mirror of
https://github.com/nhammer514/textfiles-politics.git
synced 2024-12-18 12:14:33 -05:00
501 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
501 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
<conspiracyFile>I N V I S I B L E C O N T R A C T S
|
||
George Mercier
|
||
THE RESIDENCY CONTRACT
|
||
[Pages 553-565]
|
||
[Certain conventions have been used in converting INVISIBLE CONTRACTS to an
|
||
electronic medium. For an explanation of the conventions used, please download
|
||
the file INCONHLP.ZIP for further illumination. Other background information as
|
||
well is contained in INCONHLP.ZIP. It is advisable to EXIT this file right now
|
||
and read the contents of INCONHLP.ZIP before proceeding with your study of this
|
||
file.]
|
||
Another invisible contract that is difficult to see is the Residency Contract.
|
||
By being "resident" within a particular Kingdom for a certain length of time,
|
||
it is presumed that you have accepted those juristic benefits which that
|
||
regional Prince of your's is offering you. [732]
|
||
[732]<div> "All these
|
||
appellants, indeed, shared during the taxable year the benefits of the
|
||
expenditures by the State for the various activities of its Government. As the
|
||
trial judge pointed out, the public schools were available to their children;
|
||
they had the benefit of police protection for themselves, their families and
|
||
their property; they could use the public roads daily; the courts were open for
|
||
resort by them if necessary; and so with every other benefit and privilege
|
||
provided by the State or its agencies, such, for instance, as water supply and
|
||
sewerage. They entered upon the enjoyment of these benefits, and should be
|
||
liable to a share in the taxation levied to maintain them, in the absence of
|
||
any distinguishing factor in their situation."
|
||
WOOD VS. TAWES, 28 Atlantic 2nd 850, at 854 (1942). Since we know that
|
||
the acceptance of benefits locks folks into contracts, we also know how to get
|
||
out of unwanted contracts; our distinguishing factor in our situation is going
|
||
to be, of course, a NOTICE OF REJECTION OF BENEFITS filed appropriately and
|
||
timely. Until benefits have been rejected, invisible contracts are in effect
|
||
and we are not entitled to prevail under any circumstances. Here, in WOOD VS.
|
||
TAWES, Residency Protestors tried unsuccessfully to weasel out of state income
|
||
taxes. This WOOD VS. TAWES case was heard before by the Maryland Court of
|
||
Appeals -- but its reasoning and justification is very similar to other state
|
||
judges in all 50 states. Of those benefits that are listed above, you should
|
||
know that acceptance of the twin state POLICE PROTECTION BENEFIT and
|
||
AVAILABILITY OF THE STATE COURTS BENEFIT are universally viewed by judges in
|
||
all English Common Law Countries world wide as being sufficient, all by
|
||
themselves, to lock folks into RESIDENCY CONTRACTS, as silence by inhabitants
|
||
is deemed acceptance of those particular juristic benefits. In a nice way, this
|
||
Maryland Court is trying to say: You accepted those juristic benefits -- so pay
|
||
the tax and stop trying to be cheap. Yes, protestors are irritating to judges;
|
||
so let's reverse the factual setting presented for a grievance settlement, and
|
||
let's first work our adversaries into an immoral position by vacating the
|
||
transfer of juristic benefits to us. Now, when the state tax commission asks
|
||
for money, now that there is no QUID PRO QUO equivalence on the record, now as
|
||
a moral question, we are entitled to prevail. However, if we have kids going to
|
||
public schools then we will not be able to get rid of all benefits offered by
|
||
the state, and our NOTICE OF REJECTION OF BENEFITS means nothing since it is
|
||
incomplete -- and we should not protest state income taxes while accepting
|
||
benefits, because we are not entitled to prevail.
|
||
<div>[732]
|
||
If the benefits are legitimate, then the reciprocity your regional Prince
|
||
expects back from you in the form of a state income tax, is very reasonable,
|
||
and the Supreme Court has so ruled:
|
||
"(States) can tax the privilege of residence in the State and measure
|
||
the privilege by net income, including that derived from interstate commerce."
|
||
[733]
|
||
[733]<div> FREEMAN VS.
|
||
HEWIT, 329 U.S. 249, at 255 (1946).
|
||
<div>[733]
|
||
The entire area of State Income Taxes lies generally outside of Federal
|
||
intervention, except to the narrow extent to which several slices of
|
||
restrainments resident in the United States Constitution hem in your regional
|
||
Prince; [734]
|
||
[734]<div> "A state is
|
||
free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if
|
||
by the practical operation of its power in relation to opportunities which it
|
||
has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has
|
||
conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society."
|
||
- WISCONSIN VS. J.C. PENNEY, 311 U.S. 435, at 444 (1940).
|
||
<div>[734]
|
||
even more so, Tax Protestors arguing philosophically doctrinaire and other
|
||
economic questions on State Taxation schemes are frequently rebuffed by Federal
|
||
Judges who defer the question back to the States. [735]
|
||
[735]<div> "... the
|
||
economic wisdom of state net income taxes is one of state policy not for our
|
||
decision..."
|
||
- PORTLAND CEMENT VS. MINNESOTA, 359 U.S. 450, at 461 (1959).
|
||
<div>[735]
|
||
The basic power of taxation is an attribute of Sovereignty, and is inherent in
|
||
every Government unless explicitly denied or limited by its Constitution; [736]
|
||
[736]<div> "Before we
|
||
proceed to examine [the Case's] argument, and subject it to the test of the
|
||
Constitution, we must be permitted to bestow a few considerations on the nature
|
||
and extent of this original right of taxation, which is acknowledged to remain
|
||
with the states. It is admitted that the power of taxing the people and their
|
||
property is essential to the very existence of Government, and may be
|
||
legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost
|
||
extent to which the Government may choose to carry it. The only security
|
||
against the abuse of this power is found in the structure of Government itself.
|
||
In imposing a tax the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is in
|
||
general a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation."
|
||
- M'CULLOCH VS. MARYLAND, 17 U.S. 316, at 428 (1819).
|
||
<div>[736]
|
||
(however, I am referring only to the expectations of reciprocity inherent as
|
||
Sovereignty in the several States, and not the United States Government, which
|
||
is a very unique jurisprudential structure of the world's political
|
||
jurisdictions.) Properly rephrased, what that means is that the jurisdiction
|
||
of Government (remember during this Residency Contract discussion, I am only
|
||
talking about the several States) to first throw benefits at folks, and then in
|
||
turn demand and get reciprocal taxation compensation back in return for having
|
||
done so, is simply unlimited -- unless the Juristic Institution in its
|
||
constitutional structure has been explicitly restrained (limited) from asking
|
||
for reciprocity back in return. And when dealing with a State taxation scheme,
|
||
we need to focus in on the State's statutes and its Constitution, rather than
|
||
the United States Constitution, because as a general rule the States are free
|
||
to throw benefits at folks, and then demand and get reciprocity back in return
|
||
-- generally unhampered, unencumbered, and unrestrained by the Federal
|
||
Constitution. [737]
|
||
[737]<div> "On the
|
||
other hand, the Constitution, by words, places no limitation upon a state's
|
||
power to tax the things or activities or persons within its boundaries. What
|
||
limitations there are spring from applications to state tax situations of
|
||
general clauses of the Constitution."
|
||
- JOSEPH VS. CARTER & WEEKS, 330 U.S. 442, at 426 (1946).
|
||
<div>[737]
|
||
So the place to disable a State's expectations of reciprocity has its seminal
|
||
point of origin in the Juristic Institution's own Charter -- and an examination
|
||
of your regional Prince's Charter will reveal that not very much reciprocity
|
||
restrainment exists there, if any. [738]
|
||
[738]<div> "The power
|
||
of taxation rests upon necessity and is inherent in every independent State. It
|
||
is as extensive as the range of subjects over which the Government extends; it
|
||
is absolute and unlimited, in the absence of constitutional limitations and
|
||
restraints, and carries with it the power to embarrass and destroy."
|
||
- TANNER VS. LITTLE, 240 U.S. 380, at 380 (1915).
|
||
<div>[738]
|
||
As this background legal setting applies to us, Residents are objects accepting
|
||
juristic benefits, and so now Residents are PERSONS over which the State has
|
||
reciprocal expectations of taxation jurisdiction, largely unhampered by the
|
||
Federal Constitution, because you are a benefit acceptant object lying within
|
||
the contours of its geographical perimeters. [739]
|
||
[739]<div> "... the
|
||
power of taxation is not confined to the people and property of a state. If may
|
||
be exercised upon every object brought within its jurisdiction. This is true.
|
||
But to what source do we trace the right? It is obvious, that it is an incident
|
||
of Sovereignty."
|
||
- Joseph Story, in III COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, at 490
|
||
(Cambridge, 1833).
|
||
<div>[739]
|
||
So the State has some jurisdiction over you simply because you are an object in
|
||
that kingdom, however, whether or not that level of jurisdiction ascends to the
|
||
reciprocal level of taxation jurisdiction when no benefits are being
|
||
transferred down to you, is another question. [740]
|
||
[740]<div> "The
|
||
obligation of one domiciled with a state to pay taxes there, arise from
|
||
unilateral action of the state Government in the exercise of its most plenary
|
||
of sovereign powers, that to raise revenue to defray the expenses of Government
|
||
and to distribute its burdens equably among those who enjoy its benefits.
|
||
Hence, domicile in itself establishes a basis for taxation."
|
||
- LAWRENCE VS. STATE TAX COMMISSION, 286 U.S. 276, at 279 (1931).
|
||
<div>[740]
|
||
Now we ask ourselves the usual question: Just what benefits are being thrown at
|
||
us this time, in order to justify one more juristic layer of taxation? [741]
|
||
[741]<div> "Decisions
|
||
of this Court, particularly during recent decades, have sustained
|
||
nondiscriminatory, properly apportioned state... taxes... when the tax is
|
||
related to... local [in-State] activities and the State has provided benefits
|
||
and protections for those activities for which it is justified in asking a fair
|
||
and reasonable return."
|
||
- COMPLETE AUTO BODY VS. BRADY, 430 U.S. 274, at 287 (1976). "The
|
||
application of the rule will vary with the quality and nature of the
|
||
defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act
|
||
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
|
||
conducting [commercial] activities within this forum state, thus invoking the
|
||
benefits and protections of its laws."
|
||
- HANSON VS. DENCKLA, 357 U.S. 235, at 253 (1957). "But to the extent
|
||
that a [person] exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a
|
||
state, it enjoys the benefits and protections of the laws of that state. The
|
||
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations..."
|
||
- INTERNATIONAL SHOE VS. WASHINGTON, 326 U.S. 310, at 319 (1945).
|
||
<div>[741]
|
||
As a point of beginning, Residents accept the benefits offered by State
|
||
Constitutions. [742]
|
||
[742]<div> "A Sovereign
|
||
may impose upon everyone domiciled within his territory a personal tax, which
|
||
is 'the burden imposed by Governments upon its own Citizens for the benefits
|
||
what that Government affords by its protection and its laws.' Any domiciled
|
||
person is subject to this tax, though he be an alien or a corporation."
|
||
- Joseph Beale in JURISDICTION TO TAX, 32 Harvard Law Review 587, at
|
||
589 (1919). <div>[742]
|
||
The fact that a state conducts certain programs for its Residents does not mean
|
||
that these benefits are available to all who live within its borders. [743]
|
||
[743]<div> The right to
|
||
use certain state benefits often depends upon whether the Resident can meet
|
||
certain qualifications. See generally, RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS AFTER SHAPIRO VS.
|
||
THOMPSON, 70 Columbia Law Review 134 (1970).
|
||
<div>[743]
|
||
Here in New York State, we open up the State Constitution no farther that the
|
||
first line in Article 1, Section 1, and we find the recital of benefits the
|
||
United States Supreme Court was referring to:
|
||
"No member of this state shall be disenfranchised, or deprived of any
|
||
of these rights or privileges secured to any Citizen thereof, unless by the law
|
||
of the land, or the judgment of his peers..."
|
||
- NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION, Article I, Section 1 ["Rights,
|
||
privileges, and franchise secured"] (1938).
|
||
Generally speaking, State Residents are State Citizens; and Citizens, as
|
||
members of the State body politic, possess election rights of suffrage. [744]
|
||
[744]<div> "Every
|
||
Citizen shall be entitled to vote at every election for all officers elected by
|
||
the people..."
|
||
- NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 1.
|
||
<div>[744]
|
||
Another benefit inuring to State Residents is the protectorate operation of the
|
||
State Police Powers. [745]
|
||
[745]<div> "The power
|
||
of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every civilized Government, is
|
||
exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rendered to the Taxpayer in the
|
||
protection of his person and property, in adding to the value of such property,
|
||
or in the creation and maintenance of public conveniences in which he shares --
|
||
such, for instance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements, and schools for
|
||
the education of his children. If the taxing power be in no position to render
|
||
these services, or otherwise benefit the person or property taxed, and such
|
||
property be wholly within the taxing power of another state, to which it may be
|
||
said to owe an allegiance, and to which it looks for protection, the taxation
|
||
of such property within the domicile of the owner partakes rather of the nature
|
||
of an extortion than a tax, and has been repeatedly held by this Court to be
|
||
beyond the power of the Legislature, and a taking of property without due
|
||
process of law."
|
||
- UNION REFRIGERATOR VS. KENTUCKY, 199 U.S. 195, at 202 (1905).
|
||
<div>[745]
|
||
By the use if this power, a wide ranging array of benefits can be thrown at
|
||
folks in justification for the enforcement of the reciprocal demands of
|
||
taxation. [746]
|
||
[746]<div> One
|
||
manifestation of the operation of the Police Powers, so called, is the creation
|
||
of regulatory jurisdictions designed to restrain color and race discrimination:
|
||
"... the police powers of a State under our Constitutional system is
|
||
adequate for the protection of the civil rights of its Citizens against
|
||
discrimination by reason of race or color."
|
||
- Justice Douglas in BOB-LO EXCURSION COMPANY VS. MICHIGAN, 333 U.S.
|
||
28, at 41 (1947). By multiplying little slices of invisible benefits here and
|
||
there, States create a large array of benefits that are impressive to Federal
|
||
Judges -- and even the 14th Amendment surfaces as an expression of Law in State
|
||
Residency Contract proceedings:
|
||
"Since the 14th Amendment makes one a Citizen of the state where ever
|
||
he resides, the fact of residence creates universally recognized reciprocal
|
||
duties of protection by the state and of allegiance and support by the Citizen.
|
||
The latter obviously includes a duty to pay taxes, and their nature and measure
|
||
is largely a political matter."
|
||
- MILLER BROTHERS VS. MARYLAND, 347 U.S. 340, at 345 (1954).
|
||
<div>[746]
|
||
But in addressing the Residency Question itself, which is a sister to
|
||
Citizenship, two Cases come to my mind:
|
||
- In COOK VS. TAIT, [747]
|
||
[747]<div> 265 U.S. 47
|
||
(1924). <div>[747]
|
||
which is primarily a Citizenship Contract Case, the Supreme Court ruled that
|
||
income received by a Citizen of the United States while resident in Mexico is
|
||
taxable due to benefits received while outside of the United States (the old
|
||
acceptance of benefits story: When benefits offered conditionally have been
|
||
accepted, there lies a contract and it becomes immoral not to require a
|
||
mandatory exchange of reciprocity). The Court then listed those benefits that
|
||
American Citizens carried with them no matter what their geographical situs
|
||
was. [748]
|
||
[748]<div> And just
|
||
like the King can tax his Citizens when they have asset streams out of the
|
||
country, States can tax their Residents on asset streams the Residents own
|
||
outside the perimeters of the State.
|
||
"A state may tax its residents upon net income from a business whose
|
||
physical assets, located wholly without the state, are beyond its taxing
|
||
power... That the receipt of income by a resident of the territory of a taxing
|
||
sovereignty is a taxable event is universally recognized. Domicile itself
|
||
affords a basis for such taxation. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence
|
||
[accepting residency benefits] and the attendant right to invoke the protection
|
||
of its laws [the police protectorate benefits, contract enforcement benefits,
|
||
and others], form responsibility for sharing the costs of Government. 'Taxes
|
||
are what we pay for civilized society...' See COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE
|
||
FILIPINAS VS. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE [275 U.S. 87]. A tax measured by
|
||
net income of residents is an equitable method of distributing the burdens of
|
||
Government among those who are privileged to enjoy its benefits."
|
||
- NEW YORK EX REL COHN VS. GRAVES, 300 U.S. 308, at 313 (1936)
|
||
[Statements were quoted out of order.].
|
||
<div>[748]
|
||
- In SHAFFER VS. CARTER, [749]
|
||
[749]<div> 252 U.S. 37
|
||
(1920) <div>[749]
|
||
a Resident of Illinois was experiencing income from property he owned in
|
||
Oklahoma. It was held that Oklahoma can tax non-Residents on their property
|
||
located within the Oklahoma boundary situs, and the reason is that protective
|
||
benefits were accepted by that Oklahoma property and so the state is entitled
|
||
to a part of the financial gain that property realized (which is also a correct
|
||
statement of Nature, although the Supreme Court did not use those words.)
|
||
[750]
|
||
[750]<div> "The
|
||
[income] tax, which is apportioned to the ability of the taxpayer to pay it, is
|
||
founded upon the protection afforded by the state to the recipient of the
|
||
income in his person, in his right to receive the income and in his enjoyment
|
||
of it when received. These are the rights and privileges which attach to
|
||
domicil within this state."
|
||
- NEW YORK EX REL COHN VS. GRAVES, 300 U.S. 308, at 313 (1936).
|
||
<div>[750]
|
||
The taxation key in both of those Cases was the acceptance of benefits. [751]
|
||
[751]<div> When arguing
|
||
state taxation jurisdiction Cases before judges, one of the permissible
|
||
arguments to make is a subjective value cost/benefit question. In listing some
|
||
of the arguments that could have been made by a Tax Protestor, but were not,
|
||
the Supreme Court said that:
|
||
"We note again that no claim is made that the activity is not
|
||
sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax, or that the tax is not
|
||
fairly related to benefits provided the taxpayer..."
|
||
- COMPLETE AUTO BOY VS. BRADY, 430 U.S. 274, at 287 (1976).
|
||
Incidentally, as a point of reference, the Constitution's INTERSTATE COMMERCE
|
||
CLAUSE disables certain State Income Taxing schemes from taking effect, under
|
||
some limited conditions. See UNITED STATES GLUE COMPANY VS. OAK CREEK, 247 U.S.
|
||
321 (1917), which discusses several such factual settings where challenged
|
||
State Income Taxing schemes were either affirmed or annulled on questions that
|
||
turned on the COMMERCE CLAUSE.
|
||
<div>[751]
|
||
Viewed from a Judge's perspective, what this means is that it is permissible
|
||
for a political jurisdiction to throw some benefits at you, and then demand,
|
||
and get, some QUID PRO QUO financial compensation in return for having done so.
|
||
In this respect, due to Sovereignty, Governments differ from Individuals in the
|
||
respect that Individuals have to document with evidence the voluntary
|
||
acceptance of a benefit [of which silence, but the RATIFICATION DOCTRINE, can
|
||
be reasonably inferred in some circumstances] from someone else before bringing
|
||
that other person to his knees in a Courtroom; Government, however, simply
|
||
throws benefits at everyone at large, and the acceptance of the benefit by
|
||
silence is automatically assumed absent explicit, blunt, and timely benefit
|
||
rejection and disavowal by you. The several States as independent Sovereignties
|
||
also possess this inherent power, except as limited by the United States
|
||
Constitution. [752]
|
||
[752]<div> "We have had
|
||
frequent occasion to consider questions of state taxation in the light of the
|
||
Federal Constitution, and the scope and limits of national interference are
|
||
well settled. There is no general supervision on the part of the nation over
|
||
state taxation, and, in respect to the latter, the state has, speaking
|
||
generally, the freedom of a sovereign, both as to objects and methods."
|
||
- MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD VS. POWERS, 201 U.S. 245, AT 292 (1905).
|
||
<div>[752]
|
||
And so as it applies to occupancy, Residency Status is very much a privilege in
|
||
the sense that contracts are in effect; by your silence, after talking
|
||
occupancy in some Prince's kingdom, you attached a reasonable expectation of
|
||
using the Prince's police protectorate powers, among taking advantage of other
|
||
juristic benefits; and so now state statutes that define a reciprocal taxation
|
||
liability being expected back in return after you have lived in that kingdom
|
||
for some 60 to 90 days, or whatever, and then continues liability attachment
|
||
unless you have been out of his kingdom for more than six months in any one
|
||
year, etc. are all morally correct and provident. [753]
|
||
[753]<div> "... the
|
||
'controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can
|
||
ask return.' Since by 'the practical operation of [the] tax the state has
|
||
exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to
|
||
protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred...' it 'is
|
||
free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution...'"
|
||
- PORTLAND CEMENT VS. MINNESOTA, 358 U.S. 450, at 465 (1959).
|
||
<div>[753]
|
||
By your silence, benefits offered conditionally by your regional Prince were
|
||
accepted by you through your refusal to disavow them, so invisible contracts
|
||
where then and there created by your acts (your act of refusing to reject and
|
||
disavow the juristic benefit). [754]
|
||
[754]<div> "And we deem
|
||
it clear, upon principles as well as authority, that... a State may impose
|
||
general income taxes upon its own Citizens and residents whose persons are
|
||
subject to its control..."
|
||
- SHAFFER VS. CARTER, 252 U.S. 37, at 52 (1919).
|
||
<div>[754]
|
||
Therefore, State Income Tax Protestors, who merely make the declaration, while
|
||
in the midst of some type of state income tax enforcement proceeding, that they
|
||
"are not residents" or are not "state citizens" are wasting their time. [755]
|
||
[755]<div> Whether or
|
||
not RESIDENTS of a state are automatically classifiable as STATE CITIZENS
|
||
varies based on several factors; sometimes these two words mean the same thing,
|
||
and sometimes they do not. Although a light reading of the 14th Amendment would
|
||
lead folks to believe that residents are Citizens of the state wherein they
|
||
reside, there is a distinction in effect between "resident" and "Citizen":
|
||
"Of course the terms 'resident' and 'citizen' are not synonymous, and
|
||
in some cases the distinction is important [like in] (LA TOURETTE VS MCMASTER,
|
||
248 U.S. 465, at 470 (1918))."
|
||
- TRAVIS VS. YALE & TOWNE, 252 U.S. 60, at 78 (1919). For purposes of
|
||
analyzing a taxation scheme under the PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE of the
|
||
14th Amendment, the terms RESIDENT and CITIZEN are essentially interchangeable;
|
||
see AUSTIN VS. NEW HAMPSHIRE, 420 U.S. 656, footnote 8 (1974). However unequal
|
||
the Government benefit distribution skew is between these two classifications,
|
||
important for the moment, for taxation purposes RESIDENTS are equally taxable
|
||
objects like CITIZENS.
|
||
<div>[755]
|
||
The fact that you may have recorded that declaration in a public place, and may
|
||
have also made the declaration timely, are not relevant factual elements that
|
||
inure to your advantage, since the substance of your arguments is meaningless.
|
||
Your Residency Contract is not unilaterally terminated by your mere declaration
|
||
that you are not a Resident; contractual termination has to occur for a good
|
||
substantive reason. One such reason would be Failure of Consideration (meaning,
|
||
that you explicitly and timely rejected all state and municipal benefits). Now
|
||
that there has been a failure of benefit transference, now you have a
|
||
substantive attack to make on the assertion of a Residency Contract on you.
|
||
Your objective is to terminate the contract. [756]
|
||
[756]<div> There is a
|
||
distinction between the termination of a contract, and the repudiation of
|
||
contract. REPUDIATION is to reject, disclaim, or renounce a duty or obligation
|
||
that is owed to another party -- since the retention of the benefits derived
|
||
from the operation of the contract continues the life of the contract in
|
||
effect. To repudiate a contract is to merely give advance notice to the other
|
||
party that you intend to breach the contract for some reason [see UCC 2-708
|
||
"SELLER'S DAMAGES FOR NON-ACCEPTANCE OR REPUDIATION" and 2-711 "BUYER'S
|
||
REMEDIES IN GENERAL," see also Samuel Williston in REPUDIATION OF CONTRACTS, 14
|
||
Harvard Law Review 421 (1900).] In contrast to that, to TERMINATE a contract
|
||
is to end and cease the existence of the contract altogether [see UCC 2-106
|
||
"DEFINITIONS: 'CONTRACT",... 'TERMINATION'"]. Under TERMINATION, all rights,
|
||
duties, and obligations arising between the parties cease altogether, and there
|
||
are no lingering reciprocal expectations retained by either party.
|
||
<div>[756]
|
||
If you want to win your State Income Tax Cases, then do not throw arguments
|
||
sounding in the Tort of unfairness at the Judge; do not pretend that the
|
||
invisible contract does not exist, and do not argue that it is unfair to hold
|
||
such a contract against you since either nothing "was signed" or that the
|
||
Protestor baby talk of "minimum contacts" or "nexus" required by the Supreme
|
||
Court in their line of State Jurisdiction Cases was not met (as your physical
|
||
household inhabitancy in that kingdom overrules those types of questions
|
||
designed to address factual settings where Geography Jurisdiction itself is a
|
||
disputed element). [757]
|
||
[757]<div> And
|
||
geography was very much disputed in 1959 when, as Governor, Nelson Rockefeller
|
||
gave his taxing grab one more turn of the screws to Parties of the New York
|
||
State Personal Income Tax -- as this time, Residents of New Jersey, who work in
|
||
New York City and pay New York Income Taxes as the reciprocity for the use of
|
||
the Commerce Jurisdiction of New York State, decided to take matters into their
|
||
own hands. They persuaded U.S. Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey to introduce
|
||
a proposed Constitutional amendment into the Congress in March of 1959 which
|
||
would have prohibited the several States from taxing the income of
|
||
non-Residents. Although Nelson Rockefeller's tax increase was the catalytic
|
||
trigger for initiating this amendment, however, as is usually the case the
|
||
truth itself is obscure and difficult to find, because during Hearings held in
|
||
Congress, emphasis was shifted over to paint a larger regional picture of an
|
||
"unfairness" taxation problem by pointing to the double taxation of New Jersey
|
||
Residents both by New York and also by Pennsylvania for those who commuted into
|
||
Philadelphia. During Senate Hearings, the question arose as to how to protect
|
||
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New York from the prospective
|
||
loss of revenue -- revenue that was generated from such non-Residents [certain
|
||
people seemed very concerned that Nelson Rockefeller not be deprived of so much
|
||
as one thin dime of tax money to spend]. Would there be any reciprocating QUID
|
||
PRO QUO that New Jersey would yield in exchange for financial benefits lost to
|
||
New York State?
|
||
"The reciprocal exemption of New York residents from a New Jersey
|
||
income tax on nonresidents working in New Jersey might well constitute
|
||
sufficient QUID PRO QUO."
|
||
- Senator Clifford Case in HEARINGS BEFORE... THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
|
||
OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, page 17 ["Constitutional Amendment: Taxation By
|
||
States of Nonresidents"], 86th Congress, First Session, April, 1959; acting on
|
||
Senate Joint Resolutions 29 and 67 [GPO, Washington (1959)]. As we turn around
|
||
from a juristic situs on political arguments made in Congress, over to the
|
||
unbridled snortations disseminating outward from a Federal Judge's Courtroom,
|
||
nothing changes either, as the same PRINCIPLE OF NATURE that Judges hold errant
|
||
Tax Protestors to [that your expected QUID PRO QUO reciprocity is mandatory
|
||
when juristic benefits were accepted by you], also applies to nullify
|
||
prospective opposition to political arguments. By Senator Case's identification
|
||
in advance of the QUID PRO QUO that New York State would be gaining if this
|
||
amendment gets Ratified, the impending opposition of this amendment by New York
|
||
State is placed into a known expected manageable mode -- a strategic model for
|
||
handling grievances that Tax and Draft Protestors would be wise to consider
|
||
adapting into their MODUS OPERANDI of errant defiance. Through this Letter, I
|
||
have identified certain key benefits that Federal Judges have their eyes
|
||
fixated on when signing a Commitment Order to a Federal Penitentiary on Tax and
|
||
Draft Protesting Cases. Your failure to nullify, in advance, the Principle of
|
||
BENEFITS ACCEPTED/RECIPROCITY NOW DEMANDED in the arguments of your impending
|
||
adversaries, will prove to be self-detrimental, as this PRINCIPLE OF NATURE can
|
||
and will make an appearance in any setting. And if you do win on some off-point
|
||
technical grounds, your apparent victory will be carrying over with a lingering
|
||
illicit savor. Secondary consequences will also be created in the wake of
|
||
having deflected attention off to the side while the true reason for winning
|
||
that particular battle remains obscured, and also by having been deprived of
|
||
the important intellectual benefits associated with battles that are fought and
|
||
won/lost on their merits. Failure to identify the true cause of a battle loss
|
||
or win is to render the efforts expended on behalf of your battle largely
|
||
naught, and leaves a person's judgment no better off coming out of the battle
|
||
than they were when first going into it.
|
||
<div>[757]
|
||
You must address the Contract question head on, that by the act of your silence
|
||
a Residency Contract was entered into, and you must come to grips with that
|
||
fact. [758]
|
||
[758]<div> The power to
|
||
tax, the power to throw benefits at folks and then demand, and get, financial
|
||
reciprocity:
|
||
"... is an incident of sovereignty, and is co-existensive with that to
|
||
which it is an incident. All subjects over which the sovereign power of a State
|
||
extends, are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are,
|
||
upon the soundest of principles, exempt from taxation."
|
||
- M'CULLOCH VS. MARYLAND, 17 U.S. 316, at 429 (1819).
|
||
<div>[758]
|
||
The local state tax collector did not receive any Notice of your Rejection of
|
||
Benefits, so his assertion of a reciprocal tax against you is provident, up to
|
||
a limited point. And so winning, on point, will be predicated upon your
|
||
correctly addressing the existence of the contract in arguments for what it
|
||
really is, and then attacking the content substantively on the hard mandatory
|
||
requirement of benefit enjoyment [which does not exist in your Case due to
|
||
Failure of Consideration], a defense line that causes contracts so deficient in
|
||
Consideration to fall apart and collapse under attack in adversary judicial
|
||
proceedings. When trying to get out of contract where one of the parties is a
|
||
Juristic Institution, a few low-level Trial Judges will find your position to
|
||
be novel and philosophically uncomfortable, and so you should brace yourself
|
||
for some snortations descending down to the floor of the Courtroom from the
|
||
Bench. I did not realize this at first, but some Judges are actually jealous of
|
||
people turning around so smoothly walking away from a juristic taxation
|
||
contract; the Judge went to Law School, and then possibly went to work for a
|
||
law firm, and then they were called to be a Judge; in their minds they look
|
||
back and see all that money they threw out the window to Government year after
|
||
year only to wind up in the pockets of some Special Interest Group, and here
|
||
you are, actually GETTING AWAY WITH what they did not know how to do
|
||
themselves, and what is nowhere documented in statutes.
|
||
</conspiracyFile> |