Qubes-Community-Content/docs/common-tasks/copying-files-to-dom0.md
2018-04-04 16:56:25 +03:00

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Copying files to dom0
=====================
**!! Note: copying untrusted content (or trusted content from an untrusted VM) compromises the whole Qubes OS security model !!**
Technically, the output of a file in a VM (generated by a `qvm-run --pass-io ...` command) is redirected into a file in dom0:
~~~
qvm-run --pass-io vm-name "cat /path/to/file/in/vm" > "/path/to/file/in/dom0"
~~~
or with a pipe into `dd`, with the `conv=sparse` option to recreate a sparse file in dom0:
~~~
qvm-run --pass-io vm-name "cat /path/to/file/in/vm" | dd conv=sparse of=/path/to/file/in/dom0
~~~
Note that in this case the **whole** file is read by `cat` so the operation will take some time to complete for large files. Alternatively, one could pipe the output of `tar -Scf - large_file` into `tar` in dom0, but this is not recommended since an attacker could use potential vulnerabilities in `tar` to compromise dom0.
Script to automate copying:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
# qvm-copy-to-dom0
# Copy a file from an AppVM to dom0
# qvm-copy-to-dom0 appVM srcPath [ dst ]
AppVM=$1 # mandatory
Source=$2 # mandatory
Destination=$3 # optional (will use ~/QubesIncoming/AppVM/ folder if null)
if [ -z "$Destination" ]; then
Destination="$HOME/QubesIncoming/$AppVM/$(basename "$Source")"
mkdir -p "$HOME/QubesIncoming/$AppVM"
fi
if [ -e "$Destination" ]; then
echo "'$Destination' exists; aborting" >&2
exit 1
fi
qvm-run --pass-io $AppVM "cat $Source" > "$Destination"
~~~