onionshare/docs/source/locale/zh_CN/LC_MESSAGES/security.po

# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE.
# Copyright (C) Micah Lee, et al.
# This file is distributed under the same license as the OnionShare package.
# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, 2020.
#
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"Project-Id-Version: OnionShare 2.3\n"
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"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-12-13 15:48-0800\n"
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#: ../../source/security.rst:2
msgid "Security Design"
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:4
msgid "Read :ref:`how_it_works` first to get a handle on how OnionShare works."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:6
msgid "Like all software, OnionShare may contain bugs or vulnerabilities."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:9
msgid "What OnionShare protects against"
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:11
msgid ""
"**Third parties don't have access to anything that happens in "
"OnionShare.** Using OnionShare means hosting services directly on your "
"computer. When sharing files with OnionShare, they are not uploaded to "
"any server. If you make an OnionShare chat room, your computer acts as a "
"server for that too. This avoids the traditional model of having to trust"
" the computers of others."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:13
msgid ""
"**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on anything that happens in OnionShare "
"in transit.** The connection between the Tor onion service and Tor "
"Browser is end-to-end encrypted. This means network attackers can't "
"eavesdrop on anything except encrypted Tor traffic. Even if an "
"eavesdropper is a malicious rendezvous node used to connect the Tor "
"Browser with OnionShare's onion service, the traffic is encrypted using "
"the onion service's private key."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:15
msgid ""
"**Anonymity of OnionShare users are protected by Tor.** OnionShare and "
"Tor Browser protect the anonymity of the users. As long as the OnionShare"
" user anonymously communicates the OnionShare address with the Tor "
"Browser users, the Tor Browser users and eavesdroppers can't learn the "
"identity of the OnionShare user."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:17
msgid ""
"**If an attacker learns about the onion service, it still can't access "
"anything.** Prior attacks against the Tor network to enumerate onion "
"services allowed the attacker to discover private .onion addresses. If an"
" attack discovers a private OnionShare address, a password will be "
"prevent them from accessing it (unless the OnionShare user chooses to "
"turn it off and make it public). The password is generated by choosing "
"two random words from a list of 6800 words, making 6800², or about 46 "
"million possible passwords. Only 20 wrong guesses can be made before "
"OnionShare stops the server, preventing brute force attacks against the "
"password."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:20
msgid "What OnionShare doesn't protect against"
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:22
msgid ""
"**Communicating the OnionShare address might not be secure.** "
"Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the responsibility of "
"the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as through an email message"
" monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is "
"being used. If the eavesdropper loads the address in Tor Browser while "
"the service is still up, they can access it. To avoid this, the address "
"must be communicateed securely, via encrypted text message (probably with"
" disappearing messages enabled), encrypted email, or in person. This "
"isn't necessary when using OnionShare for something that isn't secret."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:24
msgid ""
"**Communicating the OnionShare address might not be anonymous.** Extra "
"precautions must be taken to ensure the OnionShare address is "
"communicated anonymously. A new email or chat account, only accessed over"
" Tor, can be used to share the address. This isn't necessary unless "
"anonymity is a goal."
msgstr ""

#~ msgid "Security design"
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "First read :ref:`how_it_works` to understand"
#~ " the basics of how OnionShare works."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Third parties don't have access to "
#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare.** "
#~ "When you use OnionShare, you host "
#~ "services directly on your computer. For"
#~ " example, when you share files with"
#~ " OnionShare, you don't upload these "
#~ "files to any server, and when you"
#~ " start an OnionShare chat room, your"
#~ " computer is the chat room server "
#~ "itself. Traditional ways of sharing "
#~ "files or setting up websites and "
#~ "chat rooms require trusting a service"
#~ " with access to your data."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on "
#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare in"
#~ " transit.** Because connections between Tor"
#~ " onion services and Tor Browser are"
#~ " end-to-end encrypted, no network "
#~ "attackers can eavesdrop on what happens"
#~ " in an OnionShare service. If the "
#~ "eavesdropper is positioned on the "
#~ "OnionShare user's end, the Tor Browser"
#~ " user's end, or is a malicious "
#~ "Tor node, they will only see Tor"
#~ " traffic. If the eavesdropper is a"
#~ " malicious rendezvous node used to "
#~ "connect Tor Browser with OnionShare's "
#~ "onion service, the traffic will be "
#~ "encrypted using the onion service key."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, they still can't access"
#~ " anything.** There have been attacks "
#~ "against the Tor network that can "
#~ "enumerate onion services. Even if "
#~ "someone discovers the .onion address of"
#~ " an OnionShare onion service, they "
#~ "can't access it without also knowing "
#~ "the service's random password (unless, "
#~ "of course, the OnionShare users chooses"
#~ " to disable the password and make "
#~ "it public). The password is generated"
#~ " by choosing two random words from"
#~ " a list of 6800 words, meaning "
#~ "there are 6800^2, or about 46 "
#~ "million possible password. But they can"
#~ " only make 20 wrong guesses before"
#~ " OnionShare stops the server, preventing"
#~ " brute force attacks against the "
#~ "password."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
#~ " not be secure.** The OnionShare user"
#~ " is responsible for securely communicating"
#~ " the OnionShare address with people. "
#~ "If they send it insecurely (such "
#~ "as through an email message, and "
#~ "their email is being monitored by "
#~ "an attacker), the eavesdropper will "
#~ "learn that they're using OnionShare. If"
#~ " the attacker loads the address in"
#~ " Tor Browser before the legitimate "
#~ "recipient gets to it, they can "
#~ "access the service. If this risk "
#~ "fits the user's threat model, they "
#~ "must find a more secure way to "
#~ "communicate the address, such as in "
#~ "an encrypted email, chat, or voice "
#~ "call. This isn't necessary in cases "
#~ "where OnionShare is being used for "
#~ "something that isn't secret."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
#~ " not be anonymous.** While OnionShare "
#~ "and Tor Browser allow for anonymity, "
#~ "if the user wishes to remain "
#~ "anonymous they must take extra steps "
#~ "to ensure this while communicating the"
#~ " OnionShare address. For example, they "
#~ "might need to use Tor to create"
#~ " a new anonymous email or chat "
#~ "account, and only access it over "
#~ "Tor, to use for sharing the "
#~ "address. This isn't necessary in cases"
#~ " where there's no need to protect "
#~ "anonymity, such as co-workers who "
#~ "know each other sharing work documents."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, it still can't access "
#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the "
#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services"
#~ " allowed the attacker to discover "
#~ "private .onion addresses. If an attack"
#~ " discovers a private OnionShare address,"
#~ " a password will be prevent them "
#~ "from accessing it (unless the OnionShare"
#~ " user chooses to turn it off "
#~ "and make it public).. The password "
#~ "is generated by choosing two random "
#~ "words from a list of 6800 words,"
#~ " making 6800^2, or about 46 million"
#~ " possible passwords. Only 20 wrong "
#~ "guesses can be made before OnionShare"
#~ " stops the server, preventing brute "
#~ "force attacks against the password."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
#~ " not be anonymous.** Extra steps must"
#~ " be taken to ensure the OnionShare"
#~ " address is communicated anonymously. A "
#~ "new email or chat account, only "
#~ "accessed over Tor, can be used to"
#~ " share the address. This isn't "
#~ "necessary unless anonymity is a goal."
#~ msgstr ""