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43 lines
1.0 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
1.0 KiB
Markdown
# vault
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Vault environment in Qubes OS.
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## Table of Contents
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* [Description](#description)
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* [Installation](#installation)
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* [Usage](#usage)
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## Description
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An offline qube will be created and named "vault", it will have a password
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manager for high entropy passwords, PGP and SSH client for creating private
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keys.
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## Installation
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- Top:
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```sh
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qubesctl top.enable vault
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qubesctl --targets=tpl-vault state.apply
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qubesctl top.disable vault
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qubesctl state.apply vault.appmenus
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```
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- State:
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<!-- pkg:begin:post-install -->
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```sh
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qubesctl state.apply vault.create
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qubesctl --skip-dom0 --targets=tpl-vault state.apply vault.install
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qubesctl state.apply vault.appmenus
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```
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<!-- pkg:end:post-install -->
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## Usage
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The intended usage is to hold passwords and keys. You should copy the keys
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generated from the vault to another qube, which can be a split agent
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server for SSH, PGP, Pass. A compromise of the client qube can escalate into a
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compromise of the qubes it can run RPC services, therefore a separate vault is
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appropriate according to your threat model.
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