* Fix#6593 - force close any modal dialogs associated with a database widget that is being locked.
* Partial fix for #721 but doesn't address the problem of needing to save a modified entry or database while locking.
* Also improves import dialog behavior if databases(s) lock while it is visible.
* Fix#10653 - prevent category switching if no category was actually hidden/visible. Also properly select a new category when a change is made instead of just changing the widget page.
* Fix apply button still being enabled after it is pressed and successfully committed
* Set default value of DatabasePasswordMinimumQuality to 3 (do not accept a master password that is less than Good)
* Add custom message box button "Continue with weak password"
* Fixes#10400
- Support TOTP entries with bare secrets instead of otpauth urls for Bitwarden. Vice-versa for 1PUX.
- Support Bitwarden Argon2id encryption scheme
* Fixes#10380 - Support Bitwarden organization collections
This issue previously caused parent databases to be marked as modified on unlock. This was because of the new protections against byte-by-byte side channel attacks adds a randomized string to the database custom data. We should never be merging database custom data with keeshare or imports since we are merging groups only.
Also prevent overwrite of auto-generated custom data fields, Last Modified and Random Slug.
* Restrict access to changing DACL's after the process is started. This prevents the creator of the keepassxc.exe process from simply adding the permission to read memory back to the DACL list.
* Verified using System Informer.
* Avoids using QDialog which breaks the standalone password generator
Revert "Fix password dialog close button"
This reverts commit 5b47190fcc4b2f51fb11849cef7f53346e8fe439.
* Fixes#10455
* Fixes#10432
* Fixes#10415
Prevent setting critical key components to nullptr when database data is cleared. This can result in a crash due to race condition between threads.
Added a bunch of asserts to detect this problem and if guards to prevent actual crashes.
Fixes#6190
Remove the advanced settings checkbox and replace with a dedicated tab widget interface to toggle between basic and advanced encryption settings.
Add a new propery autosaveDelay in Metadata of the db.
The property is saved in customData to not affect database structure as this setting is unique to keepasxc.
The propery sets delay to wait since last modification before saving.
Co-authored-by: jNullj <jNullj@users.noreply.github.com>
* This removes the application setting to require typing the password in again even though it is visible.
* Removed automatic password repeat when the password is made visible on changing.
* Implemented database file hidden attribute preservation on Windows
Implemented database file hidden attribute preservation on Windows by modifying the save function to check the hidden attribute of the original database before saving and then reapply it post-saving if running on Windows so that users can easily store their database in a hidden file without having to re-hide it every time it's modified.
Updated the TestDatabase::testSaveAs() unit test to first verify after the initial save that the database file is not hidden before hiding it then saving again and verifying that it is now hidden.
Signed-off-by: Drwsburah <Drwsburah@yahoo.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonathan White <support@dmapps.us>
Attack - KeeShare attachments can be inferred because of attachment de-duplication.
Solution - Prevent de-duplication of normal database entry attachments with those entry attachments synchronized/associated with a KeeShare database. This is done using the KeeShare database UUID injected into the hash calculation of the attachment prior to de-dupe. The attachments themselves are not modified in any way.
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Attack - Side channel byte-by-byte inference due to compression de-duplication of data between a KeeShare database and it's parent.
Solution - Generate a random array between 64 and 512 bytes, convert to hex, and store in the database custom data.
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Attack vector assumptions:
1. Compression is enabled
2. The attacker has access to a KeeShare database actively syncing with the victim's database
3. The victim's database is unlocked and syncing
4. The attacker can see the exact size of the victim's database after saving, and syncing, the KeeShare database
Thank you to Andrés Fábrega from Cornell University for theorizing and informing us of this attack vector.
