311 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
311 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
15. Reputations and Credentials
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15.1. copyright
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THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
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1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
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See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
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use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
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name on my words.
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15.2. SUMMARY: Reputations and Credentials
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15.2.1. Main Points
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- "a man's word is his bond"
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- reputations matter
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- the expectation of future interaction/business is crucial
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15.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
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- see section on Crypto Anarchy for why reputations matter
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15.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
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- very little published on this
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- Bruce Benson's "The Enterprise of Law"
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15.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
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- this is another "transition" chapter, laying the groundwork
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for Crypto Anarchy
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15.3. The Nature of Reputations
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15.3.1. The claim by many of us that "reputations" will take care of
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many problems in crypto anarchic markets is disputed by some
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(notably Eric Hughes). To be sure, it will not be a trivial
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issue. Institutions take years or decades to evolve.
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15.3.2. However, think of how often we use reputations: friends,
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books, movies, restaurants, etc
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15.3.3. Reputations and other institutions will take time to evolve.
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Saying "the market will talke care of things" may be true,
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but this may take time. The "invisible hand" doesn't
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necessarily move swiftly.
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15.3.4. "What are 'reputations' and why are they so important?"
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- a vague concept related to degree of believability, of
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trust, etc.
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+ "we know it when we see it"
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- (sorry for the cop out, but I don't have a good
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definition handy....James Donald says studying reputatons
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is "nominalist hot air" [1994-09-02], but I think it's
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quite important)
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+ obvious, in ordinary life, but in the cyberspatial context
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- reputation-based systems
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- escrow, expectations
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- "reputation capital"
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- like book or music recommendations
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- web of trust (is different than just "trust"---tensor,
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rather than scalar)
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+ Actually very common: how most of us deal with our friends,
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our enemies, the books we read, the restaurants we
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frequent, etc.
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- we mentally downcheck and upcheck on the basis of
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experience; we learn
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- Are there examples?
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- Eric's objections
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15.3.5. "How are reputations acquired, ruined, transferred, etc.?"
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+ First, reputations are not "owned" by the person to whom
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they are attached by others
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+ the algebra is tricky...maybe Eric Hughes or one of the
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other pure math types can help straighten out the
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"calculus of reputations"
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- reputations are not symmetric: just because Alice
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esteems Bob does mean the reverse is so
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- reputations are not transitive, though they are
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partially transitive: if Alice esteems Bob and Bob
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esteems Charles, this may cause Alice to be somewhat
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more esteemful of Charles.
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- a tensor matrix?
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- a graph?
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+ Any holder of a reputation can "spend" some of his
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reputation capital
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- in praise or criticism of another agent
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- in reviews (think of Siskel and Ebert "spending" some of
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their reputation capital in the praise of a movie, and
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how their own reptutations will go up and down as a
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function of many things, including especially how much
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the viewing audience agrees with them)
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15.3.6. "Are they foolproof? Are all the questions answered?"
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- Of course not.
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- And Eric Hughes has in the past said that too much
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importance is being invested in this idea of reputations,
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though many or even most of us (who comment on the matter)
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clearly think otherwise.
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- In any case, much more study is needed. Hal Finney and I
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have debated this a couple of times (first on the
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Extropians list, then a couple or more times on the
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Cypherpunks list), and we are mostly in agreement that this
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area is very promising and is deserving of much more
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thought--and even experimentation. (One of my interests in
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crypto simulations, in "protocol ecologies," is to simulate
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agents which play games involving reputations, spoofing,
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transfers of reputations, etc.)
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15.3.7. Reputations have many aspects
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+ the trading firm which runs others people's money is
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probably less "reputable" in an important sense than the
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trading firm in which partners have their own personal
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fortunes riding....or at least I know which one I'd trust!
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- (But how to guarantee one isn't being fooled, by a spoof,
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a sham? Hard to say. Perhaps the "encrypted open books"
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protocol Eric Hughes is working on will be of use here.)
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15.4. Reputations, Institutions
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15.5. Reputation-Based Systems and Agoric Open Systems
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15.5.1. Evolutionary systems and markets
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+ markets, emergent order, Hayek, connectionism
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- many related ideas...spontaneous order, self interest,
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agents, etc.
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+ a critique of "blind rationalism"
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- or hyperrationalism, the idea that a form model can
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always be found
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- order can develop even in anonymous systems, provding
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certain types of contacts are established, certain other
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things
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15.5.2. shell games...who knows what?
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15.5.3. key is that would-be "burners" must never know when they are
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actually being tested
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- with devastating effects if they burn the tester
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+ example: how to guarantee (to some degree of certainty)
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that an anonymous bank is not renegging (or whatever)?
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- e.g., a Swiss bank that denies knowledge of an account
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- key is that bank never know when a withdrawal is just a
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test (and these tests may be done frequently)
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- the importance of repeat business
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15.5.4. another key: repeat business....when the gains from burning
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someone are greater than the expected future business.....
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15.5.5. reputations are what keep CA systems from degenerating into
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flamefests
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- digital pseudonyms mean a trail is left, kill files can be
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used, and people will take care about what they say
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- and the systems will not be truly anonymous: some people
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will see the same other people, allowing the development of
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histories and continued interactions (recall that in cases
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where no future interaction is exected, rudeness and
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flaming creeps in)
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+ "Rumormonger" at Apple (and elsewhere) always degenerates
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into flames and crudities, says Johann Strandberg
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- but this is what reputations will partly offset
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15.5.6. "brilliant pennies" scam
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15.5.7. "reputation float" is how money can be pulled out of the
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future value of a reputation
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15.5.8. Reputation-based systems and repeat business
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+ reputations matter...this is the main basis of our economic
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system
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- repeat business....people stop doing business with those
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they don't trust, or who mistreat them, or those who just
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don't seem to be reputable
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- and even in centrally-controlled systems, reputations
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matter (can't force people to undertake some relations)
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- credit ratings (even for pseudonyms) matter
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- escrow agents, bonding, etc.
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- criminal systems still rely on reputations and even on
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honor
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- ironically, it is often in cases where there are
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restrictions on choice that the advantages of reputations
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are lost, as when the government bans discrimination,
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limits choice, or insists on determining who can do
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business with who
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+ Repeat business is the most important aspect
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- granularity of transactions, cash flow, game-theoretic
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analysis of advantages of "defecting"
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- anytime a transaction has a value that is very large
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(compared to expected future profits from transactions,
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or on absolute basis), watch out
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- ideally, a series of smaller transactions are more
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conducive to fair trading...for example, if one gets a
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bad meal at a restaurant, one avoids that restaurant in
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the future, rather than suing (even though one can claim
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to have been "damaged")
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- issues of contract as well
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15.6. Reputations and Evolutionary Game Theory
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15.6.1. game of "chicken," where gaining a rep as tough guy, or king
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of the hill, can head off many future challenges (and hence
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aid in survival, differential reproduction)
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15.7. Positive Reputations
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15.7.1. better than negative reputations, because neg reps can be
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discarded by pseudonym holdes (neg reps are like allowing a
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credit card to be used then abandoned with a debt on it)
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15.7.2. "reputation capital"
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15.8. Practical Examples
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15.8.1. "Are there any actual examples of software-mediated
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reputation systems?"
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- credit databases...positive and negative reputations
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15.8.2. Absent laws which ban strong crypto (and such laws are
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themselves nearly unenforceable), it will be essentially
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impossible to stop anonymous transactions and purely
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reputation-based systems.
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- For example, Pr0duct Cypher and Sue D. Nym will be able to
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use private channels of their own choosing (possibly using
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anonymous pools, etc.) to communicate and arrange deals. If
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some form of digital cash exists, they will even be able to
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transfer this cash. (If not, barter of informations,
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whatever.)
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- So, the issues raised by Hal Finney and others, expressing
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doubts about the adequacy of reputation capital as a
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building block (and good concerns they are, by the way),
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become moot. Society cannot stop willing participants from
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using reputation and anonymity. This is a major theme of
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crypto anarchy: the bypassing of convention by willing
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participants.
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+ If Alice and Bob don't care that their physical identies
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are unknown to each other, why should we care? That is, why
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should society step in and try to ban this arrangement?
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- they won't be using "our" court systems, so that's not an
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issue (and longer term, PPLs will take the place of
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courts, many of us feel)
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- only if Alice and Bob are counting on society, on third
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parties to the transaction, to do certain things, can
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society make a claim to be involved
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- (A main reason to try to ban anonymity will be to stop
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"bad" activities, which is a separate issue; banning of
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"bad" activity is usually pointless, and leads to
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repressive states. But I digress.)
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15.8.3. Part of the "phase change": people opt out of the permission-
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slip society via strong crypto, making their own decisions on
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who to trust, who to deal with, who to make financial
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arrangements with
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+ example: credit rating agencies that are not traceable, not
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prosecutable in any court...people deal with them only if
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they think they are getting value for their money
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- no silly rules that credit rating data can "only" go back
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some arbitrary number of years (7, in U.S.)...no silly
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rules about how certain bankruptcies "can't" be
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considered, how one's record is to be "cleared" if
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conditions are met, etc.
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- rather, all data are considered....customer decides how
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to weight the data...(if a customer is too persnickety
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about past lapsed bills, or a bad debt many years in the
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past, he'll find himself never lending any money, so the
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"invisible hand" of the free market will tend to correct
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such overzealousnesses)
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+ data havens, credit havens, etc. (often called "offshore
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data havens," as the current way to do this would be to
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locate in Caymans, Isle of Man, etc.)
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- but clearly they can be "offshore in cyberspace"
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(anonymous links, etc.)
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15.9. Credentials and Reputations
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15.9.1. debate about credentials vs. reputations
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- James Donald, Hal Finney, etc.
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- (insert details of debate here)
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15.9.2. Credentials are not as important as many people seem to think
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- "Permisssion slips" for various behaviors: drinking age,
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admission to movie theaters, business licenses, licenses to
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drive taxicabs, to read palms (yes, here in Santa Cruz one
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must have a palm-reading license, separate from the normal
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"business license")
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+ Such credentials often are inappropriate extensions of
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state power into matters which only parents should handle
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- underage drinking? Not my problem! Don't force bars to be
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babysitters.
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- underage viewing of movies? Ditto, even more so.
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15.9.3. Proving possession of some credential
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15.10. Fraud and False Accusations
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15.10.1. "What if someone makes a false accusation?"
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- one's belief in an assertion is an emergent phenomenon
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+ assertion does not equal proof
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- (even "proof" is variable, too)
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- false claims eventually reflect on false claimant
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15.10.2. Scams, Ponzi Schemes, and Oceania
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+ Scams in cyberspace will abound
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- anonymous systems will worsen the situaion in some ways,
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but perhaps help in other ways
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- certainly there is the risk of losing one's electronic
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cash very quickly and irretrievably (it's pretty far gone
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once it's passed through several remailers)
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- conpersons (can't say "con men" anymore!) will be there,
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too
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+ Many of you will recall the hype about "Oceania," a
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proposed independent nation to be built on concrete
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pontoons, or somesuch. People were encouraged to send in
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donations. Apparently the scheme/scam collapsed:
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+ "It turned out to all be a scam, actually. The key
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people involved, Eric Kline and Chuck Geshlieder,
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allegedly had a scheme set up where they repeatedly paid
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themselves out of all of the proceeds." [anonymous post,
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altp.privacy, (reprint of Scott A. Kjar post on
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Compuserve), 1994-07-28]
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- or was it Eric Klein?
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15.11. Loose Ends
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15.11.1. Selective disclosure of truth
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- More euphemestic than "lying."
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- Consider how we react when someone asks us about something
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we consider overly personal, while a friend or loved one
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may routinely ask such questions.
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- Is "personal" the real issue? Or is that we understand
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truth is a commodity with value, to be given out for
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something in return?
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- At one extreme, the person who casually and consistently
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lies earns a poor reputation--anyone encountering them is
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never certain if the truth is being told. At the other
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extreme, the "always honest" person essentially gives too
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much away, revealing preferences, plans, and ideas without
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consideration.
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- I'm all for secrets--and lies, when needed. I believe in
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selective disclosure of the truth, because the truth
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carries value and need not be "given away" to anyone who
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asks.
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15.11.2. Crytography allows virtual networks to arrange by
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cryptographic collusion certain goals. Beyond just the
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standard "cell" system, it allows arrrangements, plans, and
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execution.
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- collecting money to have someone killed is an example,
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albeit a distasteful one
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