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122 lines
8.1 KiB
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122 lines
8.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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layout: doc
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title: Certified Hardware
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permalink: /doc/certified-hardware/
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redirect_from:
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- /doc/hardware/
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- /doc/certified-laptops/
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- /hardware-certification/
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---
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# Certified Hardware
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The Qubes OS Project aims to partner with a select few computer vendors to ensure that Qubes users have reliable hardware purchasing options.
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We aim for these vendors to be as diverse as possible in terms of geography, cost, and availability.
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Note, however, that we certify only that a particular hardware *configuration* is *supported* by Qubes.
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We take no responsibility for our partners' manufacturing or shipping processes, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) *en route* to the user.
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There are also other hardware models on which we have tested Qubes OS.
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See [Hardware Testing] for details.
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## Qubes-certified Laptops
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Qubes-certified laptops are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes' features.
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The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.
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### Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230
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[][Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230]
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The [Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230] meets and exceeds our hardware certification requirements.
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Read our [announcement][privacybeast announcement] of the certification for further details!
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### NitroPad X230
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[][NitroPad X230]
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The [NitroPad X230] satisfies all hardware certification requirements, offering users extensive hardware security options.
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## Become Hardware Certified
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If you are a hardware vendor, you can have your hardware certified as compatible with Qubes OS.
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The benefits of hardware certification include:
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* Your customers can purchase with confidence, knowing that they can take full advantage of Qubes OS on your hardware.
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* Your hardware will continue to be compatible with Qubes OS as it further develops.
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* You can support the development of Qubes OS.
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## Hardware Certification Requirements
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(Please note that these are the requirements for hardware *certification*, *not* the requirements for *running* Qubes 4.x.
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For the latter, please see the [system requirements for Qubes 4.x].)
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One of the most important security improvements introduced with the release of Qubes 4.0 was to replace paravirtualization (PV) technology with **hardware-enforced memory virtualization**, which recent processors have made possible thanks to so-called Second Level Address Translation ([SLAT]), also known as [EPT][EPT-enabled CPUs] in Intel parlance.
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SLAT (EPT) is an extension to Intel VT-x virtualization, which originally was capable of only CPU virtualization but not memory virtualization and hence required a complex Shadow Page Tables approach.
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We hope that embracing SLAT-based memory virtualization will allow us to prevent disastrous security bugs, such as the infamous [XSA-148], which --- unlike many other major Xen bugs --- regrettably did [affect][QSB 22] Qubes OS.
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Consequently, we require SLAT support of all certified hardware beginning with Qubes OS 4.0.
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Another important requirement is that Qubes-certified hardware should run only **open-source boot firmware** (aka "the BIOS"), such as [coreboot].
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The only exception is the use of (properly authenticated) CPU-vendor-provided blobs for silicon and memory initialization (see [Intel FSP]) as well as other internal operations (see [Intel ME]).
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However, we specifically require all code used for and dealing with the System Management Mode (SMM) to be open-source.
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While we [recognize][x86_harmful] the potential problems that proprietary CPU-vendor code can cause, we are also pragmatic enough to realize that we need to take smaller steps first, before we can implement even stronger countermeasures such as a [stateless laptop].
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A switch to open source boot firmware is one such important step.
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To be compatible with Qubes OS, the BIOS must properly expose all the VT-x, VT-d, and SLAT functionality that the underlying hardware offers (and which we require).
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Among other things, this implies **proper DMAR ACPI table** construction.
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Finally, we require that Qubes-certified hardware does not have any built-in _USB-connected_ microphones (e.g. as part of a USB-connected built-in camera) that cannot be easily physically disabled by the user, e.g. via a convenient mechanical switch.
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Thankfully, the majority of laptops on the market that we have seen already satisfy this condition out-of-the-box, because their built-in microphones are typically connected to the internal audio device, which itself is a type of PCIe device.
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This is important, because such PCIe audio devices are --- by default --- assigned to Qubes' (trusted) dom0 and exposed through our carefully designed protocol only to select AppVMs when the user explicitly chooses to do so.
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The rest of the time, they should be outside the reach of malware.
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While we also recommend a physical kill switch on the built-in camera (or, if possible, not to have a built-in camera), we also recognize this isn't a critical requirement, because users who are concerned about it can easily cover it a piece of tape (something that, regrettably, is far less effective on a microphone).
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Similarly, we don't consider physical kill switches on Wi-Fi and Bluetooth devices to be mandatory.
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Users who plan on using Qubes in an air-gap scenario would do best if they manually remove all such devices persistently (as well as the builtin [speakers][audio_modem]!), rather than rely on easy-to-flip-by-mistake switches, while others should benefit from the Qubes default sandboxing of all networking devices in dedicated VMs.
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We hope these hardware requirements will encourage the development of more secure and trustworthy devices.
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## Hardware Certification Process
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To have hardware certified, the vendor must:
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1. Send the Qubes team two (2) units for testing (non-returnable) for each configuration the vendor wishes to be offering.
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2. Offer to customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.
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3. Pay the Qubes team a flat monthly rate, to be agreed upon between the hardware vendor and the Qubes team.
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It is the vendor's responsibility to ensure the hardware they wish to have certified can run Qubes OS, at the very least the latest stable version.
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This could be done by consulting the [Hardware Compatibility List] or trying to install it themselves before shipping any units to us.
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While we are willing to troubleshoot simple issues, we will need to charge a consulting fee for more in-depth work.
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If you are interested in having your hardware certified, please [contact us].
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[Hardware Testing]: /doc/hardware-testing/
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[stateless laptop]: https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2015/12/23/state_harmful.html
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[System Requirements]: /doc/system-requirements/
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[Hardware Compatibility List]: /hcl/
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[Hardware Certification]: #hardware-certification
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[system requirements for Qubes 4.x]: /doc/system-requirements/#qubes-release-4x
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[contact us]: mailto:business@qubes-os.org
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[SLAT]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Level_Address_Translation
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[EPT-enabled CPUs]: https://ark.intel.com/Search/FeatureFilter?productType=processors&ExtendedPageTables=true&MarketSegment=Mobile
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[XSA-148]: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-148.html
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[QSB 22]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-022-2015.txt
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[pvh_ticket]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2185
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[coreboot]: https://www.coreboot.org/
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[Intel FSP]: https://firmware.intel.com/learn/fsp/about-intel-fsp
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[Intel ME]: https://www.apress.com/9781430265719
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[x86_harmful]: https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/x86_harmful.pdf
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[stateless laptop]: https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/state_harmful.pdf
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[audio_modem]: https://github.com/romanz/amodem/
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[Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230]: https://insurgo.ca/produit/qubesos-certified-privacybeast_x230-reasonably-secured-laptop/
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[privacybeast announcement]: /news/2019/07/18/insurgo-privacybeast-qubes-certification/
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[NitroPad X230]: https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitropad-x230-67
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