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<conspiracyFile>[From the January-February 1990 issue of "Extra!", a publication of FAIR.]
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The Media Goes to War:
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HOW TELEVISION SOLD THE PANAMA INVASION
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by Mark Cook and Jeff Cohen
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TWO weeks after the Panama invasion, "CBS News" sponsored a public
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opinion poll in Panama that found the residents in rapture over what
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happened. Even <data type="percent" unit="%">80%</data> of those whose homes had been blown up or
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their relatives killed by US forces said it was worth it. Their
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enthusiasm did not stop with the ousting of Gen. Manual Noriega,
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however. A less heavily advertised result of the poll was that 82% of
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the sampled Panamanian patriots did not want Panamanian control of the
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Canal, preferring either partial of exclusive control by the US
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("Panamanians Strongly Back US Move," "New York Times," 1/6/90).
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A "public opinion poll" in a country under martial law, conducted by
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an agency obviously sanctioned by the invading forces, can be expected
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to come up with such results. Most reporters, traveling as they did
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with the US military, found little to contradict this picture. Less
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than 40 hours after the invasion began, Sam Donaldson and Judd Rose
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transported us to Panama via "ABC's Prime Time Live" (12/21/90).
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"There were people who applauded us as we went by in a military
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convoy," said Rose. "The military have been very good to us [in
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escorting reporters beyond the Canal Zone]," added Donaldson.
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While this kind of "Canal Zone journalism" dominated television, a
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few independent print journalists stuck out on their own. Peter
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Eisner of "Newsday"'s Latin American Bureau, for example, reported
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(12/28/89) that Panamanians were cursing US soldiers under their
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breath as troops searched the home of a neighbor--a civilian--for
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weapons. One Panamanian pointed out a man speaking to US soldiers as
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a "sapo" (a toad--slang for "dirty informer") and suggested that
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denouncing people to the US forces was a way of settling old scores.
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A doctor living on the street said that "liberals will be laying low
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for a while, and they're probably justified" because of what would
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happen to those who speak out. All of Eisner's sources feared having
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their names printed.
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The same day's "Miami Herald" ran articles about Panamanian citizen
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reactions, including concern over the hundreds of dead civilians:
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"Neighbors saw six US truck loads bringing dozens of bodies" to a mass
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grave. As a mother watched the body of her soldier son lowered into a
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grave, her "voice rose over the crowd's silence: `Damn the
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Americans.'"
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Obviously there was a mix of opinion inside Panama, but it was
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virtually unreported on television, the dominant medium shaping US
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attitudes about the invasion. Panamanian opposition to the US was
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dismissed as nothing more than "DigBat [Dignity Battalion] thugs"
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who'd been given jobs by Noriega. And it was hardly acknowledged that
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the high-visibility demonstration outside the Vatican Embassy the day
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of Noriega's surrender had been actively "encouraged" by the US
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occupying forces ("Newsday," 1/5/90).
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Few TV reporters seemed to notice that the jubilant Panamanians
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parading before their cameras day after day to endorse the invasion
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spoke near-perfect English and were overwhelmingly light-skinned and
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well-dressed. This in a Spanish-speaking country with a largely
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mestizo and black population where poverty is widespread. "ABC"'s
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Beth Nissen (12/27/89) was one of the few TV reporters to take a close
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look at the civilian deaths caused by US bombs that pulverized El
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Chorillo, the poor neighborhood which ambulance drivers now call
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"Little Hiroshima." The people of El Chorillo don't speak perfect
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English, and they were less than jubilant about the invasion.
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"Our Boys" vs. Unseen Civilians
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In the first days of the invasion, TV journalists had one overriding
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obsession: *How many American soldiers have died?* The question,
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repeated with drumbeat regularity, tended to drown out the other
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issues: Panamanian casualties, international law, foreign reaction.
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On the morning of the invasion, "CBS" anchor Kathleen Sullivan's voice
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cracked with emotion for the US soldiers: "Nine killed, more than 50
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wounded. How long can this fighting go on?" Unknown and unknowable
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to "CBS" viewers, hundreds of Panamanians had already been killed by
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then, many buried in their homes.
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<div>
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YOU BE THE JUDGE
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* "[The invasion was legal] according to all the experts I
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talked to."--Rita Braver ("CBS Evening News," 12/20/89)
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* "As far as international law is concerned, even sources in
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the US government admit they were operating very near the
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line."--John McWethy ("ABC World News Tonight," 1/5/90)
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* "The territory of a state is inviolable. It may not be the
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object, even temporarily, of military occupation or other
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measures of force taken by another state directly or
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indirectly on any grounds whatsoever."--Article 20, OAS
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Charter
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<div>
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Judging from the calls and requests for interviews that poured into
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the FAIR office, European and Latin American journalists based in the
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US were stunned by the implied racism and national chauvinism in the
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media display. The "Toronto Globe and Mail," often referred to as the
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"New York Times" of Canada, ran a front-page article (12/22/89)
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critiquing the United States and its media for "the peculiar jingoism
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of US society so evident to foreigners but almost invisible for most
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Americans."
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TV's continuous focus on the well-being of the invaders, and not the
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invadees, meant that the screen was dominated by red, white and blue
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draped coffins and ceremonies, honor rolls of the US dead, drum rolls,
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remarks by Dan Rather (12/21/89) about "our fallen heroes"...but no
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Panamanian funerals. This despite the fact that the invasion claimed
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perhaps 50 Panamanian lives for every US citizen killed.
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When Pentagon pool correspondent Fred Francis was asked on day one
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about civilian casualties on "ABC's Nightline" (12/20/89), he said he
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did not know, because he and other journalists were traveling around
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with the US army. Curiosity didn't increase in ensuing days. FAIR
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called the TV networks daily to demand they address the issue of
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civilian deaths, but journalists said they had no way of verifying the
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numbers.
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No such qualms existed with regards to Rumania, where over the
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Christmas weekend "CNN" and other US outlets were freely dishing out
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fantastic reports of 80000 people killed in days of violence, a
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figure--greater that the immediate Hiroshima death toll--which any
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editor should have dismissed out of hand. Tom Brokaw's selective
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interest in civilians was evident when he devoted the first half of
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"NBC Nightly News" (12/20/89) to Panama without mentioning non-
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combatant casualties, then turned to Rumania and immediately referred
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to reports of thousands of civilian deaths.
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<div>
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Due Process Mugged
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You've seen it everywhere. It made the cover of "Newsweek,"
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the front page of the "New York Times"' "Week in Review", and
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the "CBS", "NBC" and "ABC" news: Manual Noriega's mug shot,
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looking just like the criminals at the end of each "Dragnet"
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episode after Sgt. Joe Friday had brought them to justice.
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But what you didn't often see is an acknowledgement that the
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release of such mug shots is highly unusual, and may threaten
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Noriega's already slim chances of getting a fair trial. The
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Miami U.S. Attorney's office claims to have released it "under
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pressure from the press," according to the "New York Times"
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(1/14/90). "We will not comment very frequently on this case,"
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U.S. Attorney Dexter Lehtinen said, calling that "the key to
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success." Sure, as long as the media are willing to publish
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prosecution leaks without regard to the defendant's
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constitutional rights.
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[Below this are two covers:]
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"Newsweek" (1/15/90) has "NORIEGA'S NEXT HOME? America's New
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Alcatraz" at the top; followed by "EXCLUSIVE The Noriega
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Files; His Treacherous Links With the Drug Cartel, Castro,
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Bush and the CIA", accompanied by a picture of a Noriega mug
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shot--he in a T-shirt holding the sign:
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"U.S. MARSHAL, MIAMI, FL, 4.1.5.8.6. .0.0.4. '90"
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"New York Post" (1/5/90) has "CANNED PINEAPPLE" covering half
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it's cover, with a subhead "Arrogant Noriega: I'm a political
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prisoner"; the bottom half shows two photos: one of Noriega
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surrounded by three police officers restraining him, and the
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other, the same mug shot as "Newsweek".
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<div>
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Not until the sixth day of the Panama invasion did the US Army
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augment its estimated dead (23 American troops, 297 alleged enemy
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soldiers) to include a figure for civilians: 254. The number was
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challenged as representing only a fraction of the true death toll by
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the few reporters who sought out independent sources: Panamanian
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human rights monitors, hospital workers, ambulance drivers, funeral
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home directors. These sources also spoke of thousands of civilian
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injuries and 10000 left homeless. Many journalists, especially on
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television, were too busy cheerleading "the successful military
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action" to notice the Panamanians who didn't fare so successfully.
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TV correspondents, so uncurious about civilian casualties, could not
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be expected to go beyond US military assurances about who was being
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arrested and why. As the "Boston Globe" noted (1/1/90), US forces
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were arresting anyone on a blacklist compiled by the newly-installed
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government. "Newsday"'s Peter Eisner reported (1/7/90): "Hundreds of
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intellectuals, university students, teachers and professional people
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say they have been harassed and detained by US forces in the guise of
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searching for hidden weapons."
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<div>
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CENSORED NEWS: Drug Links of Panama's New Rulers
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The Bush White House justified the invasion by claiming that
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overthrowing Noriega was a major victory in the war on drugs.
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If journalists had reported the backgrounds of the new
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Panamanian leaders installed by the US invasion, and their
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connections to drug-laundering banks and drug traffickers, a
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primary rationale for the invasion would have been shredded.
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But few journalists scrutinized Panama's "new democrats"
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from the country's banking and corporate elite. One who did
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was Jonathan Marshall, editorial page editor of the "Oakland
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Tribune". In a series of editorials, "Panama's Drug, Inc."
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(1/5 & 1/22/90), Marshall reported the following:
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PRESIDENT GUILLERMO ENDARA is a wealthy corporate attorney
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for several companies run by Carlos Eleta, a Panamanian
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business tycoon arrested in Georgia last April for conspiring
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to import more than half a ton of cocaine each month into the
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US. The Brazilian daily, "Jornal do Brasil," reported that
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Endara was Eleta's lawyer for 25 years and a direct
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stockholder in one of his companies. Endara's political
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mentor and idol is former President Arnulfo Arias, who
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reportedly amassed $2000000 from smuggling contraband,
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including hard drugs.
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VICE PRESIDENT GUILLERMO "BILLY" FORD is a co-founder and
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part owner of the Dadeland Bank, in Miami, a repository for
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Medellin drug cartel money. One of Ford's co-owner's,
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Panamanian Steven Samos, used the bank in the late 1970s to
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launder millions of dollars in drug money for a CIA-trained
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Cuban American. Panama's new ambassador to the US, Carlos
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Rodriguez, is also a co-founder of the Dadeland Bank. (The
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"New York Times" on Jan. 28 mustered up Roberto Eisenmann, the
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publisher of Panama's "La Prensa," to deny allegations linking
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Ford to money laundering. The "Times" didn't mention that
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Eisenmann is another co-founder of the bank.)
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ATTORNEY GENERAL ROGELIO CRUZ served as a director of the
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First Interamericas Bank. The bank, closed down for drug-
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related "irregular operations" in 1985, was owned by the
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leader of Columbia's Cali cocaine cartel and reportedly
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laundered money for Jorge Ochoa of the Medellin cartel.
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Panama's new chief justice of the supreme court and new
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treasury minister were also members of the bank's board.
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Marshall concluded: "President Endara's appointments read
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like a who's who of Panama's oligarchy. Many have personal
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or business associations with the drug-money laundering
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industry." Portraying Noriega's replacement by the Endara
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clique as a strike against drug dealing is a cruel joke.
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The importance of Panama to the international narcotics
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trade has long revolved around its supersecret banks--cool
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places to launder "hot money." In December 1986, Noriega's
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legislature pushed through a rollback in the country's bank
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secrecy law. In May 1987, when Noriega's government froze
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accounts in 18 banks as part of an anti-drug operation mounted
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by the DEA, it sparked a massive banking crisis in Panama.
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The actions were vigorously opposed by Noriega's foes in the
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banking elite. These foes now run Panama's government thanks
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to the US invasion. The "war on drugs" continues.
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<div>
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The "Objective" Reporter's Lexicon: We, Us, Our
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In covering the invasion, many TV journalists abandoned even the
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pretense of operating in a neutral, independent mode. Television
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anchors used pronouns like "we" and "us" in describing the mission
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into Panama, as if they themselves were members of the invasion force,
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or at least helpful advisors. "NBC"'s Brokaw exclaimed, on day one:
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"We haven't got [Noriega] yet." "CNN" anchor Mary Anne Loughlin asked
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a former CIA official (12/21/89): "Noriega has stayed one step ahead
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of us. Do you think we'll be able to find him?" After eagerly
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quizzing a panel of US military experts on "MacNeil/Lehrer" (12/21/89)
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about whether "we" had wiped out the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF),
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Judy Woodruff concluded, "So not only have we done away with the PDF,
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we've also done away with the police force." So much for the
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separation of press and state.
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Ted Koppel and other TV journalists had a field day mocking the
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Orwellianly-titled "Dignity Battalions," but none were heard
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ridiculing the invasion's code-name: "Operation Just Cause." The day
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after the invasion, "NBC Nightly News" offered its own case study in
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Orwellian Newspeak: While one correspondent referred to the US
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military occupiers as engaging in "peacekeeping chores," another
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correspondent on the same show referred to Latin American diplomats at
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the OAS condemning the US as a "lynch mob." After the Soviet Union
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criticized the invasion as "gunboat diplomacy" (as had many other
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countries), Dan Rather dismissed it as "old-line, hard-line talk from
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Moscow" ("CBS Evening News," 12/20/89).
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Journalism gave way to state propaganda when a "CNN" correspondent
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dutifully reported on the day of the invasion: "US troops have taken
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detainees but we are not calling them `prisoners of war' because the
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US has not declared war." (That kind of obedient reporter probably
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still refers to the Vietnam "conflict.") Similarly, on Day 1, many
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networks couldn't bring themselves to call the invasion an invasion
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until they got the green light from Washington: instead, it was
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referred to variously as a military action, intervention, operation,
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expedition, affair, insertion.
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<div>
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"NORIEGA OFFERED HIS USUAL DAMP LIMP
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HANDSHAKE TO BUSH'S FIRM GRIP."
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For sheer propaganda, high marks go to "Newsweek"'s Noriega
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cover story (1/15/90) featuring excerpts from a book about
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Noriega by "Wall Street Journal" reporter Frederick Kempe.
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The book and its author were much touted by the media during
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the invasion. Some highlights:
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HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ELLIOTT ABRAMS. "By the summer of
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1985, the State Department's new Assistant Secretary of State
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for Latin American Affairs, Elliott Abrams, began to believe
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that Noriega's help for the Contras was overestimated and his
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general harm to democracy and human rights was underestimated.
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Abrams had come out of State's human rights office..."
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Abrams hardly "came out" of a human rights office. He was
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put there to disseminate anti-Nicaragua war propaganda as
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human rights information, an operation repeatedly exposed and
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denounced by Americas Watch. Abrams "human rights" work
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included attacks on the church-based Sanctuary movement, which
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offered refuge to Central Americans fleeing death squads.
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A careful reading of the "Newsweek" article leaves the
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sneaking suspicion that much of the material was provided by
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Abrams himself. "[Abrams] argued at several interagency
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meetings that backing the Contras could only be one part of
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an overall strategy of promoting democracy in the region. He
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wanted more pressure on Panama to democratize--without
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endangering the good relationship that existed."
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FIRM, REFINED BRAHMIN VS. LIMP, MESTIZO BASTARD. "The two
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intelligence chiefs contrasted in style and substance: Bush
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was lanky and refined, raised by a Brahmin New England family.
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He towered over the five-foot five-inch Noriega. Noriega was
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mean-streets Mestizo, the bastard son of his father's
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domestic. Noriega offered his usual damp, limp handshake to
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Bush's firm grip. They were clearly uncomfortable with each
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other." Aside from the racism of the piece, the line about
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the two being uncomfortable with each other is significant-
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-primarily to protect Bush. A second later: "Only in the
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twisted mind of Manuel Antonio Noriega could that 1976
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luncheon with George Bush be construed as the beginning of a
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beautiful friendship." Though it lasted for more than ten
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years.
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BUT IT WAS ALL CASEY'S FAULT. George Bush wasn't
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responsible for the ongoing ties to Noriega. The guy to
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blame, according to Kempe, was--as usual--the CIA director
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William Casey. Casey met often with Noriega to discuss aid
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to the contras.
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AND CASTRO'S, OF COURSE. Kempe makes a herculean effort
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with scant evidence to implicate Fidel Castro in all the drug
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dealing. But as other journalists have pointed out, Castro's
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main need for Noriega and Panama was as a haven for Cuban
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front companies to engage in legitimate trade with Western
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countries in circumvention of the US economic blockade ("Miami
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Herald," 12/28/89). An editorial in Kempe's "Wall Street
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Journal" (1/8/90) called on the US to cut a deal with Noriega
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if he'd implicate Castro.
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A WALK ON THE HOMOPHOBIC SIDE. Perhaps aimed at bolstering
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the anti-gay vote in support of the invasion, "Newsweek" ran
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a sidebar from Kempe's book under the headline, "A Walk on
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the Bisexual Side": "The macho officer [Noriega], proficient
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in judo and parachuting, would perfume himself heavily on off
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hours and wear yellow jump suits with yellow shoes, travel
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the world with a male pal with whom he was widely rumored to
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be having a torrid affair, and surround himself with openly
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gay ambassadors and advisers...Armchair psychiatrists credit
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Noriega's sexual confusion to his gay brother, Luis Carlos
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Noriega, the only person Noriega ever trusted completely."
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<div>
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Where Did Our Love Go?
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Many reporters uncritically promoted White House explanations for its
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break-up with Noriega. Clifford Krauss reported ("NY Times," 1/21/90)
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that Noriega "began as a CIA asset but fell afoul of Washington over
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his involvement in drug and arms trafficking." "ABC"'s Peter Jennings
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told viewers on the day of the invasion, "Let's remember that the
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United States was very close to Mr. Noriega before the whole question
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of drugs came up." Actually, Noriega's drug links were asserted by US
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intelligence as early as 1972. In 1976, after US espionage officials
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proposed that Noriega be dumped because of drugs and double-dealing,
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then-CIA director George Bush made sure the relationship continued
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("S.F. Examiner," 1/5/90; "New Yorker," 1/8/90). US intelligence
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overlooked the drug issue year after year as long as Noriega was an
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eager ally in US espionage and covert operations, especially those
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targeted against Nicaragua.
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Peter Jennings' claim that the US broke with Noriega after the
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"question of drugs came up" turns reality upside down. Noriega's
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involvement in drug trafficking was purportedly heaviest in the early
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1980s when his relationship with the US was especially close. By
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1986, when the Noriega/US relationship began to fray, experts agree
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that Noriega had already drastically curtailed his drug links. The
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two drug-related indictments against Noriega in Florida cover
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activities from 1981 through March 1986 ("Analysts Challenge View of
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Noriega as Drug Lord," "Washington Post," 1/7/90).
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<div>
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Objective Journalists of State Propagandists?
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* "one of the more odious creatures with whom the United
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States has had a relationship."--Peter Jennings ("ABC,"
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12/20/89)
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* "At the top of the list of the world's drug thieves and
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scums."--Dan Rather ("CBS," 12/20/89)
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* Q: "Do we bring him here and put him on trial...or do we
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just neutralize him in some way?"--John Chancellor
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A: "I think you bring him here and you make it a
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showcase trial in the war on drugs and justice prevails."-
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-Tom Brokaw ("NBC," 12/20/89)
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*"We lose numbers like that in large training exercises."-
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-John Chancellor, commenting approvingly upon hearing only
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nine US soldiers had died ("NBC," 12/20/89)
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* "Noriega's reputation as a brutal drug-dealing bully who
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reveled in his public contempt for the United States all
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but begged for strong retribution."--Ted Koppel ("ABC
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Nightline," 12/20/89)
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* "Noriega asked for this. President Bush listed all the
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things Noriega had done to force him to take this action.
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Why does Noriega do these things?"--"CNN" anchor Ralph
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Wenge, interviewing a former US military commander
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(12/21/89)
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* "Noriega seemed almost superhuman in his ability to
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slither away before we got him."--Anchor Bill Beutel
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("WABC-TV," New York, 1/3/90)
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* "[George Bush has completed] a Presidential initiation
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rite [joining] American leaders who since World War II have
|
|
felt a need to demonstrate their willingness to shed blood
|
|
to protect or advance what they construe as the national
|
|
interest...Panama has shown him as a man capable of bold
|
|
action."--R.W. Apple ("New York Times," front page news
|
|
analysis, 12/21/89)
|
|
<div>
|
|
When, as vice president, Bush met with Noriega in Panama in December
|
|
1983, besides discussing Nicaragua, Bush allegedly raised questions
|
|
about drug money laundering. According to author Kevin Buckley,
|
|
Noriega told top aide Jose Blandon that he'd picked up the following
|
|
message from the Bush meeting: "The United States wanted help for the
|
|
contras so badly that if he even promised it, the US government would
|
|
turn a blind eye to money-laundering and setbacks to democracy in
|
|
Panama." In 1985 and '86, Noriega met several times with Oliver North
|
|
to discuss the assistance Noriega was providing to the contras, such
|
|
as training contras at Panamanian Defense Force bases ("Noriega could
|
|
give some interesting answers," Kevin Buckley, "St. Petersburg Times,"
|
|
1/3/90). Noriega didn't fall from grace until he stopped being a
|
|
"team player" in the US war against Nicaragua.
|
|
Democracy had as little to do with the break-up as drugs. If
|
|
Noriega believed Bush had given his strongarm rule a green light in
|
|
1983, confirmation came the next year when Noriega's troops seized
|
|
ballot boxes and blatantly rigged Panama's presidential election.
|
|
Noriega's candidate, Nicolas Ardito Barletta, was also "our"
|
|
candidate--an economist who had been a student and assistant to former
|
|
University of Chicago professor George Shultz. Though loudly
|
|
protested by Panamanians, the fraud that put Ardito Barletta in power
|
|
was cheered by the US Embassy. Secretary of State Shultz attended his
|
|
inauguration. (See "The Press on Panama," "Extra!", Mar/Apr 88;
|
|
Richard Reeves, "San Francisco Chronicle," 12/25/89)
|
|
As the Noriega case progresses toward trial, the media's treatment
|
|
of key witnesses against the General may offer a case study in bias.
|
|
Several of the witnesses have already testified on these matters in a
|
|
very public forum--hearings before Senator John Kerry's Foreign
|
|
Affairs Subcommittee on Narcotics. At that time, February 1988, they
|
|
fingered Nicaraguan contras as cocaine cohorts of Noriega operating
|
|
under the umbrella of the CIA and Ollie North. The hearings were
|
|
ignored or distorted by national media outlets, with Reagan/Bush
|
|
officials and CIA dismissing the witnesses as drug trafficking felons.
|
|
("Extra!," Mar/Apr 88; Warren Hinckle, "S.F. Examiner," 1/11/90). In
|
|
a predictable turnaround, as soon as Noriega was apprehended, TV news
|
|
brought forth experts to explain that "when one prosecutes someone
|
|
like Noriega for drug dealing, witnesses will of necessity be drug
|
|
dealers."
|
|
<div>
|
|
Reporters Rallying Round The Flag
|
|
|
|
Journalists justified their role as distributors of
|
|
government handouts in different ways. Asked on Day 1 why US
|
|
opponents of the invasion were virtually invisible on-the-air,
|
|
a "CBS" producer (who declined to give her name) told
|
|
"Extra!": "When American troops are involved and taking
|
|
losses, this is not the time to be running critical
|
|
commentary. The American public will be rallying around the
|
|
flag."
|
|
Some TV reporters claimed they were forced to rely on
|
|
official US versions because they had nothing else. As
|
|
"Newsday" reported Jan. 14, "Peter Arnett, a Pulitzer Prize-
|
|
winning combat journalist, was reduced to reporting on
|
|
Noriega's alleged pornography collection. `They [the
|
|
Pentagon] got away with it again,' Arnett said of the initial
|
|
press blackout."
|
|
Arnett, who covered the invasion for "CNN," was complaining
|
|
that Pentagon officials failed to provide photo opportunities
|
|
of wounded soldiers, suffering civilians and general bang-
|
|
bang. Naturally the Pentagon did everything possible to
|
|
prevent such shots, keeping with its belief that the Vietnam
|
|
War was lost in American living rooms. "Two things that
|
|
people should not watch are the making of sausage and the
|
|
making of war," "Newsday" (1/4/90) quoted an Air Force doctor
|
|
as saying. "All that front-page blood and gore hurts the
|
|
military."
|
|
Experienced combat journalists like Arnett should know that
|
|
the Pentagon's aim is to manipulate the pictures and stories
|
|
that get out. "If you just looked at television, the most
|
|
violent thing American troops did in Panama was play rock
|
|
music," political media consultant Robert Squier told
|
|
"Newsday." "They feel if they can control the pictures at the
|
|
outset, it doesn't make a damn what is said now or later."
|
|
Unhappiness with the Pentagon did not keep reporters from
|
|
promoting the US Army-approved image of Noriega as a comic
|
|
strip arch-villain. The Southern Command told reporters soon
|
|
after the invasion that 110 pounds of cocaine were found in
|
|
Noriega's so-called "witch house," and this played big on TV
|
|
news and the front-pages. When, a month later the "cocaine"
|
|
turned out to be tamales ("Washington Post," 1/23/90, page
|
|
A22), the government's deception was a footnote at best. The
|
|
initial headlines of Noriega as drug-crazed lunatic had served
|
|
their purpose: to convince the American people that he
|
|
represented a threat to the Canal.
|
|
<div>
|
|
Provocations of Pretexts?
|
|
The US media showed little curiosity about the Dec. 16 confrontation
|
|
that led to the death of a US Marine officer and the injury of another
|
|
when they tried to run a roadblock in front of the PDF headquarters.
|
|
The officers were supposedly "lost." In view of what is now known
|
|
about the intense pre-invasion preparations then underway ("NY Times,"
|
|
12/24/89), is it possible the Marines were actually trying to track
|
|
Noriega's whereabouts?
|
|
The Panamanian version of the event was that the US soldiers, upon
|
|
being discovered, opened fire--injuring three civilians, including a
|
|
child--and then tried to run the roadblock. This version was largely
|
|
ignored by US journalists even after the shooting two days later of a
|
|
Panamanian corporal who "signaled a US serviceman to stop," according
|
|
to the administration. "The US serviceman felt threatened," the
|
|
administration claimed, after admitting that its earlier story that
|
|
the Panamanian had pulled his gun was false ("NYT," 12/19/89)
|
|
As for the claim that a US officer had been roughly interrogated and
|
|
his wife had been sexually threatened, the administration provided no
|
|
supporting evidence ("NYT," 12/19/89; "Newsday," 12/18/89). Since
|
|
the Marine's death and the interrogation were repeatedly invoked to
|
|
justify the invasion, the lack of press scrutiny of these claims is
|
|
stunning.
|
|
For months, US forces had been trying to provoke confrontations as a
|
|
pretext for an attack. In response to an Aug. 11 incident, Panamanian
|
|
Foreign Minister Jorge Ritter asked that a UN peacekeeping force be
|
|
dispatched to Panama to prevent such encounters. The US press largely
|
|
ignored his call ("El Diario/La Prensa," New York's Spanish-language
|
|
daily, 8/13/89).
|
|
<div>
|
|
A Tale of Two Editions
|
|
|
|
Fighting in Panama: The Home Front Fighting in Panama: The Home Front
|
|
<div> <div>
|
|
The President The President
|
|
<div> <div>
|
|
|
|
DOING THE INEVITABLE
|
|
<div> A SENSE OF INEVITABILITY
|
|
Bush Reportedly Felt That Noriega IN BUSH's DECISION TO ACT
|
|
'Was Thumbing His Nose at Him'
|
|
|
|
If the news of the invasion wasn't favorable enough to the
|
|
administration, the "New York Times" sometimes fine-tuned it
|
|
between editions. Above are headlines over the same story in two
|
|
editions on Dec. 24--the earlier one (left) was apparently changed
|
|
because it implied that the invasion was an act of personal
|
|
vengeance by Bush. Another headline in the same early edition read,
|
|
"U.S. Drafted Invasion Plan Weeks Ago," accurately describing the
|
|
article's evidence that the invasion was scheduled before the
|
|
"provocations" that justified it ever occurred. The headline
|
|
changed to the more innocuous "U.S. Invasion: Many Weeks of
|
|
Rehearsals."
|
|
<div>
|
|
The "Declaration of War" That Never Was
|
|
"When during the past few days [Noriega] declared war on the United
|
|
States and some of his followers then killed a US Marine, roughed up
|
|
another American serviceman, also threatening that man's wife, strong
|
|
public support for a reprisal was all but guaranteed," Ted Koppel told
|
|
his "Nightline" audience Dec. 20.
|
|
Noriega never "declared war on the United States." The original
|
|
"Reuters" dispatches, published on the inside pages of the "New York
|
|
Times" (12/17-18/89), buried the supposed "declaration" in articles
|
|
dealing with other matters. In the Dec. 17 article headlined,
|
|
"Opposition Leader in Panama Rejects a Peace Offer from Noriega,"
|
|
"Reuters" quoted the general as saying that he would judiciously use
|
|
new powers granted to him by the Panamanian parliament and that "the
|
|
North American scheme, through constant psychological and military
|
|
harassment, has created a state of war in Panama." This statement of
|
|
fact aroused little excitement at the White House, which called the
|
|
parliament's move "a hollow step."
|
|
The day after the invasion, "Los Angeles Times" Pentagon
|
|
correspondent Melissa Healey told a call-in talk show audience on "C-
|
|
SPAN" that Noriega had "declared war" on the United States. When a
|
|
caller asked why that hadn't been front page news, Healey explained
|
|
that the declaration of war was one of a series of "incremental
|
|
escalations." When another caller pointed out that Panama had only
|
|
made a rhetorical statement that US economic and other measures had
|
|
created a state of war, the Pentagon correspondent confessed ignorance
|
|
of what had actually been said, and suggested that it was certainly
|
|
worth investigating.
|
|
The incident symbolizes media performance on the invasion--dispense
|
|
official information as gospel first, worry about the truth of that
|
|
information later. It's just what the White House was counting on
|
|
from the media. The Bush team set out to control television and front
|
|
page news in the first days knowing that exposes of official deception
|
|
(such as Noriega's 110 pounds of "cocaine" that turned out to be
|
|
tamales) would not appear until weeks later buried on inside pages of
|
|
newspapers. Rulers do not require the total suppression of news. As
|
|
Napoleon Bonaparte once said: It's sufficient to delay the news until
|
|
it no longer matters.
|
|
Besides uncritically dispensing huge quantities of official news and
|
|
views, the TV networks had another passion during the first days of
|
|
the invasion: polling their public. It was an insular process, with
|
|
predictable results. A "Toronto Globe and Mail" news story summarized
|
|
it (12/22/89): "Hardly a voice of objection is being heard within the
|
|
United States about the Panama invasion, at least from those deemed as
|
|
official sources and thus likely to be seen on television or read in
|
|
the papers. Not surprisingly, given the media coverage, a television
|
|
poll taken yesterday by one network ("CNN") indicated that nine of
|
|
ten viewers approved of the invasion."
|
|
<div>
|
|
I'm not Rappaport...I'm Valdez
|
|
|
|
"Extra!" usually complains about media outlets relying on
|
|
the same sources again and again, but "KTTV-TV" in Los Angeles
|
|
may have gone too far in the opposite direction.
|
|
Seeking a source to comment on the failed October 1989 coup
|
|
against Manuel Noriega, the station called what they thought
|
|
was the Panamanian consulate. In fact, it was the home of
|
|
Kurt Rappaport, a 22-year old prankster. Rappaport,
|
|
pretending to be an anti-Noriega Panamanian diplomat, "Arturo
|
|
Valdez," was invited to be interviewed, and showed up at the
|
|
studio sporting a false moustache.
|
|
A sound bite from the 10-15 minute "Valdez" interview was
|
|
broadcast on "KTTV"'s evening news, phony Spanish accent and
|
|
all. ("LA Times," 10/7/89) But Rappaport was not treated
|
|
any differently than most TV experts: "I get asked tougher
|
|
questions when I go to cash a check," he told the "National
|
|
Enquirer."
|
|
<div>
|
|
<div>
|
|
Swallowing Hokum in Central America
|
|
|
|
During the height of the civil rights movement, Southern
|
|
authorities frequently reacted to the bombing of a black
|
|
church or a civil rights leader's home by blaming the act on
|
|
the Movement: "The Negroes did it themselves. It's a stunt
|
|
to win sympathy." While the innuendo that Martin Luther King,
|
|
Jr. would have fire-bombed his own home while his children
|
|
slept was prominently and uncritically reported in Southern
|
|
dailies, journalists from national media ignored such hokum or
|
|
reported it as a way of highlighting how depraved or dishonest
|
|
the authorities were.
|
|
Ironically, the same absurd scenarios dismissed by
|
|
journalists when uttered by segregationists about Southern
|
|
blacks are treated as entirely credible when uttered by US
|
|
officials about Central Americans.
|
|
EXECUTION OF PRIESTS BY SALVADORAN SOLDIERS, Nov. 16, 1989:
|
|
Journalists knew instantly that the US-equipped Salvadoran
|
|
army, with a history of execution-style slayings, had control
|
|
of the Jesuit university grounds and that the martyred priests
|
|
had been outspoken advocates of seating the FMLN guerrillas at
|
|
the negotiating table. Yet when US officials played dumb,
|
|
pretending not to know whether the killers were "far rightists
|
|
or leftists," and when Salvadoran authorities asserted that
|
|
the FMLN had murdered their advocates, these statements
|
|
received credible coverage in some media. The fog was still
|
|
thick a month later when "Newsweek" reported (12/25/89) that
|
|
the priests had been murdered "by a presumed rightist death
|
|
squad." Through such phrases, centrist media obscure the fact
|
|
that the "rightist death squads" are an integral part of
|
|
Salvador's military structure. (See Amnesty International's
|
|
1988 report, "El Salvador `Death Squads'--A Government
|
|
Strategy.")
|
|
MURDER OF NUNS BY NICARAGUAN CONTRAS, Jan. 1, 1990: Days
|
|
after the US relied largely on the death of a single US
|
|
citizen to justify its invasion of Panama, two nuns--one an
|
|
American--were killed when their pickup truck was ambushed in
|
|
northeastern Nicaragua. The attack occurred in an area in
|
|
which the contras--who have killed dozens of civilians in
|
|
recent months--were known to freely roam. Initial media
|
|
coverage gave play to Nicaragua's charges that the contras
|
|
were responsible and to contra claims that the Sandinistas had
|
|
impersonated contras killing the nuns.
|
|
By Day 2, the murders were not worthy of mention on "CBS"
|
|
and "ABC" nightly newscasts. By then Mexican and Latin
|
|
American press agencies had found two eye-witnesses who
|
|
identified the contras as the killers of the nuns. The story
|
|
took two weeks to break in the US and when it did, the
|
|
"Washington Post" broke it in a news story that read like a
|
|
White House-sanctioned editorial (1/14/90): "There was little
|
|
doubt that it was contra rebels who killed them. But there is
|
|
also little doubt that the US-backed guerrillas did not mean
|
|
to do it." "The Post" proceeded with an unsourced claim
|
|
reminiscent of the innuendo once aimed at Martin Luther King:
|
|
"In Managua, the capital, some suspected immediately after the
|
|
attack that the Sandinistas might have staged it to appear to
|
|
be a contra ambush. After all, only the Sandinistas...could
|
|
benefit from such an atrocity."
|
|
By giving credence to claims which obscure the violence
|
|
caused by US-backed forces in Central America, some in the
|
|
national media seem to be impersonating the Southern cracker
|
|
reporters of 30 years ago.
|
|
<div>
|
|
<div>
|
|
POSTSCRIPT: July 4, 1990
|
|
<div>
|
|
As an indication of the on-going intent to obfuscate the true scope and impact
|
|
of US military activities in and results of the invasion, the following item
|
|
appeared in the July 4 issue of the "San Francisco Bay Guardian":
|
|
- <div>
|
|
U.S. SOLDIERS HARASS U.S. FILM CREW IN PANAMA
|
|
by Jim Crogan
|
|
<div>
|
|
IN A PANAMANIAN refugee camp last month, soldiers from the U.S.
|
|
Southern Command confronted a U.S. film crew that was interviewing
|
|
Panamanian refugees. The soldiers attempted to stop the interviews
|
|
and confiscate the videotape and equipment. An estimated 500
|
|
residents of the camp surrounded and protected the crew and hid its
|
|
taped footage.
|
|
The crew, from Ronin Films (aka the Santa Monica-based Empowerment
|
|
Project) returned to Los Angeles this week.
|
|
Barbara Trent, EP's co-director and the director and co-producer of
|
|
the Panama film, told the Bay Guardian her crew's confrontation with
|
|
Southern Command military police and members of the U.S. Army Criminal
|
|
Investigations Division [CID] took place at the Allbrook Field
|
|
Displaced Persons Camp, a civilian war refugee facility administered
|
|
jointly by the Panamanian Red Cross and the Panamanian government's
|
|
Office of Disaster Assistance.
|
|
"The camp was exclusively a Panamanian facility, and we had
|
|
permission to be there from Panamanian disaster authorities, the Red
|
|
Cross and the council set up by the refugees to govern the camp, so I
|
|
didn't understand why SouthCom people were even there," said Trent.
|
|
"The refugees saved the day for us," she added. "They got between us
|
|
and the military, surrounded us and eventually walked us over to the
|
|
office used by the Disaster Assistance people. They even hid our
|
|
tapes.
|
|
"The people wanted us there," Trent continued, "because they
|
|
desperately wanted to tell the world about the losses they suffered
|
|
during the invasion, and the camp conditions they've been forced to
|
|
live under for the last six months."
|
|
During the incident, which she said her crew captured on film, the
|
|
CID people refused to explain to her or the Panamanian officials why
|
|
or on whose authority they were trying to stop the filming.
|
|
Eventually, after a series of negotiations between the Panamanians and
|
|
representatives from SouthCom, the EP crew finished its interviews and
|
|
left the camp.
|
|
Lt. Col. Robert Donley, deputy director of public affairs for
|
|
SouthCom, said the MP's actions were "definitely wrong. They are
|
|
there only to assist the Panamanians and had no authority to
|
|
intervene."
|
|
Asked why Army CID officials were participating in trying to stop
|
|
the EP crew from filming, Donley said, "That's a good question. I
|
|
really don't know and haven't been able to find out why."
|
|
Gary Meyer, co-director of EP and co-producer of the film, said the
|
|
crew also brought back several interviews that apparently describe the
|
|
U.S. use of laser weapons during last December's invasion. One
|
|
Panamanian said he saw "a bright red light, which made a distinctive
|
|
sound that he repeated for us on camera, and was then followed by an
|
|
explosion," Meyer said. Another family said they had an intense white
|
|
light come through their apartment window and explode whatever object
|
|
it hit."
|
|
Trent added that several people said they had seen "a Panamanian
|
|
soldier killed by a laser beam."
|
|
Trent reported that she had questioned General Maxwell Thurmond,
|
|
head of SouthCom, about the reports that laser weapons were used. "He
|
|
responded by saying that was crap, and that lasers were only used by
|
|
the U.S. Air Force to pinpoint targets," Trent recalled.</conspiracyFile> |