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# qusal
Salt Formulas for Qubes OS.
## Warning
**Warning**: Not ready for production, development only. Breaking changes can
and will be introduced in the meantime. You've been warned.
## Table of Contents
* [Description ](#description )
* [Installation ](#installation )
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* [Prerequisites ](#prerequisites )
doc: how to update the repository
As it is not easy to get files to dom0 and we don't want to reimplement
a package manager, crude Git is the solution as of know.
With Git we have the following advantages: native fetch format for
source controlled files, cleaner command-line, automatic signature
verification during merge, the disadvantage is that it is not included
by default in Dom0 and filtering it's stdout chars are not possible.
Note that the remote can report messages to the client via stderr, which
is filtered already, and if it tries to send an escape sequence to
stdout, the operation will fail with 'bad line length character: CHAR'
printed to stderr on the client, unfiltered by qrexec, but filtered to
some extent by the git client. If it is an escape character, the char is
transformed to "?", but UTF-8 multibyte characters are not filtered. Up
to 4 bytes can be displayed.
Tar on the other hand is already installed, but it is much ancient and
it's file parsing caused CVEs in the past relatively more drastic than
Git, it also doesn't only include committed files, it can include any
file that is present in the directory, which by far, increases a lot of
the attack surface unless you reset the state to HEAD, clean .git
directory manually and there are possibly other avenues of attack.
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* [DomU Installation ](#domu-installation )
* [Dom0 Installation ](#dom0-installation )
* [Update ](#update )
* [DomU Update ](#domu-update )
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* [Dom0 Update with Git ](#dom0-update-with-git )
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* [Dom0 Update by literally copying the git repository ](#dom0-update-by-literally-copying-the-git-repository )
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* [Usage ](#usage )
* [Contribute ](#contribute )
* [Donate ](#donate )
* [Support ](#support )
* [Free Support ](#free-support )
* [Paid Support ](#paid-support )
* [Contact ](#contact )
* [Credits ](#credits )
* [Legal ](#legal )
## Description
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Qusal is a Free and Open Source security-focused project that provides
SaltStack Formulas for Qubes OS users to complete various daily tasks, such
as web browsing, video-calls, remote administration, coding, network tunnels
and much more, which are easy to install and maintains low attack surface.
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We not only provide a single solution for each project, but also provides
alternative when they differ, such as for networking, you could use a VPN,
DNS Sink-hole, Mirage Unikernel or the standard Qubes Firewall for managing
the network chain and the connections the clients connected to these NetVMs
are allowed to make.
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Here are some of the Global Preferences we can manage:
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- **clockvm**: disp-sys-net, sys-net
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- **default_audiovm**: disp-sys-audio
doc: how to update the repository
As it is not easy to get files to dom0 and we don't want to reimplement
a package manager, crude Git is the solution as of know.
With Git we have the following advantages: native fetch format for
source controlled files, cleaner command-line, automatic signature
verification during merge, the disadvantage is that it is not included
by default in Dom0 and filtering it's stdout chars are not possible.
Note that the remote can report messages to the client via stderr, which
is filtered already, and if it tries to send an escape sequence to
stdout, the operation will fail with 'bad line length character: CHAR'
printed to stderr on the client, unfiltered by qrexec, but filtered to
some extent by the git client. If it is an escape character, the char is
transformed to "?", but UTF-8 multibyte characters are not filtered. Up
to 4 bytes can be displayed.
Tar on the other hand is already installed, but it is much ancient and
it's file parsing caused CVEs in the past relatively more drastic than
Git, it also doesn't only include committed files, it can include any
file that is present in the directory, which by far, increases a lot of
the attack surface unless you reset the state to HEAD, clean .git
directory manually and there are possibly other avenues of attack.
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- **default_dispvm**: dvm-reader
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- **default_netvm**: sys-pihole, sys-firewall or disp-sys-firewall
- **management_dispvm**: dvm-mgmt
- **updatevm**: sys-pihole, sys-firewall or disp-sys-firewall
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If you want to learn more about how we make decisions, take a look at our
[design document ](docs/DESIGN.md ).
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## Installation
### Prerequisites
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You current setup needs to fulfill the following requisites:
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- Qubes OS R4.2
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- Internet connection
doc: how to update the repository
As it is not easy to get files to dom0 and we don't want to reimplement
a package manager, crude Git is the solution as of know.
With Git we have the following advantages: native fetch format for
source controlled files, cleaner command-line, automatic signature
verification during merge, the disadvantage is that it is not included
by default in Dom0 and filtering it's stdout chars are not possible.
Note that the remote can report messages to the client via stderr, which
is filtered already, and if it tries to send an escape sequence to
stdout, the operation will fail with 'bad line length character: CHAR'
printed to stderr on the client, unfiltered by qrexec, but filtered to
some extent by the git client. If it is an escape character, the char is
transformed to "?", but UTF-8 multibyte characters are not filtered. Up
to 4 bytes can be displayed.
Tar on the other hand is already installed, but it is much ancient and
it's file parsing caused CVEs in the past relatively more drastic than
Git, it also doesn't only include committed files, it can include any
file that is present in the directory, which by far, increases a lot of
the attack surface unless you reset the state to HEAD, clean .git
directory manually and there are possibly other avenues of attack.
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### DomU Installation
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1. Install `git` in the qube, if it is an AppVM, install it it's the
TemplateVM and restart the AppVM.
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2. Clone the repository (if you made a fork, fork the submodule(s) before
clone and use your remote repository instead, the submodules will also be
from your fork).
```sh
git clone --recurse-submodules https://github.com/ben-grande/qusal.git
```
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3. Copy the [maintainer's signing key ](https://github.com/ben-grande/ben-grande/raw/main/DF3834875B65758713D93E91A475969DE4E371E3.asc )
to your text editor and save the file to `/home/user/ben-code.asc` .
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doc: how to update the repository
As it is not easy to get files to dom0 and we don't want to reimplement
a package manager, crude Git is the solution as of know.
With Git we have the following advantages: native fetch format for
source controlled files, cleaner command-line, automatic signature
verification during merge, the disadvantage is that it is not included
by default in Dom0 and filtering it's stdout chars are not possible.
Note that the remote can report messages to the client via stderr, which
is filtered already, and if it tries to send an escape sequence to
stdout, the operation will fail with 'bad line length character: CHAR'
printed to stderr on the client, unfiltered by qrexec, but filtered to
some extent by the git client. If it is an escape character, the char is
transformed to "?", but UTF-8 multibyte characters are not filtered. Up
to 4 bytes can be displayed.
Tar on the other hand is already installed, but it is much ancient and
it's file parsing caused CVEs in the past relatively more drastic than
Git, it also doesn't only include committed files, it can include any
file that is present in the directory, which by far, increases a lot of
the attack surface unless you reset the state to HEAD, clean .git
directory manually and there are possibly other avenues of attack.
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### Dom0 Installation
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Before copying anything to Dom0, read [Qubes OS warning about consequences of
this procedure](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-from-dom0/#copying-to-dom0).
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1. Copy the repository `$file` from the DomU `$qube` to Dom0 (substitute
`CHANGEME` for the desired valued):
```sh
qube="CHANGEME" # qube name where you downloaded the repository
file="CHANGEME" # path to the repository in the qube
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qvm-run --pass-io --localcmd="UPDATES_MAX_FILES=10000
/usr/libexec/qubes/qfile-dom0-unpacker user
~/QubesIncoming/${qube}/qusal" \
"${qube}" /usr/lib/qubes/qfile-agent "${file}"
```
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2. Pass the maintainer's key from the qube to Dom0:
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```sh
qvm-run --pass-io "${qube}" -- "cat /home/user/ben-code.asc" | tee /tmp/ben-code.asc
```
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3. Verify that the key fingerprint matches
`DF38 3487 5B65 7587 13D9 2E91 A475 969D E4E3 71E3` . You can use
Sequoia-PGP or GnuPG for the fingerprint verification:
```sh
gpg --show-keys /tmp/ben-code.asc
# or
#sq inspect ben-code.asc
```
4. Import the verified key to your keyring:
```sh
gpg --import /tmp/ben-code.asc
```
5. Verify the [commit or tag signature ](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-verify-signatures-on-git-repository-tags-and-commits )
and expect a good signature, be surprised otherwise:
```sh
git verify-commit HEAD
git submodule foreach git verify-commit HEAD
```
6. Copy the project to the Salt directories:
```sh
~/QubesIncoming/"${qube}"/qusal/scripts/setup.sh
```
doc: how to update the repository
As it is not easy to get files to dom0 and we don't want to reimplement
a package manager, crude Git is the solution as of know.
With Git we have the following advantages: native fetch format for
source controlled files, cleaner command-line, automatic signature
verification during merge, the disadvantage is that it is not included
by default in Dom0 and filtering it's stdout chars are not possible.
Note that the remote can report messages to the client via stderr, which
is filtered already, and if it tries to send an escape sequence to
stdout, the operation will fail with 'bad line length character: CHAR'
printed to stderr on the client, unfiltered by qrexec, but filtered to
some extent by the git client. If it is an escape character, the char is
transformed to "?", but UTF-8 multibyte characters are not filtered. Up
to 4 bytes can be displayed.
Tar on the other hand is already installed, but it is much ancient and
it's file parsing caused CVEs in the past relatively more drastic than
Git, it also doesn't only include committed files, it can include any
file that is present in the directory, which by far, increases a lot of
the attack surface unless you reset the state to HEAD, clean .git
directory manually and there are possibly other avenues of attack.
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## Update
To update, you can copy the repository again to dom0 as instructed in the
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[installation ](#installation ) section above or you can use easier methods
demonstrated below.
doc: how to update the repository
As it is not easy to get files to dom0 and we don't want to reimplement
a package manager, crude Git is the solution as of know.
With Git we have the following advantages: native fetch format for
source controlled files, cleaner command-line, automatic signature
verification during merge, the disadvantage is that it is not included
by default in Dom0 and filtering it's stdout chars are not possible.
Note that the remote can report messages to the client via stderr, which
is filtered already, and if it tries to send an escape sequence to
stdout, the operation will fail with 'bad line length character: CHAR'
printed to stderr on the client, unfiltered by qrexec, but filtered to
some extent by the git client. If it is an escape character, the char is
transformed to "?", but UTF-8 multibyte characters are not filtered. Up
to 4 bytes can be displayed.
Tar on the other hand is already installed, but it is much ancient and
it's file parsing caused CVEs in the past relatively more drastic than
Git, it also doesn't only include committed files, it can include any
file that is present in the directory, which by far, increases a lot of
the attack surface unless you reset the state to HEAD, clean .git
directory manually and there are possibly other avenues of attack.
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### DomU Update
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Update the repository state in your DomU:
doc: how to update the repository
As it is not easy to get files to dom0 and we don't want to reimplement
a package manager, crude Git is the solution as of know.
With Git we have the following advantages: native fetch format for
source controlled files, cleaner command-line, automatic signature
verification during merge, the disadvantage is that it is not included
by default in Dom0 and filtering it's stdout chars are not possible.
Note that the remote can report messages to the client via stderr, which
is filtered already, and if it tries to send an escape sequence to
stdout, the operation will fail with 'bad line length character: CHAR'
printed to stderr on the client, unfiltered by qrexec, but filtered to
some extent by the git client. If it is an escape character, the char is
transformed to "?", but UTF-8 multibyte characters are not filtered. Up
to 4 bytes can be displayed.
Tar on the other hand is already installed, but it is much ancient and
it's file parsing caused CVEs in the past relatively more drastic than
Git, it also doesn't only include committed files, it can include any
file that is present in the directory, which by far, increases a lot of
the attack surface unless you reset the state to HEAD, clean .git
directory manually and there are possibly other avenues of attack.
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```sh
git -C ~/src/qusal fetch --recurse-submodules
```
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### Dom0 Update with Git
This method is more secure than literally copying the whole directory of the
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repository to dom0 but the setup is more involved. Requires some familiarity
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with the sys-git formula.
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1. Install the [sys-git formula ](salt/sys-git/README.md ) and push the
repository to the git server.
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2. Install `git` on Dom0, allow the Qrexec protocol to work in submodules and
clone the repository to `~/src/qusal` (only has to be run once):
```sh
mkdir -p ~/src
sudo qubesctl state.apply sys-git.install-client
git clone --recurse-submodules qrexec://@default/qusal.git ~/src/qusal
```
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3. Next updates will be pulling instead of cloning:
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```sh
git -C ~/src/qusal pull --recurse-submodules
git -C ~/src/qusal submodule update --merge
```
4. Verify the commit or tag signature and expect a good signature, be
surprised otherwise (signature verification on submodules is skipped if
checking out but not merging):
```sh
git verify-commit HEAD
git submodule foreach git verify-commit HEAD
```
5. Copy the project to the Salt directories:
```
~/src/qusal/scripts/setup.sh
```
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### Dom0 Update by literally copying the git repository
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This method is similar to the installation method, but easier to type. This
method is less secure than Git over Qrexec because it copies the whole
repository, including the `.git` directory which holds files that are not
tracked by git. It would be easier to distrust the downloader qube if the
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project had a signed archive. The `.git/info/exclude` can exclude modified
files from being tracked and signature verification won't catch it.
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1. Install the helpers scripts and git on Dom0 (only has to be run once):
```sh
sudo qubesctl state.apply dom0.install-helpers
sudo qubes-dom0-update git
```
2. Copy the repository `$file` from the DomU `$qube` to Dom0 (substitute
`CHANGEME` for the desired valued):
```sh
qube="CHANGEME" # qube name where you downloaded the repository
file="CHANGEME" # path to the repository in the qube
rm -rf ~/QubesIncoming/"${qube}"/qusal
UPDATES_MAX_FILES=10000 qvm-copy-to-dom0 "${qube}" "${file}"
```
3. Verify the commit or tag signature and expect a good signature, be
surprised otherwise:
```sh
git verify-commit HEAD
git submodule foreach git verify-commit HEAD
```
4. Copy the project to the Salt directories:
```sh
~/QubesIncoming/"${qube}"/qusal/scripts/setup.sh
```
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## Usage
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Qusal is now installed. Please read the README.md of each project in the
[salt ](salt/ ) directory for further information on how to install the desired
package. If you are unsure how to start, get some ideas from our
[bootstrap guide ](docs/BOOTSTRAP.md ).
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The intended behavior is to enforce the state of qubes and their services. If
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you modify the qubes and their services and apply the state again,
conflicting configurations will be overwritten. To enforce your state, write
a SaltFile to specify the desired state and call it after the ones provided
by this project.
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If you want to edit the access control of any service, you
should always use the Qrexec policy at `/etc/qubes/policy.d/30-user.policy` ,
as this file will take precedence over the packaged policies.
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Please note that when you allow more Qrexec calls than the default shipped by
Qubes OS, you are increasing the attack surface of the target, normally
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to a valuable qube that can hold secrets or pristine data. A compromise of
the client qube can extend to the server, therefore configure the
installation according to your threat model.
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## Contribute
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There are several ways to contribute to this project. Spread the word, help
on user support, review opened issues, fix typos, implement new features,
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donations.
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Please take a look at our [contribution guidelines ](docs/CONTRIBUTING.md )
before contributing code or to the documentation, it holds important
information on how the project is structured, why some design decisions were
made and what can be improved.
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## Donate
This project can only survive through donations. If you like what we have
done, please consider donating. [Contact us ](#contact ) for donation address.
This project depends on Qubes OS, consider donating to
[upstream ](https://qubes-os.org/donate/ ).
## Support
### Free Support
Free support will be provided on a best effort basis. If you want something,
open an issue and patiently wait for a reply, the project is best developed in
the open so anyone can search for past issues.
### Paid Support
Paid consultation services can be provided.
Request a quote [from us ](#contact ).
## Contact
You must not contact for [free support ](#free-support ).
- [E-mail ](https://github.com/ben-grande/ben-grande )
## Credits
I stand on the shoulders of giants. This would not be possible without people
contributing to Qubes OS SaltStack formulas. Honorable mention(s):
[unman ](https://github.com/unman ).
## Legal
This project is [REUSE-compliant ](https://reuse.software ). It is difficult to
list all licenses and copyrights and keep them up-to-date here.
The easiest way to get the copyright and license of the project with the reuse
tool:
```sh
reuse spdx
```
You can also check these information manually by looking in the file header,
a companion `.license` file or in `.reuse/dep5` .
All licenses are present in the LICENSES directory.
Note that submodules have their own licenses and copyrights statements, please
check each one individually using the same methods described above for a full
statement.