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https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build.git
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55 lines
2.1 KiB
Diff
55 lines
2.1 KiB
Diff
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From bf911e985d6bbaa328c20c3e05f4eb03de11fdd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2016 14:27:39 -0200
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Subject: [PATCH] sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it
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Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab
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beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the
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blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len
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only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the
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2nd and subsequent ones.
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The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the
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1st chunk.
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Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
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Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
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Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
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Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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---
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net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 12 ++++++------
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
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index 026e3bca4a94b..8ec20a64a3f80 100644
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--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
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+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
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@@ -3422,6 +3422,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
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return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
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commands);
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+ /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
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+ ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
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+ if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
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+ return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
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+ commands);
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+
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/* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header,
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* do things that are type appropriate.
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*/
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@@ -3453,12 +3459,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
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}
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}
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- /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
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- ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
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- if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
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- return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
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- commands);
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-
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ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
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} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
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