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The Most Important Problem to Solve in 2023: Exclusive Orderflow
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<img width="802" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/1130416/217937850-9b7e9434-ee72-4c2a-9e5e-ae9fe795310e.png">
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### tl; dr
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<img width="759" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/1130416/217937850-9b7e9434-ee72-4c2a-9e5e-ae9fe795310e.png">
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<img width="759" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/1130416/217938181-3ea5947c-b847-4f4c-a41c-a40addceed8b.png">
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### rpc-based "payment for order flow protocols" (POFPs)
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---
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### types of private order flows
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#### rpc-based "payment for order flow protocols" (POFPs)
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* this type of private order flows can be realized by modifying either the user's rpc or by modifying the protocol's frontend
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* this type of private order flows can be realized by modifying either the user's rpc or by modifying the protocol's frontend
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* the rpc endpoint re-broadcasts (forwarding) the tx to nodes.
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* the rpc endpoint re-broadcasts (forwarding) the tx to nodes.
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* in respect to every pending tx they receive, they can: 1) censor, 2) forward to some mempool, or 3) forward it directly to some block-builders or validators.
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* in respect to every pending tx they receive, they can: 1) censor, 2) forward to some mempool, or 3) forward it directly to some block-builders or validators.
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---
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#### validator transaction reordering protocols (VTRPs)
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### validator transaction reordering protocols (VTRPs)
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* private tx reordering
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* private tx reordering
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* two goals: 1) identify valuable user txs, 2) replace the POFP's value-extracted tx with its own value-extractive tx
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* two goals: 1) identify valuable user txs, 2) replace the POFP's value-extracted tx with its own value-extractive tx
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---
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---
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### resources
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### stat arbs
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* if CEX is greater than the price on chain (DEX), stat arbs can buy on the DEX and hedge on the CEX -> confident that the DEX price will drift towards the CEX price, but not confident that will happen to the CEX price
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* problem: settlement mismatch -> CEX trades are fast but blockchains aren't -> start arbs are unsure if the trade will land or competitors will beat them
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* from the time between trade submission and receipt of the next block, the trade (their exposure to the assets) is uncertain
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* the greater the uncertainty, the more the profit estimate needs to be marked down
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* while volatility of the token is important, the longer the time period between blocks, the longer tx remains, and the longer it can go without being fully hedged
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* as block time increases, stat arb MEV profit estimates get marked down -> payments made by stat arbers to miners/validators or to users/traders decrease
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* conclusion: the battle between PFOF-style MEV could lead to increase block times for stat arbers, decreasing combined realized MEV
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---
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#### resources
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