3763 lines
216 KiB
Markdown
3763 lines
216 KiB
Markdown
16. Crypto Anarchy
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16.1. copyright
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THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
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1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
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See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
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use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
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name on my words.
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16.2. SUMMARY: Crypto Anarchy
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16.2.1. Main Points
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- "...when you want to smash the State, everything looks like
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a hammer."
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- strong crypto as the "building material" for cyberspace
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(making the walls, the support beams, the locks)
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16.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
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- this section ties all the other sections together
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16.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
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- again, almost nothing written on this
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- Vinge, Friedman, Rand, etc.
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16.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
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- a very long section, possibly confusing to many
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16.3. Introduction
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16.3.1. "The revolution will not be televised. The revolution *will*,
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however, be digitized." Welcome to the New Underworld Order!
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(a term I have borrowed from writer Claire Sterling.)
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16.3.2. "Do the views here express the views of the Cypherpunks as a
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whole?"
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- This section is controversial. Hence, even more warnings
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than usual about being careful not to confuse these
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comments with the beliefs of all or even most Cypherpunks.
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- In fairness, libertarianism is undeniably the most
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represented ideology on the list, as it is in so much of
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the Net. The reasons for this have been extensively debated
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over the years, but it's a fact. If other major ideologies
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exists, they are fairly hidden on the Cypherpunks list.
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- Yes, some quasi-socialist views are occasionally presented.
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My friend Dave Mandl, for example, has at times argued for
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a less-anarchocapitalist view (but I think our views are
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actually fairly similar...he just has a different language
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and thinks there's more of a difference than their actually
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is--insert smiley here).
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- And several Cypherpunks who've thought about the issues of
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crypto anarchy have been disturbed by the conclusions that
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seem inevitable (markets for corporate information,
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assassianation made more liquid, data havens, espionage
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made much easier, and other such implications to be
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explored later in this section).
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- So, take this section with these caveats.
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- And some of the things I thing are inevitable, and in many
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cases positive, will be repugnant to some. The end of
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welfare, the end of subsidies of inner city breeders, for
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example. The smashing of the national security state
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through digital espionage, information markets, and
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selective assassinations are not things that everyone will
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take comfort in. Some may even call it illegal, seditious,
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and dangerous. So be it.
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16.3.3. "What are the Ideologies of Cyperpunks?"
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+ I mentioned this in an earlier section, but now that I'm
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discussing "crypto anarchy" in detail it's good to recap
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some points about the ideology of Cypherpunks.
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- an area fraught with dangers, as many Cypherpunks have
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differing views of what's important
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+ Two main foci for Cypherpunks:
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- Personal privacy in an increasingly watchful society
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- Undermining of states and governments
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- Of those who speak up, most seem to lean toward the
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libertarian position, often explicitly so (libertarians
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often are to be found on the Internet, so this correlation
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is not surprising)
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+ Socialists and Communitarians
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- Should speak up more than they have. Dave Mandl is the
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only one I can recall who's given a coherent summary of
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his views.
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+ My Personal Outlook on Laws and Ideology:
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- (Obviously also scattered thoughout this document.)
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+ Non-coercion Principle
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- avoid initiation of physical aggression
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- "to each his own" (a "neo-Calvinist" perspective of
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letting each person pick his path, and not interfering)
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- I support no law which can easily be circumvented.
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(Traffic laws are a counterexample...I generally agree
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with basic traffic laws....)
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- And I support no law I would not personally be willing to
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enforce and punish. Murder, rape, theft, etc, but not
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"victimless crimes, " not drug laws, and not 99.9998% of
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the laws on the books.
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- Crypto anarchy is in a sense a throwback to the pre-state
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days of individual choice about which laws to follow. The
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community exerted a strong force.
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- With strong crypto ("fortress crypto," in law enforcement
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terms), only an intrusive police state can stop people
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from accessing "illegal" sites, from communicating with
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others, from using "unapproved" services, and so on. To
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pick one example, the "credit data haven" that keeps any
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and all financial records--rent problems from 1975,
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bankruptcy proceedings from 1983, divorce settlements,
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results from private investigators, etc. In the U.S.,
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many such records are "unusable": can't use credit data
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older than 7 years (under the "Fair Credit Reporting
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Act"), PI data, etc. But if I am thinking about lending
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Joe Blow some money, how the hell can I be told I can't
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"consider" the fact that he declared bankruptcy in 1980,
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ran out on his debts in Haiti in 1989, and is being sued
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for all his assets by two ex-wives? The answer is simple:
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any law which says I am not allowed to take into account
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information which comes my way is _flawed_ and should be
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bypassed. Dialing in to a credit haven in Belize is one
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approach--except wiretaps might still get me caught.
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Cyberspace allows much more convenient and secure
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bypasses of these laws.
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- (For those of you who think such bypasses of laws are
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immoral, tough. Strong crypto allows this. Get used to it.)
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16.3.4. Early history of crypto anarchy
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+ 1987-8, AMIX, Salin, Manifesto
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- discussed crypto implications with Phil Salin and Gayle
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Pergamit, in December of 1987
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- with a larger group, including Marc Stiegler, Dave Ross,
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Jim Bennett, Phil Salin, etc., in June 1988.
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- released "The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" in August 1988.
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- Fen LaBalme had "Guerillan Information Net" (GIN), which he
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and I discussed in 1988 at the Hackers Conference
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+ "From Crossbows to Cryptography," 1987?
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- made similar points, but some important differences
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- TAZ also being written at this time
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16.4. The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto
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16.4.1. Unchanged since it's writing in mid-1988, except for my e-
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mail address.
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- There are some changes I'd make, but...
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- It was written quickly, and in a style to deliberately
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mimic what I remembered of the "Communist Manifesto." (for
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ironic reasons)
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- Still., I'm proud that more than six years ago I correctly
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saw some major points which Cypherpunks have helped to make
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happen: remailers, anonymous communictation, reputation-
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based systems, etc.
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- For history's sake, here it is:
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16.4.2.
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The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto
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Timothy C. May
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tcmay@netcom.com
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A specter is haunting the modern world, the specter of crypto
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anarchy.
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Computer technology is on the verge of providing the ability
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for individuals and groups to communicate and interact with
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each other in a totally anonymous manner. Two persons may
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exchange messages, conduct business, and negotiate electronic
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contracts without ever knowing the True Name, or legal
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identity, of the other. Interactions over networks will be
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untraceable, via extensive re-routing of encrypted packets
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and tamper-proof boxes which implement cryptographic
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protocols with nearly perfect assurance against any
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tampering. Reputations will be of central importance, far
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more important in dealings than even the credit ratings of
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today. These developments will alter completely the nature of
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government regulation, the ability to tax and control
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economic interactions, the ability to keep information
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secret, and will even alter the nature of trust and
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reputation.
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The technology for this revolution--and it surely will be
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both a social and economic revolution--has existed in theory
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for the past decade. The methods are based upon public-key
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encryption, zero-knowledge interactive proof systems, and
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various software protocols for interaction, authentication,
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and verification. The focus has until now been on academic
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conferences in Europe and the U.S., conferences monitored
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closely by the National Security Agency. But only recently
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have computer networks and personal computers attained
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sufficient speed to make the ideas practically realizable.
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And the next ten years will bring enough additional speed to
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make the ideas economically feasible and essentially
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unstoppable. High-speed networks, ISDN, tamper-proof boxes,
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smart cards, satellites, Ku-band transmitters, multi-MIPS
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personal computers, and encryption chips now under
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development will be some of the enabling technologies.
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The State will of course try to slow or halt the spread of
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this technology, citing national security concerns, use of
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the technology by drug dealers and tax evaders, and fears of
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societal disintegration. Many of these concerns will be
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valid; crypto anarchy will allow national secrets to be trade
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freely and will allow illicit and stolen materials to be
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traded. An anonymous computerized market will even make
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possible abhorrent markets for assassinations and extortion.
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Various criminal and foreign elements will be active users of
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CryptoNet. But this will not halt the spread of crypto
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anarchy.
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Just as the technology of printing altered and reduced the
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power of medieval guilds and the social power structure, so
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too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the nature
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of corporations
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and of government interference in economic transactions.
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Combined with emerging information markets, crypto anarchy
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will create a liquid market for any and all material which
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can be put into words and pictures. And just as a seemingly
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minor invention like barbed wire made possible the fencing-
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off of vast ranches and farms, thus altering forever the
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concepts of land and property rights in the frontier West, so
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too will the seemingly minor discovery out of an
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arcane branch of mathematics come to be the wire clippers
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which dismantle the barbed wire around intellectual property.
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Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences!
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16.5. Changes are Coming
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16.5.1. Technology is dramatically altering the nature of
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governments.
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- It may sound like newage trendiness, but strong crypto is
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"technological empowerment." It literally gives power to
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individuals. Like Sam Colt, it makes them equal.
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- "Politics has never given anyone lasting freedom, and it
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never will. Anything gained through politics will be lost
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again as soon as the society feels threatened. If most
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Americans have never been oppressed by the government
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(aside from an annual mugging) it is because most of them
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have never done anything to threaten the government's
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interests." [Mike Ingle, 1994-01-01]
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+ Thesis: Strong crypto is a good thing
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- tool against governments of all flavors, left and right
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- religious freedom
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- personal choice
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16.5.2. Dangers of democracy in general and electronic democracy in
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particular
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- mob rule, rights of minority ignored
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- too many things get decided by vote that have no business
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being voted on
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- "don't tax me...", De Tocqueville's warning
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+ electronic democracy is even worse
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- moves further from republican, representative system to
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electronc mob rule
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- too rapid a system
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- Detweiler's "electrocrasy" (spelling?)...brain-damaged,
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poorly thought-out
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16.5.3. The collapse of democracy is predicted by many
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+ the "tipping factor" exceeded, with real taxation rates at
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50% or more in most developed countries, with conditions of
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"taxation without representation" far beyond anything in
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American colonial times
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- with professional politicians...and mostly millionaires
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running for office
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- the Cincinnatus (sp?) approach of going into government
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just for a few years, then returning to the farm or
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business, is a joke
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+ rise of nominalism [argued by James Donald]
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- "After Athenian democracy self destructed, the various
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warring parties found that they could only have peace if
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they disowned omnipotent government. They put together a
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peace agreement that in part proclaimed limits to
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government, in part acknowledged inherent limits to what
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was proper for governments to do and in part guaranteed
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that the government would not go beyond what it was
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proper for government to do, that the majority could not
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do as it pleased with the minority, that not any act of
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power was a law, that law was not merely whatever the
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government willed.
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They did not agree on a constitution but agreed to
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respect an unwritten constitution that already existed in
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some sense.
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A similar arrangement underlies the American constitution
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(now defunct) and the English declaration of right (also
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defunct)
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The problem with such formal peace agreements is that
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they can only be put together after government has
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substantially collapsed. Some of us wish to try other
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possibilities in the event of collapse.
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The American constitution collapsed because of the rise
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of nominalist theories "The constitution says whatever
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the courts say that it says." [James Donald, 1994-08-31]
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- War on Drugs, conspiracy charges, random searches,
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emergency preparedness orders (Operation Vampire Killer,
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Operation Night Train, REX-84). The killings of more than a
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dozen reporters and tipsters over the past decade, many of
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them covering the Iran-Contra story, the drug deals, the
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CIA's dealings...the Farm appears to be "swamping" more and
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more of these troublemakers in the headlong march toward
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fascism.
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+ De Tocqueville's warning that the American experiment in
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democracy would last only until voters discovered they
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could pick the pockets of others at the ballot box
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- a point reached about 60 years ago
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- (prior to the federal income tax and then the "New Deal,"
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there were systemic limitations on this ability to the
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pockets of others, despite populist yearnings by
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some....after the New Deal, and the Great Society, the
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modern era of runaway taxation commenced.)
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16.5.4. Depredations of the State
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+ "Discrimination laws"..choice no longer allowed
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- the strip club in LA forced to install wheelchair access-
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-for the dancers!
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- age no longer allowed to be a factor...gag!
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+ democracy run rampant....worst fears of Founders
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- votes on everything...
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- gun control, seizures, using zoning laws (with FFL
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inspections as informants)
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- welfare state,...Murray, inner cities made worse...theft
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- "currency export" laws...how absurd that governments
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attempt to control what folks do with their own money!
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16.5.5. Things are likely to get worse, financially (a negative
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view,though there are also reasons to be optimistic)
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+ a welfare state that is careening toward the edge of a
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cliff...escalating spending, constantly increasing national
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debt (with no signs that it will ever be paid down)
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- pension burdens are rising dramatically, according to
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"Economist", 1994-08.
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- the link to crypto is that folks had better find ways to
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immunize themselves from the coming crunch
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+ Social Security, other pension plans are set to take 30-40%
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of all GDP
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- too many promies, people living longer
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- estimate: $20 trillion in "unfunded liabilities"
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- health care expectations... growing national debt
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16.5.6. Borders are becoming transparent to data...terabytes a day
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are flowing across borders, with thousands of data formats
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and virtually indistinguishable from other messages.
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Compressed files, split files, images, sounds, proprietary
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encryption formats, etc. Once can _almost_ pity the NSA in
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the hopelessness of their job.
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16.6. Free Speech and Liberty--The Effects of Crypto
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16.6.1. "What freedom of speech is becoming."
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+ An increased willingness to limit speech, by attaching
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restrictions based on it being "commercial" or "hate
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speech."
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+ advertising laws being the obvious example: smoking,
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alcohol, etc.
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- doctors, lawyers, etc.
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- sex, nudity
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- even laws that say billboards can't show guns
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- A chilling but all too common sentiment on the Net is shown
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by this quote: "Is it freedom of speech to spew racism ,
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and steriotypes, just because you lack the intellectual
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capacity to comprehend that , perhaps, somewhere, there is
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a different way of life, which is not congruent with your
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pre-conceived notions?" [Andrew Beckwith, soc.culture.usa]
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16.6.2. We don't really have free speech
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- election laws
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- advertising laws
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+ "slander" and "libel"
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- thankfully, anonymous systems will make this moot
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+ permission needed...licensing, approval, certification
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- "qualifications"
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- granted, Supremes have made it clear that political
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comments cannot be restricted, but many other areas have
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- often the distinction involves 'for pay"
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- Perhaps you are thinking that these are not really examples
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of government censorship, just of _other crimes_ and
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_other rights_ taking precedence. Thus, advertisers can't
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make false or misleading claims, and can't advertise
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dangerous or otherwise unapproved items. And I can't make
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medical diagnoses, or give structural and geological
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advice, and so on...a dozen good examples. But these
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restrictions emasculate free speech, leaving only banal
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expression of appropriately-hedged "personal opinions" as
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the free speech that is allowed...and even that is ofen
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subject to crazy lawsuits and threats of legal action.
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16.7. The Nature of Anarchies
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16.7.1. Anarchy doesn't mean chaos and killing
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- As J. Bruce Dawson put it in a review of Linux in the
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September, 1994 "Byte," "It's anarchy at its best."
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+ Ironically, crypto anarchy does admit the possibility (and
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hence probablility) of more contract killings as an
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ultimate enforcement mechanism for contracts otherwise
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unenforceable.
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- which is what is occurring in drug and other crime
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situaions: the parties cannot go to the police or courts
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for righting of wrongs, so they need to have the ultimate
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threat of death to enforce deals. It makes good sense
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from a reputation/game theory point of view.
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16.7.2. Leftists can be anarchists, too
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- In fact, this tends to be the popular interpretation of
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anarchy. (Besides the bomb-throwing, anti-Tsar anarchists
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of the 19th century, and the bomb-throwing anarchists of
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the U.S. early this century.)
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+ "Temporary Autonomous Zones" (TAZ)
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- Hakim Bey (pseudonym for )
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- Mondo 2000, books, (check with Dave Mandl, who helps to
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publish them)
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16.7.3. Anarchic development
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+ Markets and emergent behaviors vs. planned development
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- principles of locality come into play (the local players
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know what they want and how much they'll pay for it)
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- central planners have "top-down" outlooks
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- Kevin Kelley's "Out of Control" (1994). Also, David
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Friedman's "Technologies of Freedom."
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- An example I heard about recently was Carroll College, in
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Wisconsin. Instead of building pathways and sidewalks
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across the newly-constructed grounds, the ground was left
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bare. After some time, the "emergent pathways" chosen by
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students and faculty were then turned into paved pathways,
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neatly solving the problem of people not using the
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"planned" pathways. I submit that much of life works this
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way. So does the Net (the "information footpaths"?).
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- anarchies are much more common than most people
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think...personal relationships, choices in life, etc.
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16.7.4. The world financial system is a good example: beyond the
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reach of any single government, even the U.S. New World
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Order, money moves and flows as doubts and concerns appear.
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Statist governments are powerless to stop the devaluation of
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their currencies as investors move their assets (even slight
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moves can have large marginal effects).
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- "anarchy" is not a term most would apply, but it's an
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anarchy in the sense of there being no rulers ("an arch"),
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no central command structure.
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16.8. The Nature of Crypto Anarchy
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16.8.1. "What is Crypto Anarchy?"
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+ "Why the name?"
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+ a partial pun on several things"
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- "crypto," meaning "hidden," as used in the term "crypto
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fascist" (Gore Vidal called William F. Buckley this)
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- "crypto anarchy" meaning the anarchy will be hidden,
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not necessarily visible
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- and of course cryptology is centrally invovled
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+ Motivation
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- Vernor Vinge's "True Names"
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- Ayn Rand was one of the prime motivators of crypto
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anarchy. What she wanted to do with material technology
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(mirrors over Galt's Gulch) is _much_ more easily done
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with mathematical technology.
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16.8.2. "Anarchy turns people off...why not a more palatable name?"
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- people don't understand the term; if people understood the
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term, it might be more acceptable
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- some have suggested I call it "digital liberty" or
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somesuch, but I prefer to stick with the historical term
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16.8.3. Voluntary interactions involve Schelling points, mutually-
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agreed upon points of agreement
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16.8.4. Crypto anarchy as an ideology rather than as a plan.
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- Without false modesty, I think crypto anarchy is one of the
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few real contributions to ideology in recent memory. The
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notion of individuals becoming independent of states by
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bypassing ordinary channels of control is a new one. While
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there have been hints of this in the cyberpunk genre of
|
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writing, and related areas (the works of Vinge especially),
|
|
the traditional libertarian and anarchist movements have
|
|
mostly been oblivious to the ramifications of strong
|
|
crypto.
|
|
- Interestingly, David Friedman, son of Milton and author of
|
|
"The Machinery of Freedom," became a convert to the ideas.
|
|
At least enough so as to give a talk in Los Angeles
|
|
entitles "Crypto Anarchy and the State."
|
|
- Conventional political ideology has failed to realize the
|
|
huge changes coming over the next several decades.
|
|
Focussing on unwinnable battles at the ballot box, they
|
|
fritter away their energies; they join the political
|
|
process, but they have nothing to "deal" with, so they
|
|
lose. The average American actually _wants_ to pick the
|
|
pockets of his neighbors (to pay for "free" health care, to
|
|
stop companies from laying-off unneeded workers, to bring
|
|
more pork back to the local enonomy), so the average voter
|
|
is highly unlikely to ever vote for a prinicpled
|
|
Libertarian candidate.
|
|
- Fortunately, how people vote has little effect on certain
|
|
"ground truths" that emerge out of new technologies and new
|
|
economic developments.
|
|
|
|
16.9. Uses of Crypto Anarchy
|
|
16.9.1. Markets unfettered by local laws (digital black markets, at
|
|
least for items that can be moved through cyberspace)
|
|
16.9.2. Espionage
|
|
|
|
16.10. The Implications-Negative and Positive-of Crypto Anarchy
|
|
16.10.1. "What are some implications of crypto anarchy?"
|
|
+ A return to contracts
|
|
- whiners can't go outside contracts and complain
|
|
- relates to: workers, terms of employment, actions, hurt
|
|
feelings
|
|
- with untraceable communication, virtual networks....
|
|
+ Espionage
|
|
+ Spying is already changing dramatically.
|
|
+ Steele's (or Steeler?) "open sources"
|
|
- collecting info from thousands of Internet sources
|
|
- Well, this cuts both ways..
|
|
+ Will allow:
|
|
- BlackNet-type solicitations for military secrets ("Will
|
|
pay $300,000 for xxxx")
|
|
+ Digital Dead Drops
|
|
- totally secure, untraceable (pools, BlackNet mode)
|
|
- no Coke cans near the base of oak trees out on Route
|
|
42
|
|
- no chalk marks on mailboxes to signal a message is
|
|
ready
|
|
- no "burning" of spies by following them to dead drops
|
|
- No wonder the spooks are freaked out!
|
|
- Strong crypto will also have a major effect on NSA, CIA,
|
|
and FBI abilities to wiretap, to conduct surveillance,
|
|
and to do domestic and foreign counterintelligence
|
|
- This is not altogether a great thing, as there may be
|
|
_some_ counterintelligence work that is useful (I'm
|
|
perhaps betraying my lingering biases), but there's
|
|
really only one thing to say about it: get used to it.
|
|
Nothing short of a totalitarian police state (and
|
|
probably not even that, given the spread of strong
|
|
crypto) can stop these trends.
|
|
-
|
|
+ Bypassing sanctions and boycotts
|
|
- Just because Bill Clinton doesn't like the rulers of
|
|
Haiti is no reason for me to honor his "sanctions"
|
|
- Individual choice, made possible by strong crypto
|
|
(untraceable transactions, pseudonyms, black markets)
|
|
+ Information Markets and Data Havens
|
|
- medical
|
|
- scientific
|
|
- corporate knowledge
|
|
- dossiers
|
|
+ credit reports
|
|
- without the absurd rules limiting what people can store
|
|
on their computers (e.g., if Alice keeps records going
|
|
back more than 7 years, blah blah, can be thrown in
|
|
jail for violating the "Fair Credit Reporting Act")
|
|
- bypassing such laws
|
|
- true, governments can attempt to force disclosure of
|
|
"reasons" for all decisions (a popular trend, where
|
|
even one's maid cannot be dismissed without the
|
|
"reasons" being called into question!); this means that
|
|
anyone accessing such offshore (or in cyberspace...same
|
|
difference) data bases must find some acceptable reason
|
|
for the actions they take...shouldn't be too hard
|
|
- (as with so many of these ideas, the beauty is that the
|
|
using of such services is voluntary....)
|
|
+ Consulting
|
|
- increased liquidity of information
|
|
+ illegal transactions
|
|
+ untraceability and digital money means many "dark"
|
|
possibilities
|
|
- markets for assassinations
|
|
- stolen property
|
|
- copyright infringement
|
|
+ Espionage
|
|
- information markets (a la AMIX)
|
|
- "digital dead drops"
|
|
- Offshore accounts
|
|
- Money-laundering
|
|
+ Markets for Assassinations
|
|
- This is one of the more disturbing implications of crypto
|
|
anarchy. Actually, it arises immediately out of strong,
|
|
unbreakable and untraceable communication and some form
|
|
of untraceable digital cash. Distrurbing it may be, but
|
|
the implications are also interesting to consider...and
|
|
inevitable.
|
|
- And not all of the implications are wholly negative.
|
|
+ should put the fear of God into politicians
|
|
- "Day of the Jackal" made electronic
|
|
- any interest group that can (anonymously) gather money
|
|
can have a politician zapped. Positive and negative
|
|
implications, of course.
|
|
- The fact is, some people simply need killing. Shocking as
|
|
that may sound to many, surely everyone would agree that
|
|
Hitler deserved killing. The "rule of law" sounds noble,
|
|
but when despicable people control the law, other
|
|
measures are called for.
|
|
- Personally, I hold that anyone who threatens what I think
|
|
of as basic rights may need killing. I am held back by
|
|
the repercussions, the dangers. With liquid markets for
|
|
liquidations, things may change dramatically.
|
|
16.10.2. The Negative Side of Crypto Anarchy
|
|
+ Comment:
|
|
- There are some very real negative implications;
|
|
outweighed on the whole by the benefits. After all, free
|
|
speech has negatives. Poronography has negatives. (This
|
|
may not be very convincing to many....I can't do it here-
|
|
-the gestalt has to be absorbed and considered.)
|
|
+ Abhorrent markets
|
|
- contract killings
|
|
- can collect money anonymously to have someone
|
|
whacked...nearly anyone who is controversial can generate
|
|
enough "contributions"
|
|
- kidnapping, extortion
|
|
+ Contracts and assassinations
|
|
- "Will kill for $5000"
|
|
+ provides a more "liquid" market (pun intended)
|
|
- sellers and buyers more efficiently matched
|
|
- FBI stings (which are common in hiring hit men) are
|
|
made almost impossible
|
|
- the canonical "dark side" example--Eric Drexler, when
|
|
told of this in 1988, was aghast and claimed I was
|
|
immoral to even continue working on the implications of
|
|
crypto anarchy!
|
|
- made much easier by the inability to trace payments, the
|
|
lack of physical meetings, etc.
|
|
+ Potential for lawlessness
|
|
- bribery, abuse, blackmail
|
|
- cynicism about who can manipulate the system
|
|
+ Solicitation of Crimes
|
|
- untraceably, as we have seen
|
|
+ Bribery of Officials and Influencing of Elections
|
|
- and direct contact with officials is not even
|
|
needed...what if someone "lets it be known" that a
|
|
council vote in favor of some desired project will result
|
|
in campaign contributions?
|
|
+ Child molestors, pederasts, and rapists
|
|
- encrypting their diaries with PGP (a real case, says the
|
|
FBI)
|
|
- this raises the privacy issue in all its glory...privacy
|
|
protects illegality...it always has and it always will
|
|
+ Espionage is much easier
|
|
- from the guy watching ships leave a harbor to the actual
|
|
theft of defense secrets
|
|
- job of defending against spies becomes much more
|
|
difficult: and end to microdots and invisible ink, what
|
|
with the LSB method and the like that even hides the very
|
|
existence of encrypted messages!
|
|
+ Theft of information
|
|
- from corporations and individuals
|
|
- corporations as we know them today will have to change
|
|
- liquidity of information
|
|
- selling of corporate secrets, or personal information
|
|
+ Digilantes and Star Chambers
|
|
- a risk of justice running amok?
|
|
+ Some killers are not rehabilitated and need to be
|
|
disposed of through more direct means
|
|
+ Price, Rhode Island, 21, 4 brutal killings
|
|
- stabbings of children, mother, another
|
|
+ for animals like this, vigilantism...discreet
|
|
execution...is justified...
|
|
- or, at least some of us will consider it justified
|
|
- which I consider to be a good thing
|
|
- this relates to an important theme: untraceable
|
|
communication and markets means the ability to "opt
|
|
out" of conventional morality
|
|
+ Loss of trust
|
|
+ even in families, especially if the government offers
|
|
bounties and rewards
|
|
- recall Pavel Morozov in USSR, DARE-type programs
|
|
(informing on parents)
|
|
- more than 50% of all IRS suits involve one spouse
|
|
informing to the IRS
|
|
+ how will taxes be affected by the increased black market?
|
|
- a kind of Laffer curve, in which some threshold of
|
|
taxation triggers disgust and efforts to evade the taxes
|
|
- not clear how large the current underground economy
|
|
is....authorities are motivated to misstate the size
|
|
(depending on their agenda)
|
|
+ Tax Evasion (I'm not defending taxation, just pointing out
|
|
what most would call a dark side of CA)
|
|
+ By conducting business secretly, using barter systems,
|
|
alternative currencies or credit systems, etc.
|
|
- a la the lawyers who use AMIX-like systems to avoid
|
|
being taxed on mutual consultations
|
|
+ By doing it offshore
|
|
- so that the "products" are all offshore, even though
|
|
many or most of the workers are telecommuting or using
|
|
CA schemes
|
|
- recall that many musicians left Europe to avoid 90% tax
|
|
rates
|
|
+ the "nest egg" scam: drawing on a lump sum not reported
|
|
+ Scenario: Alice sells something very valuable-perhaps
|
|
the specs on a new product-to Bob. She deposits the
|
|
fee, which is, say, a million dollars, in a series of
|
|
accounts. This fee is not reported to the IRS or anyone
|
|
else.
|
|
- the fee could be in cash or in a "promise"
|
|
- in multiple accounts, or just one
|
|
+ regardless, the idea is that she is now paid, say,
|
|
$70,000 a year for the next 20 years (what with
|
|
interest) as a "consultant" to the company which
|
|
represents her funds
|
|
- this of course does not CA of any form, merely some
|
|
discreet lawyers
|
|
- and of course Alice reports the income to the
|
|
IRS-they never challenge the taxpayer to "justify"
|
|
work done (and would be incapable of "disallowing"
|
|
the work, as Alice could call it a "retainer," or
|
|
as pay for Board of Directors duties, or
|
|
whatever...in practice, it's easiest to call it
|
|
consulting)
|
|
+ these scams are closely related to similar scams for
|
|
laundering money, e.g., by selling company assets at
|
|
artificially low (or high) prices
|
|
- an owner, Charles, could sell assets to a foreign
|
|
company at low prices and then be rewarded in tax-
|
|
free, under the table, cash deposited in a foreign
|
|
account, and we're back to the situation above
|
|
+ Collusion already is common; crypto methods will make some
|
|
such collusions easier
|
|
- antique dealers at an auction
|
|
+ espionage and trading of national secrets (this has
|
|
positive aspects as well)
|
|
- "information markets" and anonymous digital cash
|
|
- (This realization, in late 1987, was the inspiration for
|
|
the ideas behind crypto anarchy.)
|
|
- mistrust
|
|
- widening gap between rich and poor, or those who can use
|
|
the tools of the age and those who can't
|
|
16.10.3. The Positive Side of Crypto Anarchy
|
|
- (other positive reasons are implicitly scattered throughout
|
|
this outline)
|
|
+ a pure kind of libertarianism
|
|
- those who are afraid of CA can stay away (not strictly
|
|
true, as the effects will ripple)
|
|
- a way to bypass the erosion of morals, contracts, and
|
|
committments (via the central role of reputations and the
|
|
exclusion of distorting governments)
|
|
- individual responsibility
|
|
- protecting privacy when using hypertext and cyberspace
|
|
services (many issues here)
|
|
- "it's neat" (the imp of the perverse that likes to see
|
|
radical ideas)
|
|
+ A return to 4th Amendment protections (or better)
|
|
- Under the current system, if the government suspects a
|
|
person of hiding assets, of conspiracy, of illegal acts,
|
|
of tax evasion, etc., they can easily seize bank
|
|
accounts, stock accounts, boats, cars, ec. In particular,
|
|
the owner has little opportunity to protect these assets.
|
|
- increased liquidity in markets
|
|
+ undermining of central states
|
|
- loss of tax revenues
|
|
- reduction of control
|
|
- freedom, personal liberty
|
|
- data havens, to bypass local restrictive laws
|
|
+ Anonymous markets for assassinations will have some good
|
|
aspects
|
|
- the liquidation of politicians and other thieves, the
|
|
killing of those who have assisted in the communalization
|
|
of private property
|
|
- a terrible swift sword
|
|
16.10.4. Will I be sad if anonymous methods allow untraceable markets
|
|
for assassinations? It depends. In many cases, people deserve
|
|
death--those who have escaped justice, those who have broken
|
|
solemn commitments, etc. Gun grabbing politicians, for
|
|
example should be killed out of hand. Anonymous rodent
|
|
removal services will be a tool of liberty. The BATF agents
|
|
who murdered Randy Weaver's wife and son should be shot. If
|
|
the courts won't do it, a market for hits will do it.
|
|
- (Imagine for a moment an "anonymous fund" to collect the
|
|
money for such a hit. Interesting possibilities.)
|
|
- "Crypto Star Chambers," or what might be called
|
|
"digilantes," may be formed on-line, and untraceably, to
|
|
mete out justice to those let off on technicalities. Not
|
|
altogether a bad thing.
|
|
16.10.5. on interference in business as justified by "society supports
|
|
you" arguments (and "opting out)
|
|
+ It has been traditionally argued that society/government
|
|
has a right to regulate businesses, impose rules of
|
|
behavior, etc., for a couple of reasons:
|
|
- "to promote the general welfare" (a nebulous reason)
|
|
+ because government builds the infrastructure that makes
|
|
business possible
|
|
- the roads, transportation systems, etc. (actually, most
|
|
are privately built...only the roads and canal are
|
|
publically built, and they certainly don't _have_ to
|
|
be)
|
|
- the police forces, courts, enforcement of contracts,
|
|
disputes, etc.
|
|
- protection from foreign countries, tariff negotiations,
|
|
etc., even to the *physical* protection against
|
|
invading countries
|
|
+ But with crypto anarchy, *all* of these reasons vanish!
|
|
- society isn't "enabling" the business being transacted
|
|
(after all, the parties don't even necessarily know what
|
|
countries the other is in!)
|
|
- no national or local courts are being used, so this set
|
|
of reasons goes out the window
|
|
- no threat of invasion...or if there is, it isn't
|
|
something governments can address
|
|
+ So, in addition to the basic unenforceability of outlawing
|
|
crypto anarchy--short of outlawing encryption--there is
|
|
also no viable argument for having governments interfere on
|
|
these traditional grounds.
|
|
- (The reasons for them to interfere based on fears for
|
|
their own future and fears about unsavory and abominable
|
|
markets being developed (body parts, assassinations,
|
|
trade secrets, tax evasion, etc.) are of course still
|
|
"valid," viewed from their perspective, but the other
|
|
reasons just aren't.)
|
|
|
|
16.11. Ethics and Morality of Crypto Anarchy
|
|
16.11.1. "How do you square these ideas with democracy?"
|
|
- I don't; democracy has run amok, fulfilling de
|
|
Tocqueville's prediction that American democracy would last
|
|
only until Americans discovered they could pick the pockets
|
|
of their neighbors at the ballot box
|
|
- little chance of changing public opinion, of educating them
|
|
- crypto anarchy is a movement of individual opting out, not
|
|
of mass change and political action
|
|
16.11.2. "Is there a moral responsibility to ensure that the overall
|
|
effects of crypto anarchy are more favorable than unfavorable
|
|
before promoting it?"
|
|
- I don't think so, any more than Thomas Jefferson should
|
|
have analyzed the future implications of freedom before
|
|
pushing it so strongly.
|
|
- All decisions have implications. Some even cost lives. By
|
|
not becoming a doctor working in Sub-Saharan Africa, have I
|
|
"killed thousands"? Certainly I might have saved the lives
|
|
of thousands of villagers. But I did not kill them just
|
|
because I chose not to be a doctor. Likewise, by giving
|
|
money to starving peasants in Bangladesh, lives could
|
|
undeniably be "saved." But not giving the money does not
|
|
murder them.
|
|
- But such actions of omission are not the same, in my mind,
|
|
as acts of comission. My freedom, via crypto anarchy, is
|
|
not an act of force in and of itself.
|
|
- Developing an idea is not the same as aggression.
|
|
- Crypto anarchy is about personal withdrawal from the
|
|
system, the "technologies of disconnection," in Kevin
|
|
Kelly's words.
|
|
16.11.3. "Should individuals have the power to decide what they will
|
|
reveal to others, and to authorities?"
|
|
- For many or even most of us, this has an easy answer, and
|
|
is axiomatically true. But others have doubts, and more
|
|
people may have doubts as some easily anticipated
|
|
develpoments occur.
|
|
- (For example, pedophiles using the much-feared "fortress
|
|
crypto," terrorists communicating in unbreakable codes, tza
|
|
evaders, etc. Lots of examples.)
|
|
- But because some people use crypto to do putatively evil
|
|
things, should basic rights be given up? Closed doors can
|
|
hide criminal acts, but we don't ban closed doors.
|
|
16.11.4. "Aren't there some dangers and risks to letting people pick
|
|
and choose their moralities?"
|
|
- (Related to questions about group consensus, actions of the
|
|
state vs. actions of the individual, and the "herd.)
|
|
- Indeed, there are dangers and risks. In the privacy of his
|
|
home, my neighbor might be operating a torture dungeon for
|
|
young children he captures. But absent real evidence of
|
|
this, most nations have not sanctioned the random searches
|
|
of private dwellings (not even in the U.S.S.R., so far as I
|
|
know).
|
|
16.11.5. "As a member of a hated minority (crypto anarchists) I'd
|
|
rather take my chances on an open market than risk official
|
|
discrimination by the state.....Mercifully, the technology we
|
|
are developing will allow everyone who cares to to decline to
|
|
participate in this coercive allocation of power." [Duncan
|
|
Frissell, 1994-09-08]
|
|
16.11.6. "Are there technologies which should be "stopped" even before
|
|
they are deployed?"
|
|
- Pandora's Box, "things Man was not meant to know," etc.
|
|
- It used to be that my answer was mostly a clear "No," with
|
|
nuclear and biological weapons as the only clear exception.
|
|
But recent events involving key escrow have caused me to
|
|
rethink things.
|
|
- Imagine a company that's developing home surveillance
|
|
cameras...perhaps for burglar prevention, child safety,
|
|
etc. Parents can monitor Junior on ceiling-mounted cameras
|
|
that can't easily be tampered with or disconnected, without
|
|
sending out alarms. All well and good.
|
|
- Now imagine that hooks are put into these camera systems to
|
|
send the captured images to a central office. Again, not
|
|
necessarily a bad idea--vacationers may want their security
|
|
company to monitor their houses, etc.
|
|
- The danger is that a repressive government could make the
|
|
process mandatory....how else to catch sexual deviates,
|
|
child molestors, marijuana growers, counterfeiters, and the
|
|
like?
|
|
- Sound implausible, unacceptable, right? Well, key escrow is
|
|
a form of this.
|
|
- The Danger. That OS vendors will put these SKE systems in
|
|
place without adequate protections against key escrow being
|
|
made mandatory at some future date.
|
|
16.11.7. "Won't crypto anarchy allow some people to do bad things?"
|
|
- Sure, so what else is new? Private rooms allows plotters to
|
|
plot their plots. Etc.
|
|
- Not to sound too glib, but most of the things we think of
|
|
as basic rights allow various illegal, distasteful, or
|
|
crummy things to go on. Part of the bargain we make.
|
|
- "Of course you could prevent contract killings by requiring
|
|
everyone to carry government "escrowed" tape recordings to
|
|
record all their conversations and requiring them to keep a
|
|
diary at all times alibing their all their activities.
|
|
This would also make it much easier to stamp out child
|
|
pornography, plutonium smuggling, and social discrimination
|
|
against the politically correct." [James Donald, 1994-09-
|
|
09]
|
|
|
|
16.12. Practical Problems with Crypto Anarchy
|
|
16.12.1. "What if "bad guys" use unbreakable crypto?"
|
|
- What if potential criminals are allowed to have locks on
|
|
their doors? What if potential rapists can buy pornography?
|
|
What if....
|
|
- These are all straw men used in varous forms throughout
|
|
history by tyrants to control their populations. The
|
|
"sheepocracies" of the modern so-called democratic era are
|
|
voting away their former freedoms in favor of cradle to
|
|
grave safety and security.
|
|
- The latest tack is to propose limits on privacy to help
|
|
catch criminals, pedophile, terrorists, and father rapers.
|
|
God help us if this comes to pass. But Cypherpunks don't
|
|
wait for God, they write code!
|
|
16.12.2. Dealing with the "Abhorrent Markets"
|
|
- such as markets for assassinations and extortion
|
|
+ Possibilities:
|
|
+ physical protection, physical capure
|
|
- make it risky
|
|
- (on the other hand, sniping is easy)
|
|
+ "flooding" of offers
|
|
- "take a number" (meaning: get in line)
|
|
- attacking reputations
|
|
- I agree that more thought is needed, more thorough analysis
|
|
- Some people have even pointed out the benefits of killing
|
|
off tens of thousands of the corrupt politicians, narcs,
|
|
and cops which have implemented fascist, collectivist
|
|
policies for so long. Assassination markets may make this
|
|
much more practical.
|
|
16.12.3. "How is *fraud* dealt with in crypto anarchy?"
|
|
- When the perpetrators can't even be identified.
|
|
- One of the most interesting problems.
|
|
- First, reputations matter. Repeat business is not assured.
|
|
It is always best to not have too much at stake in any
|
|
single transaction.
|
|
16.12.4. "How do we know that crypto anarchy will work? How do we know
|
|
that it won't plunge the world into barbarism, nuclear war,
|
|
and terror?"
|
|
- We don't know, of course. We never can.
|
|
- However, things are already pretty bad. Look at Bosnia,
|
|
Ruanda, and a hundred other hellholes and flashpoints
|
|
around the world. Look at the nuclear arsenals of the
|
|
superpowers, and look at who starts the wars. In nearly all
|
|
cases, statism is to blame. States have killed a hundred
|
|
million or more people in this century alone--think of
|
|
Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot--through forced starvation
|
|
of entire provinces, liquidation of the peasantry, killing
|
|
of intellectuals, and mass exterminations of religious and
|
|
ethnic groups. It's hard to imagine crypto anarchy causing
|
|
anything that bad!
|
|
- Crypto anarchy is a cyberspatially-mediated personal course
|
|
of action; by itself it involves no actions such as
|
|
terrorism or nuclear blackmail. One could just as easily
|
|
ask, "Will freedom lead to nuclear blackmail, weapons
|
|
trading, and pedophilia?" The answer is the same: maybe,
|
|
but so what?
|
|
16.12.5. It is true that crypto anarchy is not for everyone. Some will
|
|
be too incompetent to prepare to protect themselves, and will
|
|
want a protector. Others will have poor business sense.
|
|
16.12.6. "But what will happen to the poor people and those on welfare
|
|
if crypto anarchy really succeeds?"
|
|
- "So?"
|
|
- Many of us would see this as a good thing. Not just for
|
|
Calvinist-Randite reasons, but also because it would break
|
|
the cycle of dependency which has actually made things
|
|
worse for the underclass in America (at least). See Charles
|
|
Murray's "Losing Ground" for more on this.
|
|
- And remember that a collapse of the tax system will mean
|
|
more money left in the hands of former taxpayers, and hence
|
|
more left over for true charity (for those who truly cannot
|
|
help themselves).
|
|
|
|
16.13. Black Markets
|
|
16.13.1. "Why would anyone use black markets?"
|
|
+ when the advantages of doing so outweigh the disadvantages
|
|
- including the chance of getting caught and the
|
|
consequences
|
|
- (As the chances decline, this suggests a rise in
|
|
punishment severity)
|
|
- businesses will tend to shy away from illegal markets,
|
|
unless...
|
|
+ Anonymous markets for medical products
|
|
- to reduce liability, local ethical and religious laws
|
|
- Example: Live AIDS vaccine...considered too risky for any
|
|
company to introduce, due to inability to get binding
|
|
waivers of liability (even for "fully informed" patients
|
|
who face likely death)
|
|
- markets in body parts...
|
|
16.13.2. Crypto anarchy opens up some exciting possibilities for
|
|
collusion in financial deals, for insider trading, etc.
|
|
- I'm not claiming that this will mean instant riches, as
|
|
markets are fairly efficient (*) and "insiders" often don't
|
|
do well in the market. (* Some argue that relaxing laws
|
|
against insider trading will make for an even fairer
|
|
market...I agree with this.)
|
|
- What I am claiming is the SEC and FinCEN computers will be
|
|
working overtime to try to keep up with the new
|
|
possibilities crypto anarchy opens up. Untraceable cash, as
|
|
in offshore bank accounts that one can send anonymous
|
|
trading instructions to (or for), means insider trading
|
|
simply can't be stopped...all that happens is that insiders
|
|
see their bank accounts increase (to the extent they win
|
|
because of the insider trading...like I said, a debatable
|
|
point).
|
|
- Price signalling, a la the airline case of a few years back
|
|
(which, you won't be surprised to hear, I have no problems
|
|
with), will be easier. Untraceable communications, virtual
|
|
meetings, etc.
|
|
16.13.3. Information Markets
|
|
- a la "information brokering," but mediated
|
|
cryptographically
|
|
- recall the 1981 market in Exocet missile codes (France,
|
|
Argentina--later of relevance when an Exocet sank a British
|
|
ship)
|
|
16.13.4. Black Markets, Informal Economies, Export Laws
|
|
+ Transborder data flow, legal issues
|
|
+ complex..laws, copyrights, "national sovereignty"
|
|
- e.g., Phillipines demanded in-the-clear transmissions
|
|
during bank loan renegotiations..and several Latin
|
|
American countries forbid encrypted transmissions.
|
|
+ Export, Technology Export, Export Control
|
|
- Export Control Act
|
|
- Office of Munitions (as in "Munitions Act", circa 1918)
|
|
+ export of some crypto gear shifted from Dept. of State,
|
|
Office of Munitions, to Dept. of Commerce
|
|
- Commodity Control List, allows s/w that is freely
|
|
available to the public to be exported without
|
|
additional paperwork
|
|
- Munitions used to be stickier about export (some would
|
|
say justifiably paranoid)
|
|
- Commodity Jurisdiction request, to see whether product
|
|
for export falls under State or Commerce regulations
|
|
- Trading with the Enemy Act
|
|
- Exocet codes--black market sales of emasculated chips
|
|
16.13.5. Smuggling and Black Markets
|
|
+ Black Markets in the USSR and Other Former East Bloc
|
|
Nations
|
|
+ a major issue, because the normal mechanisms for free
|
|
markets-property laws, shops, stock markets, hard
|
|
currencies, etc.-have not been in place
|
|
- in Russia, have never really existed
|
|
+ Role of "Mafia"
|
|
- various family-related groups (which is how trade
|
|
always starts, via contacts and connections and family
|
|
loyalty, until corporations and their own structures of
|
|
loyalty and trust can evolve)
|
|
+ how the Mafia in Russia works
|
|
- bribes to "lose" materials, even entire trainloads
|
|
- black market currency (dollars favored)
|
|
+ This could cause major discontent in Russia
|
|
- as the privileged, many of them ex-Communist officials,
|
|
are best prepared to make the transition to capitalism
|
|
+ those in factory jobs, on pensions, etc., will not
|
|
have the disposable income to take advantage of the new
|
|
opportunities
|
|
- America had the dual advantages of a frontier that
|
|
people wanted to move to (Turner, Protestant ethic,
|
|
etc.) and a high-growth era (industrialization)
|
|
- plus, there was no exposure to other countries at
|
|
vastly higher living standards
|
|
+ Smuggling in the EEC
|
|
+ the dream of tariff-free borders has given way to the
|
|
reality of a complex web of laws dictating what is
|
|
politically correct and what is not:
|
|
- animal growth hormones
|
|
- artificial sweeteners are limited after 1-93 to a small
|
|
list of approved foods: and the British are finding
|
|
that their cherished "prawn cocktail-flavored crisps"
|
|
are to be banned (for export to EEC or completely?)
|
|
because they're made with saccharin or aspartame
|
|
- "European content" in television and movies may limit
|
|
American productions...as with Canada, isn't this a
|
|
major abridgement of basic freedoms?
|
|
+ this may lead to a new kind of smuggling in "politically
|
|
incorrect" items
|
|
- could be argued that this is already the case with bans
|
|
on drugs, animal skins, ivory, etc. (so tediously
|
|
argued by Brin)
|
|
- recall Turgut Ozal's refreshing comments about loosening
|
|
up on border restrictions
|
|
+ as more items are declared bootleg, smuggling will
|
|
increase...politically incorrect contraband (fur, ivory,
|
|
racist and sexist literature)
|
|
+ the point about sexist and racist literature being
|
|
contraband is telling: such literature (books, magazines)
|
|
may not be formally banned, for that would violate the
|
|
First Amendment, but may still be imported anonymously
|
|
(smuggled) and distributed as if they were banned (!) for
|
|
the reason of avoiding the "damage claims" of people who
|
|
claim they were victimized, assaulted, etc. as a result
|
|
of the literature!
|
|
+ avoidance of prosecution or damage claims for writing,
|
|
editing, distributing, or selling "damaging" materials
|
|
is yet another reason for anonymous systems to emerge:
|
|
those involved in the process will seek to immunize
|
|
themselves from the various tort claims that are
|
|
clogging the courts
|
|
- producers, distributors, directors, writers, and even
|
|
actors of x-rated or otherwise "unacceptable"
|
|
material may have to have the protection of anonymous
|
|
systems
|
|
- imagine fiber optics and the proliferation of videos
|
|
and talk shows....bluenoses and prosecutors will use
|
|
"forum shopping" to block access, to prosecute the
|
|
producers, etc.
|
|
+ Third World countries may declare "national sovereignty
|
|
over genetic resources" and thus block the free export
|
|
and use of plant- and animal-derived drugs and other
|
|
products
|
|
- even when only a single plant is taken
|
|
- royalties, taxes, fees, licenses to be paid to local
|
|
gene banks
|
|
- these gene banks would be the only ones allowed to do
|
|
genetic cataloguing
|
|
- the problem is of course one of enforcement
|
|
+ technology, programs
|
|
- scenario: many useful programs are priced for
|
|
corporations (as with hotel rooms, airline tickets,
|
|
etc.), and price-sensitive consumers will not pay $800
|
|
for a program they'll use occasionally to grind out term
|
|
papers and church newsletters
|
|
+ Scenario: Anonymous organ donor banks
|
|
+ e.g., a way to "market" rare blood types, or whatever,
|
|
without exposing one's self to forced donation or other
|
|
sanctions
|
|
- "forced donation" involves the lawsuits filed by the
|
|
potential recipient
|
|
- at the time of offer, at least...what happens when the
|
|
deal is consummated is another domain
|
|
- and a way to avoid the growing number of government
|
|
stings
|
|
+ the abortion and women's rights underground...a hopeful
|
|
ally (amidst the generally antiliberty women's movement)
|
|
- RU-486, underground abortion clinics (because many
|
|
clinics have been firebombed, boycotted out of existence,
|
|
cut off from services and supplies)
|
|
+ Illegal aliens and immigration
|
|
- "The Boxer Barrier" used to seal barriers...Barbara Boxer
|
|
wants the military and national guard to control illegal
|
|
immigration, so it would be poetic justice indeed if this
|
|
program has her name on it
|
|
16.13.6. Organized Crime and Cryptoanarchy
|
|
+ How and Why
|
|
+ wherever money is to be made, some in the underworld will
|
|
naturally take an interest
|
|
- loan sharking, numbers games, etc.
|
|
+ they may get involved in the setup of underground banks,
|
|
using CA protocols
|
|
- shell games, anonymity
|
|
- such Mafia involvement in an underground monetary system
|
|
could really spread the techniques
|
|
+ but then both sides may be lobbying with the Mafia
|
|
- the CA advocates make a deal with the devil
|
|
- and the government wants the Mob to help eradicate the
|
|
methods
|
|
+ Specific Programs
|
|
+ False Identities
|
|
- in the computerized world of the 90s, even the Mob (who
|
|
usually avoid credit cards, social security numbers,
|
|
etc.) will have to deal with how easily their movements
|
|
can be traced
|
|
+ so the Mob will involve itself in false IDs
|
|
- as mentioned by Koontz
|
|
- Money Laundering, naturally
|
|
+ but some in the government see some major freelance
|
|
opportunities in CA and begin to use it (this undermines
|
|
the control of CA and actually spreads it, because the
|
|
government is working at cross purposes)
|
|
- analogous to the way the government's use of drug trade
|
|
systems spread the techniques
|
|
16.13.7. "Digital Escrow" accounts for mutually suspicious parties,
|
|
especially in illegal transactions
|
|
- drug deals, information brokering, inside information, etc.
|
|
+ But why will the escrow entity be trusted?
|
|
+ reputations
|
|
- their business is being a reliable escrow holder, not
|
|
it destroying their reputation for a bribe or a threat
|
|
+ anonymity means the escrow company won't know who it's
|
|
"burning," should it try to do so
|
|
- they never know when they themselves are being tested
|
|
by some service
|
|
- and potential bribers will not know who to contact,
|
|
although mail could be addressed to the escrow company
|
|
easily enough
|
|
16.13.8. Private companies are often allies of the government with
|
|
regards to black markets (or grey markets)
|
|
- they see uncontrolled trade as undercutting their monopoly
|
|
powers
|
|
- a way to limit competition
|
|
|
|
16.14. Money Laundering and Tax Avoidance
|
|
16.14.1. Hopelessness of controlling money laundering
|
|
+ I see all this rise in moneylaundering as an incredibly
|
|
hopeful trend, one that will mesh nicely with the use of
|
|
cryptography
|
|
- why should export of currency be limited?
|
|
- what's wrong with tax evasion, anyway?
|
|
- corrupting, affects all transactions
|
|
- vast amounts of money flowing
|
|
- 2000 banks in Russia, mostly money-laundering
|
|
+ people and countries are so starved for hard currency that
|
|
most banks outside the U.S. will happily take this money
|
|
- no natural resources in many of these countries
|
|
- hopeless to control
|
|
- being presented as "profits vs. principals," but I think
|
|
this is grossly misguided
|
|
+ Jeffery Robinson, "The Landrymen," interviewed on CNN, 6-24-
|
|
94
|
|
- "closer to anarchy" (yeah!)
|
|
- hopeless to control
|
|
- dozens of new countries, starved for hard currency, have
|
|
autonomy to set banking policies (and most European
|
|
countries turn a blind eye toward most of the anti-
|
|
laundering provisions)
|
|
16.14.2. Taxes and Crypto
|
|
- besides avoidance, there are also issues of tax records,
|
|
sales tax, receipts, etc.
|
|
+ this is another reason government may demand access to
|
|
cyberspace:
|
|
- to ensure compliance, a la a tamper-resistant cash
|
|
register
|
|
- to avoid under-the-table transactions
|
|
- bribery, side payments, etc.
|
|
- Note: It is unlikely that such access to records would stop
|
|
all fraud or tax evasion. I'm just citing reasons for them
|
|
to try to have access.
|
|
- I have never claimed the tax system will collapse totally,
|
|
or overnight, or without a fight. Things take time.
|
|
+ tax compliance rates dropping
|
|
+ the fabric has already unraveled in many countries, where
|
|
the official standard of living is below the _apparent_
|
|
standard of living (e.g., Italy).
|
|
- tax evasion a major thing
|
|
- money runs across the border into Switzerland and
|
|
Austria
|
|
- Frissell's figures
|
|
- media reports
|
|
+ Tax issues, and how strong crypto makes it harder and
|
|
harder to enforce
|
|
- hiding income, international markets, consultants,
|
|
complexly structured transactions
|
|
16.14.3. Capital Flight
|
|
- "The important issue for Cypherpunks is how we should
|
|
respond to this seemingly inevitable increased mobility of
|
|
capital. Does it pose a threat to privacy? If so, let's
|
|
write code to thwart the threat. Does it offer us any
|
|
tools we can use to fight the efforts of nation-states to
|
|
take away our privacy? If so, let's write code to take
|
|
advantage of those tools." [ Sandy Sandfort, Decline and
|
|
Fall, 1994--06-19]
|
|
16.14.4. Money Laundering and Underground Banks
|
|
+ a vast amount of money is becoming available under the
|
|
table: from skimming, from tax avoidance, and from illegal
|
|
activities of all kinds
|
|
- can be viewed as part of the internationalization of all
|
|
enterprises: for example, the Pakistani worker who might
|
|
have put his few rupees into some local bank now deposits
|
|
it with the BCCI in Karachi, gaining a higher yield and
|
|
also increasing the "multiplier" (as these rupees get
|
|
lent out many times)
|
|
- is what happened in the U.S. many years ago
|
|
- this will accelerate as governments try to get more taxes
|
|
from their most sophisticated and technical taxpayers,
|
|
i.e., clever ways to hide income will be sought
|
|
+ BCCI, Money-Laundering, Front Banks, CIA, Organized Crime
|
|
+ Money Laundering
|
|
- New York City is the main clearinghouse, Federal
|
|
Reserve of New York oversees this
|
|
- Fedwire system
|
|
- trillions of dollars pass through this system, daily
|
|
+ How money laundering can work (a maze of techniques)
|
|
- a million dollars to be laundered
|
|
- agent wires it, perhaps along with other funds, to
|
|
Panama or to some other country
|
|
- bank in Panama can issue it to anyone who presents
|
|
the proper letter
|
|
- various ways for it to move to Europe, be issued as
|
|
bearer stock, etc.
|
|
- 1968, offshore mutual funds, Bernie Kornfield
|
|
+ CIA often prefers banks with Mob connections
|
|
- because Mob banks already have the necessary security
|
|
and anonymity
|
|
- and are willing to work with the Company in ways that
|
|
conventional banks may not be
|
|
+ links go back to OSS and Mafia in Italy and Sicily, and
|
|
to heroin trade in SE Asia
|
|
- Naval Intelligence struck a deal in WW2 with Mafia,
|
|
wherby Meyer Lansky would protect the docks against
|
|
strikes (presumably in exchange for a "cut"), if
|
|
Lucky Luciano would be released at the end of the war
|
|
(he was)
|
|
- Operation Underworld: Mafia assisted Allied troops in
|
|
Sicily
|
|
- "the Corse"
|
|
+ Luciano helped in 1947 to reopen Marseilles when
|
|
Communist strikers had shut it down
|
|
- continuing the pattern of cooperation begun during
|
|
the war
|
|
- thus establishing the French Connection!
|
|
- Nugan Hand Bank
|
|
+ BCCI and Bank of America favored by CIA
|
|
- Russbacher says B of A a favored cover
|
|
+ we will almost certainly discover that BCCI was the
|
|
main bank used, with the ties to Bank of America
|
|
offices in Vienna
|
|
+ Bank of America has admitted to having had early
|
|
ties with BCCI in the early 1970s, but claims to
|
|
have severed those ties
|
|
- however, Russbacher says that CIA used B of A as
|
|
their preferred bank in Europe, especially since
|
|
it had ties to companies like IBM that were used
|
|
as covers for their covert ops
|
|
- Vienna was a favored money-laundering center for CIA,
|
|
especially using Bank of America
|
|
+ a swirl of paper fronts, hiding the flows from regulators
|
|
and investors
|
|
- "nominees" used to hide true owners and true activities
|
|
- various nations have banking secrecy laws, creating the
|
|
"veil" that cannot be pierced
|
|
+ CIA knew about all of the flights to South America (and
|
|
probably elsewhere, too)
|
|
- admitted Thomas Polgar, a senior ex-CIA official, in
|
|
testimony on 9-19-91
|
|
- this indicates that CIA knew about the arms deals, the
|
|
drug deals, and the various other schemes and scams
|
|
+ Earlier CIA-Bank Scandals (Nugan Hand and Castle Bank)
|
|
+ Nugan Hand Bank, Australia
|
|
+ Frank Nugan, Sydney, Australia, died in 1980
|
|
+ apparent suicide, but clearly rigged
|
|
- Mercedes, rifle with no fingerprints, position
|
|
all wrong
|
|
- evidence that he'd had a change of heart-was
|
|
praying daily, a la Charles Colson-and was
|
|
thinking about getting out of the business
|
|
+ set up Nugan Hand Bank in 1973
|
|
- private banking services, tax-free deposits in
|
|
Caymans
|
|
+ used by CIA agents, both for Agency operations and
|
|
for their own private slush/retirement funds
|
|
- several CIA types on the payroll (listed their
|
|
addresses as same as Air America)
|
|
- William Colby on Board, and was their lawyer
|
|
+ links to organized crime, e.g., Santo Trafficante,
|
|
Jr.
|
|
- Florida, heroin, links to JFK assassination
|
|
- trafficante was known as "the Cobra" and handled
|
|
many transactions for the CIA
|
|
+ money-laundering for Asian drug dealers
|
|
+ Golden Triangle: N-H even had branches in GT
|
|
- and branch in Chiang Mai, in Thailand
|
|
- links to arms dealers, like Edwin P. Wilson
|
|
+ U.S. authorites refused to cooperate with
|
|
investigations
|
|
- and when info was released, it was blacked out with
|
|
a "B-1" note, implying national security
|
|
implications
|
|
+ investigations by Australian Federal Bureau of
|
|
Narcotics were thwarted-agents transferred and
|
|
Bureau disbanded shortly thereafter
|
|
- similar to "Don't fuck with us" message sent to
|
|
FBI and DEA by CIA
|
|
+ N-H Bank had close working relation with Australian
|
|
Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO)
|
|
- NSA tapped phone conversations (speculative) of
|
|
Nugan that indicated ASIO collusion with N-H Bank
|
|
in the drug trade
|
|
+ Pine Gap facility, near Alice Springs (NSA, NRO)
|
|
- P.M. Gough Whitlam's criticism of Pine Gap led to
|
|
CIA-ASIO plot to destroy the Whitlam gov't.
|
|
- November 1975 fall instigated with wiretaps and
|
|
forgeries
|
|
+ Nugan Hand Bank was also involved with "Task Force
|
|
157," a Naval Intelligence covert operation, given
|
|
the cover name "Pierce Morgan" (a good name?)
|
|
- reported to Henry Kissinger
|
|
- recall minor point that Navy is often the preferred
|
|
service for the ruling elite (the real preppies)
|
|
+ and George Bush's son, George W. Bush, was involved
|
|
with Nugan Hand:
|
|
- linked to William Quasha, who handled N-H deals in
|
|
Phillipines
|
|
+ owners of Harken Energy Corp. a Texas-based company
|
|
that bought G.W. Bush's oil company "Spectrum 7" in
|
|
1986
|
|
- later got offshore drilling rights to Bahrain's
|
|
oil-with G.W. Bush on the Board of Directors
|
|
- could this be another link to Gulf Crisis?
|
|
+ Castle Bank, Bahamas, Paul E. Helliwell
|
|
+ OSS (China). CIA
|
|
- Mitch WerBell, White Russian specialist in
|
|
assassination, silencers, worked for him in China
|
|
- Howard Hunt worked for him
|
|
- after WW2, set up Sea Supply Inc., CIA front in Miami
|
|
+ linked to Resorts International
|
|
- law firm of Helliwell, Melrose and DeWolf
|
|
- lent money to Bahamian P.M. Lynden Pindling in
|
|
exchange for extension of gambling license
|
|
+ Robert Vesco, Bebe Rebozo, and Howard Hughes
|
|
- in contrast to the "Eastern Establishment," these
|
|
were Nixon's insiders
|
|
- links with ex-CIA agent Robert Maheu (who worked
|
|
for Hughes); onvolved withTrafficante, CIA plot to
|
|
kill Castro, and possible links to JFK
|
|
assassination
|
|
- Vesco active in drug trade
|
|
+ also involved in purchase of land for Walt Disney
|
|
World
|
|
- 27,000 acres near Orlando
|
|
- Castle Bank was a CIA conduit
|
|
+ Operation Tradewinds, IRS probe of bank money flows
|
|
- late 60s
|
|
- investigation of "brass plate" companies in Caymans,
|
|
Bahamas
|
|
+ Plot Scenario: Operation Tradewinds uncovered many
|
|
UltraBlack operations, forcing them to retrench and
|
|
dig in deeper, sacrificing several hundred million
|
|
- circa 1977 (Castle Bank shut down)
|
|
+ World Finance Corporation (WFC)
|
|
+ started in 1971 in Coral Gables
|
|
- first known as Republic National Corporation
|
|
- Walter Surrey, ex-OSS, like Helliwell of Castle
|
|
Bank, helped incorporate it
|
|
+ Business
|
|
- exploited cash flows in Florida
|
|
- dealt with CIA, Vesco, Santo Trafficante, Jr.
|
|
- also got loan deposits from Arabs
|
|
- links to Narodny Bank, the Soviet bank that also
|
|
pay agents
|
|
+ a related company was Dominion Mortgage Company,
|
|
located at same address as WFC
|
|
- linked to narcotics flow into Las Vegas
|
|
- and to Trafficante, Jr.
|
|
- suitcases of cash laundered from Las Vegas to
|
|
Miami
|
|
- Jefferson Savings and Loan Association, Texas
|
|
+ Guilermo Hern‡ndez Cartaya, ex-Havana banker, Cuban
|
|
exile, was chief figure
|
|
- veteran of Bay of Pigs (likely CIA contacts)
|
|
- investigated by R. Jerome Sanford, Miami assistant
|
|
U.S. attorney
|
|
- Dade County Organized Crime Bureau also involved in
|
|
the 1978 investigation
|
|
- Rewald and his banking deals
|
|
- BCCI was a successor to this bank
|
|
+ CIA and DEA Links to Drug Trade
|
|
- former agents and drug traffickers were frequently
|
|
recruited by DEA and CIA to run their own drug
|
|
operation, sometimes with political motivations
|
|
- Carlos Hern‡ndez recruited by BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics
|
|
and Dangerous drugs, predecessor to DEA) to form a
|
|
death squad to assassinate other drug traffickers
|
|
+ possible links of the drug dealers to
|
|
UltraBlack/Witness Security Program
|
|
- agents in Florida, the stock broker killing in 1987
|
|
- Seal was betrayed by the DEA and CIA, allowed to be
|
|
killed by the Columbians
|
|
+ Afghan Rebels, Arms to Iran (and Iraq), CIA, Pakistan
|
|
- there was a banking and arms-running network centered
|
|
in Karachi, home of BCCI, for the various arms deals
|
|
involving Afghan rebels
|
|
- Karachi, Islamabad, other cities
|
|
+ Influence Peddling, Agents
|
|
- a la the many senior lawyers hired by BCCI (Clark
|
|
Clifford, Frank Manckiewicz [spelling?]
|
|
+ illustrates again the basic corruptability of a
|
|
centralized command economy, where regulators and
|
|
lawmakers are often in the pockets of corrupt
|
|
enterprises
|
|
- clearly some scandals and losses will occur in free
|
|
markets, but at least the free markets will not be
|
|
backed up with government coercion
|
|
+ Why CIA is Involved in So Many Shady Deals?
|
|
+ ideal cover for covert operations
|
|
- outside audit channels
|
|
- links to underworld
|
|
+ agents providing for their own retirements, their own
|
|
private deals, and feathering their own nests
|
|
- freedom from interferance
|
|
- greed
|
|
+ deals like that of Noriega, in which CIA-supported
|
|
dictators and agents provided for their own lavish
|
|
lifestyles\
|
|
- and the BCCI-Noriega links are believed to have
|
|
contributed to the CIA's unwillingness to question
|
|
the activities of the BCCI (actually, the Justice
|
|
Department)
|
|
+ Role of Banks in Iraq and Gulf War, Iraq-Gate, Scandals
|
|
- Export Import Bank (Ex-Im), CCC
|
|
- implicated in the arming of Iraq
|
|
- Banco Lavorzo Nazionale [spelling?]
|
|
+ CIA was using BNL to arrange $5B in transfers, to arm
|
|
Iraq, to ensure equality with Iran
|
|
- because BNL wouldn't ask where it came from
|
|
- federally guaranteed loans used to finance covert ops
|
|
+ the privatizing of covert ops by the CIA and NSA
|
|
- deniability
|
|
- they subcontracted the law-breaking
|
|
- the darker side of capitalism did the real work
|
|
- but the crooks learned quickly just how much they
|
|
could steal...probably 75% of stolen money
|
|
- insurance fraud...planes allowed to be stolen, then
|
|
shipped to Contras, with Ollie North arguing that
|
|
nobody was really hurt by this whole process
|
|
+ ironically, wealthy Kuwaitis were active in financing
|
|
"instant banks" for money laundering and arms
|
|
transactions, e.g., several in Channel Islands
|
|
- Ahmad Al Babtain Group of Companies, Ltd., a
|
|
Netherlands Antilles corporation
|
|
- Inslaw case fits in with this picture
|
|
+ Federal Reserve and SEC Lack the Power to "Peirce the
|
|
Veil" on Foreign Banks
|
|
- as the Morgenthau case in Manhattan develops
|
|
- a well-known issue
|
|
+ But should we be so surprised?
|
|
- haven't banks always funded wars and arms merchants?
|
|
- and haven't some of them failed?
|
|
- look at the Rothschilds
|
|
- what is surprising is that so many people knew what it
|
|
was doing, what its business was, and that it was even
|
|
nicknamed "Banks of Crooks and Criminals International"
|
|
+ Using software agents for money laundering and other
|
|
illegal acts
|
|
+ these agents act as semi-autonomous programs that are a
|
|
few steps beyond simple algortihms
|
|
- it is not at all clear that these agents could do
|
|
very much to run portfolio, because nothing really
|
|
works
|
|
- real use could be as "digital cutouts": transferring
|
|
wealth to other agents (also controlled from afar, like
|
|
marionettes)
|
|
- advantage is that they can be programmed to perform
|
|
operations that are perhaps illegal, but without
|
|
traceability
|
|
+ Information brokers as money launderers (the two are
|
|
closely related)
|
|
- the rise of AMIX-style information markets and Sterling-
|
|
style "data havens" will provide new avenues for money
|
|
laundering and asset-hiding
|
|
+ information is intrinsically hard to value, hard to put
|
|
a price tag on (it varies according to the needs of the
|
|
buyers)
|
|
- meaning that transnational flows of inforamation
|
|
cannot be accurately valued (assigned a cash value)
|
|
- is closely related to the idea of informal
|
|
consulting and the nontaxable nature of it
|
|
- cardboard boxes filled with cash, taped and strapped, but
|
|
still bursting open
|
|
- gym bags carrying relatively tiny amounts of the skim: a
|
|
mere hundred thousand in $100s
|
|
+ L.A. becoming a focus for much of this cash
|
|
- nearness to Mexico, large immigrant communities
|
|
- freeways and easy access
|
|
+ hundreds of airstrips, dozens of harbors
|
|
- though East Coast seems to have even more, so this
|
|
doesn't seem like a compelling reason
|
|
- Ventura County and Santa Barbara
|
|
16.14.5. Private Currencies, Denationalization of Money
|
|
- Lysander Spooner advocated these private currencies
|
|
- and "denationalization of money" is a hot topic
|
|
+ is effect, alternatives to normal currency already exist
|
|
- coupons, frequent flier coupons, etc.
|
|
+ telephone cards and coupons (widely used in Asia and
|
|
parts of Europe)
|
|
- ironically, U.S. had mostly opted for credit cards,
|
|
which are fully traceable and offer minimal privacy,
|
|
while other nations have embraced the anonymity of
|
|
their kind of cards...and this seems to be carrying
|
|
over to the toll booth systems being planned
|
|
- barter networks
|
|
- chop marks (in Asia)
|
|
+ "reputations" and favors
|
|
- if Al gives Bob some advice, is this taxable? (do
|
|
lawyers who talk amongst themselves report the
|
|
transactions/ od course not, and yet this is
|
|
effectively either a barter transaction or an outright
|
|
gift)
|
|
+ sophisticated financial alternatives to the dollar
|
|
- various instruments
|
|
- futures, forward contracts, etc.
|
|
- "information" (more than just favors)
|
|
+ art works and similar physical items
|
|
- not a liquid market, but for high rollers, an easy way
|
|
to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars (even with
|
|
the discounted values of a stolen item, and not all the
|
|
items will be stolen...many people will be very careful
|
|
to never travel with stolen art)
|
|
- diamonds, gems have long been a form of transportable
|
|
wealth
|
|
+ art works need not be declared at most (?) borders
|
|
- this may change with time
|
|
16.14.6. Tax Evasion Schemes
|
|
- unreported income, e.g., banks like the BCCI obviously did
|
|
not report what they or their customers were doing to the
|
|
various tax authorities (or anyone else)
|
|
- deferred income, via the kind of trust funds discussed here
|
|
(wherein payment is deferred and some kind of trust is used
|
|
to pay smaller amounts per year)
|
|
+ Asset-Hiding, Illegal Payments, Bribes, and Tax Evasion
|
|
Funds Can Be Protected in a "Retirement Fund"
|
|
+ e.g., a politician or information thief-perhaps an Intel
|
|
employee who sells something for $1M-can buy shares in a
|
|
crypto-fund that then ensures he is hired by a succession
|
|
of consulting firms for yearly consulting...or even just
|
|
placed on a "retainer" of, say, $100K a year
|
|
+ IRS may come to have doubts about such services, but
|
|
unless the government steps in and demands detailed
|
|
inspection of actual work done-and even then I think
|
|
this would be impossible and/or illegal-such
|
|
arrangements would seem to be foolproof
|
|
+ why can't government demand proof of work done?
|
|
- who judges the value of an employee?
|
|
- of advice given, of reports generated, or of the
|
|
value of having a consultant "on retainer"?
|
|
- such interference would devastate many vested
|
|
interests
|
|
+ tax and other advantages of these "crypto annuities"
|
|
- tax only paid on the yearly income, not on the lump
|
|
sum
|
|
- authorities are not alerted to the sudden receipt of
|
|
a lump sum (an ex-intelligence official who receives
|
|
a payement of $1 M will come under suspicion, exactly
|
|
as would a politician)
|
|
- and a lump sum payment might well arouse suspicions
|
|
and be considered evidence of some criminal activity
|
|
+ the original lump sum is protected from confiscation
|
|
by governments, by consideration in alimony or
|
|
bankruptcy cases, etc.
|
|
- such "consulting annuities" may be purchased just
|
|
so as to insulate earnings from alimony,
|
|
bankruptcy, etc.
|
|
- as usual, I'm not defending these steps as moral or
|
|
as good for the business climate of the world, just
|
|
as inevitable consequences of many current trends
|
|
and technical developments
|
|
+ the "shell game" is used to protect the funds
|
|
- with periodic withdrawals or transfers
|
|
- note that this whole scheme can pretty much be done by
|
|
attorneys and agents today, though they may be subpoenaed
|
|
or otherwise encouraged to blab
|
|
+ it may not even be illegal for a consultant to take his
|
|
fee over a period of many years
|
|
+ the IRS may claim the "discounted present value" as a
|
|
lump sum, but other folks already do things like this
|
|
- royalty streams (and nobody claims an author must
|
|
agree with the IRS to some estimated value of this
|
|
stream)
|
|
- percentages of the gross (and the like)
|
|
- engineers and other professionals are often kept on
|
|
payrolls not so much for their instantaneous
|
|
achievements as for their past and projected
|
|
achievements-are we to treat future accomplishments
|
|
in a lump sum way?
|
|
+ IRS and others may try to inspect the terms of the
|
|
employment or consulting agreement, but these seems too
|
|
invasive and cumbersome
|
|
+ it makes the government a third party in all
|
|
negotiations, requiring agents to be present in all
|
|
talks or at least to read and understand all
|
|
paperwork
|
|
- and even then, there could be claims that the
|
|
government didn't follow the deals
|
|
- not enough time or manpower to handle all these
|
|
things
|
|
- and the invasion of privacy is extreme!
|
|
+ Scenario: the Fincen-type agencies may deal with the
|
|
growing threat of CA-type systems (and encryption in
|
|
general) by involving the government in ostensibly
|
|
private deals
|
|
- analogous to the sales tax and bookkeeping
|
|
arrangements (where gov't. is a third party to all
|
|
transactions)
|
|
+ or EEOC, race and sex discimination cases
|
|
- will transcripts and recordings of all job
|
|
interviews come to be required?
|
|
- "laying track"
|
|
- OSHA, pollution, etc.
|
|
+ software copying laws (more to the point):
|
|
government seems to have the power to enter a
|
|
business to see if illegal copies are in use; this
|
|
may first require a warrant
|
|
+ how long before various kinds of software are
|
|
banned?
|
|
- with the argument being that some kinds of
|
|
software are analogous to lockpicks and other
|
|
banned burglar tools
|
|
- "used to facillitate the illegal copying of
|
|
protected software"
|
|
+ the threat of encryption for national security as
|
|
well as for the money-laundering and illegal
|
|
payments possibilities may cause the government
|
|
to place restrictions on the use of crypto
|
|
software for anything except approved uses
|
|
(external e-mail, etc.)
|
|
- and even these uses can of course be subverted
|
|
- and crypto techniques are not actually necessary: lawyers
|
|
and other discreet agents will suffice
|
|
+ furthermore, corporations have a fair amount of lattitude
|
|
in setting retirement policies and benefits, and so the
|
|
methods I've described to shelter current income may
|
|
become more widespread
|
|
+ though there may be some proviso that if benefits
|
|
exceeed some percentage of yearly income, factoring in
|
|
years on the job, that these benefits are taxed in some
|
|
punative way
|
|
- e.g.., a corporation that pays $100K a year to a
|
|
critical technical person for a year of work and then
|
|
pays him $60K a year for the next ten years could
|
|
reasonably be believed to have set up a system to
|
|
help him avoid taxes on a large lump sum payment
|
|
+ Asset-hiding, to avoid seizure in bankruptcies, lawsuits
|
|
+ e.g., funds placed in accounts which are secret, or in
|
|
systems/schemes over which the asset-hider has control
|
|
of some kind (voting, consulting, etc.)
|
|
- this is obscure: what I'm thinking of is some kind of
|
|
deal in which Albert is hired by Bob as an "advisor"
|
|
on financial matters: but Bob's money comes from
|
|
Albert and so the quid pro quo is that Bob will take
|
|
Albert's advice....hence the effective laundering and
|
|
protection
|
|
+ May also be used to create "multi-tier" currency systems,
|
|
e.g., where reported transactions are some fraction of
|
|
actuals
|
|
- suppose we agree to deal at some artificially low
|
|
value: electricians and plumbers may barter with each
|
|
other at a reported $5 an hour, while using underground
|
|
accounts to actually trade at more realistic levels
|
|
+ government (IRS) has laws about "fair value"-but how
|
|
could these laws be enforced for such intangibles as
|
|
software?
|
|
- if I sell a software program for $5000, can the
|
|
government declare this to be over or underpriced?
|
|
- likewise, if a plumber charges $5 an hour, can the
|
|
government, suspecting tax evasion, force him to
|
|
charge more?
|
|
- once again, the nature of taxation in our increasingly
|
|
many-dimensioned economy seems to necessitate major
|
|
invasions of privacy
|
|
16.14.7. "Denationalization of Money"
|
|
- as with the old SF standby of "credits"
|
|
+ cf. the books on denationalization of money, and the idea
|
|
of competing currencies
|
|
- digital cash can be denominated in these various
|
|
currencies, so it makes the idea of competing currencies
|
|
more practical
|
|
- to some extent, it already exists
|
|
+ the hard money advocates (gold bugs) are losing their
|
|
faith, as they see money moving around and never really
|
|
landing in any "hard" form
|
|
- of course, it is essential that governments and groups
|
|
not have the ability to print more money
|
|
- international networks will probably denominate
|
|
transactions in whatever currencies are the most stable and
|
|
least inflationary (or least unpredictably inflationary)
|
|
|
|
16.15. Intellectual Property
|
|
16.15.1. Concepts of property will have to change
|
|
- intellectual property; enforcement is becoming problematic
|
|
- when thieves cannot be caught
|
|
16.15.2. Intellectual property debate
|
|
- include my comment about airwaves
|
|
+ work on payment for items...Brad Cox, Peter Sprague, etc.
|
|
- Superdistribution, metered usage
|
|
- propertarian
|
|
- many issues
|
|
|
|
16.16. Markets for Contract Killings, Extortion, etc.
|
|
16.16.1. Note: This is a sufficiently important topic that it deserves
|
|
its own heading. There's material on this scattered around
|
|
this document, material I'll collect together when I get a
|
|
chance.
|
|
16.16.2. This topic came up several times on then Extropians mailing
|
|
list, where David Friedman (author of "The Machinery of
|
|
Freedom" and son of Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman) and
|
|
Robin Hanson debated this with me.
|
|
16.16.3. Doug Cutrell summarized the concerns of many when he wrote:
|
|
- "...the availability of truly secure anonymity, strong
|
|
encryption, and untraceable digital cash could allow
|
|
contract killing to be an openly conducted business. For
|
|
example, an anonymous news post announces a public key
|
|
which is to be used to encode a contract kill order, along
|
|
with a digital cash payment. The person placing the
|
|
contract need only anonymously place the encrypted message
|
|
in alt.test. Perhaps it is even possible to make it
|
|
impossible to tell that the message was encrypted with the
|
|
contract killer's public key (the killer would have to
|
|
attempt decryption of all similarly encoded messages on
|
|
alt.test, but that might be quite feasible). Thus it could
|
|
be completely risk free for anyone to place a contract on
|
|
anyone else." [Doug Cutrell, 1994-09-09]
|
|
16.16.4. Abhorrent markets
|
|
- contract killings
|
|
- can collect money anonymously to have someone
|
|
whacked...nearly anyone who is controversial can generate
|
|
enough "contributions"
|
|
- kidnapping, extortion
|
|
16.16.5. Dealing with Such Things:
|
|
+ never link physical ID with pseudonyms! (they won't kill
|
|
you if they don't know who you are)
|
|
- and even if one pseudonym is linked, make sure your
|
|
financial records are not linkable
|
|
- trust no one
|
|
- increased physical security...make the effort of killing
|
|
much more potentially dangerous
|
|
- flooding attacks..tell extortionists to "get in line"
|
|
behind all the other extortionists
|
|
+ announce to world that one does not pay extortionists...set
|
|
up protocol to ensure this
|
|
- yes, some will die as a result of this
|
|
- console yourself with the fact that though some may die,
|
|
fewer are dying as a result of state-sponsored wars and
|
|
terrorism (historically a bigger killer than contract
|
|
killings!)
|
|
|
|
16.17. Persistent Institutions
|
|
16.17.1. Strong crypto makes possible the creation of institutions
|
|
which can persist for very long periods of time, perhaps for
|
|
centuries.
|
|
- such institutions already exist: churches (Catholics of
|
|
several orders), universities, etc.
|
|
16.17.2. all of these "persistent" services (digital banks, escrow
|
|
services, reputation servers, etc.) require much better
|
|
protections against service outages, seizures by governments,
|
|
natural disasters, and even financial collapse than do most
|
|
existing computer services-an opportunity for offshore escrow-
|
|
like services
|
|
- to maintain a distributed database, with unconditional
|
|
privacy, etc.
|
|
+ again, it is imperative that escrow companies require all
|
|
material placed in it to be encrypted
|
|
- to protect them against lawsuits and claims by
|
|
authorities (that they stole information, that they
|
|
censored material, that they are an espionage conduit,
|
|
etc.)
|
|
16.17.3. Escrow Services
|
|
+ "Digital Escrow" accounts for mutually suspicious parties,
|
|
especially in illegal transactions
|
|
- drug deals, information brokering, inside information,
|
|
etc.
|
|
+ But why will the escrow entity be trusted?
|
|
+ reputations
|
|
- their business is being a reliable escrow holder, not
|
|
it destroying their reputation for a bribe or a
|
|
threat
|
|
+ anonymity means the escrow company won't know who it's
|
|
"burning," should it try to do so
|
|
- they never know when they themselves are being tested
|
|
by some service
|
|
- and potential bribers will not know who to contact,
|
|
although mail could be addressed to the escrow company
|
|
easily enough
|
|
- like bonding agencies
|
|
- key is that these entities stand to gain very little by
|
|
stealing from their customers, and much to lose (hinges on
|
|
ratio of any single transaction to size of total market)
|
|
- useful for black markets and illegal transactions (a
|
|
reliable third party that both sides can trust, albeit not
|
|
completely)
|
|
16.17.4. Reputation-Based Systems
|
|
+ Credit Rating Services that are Immune from Meddling and
|
|
Lawsuits
|
|
+ with digital pseudonyms, true credit rating data bases
|
|
can be developed
|
|
- with none of the "5 year expirations" (I mean, who are
|
|
you to tell me I must not hold it against a person that
|
|
records show he's declares Chapter 7 every 5 years or
|
|
so?...such information is information, and cannot be
|
|
declared illegal, despite the policy issues that are
|
|
involved)
|
|
+ this could probably be done today, using offshore data
|
|
banks, but then there might develop injunctions against
|
|
use by Stateside companies
|
|
- how could this be enforced? stings? entrapment?
|
|
+ it may be that credit-granting entities will be
|
|
forced to use rigid formulas for their decisions,
|
|
with a complete audit trail available to the
|
|
applicant
|
|
- if any "discretion" or judgment is allowed, then
|
|
these extralegal or offshore inputs can be used
|
|
- related to "redlining" and other informal
|
|
signalling mechanisms
|
|
- remember that Prop. 103 attempted to bypass normal
|
|
laws of economics
|
|
+ AMIX-like services will offer multiple approaches here
|
|
+ ranging from conventional credit data bases, albeit
|
|
with lower costs of entry (e.g., a private citizen
|
|
could launch a "bankruptcy filings" data base, using
|
|
public records, with no expiration-they're just
|
|
reporting the truth, e.g., that Joe Blow filed for
|
|
personal bankruptcy in 1987
|
|
- this gets into some of the strange ideas involving
|
|
mandatory rewriting of the truth, as when "credit
|
|
records are expunged" (expunged from what? from my
|
|
personal data bases? from records that were public
|
|
and that I am now selling access to?)
|
|
+ there may be arguments that the "public records" are
|
|
copyrighted or otherwise owned by someone and hence
|
|
cannot be sold
|
|
- telephone book case (however, the Supremes held
|
|
that the "creative act" was the specific
|
|
arrangement)
|
|
- one ploy may be a Habitat-like system, where some of
|
|
the records are "historical"
|
|
- to offshore data bases
|
|
+ Book Reviews, Music Reviews
|
|
- sometimes with pseudonyms to protect the authors from
|
|
retaliation or even lawsuits
|
|
+ "What should I buy?" services, a la Consumer Reports
|
|
- again, protection from lawsuits
|
|
16.17.5. Crypto Banks and the "Shell Game" as a Central Metaphor
|
|
+ Central metaphor: the Shell Game
|
|
- description of conventional shell game (and some
|
|
allusions to con artists on a street corner-the hand is
|
|
quicker than the eye)
|
|
+ like entering a room filled with safe deposit boxes, with
|
|
no surveillance and no way to monitor activity in the
|
|
boxes....and user can buy new boxes anonymously,
|
|
transferring contents amongst the boxes
|
|
- only shutting down the entire system and forcing all
|
|
the boxes open would do anything-and this would "pool"
|
|
all of the contents (unless a law was passed saying
|
|
people could "declare" the contents before some
|
|
day....)
|
|
+ the shell game system can be "tested"-by testing
|
|
services, by suspicious individuals, whatever-at very low
|
|
cost by dividing some sum amongst many accounts and
|
|
verifying that the money is still there (by retrieving or
|
|
cashing them in)
|
|
- and remember that the accounts are anonymous and are
|
|
indistinguishable, so that the money cannot be seized
|
|
without repercussions
|
|
+ this is of course the way banks and similar reputation-
|
|
based institutions have always (or mostly) worked
|
|
- people trusted the banks not to steal their money by
|
|
verifying over some period of time that their money was
|
|
not vanishing
|
|
- and by relying upon some common sense ideas of what the
|
|
bank's basic business was (the notion that a bank
|
|
exists to continue in business and will make more money
|
|
over some long run period by being trustworthy than it
|
|
would make in a one-shot ripoff)
|
|
+ Numbered accounts
|
|
- recall that Switzerland has bowed to international
|
|
pressure and is now limiting (or eliminating) numbered
|
|
accounts (though other countries are still allowing some
|
|
form of such accounts, especially Lichtenstein and
|
|
Luxembourg)
|
|
+ with crypto numbers, even more security
|
|
- "you lose your number, tough"
|
|
- but the money must exist in some form at some time?
|
|
+ options for the physical form of the money
|
|
+ accounts are shares in a fund that is publicly invested
|
|
- shares act as "votes" for the distribution of
|
|
proceeds
|
|
- dividends are paid to the account (and sent wherever)
|
|
- an abstract, unformed idea: multiple tiers of money,
|
|
like unequal voting rights of stock...
|
|
+ could even be physical deposits
|
|
- perhaps even manipulated by automatic handling
|
|
systems (though this is very insecure)
|
|
- the Bennett-Ross proposal for Global Data Services is
|
|
essentially the early form of this
|
|
16.17.6. cryonicists will seek "crypto-trusts" to protect their assets
|
|
+ again, the "crypto" part is not really necessary, given
|
|
trustworthy lawyers and similar systems
|
|
- but the crypto part-digital money-further automates the
|
|
system, allowing smaller and more secure transactions
|
|
(overhead is lower, allowing more dispersions and
|
|
diffusion)
|
|
- and eliminates the human link
|
|
- thus protecting better against subpoenas, threats, etc.
|
|
+ and to help fund "persistent institutions" that will fund
|
|
research and protect them in suspension
|
|
- they may also place their funds in "politically correct"
|
|
longterm funds-which may or may not exert a postive
|
|
ifluence in the direction they wish, what with the law of
|
|
unintended consequences and all
|
|
opl
|
|
+ many avenues for laundering money for persistent
|
|
institutions
|
|
+ dummy corporations (or even real corporations)
|
|
- with longterm consulting arrangements
|
|
- "shell game" voting
|
|
+ as people begin to believe that they may just possibly be
|
|
revived at some future time, they will begin to worry about
|
|
protecting their current assets
|
|
+ recollections of "Why Call Them Back from Heaven?"
|
|
- worries about financial stability, about confiscation
|
|
of wealth, etc.
|
|
- no longer will ersatz forms of immortality-endowments fo
|
|
museums, universities, etc.-be as acceptable...people
|
|
will want the real thing
|
|
+ Investments that may outlive current institutions
|
|
- purchases of art works (a la Bill Gates, who is in fact a
|
|
possibel model for this kind of behavior)
|
|
- rights to famous works, with provision for the copyright
|
|
expirations, etc. (which is why physical possession is
|
|
preferable)
|
|
- shell games, of course (networks of reputation-based
|
|
accounts)
|
|
- Jim Bennett reports that Saul Kent is setting up such
|
|
things in Lichtenstein for Alcor (which is what I suggested
|
|
to Keith Henson several years ago)
|
|
|
|
16.18. Organized Crime: Triads, Yakuza, Mafia, etc.
|
|
16.18.1. "The New Underworld Order"
|
|
+ Claire Sterling's "Thieve's World"
|
|
- (Sterling is well-known for her conservative views on
|
|
political matters, having written the controversial "The
|
|
Terror Connection," which basically dismissed the role of
|
|
the CIA and other U.S. agencies in promoting terrorism.
|
|
"Thieve's World" continues the alarmist stance, but has
|
|
some juicy details anyway.)
|
|
- she argues for more law enforcement
|
|
+ but it was the corrupt police states of Nazi Germany,
|
|
Sovet Russia, etc., that gave so many opportunities for
|
|
modern corruption
|
|
- and the CIA-etc. drug trade, Cold War excuses, and
|
|
national security state waivers
|
|
+ in the FSU, the Russian Mafia is the chief beneficiary
|
|
of privatization...only they had the cash and the
|
|
connections to make the purchases (by threatening non-
|
|
Mob bidders, by killing them, etc.)
|
|
- as someone put in, the world's first complete
|
|
criminal state
|
|
16.18.2. "Is the criminal world interested in crypto? Could they be
|
|
early adopters of these advanced techniques?"
|
|
- early use: BBS/Compuserve messages, digital flash paper,
|
|
codes
|
|
- money-laundering, anstalts, banks
|
|
- Triads, chop marks
|
|
- Even though this use seem inevitable, we should probably be
|
|
careful here. Both because the clientele for our advice may
|
|
be violent, and ditto for law enforcement. The conspiracy
|
|
and RICO laws may be enough to get anyone who advises such
|
|
folks into major trouble. (Of course, advice and consulting
|
|
may happen throught the very same untraceable technology!)
|
|
16.18.3. crypto provides some schemes for more secure drug
|
|
distribution
|
|
- cells, dead drops, secure transfers to foreign accounts
|
|
- communication via pools, or remailers
|
|
- too much cash is usually the problem...
|
|
- "follow the money" (FinCEN)
|
|
- no moral qualms...nearly all drugs are less dangerous than
|
|
alcohol is...that drug was just too popular to outlaw
|
|
- this drug scenario is consistent with the Triad/Mob
|
|
scenario
|
|
|
|
16.19. Privately Produced Law, Polycentric Law, Anarcho-Capitalism
|
|
16.19.1. "my house, my rules"
|
|
16.19.2. a la David Friedman
|
|
16.19.3. markets for laws, Law Merchant
|
|
- corporations, other organizations have their own local
|
|
legal rules
|
|
- Extropians had much debate on this, and various competing
|
|
legal codes (as an experiment...not very sucessful, for
|
|
various reasons)
|
|
- "Snow Crash"
|
|
16.19.4. the Cypherpunks group is itself a good example:
|
|
- a few local rules (local to the group)
|
|
- a few constraints by the host machine environment (toad,
|
|
soda)
|
|
+ but is the list run on "United States law"?
|
|
- with members in dozens of countries?
|
|
- only when the external laws are involved (if one of us
|
|
threatened another, and even then this is iffy) could the
|
|
external laws....
|
|
- benign neglect, by necessity
|
|
16.19.5. I have absolutely no faith in the law when it comes to
|
|
cyberspatial matters (other matters, too).
|
|
- especially vis-a-vis things like remote access to files, a
|
|
la the AA BBS case
|
|
- "the law is an ass"
|
|
- patch one area, another breaks
|
|
- What then? Technology. Remailers, encryption
|
|
16.19.6. Contracts and Cryptography
|
|
+ "How can contracts be enforced in crypto anarchy
|
|
situations?"
|
|
- A key question, and one which causes many people to
|
|
question whether crypto anarchy can work at all.
|
|
+ First, think of how many situations are _already_
|
|
essentially outside the scope of the law...and yet in
|
|
which something akin to "contracts" are enforceable,
|
|
albeit not via the legal process.
|
|
- friends, relationships
|
|
+ personal preferences in food, books, movies, etc.
|
|
- what "recourse" does one have in cases where a meal
|
|
is unsatisfactory? Not going back to the restaurant
|
|
is usually the best recourse (this is also a hint
|
|
about the importance of "future expectation of
|
|
business" as a means of dealing with such things).
|
|
- In these cases, the law is not directly involved. In
|
|
fact, the law is not involved in _most_ human (and
|
|
nonhuman!) interactions.
|
|
+ The Main Approaches:
|
|
+ Reputations.
|
|
- reputations are important, are not lightly to be
|
|
regarded
|
|
- Repeat Business.
|
|
- Escrow Services.
|
|
+ The "right of contract" (and the duty to adhere to them, to
|
|
not try to change the contract after the facts) is a
|
|
crucial building block.
|
|
- Imagine a society in which contracts are valid. This
|
|
allows those willing to sign contracts setting limits on
|
|
malpractice to get cheaper health care, while those who
|
|
won't sign such contracts are free to sue--but will of
|
|
course have to pay more for health care. Nothing is free,
|
|
and frivolous malpractice lawsuits have increased
|
|
operating costs. (Recall the "psychic" who alleged that
|
|
her psychic powers were lost after a CAT scan. A jury
|
|
awarded her millions of dollars. Cf. Peter Huber's books
|
|
on liability laws.)
|
|
- Now imagine a society in which it is never clear if a
|
|
contract is valid, or whether courts will overturn or
|
|
amend a contract. This distorts the above analysis, and
|
|
so hospitals, for example, have to build in safety
|
|
margins and cushions.
|
|
+ Crypto can help by creating escrow or bonding accounts held
|
|
by third parties--untraceable to the other parties--which
|
|
act as bonding agents for completion of contracts.
|
|
- Such arrangements may not be allowed. For example, a
|
|
hospital which attempted to deal with such a bonding
|
|
agency, and which asked customers to also deal with them,
|
|
could face sanctions.
|
|
- "Secured credit cards" are a current example: a person pays
|
|
a reserve amount greater than the card limits (maybe 110%).
|
|
The reason for doing this is not to obtain "credit,"
|
|
obviously, but to be able to order items over the phone, or
|
|
to avoid carrying cash. (The benefit is thus in the
|
|
_channel_ of commerce).
|
|
16.19.7. Ostracism, Banishment in Privately Produced Law
|
|
+ Voluntary and discretionary electronic communities also
|
|
admit the easy possibility of banishment or ostracism
|
|
(group-selected kill files). Of course, enforcement is
|
|
generally difficult, e.g., there is nothing to stop
|
|
individuals from continuing to communicate with the
|
|
ostracized individual using secure methods.
|
|
- I can imagine schemes in which software key escrow is
|
|
used, but these seem overly complicated and intrusive.
|
|
- The ability of individuals, and even subgroups, to thwart
|
|
the ostracism is not at all a bad thing.
|
|
-
|
|
- "In an on-line world it would be much easier to enforce
|
|
banishment or selective ostracism than in real life.
|
|
Filtering agents could look for certificates from accepted
|
|
enforcement agencies before letting messages through. Each
|
|
user could have a set of agencies which were compatible
|
|
with his principles, and another set of "outlaws". You
|
|
could even end up with the effect of multiple "logical
|
|
subnets" of people who communicate with each other but not
|
|
outside their subnet. Some nets might respect intellectual
|
|
property, others not, and so on." [Hal Finney, 1994-08-21]
|
|
16.19.8. Governments, Cyberspaces, PPLs
|
|
- Debate periodically flares up on the List about this topic.
|
|
- Can't be convered here in sufficient detail.
|
|
- Friedman, Benson, Stephenson's "Snow Crash," etc.
|
|
16.19.9. No recourse in the courts with crypto-mediated systems
|
|
- insulated from the courts
|
|
- PPLs are essential
|
|
- reputations, escrow, mediation (crypto-mediated mediation?)
|
|
16.19.10. Fraud
|
|
- not exactly rare in the non-crypto world!
|
|
- new flavors of cons will likely arise
|
|
- anonymous escrow accounts, debate with Hal Finney on this
|
|
issue, etc.
|
|
16.19.11. PPLs, polycentric law
|
|
|
|
16.20. Libertaria in Cyberspace
|
|
16.20.1. what it is
|
|
16.20.2. parallels to Oceania, Galt's Gulch
|
|
16.20.3. Privacy in communications alters the nature of connectivity
|
|
- virtual communities, invisible to outsiders
|
|
- truly a crypto cabal
|
|
- this is what frightens the lawmakers the most...people can
|
|
opt out of the mainstream governmental system, at least
|
|
partly (and probably increasingly)
|
|
|
|
16.21. Cyberspace, private spaces, enforcement of rules, and technology
|
|
16.21.1. Consider the "law" based approach
|
|
- a discussion group that wants no men involved ("a protected
|
|
space for womyn")
|
|
- so they demand the civil law system enforce their rules
|
|
- practical example: sysadmins yank accounts when
|
|
"inappropriate posts" are made
|
|
- the C&S case of spamming is an example
|
|
- Note: The Net as currently constituted is fraught with
|
|
confusion about who owns what, about what are public and
|
|
what are private resources, and about what things are
|
|
allowed. If Joe Blow sends Suzy Creamcheese an "unwanted"
|
|
letter, is this "abuse" or "harassement"? Is it stealing
|
|
Suzy's resources? (In my opinion, of course not, but I
|
|
agree that things are confusing.)
|
|
16.21.2. The technological approach:
|
|
- spaces created by crypto...unbreachable walls
|
|
+ example: a mailing list with controls on membership
|
|
- could require nomination and vouching for by others
|
|
- presentation of some credential (signed by someone), e.g.
|
|
of femaleness
|
|
- pay as you go stops spamming
|
|
16.21.3. This is a concrete example of how crypto acts as a kind of
|
|
building material
|
|
- and why government limitations on crypto hurt those who
|
|
wish to protect their own spaces
|
|
- a private mailing list is a private space, inaccessible to
|
|
those outside
|
|
- "There are good engineering approaches which can force data
|
|
to behave itself. Many of them involve cryptography. Our
|
|
government's restrictions on crypto limit our ability to
|
|
build reliable computer systems. We need strong crypto for
|
|
basic engineering reasons." [Kent Borg, "Arguing Crypto:
|
|
The Engineering Approach," 1994-06-29]
|
|
16.21.4. Virtual Communities-the Use of Virtual Networks to Avoid
|
|
Government
|
|
- that is, alternatives to creating new countries (like the
|
|
Minerva project)
|
|
- the Assassin cult/sect in the mountains of Syria, Iraq,
|
|
Afghanistan, etc. had a network of couriers in the mountain
|
|
fastnessess
|
|
- pirate communities, networks of trading posts and watering
|
|
holes, exempt-if only for a few years-from the laws of the
|
|
imperial powers
|
|
16.21.5. These private spaces will, as technology makes them more
|
|
"livable" (I don't mean in a full sense, so don't send me
|
|
notes about how "you can't eat cyberspace"), become full-
|
|
functioned "spaces" that are outside the reach of
|
|
governments. A new frontier, untouchable by outside, coercive
|
|
governments.
|
|
- Vinge's "True Names" made real
|
|
16.21.6. "Can things really develop in this "cyberspace" that so many
|
|
of us talk about?"
|
|
- "You can't eat cyberspace!' is the usual point made. I
|
|
argue, however, that abstract worlds have always been with
|
|
us, in the forms of commerce, reputations, friends, etc.
|
|
And this will continue.
|
|
- Some people have objected to the sometimes over-
|
|
enthusiastic claims that economies and socities will
|
|
flourish in computer-mediated cyberspaces. The short form
|
|
of the objection is: "You can't eat cyberspace." Meaning,
|
|
that profits and gains made in cyberspace must be converted
|
|
to real world profits and gains.
|
|
- In "Snow Crash," this was made out to be difficult...Hiro
|
|
Protagonist was vastly wealthy in the Multiverse, but lived
|
|
in a cargo container at LAX in the "real world." A fine
|
|
novel, but this idea is screwy.
|
|
+ There are many ways to transfer wealth into the "real"
|
|
world:
|
|
+ all the various money-laundering schemes
|
|
- money in offshore accounts, accessible for vacations,
|
|
visits, etc.
|
|
- phony purchase orders
|
|
- my favorite: Cyberspace, Inc. hires one as a
|
|
"consultant" (IRS cannot and does not demand proof of
|
|
work being done, the nature of the work, one's
|
|
qualifications to perform the work, etc....In fact,
|
|
many consultants are hired "on retainer," merely to be
|
|
available should a need arise.)
|
|
- information-selling
|
|
- investments
|
|
-
|
|
16.21.7. Protocols for this are far from complete
|
|
- money, identity, walls, structures
|
|
- a lot of basic work is needed (though people will pursue it
|
|
locally, not after the work is done...so solutions will
|
|
likely be emergent)
|
|
|
|
16.22. Data Havens
|
|
16.22.1. "What are data havens?"
|
|
+ Places where data can be hidden or protected against legal
|
|
action.
|
|
- Sterling, "Islands in the Net," 1988
|
|
+ Medical experiments, legal advice, pornography, weapons
|
|
- reputations, lists of doctors, lawyers, rent deadbeats,
|
|
credit records, private eyes
|
|
- What to do about the mounting pressure to ban certain kinds
|
|
of research?
|
|
- One of the powerful uses of strong crypto is the creation
|
|
of journals, web sites, mailing lists, etc., that are
|
|
"untraceable." These are sometimes called "data havens,"
|
|
though that term, as used by Bruce Sterling in "Islands in
|
|
the Net" (1988), tends to suggest specific places like the
|
|
Cayman Islands that corporations might use to store data. I
|
|
prefer the emphasis on "cypherspace."
|
|
- "It is worth noting that private "data havens" of all sorts
|
|
abound, especially for financial matters, and most are not
|
|
subject to governmental regulation....Some banks have
|
|
research departments that are older and morecomprehensive
|
|
than credit reporting agencies. Favored customers can use
|
|
them for evaluation of private deals....Large law firms
|
|
maintain data banks that approach those of banks, and they
|
|
grow with each case, through additions of private
|
|
investigators paid for by successive clients....Security
|
|
professionals, like Wackenhut and Kroll, also market the
|
|
fruits of substantial data collections....To these add
|
|
those of insurance, bonding, investment, financial firms
|
|
and the like which help make or break business deals."
|
|
[John Young, 1994-09-07]
|
|
16.22.2. "Can there be laws about what can be done with data?"
|
|
- Normative laws ("they shouldn't keep such records and hence
|
|
we'll outlaw them") won't work in an era of strong crypto
|
|
and privacy. In fact, some of us support data havens
|
|
precisely to have records of, say, terminal diseases so
|
|
we'll not lend money to Joe-who-has-AIDS. It may not be
|
|
"fair" to Joe, but it's my money. (Same idea as in using
|
|
offshore or cryptospatial data havens to bypass the
|
|
nonsense in the "Fair Credit Reporting Act" that outlaws
|
|
the keeping of certain kinds of facts about credit
|
|
applicants, such as that they declared bankruptcy 10 years
|
|
ago or that they left a string of bad debts in Germany in
|
|
the 1970s, etc.)
|
|
16.22.3. Underground Networks, Bootleg Research, and Information
|
|
Smuggling
|
|
+ The Sharing of Forbidden Knowledge
|
|
- even if the knowledge is not actually forbidden, many
|
|
people relish the idea of trafficking in the forbidden
|
|
+ Some modern examples
|
|
+ drugs and marijuana cultivation
|
|
- drugs for life extension, AIDS treatments
|
|
- illegal drugs for recreational use
|
|
+ bootleg medical research, AIDS and cancer treatments,
|
|
etc.
|
|
- for example, self-help user groups that advise on
|
|
treatments, alternatives, etc.
|
|
+ lockpicking and similar security circumvention
|
|
techniques
|
|
- recall that possession of lockpicks may be illegal
|
|
- what about manuals? (note that most catalogs have a
|
|
disclaimer: "These materials are for educational
|
|
purposes only, ...")
|
|
- defense-related issues: limitations on debate on
|
|
national security matters may result in "anonymous
|
|
forums"
|
|
+ BTW, recent work on crab shells and other hard shells
|
|
has produced even stronger armor!
|
|
- this might be some of the genetic research that is
|
|
highly classified and is sold on the anonymous nets
|
|
+ Alchemists and the search for immortality
|
|
+ theory that the "Grandfather of all cults" (my term)
|
|
started around 4500 B.C.
|
|
- in both Egypt and Babylonia/Sumeria
|
|
+ ancestor of Gnostics, Sufis, Illuminati, etc.
|
|
- The Sufi mystic Gurdjieff claimed he was a member
|
|
of a mystical cult formed in Babylon about 4500
|
|
B.C.
|
|
- spider venom?
|
|
+ Speculation: a group or cult oriented toward life
|
|
extension, toward the search for immortality-perhaps
|
|
a link to The Epic of Gilgamesh.
|
|
+ The Gilgamesh legend
|
|
- Gilgamesh, Akkadian language stone tablets in
|
|
Nineveh
|
|
- made a journey to find Utnapishtim, survivor of
|
|
Babylonian flood and possessor of secret of
|
|
immortality (a plant that would renew youth)
|
|
- but Gilgamesh lost the plant to a serpent
|
|
+ Egyptians
|
|
- obviously the Egyptians had a major interest in
|
|
life extension and/or immortality
|
|
+ Osiris, God of Resurrection and Eternal Life
|
|
- also the Dark Companion of Serius (believed to
|
|
be a neutron star?)
|
|
- they devoted huge fraction of wealth to pyramids,
|
|
embalming, etc. (myrhh or frankincense from
|
|
desert city in modern Oman, discovered with
|
|
shuttle imaging radar)
|
|
+ "pyramid power": role on Great Seal, as sign of
|
|
Illuminati, and of theories about cosmic energy,
|
|
geometrical shapes, etc.
|
|
- and recall work on numerological significance
|
|
of Great Pyramid dimensions
|
|
-
|
|
+ Early Christianity
|
|
- focus on resurrection of Jesus Christ
|
|
+ Quest for immortality is a major character
|
|
motivation or theme
|
|
+ arguably for all people: via children,
|
|
achievements, lasting actions, or even "a good
|
|
life"
|
|
- "Living a good life is no substitute for living
|
|
forever"
|
|
- but some seek it explicitly
|
|
- "Million alive today will never die." (echoes of
|
|
past religious cults....Jehovah's Witnesses?)
|
|
- banned by the Church (the Inquisition)
|
|
+ research, such as it was, was kept alive by secret
|
|
orders that communicated secretly and in code and that
|
|
were very selective about membership
|
|
- classes of membership to protect against discovery
|
|
(the modern spy cell system)
|
|
- red herrings designed to divert attention away
|
|
+ all of this fits the structure of such groups as the
|
|
Masons, Freemason, Illuminati, Rosicrucians, and other
|
|
mystical groups
|
|
- with members like John Dee, court astrologer to Queen
|
|
Elizabeth
|
|
+ a genius writer-scientist like Goethe was probably a
|
|
member of this group
|
|
- Faust was his message of the struggle
|
|
- with the Age of Rationalism, the mystical, mumbo-jumbo
|
|
aspects of alchemical research were seen to be passŽ,
|
|
and groups like Crowleys O.T.O. became purely mystical
|
|
showmanship
|
|
+ but the need for secrecy was now in the financial
|
|
arena, with vast resources, corporate R & D labs, and
|
|
banks needed
|
|
- hence the role of the Morgans, Rothschilds, etc. in
|
|
these conspiracies
|
|
+ and modern computer networks will provide the next
|
|
step, the next system of research
|
|
- funded anonymously
|
|
- anonymous systems mean that researchers can publish
|
|
results in controversial areas (recall that
|
|
cryobiologists dare not mention cryonics, lest they
|
|
be expelled from American Cryobiology xxx)
|
|
+ Bootleg Medical Research (and Cryonics)
|
|
+ Cryonics Research and Anti-aging Treatments
|
|
+ Use of Nazi Data
|
|
- hypothermia experiments at Dachau
|
|
+ Anti-aging drugs and treatments
|
|
- fountain of youth, etc.
|
|
- many FDA restrictions, of course
|
|
- Mexico
|
|
+ Switzerland
|
|
- foetal calf cells?
|
|
- blood changing or recycling?
|
|
+ Illegal Experiments
|
|
- reports that hyperbaric oxygen may help revival of
|
|
patients from neat-death in freezing accidents
|
|
+ Black Markets in Drugs, Medical Treatments
|
|
+ RU-486, bans on it
|
|
- anti-abortion foes
|
|
- easy to synthesize
|
|
- NOW has indicated plans to distribute this drug
|
|
themselves, to create networks (thus creating de
|
|
facto allies of the libertarian-oriented users)
|
|
+ Organ Banks
|
|
+ establishing a profit motive for organ donors
|
|
- may be the only way to generate enough donations,
|
|
even from the dead
|
|
- some plans are being made for such motives,
|
|
especially to motivate the families of dying
|
|
patients
|
|
- ethical issues
|
|
+ what about harvesting from the still-living?
|
|
- libertarians would say: OK, if informed consent was
|
|
given
|
|
- the rich can go to overseas clinics
|
|
+ AIDS patients uniting via bulletin boards to share
|
|
treatment ideas, self-help, etc.
|
|
- with buying trips to Mexico and elsewhere
|
|
- authorities will try to halt such BBSs (on what
|
|
grounds, if no money is changing hands?)
|
|
+ Doctors may participate in underground research networks
|
|
to protect their own reputations and professional status
|
|
- to evade AMA or other professional organizations and
|
|
their restrictive codes of ethics
|
|
+ or lawsuits and bad publicity
|
|
- some groups, the "Guardian Angels" of the future,
|
|
seek to expose those who they think are committing
|
|
crimes: abortionists (even though legal), etc.
|
|
- "politically incorrect" research, such as vitamin
|
|
therapy, longevity research, cryonics
|
|
- breast implant surgery may be forced into black markets
|
|
(and perhaps doctors who later discover evidence of such
|
|
operations may be forced to report such operations)
|
|
+ Back Issues of Tests and Libraries of Term Papers
|
|
- already extant, but imagine with an AMIX-like frontend?
|
|
+ Different kinds of networks will emerge, not all of them
|
|
equally accessible
|
|
+ the equivalent of the arms and drug networks-one does not
|
|
gain entree merely by asking around a bit
|
|
- credibility, reputation, "making your bones"
|
|
- these networks are not open to the casual person
|
|
+ Some Networks May Be For the Support of Overseas
|
|
Researchers
|
|
+ who face restrictions on their research
|
|
- e.g., countries that ban birth control may forbid
|
|
researchers from communication with other researchers
|
|
+ suppose U.S. researchers are threatened with
|
|
sanctions-loss of their licenses, censure, even
|
|
prosecution-if they participate in RU-486 experiments?
|
|
- recall the AIDS drug bootleg trials in SF, c. 1990
|
|
- or to bypass export restrictions
|
|
- scenario: several anonymous bulletin boards are set
|
|
up-and then closed down by the authorities-to facillitate
|
|
anonymous hookups (much like "anonymous FTP")
|
|
+ Groups faced with debilitating lawsuits will "go
|
|
underground"
|
|
- Act Up! and Earth First! have no identifiable central
|
|
office that can be sued, shut down, etc.
|
|
- and Operation Rescue has done the same thing
|
|
16.22.4. Illegal Data
|
|
- credit histories that violate some current law about
|
|
records
|
|
- bootleg medical research
|
|
- stolen data (e.g., from competitors....a GDS system could
|
|
allow remote queries of a database, almost "oracular,"
|
|
without the stolen data being in a U.S. jurisdiction)
|
|
- customers in the U.K or Sweden that are forbidden to
|
|
compile data bases on individuals may choose to store the
|
|
data offshore and then access it discreetly (another reason
|
|
encryption and ZKIPS must be offered)
|
|
16.22.5. "the Switzerland of data"
|
|
- Brussells supposedly raises fewer eyebrows than
|
|
Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Switzerland, etc.
|
|
- Cayman Islands, other small nations see possibilities
|
|
16.22.6. Information markets may have to move offshore, due to
|
|
licensing and other restrictions
|
|
- just as stock brokers and insurance brokers are licensed,
|
|
the government may insist that information resellers be
|
|
licensed (pass exams, be subject to audits and regulations)
|
|
|
|
16.23. Undermining Governments--Collapse of the State
|
|
16.23.1. "Is it legal to advocate the overthrow of governments or the
|
|
breaking of laws?"
|
|
- Although many Cypherpunks are not radicals, many others of
|
|
us are, and we often advocate "collapse of governments" and
|
|
other such things as money laundering schemes, tax evasion,
|
|
new methods for espionage, information markets, data
|
|
havens, etc. This rasises obvious concerns about legality.
|
|
- First off, I have to speak mainly of U.S. issues...the laws
|
|
of Russia or Japan or whatever may be completely different.
|
|
Sorry for the U.S.-centric focus of this FAQ, but that's
|
|
the way it is. The Net started here, and still is
|
|
dominantly here, and the laws of the U.S. are being
|
|
propagated around the world as part of the New World Order
|
|
and the collapse of the other superpower.
|
|
- Is it legal to advocate the replacement of a government? In
|
|
the U.S., it's the basic political process (though cynics
|
|
might argue that both parties represent the same governing
|
|
philosophy). Advocating the *violent overthrow* of the U.S.
|
|
government is apparently illegal, though I lack a cite on
|
|
this.
|
|
+ Is it legal to advocate illegal acts in general? Certainly
|
|
much of free speech is precisely this: arguing for drug
|
|
use, for boycotts, etc.
|
|
+ The EFF gopher site has this on "Advocating Lawbreaking,
|
|
Brandenburg v. Ohio. ":
|
|
- "In the 1969 case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme
|
|
Court struck down the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan
|
|
member under a criminal syndicalism law and established
|
|
a new standard: Speech may not be suppressed or
|
|
punished unless it is intended to produce 'imminent
|
|
lawless action' and it is 'likely to produce such
|
|
action.' Otherwise, the First Amendment protects even
|
|
speech that advocates violence. The Brandenburg test is
|
|
the law today. "
|
|
16.23.2. Espionage and Subversion of Governments Will be
|
|
Revolutionized by Strong Crypto
|
|
- (I think they see what we see, too, and this is a
|
|
motivation for the attempts to limit the use of strong
|
|
crypto. Besides some of the more conventional reasons.)
|
|
+ Digital dead drops will revolutionize espionage
|
|
+ spies and their controllers can communicate securely,
|
|
relatively quickly, without fear of being watched, their
|
|
drops compromised, etc.
|
|
- no more nooks of trees, no more chalk marks on
|
|
mailboxes to signal a drop to be made
|
|
+ this must be freaking out the intelligence community!
|
|
- more insights into why the opposition to crypto is so
|
|
strong
|
|
+ Cell-Based Systems and Conventional Protection Systems
|
|
+ Cells are a standard way to limit the damage of exposure
|
|
- the standard is the 3-person cell so common in the
|
|
early days of Soviet espionage in the U.S.
|
|
- but computer systems may allow new kinds of cells, with
|
|
more complicated protocols and more security
|
|
+ Keeping files for protection is another standard
|
|
protection method
|
|
+ and with strong crypto, these files can be kept
|
|
encrypted and in locations not apparent (e.g., posted
|
|
on bulletin boards or other such places, with only the
|
|
key needed at a later time to open them)
|
|
- a la the "binary files" idea, wherein encrypted files
|
|
are widely available for some time before the key is
|
|
distributed (thus making it very hard for governments
|
|
to halt the distribution of the raw files)
|
|
16.23.3. "Xth Column" (X = encrypted)
|
|
- The possible need to use strong cryptography as a tool to
|
|
fight the state.
|
|
+ helping to undermine the state by using whistleblowers and
|
|
anonymous information markets to leak information
|
|
- the 63,451 people given false identities in the WitSec
|
|
program...leak their names, watch them be zapped by
|
|
vengeful enemies, and watch the government squirm
|
|
- auction off the details of the 1967 Inspector General's
|
|
report on CIA assassinations
|
|
16.23.4. use of clandestine, cell-based systems may allow a small
|
|
group to use "termite" methods to undermine a society, to
|
|
destroy a state that has become too repressive (sounds like
|
|
the U.S. to me)
|
|
- encrypted systems, anonymous pools, etc., allow truly
|
|
secure cell-based systems (this is, by the way, one of the
|
|
concerns many countries have about "allowing" cryptography
|
|
to be used...and they're right abou the danger!)
|
|
- subversion of fascist or socialist governments, undermining
|
|
the so-called democratic governments
|
|
16.23.5. "Why won't government simply ban such encryption methods?"
|
|
+ This has always been the Number One Issue!
|
|
- raised by Stiegler, Drexler, Salin, and several others
|
|
(and in fact raised by some as an objection to my even
|
|
discussing these issues, namely, that action may then be
|
|
taken to head off the world I describe)
|
|
+ Types of Bans on Encryption and Secrecy
|
|
- Ban on Private Use of Encryption
|
|
- Ban on Store-and-Forward Nodes
|
|
- Ban on Tokens and ZKIPS Authentication
|
|
- Requirement for public disclosure of all transactions
|
|
+ Recent news (3-6-92, same day as Michaelangelo and
|
|
Lawnmower Man) that government is proposing a surcharge
|
|
on telcos and long distance services to pay for new
|
|
equipment needed to tap phones!
|
|
- S.266 and related bills
|
|
- this was argued in terms of stopping drug dealers and
|
|
other criminals
|
|
- but how does the government intend to deal with the
|
|
various forms fo end-user encryption or "confusion"
|
|
(the confusion that will come from compression,
|
|
packetizing, simple file encryption, etc.)
|
|
+ Types of Arguments Against Such Bans
|
|
- The "Constitutional Rights" Arguments
|
|
+ The "It's Too Late" Arguments
|
|
- PCs are already widely scattered, running dozens of
|
|
compression and encryption programs...it is far too
|
|
late to insist on "in the clear" broadcasts, whatever
|
|
those may be (is program code distinguishable from
|
|
encrypted messages? No.)
|
|
- encrypted faxes, modem scramblers (albeit with some
|
|
restrictions)
|
|
- wireless LANs, packets, radio, IR, compressed text and
|
|
images, etc....all will defeat any efforts short of
|
|
police state intervention (which may still happen)
|
|
+ The "Feud Within the NSA" Arguments
|
|
- COMSEC vs. PROD
|
|
+ Will affect the privacy rights of corporations
|
|
- and there is much evidence that corporations are in
|
|
fact being spied upon, by foreign governments, by the
|
|
NSA, etc.
|
|
+ They Will Try to Ban Such Encryption Techniques
|
|
+ Stings (perhaps using viruses and logic bombs)
|
|
- or "barium," to trace the code
|
|
+ Legal liability for companies that allow employees to use
|
|
such methods
|
|
- perhaps even in their own time, via the assumption that
|
|
employees who use illegal software methods in their own
|
|
time are perhaps couriers or agents for their
|
|
corporations (a tenuous point)
|
|
16.23.6. "How will the masses be converted?"
|
|
- Probably they won't. Things will just happen, just as the
|
|
masses were not converted on issues of world financial
|
|
markets, derivative instruments, and a lot of similar
|
|
things.
|
|
- Crypto anarchy is largely a personal approach of
|
|
withdrawal, of avoidance. Mass consensus is not needed
|
|
(unless the police state option is tried).
|
|
- Don't think in terms of selling crypto anarchy to Joe
|
|
Average. Just use it.
|
|
16.23.7. As things seem to be getting worse, vis-a-vis the creation of
|
|
a police state in the U.S.--it may be a good thing that
|
|
anonymous assassination markets will be possible. It may
|
|
help to level the playing field, as the Feds have had their
|
|
hit teams for many years (along with their safe houses,
|
|
forged credentials, accommodation addresses, cut-outs, and
|
|
other accouterments of the intelligence state).
|
|
- (I won't get into conspiracies here, but the following
|
|
terms may trigger some memories: Gehlen Org, Wackenhut,
|
|
McKee Team, Danny Casolaro, Cabazon Indians, Gander crash,
|
|
Iraq arms deals, Pan Am 103, Bridegrooms of Death, French
|
|
Connection, Fascist Third Position, Phoenix Program, Bebe
|
|
Rebozo, Marex, Otto Skorzeny, Nixon, P-2, Klaus Barbie,
|
|
etc.)
|
|
- Plenty of evidence of misbehavior on a massive scales by
|
|
the intelligence agencies, the police forces, and states in
|
|
general. Absolute power has corrupted absolutely.
|
|
- I'm certainly not advocating the killing of Congressrodents
|
|
and other bureaucrats, just noting that this cloud may have
|
|
a silver lining.
|
|
|
|
16.24. Escrow Agents and Reputations
|
|
16.24.1. Escrow Agents as a way to deal with contract renegging
|
|
- On-line clearing has the possible danger implicit in all
|
|
trades that Alice will hand over the money, Bob will verify
|
|
that it has cleared into hisaccount (in older terms, Bob
|
|
would await word that his Swiss bank account has just been
|
|
credited), and then Bob will fail to complete his end of
|
|
the bargain. If the transaction is truly anonymous, over
|
|
computer lines, then of course Bob just hangs up his modem
|
|
and the connection is broken. This situation is as old as
|
|
time, and has always involved protcols in which trust,
|
|
repeat business, etc., are factors. Or escrow agents.
|
|
- Long before the "key escrow" of Clipper, true escrow was
|
|
planned. Escrow as in escrow agents. Or bonding agents.
|
|
- Alice and Bob want to conduct a transaction. Neither trusts
|
|
the other;
|
|
indeed, they are unknown to each other. In steps "Esther's
|
|
Escrow Service." She is _also utraceable_, but has
|
|
established a digitally-signed presence and a good
|
|
reputation for fairness. Her business is in being an escrow
|
|
agent, like a bonding agency, not in "burning" either
|
|
party. (The math of this is interesting: as long as the
|
|
profits to be gained from any small set of transactions is
|
|
less than her "reputation capital," it is in her interest
|
|
to forego the profits from burning and be honest. It is
|
|
also possible to arrange that Esther cannot profit from
|
|
burning either Alice or Bob or both of them, e.g., by
|
|
suitably encrypting the escrowed stuff.)
|
|
- Alice can put her part of the transaction into escrow with
|
|
Esther, Bob can do the same, and then Esther can release
|
|
the items to the parties when conditions are met, when both
|
|
parties agree, when adjudication of some sort occurs, etc.
|
|
(There a dozen issues here, of course, about how disputes
|
|
are settled, about how parties satisfy themselves that
|
|
Esther has the items she says she has, etc.)
|
|
16.24.2. Use of escrow services as a substute for government
|
|
+ as in underworld deals, international deals, etc.
|
|
- "Machinery of Freedom" (Friedman), "The Enterprise of
|
|
Law" (Benson)
|
|
- "It is important to note in any case that the use of third-
|
|
party escrow as a substitute for Government regulation was
|
|
a feature of the Northern European semi-anarchies of
|
|
Iceland and Ireland that have informed modern libertarian
|
|
thought." [Duncan Frissell, 1994-08-30]
|
|
16.24.3. Several people have raised the issue of someone in an
|
|
anonymous transaction simply taking the money and not
|
|
performing the service (or the flip side). This is where
|
|
_intermediaries_ come into the picture, just as in the real
|
|
worl (bonds, escrow agents, etc.).
|
|
16.24.4. Alice and Bob wish to conduct an anonymous transaction; each
|
|
is unknown to the other (no physical knowledge, no pseudonym
|
|
reputation knowledge). These "mutually suspicious agents," in
|
|
1960s- and 70s-era computer science lingo, must arrange
|
|
methods to conduct business while not trusting the other.
|
|
16.24.5. Various cryptographic protocols have been developed for such
|
|
things as "bit commitment" (useful in playing poker over the
|
|
phone, for example). I don't know of progress made at the
|
|
granularity of anonymous transactions, though. (Though the
|
|
cryptographic protocol building blocks at lower levels--such
|
|
as bit commitment and blobs--will presumably be used
|
|
eventually at higher levels, in markets.)
|
|
16.24.6. I believe there is evidence we can shorten the cycle by
|
|
borrowing noncryptographic protocols (heresy to purists!) and
|
|
adapting them. Reputations, for example. And escrow agents (a
|
|
form of reputation, in that the "value" of a bonding entity
|
|
or escrow agent lies in reputation capital).
|
|
16.24.7. if a single escrow agent is suspected of being untrustworthy
|
|
(in a reputation capital sense), then can use _multiple_
|
|
escrows
|
|
- with various protocols, caveat emptor
|
|
- n-out-of-m voting schemes, where n escrow agents out of m
|
|
are required to complete a transaction
|
|
- hard to compromise them all, especially if they have no
|
|
idea whether they are being "legitimately bribed" or merely
|
|
pinged by a reputation-rating service
|
|
- Hunch: the work of Chaum, Bos, and the Pfaltzmanns on DC-
|
|
nets may be direcly applicable here...issues of collusion,
|
|
sets of colluders, detection of collusion, etc.
|
|
|
|
16.25. Predictions vs. Implications
|
|
16.25.1. "How do we know that crypto anarchy will 'work,' that the
|
|
right institutions will emerge, that wrongs will be righted,
|
|
etc.?"
|
|
- We don't know. Few things are certain. Only time will tell.
|
|
These are emergent situations, where evolution will
|
|
determine the outcome. As in other areas, the forms of
|
|
solutions will take time to evolve.
|
|
- (The Founders could not have predicted the form corporate
|
|
law would take, as but one example.)
|
|
16.25.2. My thinking on crypto anarchy is not so much _prediction_ as
|
|
examination of trends and the implications of certain things.
|
|
Just as steel girders mean certain things for the design of
|
|
buildings, so too does unbreakable crypto mean certain things
|
|
for the design of social and economic systems.
|
|
16.25.3. Several technologies are involved:
|
|
- Unbreakable crypto
|
|
- Untraceable communication
|
|
- Unforgeable signatures
|
|
16.25.4. (Note: Yes, it's sometimes dangerous to say "unbreakable,"
|
|
"untraceable," and "unforgeable." Purists eschew such terms.
|
|
All crypto is economics, even information-theoretically
|
|
secure crypto (e.g., bribe someone to give you the key, break
|
|
in and steal it, etc.). And computationally-secure crypto--
|
|
such as RSA, IDEA, etc.--can in *principle* be brute-forced.
|
|
In reality, the costs may well be exhorbitantly
|
|
high...perhaps more energy than is available in the entire
|
|
universe would be needed. Essentially, these things are about
|
|
as unbreakable, untraceable, and unforgeable as one can
|
|
imagine.)
|
|
16.25.5. "Strong building materials" implies certain things. Highways,
|
|
bridges, jet engines, etc. Likewise for strong crypto, though
|
|
the exact form of the things that get built is still unknown.
|
|
But pretty clearly some amazing new structures will be built
|
|
this way.
|
|
16.25.6. Cyberspace, walls, bricks and mortar...
|
|
16.25.7. "Will strong crypto have the main effect of securing current
|
|
freedoms, or will it create new freedoms and new situations?"
|
|
- There's a camp that believe mainly that strong crypto will
|
|
ensure that current freedoms are preserved, but that this
|
|
will not change things materially, Communications can be
|
|
private, diaries can be secured, computer security will be
|
|
enhanced, etc.
|
|
- Another camp--of which I am a vocal spokesman--believes
|
|
that qualitatively different types of transactions will be
|
|
made possible. In addition, of course, to the securing of
|
|
liberties that the first camp things is the main effect.
|
|
+ These effects are specultative, but probably include:
|
|
- increased hiding of assets through untraceable banking
|
|
systems
|
|
- markets in illegal services
|
|
- increased espionage
|
|
- data havens
|
|
16.25.8. "Will all crypto-anarchic transactions be anonymous?"
|
|
- No, various parties will negotiate different arrangements.
|
|
All a matter of economics, of enforcement of terms, etc.
|
|
Some will, some won't. The key thing is that the decision
|
|
to reveal identity will be just another mutually negotiated
|
|
matter. (Think of spending cash in a store. The store owner
|
|
may _want_ to know who his customers are, but he'll still
|
|
take cash and remain ignorant in most cases. Unless a
|
|
government steps in and distorts the market by requiring
|
|
approvals for purchases and records of identities--think of
|
|
guns here.)
|
|
- For example, the local Mob may not lend me money if I am
|
|
anonymous to them, but they have a "hook" in me if they
|
|
know who I am. (Aspects of anonymity may still be used,
|
|
such as systems that leave no paper or computer trail
|
|
pointing to them or to me, to avoid stings.)
|
|
- "Enforcement" in underground markets, for which the
|
|
conventional legal remedies are impossible, is often by
|
|
means of physical force: breaking legs and even killing
|
|
welshers.
|
|
- (Personally, I have no problems with this. The Mob cannot
|
|
turn to the local police, so it has to enforce deals its
|
|
own way. If you can't pay, don't play.)
|
|
|
|
16.26. How Crypto Anarchy Will Be Fought
|
|
16.26.1. The Direct Attack: Restrictions on Encryption
|
|
+ "Why won't government simply ban such encryption methods?"
|
|
+ This has always been the Number One Issue!
|
|
- raised by Stiegler, Drexler, Salin, and several others
|
|
(and in fact raised by some as an objection to my even
|
|
discussing these issues, namely, that action may then
|
|
be taken to head off the world I describe)
|
|
+ Types of Bans on Encryption and Secrecy
|
|
- Ban on Private Use of Encryption
|
|
- Ban on Store-and-Forward Nodes
|
|
- Ban on Tokens and ZKIPS Authentication
|
|
- Requirement for public disclosure of all transactions
|
|
+ Recent news (3-6-92, same day as Michaelangelo and
|
|
Lawnmower Man) that government is proposing a surcharge
|
|
on telcos and long distance services to pay for new
|
|
equipment needed to tap phones!
|
|
- S.266 and related bills
|
|
- this was argued in terms of stopping drug dealers and
|
|
other criminals
|
|
- but how does the government intend to deal with the
|
|
various forms fo end-user encryption or "confusion"
|
|
(the confusion that will come from compression,
|
|
packetizing, simple file encryption, etc.)
|
|
+ Types of Arguments Against Such Bans
|
|
- The "Constitutional Rights" Arguments
|
|
+ The "It's Too Late" Arguments
|
|
- PCs are already widely scattered, running dozens of
|
|
compression and encryption programs...it is far too
|
|
late to insist on "in the clear" broadcasts, whatever
|
|
those may be (is program code distinguishable from
|
|
encrypted messages? No.)
|
|
- encrypted faxes, modem scramblers (albeit with some
|
|
restrictions)
|
|
- wireless LANs, packets, radio, IR, compressed text
|
|
and images, etc....all will defeat any efforts short
|
|
of police state intervention (which may still happen)
|
|
+ The "Feud Within the NSA" Arguments
|
|
- COMSEC vs. PROD
|
|
+ Will affect the privacy rights of corporations
|
|
- and there is much evidence that corporations are in
|
|
fact being spied upon, by foreign governments, by the
|
|
NSA, etc.
|
|
+ They Will Try to Ban Such Encryption Techniques
|
|
+ Stings (perhaps using viruses and logic bombs)
|
|
- or "barium," to trace the code
|
|
+ Legal liability for companies that allow employees to
|
|
use such methods
|
|
- perhaps even in their own time, via the assumption
|
|
that employees who use illegal software methods in
|
|
their own time are perhaps couriers or agents for
|
|
their corporations (a tenuous point)
|
|
- restrictions on: use of codes and ciphers
|
|
+ there have long been certain restrictions on the use of
|
|
encryption
|
|
- encryption over radio waves is illegal (unless the key is
|
|
provided to the government, as with Morse code)
|
|
+ in war time, many restrictions (by all governments)
|
|
- those who encrypt are ipso facto guilty and are shot
|
|
summarily, in many places
|
|
- even today, use of encryption near a military base or
|
|
within a defense contractor could violate laws
|
|
+ S.266 and similar bills to mandate "trapdoors"
|
|
+ except that this will be difficult to police and even to
|
|
detect
|
|
- so many ways to hide messages
|
|
- so much ordinary compression, checksumming, etc.
|
|
+ Key Registration Trail Balloon
|
|
- cite Denning's proposal, and my own postings
|
|
16.26.2. Another Direct Attack: Elimination of Cash
|
|
+ the idea being that elimination of cash, with credit cards
|
|
replacing cash, will reduce black markets
|
|
- "one person, one ID" (goal of many international
|
|
standards organizations)
|
|
- this elimination of cash may ultimately be tied in to the
|
|
key registration ideas...government becomes a third party
|
|
in all transactions
|
|
+ a favorite of conspiracy theorists
|
|
- in extreme form: the number of the Beast tattooed on us
|
|
(credit numbers, etc.)
|
|
- currency exchanges (rumors on the Nets about the imminent
|
|
recall of banknotes, ostensibly to flush out ill-gotten
|
|
gains and make counterfeiting easier)
|
|
+ but also something governments like to do at times, sort
|
|
of to remind us who's really in charge
|
|
- Germany, a couple of times
|
|
- France, in the late 1950s
|
|
- various other devaluations and currency reforms
|
|
+ Partial steps have already been made
|
|
- cash transactions greater than some value-$10,000 at this
|
|
time, though "suspicious" sub-$10K transactions must be
|
|
reported-are banned
|
|
+ large denomination bills have been withdrawn from
|
|
circulation
|
|
- used in drug deals, the argument goes
|
|
- Massachussetts has demanded that banks turn over all
|
|
account records, SS numbers, balances, etc.
|
|
+ "If what you're doing is legal, why do you need cash for
|
|
it?"
|
|
- part of the old American dichotomy: privacy versus "What
|
|
have you got to hide?"
|
|
+ But why the outlawing of cash won't work
|
|
+ if a need exists, black markets will arise
|
|
- i.e., the normal tradeoff between risk and reward:
|
|
there may be some "discounts" on the value, but cah
|
|
will still circulate
|
|
+ too many other channels exist: securities, secrets, goods
|
|
+ from trading in gold or silver, neither of which are
|
|
outlawed any longer, to trading in secrets, how can the
|
|
government stop this?
|
|
- art being used to transfer money across international
|
|
borders (avoids Customs)
|
|
- "consideration" given, a la the scam to hide income
|
|
+ total surveillance?
|
|
- it doesn't even work in Russia
|
|
- on the other hand, Russia lacks the "point of sale"
|
|
infrastructure to enforce a cashless system
|
|
16.26.3. Another Direct Attack: Government Control of Encryption,
|
|
Networks, and Net Access
|
|
- a la the old Bell System monopoly, which limited what could
|
|
be hooked up to a phone line
|
|
+ the government may take control of the networks in several
|
|
ways:
|
|
+ FCC-type restrictions, though it is hard to see how a
|
|
private network, on private property, could be restricted
|
|
- as it is not using part of the "public spectrum"
|
|
- but it is hard to build a very interesting network that
|
|
stays on private property....and as soon as it crosses
|
|
public property, BINGO!
|
|
+ "National Data Highway" could be so heavily subsidized
|
|
that alternatives will languish (for a while)
|
|
- the Al Gore proposals for a federally funded system
|
|
(and his wife, Tipper, is of course a leader of the
|
|
censorship wing)
|
|
- and then the government can claim the right and duty to
|
|
set the "traffic" laws: protocols, types of encryption
|
|
allowed, etc.
|
|
- key patents, a la RSA (if in fact gov't. is a silent
|
|
partner in RSA Data Security)
|
|
16.26.4. An Indirect Attack: Insisting that all economic transactions
|
|
be "disclosed" (the "Full Disclosure Society" scenario)
|
|
+ this sounds Orwellian, but the obvious precedent is that
|
|
businesses must keep records of all financial transactions
|
|
(and even some other records, to see if they're colluding
|
|
or manipulating something)
|
|
- for income and sales tax reasons
|
|
- and OSHA inspections, INS raids, etc.
|
|
+ there is currently no requirement that all transactions
|
|
be fully documented with the identies of all parties,
|
|
except in some cases like firearms purchases, but this
|
|
could change
|
|
- especially as electronic transactions become more
|
|
common: the IRS may someday insist on such records,
|
|
perhaps even insisting on escrowing of such records, or
|
|
time-stamping
|
|
+ this will hurt small businesses, due to the entry cost
|
|
and overhead of such systems, but big businesses will
|
|
probably support it (after some grumbling)
|
|
- big business always sees bureaucracy as one of their
|
|
competitive advantages
|
|
+ and individuals have not been hassled by the IRS on minor
|
|
personal transactions, though the web is tightening:
|
|
1099s are often required (when payments exceed some
|
|
amount, such as $500)
|
|
- small scale barter transactions
|
|
+ but the nature of CA is that many transactions can be
|
|
financial while appearing to be something else (like the
|
|
transfer of music or images, or even the writing of
|
|
letters)
|
|
- which is why a cusp is coming: full disclosure is one
|
|
route, protection of privacy is another
|
|
+ the government may cite the dangers of a "good old boy
|
|
network" (literally) that promulgates racist, sexist, and
|
|
ableist discrimination via computer networks
|
|
- i.e., that the new networks are "under-representing
|
|
people of color"
|
|
- and how can quotas be enforced in an anonymous system?
|
|
- proposals in California (7-92) that consultants file
|
|
monthly tax statements, have tax witheld, etc.
|
|
- a strategy for the IRS: require all computer network users
|
|
to have a "taxpayer ID number" for all transactions, so
|
|
that tax evasion can be checked
|
|
16.26.5. Attempts to discredit reputation-based systems by deceit,
|
|
fraud, nonpayment, etc.
|
|
- deliberate attacks on the reputation of services the
|
|
government doesn't want to see
|
|
- there may be government operations to sabotage businesses,
|
|
to undermine such efforts before they get started
|
|
- analogous to "mail-bombing" an anonymous remailer
|
|
16.26.6. Licensing of software developers may be one method used to
|
|
try to control the spread of anonymous systems and
|
|
information markets
|
|
- by requiring a "business license" attached to any and all
|
|
chunks of code
|
|
+ implemented via digital signatures, a la the code signing
|
|
protocols mentioned by Bob Baldwin as a means of reducing
|
|
trapdoors, sabotage, and other modifications by spies,
|
|
hackers, etc.
|
|
- proposals to require all chunks of code to be signed,
|
|
after the Sililcon Valley case in mid-80s, where
|
|
spy/saboteur went to several s/w companies and meddled
|
|
with code
|
|
- "seals" from some group such as "Software Writers
|
|
Laboratories," with formal specs required, source code
|
|
provided to a trusted keeper, etc.
|
|
+ such licensing and inspection will also serve to lock-in
|
|
the current players (Microsoft will love it) and make
|
|
foreign competition in software more difficult
|
|
- unless the foreign competition is "sanctioned," e.g.,
|
|
Microsoft opens a code facility in India
|
|
16.26.7. RICO-like seizures of computers and bulletin board systems
|
|
- sting operations and setups
|
|
- Steve Jackson Games is obvious example
|
|
- for illegal material (porno, drug advocacy, electronic
|
|
money, etc.) flowing through their systems
|
|
- even when sysop can prove he did not know illegal acts were
|
|
being committed on his system (precedents are the yachts
|
|
seized because a roach was found)
|
|
+ these seizures can occur even when a trial is never held
|
|
- e.g., the "administrative seizure" of cars in Portland in
|
|
prostitution cases
|
|
- and the seizures are on civil penalties, where the
|
|
standards of proof are much lower
|
|
+ in some cases a mere FBI investigation is enough to get
|
|
employees fired, renters kicked out, IRS audits started
|
|
+ reports that a woman in Georgia who posted some "ULs"
|
|
(unlisted numbers?) was fired by her company after the
|
|
FBI got involved, told by her landlord that her lease was
|
|
not being extended, and so forth
|
|
- "We don't truck with no spies"
|
|
- the IRS audit would not ostensibly be for harassment, but
|
|
for "probable cause" (or whatever term they use) that tax
|
|
avoidance, under-reporting, even money-laundering might
|
|
be involved
|
|
16.26.8. Outlawing of Digital Pseudonyms and Credentialling
|
|
+ may echoe the misguided controversy over Caller ID
|
|
- misguided because the free market solution is clear: let
|
|
those who wish to hide their numbers-rape and battering
|
|
support numbers, police, detectives, or even just
|
|
citizens requesting services or whatever-do so
|
|
- and let those who refuse to deal with these anonymous
|
|
callers also do so (a simple enough programming of
|
|
answering machines and telephones)
|
|
- for example, to prevent minors and felons from using the
|
|
systems, "true names" may be required, with heavy fines and
|
|
forfeitures of equipment and assets for anybody that fails
|
|
to comply (or is caught in stings and setups)
|
|
+ minors may get screened out of parts of cyberspace by
|
|
mandatory "age credentialing" ("carding")
|
|
- this could be a major threat to such free and open
|
|
systems, as with the various flaps over minors logging on
|
|
to the Internet and seeing X-rated images (however poorly
|
|
rendered) or reading salacious material in alt.sex
|
|
- there may be some government mood to insist that only
|
|
"true names" be used, to facillitate such age screening
|
|
(Fiat-Shamir passports, papers, number of the Beast?)
|
|
+ the government may argue that digital pseudonyms are
|
|
presumptively considered to be part of a conspiracy, a
|
|
criminal enterprise, tax evasion, etc.
|
|
- the old "what have you got to hide" theory
|
|
- closely related to the issue of whether false IDs can be
|
|
used even when no crimes are being committed (that is,
|
|
can Joe Average represent himself by other than his True
|
|
Name?)
|
|
- civil libertarians may fight this ban, arguing that
|
|
Americans are not required to present "papers" to
|
|
authorities unless under direct suspicion for a crime
|
|
(never mind the loitering laws, which take the other view)
|
|
16.26.9. Anonymous systems may be restricted on the grounds that they
|
|
constitute a public nuisance
|
|
- or that they promote crime, espionage, etc.
|
|
+ especially after a few well-publicized abuses
|
|
- possibly instigated by the government?
|
|
- operators may have to post bonds that effectively drive
|
|
them out of business
|
|
16.26.10. Corporations may be effectively forbidden to hire consultants
|
|
or subcontractors as individuals
|
|
+ the practical issue: the welter of tax and benefit laws
|
|
make individuals unable to cope with the mountains of forms
|
|
that have to be filed
|
|
- thus effectively pricing individuals out of this market
|
|
+ the tax law side: recall the change in status of
|
|
consultants a few years back...this may be extended further
|
|
- a strategy for the IRS: require all computer network
|
|
users to have a "taxpayer ID number" for all
|
|
transactions, so that tax evasion can be checked
|
|
- not clear how this differs from the point above, but I
|
|
feel certain more such pressures will be applied (after
|
|
all, most corporations tend to see independent
|
|
contractors as more of a negative than a positive)
|
|
- this may be an agenda of the already established companies:
|
|
they see consultants and free lancers as thieves and
|
|
knaves, stealing their secrets and disseminating the crown
|
|
jewels (to punningly mix some metaphors)
|
|
- and since the networks discussed here facilitate the use of
|
|
consultants, more grounds to limit them
|
|
16.26.11. There may be calls for U.N. control of the world banking
|
|
system in the wake of the BCCI and similar scandals
|
|
- to "peirce the veil" on transnationals
|
|
- calls for an end to banking secrecy
|
|
- talk about denying access to the money centers of New York
|
|
(but will this push the business offshore, in parallel to
|
|
the Eurodollar market?)
|
|
+ motivations and methods
|
|
- recall the UNESCO attempt a few years back to credential
|
|
reporters, ostensibly to prevent chaos and "unfair"
|
|
reporting...well, the BCCI and nuclear arms deals
|
|
surfacing may reinvigorate the efforts of
|
|
"credentiallers"
|
|
+ the USSR and other countries entering the world community
|
|
may sense an opportunity to get in on the formation of
|
|
"boards of directors" of these kinds of banks and
|
|
corporations and so may push the idea in the U.N.
|
|
- sort of like a World Bank or IMF with even more power
|
|
to step in and take control of other banks, and with
|
|
the East Bloc and USSR having seats!
|
|
16.26.12. "National security"
|
|
- if the situation gets serious enough, a la a full-blown
|
|
crypto anarchy system, mightn't the government take the
|
|
step of declaring a kind of national emergency?
|
|
- provisions exist: "401 Emergency" and FEMA plans
|
|
- of course, the USSR tried to intitiate emergency measures
|
|
and failed
|
|
- recall that a major goal of crypto anarchy is that the
|
|
systems described here will be so widely deployed as to be
|
|
essential or critical to the overall economy...any attempt
|
|
to "pull the plug" will also kill the economy
|
|
16.26.13. Can authorities force the disclosure of a key?
|
|
+ on the "Yes" side:
|
|
+ is same, some say, as forcing combination to a safe
|
|
containing information or stolen goods
|
|
- but some say-and a court may have ruled on this-that
|
|
the safe can always be cut open and so the issue is
|
|
mostly moot
|
|
- while forcing key disclosure is compelled testimony
|
|
- and one can always claim to have forgotten the key
|
|
- i.e., what happens when a suspect simply clams up?
|
|
- but authorities can routinely demand cooperation in
|
|
investigations, can seize records, etc.
|
|
+ on the "No" side:
|
|
- can't force a suspect to talk, whether about where he hid
|
|
the loot or where his kidnap victim is hidden
|
|
- practically speaking, someone under indictment cannot be
|
|
forced to reveal Swiss bank accounts....this would seem
|
|
to be directly analogous to a cryptographic key
|
|
- thus, the key to open an account would seem to be the
|
|
same thing
|
|
- a memorized key cannot be forced, says someone with EFF
|
|
or CPSR
|
|
- on balance, it seems clear that the disclosure of
|
|
cryptographic keys cannot be forced (though the practical
|
|
penalty for nondisclosure could be severe)
|
|
- but this has not really been tested, so far as I know
|
|
- and many people say that such cooperation can be
|
|
demanded...
|
|
|
|
16.27. How Crypto Anarchy Advocates Will Fight Back
|
|
16.27.1. Bypassing restrictions on commercial encryption packages by
|
|
not making them "commercial"
|
|
- public domain
|
|
- freely distributed
|
|
- after all, the basic algorithms are simple and don't really
|
|
deserve patent protection: money will not be made by the
|
|
originators of the code, but by the actual providers of
|
|
services (for transmission and storage of packets)
|
|
16.27.2. Noise and signals are often indistinguishable
|
|
- as with the LSB audio signal approach...unless the
|
|
government outlaws live recordings or dubs on digital
|
|
systems...
|
|
16.27.3. Timed-release files (using encryption) will be used to hide
|
|
files, to ensure that governments cannot remove material they
|
|
don't like
|
|
- easier said than done
|
|
16.27.4. Legal approaches will also be taken: fundamental
|
|
constitutional issues
|
|
- privacy, free speech, free association
|
|
16.27.5. The Master Plan to Fight Restrictions on Encryption
|
|
+ "Genie out of the bottle" strategy: deploy crypto widely
|
|
- intertwined with religions, games, whistleblower groups,
|
|
and other uses that cannot easily just be shut down
|
|
- scattered in amongst many other activities
|
|
- Media attention: get media to report on value of
|
|
encryption, privacy, etc.
|
|
+ Diffusion, confusion, and refusion
|
|
- Diffuse the use by scattering it around
|
|
- Confuse the issue by fake religions, games, other uses
|
|
- Refuse to cooperate with the government
|
|
- Free speech arguments: calling the discussions free speech
|
|
and forcing the government to prove that the free speech is
|
|
actually an economic transaction
|
|
+ links with religions, corporations, etc.
|
|
- private meetings protected
|
|
- voting systems
|
|
|
|
16.28. Things that May Hide the Existence of Crypto Anarchy
|
|
16.28.1. first and foremost, the incredible bandwidth, the bits
|
|
sloshing around the world's networks...tapes being exchanged,
|
|
PCs calling other PCs, a variety of data and compression
|
|
formats, ISDN, wireless transmission, etc.
|
|
16.28.2. in the coming years, network traffic will jump a thousand-
|
|
fold, what with digital fax, cellular phones and computers,
|
|
ISDN, fiber optics, and higher-speed modems
|
|
- and these links will be of all kinds: local, private,
|
|
corporate, business, commercial, bootleg (unrecorded),
|
|
cellular radio, etc.
|
|
16.28.3. corporations and small groups will have their own private
|
|
LANs and networks, with massive bandwidth, and with little
|
|
prospects that the government can police them-there can be no
|
|
law requiring that internal communications be readable by the
|
|
government!
|
|
- and the revelations that Ultra Black has been used to read
|
|
messages and use the information will be further proof to
|
|
corporations that they need to adopt very strong security
|
|
measures
|
|
+ and "partnerships" can be scattered across the country, and
|
|
even internationally, and have great lattitude in setting
|
|
up their own communication and encryption systems
|
|
- recall Cargill case
|
|
- and also remember that the government may crack down on
|
|
these systems
|
|
16.28.4. AMIX-like services, new services, virtual reality (for games,
|
|
entertainment, or just as a place of doing business) etc.
|
|
+ many users will encrypt their links to VR servers, with a
|
|
decryption agent at the other end, so that their activities
|
|
(characters, fantasies, purchases, etc.) cannot be
|
|
monitored and logged
|
|
+ this will further increase the bandwidth of encrypted
|
|
data and will complicate further the work of the NSA and
|
|
similar agencies
|
|
- attempts to force "in the clear" links will be doomed
|
|
by the welter of PC standards, compression utilities,
|
|
cellular modems, and the like...there will be no
|
|
"cleartext" that can be mandated
|
|
16.28.5. steganography
|
|
+ in general, impossible to know that a message contains
|
|
other encypted messages
|
|
- except in stings and setups, which may be ruled illegal
|
|
+ the LSB method, and variants
|
|
+ LSB of DAT, DCC, MD, etc., or even sound bites (chunks of
|
|
sampled sounds traded on bulletin boards)
|
|
- especially of live or analog-dubbed copies (the noise
|
|
floor of a typical consumer-grade mike is much higher
|
|
than the LSB of DAT)
|
|
+ of images, Adobe Photoshop images, artwork, etc.
|
|
+ imagine an "Online Art Gallery" that is used to store
|
|
messages, or a "Photo Gallery" that participants post
|
|
their best photos to, offering them for sale
|
|
- Sturges case
|
|
- LSB method
|
|
+ gets into some theoretical nitpicking about the true
|
|
nature of noise, especially if the entire LSB channel is
|
|
uncharacteristic of "real noise"
|
|
- but by reducing the bandwidth somewhat, the noise
|
|
profile can be made essentially undistinguishable from
|
|
real noise
|
|
- and a 2 GB DAT produces 130 MB of LSB, which is a lot
|
|
of margin!
|
|
+ what could the government do?
|
|
- stings and setups to catch and scare off potential
|
|
users
|
|
- an attempt to limit the wide use of digital
|
|
data-hopeless!
|
|
+ a requirement for government-approved "dithering"?
|
|
- this would be an enforcement nightmare
|
|
+ and would only cause the system to be moved into
|
|
higher bits
|
|
- and with enough error correction, even audible
|
|
dithering of the signal would not wipe out the
|
|
encrypted signal
|
|
+ variants: text justification, word selection
|
|
- bandwidth tends to be low
|
|
- but used in Three Days of the Condor
|
|
+ virtual reality art may further enable private
|
|
communications
|
|
- think of what can be encrypted into such digital images!
|
|
- and user has total privacy and is able to manipulate the
|
|
images and databases locally
|
|
16.28.6. in the sense that these other things, such as the governments
|
|
own networks of safe houses, false identities, and bootleg
|
|
payoffs, will tend to hide any other such systems that emerge
|
|
+ because investigators may think they've stumbled onto yet
|
|
another intelligence operation, or sting, or whatever
|
|
- this routinely cripples undercover investigations
|
|
- scenario: criminals even float rumors that another agency
|
|
is doing an operation....?
|
|
16.28.7. Government Operations that Resemble Cryptoanarchy will
|
|
Confuse the Issues
|
|
- various confidential networks already exist, operated by
|
|
State, DoD, the services, etc.
|
|
+ Witness Protection Program (or Witness Relocation Program)
|
|
- false IDs, papers, transcripts
|
|
- even money given to them (and the amounts seem to be
|
|
downplayed in the press and on t.v., with a sudden spate
|
|
of shows about how poorly they do in the middle of middle
|
|
America-sounds like a planted story to me)
|
|
- cooperation with certain companies and schools to assist
|
|
in this aspect
|
|
+ Payoffs of informants, unofficial agents
|
|
- like agents in place inside defense contractors
|
|
- vast amount of tips from freelancers, foreign citizens,
|
|
etc.
|
|
- operators of safe houses (like Mrs. Furbershaw)
|
|
+ Networks of CIA-funded banks, for various purposes
|
|
- a la the Nugan-Hand Bank, BCCI, etc.
|
|
- First American, Bank of Atlanta, Centrust Savings, etc.
|
|
- these banks and S&Ls act as conduits for controversial or
|
|
secret operations, for temporary parking of funds, for
|
|
the banking of profits, and even for the private
|
|
retirement funds of agents (a winked-at practice)
|
|
+ Confidential networks over computer lines
|
|
- e.g., encrypted teleconferencing of Jasons, PFIAB, etc.
|
|
+ these will increase, for many reasons
|
|
- concerns over terrorism
|
|
- demands on time will limit travel (especially for
|
|
groups of non-fulltime committee members)
|
|
- these suspected government operations will deter
|
|
investigation
|
|
16.28.8. Encrypted Traffic Will Increase Dramatically
|
|
- of all kinds
|
|
- mail, images, proposals, faxes, etc.
|
|
- acceptance of a P-K mail system will make wide use of
|
|
encryption nearly automatic (though some fraction, perhaps
|
|
the majority, will not even bother)
|
|
+ there may even be legal reasons for encryption to increase:
|
|
- requirements that employee records be protected, that
|
|
medical records be protected, etc.
|
|
- "prudent man" rules about the theft of information (could
|
|
mean that files are to be encrypted except when being
|
|
worked on)
|
|
- digital signatures
|
|
- echoes of the COMSEC vs. SIGINT (or PROD) debate, where
|
|
COMSEC wants to see more encryption (to protect American
|
|
industry against Soviet and commercial espionage)
|
|
+ Selling of "Anonymous Mailers"?
|
|
- using RSA
|
|
+ avoiding RSA and the P-K patent morass
|
|
- could sell packets of one-time pads
|
|
+ no effective guarantee of security, but adequate for
|
|
many simple purposes
|
|
+ especially if buyers swap them with others
|
|
- but how to ensure that copies are not kept?
|
|
- idea is to enable a kind of "Democracy Wall"
|
|
+ prepaid "coins," purchased anonymously
|
|
- as with the Japanese phone cards
|
|
- or the various toll booth electronic tokens being
|
|
developed
|
|
16.28.9. Games, Religions, Legal Consultation, and Other "Covers" for
|
|
the Introduction and Proliferation of Crypto Anarchy
|
|
- won't be clear what is real encryption and what is game-
|
|
playing
|
|
- imagine a game called "Cryptoanarchy"!
|
|
+ Comment on these "Covers"
|
|
- some of these will be quite legitimate, others will be
|
|
deliberately set up as covers for the spread of CA
|
|
methods
|
|
- perhaps subsidized just to increase traffic (and
|
|
encrypted traffic is already expected to increase for a
|
|
variety of reasons)
|
|
- people will have various reasons for wanting anonymity
|
|
+ Games
|
|
+ "Habitat"-style games and systems
|
|
- with "handles" that are much more secure than at
|
|
present (recall Chip's comments)
|
|
+ behaviors that are closely akin to real-world illegal
|
|
behaviors:
|
|
- a thieves area
|
|
- an espionage game
|
|
- a "democracy wall" in which anything can be posted
|
|
anonymously, and read by all
|
|
+ MUDs (Multi-user Domains, Multi-User Dungeons)
|
|
- lots of interest here
|
|
- topic of discussion at a special Cypherpunks meeting,
|
|
early 1994.
|
|
+ interactive role-playing games will provide cover for the
|
|
spread of systems: pseudonyms will have much more
|
|
protection than they now have
|
|
- though various methods may exist to "tag" a transaction
|
|
(a la barium), especially when lots of bandwidth is
|
|
involved, for analysis (e.g., "Dark Dante" is
|
|
identified by attaching specific bits to stream)
|
|
+ Dealing with Barium Tracers
|
|
- code is allowed to simmer in an offsite machine for
|
|
some time (and with twiddling of system clock)
|
|
- mutations added
|
|
+ Shared Worlds
|
|
- authors, artists, game-players, etc. may add to these
|
|
worlds
|
|
- hypertext links, reputation-based systems
|
|
+ hypothesize a "True Names" game on the nets, based
|
|
_explicitly_ on Vinge's work
|
|
- perhaps from an outfit like Steve Jackson Games, maker
|
|
of similar role-playing games
|
|
- with variable-resolution graphics (a la Habitat)
|
|
- virtual reality capabilities
|
|
+ a game like "Habitat" can be used as a virtual Labyrinth,
|
|
further confusing the line between reality and fantasy
|
|
- and this could provide a lot of bandwidth for cover
|
|
- the Smalltalk "Cryptoids" idea is related to this...it
|
|
looks like a simulation or a game, but can be used by
|
|
"outsiders"
|
|
+ Religions
|
|
+ a nearly ironclad system of liberties, though _some_
|
|
limits exist
|
|
- e.g., a church that uses its organization to transport
|
|
drugs or run a gambling operation would be shut down
|
|
quickly (recall the drug church?)
|
|
- and calls for tax-break limitations (which Bill of
|
|
Rights says nothing about)
|
|
- still, it will be _very_ difficult for the U.S.
|
|
government to interfere with the communications of a
|
|
"religion."
|
|
+ "ConfessionNet"
|
|
+ a hypothetical anonymous system that allows confessions
|
|
to be heard, with all of the privileges of privacy that
|
|
normal confessions have
|
|
- successors to 900 numbers?
|
|
+ virtually ironclad protections against government
|
|
interference
|
|
- "Congress shall make no law..."
|
|
+ but governments may try to restrict who can do this, a
|
|
la the restrictions in the 70s and 80s on "instant
|
|
Reverends"
|
|
- Kirby J. Hensley's Univeral Life Church
|
|
- various IRS restrictions, effectively establishing
|
|
two classes of religions: those grandfathered in and
|
|
given tax breaks and the like, and those that were
|
|
deemed invalid in some way
|
|
+ Scenario: A Scientology-like cult using CA as its chief
|
|
communications system?
|
|
- levels of initiation same as a cell system
|
|
- "clearing"
|
|
- New Age garbage: Ascended Masters, cells, money flowing
|
|
back and forth
|
|
- blackballing
|
|
+ Digital Personals
|
|
- the "personals" section of newspapers currently requires
|
|
the newspaper to provide the anonymity (until the parties
|
|
mutually agree to meet)
|
|
- what about on AMIX or similar services?
|
|
- a fully digital system could allow self-arranging systems
|
|
+ here's how it could work:
|
|
- Alice wants to meet a man. She writes up a typical ad,
|
|
"SWF seeks SWM for fun and walks on the beach..."
|
|
- Alice encloses her specially-selected public key, which
|
|
is effectively her only name. This is probably a one-
|
|
time deal, unlinkable to her in any way.
|
|
- She encrypts the entire package and sends it through a
|
|
remailing chain (or DC-Net) for eventual posting in a
|
|
public place.
|
|
- Everyone can download the relevant area (messages can
|
|
be sorted by type, or organized in interest groups),
|
|
with nobody else knowing which messages they're
|
|
reading.
|
|
- Bob reads her message and decides to repond. He
|
|
digitizes a photo of himself and includes some other
|
|
info, but not his real name. He also picks a public key
|
|
for Alice to communicate with him.
|
|
- Bob encrypts all of this with the public key of Alice
|
|
(though remember that he has no way of knowing who she
|
|
really is).
|
|
- Bob sends this message through a remailing chain and it
|
|
gets posted as an encrypted message addressed to the
|
|
public key of Alice. Again, some organization can
|
|
reduce the total bandwidth (e.g., an area for
|
|
"Replies").
|
|
- Alice scans the replies and downloads a group of
|
|
messages that includes the one she can see-and only she
|
|
can see!-is addressed to her.
|
|
- This has established a two-way communication path
|
|
between Alice and Bob without either of them knowing
|
|
who the other one is or where they live. (The business
|
|
about the photos is of course not conducive to
|
|
anonymity, but is consistent with the "Personals"
|
|
mode.)
|
|
- If Alice and Bob wish to meet in person it is then easy
|
|
for them to communicate real phone numbers and the
|
|
like.
|
|
+ Why is this interesting?
|
|
- it establishes a role for anonymous systems
|
|
- it could increase the bandwidth of such messages
|
|
+ Legal Services (Legitimate, i.e., not even the bootleg
|
|
stuff)
|
|
+ protected by attorney-client privileges, but various Bar
|
|
Associations may place limits on the use of networks
|
|
- but if viewed the way phones are, seems unlikely that
|
|
Bars could do much to limit the use of computer
|
|
networks
|
|
- and suppose a Nolo Press-type publishing venture started
|
|
up on the Nets? (publishing self-help info under
|
|
pseudonyms)
|
|
- or the scam to avoid taxes by incorporating as a
|
|
corporation or nonprofit?
|
|
+ Voting Systems
|
|
- with and without anonymity
|
|
+ Board of Directors-type voting
|
|
- with credentials, passwords, and (maybe) anonymity
|
|
(under certain conditions)
|
|
+ Blackballing and Memberships
|
|
- generally anonymous
|
|
- blackballing may be illegal these days (concerns about
|
|
racism, sexism, etc.)
|
|
- cf. Salomaa for discussion of indistinguishability of
|
|
blackballing from majority voting
|
|
+ Consumer Ratings and Evaluations
|
|
- e.g., there may be "guaranteed anonymous" evalution
|
|
systems for software and other high-tech items (Joe
|
|
Bluecollar won't mess with computers and complicated
|
|
voting systems)
|
|
+ Politically Active Groups May Have Anonymous Voting
|
|
- to vote on group policies, procedures, leadership
|
|
- or on boycott lists (recall the idea of the PC-Card
|
|
that doesn't allow politically incorrect purchases)
|
|
+ this may be to protect themselves from lawsuits (SLAPP)
|
|
and government harassment
|
|
- they fear government infiltrators will get the names
|
|
of voters and how they voted
|
|
+ Official Elections
|
|
- though this is unlikely for the barely-literate
|
|
majority
|
|
- the inevitable fraud cases will get wide exposure and
|
|
scare people and politicians off even more
|
|
- unlikely in next decade
|
|
+ Journal Refereeing
|
|
- some journals, such as Journal of Cryptology,
|
|
appropriately enough, are already using paper-based
|
|
versions of this
|
|
+ Xanadu-like systems may be early adopters
|
|
- there are of course reasons for just the opposite:
|
|
enhanced used of reputations
|
|
- but in some cases anonymity may be preferred
|
|
+ Groupware
|
|
- anonymous comment systems (picture a digital blackboard
|
|
with anonymous remarks showing up)
|
|
- these systems are promoted to encourage the quiet to have
|
|
an equal voice
|
|
- but they also provide another path to anonymous and/or
|
|
reputation-based systems
|
|
+ Psychological Consultations
|
|
- will require the licensing of counselors, of course
|
|
(under U.S. laws)
|
|
- what if people call offshore counselors?
|
|
+ and various limitations on privacy of records exist
|
|
- Tarisoff [spelling?]
|
|
- subpoenas
|
|
- record-keeping required
|
|
+ may be used by various "politically correct" groups
|
|
- battered women
|
|
- abused children
|
|
- perhaps in conjunction with the RU-486-type issues,
|
|
some common ground can be established (a new kind of
|
|
Underground Railroad)
|
|
+ Advice on Medicine (a la AIDS, RU 486)
|
|
- anonymity needed to protect against lawsuits and seizure
|
|
- NOW and other feminist groups could use crypto anarchy
|
|
methods to reduce the risks to their organizations
|
|
+ Anonymous Tip Lines, Whistleblower Services
|
|
+ for example, a newspaper might set up a reward system,
|
|
using the crypto equivalent of the "torn paper" key
|
|
- where informant holds onto the torn off "key"
|
|
- even something like the James Randi/Yuri Geller case
|
|
reveals that "anonymous critics" may become more common
|
|
+ corporate and defense contractor whistleblowers may seek
|
|
protection through crypto methods
|
|
- a "Deep Throat" who uses bulletin boards to communicate
|
|
with DS?
|
|
+ this presumes much wider use of computers and modems by
|
|
"average" people...and I doubt "Prodigy"-type systems
|
|
will support these activities!
|
|
- but there may be cheap systems based on video game
|
|
machines, a la the proposed Nintendo computers
|
|
- environmentalists set up these whistleblower lines, for
|
|
people to report illegal logging, spraying, etc.
|
|
+ Online, "Instant" Corporations
|
|
+ shell companies, duly incorporated in Delaware or
|
|
wherever (perhaps even foreign sites) are "sold" to
|
|
participants who wish to create a corporate cover for
|
|
their activities
|
|
- so that AMIX-like fees are part of the "internal
|
|
accounting"
|
|
+ Anonymous collaborative writing and criticism
|
|
- similar to anonymous voting
|
|
16.28.10. Compressed traffic will similarly increase
|
|
- and many compression algortithms will offer some form of
|
|
encryption as a freebie
|
|
- and will be difficult to decypher, based just on sheer
|
|
volume
|
|
- files will have to at least be decompressed before key word
|
|
searches can be done (though there may be shortcuts)
|
|
|
|
16.29. The Coming Phase Change
|
|
16.29.1. "We'd better hope that strong cypto, cheap telecoms and free
|
|
markets can provide the organizing basis for a workable
|
|
society because it is clear that coercion as an organizing
|
|
principle ain't what it used to be." [Duncan Frissell, in
|
|
his sig, 4-13-94]
|
|
16.29.2. "What is the "inevitability" argument?"
|
|
- Often made by me (Tim May), Duncan Frissell, Sandy
|
|
Sandfort, and Perry Metzger (with some twists). And Hal
|
|
Finney takes issue with certain aspects and contributes
|
|
incisive critiques.
|
|
+ Reasons:
|
|
- borders becoming more transparent to data flow
|
|
- encryption is not detectable/stoppable
|
|
- derivative financial instruments, money sloshing across
|
|
borders
|
|
- transnationalism
|
|
- cash machines, wire transfers
|
|
- "permanent tourists"
|
|
- Borders are becoming utterly transparent to massive data
|
|
flows. The rapid export of crypto is but an ironic example
|
|
of this. Mosaid, ftp, gopher, lynx...all cross borders
|
|
fluidly and nearly untraceably. It is probably too late to
|
|
stop these systems, short of "pulling the plug" on the Net,
|
|
and this pulling the plug is simply too expensive to
|
|
consider. (If the Feds ever really figure out the long-
|
|
range implications of this stuff, they may try it...but
|
|
probably not.)
|
|
16.29.3. "What is the "crypto phase change"?"
|
|
- I'm normally skeptical of claims that a "singularity" is
|
|
coming (nanotechnology being the usual place this is
|
|
claimed, a la Vinge), but "phase changes" are more
|
|
plausible. The effect of cheap printing was one such phase
|
|
change, altering the connectivity of society and the
|
|
dispersion of knowledge in a way that can best be described
|
|
as a phase change. The effects of strong crypto, and the
|
|
related ideas of digital cash, anonymous markets, etc., are
|
|
likely to be similar.
|
|
- transition
|
|
- tipping factors, disgust by populace, runaway taxation
|
|
+ "leverage effect"
|
|
- what Kelly called "the fax effect"
|
|
- crypto use spreads, made more popular by common use
|
|
- can nucleate in a small group...doesn't need mass
|
|
acceptance
|
|
16.29.4. "Can crypto anarchy be stopped?"
|
|
+ A goal is to get crypto widely enough deployed that it
|
|
cannot then be stopped
|
|
- to the point of no return, where the cost of withdrawing
|
|
or banning a technology is simply too high (not always a
|
|
guaranteee)
|
|
- The only recourse is a police state in which homes and
|
|
businesses are randomly entered and searched, in which
|
|
cryptography is outlawed and vigorously prosecuted, in
|
|
which wiretaps, video surveillance, and other forms of
|
|
surveillance are used aggressively, and in which perhaps
|
|
the very possession of computers and modems is restricted.
|
|
- Anything short of these police state tactics will allow the
|
|
development of the ideas discussed here. To some extent.
|
|
But enough to trigger the transition to a mostly crypto
|
|
anarchic situation.
|
|
- (This doesn't mean everyone, or even most, will use crypto
|
|
anarchy.)
|
|
16.29.5. Need not be a universal or even popular trend
|
|
- even if restricted to a minority, can be very influential
|
|
- George Soros, Quantum fund, central banks, Spain, Britain,
|
|
Germany
|
|
- and a minority trend can affect others
|
|
16.29.6. "National borders are just speedbumps on the digital
|
|
superhighway."
|
|
16.29.7. "Does crypto anarchy have to be a mass movement to succeed?"
|
|
- Given that only a tiny fraction is now aware of the
|
|
implications....
|
|
+ Precedents for "vanguard" movements
|
|
+ high finance in general is an elite thing
|
|
- Eurodollars, interest rate swaps, etc....not exactly
|
|
Joe Average...and yet of incredible importance (George
|
|
Soros has affected European central bank policy)
|
|
- smuggling is in general not a mass thing
|
|
- etc.
|
|
+ Thus, the users of crypto anarchic tools and instruments
|
|
can have an effect out of proportion to their numbers
|
|
- others will start to use
|
|
- resentment by the "suckers" will build
|
|
- the services themselves--the data havens, the credit
|
|
registries, the espionage markets--will of course have a
|
|
real effect
|
|
16.29.8. Strong crypto does not mean the end to law enforcement
|
|
- "...cryptography is not by any means a magic shield for
|
|
criminals. It eliminates, perhaps, one avenue by which
|
|
crimes might be discovered. However, it is most certainly
|
|
not the case that someone who places an open anonymous
|
|
contract for a murder in an open forum is doing so "risk
|
|
free". There are *plenty* of ways she might be found out.
|
|
Likewise, big secret societies that nefariously undermine
|
|
the free world via cryptography are as vulnerable as ever
|
|
to the motivations of their own members to expose the
|
|
groups in a double-cross." [Mike McNally, 1994-09-09]
|
|
|
|
16.30. Loose Ends
|
|
16.30.1. governments may try to ban the use of encryption in any
|
|
broadcast system, no matter how low the power, because of a
|
|
realization that all of them can be used for crypto anarchy
|
|
and espionage
|
|
- a losing battle, of course, what with wireless LANs of
|
|
several flavors, cellular modems, the ability to hide
|
|
information, and just the huge increase in bandwidth
|
|
16.30.2. "tontines"
|
|
- Eric Hughes wrote up some stuff on this in 1992 [try to get
|
|
it]
|
|
- Italian pseudo-insurance arrangements
|
|
- "digital tontines"?
|
|
16.30.3. Even in market anarchies, there are times when a top-down,
|
|
enforced set of behaviors is desirable. However, instead of
|
|
being enforced by threat of violence, the market itself
|
|
enforces a standard.
|
|
- For example, the Macintosh OS, with standardized commands
|
|
that program developers are "encouraged" to use. Deviations
|
|
are obviously allowed, but the market tends to punish such
|
|
deviations. (This has been useful in avoiding modal
|
|
software, where the same keystroke sequence might save a
|
|
file in one program and erase it in another. Sadly, the
|
|
complexity of modern software has outpaced the Mac OS
|
|
system, so that Command-Option Y often does different
|
|
things in different programs.)
|
|
- Market standards are a noncoercive counter to total chaos.
|
|
16.30.4. Of course, nothing stops people from hiring financial
|
|
advisors, lawyers, and even "Protectors" to shield them from
|
|
the predations of others. Widows and orphans could choose
|
|
conservative conservators, while young turks could choose to
|
|
go it alone.
|
|
16.30.5. on who can tolerate crypto anarchy
|
|
- Not much different here from how things have been in the
|
|
past. Caveat emptor. Look out for Number One. Beware of
|
|
snake oil.
|
|
16.30.6. Local enforcement of rules rather than global rules
|
|
+ e.g., flooding of Usenet with advertising and chain letters
|
|
+ two main approaches
|
|
- ban such things, or set quotas, global acceptable use
|
|
policies, etc. (or use tort law to prosecute & collect
|
|
damages)
|
|
- local carrriers decide what they will and will not
|
|
carry, and how much they'll charge
|
|
- it's the old rationing vs. market pricing argument
|
|
16.30.7. Locality is a powerful concept
|
|
- self-responsibility
|
|
- who better to make decisions than those affected?
|
|
- tighter feedback loops
|
|
- avoids large-scale governments
|
|
+ Nonlocally-arranged systems often result in calls to stop
|
|
"hogging" of resources, and general rancor and envy
|
|
+ water consumption is the best example: anybody seen
|
|
"wasting" water, regardless of their conservations
|
|
elsewhere or there priorities, is chastised and rebuked.
|
|
Sometimes the water police are called.
|
|
- the costs involved (perhaps a few pennies worth of
|
|
water, to wash a car or water some roses) are often
|
|
trivial...meanwhile, billions of acre-feet of water are
|
|
sold far below cost to farmers who grow monsoon crops
|
|
like rice in the California desert
|
|
- this hypocrisy is high on my list of reasons why free
|
|
markets are morally preferable to rationing-based
|
|
systems
|