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169 | YubiKey |
You can use a YubiKey to enhance Qubes user authentication, for example to mitigate risk of someone snooping the password. This can also slightly improve security when you have a USB keyboard.
Challenge-response mode
In this mode, your YubiKey will generate a response based on the secret key, and a random challenge (instead of counter). This means that it isn't possible to generate a response in advance even if someone gets access to your YubiKey. This makes it reasonably safe to use the same YubiKey for other services (also in challenge-response mode).
Same as in the OTP case, you will need to set up your YubiKey, choose a separate password (other than your login password!) and apply the configuration.
To use this mode you need to:
-
Install yubikey personalization the packages in your TemplateVM on which your USB VM is based.
For Fedora.
sudo dnf install ykpers yubikey-personalization-gui
For Debian.
sudo apt-get install yubikey-personalization yubikey-personalization-gui
Shut down your TemplateVM. Then, either reboot your USB VM (so changes inside the TemplateVM take effect in your USB TemplateBasedVM) or install the packages inside your USB VM if you would like to avoid rebooting it.
-
Configure your YubiKey for challenge-response
HMAC-SHA1
mode, for example following this tutorial.On Debian, you can run the graphical user interface
yubikey-personalization-gui
from the command line.- Choose
configuration slot 2
. - It is recommended to enable
Require user input (button press)
but this is optional. - Note: Different from the above video, use the following settings select
HMAC-SHA1 mode
:fixed 64 bit input
. - We will refer the
Secret Key (20 bytes hex)
asAESKEY
.- It is recommended to keep a backup of your
AESKEY
in an offline VM used as a vault. - Consider keeping a backup of your
AESKEY
on paper and storing it in a safe place. - If you have multiple YubiKeys for backup purposes (in case a yubikey gets lost, stolen or breaks) you can write the same settings into other YubiKeys.
- It is recommended to keep a backup of your
- Choose
-
Install qubes-app-yubikey in dom0.
sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-yubikey-dom0
-
Adjust the USB VM name in case you are using something other than the default
sys-usb
by editing/etc/qubes/yk-keys/yk-vm
in dom0. -
Paste your
AESKEY
from step 2 into/etc/qubes/yk-keys/yk-secret-key.hex
in dom0. -
Paste your hashed password (other than your standard Qubes password) into
/etc/qubes/yk-keys/yk-login-pass-hashed.hex
in dom0.You can calculate your hashed password using the following two commands. First run the following command to store your password in a temporary variable
password
. (This way your password will not leak to the terminal command history file.)read password
Now run the following command to calculate your hashed password.
echo -n "$password" | openssl dgst -sha1
-
Edit
/etc/pam.d/login
in dom0, adding this line at the beginning:auth include yubikey
-
Edit
/etc/pam.d/xscreensaver
(or appropriate file if you are using another screen locker program) in dom0, adding this line at the beginning:auth include yubikey
-
Edit
/etc/pam.d/lightdm
(or appropriate file if you are using another display manager) in dom0, adding this line at the beginning:auth include yubikey
Usage
When you want to unlock your screen...
- Plug YubiKey into USB slot.
- Enter password associated with YubiKey.
- Press Enter.
- If you configured so, YubiKey will request confirmation by pressing button on it (it will blink).
When everything is ok, your screen will be unlocked.
In any case you can still use your login password, but do it in a secure location where no one can snoop your password.
Mandatory YubiKey Login
Edit /etc/pam.d/yubikey
(or appropriate file if you are using other screen locker program) and remove default=ignore
so the line looks like this.
auth [success=done] pam_exec.so expose_authtok quiet /usr/bin/yk-auth
Locking the screen when YubiKey is removed
You can setup your system to automatically lock the screen when you unplug your YubiKey. This will require creating a simple qrexec service which will expose the ability to lock the screen to your USB VM, and then adding a udev hook to actually call that service.
In dom0:
-
First configure the qrexec service. Create
/etc/qubes-rpc/custom.LockScreen
with a simple command to lock the screen. In the case of xscreensaver (used in Xfce) it would be:DISPLAY=:0 xscreensaver-command -lock
-
Allow your USB VM to call that service. Assuming that it's named
sys-usb
it would require creating/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/custom.LockScreen
with:sys-usb dom0 allow
In your USB VM:
-
Create udev hook. Store it in
/rw/config
to have it persist across VM restarts. For example name the file/rw/config/yubikey.rules
. Add the following line:ACTION=="remove", SUBSYSTEM=="usb", ENV{ID_SECURITY_TOKEN}=="1", RUN+="/usr/bin/qrexec-client-vm dom0 custom.LockScreen"
-
Ensure that the udev hook is placed in the right place after VM restart. Append to
/rw/config/rc.local
:ln -s /rw/config/yubikey.rules /etc/udev/rules.d/ udevadm control --reload
-
Then make
/rw/config/rc.local
executable.sudo chmod +x /rw/config/rc.local
-
For changes to take effect, you need to call this script manually for the first time.
sudo /rw/config/rc.local
If you use KDE, the command(s) in first step would be different:
# In the case of USB VM being autostarted, it will not have direct access to D-Bus
# session bus, so find its address manually:
kde_pid=`pidof kdeinit4`
export `cat /proc/$kde_pid/environ|grep -ao 'DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=[[:graph:]]*'`
qdbus org.freedesktop.ScreenSaver /ScreenSaver Lock