security-misc/README.md

# Enhances miscellaneous security settings

## Kernel hardening

This section is inspired by the Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP). It
implements all recommended Linux kernel settings by the KSPP and many more.

-   https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project

### sysctl

sysctl settings are configured via the `/etc/sysctl.d/30_security-misc.conf`
configuration file.

-   A kernel pointer points to a specific location in kernel memory. These can
    be very useful in exploiting the kernel so they are restricted to
    `CAP_SYSLOG`.

-   The kernel logs are restricted to `CAP_SYSLOG` as they can often leak
    sensitive information such as kernel pointers.

-   The `ptrace()` system call is restricted to `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`.

-   eBPF is restricted to `CAP_BPF` (`CAP_SYS_ADMIN` on kernel versions prior to
    5.8) and JIT hardening techniques such as constant blinding are enabled.

-   Restricts performance events to `CAP_PERFMON` (`CAP_SYS_ADMIN` on kernel
    versions prior to 5.8).

-   Restricts loading line disciplines to `CAP_SYS_MODULE` to prevent
    unprivileged attackers from loading vulnerable line disciplines with the
    `TIOCSETD` ioctl which has been abused in a number of exploits before.

-   Restricts the `userfaultfd()` syscall to `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` as `userfaultfd()`
    is often abused to exploit use-after-free flaws.

-   Kexec is disabled as it can be used to load a malicious kernel and gain
    arbitrary code execution in kernel mode.

-   Randomises the addresses for mmap base, heap, stack, and VDSO pages.

-   Prevents unintentional writes to attacker-controlled files.

-   Prevents common symlink and hardlink TOCTOU races.

-   Disables SysRq key completely.
    * Therefore Secure Attention Key (SAK) cannot be used.
    * https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/SysRq

-   The kernel is only allowed to swap if it is absolutely necessary. This
    prevents writing potentially sensitive contents of memory to disk.

-   TCP timestamps are disabled as it can allow detecting the system time.

-   Set coredump file name based on core_pattern value instead of the default of
    naming it 'core'.

-   Will disable `io_uring` interface for performing asynchronous I/O as it has
    historically been a significant attack surface.

### mmap ASLR

-   The bits of entropy used for mmap ASLR are maxed out via
    `/usr/libexec/security-misc/mmap-rnd-bits` (set to the values of
    `CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX` and `CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX`
    that the kernel was built with), therefore improving its effectiveness.

### Boot parameters

Boot parameters are outlined in configuration files located in the
`etc/default/grub.d/` directory.

-   Slab merging is disabled which significantly increases the difficulty of
    heap exploitation by preventing overwriting objects from merged caches and
    by making it harder to influence slab cache layout.

-   Memory zeroing at allocation and free time is enabled to mitigate some
    use-after-free vulnerabilities and erase sensitive information in memory.

-   Page allocator freelist randomization is enabled.

-   Kernel Page Table Isolation is enabled to mitigate Meltdown and increase
    KASLR effectiveness.

-   vsyscalls are disabled as they are obsolete, are at fixed addresses and
    thus, are a potential target for ROP.

-   The kernel panics on oopses to thwart certain kernel exploits.

-   Enables randomisation of the kernel stack offset on syscall entries.

-   Mitigations for known CPU vulnerabilities are enabled and SMT is
    disabled.

-   IOMMU is enabled to prevent DMA attacks along with strict enforcement of
    IOMMU TLB invalidation so devices will never be able to access stale data
    contents.

-   Distrust the 'randomly' generated CPU and bootloader seeds.

### Kernel Modules

#### Kernel Module Signature Verification

Not yet due to issues:

-   https://forums.whonix.org/t/enforce-kernel-module-software-signature-verification-module-signing-disallow-kernel-module-loading-by-default/7880/64
-   https://github.com/dell/dkms/issues/359

See:

-   `/etc/default/grub.d/40_only_allow_signed_modules.cfg`

#### Disables the loading of new modules to the kernel after the fact

Not yet due to issues:

-   https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/pull/152

A systemd service dynamically sets the kernel parameter `modules_disabled` to 1,
preventing new modules from being loaded. Since this isn't configured directly
within systemctl, it does not break the loading of legitimate and necessary
modules for the user, like drivers etc., given they are plugged in on startup.

#### Blacklist and disable kernel modules

Conntrack: Deactivates Netfilter's connection tracking helper module which
increases kernel attack surface by enabling superfluous functionality such
as IRC parsing in the kernel. See `/etc/modprobe.d/30_security-misc_conntrack.conf`.

Certain kernel modules are blacklisted by default to reduce attack surface via
`/etc/modprobe.d/30_security-misc_blacklist.conf`. Blacklisting prevents kernel
modules from automatically starting.

-   CD-ROM/DVD: Blacklist modules required for CD-ROM/DVD devices.

-   Framebuffer Drivers: Blacklisted as they are well-known to be buggy, cause 
    kernel panics, and are generally only used by legacy devices. 

-   Miscellaneous: Blacklist an assortment other modules to prevent them from
    automatically loading.

Specific kernel modules are entirely disabled to reduce attack surface via
`/etc/modprobe.d/30_security-misc_disable.conf`. Disabling prohibits kernel
modules from starting. This approach should not be considered comprehensive,
rather it is a form of badness enumeration. Any potential candidates for future
disabling should first be blacklisted for a suitable amount of time.

-   File Systems: Disable uncommon and legacy file systems.

-   FireWire (IEEE 1394): Disabled as they are often vulnerable to DMA attacks.

-   GPS: Disable GPS-related modules such as those required for Global Navigation 
    Satellite Systems (GNSS).

-   Intel Management Engine (ME): Provides some disabling of the interface between the
    Intel ME and the OS.

-   Network File Systems: Disable uncommon and legacy network file systems.

-   Network Protocols: Wide array of uncommon and legacy network protocols are disabled.

-   Miscellaneous: Disable an assortment other modules such as vivid.

-   Thunderbolt: Disabled as they are often vulnerable to DMA attacks.

### Other

-   A systemd service clears the System.map file on boot as these contain kernel
    pointers. The file is completely overwritten with zeroes to ensure it cannot
    be recovered. See:

`/etc/kernel/postinst.d/30_remove-system-map`

`/lib/systemd/system/remove-system-map.service`

`/usr/libexec/security-misc/remove-system.map`

-   Coredumps are disabled as they may contain important information such as
    encryption keys or passwords. See:

`/etc/security/limits.d/30_security-misc.conf`

`/etc/sysctl.d/30_security-misc.conf`

`/lib/systemd/coredump.conf.d/30_security-misc.conf`

-   An initramfs hook sets the sysctl values in `/etc/sysctl.conf` and
    `/etc/sysctl.d` before init is executed so sysctl hardening is enabled as
    early as possible. This is implemented for `initramfs-tools` only because
    this is not needed for `dracut` because `dracut` does that by default, at
    least on `systemd` enabled systems. Not researched for non-`systemd` systems
    by the author of this part of the readme.

## Network hardening

-   TCP syncookies are enabled to prevent SYN flood attacks.

-   ICMP redirect acceptance, ICMP redirect sending, source routing and IPv6
    router advertisements are disabled to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.

-   The kernel is configured to ignore all ICMP requests to avoid Smurf attacks,
    make the device more difficult to enumerate on the network and prevent clock
    fingerprinting through ICMP timestamps.

-   RFC1337 is enabled to protect against time-wait assassination attacks by
    dropping RST packets for sockets in the time-wait state.

-   Reverse path filtering is enabled to prevent IP spoofing and mitigate
    vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-14899.

-   Unlike version 4, IPv6 addresses can provide information not only about the
    originating network, but also the originating device. We prevent this from
    happening by enabling the respective privacy extensions for IPv6.

-   In addition, we deny the capability to track the originating device in the
    network at all, by using randomized MAC addresses per connection per
    default.

See:

-   `/usr/lib/NetworkManager/conf.d/80_ipv6-privacy.conf`
-   `/usr/lib/NetworkManager/conf.d/80_randomize-mac.conf`
-   `/usr/lib/systemd/networkd.conf.d/80_ipv6-privacy-extensions.conf`

## Bluetooth Hardening

### Bluetooth Status: Enabled but Defaulted to Off

- **Default Behavior**: Although Bluetooth capability is 'enabled' in the kernel, security-misc deviates from the usual behavior by starting with Bluetooth turned off at system start. This setting remains until the user explicitly opts to activate Bluetooth.

- **User Control**: Users have the freedom to easily switch Bluetooth on and off in the usual way, exercising their own discretion. This can be done via the Bluetooth toggle through the usual way, that is either through GUI settings application or command line commands.

- **Enhanced Privacy Settings**: We enforce more private defaults for Bluetooth connections. This includes the use of private addresses and strict timeout settings for discoverability and visibility.

- **Security Considerations**: Despite these measures, it's important to note that Bluetooth technology, by its nature, may still be prone to exploits due to its history of security vulnerabilities. Thus, we recommend users to opt-out of using Bluetooth when possible.

### Configuration Details

- See configuration: `/etc/bluetooth/30_security-misc.conf`
- For more information and discussion: [GitHub Pull Request](https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/pull/145)

### Understanding Bluetooth Terms

- **Disabling Bluetooth**: This means the absence of the Bluetooth kernel module. When disabled, Bluetooth is non-existent in the system - it cannot be seen, set, configured, or interacted with in any way.

- **Turning Bluetooth On/Off**: This refers to a software toggle. Normally, on Debian systems, Bluetooth is 'on' when the system boots up. It actively searches for known devices to auto-connect and may be discoverable or visible under certain conditions. Our default ensures that Bluetooth is off on startup. However, it remains 'enabled' in the kernel, meaning the kernel can use the Bluetooth protocol and has the necessary modules.

### Quick Toggle Guide

- **Turning Bluetooth On**: Simply click the Bluetooth button in the settings application or on the tray, and switch the toggle. It's a straightforward action that can be completed in less than a second.

- **Turning Bluetooth Off**: Follow the same procedure as turning it on but switch the toggle to the off position.

## Entropy collection improvements

-   The `jitterentropy_rng` kernel module is loaded as early as possible during
    boot to gather more entropy via the
    `/usr/lib/modules-load.d/30_security-misc.conf` configuration file.

-   Distrusts the CPU for initial entropy at boot as it is not possible to
    audit, may contain weaknesses or a backdoor. For references, see:
    `/etc/default/grub.d/40_distrust_cpu.cfg`

-   Gathers more entropy during boot if using the linux-hardened kernel patch.

## Restrictive mount options

A systemd service is triggered on boot to remount all sensitive partitions and
directories with significantly more secure hardened mount options. Since this
would require manual tuning for a given specific system, we handle it by
creating a very solid configuration file for that very system on package
install.

Not enabled by default yet. In development. Help welcome.

-   https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Dev/remount-secure
-   https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/issues/157
-   https://forums.whonix.org/t/re-mount-home-and-other-with-noexec-and-nosuid-among-other-useful-mount-options-for-better-security/

## Root access restrictions

-   `su` is restricted to only users within the group `sudo` which prevents
    users from using `su` to gain root access or to switch user accounts -
    `/usr/share/pam-configs/wheel-security-misc` (which results in a change in
    file `/etc/pam.d/common-auth`).

-   Add user `root` to group `sudo`. This is required due to the above
    restriction so that logging in from a virtual console is still possible -
    `debian/security-misc.postinst`

-   Abort login for users with locked passwords -
    `/usr/libexec/security-misc/pam-abort-on-locked-password`.

-   Logging into the root account from a virtual, serial, whatnot console is
    prevented by shipping an existing and empty `/etc/securetty` file (deletion
    of `/etc/securetty` has a different effect).

This package does not yet automatically lock the root account password. It is
not clear if this would be sane in such a package although, it is recommended to
lock and expire the root account.

In new Kicksecure builds, root account will be locked by package
dist-base-files.

See:

-   https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Root
-   https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Dev/Permissions
-   https://forums.whonix.org/t/restrict-root-access/7658

However, a locked root password will break rescue and emergency shell.
Therefore, this package enables passwordless rescue and emergency shell. This is
the same solution that Debian will likely adapt for Debian installer:
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=802211

See:

-   `/etc/systemd/system/emergency.service.d/override.conf`
-   `/etc/systemd/system/rescue.service.d/override.conf`

Adverse security effects can be prevented by setting up BIOS password
protection, GRUB password protection and/or full disk encryption.

## Console lockdown

This uses pam_access to allow members of group `console` to use console but
restrict everyone else (except members of group `console-unrestricted`) from
using console with ancient, unpopular login methods such as `/bin/login` over
networks as this might be exploitable. (CVE-2001-0797)

This is not enabled by default in this package since this package does not know
which users shall be added to group 'console' and thus, would break console.

See:

-   `/usr/share/pam-configs/console-lockdown-security-misc`
-   `/etc/security/access-security-misc.conf`

## Brute force attack protection

User accounts are locked after 50 failed login attempts using `pam_faillock`.

Informational output during Linux PAM:

-   Show failed and remaining password attempts.
-   Document unlock procedure if Linux user account got locked.
-   Point out that there is no password feedback for `su`.
-   Explain locked root account if locked.

See:

-   `/usr/share/pam-configs/tally2-security-misc`
-   `/usr/libexec/security-misc/pam-info`
-   `/usr/libexec/security-misc/pam-abort-on-locked-password`

## Access rights restrictions

### Strong user account separation

#### Permission Lockdown

Read, write and execute access for "others" are removed during package
installation, upgrade or PAM `mkhomedir` for all users who have home folders in
`/home` by running, for example:

    chmod o-rwx /home/user

This will be done only once per folder in `/home` so users who wish to relax
file permissions are free to do so. This is to protect files in a home folder
that were previously created with lax file permissions prior to the installation
of this package.

See:

-   `debian/security-misc.postinst`
-   `/usr/libexec/security-misc/permission-lockdown`
-   `/usr/share/pam-configs/mkhomedir-security-misc`

#### umask

Default `umask` is set to `027` for files created by non-root users such as for
example user `user`. Broken. Disabled. See:

* https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/issues/184

This is doing using pam module `pam_mkhomedir.so umask=027`.

This means, files created by non-root users cannot be read by other non-root
users by default. While Permission Lockdown already protects the `/home` folder,
this protects other folders such as `/tmp`.

`group` read permissions are not removed. This is unnecessary due to Debian's
use of User Private Groups (UPGs). See also:
https://wiki.debian.org/UserPrivateGroups

Default `umask` is unchanged for root, because then configuration files created
in `/etc` by the system administrator would be unreadable by "others" and break
applications. Examples include `/etc/firefox-esr` and `/etc/thunderbird`.

See:

-   `/usr/share/pam-configs/umask-security-misc`

### SUID / SGID removal and permission hardening

#### SUID / SGID removal

A systemd service removes SUID / SGID bits from non-essential binaries as these
are often used in privilege escalation attacks.

#### File permission hardening

Various file permissions are reset with more secure and hardened defaults. These
include but are not limited to:

-   Limiting `/home` and `/root` to the root only.
-   Limiting crontab to root as well as all the configuration files for cron.
-   Limiting the configuration for cups and ssh.
-   Protecting the information of sudoers from others.
-   Protecting various system relevant files and modules.

##### permission-hardener #####

`permission-hardener` removes SUID / SGID bits from non-essential binaries as
these are often used in privilege escalation attacks. It is enabled by default
and applied at security-misc package installation and upgrade time.

There is also an optional systemd unit which does the same at boot time that
can be enabled by running `systemctl enable permission-hardener.service` as
root. The hardening at boot time is not the default because this slows down
the boot too much.

See:

* `/usr/bin/permission-hardener`
* `debian/security-misc.postinst`
* `/lib/systemd/system/permission-hardener.service`
* `/etc/permission-hardener.d`
* https://forums.whonix.org/t/disable-suid-binaries/7706
* https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/SUID_Disabler_and_Permission_Hardener

### Access rights relaxations

This is not enabled yet because hidepid is not enabled by default.

Calls to `pkexec` are redirected to `lxqt-sudo` because `pkexec` is
incompatible with `hidepid=2`.

See:

* `/usr/bin/pkexec.security-misc`
* https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860040
* https://forums.whonix.org/t/cannot-use-pkexec/8129

## Application-specific hardening

-   Enables "`apt-get --error-on=any`" which makes apt exit non-zero for
    transient failures. - `/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/40error-on-any`.
-   Enables APT seccomp-BPF sandboxing - `/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/40sandbox`.
-   Deactivates previews in Dolphin.
-   Deactivates previews in Nautilus -
    `/usr/share/glib-2.0/schemas/30_security-misc.gschema.override`.
-   Deactivates thumbnails in Thunar.
    -   rationale: lower attack surface when using the file manager
    -   https://forums.whonix.org/t/disable-preview-in-file-manager-by-default/18904
-   Thunderbird is hardened with the following options:
    -   Displays domain names in punycode to prevent IDN homograph attacks (a
        form of phishing).
    -   Strips email client information for sent email headers.
    -   Stripts user time information from sent email headers by replacing the
        originating time zone with UTC and rounding the timestamp to the nearest
        minute.
    -   Disables scripting when viewing pdf files.
    -   Disables implicit outgoing connections.
    -   Disables all and any kind of telemetry.
-   Security and privacy enhancements for gnupg's config file
    `/etc/skel/.gnupg/gpg.conf`. See also:
    -   https://raw.github.com/ioerror/torbirdy/master/gpg.conf
    -   https://github.com/ioerror/torbirdy/pull/11

### project scope of application-specific hardening

Added in December 2023.

Before sending pull requests to harden arbitrary applications, please note the
scope of security-misc is limited to default installed applications in
Kicksecure, Whonix. This includes:

-   Thunderbird, VLC Media Player, KeepassXC
-   Debian Specific System Components (APT, DPKG)
-   System Services (NetworkManager IPv6 privacy options, MAC address
    randomization)
-   Actually used development utilities such as `git`.

It will not be possible to review and merge "1500" settings profiles for
arbitrary applications outside of this context.

The main objective of security-misc is to harden Kicksecure and its derivatives,
such as Whonix, by implementing robust security settings. It's designed to be
compatible with Debian, reflecting a commitment to clean implementation and
sound design principles. However, it's important to note that security-misc is a
component of Kicksecure, not a substitute for it. The intention isn't to
recreate Kicksecure within security-misc. Instead, specific security
enhancements, like for example recommending a curated list of security-focused
default packages (e.g., `libpam-tmpdir`), should be integrated directly into
those appropriate areas of Kicksecure (e.g.`kicksecure-meta-packages`).

Discussion: https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/issues/154

### development philosophy

Added in December 2023.

"Maintainability is a key priority \[1\]. Before modifying settings in the
downstream security-misc, it's essential to first engage with upstream
developers to propose these changes as defaults. This step should only be
bypassed if there's a clear, prior indication from upstream that such changes
won't be accepted. Additionally, before implementing any workarounds, consulting
with upstream is necessary to future unmaintainable complexity.

If debugging features are disabled, pull requests won't be merged until there is
a corresponding pull request for the debug-misc package to re-enable these. This
is to avoid configuring the system into a corner where it can be no longer
debugged.

\[1\] https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Dev/maintainability

## Opt-in hardening

Some hardening is opt-in as it causes too much breakage to be enabled by
default.

-   An optional systemd service mounts `/proc` with `hidepid=2` at boot to
    prevent users from seeing another user's processes. This is disabled by
    default because it is incompatible with `pkexec`. It can be enabled by
    executing `systemctl enable proc-hidepid.service` as root.

-   A systemd service restricts `/proc/cpuinfo`, `/proc/bus`, `/proc/scsi` and
    `/sys` to the root user. This hides a lot of hardware identifiers from
    unprivileged users and increases security as `/sys` exposes a lot of
    information that shouldn't be accessible to unprivileged users. As this will
    break many things, it is disabled by default and can optionally be enabled
    by executing `systemctl enable hide-hardware-info.service` as root.

## miscellaneous

-   hardened malloc compatibility for haveged workaround
    `/lib/systemd/system/haveged.service.d/30_security-misc.conf`

-   set `dracut` `reproducible=yes` setting

## legal

`/usr/lib/issue.d/20_security-misc.issue`

https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/pull/167

## Related

-   Linux Kernel Runtime Guard (LKRG)
-   tirdad - TCP ISN CPU Information Leak Protection.
-   Kicksecure (TM) - a security-hardened Linux Distribution
-   And more.
-   https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Linux_Kernel_Runtime_Guard_LKRG
-   https://github.com/Kicksecure/tirdad
-   https://www.kicksecure.com
-   https://github.com/Kicksecure

## Discussion

Happening primarily in forums.

https://forums.whonix.org/t/kernel-hardening/7296

## How to install `security-misc`

See https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Security-misc#install

## How to Build deb Package from Source Code

Can be build using standard Debian package build tools such as:

    dpkg-buildpackage -b

See instructions. (Replace `generic-package` with the actual name of this
package `security-misc`.)

-   **A)**
    [easy](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Dev/Build_Documentation/generic-package/easy),
    *OR*
-   **B)** [including verifying software
    signatures](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Dev/Build_Documentation/generic-package)

## Contact

-   [Free Forum Support](https://forums.kicksecure.com)
-   [Professional Support](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Professional_Support)

## Donate

`security-misc` requires [donations](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate) to
stay alive!