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commit: editorialising
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@ -39,3 +39,24 @@ Mouse-over the icons for details of HTTP codes, curl exit statuses, and the numb
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- exits [are from Curl and are documented elsewhere](https://curl.haxx.se/libcurl/c/libcurl-errors.html); common ones include:
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- `7` - "curl couldn't connect"
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- `52` - "curl got nothing", received no data from upstream
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### TLS Security
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- :wrench: semi-secure HTTP Onion site, protected by Onion circuits at
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best; will not respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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- :closed_lock_with_key: secure HTTPS Onion site, protected by both
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Onion circuits and TLS, will respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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Due to the fundamental protocol differences between `HTTP` and
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`HTTPS`, it is not wise to consider HTTP-over-Onion to be "as secure
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as HTTPS"; web browsers *do* and *must* treat HTTPS in ways that are
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fundamentally more secure than HTTP - e.g.: with respect to cookie
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handling or loading insecure content - and the necessity of broad
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adherence to web standards would make it harmful to attempt to
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optimise just one browser (Tor Browser) to elevate HTTP-over-Onion to
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the same levels of trust as HTTPS-over-TCP, let alone
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HTTPS-over-Onion.
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tl;dr - HTTP-over-Onion is not as secure as HTTPS-over-Onion, and
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attempting to force it to be so will create a compatibility mess for
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the ecosystem of onion-capable browsers.
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21
README.md
21
README.md
@ -40,6 +40,27 @@ Mouse-over the icons for details of HTTP codes, curl exit statuses, and the numb
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- `7` - "curl couldn't connect"
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- `52` - "curl got nothing", received no data from upstream
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### TLS Security
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- :wrench: semi-secure HTTP Onion site, protected by Onion circuits at
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best; will not respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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- :closed_lock_with_key: secure HTTPS Onion site, protected by both
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Onion circuits and TLS, will respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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Due to the fundamental protocol differences between `HTTP` and
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`HTTPS`, it is not wise to consider HTTP-over-Onion to be "as secure
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as HTTPS"; web browsers *do* and *must* treat HTTPS in ways that are
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fundamentally more secure than HTTP - e.g.: with respect to cookie
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handling or loading insecure content - and the necessity of broad
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adherence to web standards would make it harmful to attempt to
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optimise just one browser (Tor Browser) to elevate HTTP-over-Onion to
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the same levels of trust as HTTPS-over-TCP, let alone
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HTTPS-over-Onion.
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tl;dr - HTTP-over-Onion is not as secure as HTTPS-over-Onion, and
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attempting to force it to be so will create a compatibility mess for
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the ecosystem of onion-capable browsers.
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----
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# Index
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