Create section on verifying digests (QubesOS/qubes-issues#1077)

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Axon 2015-09-22 19:02:04 +00:00
parent 6f90c5ef19
commit dce446596f
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 8CE137352A019A17

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@ -132,6 +132,62 @@ Having problems verifying the ISO images? Make sure you have the corresponding r
[https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/browse\_thread/thread/4bdec1cd19509b38/9f8e219c41e1b232](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/browse_thread/thread/4bdec1cd19509b38/9f8e219c41e1b232)
Verifying Digests
-----------------
Each ISO is accompanied by a plain text file ending in `.DIGESTS`. This file contains the output of running several different crytographic hash functions on the ISO in order to obtain an alphanumeric output known as a "digest." For example, `Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso` is accompanied by `Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso.DIGESTS` which has the following content:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
6f6ff24f2edec3a7607671001e694d8e *Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso
0344e04a98b741c311936f3e2bb67fcebfc2be08 *Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso
1fa056b73d8e2e93acdf3dcaface2515d61335e723d1d7d338241209119c10a3 *Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso
a49ff19c1ad8c51a50198ac51670cf7c71972b437fa59f2e9fc9432cce76f4529f10de1d576ac777cdd49b9325eb2f32347fd13e0f9b04f823a73e84c6ddd772 *Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1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=NVWj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Four digests have been computed for this ISO. The hash functions used, in order from top to bottom, are MD5, SHA1, SHA256, and SHA512. One way to verify that the ISO you downloaded matches any of these is by using `openssl` from the command line:
$ openssl dgst -md5 Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso
MD5(Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso)= 6f6ff24f2edec3a7607671001e694d8e
$ openssl dgst -sha1 Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso
SHA1(Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso)= 0344e04a98b741c311936f3e2bb67fcebfc2be08
$ openssl dgst -sha256 Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso
SHA256(Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso)= 1fa056b73d8e2e93acdf3dcaface2515d61335e723d1d7d338241209119c10a3
$ openssl dgst -sha512 Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso
SHA512(Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso)= a49ff19c1ad8c51a50198ac51670cf7c71972b437fa59f2e9fc9432cce76f4529f10de1d576ac777cdd49b9325eb2f32347fd13e0f9b04f823a73e84c6ddd772
(Notice that the outputs match the values from the `.DIGESTS` file.)
However, it is possible that an attacker replaced `Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso` with a malicious ISO, computed the hash values for that ISO, and replaced the values in `Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso.DIGESTS` with his own set of values. Therefore, ideally, we should also verify the authenticity of the listed hash values. Since `Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso.DIGESTS` is a clearsigned PGP file, we can use `gpg` to verify it from the command line:
$ gpg -v --verify Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso.DIGESTS
gpg: armor header: Hash: SHA256
gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v1
gpg: original file name=''
gpg: Signature made 2015-08-01T22:27:18 UTC using RSA key ID 0A40E458
gpg: using PGP trust model
gpg: Good signature from "Qubes OS Release 2 Signing Key"
gpg: textmode signature, digest algorithm SHA256
The signature is good. Assuming our copy of the `Qubes OS Release 2 Signing Key` is also authentic (see above), we can be confident that these hash values came from the Qubes devs.
Verifying Qubes Code
--------------------