1130 lines
63 KiB
Markdown
1130 lines
63 KiB
Markdown
13. Activism and Projects
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13.1. copyright
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THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666,
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1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved.
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See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair
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use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your
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name on my words.
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13.2. SUMMARY: Activism and Projects
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13.2.1. Main Points
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13.2.2. Connections to Other Sections
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13.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information
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13.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments
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13.3. Activism is a Tough Job
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13.3.1. "herding cats"..trying to change the world through
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exhortation seems a particulary ineffective notion
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13.3.2. There's always been a lot of wasted time and rhetoric on the
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Cypherpunks list as various people tried to get others to
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follow their lead, to adopt their vision. (Nothing wrong with
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this, if done properly. If someone leads by example, or has a
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particularly compelling vision or plan, this may naturally
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happen. Too often, though, the situation was that someone's
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vague plans for a product were declared by them to be the
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standards that others should follow. Various schemes for
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digital money, in many forms and modes, has always been the
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prime example of this.)
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13.3.3. This is related also to what Kevin Kelley calls "the fax
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effect." When few people own fax machines, they're not of
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much use. Trying to get others to use the same tools one has
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is like trying to convince people to buy fax machines so that
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you can communicate by fax with them...it may happen, but
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probably for other reasons. (Happily, the interoperability of
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PGP provided a common communications medium that had been
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lacking with previous platform-specific cipher programs.)
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13.3.4. Utopian schemes are also a tough sell. Schemes about using
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digital money to make inflation impossible, schemes to
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collect taxes with anonymous systems, etc.
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13.3.5. Harry Browne's "How I Found Freedom in an Unfree World" is
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well worth reading; he advises against getting upset and
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frustrated that the world is not moving in the direction one
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would like.
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13.4. Cypherpunks Projects
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13.4.1. "What are Cypherpunks projects?"
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- Always a key part--perhaps _the_ key part--of Cypherpunks
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activity. "Cypherpunks write code." From work on PGP to
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remailers to crypto toolkits to FOIA requests, and a bunch
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of other things, Cypherpunks hack the system in various
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ways.
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- Matt Blaze's LEAF blower, Phil Karn's "swIPe" system, Peter
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Wayner's articles....all are examples. (Many Cypherpunks
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projects are also done, or primarily done, for other
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reasons, so we cannot in all cases claim credit for this
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work.)
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13.4.2. Extensions to PGP
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13.4.3. Spread of PGP and crypto in general.
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- education
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- diskettes containing essays, programs
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- ftp sites
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- raves, conventions, gatherings
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13.4.4. Remailers
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+ ideal Chaumian mix has certain properties
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- latency to foil traffic analysis
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- encryption
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- no records kept (hardware tamper-resistance, etc.)
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- Cyperpunks remailers
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- julf remailers
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+ abuses
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- flooding, because mail transmission costs are not borne
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by sender
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+ anonymity produces potential for abuses
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- death threats, extortion
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- Progress continues, with new features added. See the
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discussion in the remailers section.
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13.4.5. Steganography
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- hiding the existence of a message, for at least some amount
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of time
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- security through obscurity
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- invisible ink, microdots
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+ Uses
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- in case crypto is outawed, may be useful to avoid
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authorities
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- if enough people do it, increases the difficulty of
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enforcing anti-crypto laws (all
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+ Stego
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- JSTEG:
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soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/applications/jsteg
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- Stego: sumex-aim.stanford.edu
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13.4.6. Anonymous Transaction Systems
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13.4.7. Voice Encryption, Voice PGP
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- Clipper, getting genie out of bottle
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- CELP, compression, DSPs
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- SoundBlaster approach...may not have enough processing
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power
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+ hardware vs. pure software
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- newer Macs, including av Macs and System 7 Pro, have
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interesting capabilities
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+ Zimmermann's plans have been widely publicized, that he is
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looking for donations, that he is seeking programming help,
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etc.
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- which does not bode well for seeing such a product from
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him
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- frankly, I expect it will come from someone else
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- Eric Blossom is pursuing own hardware board, based on 2105
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+ "Is anyone building encrypted telephones?"
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-
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+ Yes, several such projects are underway. Eric Blossom
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even showed a
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- PCB of one at a Cypherpunks meeting, using an
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inexpensive DSP chip.
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-
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+ Software-only versions, with some compromises in speech
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quality
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- probably, are also underway. Phil Zimmermann
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described his progress at
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+ the last Cypherpunks meeting.
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-
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- ("Software-only" can mean using off-the-shelf, widely-
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available DSP
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+ boards like SoundBlasters.)
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-
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- And I know of at least two more such projects.
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Whether any will
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+ materialize is anyone's guess.
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-
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- And various hacks have already been done. NeXT users
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have had
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- voicemail for years, and certain Macs now offer
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something similar.
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+ Adding encryption is not a huge obstacle.
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-
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- A year ago, several Cypherpunks meeting sites around
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the U.S. were
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- linked over the Internet using DES encryption. The
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sound quality was
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- poor, for various reasons, and we turned off the DES
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in a matter of
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- minutes. Still, an encrypted audio conference call.
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13.4.8. DC-Nets
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- What it is, how it works
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- Chaum's complete 1988 "Journal of Cryptology" article is
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available at the Cypherpunks archive site,
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ftp.soda.csua.edu, in /pub/cypherpunks
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+ Dining Cryptographers Protocols, aka "DC Nets"
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+ "What is the Dining Cryptographers Problem, and why is it
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so important?"
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+ This is dealt with in the main section, but here's
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David Chaum's Abstract, from his 1988 paper"
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- Abstract: "Keeping confidential who sends which
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messages, in a world where any physical transmission
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can be traced to its origin, seems impossible. The
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solution presented here is unconditionally or
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cryptographically secure, depending on whether it is
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based on one-time-use keys or on public keys.
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respectively. It can be adapted to address
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efficiently a wide variety of practical
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considerations." ["The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
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Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability,"
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David Chaum, Journal of Cryptology, I, 1, 1988.]
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-
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- DC-nets have yet to be implemented, so far as I know,
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but they represent a "purer" version of the physical
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remailers we are all so familiar with now. Someday
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they'll have have a major impact. (I'm a bigger fan of
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this work than many seem to be, as there is little
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discussion in sci.crypt and the like.)
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+ "The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender
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and Recipient Untraceability," David Chaum, Journal of
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Cryptology, I, 1, 1988.
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- available courtesy of the Information Liberation Front
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at the soda.csua.berkeley.edu site
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- Abstract: "Keeping confidential who sends which
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messages, in a world where any physical transmission
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can be traced to its origin, seems impossible. The
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solution presented here is unconditionally or
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cryptographically secure, depending on whether it is
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based on one-time-use keys or on public keys.
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respectively. It can be adapted to address efficiently
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a wide variety of practical considerations." ["The
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Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and
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Recipient Untraceability," David Chaum, Journal of
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Cryptology, I, 1, 1988.]
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- Note that the initials "D.C." have several related
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meanings: Dining Cryptographers, Digital Cash/DigiCash,
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and David Chaum. Coincidence?
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+ Informal Explanation
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- Note: I've posted this explanation, and variants,
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several times since I first wrote it in mid-1992. In
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fact, I first posted it on the "Extropians" mailing
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list, as "Cypherpunks" did not then exist.
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- Three Cypherpunks are having dinner, perhaps in Palo
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Alto. Their waiter tells them that their bill has
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already been paid, either by the NSA or by one of them.
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The waiter won't say more. The Cypherpunks wish to know
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whether one of them paid, or the NSA paid. But they
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don't want to be impolite and force the Cypherpunk
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payer to 'fess up, so they carry out this protocol (or
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procedure):
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Each Cypherpunk flips a fair coin behind a menu placed
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upright between himself and the Cypherpunk on his
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right. The coin is visible to himself AND to the
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Cypherpunk on his left. Each Cypherpunk can see his own
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coin and the coin to his right. (STOP RIGHT HERE!
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Please take the time to make a sketch of the situation
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I've described. If you lost it here, all that follows
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will be a blur. It's too bad the state of the Net today
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cannot support figures and diagrams easily.)
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Each Cypherpunk then states out loud whether the two
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coins he can see are the SAME or are DIFFERENT, e.g.,
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"Heads-Tails" means DIFFERENT, and so forth. For now,
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assume the Cypherpunks are truthful. A little bit of
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thinking shows that the total number of "DIFFERENCES"
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must be either 0 (the coins all came up the same), or
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2. Odd parity is impossible.
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Now the Cypherpunks agree that if one of them paid, he
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or she will SAY THE OPPOSITE of what they actually see.
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Remember, they don't announce what their coin turned up
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as, only whether it was the same or different as their
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neighbor.
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Suppose none of them paid, i.e., the NSA paid. Then
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they all report the truth and the parity is even
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(either 0 or 2 differences). They then know the NSA
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paid.
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Suppose one of them paid the bill. He reports the
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opposite of what he actually sees, and the parity is
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suddenly odd. That is, there is 1 difference reported.
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The Cypherpunks now know that one of them paid. But can
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they determine which one?
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Suppose you are one of the Cypherpunks and you know you
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didn't pay. One of the other two did. You either
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reported SAME or DIFFERENT, based on what your neighbor
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to the right (whose coin you can see) had. But you
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can't tell which of the other two is lying! (You can
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see you right-hand neighbor's coin, but you can't see
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the coin he sees to his right!)
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This all generalizes to any number of people. If none
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of them paid, the parity is even. If one of them paid,
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the parity is odd. But which one of them paid cannot be
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deduced. And it should be clear that each round can
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transmit a bit, e.g., "I paid" is a "1". The message
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"Attack at dawn" could thus be "sent" untraceably with
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multiple rounds of the protocol.
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- The "Crypto Ouija Board": I explain this to people as a
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kind of ouija board. A message, like "I paid" or a more
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interesting "Transfer funds from.....," just "emerges"
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out of the group, with no means of knowing where it
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came from. Truly astounding.
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+ Problems and Pitfalls
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- In Chaum's paper, the explanation above is given
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quickly, in a few pages. The _rest_ of the paper is
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then devoted to dealing with the many "gotchas" and
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attacks that come up and that must be dealt with before
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the DC protocol is even remotely possible. I think all
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those interested in protocol design should read this
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paper, and the follow-on papers by Bos, Pfitzmann,
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etc., as object lessons for dealing with complex crypto
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protocols.
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+ The Problems:
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- 1. Collusion. Obviously the Cypherpunks can collude
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to deduce the payer. This is best dealt with by
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creating multiple subcircuits (groups doing the
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protocol amongst themselves). Lots more stuff here.
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Chaum devotes most of the paper to these kind of
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issues and their solutions.
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2. With each round of this protocol, a single bit is
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transmitted. Sending a long message means many coin
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flips. Instead of coins and menus, the neighbors
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would exchange lists of random numbers (with the
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right partners, as per the protocol above, of course.
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Details are easy to figure out.)
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3. Since the lists are essentially one-time pads, the
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protocol is unconditionally secure, i.e., no
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assumptions are made about the difficulty of
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factoring large numbers or any other crypto
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assumptions.
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4. Participants in such a "DC-Net" (and here we are
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coming to the heart of the "crypto anarchy" idea)
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could exchange CD-ROMs or DATs, giving them enough
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"coin flips" for zillions of messages, all
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untraceable! The logistics are not simple, but one
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can imagine personal devices, like smart card or
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Apple "Newtons," that can handle these protocols
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(early applications may be for untraceable
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brainstorming comments, secure voting in corportate
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settings, etc.)
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5. The lists of random numbers (coin flips) can be
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generated with standard cryptographic methods,
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requiring only a key to be exchanged between the
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appropriate participants. This eliminates the need
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for the one-time pad, but means the method is now
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only cryptographically secure, which is often
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sufficient. (Don't think "only cryptographically
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secure" means insecure....the messages may remain
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encrypted for the next billion years)
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6. Collisions occur when multiple messages are sent
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at the same time. Various schemes can be devised to
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handle this, like backing off when you detect another
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sender (when even parity is seen instead of odd
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parity). In large systems this is likely to be a
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problem. Deliberate disruption, or spamming, is a
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major problem--a disruptor can shut down the DC-net
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by sending bits out. As with remailes, anonymity
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means freedom from detection. (Anonymous payments to
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send a message may help, but the details are murky to
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me.)
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+ Uses
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- * Untraceable mail. Useful for avoiding censorship, for
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avoiding lawsuits, and for all kinds of crypto anarchy
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things.
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- * Fully anonymous bulletin boards, with no traceability
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of postings or responses. Illegal materials can be
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offered for sale (my 1987 canonical example, which
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freaked out a few people: "Stealth bomber blueprints
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for sale. Post highest offer and include public key.").
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Think for a few minutes about this and you'll see the
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profound implications.
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- * Decentralized nexus of activity. Since messages
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"emerge" (a la the ouija board metaphor), there is no
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central posting area. Nothing for the government to
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shut down, complete deniability by the participants.
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- * Only you know who your a partners are....in any given
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circuit. And you can be in as many circuits as you
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wish. (Payments can be made to others, to create a
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profit motive. I won't deal with this issue, or with
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the issue of how reputations are handled, here.)
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- It should be clear that DC-nets offer some amazing
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opportunities. They have not been implemented at all, and
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have received almost no attention compared to ordinary
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Cypherpunks remailers. Why is this? The programming
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complexity (and the underlying cryptographic primitives
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that are needed) seems to be the key. Several groups have
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announced plans to imlement some form of DC-net, but
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nothing has appeared.
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- software vs. hardware,
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- Yanek Martinson, Strick, Austin group, Rishab
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- IMO, this is an ideal project for testing the efficacy of
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software toolkits. The primitives needed, including bit
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commitment, synchronization, and collusion handling, are
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severe tests of crypto systems. On the downside, I doubt
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that even the Pfaltzmans or Bos has pulled off a running
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simulation...
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13.4.9. D-H sockets, UNIX, swIPe
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+ swIPe
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- Matt Blaze, John I. (did coding), Phil Karn, Perry
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Metzger, etc. are the main folks involved
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- evolved from "mobile IP," with radio links, routing
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- virtual networks
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- putting encryption in at the IP level, transparently
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- bypassing national borders
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- Karn
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- at soda site
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+ swIPe system, for routing packets
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- end to end, gateways, links, Mach, SunOS
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13.4.10. Digital Money, Banks, Credit Unions
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- Magic Money
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- Digital Bank
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- "Open Encrypted Books"
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- not easy to do...laws, regulations, expertise in banking
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- technical flaws, issues in digital money
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+ several approaches
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- clearing
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- tokens, stamps, coupons
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- anonymity-protected transactions
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13.4.11. Data Havens
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+ financial info, credit reports
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- bypassing local jurisdictions, time limits, arcane rules
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- reputations
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- insider trading
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- medical
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- technical, scientific, patents
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- crypto information (recursively enough)
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- need not be any known location....distributed in
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cyberspace
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- One of the most commercially interesting applications.
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13.4.12. Related Technologies
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- Agorics
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- Evolutionary Systems
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- Virtual Reality and Cyberspace
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- Agents
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+ Computer Security
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+ Kerberos, Gnu, passwords
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- recent controversy
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- demon installed to watch packets
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- Cygnus will release it for free
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- GuardWire
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+ Van Eck, HERF, EMP
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- Once Cypherpunk project proposed early on was the
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duplication of certain NSA capabilities to monitor
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electronic communications. This involves "van Eck"
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radiation (RF) emitted by the CRTs and other electronics
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of computers.
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+ Probably for several reasons, this has not been pursued,
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at least not publically.
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- legality
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- costs
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- difficulty in finding targets of opportunity
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- not a very CPish project!
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13.4.13. Matt Blaze, AT&T, various projects
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+ a different model of trust...multiple universes
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- not heierarchical interfaces, but mistrust of interfaces
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- heterogeneous
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- where to put encryption, where to mistrust, etc.
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+ wants crypto at lowest level that is possible
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- almost everything should be mistrusted
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- every mistrusted interface shoud be cryptographically
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protected...authentication, encryption
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+ "black pages"---support for cryptographic communication
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- "pages of color"
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- a collection of network services that identiy and deliver
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security information as needed....keys, who he trusts,
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protocols, etc.
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+ front end: high-level API for security requirements
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- like DNS? caching models?
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- trusted local agent....
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+ "people not even born yet" (backup tapes of Internet
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communications)
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- tapes stored in mountains, access by much more powerful
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computers
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+ "Crytptographic File System" (CFS)
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- file encryption
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- no single DES mode appears to be adequate...a mix of
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modes
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+ swIPe system, for routing packets
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- end to end, gateways, links, Mach, SunOS
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13.4.14. Software Toolkits
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+ Henry Strickland's TCL-based toolkit for crypto
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- other Cypherpunks, including Hal Finney and Marianne
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Mueller, have expressed good opinions of TCL and TCL-TK
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(toolkit)
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- Pr0duct Cypher's toolkit
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- C++ Class Libraries
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- VMX, Visual Basic, Visual C++
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- Smalltalk
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13.5. Responses to Our Projects (Attacks, Challenges)
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13.5.1. "What are the likely attitudes toward mainstream Cypherpunks
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projects, such as remailers, encryption, etc.?"
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- Reaction has already been largely favorable. Journalists
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such as Steven Levy, Kevin Kelly, John Markoff, and Julian
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Dibbell have written favorably. Reaction of people I have
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talked to has also been mostly favorable.
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13.5.2. "What are the likely attitudes toward the more outre
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projects, such as digital money, crypto anarchy, data havens,
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and the like?"
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- Consternation is often met. People are frightened.
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- The journalists who have written about these things (those
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mentioned above) have gotten beyond the initial reaction
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and seem genuinely intrigued by the changes that are
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coming.
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13.5.3. "What kinds of _attacks_ can we expect?"
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+ Depends on the projects, but some general sorts of attacks
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are likely. Some have already occurred. Examples:
|
|
* flooding of remailers, denial of service attacks--to
|
|
swamp systems and force remailers to reconsider
|
|
operations
|
|
- this is fixed (mostly) with "digital postage" (if
|
|
postage covers costs, and generates a profit, then the
|
|
more the better)
|
|
* deliberately illegal or malicicious messages, such as
|
|
death threats
|
|
- designed to put legal and sysop pressures on the
|
|
remailer operator
|
|
- several remailers have been attacked this way, or at
|
|
least have had these messages
|
|
- source-blocking sometimes works, though not of course
|
|
if another remailer is first used (many issues here)
|
|
* prosecution for content of posts
|
|
+ copyright violations
|
|
- e.g., forwarding ClariNet articles through Hal
|
|
Finney's remailer got Brad Templeton to write warning
|
|
letters to Hal
|
|
- pornography
|
|
- ITAR violations, Trading with the Enemy Act
|
|
- espionage, sedition, treason
|
|
- corporate secrets,
|
|
- These attacks will test the commitment and courage of
|
|
remailer or anonymizing service operators
|
|
|
|
13.6. Deploying Crypto
|
|
13.6.1. "How can Cypherpunks publicize crypto and PGP?"
|
|
- articles, editorials, radio shows, talking with friends
|
|
- The Net itself is probably the best place to publicize the
|
|
problems with Clipper and key escrow. The Net played a
|
|
major role--perhaps the dominant role--in generating scorn
|
|
for Clipper. In many way the themes debated here on the Net
|
|
have tremendous influence on media reaction, on editorials,
|
|
on organizational reactions, and of course on the opinion
|
|
of technical folks. News spreads quickly, zillions of
|
|
theories are aired and debated, and consensus tends to
|
|
emerge quickly.
|
|
- raves, Draper
|
|
- Libertarian Party, anarchists...
|
|
+ conferences and trade shows
|
|
- Arsen Ray Arachelian passed out diskettes at PC Expo
|
|
13.6.2. "What are the Stumbling Blocks to Greater Use of Encryption
|
|
(Cultural, Legal, Ethical)?"
|
|
+ "It's too hard to use"
|
|
- multiple protocols (just consider how hard it is to
|
|
actually send encrypted messages between people today)
|
|
- the need to remember a password or passphrase
|
|
+ "It's too much trouble"
|
|
- the argument being that people will not bother to use
|
|
passwords
|
|
- partly because they don't think anything will happen to
|
|
them
|
|
+ "What have you got to hide?"
|
|
- e.g.,, imagine some comments I'd have gotten at Intel had
|
|
I encrypted everything
|
|
- and governments tend to view encryption as ipso facto
|
|
proof that illegalities are being committed: drugs, money
|
|
laundering, tax evasion
|
|
- recall the "forfeiture" controversy
|
|
- BTW, anonymous systems are essentially the ultimate merit
|
|
system (in the obvious sense) and so fly in the face of the
|
|
"hiring by the numbers" de facto quota systems now
|
|
creeeping in to so many areas of life....there may be rules
|
|
requiring all business dealings to keep track of the sex,
|
|
race, and "ability group" (I'm kidding, I hope) of their
|
|
employees and their consultants
|
|
+ Courts Are Falling Behind, Are Overcrowded, and Can't Deal
|
|
Adequately with New Issues-Such as Encryption and Cryonics
|
|
- which raises the issue of the "Science Court" again
|
|
- and migration to private adjudication
|
|
- scenario: any trials that are being decided in 1998-9
|
|
will have to have been started in 1996 and based on
|
|
technology and decisions of around 1994
|
|
+ Government is taking various steps to limit the use of
|
|
encryption and secure communication
|
|
- some attempts have failed (S.266), some have been
|
|
shelved, and almost none have yet been tested in the
|
|
courts
|
|
- see the other sections...
|
|
13.6.3. Practical Issues
|
|
- Education
|
|
- Proliferation
|
|
- Bypassing Laws
|
|
13.6.4. "How should projects and progress best be achieved?"
|
|
- This is a tough one, one we've been grappling with for a
|
|
couple of years now. Lots of approaches.
|
|
- Writing code
|
|
- Organizational
|
|
- Lobbying
|
|
- I have to say that there's one syndrome we can probably do
|
|
w,the Frustrated Cyperpunks Syndrome. Manifested by someone
|
|
flaming the list for not jumping in to join them on their
|
|
(usually) half-baked scheme to build a digital bank, or
|
|
write a book, or whatever. "You guys just don't care!" is
|
|
the usual cry. Often these flamers end up leaving the list.
|
|
- Geography may play a role, as folks in otherwise-isolated
|
|
areas seem to get more attached to their ideas and then get
|
|
angry when the list as a whole does not adopt them (this is
|
|
my impression, at least).
|
|
13.6.5. Crypto faces the complexity barrier that all technologies
|
|
face
|
|
- Life has gotten more complicated in some ways, simpler in
|
|
other ways (we don't have to think about cooking, about
|
|
shoeing the horses, about the weather, etc.). Crypto is
|
|
currently fairly complicated, especially if multiple
|
|
paradigms are used (encryption, signing, money, etc.).
|
|
- As a personal note, I'm practically drowning in a.c.
|
|
adaptors and power cords for computers, laser printers,
|
|
VCRs, camcorders, portable stereos, laptop computers,
|
|
guitars, etc. Everything with a rechargeable battery has to
|
|
be charged, but not overcharged, and not allowed to run-
|
|
down...I forgot to plug in my old Powerbook 100 for a
|
|
couple of months, and the lead-acid batteries went out on
|
|
me. Personally, I'm drowning in this crap.
|
|
- I mention this only because I sense a backlash
|
|
coming...people will say "screw it" to new technology that
|
|
actually complicates their lives more than it simplifies
|
|
their lives. "Crypto tweaks" who like to fool around with
|
|
"creating a client" in order to play with digital cash will
|
|
continue to do so, but 99% of the sought-after users won't.
|
|
(A nation that can't--or won't--set its VCR clock will
|
|
hardly embrace the complexities of digital cash. Unless
|
|
things change, and use becomes as easy as using an ATM.)
|
|
13.6.6. "How can we get more people to worry about security in
|
|
general and encryption in particular?"
|
|
- Fact is, most people never think about real security. Safe
|
|
manufacturers have said that improvements in safes were
|
|
driven by insurance rates. A direct incentive to spend more
|
|
money to improve security (cost of better safe < cost of
|
|
higher insurance rate).
|
|
|
|
Right now there is almost no economic incentive for people
|
|
to worry about PIN security, about protecting their files,
|
|
etc. (Banks eat the costs and pass them on...any bank which
|
|
tried to save a few bucks in losses by requiring 10-digit
|
|
PINs--which people would *write down* anyway!--would lose
|
|
customers. Holograms and pictures on bank cards are
|
|
happening because the costs have dropped enough.)
|
|
|
|
Personally, my main interests is in ensuring the Feds don't
|
|
tell me I can't have as much security as I want to buy. I
|
|
don't share the concern quoted above that we have to find
|
|
ways to give other people security.
|
|
- Others disagree with my nonchalance, pointing out that
|
|
getting lots of other people to use crypto makes it easier
|
|
for those who already protect themselves. I agree, I just
|
|
don't focus on missionary work.
|
|
- For those so inclined, point out to people how vulnerable
|
|
their files are, how the NSA can monitor the Net, and so
|
|
on. All the usual scare stories.
|
|
|
|
13.7. Political Action and Opposition
|
|
13.7.1. Strong political action is emerging on the Net
|
|
- right-wing conspiracy theorists, like Linda Thompson
|
|
+ Net has rapid response to news events (Waco, Tienenmen,
|
|
Russia)
|
|
- with stories often used by media (lots of reporters on
|
|
Net, easy to cull for references, Net has recently become
|
|
tres trendy)
|
|
- Aryan Nation in Cyberspace
|
|
- (These developments bother many people I mention them to.
|
|
Nothing can be done about who uses strong crypto. And most
|
|
fasicst/racist situations are made worse by state
|
|
sponsorship--apartheid laws, Hitler's Germany, Pol Pot's
|
|
killing fields, all were examples of the state enforcing
|
|
racist or genocidal laws. The unbreakable crypto that the
|
|
Aryan Nation gets is more than offset by the gains
|
|
elsewhere, and the undermining of central authority.)
|
|
- shows the need for strong crypto...else governments will
|
|
infiltrate and monitor these political groups
|
|
13.7.2. Cypherpunks and Lobbying Efforts
|
|
+ "Why don't Cypherpunks have a lobbying effort?"
|
|
+ we're not "centered" near Washington, D.C., which seems
|
|
to be an essential thing (as with EFF, ACLU, EPIC, CPSR,
|
|
etc.)
|
|
- D.C. Cypherpunks once volunteered (April, 1993) to make
|
|
this their special focus, but not much has been heard
|
|
since. (To be fair to them, political lobbying is
|
|
pretty far-removed from most Cypherpunks interests.)
|
|
- no budget, no staff, no office
|
|
+ "herding cats" + no financial stakes = why we don't do
|
|
more
|
|
+ it's very hard to coordinate dozens of free-thinking,
|
|
opinionated, smart people, especially when there's no
|
|
whip hand, no financial incentive, no way to force them
|
|
into line
|
|
- I'm obviously not advocating such force, just noting a
|
|
truism of systems
|
|
+ "Should Cypherpunks advocate breaking laws to achieve
|
|
goals?"
|
|
- "My game is to get cryptography available to all, without
|
|
violating the law. This mean fighting Clipper, fighting
|
|
idiotic export restraints, getting the government to
|
|
change it's stance on cryptography, through arguements
|
|
and letter pointing out the problems ... This means
|
|
writing or promoting strong cryptography....By violating
|
|
the law, you give them the chance to brand you
|
|
"criminal," and ignore/encourage others to ignore what
|
|
you have to say." [Bob Snyder, 4-28-94]
|
|
13.7.3. "How can nonlibertarians (liberals, for example) be convinced
|
|
of the need for strong crypto?"
|
|
- "For liberals, I would examine some pet cause and examine
|
|
the consequences of that cause becoming "illegal." For
|
|
instance, if your friends are "pro choice," you might ask
|
|
them what they would do if the right to lifers outlawed
|
|
abortion. Would they think it was wrong for a rape victim
|
|
to get an abortion just because it was illegal? How would
|
|
they feel about an abortion "underground railroad"
|
|
organized via a network of "stations" coordinated via the
|
|
Internet using "illegal encryption"? Or would they trust
|
|
Clipper in such a situation?
|
|
|
|
"Everyone in America is passionate about something. Such
|
|
passion usually dispenses with mere legalism, when it comes
|
|
to what the believer feels is a question of fundamental
|
|
right and wrong. Hit them with an argument that addresses
|
|
their passion. Craft a pro-crypto argument that helps
|
|
preserve the object of that passion." [Sandy Sandfort, 1994-
|
|
06-30]
|
|
13.7.4. Tension Between Governments and Citizens
|
|
- governments want more monitoring...big antennas to snoop on
|
|
telecommunications, "
|
|
- people who protect themselves are sometimes viewed with
|
|
suspicion
|
|
+ Americans have generally been of two minds about privacy:
|
|
- None of your damn business, a man's home is his
|
|
castle..rugged individualism, self-sufficiency, Calvinism
|
|
- What have you got to hide? Snooping on neighbors
|
|
+ These conflicting views are held simultaneously, almost
|
|
like a tensor that is not resolvable to some resultant
|
|
vector
|
|
- this dichotomy cuts through legal decisions as well
|
|
13.7.5. "How does the Cypherpunks group differ from lobbying groups
|
|
like the EFF, CPSR, and EPIC?"
|
|
- We're more disorganized (anarchic), with no central office,
|
|
no staff, no formal charter, etc.
|
|
- And the political agenda of the aforementioned groups is
|
|
often at odds with personal liberty. (support by them for
|
|
public access programs, subsidies, restrictions on
|
|
businesses, etc.)
|
|
- We're also a more radical group in nearly every way, with
|
|
various flavors of political extremism strongly
|
|
represented. Mostly anarcho-capitalists and strong
|
|
libertarians, and many "no compromises" privacy advocates.
|
|
(As usual, my apologies to any Maoists or the like who
|
|
don't feel comfortable being lumped in with the
|
|
libertarians....if you're out there, you're not speaking
|
|
up.) In any case, the house of Cypherpunks has many rooms.
|
|
- We were called "Crypto Rebels" in Steven Levy's "Wired"
|
|
article (issue 1.2, early 1993). We can represent a
|
|
_radical alternative_ to the Beltway lawyers that dominate
|
|
EFF, EPIC, etc. No need to compromise on things like
|
|
Clipper, Software Key Escrow, Digital Telephony, and the
|
|
NII. But, of course, no input to the legislative process.
|
|
- But there's often an advantage to having a much more
|
|
radical, purist body out in the wings, making the
|
|
"rejectionist" case and holding the inner circle folks to a
|
|
tougher standard of behavior.
|
|
- And of course there's the omnipresent difference that we
|
|
tend to favor direct action through technology over
|
|
politicking.
|
|
13.7.6. Why is government control of crypto so dangerous?
|
|
+ dangers of government monopoly on crypto and sigs
|
|
- can "revoke your existence"
|
|
- no place to escape to (historically an important social
|
|
relief valve)
|
|
13.7.7. NSA's view of crypto advocates
|
|
- "I said to somebody once, this is the revenge of people
|
|
who couldn't go to Woodstock because they had too much trig
|
|
homework. It's a kind of romanticism about privacy and the
|
|
kind of, you know, "you won't get my crypto key until you
|
|
pry it from my dead cold fingers" kind of stuff. I have to
|
|
say, you know, I kind of find it endearing." [Stuart Baker,
|
|
counsel, NSA, CFP '94]
|
|
13.7.8. EFF
|
|
- eff@eff.org
|
|
+ How to Join
|
|
- $40, get form from many places, EFFector Online,
|
|
- membership@eff.org
|
|
+ EFFector Online
|
|
- ftp.eff.org, pub/EFF/Newsletters/EFFector
|
|
+ Open Platform
|
|
- ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Open_Platform
|
|
- National Information Infrastructure
|
|
13.7.9. "How can the use of cryptography be hidden?"
|
|
+ Steganography
|
|
- microdots, invisible ink
|
|
- where even the existence of a coded message gets one shot
|
|
+ Methods for Hiding the Mere Existence of Encrypted Data
|
|
+ in contrast to the oft-cited point (made by crypto
|
|
purists) that one must assume the opponent has full
|
|
access to the cryptotext, some fragments of decrypted
|
|
plaintext, and to the algorithm itself, i.e., assume the
|
|
worst
|
|
- a condition I think is practically absurd and
|
|
unrealistic
|
|
- assumes infinite intercept power (same assumption of
|
|
infinite computer power would make all systems besides
|
|
one-time pads breakable)
|
|
- in reality, hiding the existence and form of an
|
|
encrypted message is important
|
|
+ this will be all the more so as legal challenges to
|
|
crypto are mounted...the proposed ban on encrypted
|
|
telecom (with $10K per day fine), various governmental
|
|
regulations, etc.
|
|
- RICO and other broad brush ploys may make people very
|
|
careful about revealing that they are even using
|
|
encryption (regardless of how secure the keys are)
|
|
+ steganography, the science of hiding the existence of
|
|
encrypted information
|
|
- secret inks
|
|
- microdots
|
|
- thwarting traffic analysis
|
|
- LSB method
|
|
+ Packing data into audio tapes (LSB of DAT)
|
|
+ LSB of DAT: a 2GB audio DAT will allow more than 100
|
|
megabytes in the LSBs
|
|
- less if algorithms are used to shape the spectrum to
|
|
make it look even more like noise
|
|
- but can also use the higher bits, too (since a real-
|
|
world recording will have noise reaching up to
|
|
perhaps the 3rd or 4th bit)
|
|
+ will manufacturers investigate "dithering" circuits?
|
|
(a la fat zero?)
|
|
- but the race will still be on
|
|
+ Digital video will offer even more storage space (larger
|
|
tapes)
|
|
- DVI, etc.
|
|
- HDTV by late 1990s
|
|
+ Messages can be put into GIFF, TIFF image files (or even
|
|
noisy faxes)
|
|
- using the LSB method, with a 1024 x 1024 grey scale
|
|
image holding 64KB in the LSB plane alone
|
|
- with error correction, noise shaping, etc., still at
|
|
least 50KB
|
|
- scenario: already being used to transmit message
|
|
through international fax and image transmissions
|
|
+ The Old "Two Plaintexts" Ploy
|
|
- one decoding produces "Having a nice time. Wish you
|
|
were here."
|
|
- other decoding, of the same raw bits, produces "The
|
|
last submarine left this morning."
|
|
- any legal order to produce the key generates the first
|
|
message
|
|
+ authorities can never prove-save for torture or an
|
|
informant-that another message exists
|
|
- unless there are somehow signs that the encrypted
|
|
message is somehow "inefficiently encrypted,
|
|
suggesting the use of a dual plaintext pair method"
|
|
(or somesuch spookspeak)
|
|
- again, certain purist argue that such issues (which are
|
|
related to the old "How do you know when to stop?"
|
|
question) are misleading, that one must assume the
|
|
opponent has nearly complete access to everything
|
|
except the actual key, that any scheme to combine
|
|
multiple systems is no better than what is gotten as a
|
|
result of the combination itself
|
|
- and just the overall bandwidth of data...
|
|
13.7.10. next Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference will be March
|
|
1995, San Francisco
|
|
13.7.11. Places to send messages to
|
|
- cantwell@eff.org, Subject: I support HR 3627
|
|
- leahy@eff.org, Subject: I support hearings on Clipper
|
|
13.7.12. Thesis: Crypto can become unstoppable if critical mass is
|
|
reached
|
|
- analogy: the Net...too scattered, too many countries, too
|
|
many degrees of freedom
|
|
- so scattered that attempts to outlaw strong crypto will be
|
|
futile...no bottlenecks, no "mountain passes" (in a race to
|
|
the pass, beyond which the expansion cannot be halted
|
|
except by extremely repressive means)
|
|
13.7.13. Keeping the crypto genie from being put in the bottle
|
|
- (though some claim the genie was never _in_ the bottle,
|
|
historically)
|
|
- ensuring that enough people are using it, and that the Net
|
|
is using it
|
|
- a _threshold_, a point of no return
|
|
13.7.14. Activism practicalities
|
|
+ "Why don't we buy advertising time like Perot did?"
|
|
+ This and similar points come up in nearly all political
|
|
discussions (I'm seeing in also in talk.politics.guns).
|
|
The main reasons it doesn't happen are:
|
|
- ads cost a lot of money
|
|
- casual folks rarely have this kind of money to spend
|
|
- "herding cats" comes to mind, i.e., it's nearly
|
|
impossible to coordinate the interests of people to
|
|
gather money, set up ad campaigns, etc.
|
|
- In my view, a waste of efforts. The changes I want won't
|
|
come through a series of ads that are just fingers in the
|
|
dike. (More cynically, Americans are getting the government
|
|
they've been squealing for. My interest is in bypassing
|
|
their avarice and repression, not in changing their minds.)
|
|
- Others feel differently, from posts made to the list.
|
|
Practically speaking, though, organized political activity
|
|
is difficult to achieve with the anarchic nonstructure of
|
|
the Cypherpunks group. Good luck!
|
|
|
|
13.8. The Battle Lines are Being Drawn
|
|
13.8.1. Clipper met with disdain and scorn, so now new strategies are
|
|
being tried...
|
|
13.8.2. Strategies are shifting, Plan B is being hauled out
|
|
- fear, uncertainty, and doubt
|
|
- fears about terrorists, pornographers, pedophiles, money
|
|
launderers
|
|
13.8.3. corporate leaders like Grove are being enlisted to make the
|
|
Clipper case
|
|
13.8.4. Donn Parker is spreading panic about "anarchy" (similar to my
|
|
own CA)
|
|
13.8.5. "What can be done in the face of moves to require national ID
|
|
cards, use official public key registries, adhere to key
|
|
escrow laws, etc?"
|
|
- This is the most important question we face.
|
|
- Short of leaving the country (but for where?) or living a
|
|
subsistence-level lifestyle below the radar screens of the
|
|
surveillance state, what can be done?
|
|
+ Some possibilities, not necessarily good ones:
|
|
+ civil disobedience
|
|
- mutilation of cards, "accidental erasure," etc.
|
|
- forgeries of cards...probably not feasible (we understand
|
|
about digital sigs)
|
|
- creation of large black markets...still doesn't cover
|
|
everything, such as water, electricity, driver's
|
|
licenses, etc....just too many things for a black market
|
|
to handle
|
|
- lobby against these moves...but it appears the momentum
|
|
is too strong in the other direction
|
|
|
|
13.9. "What Could Make Crypto Use more Common?"
|
|
13.9.1. transparent use, like the fax machine, is the key
|
|
13.9.2. easier token-based key and/or physical metrics for security
|
|
- thumbprint readers
|
|
- tokens attached to employee badges
|
|
- rings, watches, etc. that carry most of key (with several
|
|
bits remembered, and a strict "three strikes and you're
|
|
out" system)
|
|
13.9.3. major security scares, or fears over "back doors" by the
|
|
government, may accelerate the conversion
|
|
- all it may take are a couple of very large scandals
|
|
13.9.4. insurance companies may demand encryption, for several
|
|
reasons
|
|
- to protect against theft, loss, etc.
|
|
- to provide better control against viruses and other
|
|
modifications which expose the companies they ensure to
|
|
liability suits
|
|
- same argument cited by safe makers: when insurance
|
|
companies demanded better safes, that's when customers
|
|
bought them (and not before)
|
|
13.9.5. Networks will get more complex and will make conventional
|
|
security systems unacceptable
|
|
- "Fortress" product of Los Altos Technologies
|
|
- too many ways for others to see passwords being given to a
|
|
remote host, e.g., with wireless LANs (which will
|
|
necessitate ZKIPS)
|
|
- ZKIPS especially in networks, where the chances of seeing a
|
|
password being transmitted are much greater (an obvious
|
|
point that is not much discussed)
|
|
- the whole explosion in bandwidth
|
|
13.9.6. The revelations of surveillance and monitoring of citizens
|
|
and corporations will serve to increase the use of
|
|
encryption, at first by people with something to hide, and
|
|
then by others. Cypherpunks are already helping by spreading
|
|
the word of these situations.
|
|
- a snowballing effect
|
|
- and various government agencies will themselves use
|
|
encryption to protect their files and their privacy
|
|
13.9.7. for those in sensitive positions, the availability of new
|
|
bugging methods will accelerate the conversion to secure
|
|
systems based on encrypted telecommunications and the
|
|
avoidance of voice-based systems
|
|
13.9.8. ordinary citizens are being threatened because of what they
|
|
say on networks, causing them to adopt pseudonyms
|
|
- lawsuits, ordinary threats, concerns about how their
|
|
employers will react (many employers may adopt rules
|
|
limiting the speech of their employees, largely because of
|
|
concerns they'll get sued)
|
|
+ and some database providers are providing cross-indexed
|
|
lists of who has posted to what boards-this is freely
|
|
available information, but it is not expected by people
|
|
that their postings will live forever
|
|
- some may see this as extortion
|
|
- but any proposed laws are unlikely to succeed
|
|
- so, as usual, the solution is for people to protect
|
|
themselves via technological means
|
|
13.9.9. "agents" that are able to retransmit material will make
|
|
certain kinds of anonymous systems much easier to use
|
|
|
|
13.10. Deals, the EFF, and Digital Telephony Bill
|
|
13.10.1. The backroom deals in Washington are flying...apparently the
|
|
Administration got burned by the Clipper fiasco (which they
|
|
could partly write-off as being a leftover from the Bush era)
|
|
and is now trying to "work the issues" behind the scenes
|
|
before unveiling new and wide-reaching programs. (Though at
|
|
this writing, the Health Bill is looking mighty amateurish
|
|
and seems ulikely to pass.)
|
|
13.10.2. We are not hearing about these "deals" in a timely way. I
|
|
first heard that a brand new, and "in the bag," deal was
|
|
cooking when I was talking to a noted journalist. He told me
|
|
that a new deal, cut between Congress, the telecom industry,
|
|
and the EFF-type lobbying groups, was already a done deal and
|
|
would be unveiled so. Sure enough, the New and Improved
|
|
Digital Telephony II Bill appears a few weeks later and is
|
|
said by EFF representatives to be unstoppable. [comments by
|
|
S. McLandisht and others, comp.org.eff.talk, 1994-08]
|
|
13.10.3. Well, excuse me for reminding everyone that this country is
|
|
allegedly still a democracy. I know politics is done behinde
|
|
closed doors, as I'm no naif, but deal-cutting like this
|
|
deserves to be exposed and derided.
|
|
13.10.4. I've announced that I won't be renewing my EFF membership. I
|
|
don't expect them to fight all battles, to win all wars, but
|
|
I sure as hell won't help *pay* for their backrooms deals
|
|
with the telcos.
|
|
13.10.5. This may me in trouble with my remaining friends at the EFF,
|
|
but it's as if a lobbying groups in Germany saw the
|
|
handwriting on the wall about the Final Solution, deemed it
|
|
essentially unstoppable, and so sent their leaders to
|
|
Berchtesgaden/Camp David to make sure that the death of the
|
|
Jews was made as painless as possible. A kind of joint
|
|
Administration/Telco/SS/IG Farben "compromise." While I don't
|
|
equate Mitch, Jerry, Mike, Stanton, and others with Hitler's
|
|
minions, I certainly do think the inside-the-Beltway
|
|
dealmaking is truly disgusting.
|
|
13.10.6. Our freedoms are being sold out.
|
|
|
|
13.11. Loose ends
|
|
13.11.1. Deals, deals, deals!
|
|
- pressures by Administration...software key escrow, digital
|
|
telephony, cable regulation
|
|
+ and suppliers need government support on legislation,
|
|
benefits, spectrum allocation, etc
|
|
- reports that Microsoft is lobbying intensively to gain
|
|
control of big chunks of spectrum...could fit with cable
|
|
set-top box negotiations, Teledesic, SKE, etc.
|
|
- EFF even participates in some of these deals. Being "inside
|
|
the Beltway" has this kind of effect, where one is either a
|
|
"player" or a "non-player." (This is my interpretation of
|
|
how power corrupts all groups that enter the Beltway.)
|
|
Shmoozing and a desire to help.
|
|
13.11.2. using crypto to bypass laws on contacts and trade with other
|
|
countries
|
|
- one day it's illegal to have contact with China, the next
|
|
day it's encouraged
|
|
+ one day it's legal to have contact with Haiti, the next day
|
|
there's an embargo (and in the case of Haiti, the economic
|
|
effects fall on on the poor--the tens of thousands fleeing
|
|
are not fleeing the rulers, but the poverty made worse by
|
|
the boycott
|
|
- (The military rulers are just the usual thugs, but
|
|
they're not "our" thugs, for reasons of history. Aristide
|
|
would almost certainly be as bad, being a Marxist priest.
|
|
Thus, I consider the breakin of the embargo to be a
|
|
morally good thing to do.
|
|
- who's to say why Haiti is suddenly to be shunned? By force
|
|
of law, no less!
|
|
13.11.3. Sun Tzu's "Art of War" has useful tips (more useful than "The
|
|
Prince")
|
|
- work with lowliest
|
|
- sabotage good name of enemy
|
|
- spread money around
|
|
- I think the events of the past year, including...
|
|
13.11.4. The flakiness of current systems...
|
|
- The current crypto infrastructure is fairly flaky, though
|
|
the distributed web-of-trust model is better than some
|
|
centralized system, of coure. What I mean is that many
|
|
aspects are slow, creaky, and conducive to errors.
|
|
- In the area of digital cash, what we have now is not even
|
|
as advanced as was seen with real money in Sumerian times!
|
|
(And I wouldn't trust the e-mail "message in a bottle"
|
|
approach for any nontrivial financial transactions.)
|
|
- Something's got to change. The NII/Superhighway/Infobahn
|
|
people have plans, but their plans are not likely to mesh
|
|
well with ours. A challenge for us to consider.
|
|
13.11.5. "Are there dangers in being too paranoid?"
|
|
+ As Eric Hughes put it, "paranoia is cryptography's
|
|
occupational hazard."
|
|
- "The effect of paranoia is self-delusion of the following
|
|
form--that one's possible explanations are skewed toward
|
|
malicious attacks, by individuals, that one has the
|
|
technical knowledge to anticipate. This skewing creates
|
|
an inefficient allocation of mental energy, it tends
|
|
toward the personal, downplaying the possibility of
|
|
technical error, and it begins to close off examination
|
|
of technicalities not fully understood.
|
|
|
|
"Those who resist paranoia will become better at
|
|
cryptography than those who do not, all other things
|
|
being equal. Cryptography is about epistemology, that
|
|
is, assurances of truth, and only secondarily about
|
|
ontology, that is, what actually is true. The goal of
|
|
cryptography is to create an accurate confidence that a
|
|
system is private and secure. In order to create that
|
|
confidence, the system must actually be secure, but
|
|
security is not sufficient. There must be confidence
|
|
thatthe way by which this security becomes to be believed
|
|
is robust and immune to delusion.
|
|
|
|
"Paranoia creates delusion. As a direct and fundamental
|
|
result, it makes one worse at cryptography. At the
|
|
outside best, it makes one slower, as the misallocation
|
|
of attention leads one down false trails. Who has the
|
|
excess brainpower for that waste? Certainly not I. At
|
|
the worst, paranoia makes one completely ineffective, not
|
|
only in technical means but even more so in the social
|
|
context in which cryptography is necessarily relevant."
|
|
[Eric Hughes, 1994-05-14]
|
|
+ King Alfred Plan, blacks
|
|
- plans to round up 20 million blacks
|
|
- RFK, links to LAPD, Western Goals, Birch, KKK
|
|
- RFA #9, 23, 38
|
|
+ organized crime situation, perhaps intelligence
|
|
community
|
|
- damaging to blacks, psychological
|
|
13.11.6. The immorality of U.S. boycotts and sanctions
|
|
- as with Haiti, where a standard and comparatively benign
|
|
and harmless military dictatorship is being opposed, we are
|
|
using force to interfere with trade, food shipments,
|
|
financial dealings, etc.
|
|
- invasion of countries that have not attacked other
|
|
countries...a major new escalation of U.S. militarism
|
|
- crypto will facillitate means of underming imperialism
|
|
13.11.7. The "reasonableness" trap
|
|
- making a reasonable thing into a mandatory thing
|
|
- this applies to what Cypherpunks should ever be prepared to
|
|
support
|
|
+ An example: A restaurant offers to replace dropped items
|
|
(dropped on the floor, literally) for free...a reasonable
|
|
thing to offer customers (something I see frequently). So
|
|
why not make it the law? Because then the reasonable
|
|
discretion of the restaurant owner would be lost, and some
|
|
customers could "game against" (exploit the letter of the
|
|
law) the system. Even threaten lawsuits.
|
|
- (And libertarians know that "my house, my rules" applies
|
|
to restaurants and other businesses, absent a contract
|
|
spelling exceptions out.)
|
|
- A more serious example is when restaurants (again) find it
|
|
"reasonable" to hire various sorts of qualified people.
|
|
What may be "reasonable" is one thing, but too often the
|
|
government decides to _formalize_ this and takes away the
|
|
right to choose. (In my opinion, no person or group has any
|
|
"right" to a job unless the employer freely offers it. Yes,
|
|
this could included discrimination against various groups.
|
|
Yes, we may dislike this. But the freedom to choose is a
|
|
much more basic right than achieving some ideal of equality
|
|
is.)
|
|
- And when "reasonableness" is enforced by law, the game-
|
|
playing increases. In effect, some discretion is needed to
|
|
reject claims that are based on gaming. Markets naturally
|
|
work this way, as no "basic rights" or contracts are being
|
|
violated.
|
|
- Fortunately, strong crypto makes this nonsense impossible.
|
|
Perforce, people will engage in contracts only voluntarily.
|
|
13.11.8. "How do we get agreement on protocols?"
|
|
- Give this idea up immediately! Agreement to behave in
|
|
certain ways is almost never possible.
|
|
- Is this an indictment of anarchy?
|
|
- No, because the way agreement is sort of reached is through
|
|
standards or examplars that people can get behind. Thus, we
|
|
don't get "consensus" in advance on the taste of Coca
|
|
Cola...somebody offers Coke for sale and then the rest is
|
|
history.
|
|
- PGP is a more relevant example. The examplar is on a "take
|
|
it or leave it" basis, with minor improvements made by
|
|
others, but within the basic format.
|