From 5afbd3533cf531bb0fff0d5823439423c9ae24c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dr. mia von steinkirch, phd"
 <1130416+mvonsteinkirch@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2023 13:02:44 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] The Most Important Problem to Solve in 2023: Exclusive
 Orderflow

---
 MEV_searchers/private_order_flows/README.md | 39 ++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/MEV_searchers/private_order_flows/README.md b/MEV_searchers/private_order_flows/README.md
index dcf4b25..915a304 100644
--- a/MEV_searchers/private_order_flows/README.md
+++ b/MEV_searchers/private_order_flows/README.md
@@ -2,27 +2,36 @@
 
 <br>
 
-<img width="802" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/1130416/217937850-9b7e9434-ee72-4c2a-9e5e-ae9fe795310e.png">
+### tl; dr
 
+<br>
+
+<img width="759" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/1130416/217937850-9b7e9434-ee72-4c2a-9e5e-ae9fe795310e.png">
+
+<br>
+
+<img width="759"  src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/1130416/217938181-3ea5947c-b847-4f4c-a41c-a40addceed8b.png">
 
 
 <br>
 
-### rpc-based "payment for order flow protocols" (POFPs)
+---
+
+### types of private order flows
 
 <br>
 
+#### rpc-based "payment for order flow protocols" (POFPs)
+
 * this type of private order flows can be realized by modifying either the user's rpc or by modifying the protocol's frontend
 * the rpc endpoint re-broadcasts (forwarding) the tx to nodes. 
 * in respect to every pending tx they receive, they can: 1) censor, 2) forward to some mempool, or 3) forward it directly to some block-builders or validators.
 
 <br>
 
---- 
+#### validator transaction reordering protocols (VTRPs)
 
-### validator transaction reordering protocols (VTRPs)
 
-<br>
 
 * private tx reordering
 * two goals: 1) identify valuable user txs, 2) replace the POFP's value-extracted tx with its own value-extractive tx
@@ -32,25 +41,7 @@
 
 ---
 
-
-
-### stat arbs
-
-<br>
-
-* if CEX is greater than the price on chain (DEX), stat arbs can buy on the DEX and hedge on the CEX -> confident that the DEX price will drift towards the CEX price, but not confident that will happen to the CEX price
-* problem: settlement mismatch -> CEX trades are fast but blockchains aren't -> start arbs are unsure if the trade will land or competitors will beat them
-* from the time between trade submission and receipt of the next block, the trade (their exposure to the assets) is uncertain 
-* the greater the uncertainty, the more the profit estimate needs to be marked down
-* while volatility of the token is important, the longer the time period between blocks, the longer tx remains, and the longer it can go without being fully hedged
-* as block time increases, stat arb MEV profit estimates get marked down -> payments made by stat arbers to miners/validators or to users/traders decrease
-* conclusion: the battle between PFOF-style MEV could lead to increase block times for stat arbers, decreasing combined realized MEV
-
-<br>
-
----
-
-#### resources
+### resources
 
 <br>