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213 | Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) |
The Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack) is a Git repository that
contains:
- Qubes Security Bulletins (QSBs)
- Qubes Canaries
- Signed Qubes ISO digests
- Qubes fund information
- Qubes PGP keys
- Security-related information and announcements (e.g., key revocations)
While qubes-secpack itself is independent of any particular host, its current
official location is:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack
How to obtain, verify, and read
The following example demonstrates one method of obtaining the qubes-secpack,
verifying its contents, and reading them.
-
Clone the
qubes-secpackrepo.$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'... remote: Counting objects: 195, done. remote: Total 195 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Receiving objects: 100% (195/195), 130.94 KiB | 207.00 KiB/s, done. Resolving deltas: 100% (47/47), done. Checking connectivity... done. -
Import the included PGP keys.
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/* gpg: directory `/home/user/.gnupg' created gpg: new configuration file `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' created gpg: WARNING: options in `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' are not yet active during this run gpg: keyring `/home/user/.gnupg/secring.gpg' created gpg: keyring `/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.gpg' created gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created gpg: key C37BB66B: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key 1E30A75D: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key 74EADABC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key 65EF29CA: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key 34898310: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key B298547C: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@mimuw.edu.pl>" imported gpg: key AB5EEF90: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key A603BCB6: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key 42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key 15CE40BF: public key "Wojciech Zygmunt Porczyk (Qubes OS signing key) <woju@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key 36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported gpg: key 211093A7: public key "Qubes OS Release 1 Signing Key" imported gpg: key 0A40E458: public key "Qubes OS Release 2 Signing Key" imported gpg: key 03FA5082: public key "Qubes OS Release 3 Signing Key" imported gpg: key 92C7B3DC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key 1830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported gpg: key 3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team <security@qubes-os.org>" imported gpg: Total number processed: 17 gpg: imported: 17 (RSA: 17) gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found -
Verify and trust the Qubes Master Signing Key.
$ gpg --edit-key 36879494 gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.18; Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. pub 4096R/36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key gpg> fpr pub 4096R/36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 gpg> trust pub 4096R/36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.) 1 = I don't know or won't say 2 = I do NOT trust 3 = I trust marginally 4 = I trust fully 5 = I trust ultimately m = back to the main menu Your decision? 5 Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y pub 4096R/36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct unless you restart the program. gpg> qImportant!
In order to verify the authenticity of the Qubes Master Signing Key prior to trusting it, you should obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint from a trustworthy source (ideally, multiple sources) other than this website and visually compare it (them) to the fingerprint displayed in the preceding step, ensuring they match. You can read more about digital signatures and key verification here.
-
Verify signed Git tags.
$ cd qubes-secpack/ $ git tag -v `git describe` object 2bb7f0b966593d8ed74e140a04d60c68b96b164e type commit tag joanna_sec_2bb7f0b9 tagger Joanna Rutkowska <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com> 1468335706 +0000 Tag for commit 2bb7f0b966593d8ed74e140a04d60c68b96b164e gpg: Signature made 2016-07-12T08:01:46 PDT gpg: using RSA key 0x4E6829BC92C7B3DC gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" [full](The final line of output confirms that the signature is good.)
-
Verify detached PGP signatures.
$ cd canaries/ $ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.joanna canary-001-2015.txt gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 20:21:40 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 92C7B3DC gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" $ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.marmarek canary-001-2015.txt gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 20:13:37 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 1830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>"
(The fourth and final lines of output confirm that the two signatures are good.)
The same procedures can be applied to any directory or file in the
qubes-secpack. Two methods of verification (signed Git tags and detached PGP
signatures) are provided to ensure that the system is robust (e.g., against a
potential failure in Git tag-based verification) and to give users more options
to verify the files.
PGP key inclusion criteria
The qubes-secpack generally includes only those PGP keys used to sign some
kind of official project artifact, such as Qubes release ISOs (release signing
keys), Git tags and commits (code signing, doc signing, and security team
keys), and the qubes-secpack's own files and Git tags (security team keys
again). This means that email keys are generally not included, even for
official project email addresses. There is one exception to this rule: the
official Qubes Security Team email address,
which is used to report security vulnerabilities in Qubes OS to our security
team.
History and rationale
On 2013-01-05, Joanna Rutkowska announced the qubes-secpack and explained its
rationale in an
email
to the Qubes mailing lists:
Hello,
A new Qubes Security Bulletin has been just released and is available here:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-013-2015.txt
As per the previous discussions about recent problems with verifying
digital signatures on messages sent to Google Groups (thanks to
automatic footer addition by Google), we have decided to change the way
we publish Qubes Security Bulletins, as well as other security-related
info pertinent to the Qubes Project.
Starting today, we will be maintain a Git repository -- "Qubes Security
Pack" -- which will contain all the QSBs released so far, all the keys,
warrant canaries [1], and potentially some additional info or
announcements (e.g. key revocations). The whole repo can be found here:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack
Note that all the keys distributed there should be signed by Qubes
Master Key. The Master Key is also attached in the repo, but should
really be obtained/verified using a different channel.
Additionally, most of the files are signed by core Qubes
developers (currently by Marek and myself) via detached signatures as
well as git tag signatures.
The are several advantages of using Git to distribute all these information:
1) Git repo is a collection of files, some of which can be detached GPG
signatures for other files and we can ensure all these files are
distributed together.
2) Git makes it easy for people to clone and redistribute these
collection of files, as well as to easily host them and view on the Web.
3) Git provides for signed tags mechanisms which is another mean we
utilize to ensure integrity of the distributed files.
A few words about the Warrant Canary which we've just introduced today,
and which can be seen here:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-001-2015.txt
Even though we're not providing any kind of services (such as e.g. email
hosting), that could be searched or tapped by authorities, there are
other possibilities that worry us [2], in the light of various recent
law "developments", such as those that might be coercing people to hand
over their private keys to authorities.
Until we fully decentralize the root of trust for Qubes, something that
requires the move to deterministic builds [3], and so won't happen
very soon, the possibility of having to disclose any of the Qubes
signing keys to anybody might have pretty serious consequences for those
who decided to entrust Qubes with anything serious. And we would like to
somehow minimize these consequences with this canary thing.
Additionally the canary is a nice way of ensuring "freshness" of our
messaging to the community.
Of course the canary doesn't solve all the problems. E.g. if my signing
keys were somehow stolen without our knowledge, it wouldn't help.
Neither it could help in case me being or becoming a miscreant. And
probably it doesn't address many other potential problems, which could
only be solved one day with a multi-signature scheme. But anyway, until
that time, this is the best we can do, I think.
And congrats to Jann for the very interesting clipboard attack (even
though mostly theoretical, still very cool)!
Thanks,
joanna.
--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/SecurityPage
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary
[2] Especially myself, because I'm currently the Root Of Trust for all
Qubes binaries :/
[3] Deterministic builds are required because it's the only way we can
implement multiple signature scheme for distributed binaries.