Objective Journalists of State Propagandists?
* "one of the more odious creatures with whom the United
States has had a relationship."--Peter Jennings ("ABC,"
12/20/89)
* "At the top of the list of the world's drug thieves and
scums."--Dan Rather ("CBS," 12/20/89)
* Q: "Do we bring him here and put him on trial...or do we
just neutralize him in some way?"--John Chancellor
A: "I think you bring him here and you make it a
showcase trial in the war on drugs and justice prevails."-
-Tom Brokaw ("NBC," 12/20/89)
*"We lose numbers like that in large training exercises."-
-John Chancellor, commenting approvingly upon hearing only
nine US soldiers had died ("NBC," 12/20/89)
* "Noriega's reputation as a brutal drug-dealing bully who
reveled in his public contempt for the United States all
but begged for strong retribution."--Ted Koppel ("ABC
Nightline," 12/20/89)
* "Noriega asked for this. President Bush listed all the
things Noriega had done to force him to take this action.
Why does Noriega do these things?"--"CNN" anchor Ralph
Wenge, interviewing a former US military commander
(12/21/89)
* "Noriega seemed almost superhuman in his ability to
slither away before we got him."--Anchor Bill Beutel
("WABC-TV," New York, 1/3/90)
* "[George Bush has completed] a Presidential initiation
rite [joining] American leaders who since World War II have
felt a need to demonstrate their willingness to shed blood
to protect or advance what they construe as the national
interest...Panama has shown him as a man capable of bold
action."--R.W. Apple ("New York Times," front page news
analysis, 12/21/89)
When, as vice president, Bush met with Noriega in Panama in December
1983, besides discussing Nicaragua, Bush allegedly raised questions
about drug money laundering. According to author Kevin Buckley,
Noriega told top aide Jose Blandon that he'd picked up the following
message from the Bush meeting: "The United States wanted help for the
contras so badly that if he even promised it, the US government would
turn a blind eye to money-laundering and setbacks to democracy in
Panama." In 1985 and '86, Noriega met several times with Oliver North
to discuss the assistance Noriega was providing to the contras, such
as training contras at Panamanian Defense Force bases ("Noriega could
give some interesting answers," Kevin Buckley, "St. Petersburg Times,"
1/3/90). Noriega didn't fall from grace until he stopped being a
"team player" in the US war against Nicaragua.
Democracy had as little to do with the break-up as drugs. If
Noriega believed Bush had given his strongarm rule a green light in
1983, confirmation came the next year when Noriega's troops seized
ballot boxes and blatantly rigged Panama's presidential election.
Noriega's candidate, Nicolas Ardito Barletta, was also "our"
candidate--an economist who had been a student and assistant to former
University of Chicago professor George Shultz. Though loudly
protested by Panamanians, the fraud that put Ardito Barletta in power
was cheered by the US Embassy. Secretary of State Shultz attended his
inauguration. (See "The Press on Panama," "Extra!", Mar/Apr 88;
Richard Reeves, "San Francisco Chronicle," 12/25/89)
As the Noriega case progresses toward trial, the media's treatment
of key witnesses against the General may offer a case study in bias.
Several of the witnesses have already testified on these matters in a
very public forum--hearings before Senator John Kerry's Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Narcotics. At that time, February 1988, they
fingered Nicaraguan contras as cocaine cohorts of Noriega operating
under the umbrella of the CIA and Ollie North. The hearings were
ignored or distorted by national media outlets, with Reagan/Bush
officials and CIA dismissing the witnesses as drug trafficking felons.
("Extra!," Mar/Apr 88; Warren Hinckle, "S.F. Examiner," 1/11/90). In
a predictable turnaround, as soon as Noriega was apprehended, TV news
brought forth experts to explain that "when one prosecutes someone
like Noriega for drug dealing, witnesses will of necessity be drug
dealers."
Reporters Rallying Round The Flag
Journalists justified their role as distributors of
government handouts in different ways. Asked on Day 1 why US
opponents of the invasion were virtually invisible on-the-air,
a "CBS" producer (who declined to give her name) told
"Extra!": "When American troops are involved and taking
losses, this is not the time to be running critical
commentary. The American public will be rallying around the
flag."
Some TV reporters claimed they were forced to rely on
official US versions because they had nothing else. As
"Newsday" reported Jan. 14, "Peter Arnett, a Pulitzer Prize-
winning combat journalist, was reduced to reporting on
Noriega's alleged pornography collection. `They [the
Pentagon] got away with it again,' Arnett said of the initial
press blackout."
Arnett, who covered the invasion for "CNN," was complaining
that Pentagon officials failed to provide photo opportunities
of wounded soldiers, suffering civilians and general bang-
bang. Naturally the Pentagon did everything possible to
prevent such shots, keeping with its belief that the Vietnam
War was lost in American living rooms. "Two things that
people should not watch are the making of sausage and the
making of war," "Newsday" (1/4/90) quoted an Air Force doctor
as saying. "All that front-page blood and gore hurts the
military."
Experienced combat journalists like Arnett should know that
the Pentagon's aim is to manipulate the pictures and stories
that get out. "If you just looked at television, the most
violent thing American troops did in Panama was play rock
music," political media consultant Robert Squier told
"Newsday." "They feel if they can control the pictures at the
outset, it doesn't make a damn what is said now or later."
Unhappiness with the Pentagon did not keep reporters from
promoting the US Army-approved image of Noriega as a comic
strip arch-villain. The Southern Command told reporters soon
after the invasion that 110 pounds of cocaine were found in
Noriega's so-called "witch house," and this played big on TV
news and the front-pages. When, a month later the "cocaine"
turned out to be tamales ("Washington Post," 1/23/90, page
A22), the government's deception was a footnote at best. The
initial headlines of Noriega as drug-crazed lunatic had served
their purpose: to convince the American people that he
represented a threat to the Canal.
Provocations of Pretexts?
The US media showed little curiosity about the Dec. 16 confrontation
that led to the death of a US Marine officer and the injury of another
when they tried to run a roadblock in front of the PDF headquarters.
The officers were supposedly "lost." In view of what is now known
about the intense pre-invasion preparations then underway ("NY Times,"
12/24/89), is it possible the Marines were actually trying to track
Noriega's whereabouts?
The Panamanian version of the event was that the US soldiers, upon
being discovered, opened fire--injuring three civilians, including a
child--and then tried to run the roadblock. This version was largely
ignored by US journalists even after the shooting two days later of a
Panamanian corporal who "signaled a US serviceman to stop," according
to the administration. "The US serviceman felt threatened," the
administration claimed, after admitting that its earlier story that
the Panamanian had pulled his gun was false ("NYT," 12/19/89)
As for the claim that a US officer had been roughly interrogated and
his wife had been sexually threatened, the administration provided no
supporting evidence ("NYT," 12/19/89; "Newsday," 12/18/89). Since
the Marine's death and the interrogation were repeatedly invoked to
justify the invasion, the lack of press scrutiny of these claims is
stunning.
For months, US forces had been trying to provoke confrontations as a
pretext for an attack. In response to an Aug. 11 incident, Panamanian
Foreign Minister Jorge Ritter asked that a UN peacekeeping force be
dispatched to Panama to prevent such encounters. The US press largely
ignored his call ("El Diario/La Prensa," New York's Spanish-language
daily, 8/13/89).
A Tale of Two Editions
Fighting in Panama: The Home Front Fighting in Panama: The Home Front
The President The President
DOING THE INEVITABLE
A SENSE OF INEVITABILITY
Bush Reportedly Felt That Noriega IN BUSH's DECISION TO ACT
'Was Thumbing His Nose at Him'
If the news of the invasion wasn't favorable enough to the
administration, the "New York Times" sometimes fine-tuned it
between editions. Above are headlines over the same story in two
editions on Dec. 24--the earlier one (left) was apparently changed
because it implied that the invasion was an act of personal
vengeance by Bush. Another headline in the same early edition read,
"U.S. Drafted Invasion Plan Weeks Ago," accurately describing the
article's evidence that the invasion was scheduled before the
"provocations" that justified it ever occurred. The headline
changed to the more innocuous "U.S. Invasion: Many Weeks of
Rehearsals."
The "Declaration of War" That Never Was
"When during the past few days [Noriega] declared war on the United
States and some of his followers then killed a US Marine, roughed up
another American serviceman, also threatening that man's wife, strong
public support for a reprisal was all but guaranteed," Ted Koppel told
his "Nightline" audience Dec. 20.
Noriega never "declared war on the United States." The original
"Reuters" dispatches, published on the inside pages of the "New York
Times" (12/17-18/89), buried the supposed "declaration" in articles
dealing with other matters. In the Dec. 17 article headlined,
"Opposition Leader in Panama Rejects a Peace Offer from Noriega,"
"Reuters" quoted the general as saying that he would judiciously use
new powers granted to him by the Panamanian parliament and that "the
North American scheme, through constant psychological and military
harassment, has created a state of war in Panama." This statement of
fact aroused little excitement at the White House, which called the
parliament's move "a hollow step."
The day after the invasion, "Los Angeles Times" Pentagon
correspondent Melissa Healey told a call-in talk show audience on "C-
SPAN" that Noriega had "declared war" on the United States. When a
caller asked why that hadn't been front page news, Healey explained
that the declaration of war was one of a series of "incremental
escalations." When another caller pointed out that Panama had only
made a rhetorical statement that US economic and other measures had
created a state of war, the Pentagon correspondent confessed ignorance
of what had actually been said, and suggested that it was certainly
worth investigating.
The incident symbolizes media performance on the invasion--dispense
official information as gospel first, worry about the truth of that
information later. It's just what the White House was counting on
from the media. The Bush team set out to control television and front
page news in the first days knowing that exposes of official deception
(such as Noriega's 110 pounds of "cocaine" that turned out to be
tamales) would not appear until weeks later buried on inside pages of
newspapers. Rulers do not require the total suppression of news. As
Napoleon Bonaparte once said: It's sufficient to delay the news until
it no longer matters.
Besides uncritically dispensing huge quantities of official news and
views, the TV networks had another passion during the first days of
the invasion: polling their public. It was an insular process, with
predictable results. A "Toronto Globe and Mail" news story summarized
it (12/22/89): "Hardly a voice of objection is being heard within the
United States about the Panama invasion, at least from those deemed as
official sources and thus likely to be seen on television or read in
the papers. Not surprisingly, given the media coverage, a television
poll taken yesterday by one network ("CNN") indicated that nine of
ten viewers approved of the invasion."
I'm not Rappaport...I'm Valdez
"Extra!" usually complains about media outlets relying on
the same sources again and again, but "KTTV-TV" in Los Angeles
may have gone too far in the opposite direction.
Seeking a source to comment on the failed October 1989 coup
against Manuel Noriega, the station called what they thought
was the Panamanian consulate. In fact, it was the home of
Kurt Rappaport, a 22-year old prankster. Rappaport,
pretending to be an anti-Noriega Panamanian diplomat, "Arturo
Valdez," was invited to be interviewed, and showed up at the
studio sporting a false moustache.
A sound bite from the 10-15 minute "Valdez" interview was
broadcast on "KTTV"'s evening news, phony Spanish accent and
all. ("LA Times," 10/7/89) But Rappaport was not treated
any differently than most TV experts: "I get asked tougher
questions when I go to cash a check," he told the "National
Enquirer."
Swallowing Hokum in Central America
During the height of the civil rights movement, Southern
authorities frequently reacted to the bombing of a black
church or a civil rights leader's home by blaming the act on
the Movement: "The Negroes did it themselves. It's a stunt
to win sympathy." While the innuendo that Martin Luther King,
Jr. would have fire-bombed his own home while his children
slept was prominently and uncritically reported in Southern
dailies, journalists from national media ignored such hokum or
reported it as a way of highlighting how depraved or dishonest
the authorities were.
Ironically, the same absurd scenarios dismissed by
journalists when uttered by segregationists about Southern
blacks are treated as entirely credible when uttered by US
officials about Central Americans.
EXECUTION OF PRIESTS BY SALVADORAN SOLDIERS, Nov. 16, 1989:
Journalists knew instantly that the US-equipped Salvadoran
army, with a history of execution-style slayings, had control
of the Jesuit university grounds and that the martyred priests
had been outspoken advocates of seating the FMLN guerrillas at
the negotiating table. Yet when US officials played dumb,
pretending not to know whether the killers were "far rightists
or leftists," and when Salvadoran authorities asserted that
the FMLN had murdered their advocates, these statements
received credible coverage in some media. The fog was still
thick a month later when "Newsweek" reported (12/25/89) that
the priests had been murdered "by a presumed rightist death
squad." Through such phrases, centrist media obscure the fact
that the "rightist death squads" are an integral part of
Salvador's military structure. (See Amnesty International's
1988 report, "El Salvador `Death Squads'--A Government
Strategy.")
MURDER OF NUNS BY NICARAGUAN CONTRAS, Jan. 1, 1990: Days
after the US relied largely on the death of a single US
citizen to justify its invasion of Panama, two nuns--one an
American--were killed when their pickup truck was ambushed in
northeastern Nicaragua. The attack occurred in an area in
which the contras--who have killed dozens of civilians in
recent months--were known to freely roam. Initial media
coverage gave play to Nicaragua's charges that the contras
were responsible and to contra claims that the Sandinistas had
impersonated contras killing the nuns.
By Day 2, the murders were not worthy of mention on "CBS"
and "ABC" nightly newscasts. By then Mexican and Latin
American press agencies had found two eye-witnesses who
identified the contras as the killers of the nuns. The story
took two weeks to break in the US and when it did, the
"Washington Post" broke it in a news story that read like a
White House-sanctioned editorial (1/14/90): "There was little
doubt that it was contra rebels who killed them. But there is
also little doubt that the US-backed guerrillas did not mean
to do it." "The Post" proceeded with an unsourced claim
reminiscent of the innuendo once aimed at Martin Luther King:
"In Managua, the capital, some suspected immediately after the
attack that the Sandinistas might have staged it to appear to
be a contra ambush. After all, only the Sandinistas...could
benefit from such an atrocity."
By giving credence to claims which obscure the violence
caused by US-backed forces in Central America, some in the
national media seem to be impersonating the Southern cracker
reporters of 30 years ago.
POSTSCRIPT: July 4, 1990
As an indication of the on-going intent to obfuscate the true scope and impact
of US military activities in and results of the invasion, the following item
appeared in the July 4 issue of the "San Francisco Bay Guardian":
-
U.S. SOLDIERS HARASS U.S. FILM CREW IN PANAMA
by Jim Crogan
IN A PANAMANIAN refugee camp last month, soldiers from the U.S.
Southern Command confronted a U.S. film crew that was interviewing
Panamanian refugees. The soldiers attempted to stop the interviews
and confiscate the videotape and equipment. An estimated 500
residents of the camp surrounded and protected the crew and hid its
taped footage.
The crew, from Ronin Films (aka the Santa Monica-based Empowerment
Project) returned to Los Angeles this week.
Barbara Trent, EP's co-director and the director and co-producer of
the Panama film, told the Bay Guardian her crew's confrontation with
Southern Command military police and members of the U.S. Army Criminal
Investigations Division [CID] took place at the Allbrook Field
Displaced Persons Camp, a civilian war refugee facility administered
jointly by the Panamanian Red Cross and the Panamanian government's
Office of Disaster Assistance.
"The camp was exclusively a Panamanian facility, and we had
permission to be there from Panamanian disaster authorities, the Red
Cross and the council set up by the refugees to govern the camp, so I
didn't understand why SouthCom people were even there," said Trent.
"The refugees saved the day for us," she added. "They got between us
and the military, surrounded us and eventually walked us over to the
office used by the Disaster Assistance people. They even hid our
tapes.
"The people wanted us there," Trent continued, "because they
desperately wanted to tell the world about the losses they suffered
during the invasion, and the camp conditions they've been forced to
live under for the last six months."
During the incident, which she said her crew captured on film, the
CID people refused to explain to her or the Panamanian officials why
or on whose authority they were trying to stop the filming.
Eventually, after a series of negotiations between the Panamanians and
representatives from SouthCom, the EP crew finished its interviews and
left the camp.
Lt. Col. Robert Donley, deputy director of public affairs for
SouthCom, said the MP's actions were "definitely wrong. They are
there only to assist the Panamanians and had no authority to
intervene."
Asked why Army CID officials were participating in trying to stop
the EP crew from filming, Donley said, "That's a good question. I
really don't know and haven't been able to find out why."
Gary Meyer, co-director of EP and co-producer of the film, said the
crew also brought back several interviews that apparently describe the
U.S. use of laser weapons during last December's invasion. One
Panamanian said he saw "a bright red light, which made a distinctive
sound that he repeated for us on camera, and was then followed by an
explosion," Meyer said. Another family said they had an intense white
light come through their apartment window and explode whatever object
it hit."
Trent added that several people said they had seen "a Panamanian
soldier killed by a laser beam."
Trent reported that she had questioned General Maxwell Thurmond,
head of SouthCom, about the reports that laser weapons were used. "He
responded by saying that was crap, and that lasers were only used by
the U.S. Air Force to pinpoint targets," Trent recalled.