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Copy and Paste between domains
Qubes fully supports secure copy and paste operation between domains. In order to copy a clipboard from domain A to domain B, follow those steps:
- Click on the application window in domain A where you have selected text for copying. Then use the app-specific hot-key (or menu option) to copy this into domain's local clipboard (in other words: do the copy operation as usual, in most cases by pressing Ctrl-C).
- Then (when the app in domain A is still in focus) press Ctrl-Shift-C magic hot-key. This will tell Qubes that we want to select this domain's clipboard for global copy between domains.
- Now select the destination app, running in domain B, and press Ctrl-Shift-V, another magic hot-key that will tell Qubes to make the clipboard marked in the previous step available to apps running in domain B. This step is necessary because it ensures that only domain B will get access to the clipboard copied from domain A, and not any other domain that might be running in the system.
- Now, in the destination app use the app-specific key combination (usually Ctrl-V) for pasting the clipboard.
Note that the global clipboard will be cleared after step #3, to prevent accidental leakage to another domain, if the user accidentally pressed Ctrl-Shift-V later.
This 4-step process might look complex, but after some little practice it really is very easy and fast. At the same time it provides the user with full control over who has access to the clipboard.
Note that only simple plain text copy/paste is supported between AppVMs. This is discussed in a bit more detail in this message.
On Copy/Paste Security
The scheme is secure because it doesn't allow other VMs to steal the content of the clipboard. However, one should keep in mind that performing a copy and paste operation from less trusted to more trusted domain can always be potentially insecure, because the data that we insert might potentially try to exploit some hypothetical bug in the destination VM (e.g. the seemingly innocent link that we copy from untrusted domain, might turn out to be, in fact, a large buffer of junk that, when pasted into the destination VM's word processor could exploit a hypothetical bug in the undo buffer). This is a general problem and applies to any data transfer between less trusted to more trusted domains. It even applies to copying files between physically separate machines (air-gapped) systems. So, you should always copy clipboard and data only from more trusted to less trusted domains.
See also this article for more information on this topic, and some ideas of how we might solve this problem in some future version of Qubes.
And this message from qubes-devel.
Copy/Paste between dom0 and other domains
See "Copying from (and to) dom0".
Clipboard automatic policy enforcement
The Qubes clipboard policy is configurable in:
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.ClipboardPaste
You may wish to configure this policy in order to prevent user error. For example, if you are certain that you never wish to paste into your "vault" AppVM (and it is highly recommended that you do not), then you should edit the policy as follows:
$anyvm vault deny
$anyvm $anyvm ask
Shortcut Configuration
The copy/paste shortcuts are configurable in:
/etc/qubes/guid.conf
VMs need to be restarted in order for changes in /etc/qubes/guid.conf to take effect.