! attention
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!!! tip
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Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android) so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot) instead.
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CalyxOS includes a device controller app so there is no need to install a third party app like Shelter.
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GrapheneOS extends the user profile feature allowing a user to press an "End Session" button. This button clears the encryption key from memory. There are plans to add a [cross profile notifications system](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/88) in the future. GrapheneOS plans to introduce nested profile support with better isolation in the future.
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GrapheneOS extends the user profile feature, allowing you to end a current session. To do this, select *End Session* which will clear the encryption key from memory. There are plans to add a [cross profile notifications system](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/88) in the future. GrapheneOS plans to introduce nested profile support with better isolation in the future.
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## Sandboxed Google Play vs Privileged MicroG
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## Sandboxed Google Play vs Privileged microG
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When Google Play services are used on GrapheneOS, they run as a user app and are contained within a user or work profile.
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Sandboxed Google Play is confined using the highly restrictive, default [`untrusted_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) domain provided by [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux). Permissions for apps to use Google Play Services can be revoked at any time by the user.
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MicroG is a reimplementation of Google Play Services. This means it needs to be updated every time Android has a major version update (or the Android API changes). It also needs to run in the highly privileged [`system_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain like normal Google Play Services and requires access to [signature spoofing](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/android.html#microg-signature-spoofing) so this is less secure than the Sandboxed Google Play approach. We do not believe MicroG provides any privacy advantages over Sandboxed Google Play except for the option to *shift trust* of the location backend from Google to another provider such as Mozilla or DejaVu.
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microG is an open-source re-implementation of Google Play Services. This means it needs to be updated every time Android has a major version update (or the Android API changes). It also needs to run in the highly privileged [`system_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain like regular Google Play Services, and it requires an operating system that allows [signature spoofing](https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/wiki/Signature-Spoofing), which allows system apps to insecurely masquerade as other apps. This is less secure than Sandboxed Google Play's approach, which does not need access to sensitive system APIs.
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From a usability point of view, Sandboxed Google Play also works well with far more applications than MicroG, thanks to its support for services like [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html).
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When using Sandboxed Play Services, you have the option to reroute location requests to the Play Services API back to the OS location API which uses satellite based location services. With microG, you have the option to either not use a network location backend at all, *shift trust* to another location backend like Mozilla, or use [DejaVu](https://github.com/n76/DejaVu), a location backend that locally collects and saves RF-based location data to an offline database which can be used when GPS is not available.
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Network location providers like Play Services or Mozilla rely the on the MAC addresses of surrounding WiFi access points and Bluetooth devices being submitted for location approximation. Choosing a network location like Mozilla to use with microG provides little to no privacy benefit over Google because you are still submitting the same data and trusting them to not profile you.
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Local RF location backends like DejaVu require that the phone has a working GPS first for the local RF data collected to be useful. This makes them ineffective as location providers, as the job of a location provider is to assist location approximation when satellite based services are not working.
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If your threat model requires protecting your location or the MAC addresses of nearby devices, rerouting location requests to the OS location API is probably the best option. The benefit brought by microG's custom location backend is minimal at best when compared to Sandboxed Play Services.
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In terms of application compatibility, Sandboxed Google Play outperforms microG due to its support for many services which microG has not yet implemented, like [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html). Authentication using [FIDO](security/multi-factor-authentication#fido-fast-identity-online) with online services on Android also relies on Play Services, and the feature is not yet implemented in microG.
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## Privileged App Extensions
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## Choosing an Android Distribution
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When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services which are not part of the [Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has unrevokable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
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When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has unrevokable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
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This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often break the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship with [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via the [Android Debug Bridge](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) (ADB) and requires [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accomodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
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This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accomodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
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Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in enforcing mode. All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria.
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Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria.
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[Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right:](../android.md){ .md-button }
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## Avoid Root
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## Avoid Rooting
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[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) policy bypasses.
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[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
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|
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Adblockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,13 +24,23 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire
|
|||
|
||||
We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verified Boot
|
||||
|
||||
[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
|
||||
|
||||
Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Each user's data is encrypted using their own unique encryption key, and the operating system files are left unencrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files, thereby preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon rebooting device.
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom AVB key enrollment on their devices. Additionally, some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
|
||||
|
||||
## Firmware Updates
|
||||
|
||||
Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
|
||||
|
||||
As the components of the phone such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years while cheaper products often have shorter support. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own system on chip (SoC) and they will provide 5 years of support.
|
||||
As the components of the phone such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
|
||||
|
||||
Devices that have reached their end-of-life (EoL) and are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer, cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
|
||||
EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Android Versions
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -44,7 +54,7 @@ Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or
|
|||
|
||||
## User Profiles
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple user profiles (Settings → System → Multiple users) are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles you can limit a user from making calls, SMS or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles is a more secure method of isolation.
|
||||
Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles you can limit a user from making calls, SMS or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles is a more secure method of isolation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Profile
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -56,19 +66,9 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such
|
|||
|
||||
This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verified Boot
|
||||
|
||||
[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
|
||||
|
||||
Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based).
|
||||
|
||||
Each user's data is encrypted using their own unique encryption key, and the operating system files are left unencrypted. Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon reboot of the device.
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom AVB key enrollment on their devices. Some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
|
||||
|
||||
## VPN Killswitch
|
||||
|
||||
Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: Settings → Network & internet → VPN → :gear: → Block connections without VPN.
|
||||
Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in (:gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**).
|
||||
|
||||
## Global Toggles
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating syst
|
|||
|
||||
### Advanced Protection Program
|
||||
|
||||
If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). It is available at no cost to anyone with two or more hardware security keys with [FIDO](/security/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) support.
|
||||
If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). It is available at no cost to anyone with two or more hardware security keys with [FIDO](../security/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) support.
|
||||
|
||||
The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -96,18 +96,24 @@ The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
|
|||
- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
|
||||
- Warning the user about unverified applications
|
||||
|
||||
### Google Play System Updates
|
||||
|
||||
In the past, Android security updates had to be shipped by the operating system vendor. Android has become more modular beginning with Android 10, and Google can push security updates for **some** system components via the privileged Play Services.
|
||||
|
||||
If you have an EOL device shipped with Android 10 or above and are unable to run any of our recommended operating systems on your device, you are likely going to be better off sticking with your OEM Android installation (as opposed to an operating system not listed here such as LineageOS or /e/ OS). This will allow you to receive **some** security fixes from Google, while not violating the Android security model by using an insecure Android derivative and increasing your attack surface. We would still recommend upgrading to a supported device as soon as possible.
|
||||
|
||||
### Advertising ID
|
||||
|
||||
All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
|
||||
|
||||
On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: Settings → Apps → Sandboxed Google Play → Google Settings → Ads and select **Delete advertising ID**.
|
||||
On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*.
|
||||
|
||||
On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
|
||||
|
||||
- :gear: Settings → Google → Ads
|
||||
- :gear: Settings → Privacy → Ads
|
||||
- :gear: **Settings** → **Google** → **Ads**
|
||||
- :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Ads**
|
||||
|
||||
Depending on your system, you will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to "Opt out of interest-based ads". You should delete the advertising ID if you are given the option to, and if you are not, we recommend that you opt out of interested-based ads and then reset your advertising ID.
|
||||
You will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to *Opt out of interest-based ads*, this varies between OEM distributions of Android. If presented with the option to delete the advertising ID that is preferred. If not, then make sure to opt out and reset your advertising ID.
|
||||
|
||||
### SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ These are our current web browser recommendations and settings. We recommend kee
|
|||
|
||||
#### Recommended Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
These options can be found in the *Privacy & Security* settings page ( :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**).
|
||||
These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
|
||||
|
||||
##### Enhanced Tracking Protection (ETP)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ On iOS, any app that can browse the web is [restricted](https://developer.apple.
|
|||
- [:fontawesome-brands-android: Android](https://www.bromite.org/fdroid)
|
||||
- [:fontawesome-brands-github: Source](https://github.com/bromite/bromite)
|
||||
|
||||
These options can be found in *Privacy and Security* ( :material-menu: → :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy and Security**).
|
||||
These options can be found in :material-menu: → :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy and Security**.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Recommended Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ These options can be found in *Privacy and Security* ( :material-menu: → :gear
|
|||
|
||||
#### Recommended Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
These options can be found in *Privacy and Security* ( :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **Privacy and Security**).
|
||||
These options can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **Privacy and Security**.
|
||||
|
||||
##### Cross-Site Tracking Prevention
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ Open Safari and press the tabs icon in the bottom right corner. Open Tab Groups,
|
|||
|
||||
While synchronization of Safari History, Tab Groups, and iCloud Tabs uses E2EE, bookmarks sync does [not](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303); they are only encrypted in transit and stored in an encrypted format on Apple's servers. Apple may be able to decrypt and access them.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use iCloud, we also recommend checking to ensure Safari's default download location is set to locally on your device. This option can be found in *General* ( :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**).
|
||||
If you use iCloud, we also recommend checking to ensure Safari's default download location is set to locally on your device. This option can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Extensions
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ The primary threat when using a video streaming platform is that your streaming
|
|||
|
||||
We recommend **against** synchronizing your wallet with LBRY Inc., as synchronizing encrypted wallets is not supported yet. If you synchronize your wallet with LBRY Inc., you have to trust them to not look at your subscription list, [LBC](https://lbry.com/faq/earn-credits) funds, or take control of your channel.
|
||||
|
||||
You can disable *Save hosting data to help the LBRY network* option (:gear: Settings → Advanced Settings) to avoid exposing your IP address and watched videos when using LBRY for a prolonged period of time.
|
||||
You can disable *Save hosting data to help the LBRY network* option in :gear: **Settings** → **Advanced Settings**, to avoid exposing your IP address and watched videos when using LBRY for a prolonged period of time.
|
||||
|
||||
### NewPipe
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
|
|||
<!-- markdownlint-disable -->
|
||||
*[2FA]: 2-Factor Authentication
|
||||
*[ADB]: Android Debug Bridge
|
||||
*[AOSP]: Android Open Source Project
|
||||
*[attack surface]: The attack surface of software or hardware is the sum of the different places an unauthorized user (the "attacker") can try to enter data to or extract data from.
|
||||
*[AVB]: Android Verified Boot
|
||||
*[CLI]: Command Line Interface
|
||||
*[CSV]: Comma-Separated Values
|
||||
*[CVE]: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
|
||||
*[DNSSEC]: Domain Name System Security Extensions
|
||||
*[DNS]: Domain Name System
|
||||
*[DoH]: DNS over HTTPS
|
||||
*[DoT]: DNS over TLS
|
||||
*[E2EE]: End-to-End Encryption/Encrypted
|
||||
*[ECS]: EDNS Client Subnet
|
||||
*[EOL]: End-of-Life
|
||||
*[Exif]: Exchangeable image file format
|
||||
*[FDE]: Full Disk Encryption
|
||||
*[FIDO]: Fast IDentity Online
|
||||
|
|
@ -23,14 +26,19 @@
|
|||
*[HTTPS]: Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
|
||||
*[HTTP]: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
|
||||
*[I2P]: Invisible Internet Project
|
||||
*[ICCID]: Integrated Circuit Card Identifier
|
||||
*[IMAP]: Internet Message Access Protocol
|
||||
*[IMEI]: International Mobile Equipment Identity
|
||||
*[IMSI]: International Mobile Subscriber Identity
|
||||
*[IP]: Internet Protocol
|
||||
*[IPv4]: Internet Protocol version 4
|
||||
*[IPv6]: Internet Protocol version 6
|
||||
*[ISP]: Internet Service Provider
|
||||
*[ISPs]: Internet Service Providers
|
||||
*[JNI]: Java Native Interface
|
||||
*[LUKS]: Linux Unified Key Setup (Full-Disk Encryption)
|
||||
*[MAC]: Media Access Control
|
||||
*[MEID]: Mobile Equipment Identifier
|
||||
*[MFA]: Multi-Factor Authentication
|
||||
*[OCSP]: Online Certificate Status Protocol
|
||||
*[OEM]: Original Equipment Manufacturer
|
||||
|
|
@ -45,11 +53,13 @@
|
|||
*[rolling release]: An update release cycle in which updates are released very frequently, instead of at set intervals.
|
||||
*[RSS]: Really Simple Syndication
|
||||
*[SELinux]: Security-Enhanced Linux
|
||||
*[SIM]: Subscriber Identity Module
|
||||
*[SMS]: Short Message Service (standard text messaging)
|
||||
*[SMTP]: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
|
||||
*[SNI]: Server Name Indication
|
||||
*[SSH]: Secure Shell
|
||||
*[SaaS]: Software as a Service (cloud software)
|
||||
*[SoC]: System on Chip
|
||||
*[TCP]: Transmission Control Protocol
|
||||
*[TEE]: Trusted Execution Environment
|
||||
*[TLS]: Transport Layer Security
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user