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commit: better framing
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parent
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@ -42,19 +42,25 @@ Mouse-over the icons for details of HTTP codes, curl exit statuses, and the numb
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### TLS Security
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### TLS Security
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Due to the fundamental protocol differences between `HTTP` and
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`HTTPS`, it is not wise to consider HTTP-over-Onion to be "as secure
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as HTTPS"; web browsers *do* and *must* treat HTTPS in ways that are
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fundamentally more secure than HTTP - e.g.:
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- with respect to cookie handling, or
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- where the trusted connection terminates, or
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- how to deal with loading embedded insecure content
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...and the necessity of broad adherence to web standards would make it
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harmful to attempt to optimise just one browser (e.g. Tor Browser) to
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elevate HTTP-over-Onion to the same levels of trust as HTTPS-over-TCP,
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let alone HTTPS-over-Onion.
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**tl;dr** - HTTP-over-Onion should not be considered as secure as
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HTTPS-over-Onion, and attempting to force it thusly will create a
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future compatibility mess for the ecosystem of onion-capable browsers.
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- :wrench: semi-secure HTTP Onion site, protected by Onion circuits at
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- :wrench: semi-secure HTTP Onion site, protected by Onion circuits at
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best; will not respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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best; will not respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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- :closed_lock_with_key: secure HTTPS Onion site, protected by both
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- :closed_lock_with_key: secure HTTPS Onion site, protected by both
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Onion circuits and TLS, will respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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Onion circuits and TLS, will respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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- Due to the fundamental protocol differences between `HTTP` and
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`HTTPS`, it is not wise to consider HTTP-over-Onion to be "as secure
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as HTTPS"; web browsers *do* and *must* treat HTTPS in ways that are
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fundamentally more secure than HTTP - e.g.: with respect to cookie
|
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handling, where the trusted connection terminates, or in loading
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insecure content - and the necessity of broad adherence to web
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standards would make it harmful to attempt to optimise just one
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browser (Tor Browser) to elevate HTTP-over-Onion to the same levels
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of trust as HTTPS-over-TCP, let alone HTTPS-over-Onion.
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- tl;dr - HTTP-over-Onion is not as secure as HTTPS-over-Onion, and
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attempting to force it to be so will create a compatibility mess for
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the ecosystem of onion-capable browsers.
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30
README.md
30
README.md
@ -42,22 +42,28 @@ Mouse-over the icons for details of HTTP codes, curl exit statuses, and the numb
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### TLS Security
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### TLS Security
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Due to the fundamental protocol differences between `HTTP` and
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`HTTPS`, it is not wise to consider HTTP-over-Onion to be "as secure
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as HTTPS"; web browsers *do* and *must* treat HTTPS in ways that are
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fundamentally more secure than HTTP - e.g.:
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|
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- with respect to cookie handling, or
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- where the trusted connection terminates, or
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- how to deal with loading embedded insecure content
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...and the necessity of broad adherence to web standards would make it
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harmful to attempt to optimise just one browser (e.g. Tor Browser) to
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elevate HTTP-over-Onion to the same levels of trust as HTTPS-over-TCP,
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let alone HTTPS-over-Onion.
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**tl;dr** - HTTP-over-Onion should not be considered as secure as
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HTTPS-over-Onion, and attempting to force it thusly will create a
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future compatibility mess for the ecosystem of onion-capable browsers.
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- :wrench: semi-secure HTTP Onion site, protected by Onion circuits at
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- :wrench: semi-secure HTTP Onion site, protected by Onion circuits at
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best; will not respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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best; will not respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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- :closed_lock_with_key: secure HTTPS Onion site, protected by both
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- :closed_lock_with_key: secure HTTPS Onion site, protected by both
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Onion circuits and TLS, will respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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Onion circuits and TLS, will respect browser secure/HTTPS behaviour
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- Due to the fundamental protocol differences between `HTTP` and
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`HTTPS`, it is not wise to consider HTTP-over-Onion to be "as secure
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as HTTPS"; web browsers *do* and *must* treat HTTPS in ways that are
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fundamentally more secure than HTTP - e.g.: with respect to cookie
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handling, where the trusted connection terminates, or in loading
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insecure content - and the necessity of broad adherence to web
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standards would make it harmful to attempt to optimise just one
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browser (Tor Browser) to elevate HTTP-over-Onion to the same levels
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of trust as HTTPS-over-TCP, let alone HTTPS-over-Onion.
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- tl;dr - HTTP-over-Onion is not as secure as HTTPS-over-Onion, and
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attempting to force it to be so will create a compatibility mess for
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the ecosystem of onion-capable browsers.
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----
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----
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# Index
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# Index
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