qubes-doc/user/how-to-guides/backup-emergency-restore-v4.md

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---
lang: en
layout: doc
permalink: /doc/backup-emergency-restore-v4/
redirect_from:
- /en/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v4/
- /doc/BackupEmergencyRestoreV4/
ref: 192
title: Emergency backup recovery (v4)
---
This page describes how to perform an emergency restore of a backup created on
Qubes R4.X (which uses backup format version 4).
The Qubes backup system is designed with emergency disaster recovery in mind. No
special Qubes-specific tools are required to access data backed up by Qubes. In
the event a Qubes system is unavailable, you can access your data on any
GNU/Linux system by following the instructions on this page.
**Important:** You may wish to store a copy of these instructions with your
Qubes backups. All Qubes documentation, including this page, is available in
plain text format in the [qubes-doc](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc) Git
repository.
## Required `scrypt` utility
In Qubes 4.X, backups are encrypted and integrity-protected with
[scrypt](https://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt.html). You will need a copy of this
utility in order to access your data. Since `scrypt` is not pre-installed on
every GNU/Linux system, it is strongly recommended that you store a copy of it
with your backups. If your distribution has `scrypt` packaged (e.g., Debian),
you can install the package in the standard way using your distribution's
package manager. Otherwise, you'll need to obtain a compiled binary
(instructions below) or compile the program from source yourself. (Don't forget
to [verify signatures](/security/verifying-signatures) first!) Note that
versions of `scrypt` up to 1.2.0 (inclusive) do not support the `-P` option for
easier scripting, which means you'll need to enter the passphrase for each file
separately, instead of using `echo ... | scrypt`.
Here are instructions for obtaining a compiled `scrypt` binary. This example
uses an RPM-based system (Fedora), but the same general procedure should work on
any GNU/Linux system.
1. If you're not on Qubes 4.X, [import and authenticate the Release 4 Signing
Key](/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys).
[user@restore ~]$ sudo rpm --import qubes-release-4-signing-key.asc
2. Download the `scrypt` RPM.
[user@restore ~]$ dnf download scrypt
Or, if that doesn't work:
[user@restore ~]$ curl -O https://yum.qubes-os.org/r4.0/current/vm/fc28/rpm/scrypt-1.2.1-1.fc28.x86_64.rpm
3. Verify the signature on the `scrypt` RPM.
[user@restore ~]$ rpm -K scrypt-*.rpm
scrypt-*.rpm: digests signatures OK
The message `digests signatures OK` means that both the digest (i.e., the
output of a hash function) and PGP signature verification were successful.
4. Install `rpmdevtools`.
[user@restore ~]$ sudo dnf install rpmdevtools
5. Extract the `scrypt` binary from the RPM and make it conveniently
available.
[user@restore ~]$ rpmdev-extract scrypt-*.rpm
[user@restore ~]$ alias scrypt="$PWD/scrypt-*/usr/bin/scrypt"
## Emergency recovery instructions
**Note:** In the following example, the backup file is both *encrypted* and
*compressed*.
1. Untar the backup metadata from the main backup file.
[user@restore ~]$ tar -i -xvf qubes-backup-2023-04-05T123456 \
backup-header backup-header.hmac qubes.xml.000.enc
backup-header
backup-header.hmac
qubes.xml.000.enc
2. Set the backup passphrase environment variable. While this isn't strictly
required, it will be handy later and will avoid saving the passphrase in the
shell's history.
[user@restore ~]$ read -r backup_pass
Type in your passphrase (it will be visible on screen!) and press Enter.
3. Verify the integrity of `backup-header` using `backup-header.hmac` (an
encrypted *and integrity protected* version of `backup-header`).
[user@restore ~]$ set +H
[user@restore ~]$ echo "backup-header!$backup_pass" |\
scrypt dec -P backup-header.hmac backup-header.verified && \
diff -qs backup-header backup-header.verified
Files backup-header and backup-header.verified are identical
**Note:** If this command fails, it may be that the backup was tampered with
or is in a different format. In the latter case, look inside `backup-header`
at the `version` field. If it contains a value other than `version=4`, go to
the instructions for that format version:
- [Emergency Backup Recovery without Qubes (v2)](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v2/)
- [Emergency Backup Recovery without Qubes (v3)](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v3/)
4. Read `backup-header`.
[user@restore ~]$ cat backup-header
version=4
encrypted=True
compressed=True
compression-filter=gzip
hmac-algorithm=scrypt
backup-id=20230405T123455-1234
5. Set `backup_id` to the value in the last line of `backup-header`. (Note that
there is a hyphen in `backup-id` in the file, whereas there is an underscore
in `backup_id` in the variable you're setting.)
[user@restore ~]$ backup_id=20230405T123455-1234
6. Verify and decrypt, decompress, and extract the `qubes.xml` file.
[user@restore ~]$ echo "$backup_id!qubes.xml.000!$backup_pass" |\
scrypt dec -P qubes.xml.000.enc | gzip -d | tar -xv
qubes.xml
If this pipeline fails, it is likely that the backup is corrupted or has
been tampered with.
**Note:** If your backup was compressed with a program other than `gzip`,
you must substitute the correct compression program in the command above.
This information is contained in `backup-header` (see step 4). For example,
if your backup is compressed with `bzip2`, use `bzip2 -d` instead of `gzip
-d` in the command above. You might need to install a package of the same
name (in this example, `bzip2`) through your distribution's package manager.
7. Search inside of the `qubes.xml` file for the `backup-path` of the qube
whose data you wish to restore. If you install the `xmlstarlet` package, the
following command will convert `qubes.xml` to a friendlier listing for this
purpose:
[user@restore ~]$ xmlstarlet sel -T -t -m //domain \
-v 'concat(.//property[@name="name"], " ", .//feature[@name="backup-path"])' \
-n qubes.xml
anon-whonix
debian-11
default-mgmt-dvm
disp2345
fedora-37
fedora-37-dvm
personal vm123/
sys-firewall
sys-net
sys-usb
sys-whonix
untrusted
vault vm321/
whonix-gw-16
whonix-ws-16
whonix-ws-16-dvm
work
The example output above shows that the backup file includes a qube named
`personal` and a qube named `vault`, with `backup-path` values of `vm123/`
and `vm321/` respectively. (Every other listed qube was not selected to be
included in the backup file.) Use the corresponding value to untar the
necessary data files of the qube:
[user@restore ~]$ tar -i -xvf qubes-backup-2023-04-05T123456 vm123/
8. Verify and decrypt the backed up data, decompress it, and extract it.
[user@restore ~]$ find vm123/ -name 'private.img.*.enc' | sort -V | while read f_enc; do \
f_dec=${f_enc%.enc}; \
echo "$backup_id!$f_dec!$backup_pass" | scrypt dec -P $f_enc || break; \
done | gzip -d | tar -xv
vm123/private.img
If this pipeline fails, it is likely that the backup is corrupted or has
been tampered with.
Also see the note in step 6 about substituting a different compression
program for `gzip`.
9. Mount `private.img` and access your data.
[user@restore ~]$ sudo mkdir /mnt/img
[user@restore ~]$ sudo mount -o loop vm123/private.img /mnt/img/
[user@restore ~]$ ls /mnt/img/home/user/
example_data_file.txt
...
Success! If you wish to recover data from more than one qube in your backup,
simply repeat steps 7, 8, and 9 for each additional qube.