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139 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
139 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
---
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layout: doc
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title: YubiKey in Qubes
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permalink: /doc/yubi-key/
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redirect_from:
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- /en/doc/yubi-key/
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- /doc/YubiKey/
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---
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Using YubiKey to Qubes authentication
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=====================================
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You can use YubiKey to enhance Qubes user authentication, for example to mitigate
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risk of snooping the password. This can also slightly improve security when you have [USB keyboard](https://github.com/marmarek/qubes-app-linux-input-proxy).
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There (at least) two possible configurations: using OTP mode and using challenge-response mode.
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OTP mode
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--------
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This can be configured using
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[app-linux-yubikey](https://github.com/adubois/qubes-app-linux-yubikey)
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package. This package does not support sharing the same key slot with other
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applications (it will deny further authentications if you try).
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Contrary to instruction there, currently there is no binary packages in Qubes
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repository and you need to compile it yourself. This can change in the future.
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Challenge-reponse mode
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----------------------
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In this mode, your YubiKey will generate response based on secret key, and
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random challenge (instead of counter). This means that it isn't possible to
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generate response in advance even when someone get access to your YubiKey. This
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makes reasonably safe to use the same YubiKey for other services (also in
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challenge-response mode).
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Same as in OTP case, you will need to setup your YubiKey, choose separate
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password (other than your login password!) and apply the configuration.
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To use this mode you need:
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1. Configure your YubiKey for challenge-reponse HMAC-SHA1 mode, for example
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[following this
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tutorial](https://www.yubico.com/products/services-software/personalization-tools/challenge-response/)
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2. Install `ykpers` package in template on which your USB VM is based.
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3. Create `/usr/local/bin/yubikey-auth` script:
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#!/bin/sh
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key="$1"
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if [ -z "$key" ]; then
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echo "Usage: $0 <AESKEY> [<PASSWORD-HASH>]"
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exit 1
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fi
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# if password has given, verify it
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if [ -n "$2" ]; then
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# PAM appends \0 at the end
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hash=`head -c -1 | openssl dgst -sha1 -r | cut -f1 -d ' '`
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if [ "x$2" != "x$hash" ]; then
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exit 1
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fi
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fi
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challenge=`head -c64 /dev/urandom | xxd -c 64 -ps`
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# You may need to adjust slot number and USB VM name here
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response=`qvm-run -u root --nogui -p sys-usb "ykchalresp -2 -x $challenge"`
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correct_response=`echo $challenge | xxd -r -ps | openssl dgst -sha1 -macopt hexkey:$key -mac HMAC -r | cut -f1 -d ' '`
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test "x$correct_response" = "x$response"
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exit $?
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4. Adjust USB VM name (`sys-usb` above), and possibly YubiKey slot number (`2`
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above), then make the script executable.
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5. Edit `/etc/pam.d/xscreensaver` (or appropriate file if you are using other
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screen locker program). Add this line at the beginning:
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auth [success=done default=ignore] pam_exec.so expose_authtok quiet /usr/local/bin/yubikey-auth AESKEY PASSWORD-HASH
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Replace `AESKEY` with hex-encoded key configured in the first step, then
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replace `PASSWORD-HASH` with SHA1 hash for your YubiKey-linked password (other
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than your standard Qubes password). You can calculate it using this command:
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echo -n "PASSWORD" | openssl dgst -sha1
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### Usage
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When you want to unlock your screen, plug YubiKey into USB slot, then enter
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password associated with YubiKey. If you configured so, YubiKey will request
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confirmation by pressing button on it (it will blink).
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When everything is ok, your screen will be unlocked.
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In any case you can still use your login password, but do it in secure location
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where no one can snoop your password.
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Locking the screen when YubiKey is removed
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------------------------------------------
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You can setup your system to automatically lock the screen when you unplug
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YubiKey. This will require creating simple qrexec service which will expose
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ability to lock the screen to your USB VM, and then adding udev hook to
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actually call that service.
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1. First configure the qrexec service. Create `/etc/qubes-rpc/custom.LockScreen` (in dom0)
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with simple command to lock the screen. In case of xscreensaver (used in Xfce)
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it would be:
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DISPLAY=:0 xscreensaver-command -lock
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2. Allow your USB VM to call that service. Assuming that its named `sys-usb` it
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would require creating `/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/custom.LockScreen` with:
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sys-usb dom0 allow
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3. Create udev hook in your USB VM. Store it in `/rw/config` to have it
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persistent across VM restarts. For example name the file
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`/rw/config/yubikey.rules`. Write there single line:
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ACTION=="remove", SUBSYSTEM=="usb", ENV{ID_SECURITY_TOKEN}=="1", RUN+="/usr/bin/qrexec-client-vm dom0 custom.LockScreen"
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4. Ensure that the udev hook is placed in the right place after VM restart. Append to `/rw/config/rc.local`:
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ln -s /rw/config/yubikey.rules /etc/udev/rules.d/
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udevadm control --reload
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Then make `/rw/config/rc.local` executable. For changes to take effect, you
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need to call this script manually for the first time.
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If you use KDE, the command(s) in first step would be different:
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# In case of USB VM being autostarted, it will not have direct access to D-Bus
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# session bus, so find its address manually:
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kde_pid=`pidof kdeinit4`
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export `cat /proc/$kde_pid/environ|grep -ao 'DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=[[:graph:]]*'`
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qdbus org.freedesktop.ScreenSaver /ScreenSaver Lock
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