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317 lines
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317 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
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Testimony of Dr. Arjun Makhijani on the Programmatic
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Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Reconfiguration
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of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, given at Washington, D.C., June
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12, 1991.
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My name is Arjun Makhijani. I am representing the Institute
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for Energy and Environmental Research of Takoma Park, Maryland,
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of which I am the president. I appreciate this opportunity to
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present my views. I am submitting a written statement for the
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record.
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There are a number of overarching issues regarding the
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scientific and technical content and integrity of the
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Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement which must be
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addressed so that the range of reconfiguration options
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corresponds to the reality of a rapidly changing world and the
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immense needs for money and technical resources of the problems
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of nuclear and non-nuclear hazardous wastes which have already
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been created from past weapons production. The scope proposed by
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the DOE for the reconfiguration PEIS is fundamentally deficient
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on a number of grounds.
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The most fundamental deficiency has already been much
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discussed as part of extensive and repeated public comments on
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the scope of the Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
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PEIS -- the modernization PEIS and Environmental
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Restoration/Waste Management PEIS need to be a part of a single
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interconnected document. Despite these many comments the DOE is
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single-mindedly pursuing and original, flawed decision to do two
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documents, each highly flawed in its own concept, in large
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measure because of the failure to properly consider nuclear waste
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issues.
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Risk Minimization
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In my own comments on the scope of the Environmental
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Restoration and Waste Management PEIS, I had noted that risk
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2
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minimization should be a primary goal of the entire PEIS. This
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should include the approach to the problem, the way in which
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scenarios are set and may other aspects of environmental
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evaluation. One of the most basic aspects of risk minimization,
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as I noted in my testimony of January 14, 1991, is that it "is
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not only each risk from each operation that is to be reduced.
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Rather, a programmatic statement is done precisely because we
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seek to minimize overall risk." This cannot be done if
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modernization, production for existing plants and risks from past
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activities are considered separately.
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During that same process of comment on the scope of the
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Environmental Restoration and Waste Management PEIS, some twenty
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groups sent a letter to Secretary Watkins asserting that it would
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be absurd and unacceptable to consider a clean-up plan which
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excluded waste generation from new weapons production activities.
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It is similarly absurd and unacceptable to exclude crucial waste
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management aspects from an environmental impact statement about
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modernization that claims to be a "programmatic" statement.
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Waste Management Impacts
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There are a number of practical problems which arise out of
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the omission of critical waste management issues. First, some of
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the waste generated may need to be sent either to high-level
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waste repository or to a transuranic waste repository. Space
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considerations for these repositories, waste forms, geologic
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isolation criteria for specific waste forms, and many other
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factors will impact on the environment and the health of future
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generations. Yet, both Yucca Mountain and the Waste Isolation
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Pilot Project are excluded from the scope of the modernization
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PEIS. Indeed, the modernization PEIS does not even consider one
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of the most important elements of the proposed modernization --
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the New Production Reactor.
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The excuse for excluding the NPR is the same as that for
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excluding Yucca Mountain and WIPP -- that they are the subjects
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of separate EIS processes. Yet it defeats the purpose of a
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programmatic statement if the interactions and implications of
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critical aspects of the program are not considered. The New
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Production Reactor will have spent fuel driver rods, possibly
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reprocessing wastes, "low-level" wastes, decommissioning wastes,
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as well as emissions to the environment from routine operations.
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While the modernization PEIS excludes the NPR and associated
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wastes from its scope, the NPR draft EIS in its turn also
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excludes environmental impacts from reprocessing driver rods, as
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well as high-level waste repository impacts. Thus, among the
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most serious radioactive waste impacts of tritium production and
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possible associated uranium and plutonium recovery have been
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neatly sidestepped in this way. DOE should have incorporated
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these obvious aspects into a programmatic statement on its own.
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Not only has it failed to meet the obvious, minimum test of
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technical completeness for a programmatic statement, it continues
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3
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to repeatedly ignore suggestions that would enable a minimally
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complete PEIS to be done. This is hardly indicative of a new
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culture committed to environmental protection above all else.
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Rather it looks, walks and quacks like the same old production-
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oriented duck.
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Unfunded Obligations from Past Production
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The U.S. government, through its DOE budget owes the nuclear
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waste fund a very substantial sum of money for disposal costs of
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high level radioactive waste from weapons production in the
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repository. According to Ron Callen, the director of the Nuclear
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Waste Program Assessment office of the national Association of
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Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the DOE owes about one billion
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dollars to this fund and this amount is increasing, since
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interest on this obligation is accruing. The DOE has only
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contributed $5 million into this Fund so far, a laughable sum
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compared to even the level of obligation of about $500 million
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which it itself acknowledges.
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The DOE has also reneged on its promise in its first Five
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Year Plan to contribute $200 million per year into this fund. It
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may be that this is due to the general stringency in which the
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present budgetary decisions are being made that these obligations
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to the Nuclear Waste Fund are not being met. But that only
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illustrates the point that I have made that it is precisely
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because there are substantial unfunded and underfunded
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liabilities relating to past waste and pollution that the DOE and
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the U.S. government should set aside all monies proposed to be
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devoted to modernization to a special cleanup fund. The
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obligations to the Nuclear Waste Fund should be met forthwith.
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Size of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal
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The requirements for nuclear weapons materials as defined by
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the Pentagon have been changing very rapidly due to the evolving
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international situation. Thus, a couple of years ago, a
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substantial downsizing of the arsenal was not even under
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consideration. Yet DOE is now considering scenarios with an
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arsenal 15% of the size of the present one. To propose to invest
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huge sums of money in a new weapons complex when superpower
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military tensions have declined drastically and indeed when they
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have even collaborated on settling conflicts around the world
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would appear to be financially imprudent, especially in a time
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when other social and environmental needs are unmet. This is not
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mere speculation. DOE has in the past few years spent hundreds
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of millions of dollars trying to restore facilities which are not
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required due to the changing international situation. DOE has
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yet to analyze this experience and examine its implications for
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the modernization program.
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It must be borne in mind that the proposed new nuclear
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weapons complex is supposed to provide for U.S. nuclear weapons
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4
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requirements until around the middle of the next century.
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Planning for such a long time horizon is a chancy business under
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any circumstances. Doing so in the present circumstances when
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the political assumptions upon which the arsenal has been based
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have been changing very rapidly is like trying to predict the
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course of Alice in Wonderland as she enters the rabbit hole. It
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might be an interesting exercise, but one wouldn't want to bet
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tens of billions of dollars of public money on it. It is all the
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more shocking that this is being pursued without serious
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consideration or discussion of the financial and political risk.
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Non-proliferation Considerations
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The political and military risk could be considerable. To
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begin to spend billions of dollars on a new nuclear weapons
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production complex when the United States already has 20,000
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nuclear weapons could be regarded in the Third World, and perhaps
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even in certain quarters in the Soviet Union as a highly
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provocative act at a time when the U.S. is proclaiming interest
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in nuclear non-proliferation and superpower cooperation. Even
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before this, the nuclear non-proliferation talks for the renewal
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of the treaty are mired in controversy over the failure of the
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U.S. to even negotiate for a comprehensive test ban and the
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practical failure of the superpowers to substantially reduce
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their nuclear arsenals.
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At the same time we have the spectacle of one of the
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superpowers, the Soviet Union, asking for hundreds of billions of
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dollars in aid from the other. Such sums would hardly be given
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serious consideration if the Soviet Union did not possess and
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vast nuclear arsenal. Much less would major Third World
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countries' leaders be given serious consideration should they ask
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to be present at the economic summit of the major economic
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powers. The implications of this are surely not lost on
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potential nuclear weapons powers in the Third World.
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Even these few basic preliminaries regarding non-
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proliferation questions lead to the conclusion that embarking on
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a modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex is a highly
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risky, politically and militarily. The world has changed too
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fast for the implications of this to be thought through
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sufficiently to arrive at conclusions regarding the size of the
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U.S. arsenal, even according to criteria of the Pentagon.
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Indeed, the very criteria are in flux; if they are not, they
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should be because the world situation is changing so fast.
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Conclusions
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The fact that so much has been said on the subject of
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integrating the two PEIS statements, that it makes eminent
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technical and environmental sense, and that the DOE has continued
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to ignore it outright shows that despite a great deal of talk
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about public participation, change in culture at DOE and so on,
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5
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there has been little practical cognizance of public comment or
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actual change in culture whenever it touches upon nuclear weapons
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production. The DOE continues to pursue goals and means that it
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has already decided, regardless of public comment, so that public
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comment is turning into a farce.
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In addition to the futile expenditures which DOE has already
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made on facilities which it will never use, there is problem of
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whether there will be sufficient money and technical resources
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available for clean-up in future years. Clearly, there is
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considerable uncertainty whether the clean-up program can be
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adequately funded in the long-term, even if DOE cannot
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efficiently spend much more money today. It would therefore be
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prudent to set aside considerable sums of money for the long-term
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clean-up program at the present time when there is no clear
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justification for spending money on new production facilities and
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when it would be politically prudent to await further
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developments over the next three years in terms of U.S.-Soviet
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relations and other international political and military issues.
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I recommend that all expenditures on modernization be halted
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for three years and that such a scenario be explicitly considered
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in the modernization PEIS. The total halting of production
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activities in the present nuclear weapons complex should also be
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part of this scenario. Activities related to reducing the size
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of the arsenal should, of course be considered, and various
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levels should be incorporated, as part of these same
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considerations. Any new facilities needed for reducing arsenal
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size, as distinct from modernization should be clearly specified
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and clearly distinguished from new production or refurbishing of
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old weapons into new designs. If the DOE feels that any of the
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facilities associated with the modernization PEIS may be relevant
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to clean-up these should be justified only on the grounds of its
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being the best available technology for clean-up and have no
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production related component. It is unacceptable for DOE to
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continue to hide production under the guise of clean-up.
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During this time the implications of the U.S. nuclear
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program for building a new nuclear weapons complex for waste
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management, for the environment, for nuclear non-proliferation,
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for U.S.-Soviet relations, for contingencies related to the
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possible political break-up of the Soviet Union should all be
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examined more carefully and thoroughly. The latter aspects are
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not the charge of the DOE, of course, but the modernization
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program is profoundly affected by them. A more careful, prudent
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course is much more desirable than the spectacle of spending huge
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sums of public money on scenarios for arsenal size which change
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wildly from year to year.
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The funds now earmarked for modernization should be set
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aside in a fund earmarked for clean-up, analogous to the nuclear
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waste fund. In fact, I recommend that some of the funds
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earmarked for production should be put into the nuclear waste
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6
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fund to which the DOE has already huge unfunded obligations.
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This issue is worth considering in some detail as it concerns the
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failure of the DOE and the U.S. government to attend to waste
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management costs for past operations while charging ahead with
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plans for further production.
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Then instead of having increasing labilities and wastes, we
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will in a position that some interest will be to accrue to the
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clean-up program from these funds which have been set aside.
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This will enable us to begin to meet at least in some modest
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measure our commitment to future generations of leaving them a
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safer, healthier and more peaceful world. Thank you.
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