mirror of
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc.git
synced 2025-08-02 11:36:36 -04:00
Merge branch 'master' into nvidia-troubleshooting
This commit is contained in:
Enjeck Cleopatra
GitHub
commit
265d03feb0
24 changed files with 284 additions and 181 deletions
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@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ redirect_from:
|
|||
|
||||
## Introduction
|
||||
|
||||
A DisposableVM (previously known as a "DispVM") in can be based on any TemplateBasedVM.
|
||||
You can also choose to use different DisposableVM Templates for different DisposableVMs.
|
||||
To prepare AppVM to be a DisposableVM Template, you need to set `template_for_dispvms` property, for example:
|
||||
A [DisposableVM](/doc/disposablevm) can be based on any [TemplateBasedVM](/doc/glossary/#templatebasedvm).
|
||||
You can also choose to use different [DisposableVM Templates](/doc/glossary/#disposablevm-template) for different DisposableVMs.
|
||||
To prepare an AppVM to be a DisposableVM Template, you need to set `template_for_dispvms` property, for example:
|
||||
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-prefs fedora-26-dvm template_for_dispvms True
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -9,67 +9,71 @@ redirect_from:
|
|||
- /wiki/CopyToDomZero/
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Copying from (and to) dom0
|
||||
==========================
|
||||
# Copying from (and to) dom0
|
||||
|
||||
Copying **from** dom0
|
||||
---------------------
|
||||
This page covers copying files and clipboard text between [dom0](/doc/glossary/#dom0) and [domUs](/doc/glossary/#domu).
|
||||
Since dom0 is special, the processes are different from [copying and pasting text between qubes](/doc/copy-paste/) and [copying and moving files between qubes](/doc/copying-files/).
|
||||
|
||||
To copy a file from dom0 to a VM (domU), simply use `qvm-copy-to-vm`:
|
||||
## Copying **from** dom0
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
qvm-copy-to-vm <dest-vm> <file>
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
### Copying files from dom0
|
||||
|
||||
The file will arrive in your destination VM in the `~/QubesIncoming/dom0/` directory.
|
||||
To copy a file from dom0 to a VM, simply use `qvm-copy-to-vm`:
|
||||
|
||||
### Copying logs from dom0 ###
|
||||
qvm-copy-to-vm <target_vm> <file>
|
||||
|
||||
The file will arrive in the target VM in the `/home/user/QubesIncoming/dom0/` directory.
|
||||
|
||||
### Copying and pasting clipboard text from dom0
|
||||
|
||||
Use the **Qubes Clipboard** widget:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Copy text to the clipboard normally in dom0 (e.g., by pressing Ctrl+C).
|
||||
|
||||
2. Click the **Qubes Clipboard** icon in the Notification Area.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Click "Copy dom0 clipboard".
|
||||
This displays a notification that text has been copied to the inter-qube clipboard.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Press Ctrl+Shift+V in the target qube.
|
||||
This pastes the inter-qube clipboard contents into the target qube's normal clipboard.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Paste normally within that qube (e.g., by pressing Shift+V).
|
||||
|
||||
Alternatively, you can put your text in a file, then [copy it as a file](#copying-files-from-dom0).
|
||||
Or, you can write the data you wish to copy into `/var/run/qubes/qubes-clipboard.bin`, then `echo -n dom0 > /var/run/qubes/qubes-clipboard.bin.source`.
|
||||
Then use Ctrl+Shift+V to paste the data to the target qube.
|
||||
|
||||
### Copying logs from dom0
|
||||
|
||||
In order to easily copy/paste the contents of logs from dom0 to the inter-VM clipboard, you can simply:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Right-click on the desired VM in the Qubes VM Manager.
|
||||
2. Click "Logs."
|
||||
3. Click on the desired log.
|
||||
4. Click "Copy to Qubes clipboard."
|
||||
1. Right-click on the desired qube in the Qube Manager.
|
||||
|
||||
You may now paste the log contents to any VM as you normally would (i.e., Ctrl-Shift-V, then Ctrl-V).
|
||||
2. Click "Logs."
|
||||
|
||||
### Copy/paste from dom0 ###
|
||||
3. Click on the desired log.
|
||||
|
||||
For data other than logs, there are several options:
|
||||
4. Click "Copy to Qubes clipboard."
|
||||
|
||||
1. Use the **Qubes Clipboard** widget:
|
||||
- Copy text to the clipboard normally in dom0.
|
||||
- Click the **Qubes Clipboard** icon in the Notification Area.
|
||||
- Click "Copy dom0 clipboard".
|
||||
- Receive a notification that text has been copied to the inter-qube clipboard.
|
||||
- Press Ctrl + Shift + V in a qube to paste into the desired qube's clipboard.
|
||||
- Paste normally within that qube.
|
||||
2. Copy it as a file (see above)
|
||||
3. Write the data you wish to copy into `/var/run/qubes/qubes-clipboard.bin`, then `echo -n dom0 > /var/run/qubes/qubes-clipboard.bin.source`.
|
||||
Then use Ctrl-Shift-V to paste the data to the desired VM.
|
||||
You may now paste the log contents in qube as you normally would (e.g., Ctrl+Shift+V, then Ctrl+V).
|
||||
|
||||
Copying **to** dom0
|
||||
-------------------
|
||||
## Copying **to** dom0
|
||||
|
||||
Copying anything into dom0 is not advised, since doing so can compromise the security of your Qubes system.
|
||||
For this reason, there is no simple means of copying anything into dom0, unlike [copying from dom0](#copying-from-dom0) and [copying files between VMs](/doc/copying-files/).
|
||||
For this reason, there is no simple means of copying anything into dom0, unlike [copying from dom0](#copying-from-dom0).
|
||||
|
||||
There should normally be few reasons for the user to want to copy anything from VMs to dom0, as dom0 only acts as a "thin trusted terminal", and no user applications run there.
|
||||
One possible use-case for this is if we want to use a desktop wallpaper in dom0 we have located in one of our AppVMs (e.g. in the 'personal' AppVM where we got the wallpaper from our camera or downloaded it from the Internet).
|
||||
While this use-case is understandable, imagine what would happen if the wallpaper (e.g. a JPEG file) was somehow malformed or malicious and attempted to exploit a hypothetical JPEG parser bug in dom0 code (e.g. in the dom0's Xorg/KDE code that parses the wallpaper and displays it).
|
||||
There should normally be few reasons for the user to want to copy anything from domUs to dom0, as dom0 only acts as a "thin trusted terminal", and no user applications run there.
|
||||
Sometimes, new users feel the urge to copy a desktop wallpaper image into dom0, but that is not necessary.
|
||||
A safer approach is simply to display the image in [full-screen mode](/doc/full-screen-mode/) in an AppVM, then take a screenshot from dom0, which results in exactly the image needed for a wallpaper, created securely and natively in dom0.
|
||||
|
||||
If you are determined to copy some files to dom0 anyway, you can use the following method.
|
||||
(If you want to copy text, first save it into a text file.)
|
||||
Run this command in a dom0 terminal:
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
qvm-run --pass-io <src-vm> 'cat /path/to/file_in_src_domain' > /path/to/file_name_in_dom0
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
qvm-run --pass-io <src-vm> 'cat /path/to/file_in_src_domain' > /path/to/file_name_in_dom0
|
||||
|
||||
Note that you can use the same method to copy files from dom0 to VMs (if, for some reason, you don't want to use `qvm-copy-to-vm`):
|
||||
Note that you can use the same method to copy files from dom0 to domUs (if, for some reason, you don't want to use `qvm-copy-to-vm`):
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
cat /path/to/file_in_dom0 | qvm-run --pass-io <dest-vm> 'cat > /path/to/file_name_in_appvm'
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
cat /path/to/file_in_dom0 | qvm-run --pass-io <dest-vm> 'cat > /path/to/file_name_in_appvm'
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
layout: doc
|
||||
title: Copy and Paste
|
||||
title: Copying and pasting text between qubes
|
||||
permalink: /doc/copy-paste/
|
||||
redirect_from:
|
||||
- /en/doc/copy-paste/
|
||||
|
|
@ -8,51 +8,49 @@ redirect_from:
|
|||
- /wiki/CopyPaste/
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Copy and Paste between domains
|
||||
==============================
|
||||
Copying and pasting text between qubes
|
||||
======================================
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes fully supports secure copy and paste operation between domains.
|
||||
In order to copy a clipboard from domain A to domain B, follow those steps:
|
||||
*This page is about copying and pasting plain text.
|
||||
If you wish to copy more complex data, such as rich text or images, see [copying and moving files between qubes](/doc/copying-files/).
|
||||
For dom0, see [copying from (and to) dom0](/doc/copy-from-dom0/).*
|
||||
|
||||
1. Click on the application window in domain A where you have selected text for copying.
|
||||
Then use the *app-specific* hot-key (or menu option) to copy this into domain's local clipboard (in other words: do the copy operation as usual, in most cases by pressing Ctrl-C).
|
||||
2. Then (when the app in domain A is still in focus) press Ctrl-Shift-C magic hot-key.
|
||||
This will tell Qubes that we want to select this domain's clipboard for *global copy* between domains.
|
||||
3. Now select the destination app, running in domain B, and press Ctrl-Shift-V, another magic hot-key that will tell Qubes to make the clipboard marked in the previous step available to apps running in domain B.
|
||||
This step is necessary because it ensures that only domain B will get access to the clipboard copied from domain A, and not any other domain that might be running in the system.
|
||||
4. Now, in the destination app use the app-specific key combination (usually Ctrl-V) for pasting the clipboard.
|
||||
Qubes OS features a secure inter-qube clipboard that allows you to copy and paste text between qubes.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that the global clipboard will be cleared after step \#3, to prevent accidental leakage to another domain, if the user accidentally pressed Ctrl-Shift-V later.
|
||||
In order to copy text from qube A to qube B:
|
||||
|
||||
This 4-step process might look complex, but after some little practice it really is very easy and fast.
|
||||
At the same time it provides the user with full control over who has access to the clipboard.
|
||||
1. Select text from the source app in qube A, then copy it normally (e.g., by pressing Ctrl+C).
|
||||
|
||||
Note that only simple plain text copy/paste is supported between AppVMs.
|
||||
This is discussed in a bit more detail in [this message](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/57fe6695eb8ec8cd).
|
||||
2. With the source app in qube A still in focus, press Ctrl+Shift+C.
|
||||
This copies the text from qube A's clipboard to the inter-qube clipboard.
|
||||
|
||||
On Copy/Paste Security
|
||||
----------------------
|
||||
3. Select the target app in qube B and press Ctrl+Shift+V.
|
||||
This copies the text from the inter-qube clipboard to qube B's clipboard and clears the inter-qube clipboard, ensuring that only qube B will have access to the copied text.
|
||||
|
||||
The scheme is *secure* because it doesn't allow other VMs to steal the content of the clipboard.
|
||||
However, one should keep in mind that performing a copy and paste operation from *less trusted* to *more trusted* domain can always be potentially insecure, because the data that we insert might potentially try to exploit some hypothetical bug in the destination VM (e.g.
|
||||
the seemingly innocent link that we copy from untrusted domain, might turn out to be, in fact, a large buffer of junk that, when pasted into the destination VM's word processor could exploit a hypothetical bug in the undo buffer).
|
||||
This is a general problem and applies to any data transfer between *less trusted to more trusted* domains.
|
||||
It even applies to copying files between physically separate machines (air-gapped) systems.
|
||||
So, you should always copy clipboard and data only from *more trusted* to *less trusted* domains.
|
||||
4. Paste the text in the target app in qube B normally (e.g., by pressing Ctrl+V).
|
||||
|
||||
See also [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html) for more information on this topic, and some ideas of how we might solve this problem in some future version of Qubes.
|
||||
This process might look complicated at first glance, but in practice it is actually very easy and fast once you get used to it.
|
||||
At the same time, it provides you with full control over exactly which qube receives the content of the inter-qube clipboard every time.
|
||||
|
||||
And [this message](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/48b4b532cee06e01) from qubes-devel.
|
||||
Security
|
||||
--------
|
||||
|
||||
Copy/Paste between dom0 and other domains
|
||||
-----------------------------------------
|
||||
The inter-qube clipboard system is secure because it doesn't allow any qube other than your selected target to steal any contents from the inter-qube clipboard.
|
||||
Without such a system in place, any password you were to copy from the password manager in your vault qube to another qube, for example, would immediately be leaked to every other running qube in the system, including qubes that are untrusted by default, such as `sys-net`.
|
||||
By giving you precise control over exactly which qube receives the inter-qube clipboard content, then immediately wiping the inter-qube clipboard afterward, Qubes OS protects the confidentiality of the text being copied.
|
||||
|
||||
See ["Copying from (and to) dom0"](/doc/copy-from-dom0/).
|
||||
However, one should keep in mind that performing a copy and paste operation from *less trusted* to *more trusted* qube is always potentially insecure, since the data that we copy could exploit some hypothetical bug in the target qube.
|
||||
For example, the seemingly-innocent link that we copy from an untrusted qube could turn out to be a large buffer of junk that, when pasted into the target qube's word processor, could exploit a hypothetical bug in the undo buffer.
|
||||
This is a general problem and applies to any data transfer from *less trusted* to *more trusted* qubes.
|
||||
It even applies to copying files between physically separate (air-gapped) machines.
|
||||
Therefore, you should always copy clipboard data only from *more trusted* to *less trusted* qubes.
|
||||
|
||||
See also [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html) for more information on this topic, and some ideas of how we might solve this problem in some future version of Qubes, as well as [this message](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/48b4b532cee06e01) from qubes-devel.
|
||||
|
||||
Clipboard automatic policy enforcement
|
||||
--------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The Qubes clipboard [RPC policy] is configurable in:
|
||||
The Qubes clipboard [RPC policy](/doc/rpc-policy/) is configurable in:
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.ClipboardPaste
|
||||
|
|
@ -66,7 +64,7 @@ For example, if you are certain that you never wish to paste *into* your "vault"
|
|||
@anyvm @anyvm ask
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Shortcut Configuration
|
||||
Shortcut configuration
|
||||
----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The copy/paste shortcuts are configurable in:
|
||||
|
|
@ -78,7 +76,3 @@ The copy/paste shortcuts are configurable in:
|
|||
If you edit a line in this file, you must uncomment it (by removing the initial `#` character), or else it will have no effect.
|
||||
|
||||
VMs need to be restarted in order for changes in `/etc/qubes/guid.conf` to take effect.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
[RPC policy]: /doc/rpc-policy/
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
layout: doc
|
||||
title: Copying Files between qubes
|
||||
title: Copying and moving files between qubes
|
||||
permalink: /doc/copying-files/
|
||||
redirect_from:
|
||||
- /en/doc/copying-files/
|
||||
|
|
@ -8,31 +8,34 @@ redirect_from:
|
|||
- /wiki/CopyingFiles/
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Copying files and folders between qubes
|
||||
=============================
|
||||
Copying and moving files between qubes
|
||||
======================================
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes also supports secure copying of files and folders between qubes.
|
||||
These instructions refer to file(s) but equally apply to copying folders.
|
||||
*This page is about copying and moving files.
|
||||
If you wish to simply copy and paste text, that can be done more easily using the inter-qube clipboard.
|
||||
See [copying and pasting text between qubes](/doc/copy-paste/).
|
||||
For dom0, see [copying from (and to) dom0](/doc/copy-from-dom0/).*
|
||||
|
||||
In order to copy file(s) from qube A to qube B, follow these steps:
|
||||
Qubes OS supports the secure copying and moving of files and directories (folders) between qubes.
|
||||
|
||||
GUI
|
||||
---
|
||||
For simplicity, these instructions will refer to copying/moving a single file, but they apply equally well to groups of files and directories, which are copied recursively.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Open file manager in the source qube (qube A), choose file(s) that you wish to copy, and right click on the selection, and choose `Copy to another AppVM`
|
||||
1. Open a file manager in the qube containing the file you wish to copy (the source qube), right-click on the file you wish to copy or move, and select `Copy to Other AppVM...` or `Move to Other AppVM...`.
|
||||
|
||||
2. A dialog box will appear asking for the name of the destination qube (qube B).
|
||||
2. A dialog box will appear in dom0 asking for the name of the target qube (qube B).
|
||||
Enter or select the desired destination qube name.
|
||||
|
||||
3. A confirmation dialog box will appear(this will be displayed by Dom0, so none of the qubes can fake your consent).
|
||||
After you click ok, qube B will be started if it is not already running, the file copy operation will start, and the files will be copied into the following folder in qube B:
|
||||
3. If the target qube is not already running, it will be started automatically, and the file will be copied there.
|
||||
It will show up in this directory (which will automatically be created if it does not already exist):
|
||||
|
||||
`/home/user/QubesIncoming/<source>`
|
||||
/home/user/QubesIncoming/<source_qube>/<filename>
|
||||
|
||||
4. You can now move them whenever you like in the qube B filesystem using the file manager there.
|
||||
If you selected **Move** rather than **Copy**, the original file in the source qube will be deleted.
|
||||
(Moving a file is equivalent to copying the file, then deleting the original.)
|
||||
|
||||
4. If you wish, you may now move the file in the target qube to a different directory and delete the `/home/user/QubesIncoming/` directory when no longer needed.
|
||||
|
||||
CLI
|
||||
---
|
||||
The same operations are also available via these command-line tools:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
qvm-copy [--without-progress] file [file]+
|
||||
|
|
@ -42,18 +45,21 @@ qvm-copy [--without-progress] file [file]+
|
|||
qvm-move [--without-progress] file [file]+
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Security
|
||||
--------
|
||||
|
||||
On inter-qube file copy security
|
||||
----------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The scheme is *secure* because it doesn't allow other qubes to steal the files that are being copied, and also doesn't allow the source qube to overwrite arbitrary files on the destination qube.
|
||||
Also, Qubes's file copy scheme doesn't use any sort of virtual block devices for file copy -- instead we use Xen shared memory, which eliminates lots of processing of untrusted data.
|
||||
The inter-qube file copy system is secure because it doesn't allow other qubes to steal the files that are being copied, and it doesn't allow the source qube to overwrite arbitrary files on the destination qube.
|
||||
Moreover, this system doesn't use any sort of virtual block device for file copy.
|
||||
Instead, we use Xen shared memory, which eliminates a lot of processing of untrusted data.
|
||||
For example, the receiving qube is *not* forced to parse untrusted partitions or file systems.
|
||||
In this respect our file copy mechanism provides even more security than file copy between two physically separated (air-gapped) machines!
|
||||
In this respect, the inter-qube file copy system provides even more security than file copy between two physically separated (air-gapped) machines!
|
||||
(See [Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf) for more on this.)
|
||||
|
||||
However, one should keep in mind that performing a data transfer from *less trusted* to *more trusted* qubes can always be potentially insecure, because the data that we insert might potentially try to exploit some hypothetical bug in the destination qube (e.g. a seemingly innocent JPEG that we copy from an untrusted qube might contain a specially crafted exploit for a bug in JPEG parsing application in the destination qube).
|
||||
This is a general problem and applies to any data transfer between *less trusted to more trusted* qubes.
|
||||
However, one should keep in mind that performing a data transfer from *less trusted* to *more trusted* qubes is always potentially insecure if the data will be parsed in the target qube.
|
||||
This is because the data that we copy could try to exploit some hypothetical bug in software running in the target qube.
|
||||
For example, a seemingly-innocent JPEG that we copy from an untrusted qube might contain a specially-crafted exploit for a bug in a JPEG-parsing application in the target qube.
|
||||
This is a general problem and applies to any data transfer from *less trusted* to *more trusted* qubes.
|
||||
It even applies to the scenario of copying files between air-gapped machines.
|
||||
So, you should always copy data only from *more trusted* to *less trusted* qubes.
|
||||
Therefore, you should always copy data only from *more trusted* to *less trusted* qubes.
|
||||
|
||||
See also [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html) for more information on this topic, and some ideas of how we might solve this problem in some future version of Qubes.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -122,7 +122,9 @@ Note that the `qvm-open-in-dvm` process will not exit until you close the applic
|
|||
## Starting an arbitrary program in a DisposableVM from an AppVM ##
|
||||
|
||||
Sometimes it can be useful to start an arbitrary program in a DisposableVM.
|
||||
This can be done from an AppVM by running
|
||||
The DisposableVM will stay running so long as the process which started the DisposableVM has not exited.
|
||||
Some applications, such as GNOME Terminal, do not wait for the application to close before the process exits (details [here](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2581#issuecomment-272664009)).
|
||||
Starting an arbitrary program can be done from an AppVM by running
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
[user@vault ~]$ qvm-run '@dispvm' xterm
|
||||
|
|
@ -134,7 +136,9 @@ The created DisposableVM can be accessed via other tools (such as `qvm-copy-to-v
|
|||
## Starting an arbitrary application in a DisposableVM via command line from dom0 ##
|
||||
|
||||
The Application Launcher has shortcuts for opening a terminal and a web browser in dedicated DisposableVMs, since these are very common tasks.
|
||||
However, it is possible to start an arbitrary application in a DisposableVM directly from dom0 by running:
|
||||
The DisposableVM will stay running so long as the process which started the DisposableVM has not exited.
|
||||
Some applications, such as GNOME Terminal, do not wait for the application to close before the process exits (details [here](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2581#issuecomment-272664009)).
|
||||
It is possible to start an arbitrary application in a DisposableVM directly from dom0 by running:
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
$ qvm-run --dispvm=dvm-template --service qubes.StartApp+xterm
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ redirect_from:
|
|||
|
||||
# Installing and updating software in dom0
|
||||
|
||||
Updating dom0 is one of the main steps in [Updating Qubes OS].
|
||||
Updating [dom0] is one of the main steps in [Updating Qubes OS].
|
||||
It is very important to keep dom0 up-to-date with the latest [security] updates.
|
||||
We also publish dom0 updates for various non-security bug fixes and enhancements to Qubes components.
|
||||
In addition, you may wish to update the kernel, drivers, or libraries in dom0 when [troubleshooting newer hardware].
|
||||
|
|
@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ For example: sys-whonix.
|
|||
Qubes VM Manager -> System -> Global Settings -> UpdateVM -> sys-whonix
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
[dom0]: /doc/glossary/#dom0
|
||||
[Updating Qubes OS]: /doc/updating-qubes-os/
|
||||
[security]: /security/
|
||||
[testing]: /doc/testing/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -25,6 +25,11 @@ To permanently install new software in a TemplateVM:
|
|||
3. Install software as normally instructed inside that operating system (e.g. using `dnf`, or the dedicated GUI application).
|
||||
4. Shut down the TemplateVM.
|
||||
5. Restart all [TemplateBasedVMs] based on the TemplateVM.
|
||||
6. (Optional) In the relevant [TemplateBasedVMs]' **Qube Settings**, go to the **Applications** tab, select the new application(s) from the list, and press OK.
|
||||
These new shortcuts will appear in the Applications Menu.
|
||||
(If you encounter problems, see [here][shortcuts] for troubleshooting.)
|
||||
|
||||
](/attachment/wiki/ManagingAppVmShortcuts/r4.1-dom0-appmenu-select.png)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Updating software in TemplateVMs
|
||||
|
|
@ -105,6 +110,10 @@ sudo dnf config-manager --set-enabled rpmfusion-nonfree-updates
|
|||
sudo dnf upgrade --refresh
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
This will permanently enable the RPM Fusion repos.
|
||||
If you install software from here, it's important to keep these repos enabled so that you can receiving future updates.
|
||||
If you only enable these repos temporarily to install a package the Qubes update mechanism may persistently notify you that updates are available, since it cannot download them.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Reverting changes to a TemplateVM
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -319,4 +328,5 @@ Note that the app will autostart only when the AppVM starts. If you would like t
|
|||
[service framework]: /doc/qubes-service/
|
||||
[How to Reinstall a TemplateVM]: /doc/reinstall-template/
|
||||
[installing contributed packages]: /doc/installing-contributed-packages/
|
||||
[shortcuts]: /doc/managing-appvm-shortcuts/
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -367,6 +367,8 @@ The [Qubes backup system] allows you to do this securely and easily.
|
|||
We urge you to read it! It may very well contain the answers to your questions.
|
||||
(Since the documentation is a community effort, we'd also greatly appreciate your help in [improving] it!)
|
||||
|
||||
* If issues arise during installation, see the [Installation Troubleshooting](/doc/installation-troubleshooting) guide.
|
||||
|
||||
* If you don't find your answer in the documentation, please see [Help, Support, Mailing Lists, and Forum] for places to ask.
|
||||
|
||||
* Please do **not** email individual members of the Qubes team with questions about installation or other problems.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ There are currently three Minimal TemplateVMs corresponding to the standard [Fed
|
|||
3. The Minimal TemplateVMs are intentionally *minimal*.
|
||||
[Do not ask for your favorite package to be added to the minimal template by default.][pref-default]
|
||||
|
||||
4. In order to reduce unnecessary risk, unused repositories have been disabled by default.
|
||||
If you wish to install or update any packages from those repositories, you must enable them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Installation
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -117,11 +117,11 @@ If this doesn't work, please see [How to Remove VMs Manually].
|
|||
|
||||
If the Applications Menu entry doesn't go away after you uninstall a TemplateVM, execute the following type of command in dom0:
|
||||
|
||||
$ rm ~/.local/share/applications/<template-vm-name>
|
||||
$ rm ~/.local/share/applications/<template_vm_name>
|
||||
|
||||
Applications Menu entries for backups of removed VMs can also be found in `/usr/local/share/applications/` of dom0.
|
||||
|
||||
$ rm /usr/local/share/applications/<template-vm-name>
|
||||
$ rm /usr/local/share/applications/<template_vm_name>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Reinstalling
|
||||
|
|
@ -137,24 +137,22 @@ When you install a new template or upgrade a clone of a template, it is recommen
|
|||
|
||||
Applications Menu --> System Tools --> Qubes Global Settings --> Default template
|
||||
|
||||
2. Base AppVMs on the new template.
|
||||
2. If your keyboard or mouse is connected through `sys-usb`, switch `sys-usb` to the new template.
|
||||
(Note that this is a single command to ensure that `sys-usb` restarts.
|
||||
If it does not, you will not be able to use your USB keyboard or mouse.)
|
||||
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-shutdown --wait sys-usb; qvm-prefs sys-usb template <new_template>; qvm-start sys-usb
|
||||
|
||||
3. Base AppVMs on the new template.
|
||||
|
||||
Applications Menu --> System Tools --> Qubes Template Manager
|
||||
|
||||
3. Base the [DisposableVM Template] on the new template.
|
||||
4. Base the [DisposableVM Template] on the new template.
|
||||
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-create -l red -t new-template new-template-dvm
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-prefs new-template-dvm template_for_dispvms True
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-features new-template-dvm appmenus-dispvm 1
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ qubes-prefs default-dispvm new-template-dvm
|
||||
|
||||
4. Updating the template for sys-usb if peripheral devices are dependent upon the VM
|
||||
|
||||
If you are running Qubes on a desktop or other device where the peripheral devices such as keyboard / mouse / trackpad are dependent upon the sys-usb appVM then updating the template is a challenge. In this situation, you can use the following commands in a dom0 terminal window to update the templateVM.
|
||||
|
||||
$ qvm-shutdown --wait sys-usb; qvm-prefs sys-usb template fedora-31; qvm-start sys-usb
|
||||
|
||||
Be careful to run this set of commands as shown above (3 commands in a single line) because if the sys-usb VM does not start back up you may be locked out of your machine.
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-create -l red -t <new_template> <new_template_dvm>
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-prefs <new_template_dvm> template_for_dispvms True
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-features <new_template_dvm> appmenus-dispvm 1
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ qubes-prefs default-dispvm <new_template_dvm>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Advanced
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -119,8 +119,9 @@ FirewallVM
|
|||
FirewallVMs, as defined here, no longer exist in Qubes 4.0 or later (see [here][pr-748] for technical details).*
|
||||
|
||||
Firewall Virtual Machine.
|
||||
A type of [ProxyVM](#proxyvm) that is used to enforce network-level policies (a.k.a. "firewall rules").
|
||||
A type of [ProxyVM](#proxyvm) that is used to enforce network-level policies (a.k.a. "firewall rules").
|
||||
A FirewallVM called `sys-firewall` is created by default in most Qubes installations.
|
||||
Also see [Qubes Firewall](/doc/firewall/).
|
||||
|
||||
DisposableVM
|
||||
------------
|
||||
|
|
@ -191,7 +192,8 @@ This allows for optimal performance on guest operating systems such as Windows.
|
|||
|
||||
Windows Tools
|
||||
-----
|
||||
Qubes Windows Tools are a set of programs and drivers that provide integration of Windows [AppVMs](#appvm) with the rest of the Qubes system.
|
||||
[Qubes Windows Tools](/doc/windows-tools/) (QWT) are a set of programs and drivers that provide integration of Windows [AppVMs](#appvm) with the rest of the Qubes system.
|
||||
Also see [Windows](/doc/windows/).
|
||||
|
||||
QWT
|
||||
----
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ redirect_from:
|
|||
|
||||
# Qubes Split GPG #
|
||||
|
||||
Split GPG implements a concept similar to having a smart card with your private GPG keys, except that the role of the "smart card" plays another Qubes AppVM.
|
||||
This way one, not-so-trusted domain, e.g. the one where Thunderbird is running, can delegate all crypto operations, such as encryption/decryption and signing to another, more trusted, network-isolated, domain.
|
||||
Split GPG implements a concept similar to having a smart card with your private GPG keys, except that the role of the "smart card" is played by another Qubes AppVM.
|
||||
This way one not-so-trusted domain, e.g. the one where Thunderbird is running, can delegate all crypto operations -- such as encryption/decryption and signing -- to another, more trusted, network-isolated domain.
|
||||
This way the compromise of your domain where Thunderbird or another client app is running -- arguably a not-so-unthinkable scenario -- does not allow the attacker to automatically also steal all your keys.
|
||||
(We should make a rather obvious comment here that the so-often-used passphrases on private keys are pretty meaningless because the attacker can easily set up a simple backdoor which would wait until the user enters the passphrase and steal the key then.)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -378,8 +378,8 @@ As always, exercise caution and use your good judgment.)
|
|||
[intro]: #what-is-split-gpg-and-why-should-i-use-it-instead-of-the-standard-gpg
|
||||
[se-pinentry]: https://unix.stackexchange.com/a/379373
|
||||
[subkeys]: https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys
|
||||
[copied]: /doc/copying-files#on-inter-qube-file-copy-security
|
||||
[pasted]: /doc/copy-paste#on-copypaste-security
|
||||
[copied]: /doc/copying-files#security
|
||||
[pasted]: /doc/copy-paste#security
|
||||
[MUA]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mail_user_agent
|
||||
[covert channels]: /doc/data-leaks
|
||||
[trusting-templates]: /doc/templates/#trusting-your-templatevms
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ If a machine can not boot from a bigger USB, it may be too old to run Qubes.
|
|||
Errors will occur if the Qubes installer is corrupted.
|
||||
Ensure that the installer is correct and complete before writing it to a flash drive by [verifying the ISO](/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-verify-qubes-iso-signatures).
|
||||
* **Change the method you used to [write your ISO to a USB key](/doc/installation-guide/#copying-the-iso-onto-the-installation-medium):**
|
||||
Some people use the ``dd`` command (recommended), others use tools like Rufus and balenaEtcher.
|
||||
Some people use the ``dd`` command (recommended), others use tools like Rufus, balenaEtcher or the GNOME Disk Utility.
|
||||
If installation fails after using one tool, try a different one.
|
||||
For example, if you are facing trouble installing Qubes after writing the ISO using Rufus, then try using other tools like balenaEtcher or the ``dd`` command.
|
||||
|
||||
In case the boot partition is not set to "active" after copying the ISO, you can use some other tool like `gparted` on a Linux system to activate it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Boot screen does not appear / system does not detect your installation medium ##
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
layout: doc
|
||||
title: Sony Vaio Tinkering
|
||||
permalink: /doc/sony-vaio-tinkering/
|
||||
redirect_from:
|
||||
- /en/doc/sony-vaio-tinkering/
|
||||
- /doc/SonyVaioTinkering/
|
||||
- /wiki/SonyVaioTinkering/
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Instructions for getting your Sony Vaio Z laptop working with Qubes/Linux
|
||||
=========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
Sony Vaio Z are great laptops -- they are very powerful, yet compact. The newer models, starting from Z12 are, however, not very well supported by Linux kernels (at least 2.6.34 that we currently use in Dom0) and thus some tinkering is needed to get Qubes working on those machines.
|
||||
|
||||
Getting the graphics card working under Linux/Qubes OS
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Newer models of Sony Vaio Z come with an "intelligent" GPU switch, that automatically chooses either Intel Integrated GPU (IGD) or the discrete NVIDIA GPU. This confuses the Linux graphics so much, that in most cases won't even be able to install a regular Linux on such a machine. Unfortunately, moving the switch into the "Stamina" position apparently doesn't work, and the automatic GPU switching is still active.
|
||||
|
||||
One solution that actually worked for me was to reflash the BIOS (I know, I know, this is scary) and to enable the so called "Advanced Menu" in the BIOS. This Advanced Menu allows you to choose the desired behaviour of the GPU switch, which in our case would be to set it to "Static" and then move the mechanical switch to the "Stamina" position, that enabled the Intel IGD (which is much better supported on Linux).
|
||||
|
||||
If you think you are ready to reflash you BIOS, here are the instructions that worked for me:
|
||||
|
||||
[http://forum.notebookreview.com/sony/473226-insyde-hacking-new-vaio-z-advanced-menu-bios.html](http://forum.notebookreview.com/sony/473226-insyde-hacking-new-vaio-z-advanced-menu-bios.html)
|
||||
|
||||
**WARNING**: We take absolutely no responsibility that the BIOS reflashing instructions given at the referenced forum are 1) valid, 2) non-malicious, and 3) work at all. Do this step at your own risk. Keep in mind that reflashing your BIOS might yield your system unusable. If you don't feel like taking this risk (which is a reasonable state of mind), look for a different notebook, or ask Sony Support to enable this option for you.
|
||||
|
||||
In practice I have downloaded the BIOS-patching tools, run them in a VM on a BIOS image I extracted from my laptop, diffed the two versions, and concluded that it doesn't *seem* malicious, and then bravely applied tha patched image. If you don't know what are you doing, just get a different laptop, really!
|
||||
|
||||
On a side note, we should note that allowing anybody to reflash the BIOS is really a bad idea from a security point of view (Hello Evil Maids!). Shame on you, Sony!
|
||||
|
||||
Getting the touchpad working during installation
|
||||
------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
In order to get the touchpad working during installation you should pass the **~~~i8042.nopnp=1~~~** option to the kernel before the installer starts.
|
||||
|
||||
\<screenshot\>
|
||||
|
||||
Applying other fixes
|
||||
--------------------
|
||||
|
||||
There are a few more fixes needed for Sony Vaio Z, and we have prepared a special package that you can install in Dom0 that applies them all. After the installation is complete, open console in Dom0 and do the following:
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
$ sudo bash
|
||||
# qvm-dom0-networking up
|
||||
# yum install qubes-core-dom0-vaio-fixes
|
||||
# reboot
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
This script takes care about the following:
|
||||
|
||||
- Setting i8042.nopnp for your installed system
|
||||
- Adding special option for the sound module (so you can get sound)
|
||||
- Adding pm-suspend scripts that take care about restoring your screen after resume
|
||||
|
||||
... now, having done this all, you will surely feel unprecedented satisfaction and you will love your Vaio very much! ;)
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
layout: doc
|
||||
title: Lenovo ThinkPad Troubleshooting
|
||||
permalink: /doc/thinkpad-troubleshooting/
|
||||
redirect_from:
|
||||
- /doc/thinkpad_x201/
|
||||
- /en/doc/thinkpad_x201/
|
||||
- /doc/Thinkpad_X201/
|
||||
- /wiki/Thinkpad_X201/
|
||||
- /doc/lenovo450-tinkering/
|
||||
- /en/doc/lenovo450-tinkering/
|
||||
- /doc/Lenovo450Tinkering/
|
||||
- /wiki/Lenovo450Tinkering/
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Lenovo ThinkPad Troubleshooting #
|
||||
|
||||
## Instructions to create USB installation medium for newer (UEFI-only) ThinkPads ##
|
||||
Some newer ThinkPads (e.g. T470, T470p, [P51](https://www.svensemmler.org/blog/2017/12/17/qubes-on-thinkpad-p51.html), ThinkPad 25, but not the [P53](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5851)) are likely to fail installation attempts made from a USB stick that was created with dd or Rufus, and even from a DVD burned using official ISO images - if the ThinkPad is configured for UEFI boot. If you don't want to use Legacy Mode as a workaround, the following instructions should help you create a Qubes Installation USB stick that works in UEFI-only mode.
|
||||
|
||||
In a nutshell, you need to use the Fedora livecd-tools to make a Qubes Installation USB Stick from the Qubes ISO image, then update the label on the partition of that USB stick to "BOOT", and then update the BOOT/EFI/BOOTX64.cfg file on the USB stick so that all labels point to BOOT. In more detail:
|
||||
|
||||
1. On your ThinkPad, enter the UEFI setup (press F1 at startup) and make sure to set at least the following options:
|
||||
- *USB UEFI BIOS Support: Enabled*
|
||||
- *UEFI/Legacy Boot: UEFI Only*
|
||||
- *Secure Boot: Disabled*
|
||||
2. On a different computer, create a "Fedora Live USB Stick": Download a current Fedora Live CD image, and put it onto a USB stick (e.g. using dd or Rufus). Start your ThinkPad from the Fedora Live USB Stick on your ThinkPad (Press F12 at startup to select boot device). Of course, you can alternatively start a different machine from the Fedora Live USB Stick, or use an existing Fedora installation. The next steps all occur within Fedora:
|
||||
3. Install livecd-tools: `# dnf install livecd-tools`
|
||||
4. Download the desired Qubes ISO image (or attach a storage device containing it), and verify the signatures as described in the Qubes installation guide. For these instructions, I assume the ISO image is at */run/media/liveuser/qsrc/Qubes-R4.0-rc3-x86_64.iso* (so whenever you see that path going forward in these instructions, replace it with whatever your own path is)
|
||||
5. Within Fedora, attach the USB stick that you would like to turn into your Qubes Installation USB Stick. Use `dmesg` to figure out what the device name of that stick is. For these instructions, I assume it's */dev/sdd* (so whenever you see */dev/sdd* going forward in these instructions, replace it with whatever your actual device name is)
|
||||
6. Make sure your target USB stick (presumed to be /dev/sdd) has no mounted partitions: ``# umount /dev/sdd*`` (the asterisk at the end makes sure to unmount all partitions if more than one exists). If none are mounted you'll get an error that you can ignore.
|
||||
7. Use livecd-tools to copy the image: ``# livecd-iso-to-disk --format --efi /run/media/liveuser/qsrc/Qubes-R4.0-rc3-x86_64.iso /dev/sdd``. **This will erase everything on the drive. Make sure you specify the correct destination.** Then press ENTER when prompted to proceed. This process will take quite a while, be patient.
|
||||
8. When imaging is complete, change the partition label to BOOT: ``# dosfslabel /dev/sdd1 BOOT``
|
||||
9. Now create a mount point and mount the partition:
|
||||
|
||||
``# mkdir /mnt/qinst``
|
||||
|
||||
``# mount /dev/sdd1 /mnt/qinst/``
|
||||
|
||||
10. Use your favorite editor to edit the file */mnt/qinst/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.cfg*: Replace all instances of ``LABEL=Qubes-R4.0-rc3-x86_64`` with ``LABEL=BOOT``. There is typically no space in front of ``LABEL``, but there is a space at the end of the portion you replace.
|
||||
11. Unmount the Qubes Installation USB stick: ``# umount /dev/sdd*`` and disconnect it.
|
||||
|
||||
That's it! You can now reboot the machine with the Qubes USB Installation stick attached, and press F12 to select it as the boot device at startup. Proceed to install Qubes OS normally. Enjoy!
|
||||
|
||||
## ThinkPads with Intel HD 3000 graphics ##
|
||||
|
||||
Several ThinkPad models have Intel HD 3000 graphics, including the T420s and the
|
||||
T520. Some users with these laptops have experienced random reboots, which were
|
||||
solved by adding `i915.enable_rc6=0` as a kernel parameter to
|
||||
`GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX` in the file `/etc/default/grub` in dom0.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Instructions for getting your Lenovo Thinkpad X201 & X200 laptop working with Qubes/Linux ##
|
||||
|
||||
For being able to boot the installer from USB, you have to disable VT-d in the BIOS.
|
||||
Enter the BIOS by hitting F1, go to Config - CPU and then disable VT-d there.
|
||||
|
||||
After the installation, you have to set a startup-parameter for Xen, to be able to activate VT-d again:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Open a terminal in dom0
|
||||
2. Edit `/etc/default/grub`
|
||||
3. Add to the line `GRUB_CMDLINE_XEN_DEFAULT` the setting `iommu=no-igfx`, save and quit
|
||||
4. sudo `grub2-mkconfig --output /boot/grub2/grub.cfg`
|
||||
|
||||
Then reboot, enter BIOS and re-enable VT-d.
|
||||
|
||||
### Getting scrolling with the Trackpoint and the Middle Button to work ###
|
||||
|
||||
1. Create a script with the following content:
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
xinput set-prop "TPPS/2 IBM TrackPoint" "Evdev Wheel Emulation" 1
|
||||
xinput set-prop "TPPS/2 IBM TrackPoint" "Evdev Wheel Emulation Button" 2
|
||||
xinput set-prop "TPPS/2 IBM TrackPoint" "Evdev Wheel Emulation Timeout" 200
|
||||
xinput set-prop "TPPS/2 IBM TrackPoint" "Evdev Wheel Emulation Axes" 6 7 4 5
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
2. Add the script to the startup-items of your desktop environment.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Instructions for getting your Lenovo 450 laptop working with Qubes/Linux ##
|
||||
|
||||
Lenovo 450 uses UEFI, so some settings are needed to get Qubes (or Fedora) to boot, otherwise Qubes install USB stick will reboot right after boot selector screen and not continue install.
|
||||
|
||||
### Setting UEFI options to get Qubes install to boot ###
|
||||
|
||||
1. Enable Legacy USB mode
|
||||
2. Disable all Secure Boot and UEFI options, but leave this enabled: Config / USB / USB UEFI BIOS SUPPORT
|
||||
3. Save settings and reboot
|
||||
5. Install Qubes
|
||||
|
||||
... and now enjoy :) These settings may be needed also in other UEFI computers.
|
||||
|
||||
31
user/troubleshooting/vpn-troubleshooting.md
Normal file
31
user/troubleshooting/vpn-troubleshooting.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
layout: doc
|
||||
title: VPN Troubleshooting
|
||||
permalink: /doc/vpn-troubleshooting/
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# VPN Troubleshooting Guide #
|
||||
|
||||
## Tips
|
||||
|
||||
* If using qubes-vpn, check the VPN service's log in the VPN VM by running:
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
sudo journalctl -u qubes-vpn-handler
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
* Always test your basic VPN connection before adding scripts.
|
||||
|
||||
* Test DNS: Ping a familiar domain name from an appVM. It should print the IP address for the domain.
|
||||
|
||||
* Use `iptables -L -v` and `iptables -L -v -t nat` to check firewall rules. The latter shows the critical PR-QBS chain that enables DNS forwarding.
|
||||
|
||||
## VPN does not reconnect after suspend
|
||||
|
||||
This applies when using OpenVPN.
|
||||
|
||||
After suspend/resume, OpenVPN may not automatically reconnect. In order to get it to work, you must kill the OpenVPN process and restart it.
|
||||
|
||||
## VPN stuck at "Ready to start link"
|
||||
|
||||
After setting up OpenVPN and restarting the VM, you may be repeatedly getting the popup "Ready to start link", but the VPN isn't connected.
|
||||
|
||||
To figure out the root of the problem, check the VPN logs in `/var/logs/syslog`. The log may reveal issues like missing OpenVPN libraries, which you can then install.
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue