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182
README.md
View File

@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ are allowed to make.
Here are some of the Global Preferences we can manage:
- **clockvm**: disp-sys-net, sys-net
- **default_audiovm**: disp-sys-audio
- **default_dispvm**: dvm-reader
- **default_netvm**: sys-pihole, sys-firewall or disp-sys-firewall
- **management_dispvm**: dvm-mgmt
- **updatevm**: sys-pihole, sys-firewall or disp-sys-firewall
- **default_audiovm**: disp-sys-audio
If you want to learn more about how we make decisions, take a look at our
[design document](docs/DESIGN.md).
@ -64,66 +64,66 @@ You current setup needs to fulfill the following requisites:
### DomU Installation
1. Install `git` in the qube, if it is an AppVM, install it it's the
TemplateVM and restart the AppVM.
1. Install `git` in the qube, if it is an AppVM, install it it's the
TemplateVM and restart the AppVM.
2. Clone this repository:
```sh
git clone --recurse-submodules https://github.com/ben-grande/qusal.git
```
If you made a fork, fork the submodule(s) before clone and use your remote
repository instead, the submodules will also be from your fork.
2. Clone the repository (if you made a fork, fork the submodule(s) before
clone and use your remote repository instead, the submodules will also be
from your fork).
```sh
git clone --recurse-submodules https://github.com/ben-grande/qusal.git
```
3. Copy the [maintainer's signing key](https://github.com/ben-grande/ben-grande/raw/main/DF3834875B65758713D93E91A475969DE4E371E3.asc)
to your text editor and save the file to `/home/user/ben-code.asc`.
3. Copy the [maintainer's signing key](https://github.com/ben-grande/ben-grande/raw/main/DF3834875B65758713D93E91A475969DE4E371E3.asc)
to your text editor and save the file to `/home/user/ben-code.asc`.
### Dom0 Installation
Before copying anything to Dom0, read [Qubes OS warning about consequences of
this procedure](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-from-dom0/#copying-to-dom0).
1. Copy the repository `$file` from the DomU `$qube` to Dom0 (substitute
`CHANGEME` for the desired valued):
```sh
qube="CHANGEME" # qube name where you downloaded the repository
file="CHANGEME" # path to the repository in the qube
1. Copy the repository `$file` from the DomU `$qube` to Dom0 (substitute
`CHANGEME` for the desired valued):
```sh
qube="CHANGEME" # qube name where you downloaded the repository
file="CHANGEME" # path to the repository in the qube
qvm-run --pass-io --localcmd="UPDATES_MAX_FILES=10000
/usr/libexec/qubes/qfile-dom0-unpacker user
~/QubesIncoming/${qube}/qusal" \
"${qube}" /usr/lib/qubes/qfile-agent "${file}"
```
qvm-run --pass-io --localcmd="UPDATES_MAX_FILES=10000
/usr/libexec/qubes/qfile-dom0-unpacker user
~/QubesIncoming/${qube}/qusal" \
"${qube}" /usr/lib/qubes/qfile-agent "${file}"
```
2. Pass the maintainer's key from the qube to Dom0:
2. Pass the maintainer's key from the qube to Dom0:
```sh
qvm-run --pass-io "${qube}" -- "cat /home/user/ben-code.asc" | tee /tmp/ben-code.asc
```
3. Verify that the key fingerprint matches
`DF38 3487 5B65 7587 13D9 2E91 A475 969D E4E3 71E3`. You can use
Sequoia-PGP or GnuPG for the fingerprint verification:
```sh
gpg --show-keys /tmp/ben-code.asc
# or
#sq inspect ben-code.asc
```
3. Verify that the key fingerprint matches
`DF38 3487 5B65 7587 13D9 2E91 A475 969D E4E3 71E3`. You can use
Sequoia-PGP or GnuPG for the fingerprint verification:
```sh
gpg --show-keys /tmp/ben-code.asc
# or
#sq inspect ben-code.asc
```
4. Import the verified key to your keyring:
```sh
gpg --import /tmp/ben-code.asc
```
4. Import the verified key to your keyring:
```sh
gpg --import /tmp/ben-code.asc
```
5. Verify the [commit or tag signature](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-verify-signatures-on-git-repository-tags-and-commits)
and expect a good signature, be surprised otherwise:
```sh
git verify-commit HEAD
git submodule foreach git verify-commit HEAD
```
5. Verify the [commit or tag signature](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-verify-signatures-on-git-repository-tags-and-commits)
and expect a good signature, be surprised otherwise:
```sh
git verify-commit HEAD
git submodule foreach git verify-commit HEAD
```
6. Copy the project to the Salt directories:
```sh
~/QubesIncoming/"${qube}"/qusal/scripts/setup.sh
```
6. Copy the project to the Salt directories:
```sh
~/QubesIncoming/"${qube}"/qusal/scripts/setup.sh
```
## Update
@ -144,35 +144,35 @@ This method is more secure than literally copying the whole directory of the
repository to dom0 but the setup is more involved. Requires some familiarity
with the sys-git formula.
1. Install the [sys-git formula](salt/sys-git/README.md) and push the
repository to the git server.
1. Install the [sys-git formula](salt/sys-git/README.md) and push the
repository to the git server.
2. Install git on Dom0, allow the Qrexec protocol to work in submodules and
clone the repository to `~/src/qusal` (only has to be run once):
```sh
mkdir -p ~/src
sudo qubesctl state.apply sys-git.install-client
git clone --recurse-submodules qrexec://@default/qusal.git ~/src/qusal
```
2. Install `git` on Dom0, allow the Qrexec protocol to work in submodules and
clone the repository to `~/src/qusal` (only has to be run once):
```sh
mkdir -p ~/src
sudo qubesctl state.apply sys-git.install-client
git clone --recurse-submodules qrexec://@default/qusal.git ~/src/qusal
```
3. Next updates will be pulling instead of cloning:
```sh
git -C ~/src/qusal pull --recurse-submodules
git -C ~/src/qusal submodule update --merge
```
```sh
git -C ~/src/qusal pull --recurse-submodules
git -C ~/src/qusal submodule update --merge
```
4. Verify the commit or tag signature and expect a good signature, be
surprised otherwise (signature verification on submodules is skipped if
checking out but not merging):
```sh
git verify-commit HEAD
git submodule foreach git verify-commit HEAD
```
4. Verify the commit or tag signature and expect a good signature, be
surprised otherwise (signature verification on submodules is skipped if
checking out but not merging):
```sh
git verify-commit HEAD
git submodule foreach git verify-commit HEAD
```
5. Copy the project to the Salt directories:
```
~/src/qusal/scripts/setup.sh
```
5. Copy the project to the Salt directories:
```
~/src/qusal/scripts/setup.sh
```
### Dom0 Update by literally copying the git repository
@ -183,33 +183,33 @@ tracked by git. It would be easier to distrust the downloader qube if the
project had a signed archive. The `.git/info/exclude` can exclude modified
files from being tracked and signature verification won't catch it.
1. Install the helpers scripts and git on Dom0 (only has to be run once):
```sh
sudo qubesctl state.apply dom0.install-helpers
sudo qubes-dom0-update git
```
1. Install the helpers scripts and git on Dom0 (only has to be run once):
```sh
sudo qubesctl state.apply dom0.install-helpers
sudo qubes-dom0-update git
```
2. Copy the repository `$file` from the DomU `$qube` to Dom0 (substitute
`CHANGEME` for the desired valued):
```sh
qube="CHANGEME" # qube name where you downloaded the repository
file="CHANGEME" # path to the repository in the qube
2. Copy the repository `$file` from the DomU `$qube` to Dom0 (substitute
`CHANGEME` for the desired valued):
```sh
qube="CHANGEME" # qube name where you downloaded the repository
file="CHANGEME" # path to the repository in the qube
rm -rf ~/QubesIncoming/"${qube}"/qusal
UPDATES_MAX_FILES=10000 qvm-copy-to-dom0 "${qube}" "${file}"
```
rm -rf ~/QubesIncoming/"${qube}"/qusal
UPDATES_MAX_FILES=10000 qvm-copy-to-dom0 "${qube}" "${file}"
```
3. Verify the commit or tag signature and expect a good signature, be
surprised otherwise:
```sh
git verify-commit HEAD
git submodule foreach git verify-commit HEAD
```
3. Verify the commit or tag signature and expect a good signature, be
surprised otherwise:
```sh
git verify-commit HEAD
git submodule foreach git verify-commit HEAD
```
4. Copy the project to the Salt directories:
```sh
~/QubesIncoming/"${qube}"/qusal/scripts/setup.sh
```
4. Copy the project to the Salt directories:
```sh
~/QubesIncoming/"${qube}"/qusal/scripts/setup.sh
```
## Usage

2
docs/CONTRIBUTING.md
View File

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Be respectful towards peers.
## Environment
You will need to setup you development environment before you start
contributing. You will need Qubes OS R4 or higher.
contributing.
### Requirements

179
docs/DESIGN.md
View File

@ -39,26 +39,21 @@ No extraneous features should be included by default besides the basic for
functionality. Extra functionalities that could weaken the system can be
provided via extra states that needs to be installed per the user discretion.
## Documentation
Markdown code must follow
[Google's Markdown style guide](https://google.github.io/styleguide/docguide/style.html).
Any discrepancies with Google's style guide must be fixed or documented here
with clear motive.
Documentation must not duplicate itself, but reference one another.
Reproducing instructions that can be found in upstream documentation is
discouraged unless the benefits of documenting it in-house, such as getting
the documentation from a single source, do outweigh the necessity of having to
modify the documentation constantly to keep up with upstream.
## Format
### File naming
1. Every State file `.sls` must have a Top file `.top`. This ensures that
every state can be applied with top.
2. Every project must have a `init.top`, it facilitates applying every state
by enabling a single top file.
3. State file naming must be common between the projects, it helps
understand the project as if it was any other.
4. File name must use `-` as separator, not `_`.
### State ID
1. State IDs must use `-` as separator, not `_`. The underline is allowed in
case the features it is changing has underline, such as `default_netvm`.
2. State IDs must always have the project ID, thus allowing to target multiple
states to the same minion from different projects without having
conflicting IDs.
### Readme
Every project should have a README.md with at least the following sections:
@ -70,6 +65,24 @@ Every project should have a README.md with at least the following sections:
- Usage; and
- Credits (if sourced).
### File naming
1. Every State file `.sls` must have a Top file `.top`. This ensures that
every state can be applied with top.
2. Every project must have a `init.top`, it facilitates applying every state
by enabling a single top file.
3. State file naming must be common between the projects, it helps understand
the project as if it was any other.
4. File name must use `-` as separator, not `_`.
### State ID
1. State IDs must use `-` as separator, not `_`. The underline is allowed in
case the features it is changing has underline, such as `default_netvm`.
2. State IDs must always have the project ID, thus allowing to target multiple
states to the same minion from different projects without having
conflicting IDs.
### Qube preferences
#### Qube naming
@ -99,77 +112,77 @@ the same as you trust your vault. The following method tries to fix this
problem, domain name is in the prefix of the qube, the label is solely
related to trustworthiness of the data it is dealing with.
- **Black**:
- **Trust**: Ultimate.
- **Description**: You must trust Dom0, Templates, Vaults, Management qubes,
these qubes control your system and hold valuable information.
- **Examples**: dom0, tpl-ssh, vault, dvm-mgmt.
- **Gray**:
- **Trust**: Fully.
- **Description**: Trusted storage with extra RPC services that allow certain
operations to be made by the client and executed on the server or may
build components for other qubes.
- **Examples**: sys-cacher, sys-git, sys-pgp, sys-ssh-agent, qubes-builder.
- **Purple**:
- **Trust**: Very much.
- **Description**: Has the ability to manager remote servers via encrypted
connections and depend on authorization provided by another qube.
Examples: ansible, dev, ssh, terraform.
- **Blue**:
- **Trust**: Much.
- **Description**: TODO
- **Examples**: TODO
- **Green**:
- **Trust**: Trusted.
- **Description**: TODO
- **Examples**: TODO
- **Yellow**:
- **Trust**: Relatively trusted.
- **Description**: TODO
- **Examples**: TODO
- **Orange**:
- **Trust**: Slight.
- **Description**: Controls the network flow of data to the client, normally a
firewall.
- **Examples**: sys-firewall, sys-vpn, sys-pihole.
- **Red**:
- **Trust**: Untrusted.
- **Description**: Holds untrusted data (PCI devices, untrusted programs,
disposables for opening untrusted files or web pages).
- **Examples**: sys-net, sys-usb, dvm-browser.
- **Black**:
- **Trust**: Ultimate.
- **Description**: You must trust Dom0, Templates, Vaults, Management
qubes, these qubes control your system and hold valuable information.
- **Examples**: dom0, tpl-ssh, vault, dvm-mgmt.
- **Gray**:
- **Trust**: Fully.
- **Description**: Trusted storage with extra RPC services that allow
certain operations to be made by the client and executed on the server
or may build components for other qubes.
- **Examples**: sys-cacher, sys-git, sys-pgp, sys-ssh-agent, qubes-builder.
- **Purple**:
- **Trust**: Very much.
- **Description**: Has the ability to manager remote servers via encrypted
connections and depend on authorization provided by another qube.
Examples: ansible, dev, ssh, terraform.
- **Blue**:
- **Trust**: Much.
- **Description**: TODO
- **Examples**: TODO
- **Green**:
- **Trust**: Trusted.
- **Description**: TODO
- **Examples**: TODO
- **Yellow**:
- **Trust**: Relatively trusted.
- **Description**: TODO
- **Examples**: TODO
- **Orange**:
- **Trust**: Slight.
- **Description**: Controls the network flow of data to the client,
normally a firewall.
- **Examples**: sys-firewall, sys-vpn, sys-pihole.
- **Red**:
- **Trust**: Untrusted.
- **Description**: Holds untrusted data (PCI devices, untrusted
programs, disposables for opening untrusted files or web pages).
- **Examples**: sys-net, sys-usb, dvm-browser.
### Qube connections
There are several ways a qube can connect to another, either directly with
Xen or with Qrexec. If something is not required, we remove it.
- `template` is always required:
- When required, must be set to the custom-made template;
- When not possible to use, prefer StandaloneVMs instead.
- `audiovm` is rarely required on the majority of the projects:
- When required, set it to `"*default*"` to honor the global preferences.
- When not required, must be set to None;
- `netvm` is required on a lot of projects.
- When required, must not be managed to honor the global preferences. If it
requires a custom networking scheme, the state must make sure that the
netvm exists;
- When not required, must be set to None.
- `default_dispvm` is nice to have:
- When required, must guarantee that the network follows the same chain as
the calling qube in the default configuration;
- When not required, must be set to None.
- `management_dispvm` is always required:
- When required, should not be managed to honor the global preferences,
but it can make sense to set a custom management qube for debugging.
- When not required, such as on qubes that don't work through Salt, don't
touch it, it doesn't increase attack surface.
- `template` is always required:
- When required, must be set to the custom-made template;
- When not possible to use, prefer StandaloneVMs instead.
- `audiovm` is rarely required on the majority of the projects:
- When required, set it to `"*default*"` to honor the global preferences.
- When not required, must be set to None;
- `netvm` is required on a lot of projects.
- When required, must not be managed to honor the global preferences. If
it requires a custom networking scheme, the state must make sure that
the netvm exists;
- When not required, must be set to None.
- `default_dispvm` is nice to have:
- When required, must guarantee that the network follows the same chain as
the calling qube in the default configuration;
- When not required, must be set to None.
- `management_dispvm` is always required:
- When required, should not be managed to honor the global preferences,
but it can make sense to set a custom management qube for debugging.
- When not required, such as on qubes that don't work through Salt, don't
touch it, it doesn't increase attack surface.
### Qrexec call and policy
1. Don't use `*` for source and destination, use `@anyvm` instead
2. Target qube for policies must be `@default`. It allows for the real target
to be set by Dom0 via the `target=` redirection parameter, instead of
having to modify the client to target a different server via
`qrexec-client-vm`.
3. Target qube for client script must default to `@default`, but other targets
must be allowed via parameters.
1. Don't use `*` for source and destination, use `@anyvm` instead
2. Target qube for policies must be `@default`. It allows for the real target
to be set by Dom0 via the `target=` redirection parameter, instead of
having to modify the client to target a different server via
`qrexec-client-vm`.
3. Target qube for client script must default to `@default`, but other targets
must be allowed via parameters.

4
salt/browser/README.md
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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Firefox-ESR, W3M or Lynx.
## Installation
- Top
- Top:
```sh
sudo qubesctl top.enable browser
sudo qubesctl --targets=tpl-browser,dvm-browser state.apply
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sudo qubesctl top.disable browser
sudo qubesctl state.apply browser.appmenus
```
- State
- State:
<!-- pkg:begin:post-install -->
```sh
sudo qubesctl state.apply browser.create

4
salt/dom0/README.md
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@ -15,14 +15,14 @@ etc.
## Installation
- Top
- Top:
```sh
sudo qubesctl top.enable dom0
sudo qubesctl state.apply
sudo qubesctl top.disable dom0
```
- State
- State:
<!-- pkg:begin:post-install -->
```sh
sudo qubesctl state.apply dom0

2
salt/dotfiles

@ -1 +1 @@
Subproject commit 84bae87dc5da48334f81501e11cf17919ff1504b
Subproject commit 0dd49bcab48ddb7c328e1320c875780b2d9db1bc

4
salt/mail/README.md
View File

@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ exploitation, as `msmtp` still needs to parse the mail to be sent.
## Installation
- Top
- Top:
```sh
sudo qubesctl top.enable mail reader
sudo qubesctl --targets=tpl-mail-fetcher,tpl-mail-reader,tpl-mail-sender,dvm-mail-fetcher,mail-reader,dvm-mail-sender,tpl-reader state.apply
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ sudo qubesctl top.disable mail reader
sudo qubesctl state.apply mail.appmenus,reader.appmenus
```
- State
- State:
<!-- pkg:begin:post-install -->
```sh
sudo qubesctl state.apply mail.create

4
salt/mirage-builder/README.md
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@ -21,14 +21,14 @@ are done through the web interface, they have GitHub Web-Flow signature. This
is the best verification we can get for Mirage Firewall. If you don't trust
the hosting provider however, don't install this package.
- Top
- Top:
```sh
sudo qubesctl top.enable mirage-builder
sudo qubesctl --targets=tpl-mirage-builder,mirage-builder state.apply
sudo qubesctl top.disable mirage-builder
```
- State
- State:
<!-- pkg:begin:post-install -->
```sh
sudo qubesctl state.apply mirage-builder.create

4
salt/sys-electrs/README.md
View File

@ -26,14 +26,14 @@ At least `200GB` of disk space is required.
This formula depends on [sys-bitcoin](../sys-bitcoin/README.md).
- Top
- Top:
```sh
sudo qubesctl top.enable sys-electrs
sudo qubesctl --targets=tpl-electrs-builder,tpl-sys-electrs,disp-electrs-builder,sys-electrs state.apply
sudo qubesctl top.disable sys-electrs
```
- State
- State:
<!-- pkg:begin:post-install -->
```sh
sudo qubesctl state.apply sys-electrs.create

4
salt/sys-mirage-firewall/README.md
View File

@ -26,14 +26,14 @@ You can't use Mirage Firewall to be the updatevm, use another qube instead.
We have built the Unikernel locally and verified that the upstream checksum
and local checksum matched when comparing the same release.
- Top
- Top:
```sh
sudo qubesctl top.enable sys-mirage-firewall
sudo qubesctl state.apply
sudo qubesctl top.disable sys-mirage-firewall
```
- State
- State:
<!-- pkg:begin:post-install -->
```sh
sudo qubesctl state.apply sys-mirage-firewall.create

1
salt/sys-pihole/README.md
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@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ Pi-hole will be installed with these default settings:
- Query logging is enabled to show everything.
You can change the settings via the admin interface:
- URL: http://localhost/admin
- There is no password (access allowed only through localhost)

4
salt/utils/tools/zsh/README.md
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@ -15,14 +15,14 @@ warnings.
## Installation
- Top
- Top:
```sh
sudo qubesctl top.enable utils.tools.zsh
sudo qubesctl --targets=TARGET state.apply
sudo qubesctl top.disable utils.tools.zsh
```
- State
- State:
<!-- pkg:begin:post-install -->
```sh
sudo qubesctl --skip-dom0 --targets=TEMPLATEVMS state.apply utils.tools.zsh.change-shell