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Andrew David Wong 2020-11-20 03:07:12 -08:00
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user/security-in-qubes/split-gpg.md
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# Qubes Split GPG #
Split GPG implements a concept similar to having a smart card with your private GPG keys, except that the role of the "smart card" plays another Qubes AppVM.
This way one, not-so-trusted domain, e.g. the one where Thunderbird is running, can delegate all crypto operations, such as encryption/decryption and signing to another, more trusted, network-isolated, domain.
Split GPG implements a concept similar to having a smart card with your private GPG keys, except that the role of the "smart card" is played by another Qubes AppVM.
This way one not-so-trusted domain, e.g. the one where Thunderbird is running, can delegate all crypto operations -- such as encryption/decryption and signing -- to another, more trusted, network-isolated domain.
This way the compromise of your domain where Thunderbird or another client app is running -- arguably a not-so-unthinkable scenario -- does not allow the attacker to automatically also steal all your keys.
(We should make a rather obvious comment here that the so-often-used passphrases on private keys are pretty meaningless because the attacker can easily set up a simple backdoor which would wait until the user enters the passphrase and steal the key then.)