DISARMframeworks/generated_pages/counters/C00073.md
Sara-Jayne Terp aca100b364 framework and page updates
Framework updates:
- TA08 added text "Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing."
- TA10 change name from "Go Physical" to "Drive Offline Activity"
- T0004 change name from "Competing Narratives" to "Devise Competing Narratives"
- T0005 convert into a tactic stage, TA13.  Change name from "Center of Gravity Analysis" to "Conduct Center of Gravity Analysis"
- T0006 rename from "Create Master Narratives" to "Develop Narrative Concepts".  nb narratology: can't create master narratives - can only latch onto them
- T0011 change name from "Hijack legitimate account" to "Compromise legitimate account"
- T0065. Create new technique "use physical broadcast capabilities" under TA04
- T0014. Rename from "Create funding campaigns" to "Prepare fundraising campaigns".  Exited text to reflect that this new name allows the possibility of either creating a new one, or revitalizing an existing one.
- T0015 rename from "Create hashtag" to "Create hashtags".  Change text to mention hashtag groups.
- T0017 rename from "Promote online funding" to "Conduct Fundraising Campaigns"
- T0018 rename from "Paid targeted ads" to "Purchase advertisements"
- T0026 rename from "Create fake research" to "create pseudoscientific or disingenuous research"

Page and file updates:
- Added MITRE, FIU, and SPICE to DISARM's history
- reran github page generator
- reran sqlite generator
2022-02-02 10:57:17 -05:00

4.0 KiB
Raw Blame History

Counter C00073: Inoculate populations through media literacy training

  • Summary: Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Example is the "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in safe, informed media consumption techniques, including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.” Example: NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.” concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade.

  • Playbooks:

  • Metatechnique: M001 - resilience

  • Resources needed:

  • Belongs to tactic stage: TA01

Actor types Sectors
A005 community group S002
A006 educator S002
A008 library S002
A009 NGO S002
A010 religious organisation S002
A017 coordinating body S003
A021 media organisation S010
A032 social media platform outreach S007
Counters these Tactics
Counters these Techniques
T0016 Clickbait
T0048 Cow online opinion leaders
T0045 Use fake experts
T0044 Seed distortions
T0040 Demand unsurmountable proof
T0039 Bait legitimate influencers
T0027 Adapt existing narratives
T0025 Leak altered documents
T0026 Create pseudoscientific or disingenuous research
T0023 Distort facts
T0022 Conspiracy narratives
T0021 Memes
T0010 Cultivate ignorant agents
T0056 Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
T0056 Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
T0019 Generate information pollution
T0053 Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
T0060 Continue to amplify
Seen in incidents

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