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Add patches for many Linux CVEs, and overhaul script paths

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Tad 2017-10-29 01:48:53 -04:00
parent 8c8dc284c9
commit 75099b9404
801 changed files with 123220 additions and 16 deletions
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34
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2012-6657/0.patch Normal file
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From 3e10986d1d698140747fcfc2761ec9cb64c1d582 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 07:00:11 +0000
Subject: net: guard tcp_set_keepalive() to tcp sockets
Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in
tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer()
Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/sock.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 3057920..a6000fb 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -691,7 +691,8 @@ set_rcvbuf:
case SO_KEEPALIVE:
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
- if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP)
+ if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
+ sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
tcp_set_keepalive(sk, valbool);
#endif
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_KEEPOPEN, valbool);
--
cgit v1.1

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Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2012-6689/0.patch Normal file
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From 20e1db19db5d6b9e4e83021595eab0dc8f107bef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2012 02:09:11 +0000
Subject: netlink: fix possible spoofing from non-root processes
Non-root user-space processes can send Netlink messages to other
processes that are well-known for being subscribed to Netlink
asynchronous notifications. This allows ilegitimate non-root
process to send forged messages to Netlink subscribers.
The userspace process usually verifies the legitimate origin in
two ways:
a) Socket credentials. If UID != 0, then the message comes from
some ilegitimate process and the message needs to be dropped.
b) Netlink portID. In general, portID == 0 means that the origin
of the messages comes from the kernel. Thus, discarding any
message not coming from the kernel.
However, ctnetlink sets the portID in event messages that has
been triggered by some user-space process, eg. conntrack utility.
So other processes subscribed to ctnetlink events, eg. conntrackd,
know that the event was triggered by some user-space action.
Neither of the two ways to discard ilegitimate messages coming
from non-root processes can help for ctnetlink.
This patch adds capability validation in case that dst_pid is set
in netlink_sendmsg(). This approach is aggressive since existing
applications using any Netlink bus to deliver messages between
two user-space processes will break. Note that the exception is
NETLINK_USERSOCK, since it is reserved for netlink-to-netlink
userspace communication.
Still, if anyone wants that his Netlink bus allows netlink-to-netlink
userspace, then they can set NL_NONROOT_SEND. However, by default,
I don't think it makes sense to allow to use NETLINK_ROUTE to
communicate two processes that are sending no matter what information
that is not related to link/neighbouring/routing. They should be using
NETLINK_USERSOCK instead for that.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 1445d73..5270238 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1373,7 +1373,8 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
dst_pid = addr->nl_pid;
dst_group = ffs(addr->nl_groups);
err = -EPERM;
- if (dst_group && !netlink_capable(sock, NL_NONROOT_SEND))
+ if ((dst_group || dst_pid) &&
+ !netlink_capable(sock, NL_NONROOT_SEND))
goto out;
} else {
dst_pid = nlk->dst_pid;
@@ -2147,6 +2148,7 @@ static void __init netlink_add_usersock_entry(void)
rcu_assign_pointer(nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].listeners, listeners);
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].module = THIS_MODULE;
nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].registered = 1;
+ nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].nl_nonroot = NL_NONROOT_SEND;
netlink_table_ungrab();
}
--
cgit v1.1

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Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2012-6701/0.patch Normal file
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From a70b52ec1aaeaf60f4739edb1b422827cb6f3893 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Mon, 21 May 2012 16:06:20 -0700
Subject: vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify_area() area helpers
We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.
Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.
This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.
Reported-by: Manish Honap <manish_honap_vit@yahoo.co.in>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/aio.c | 30 ++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 67a6db3..e7f2fad 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -1456,6 +1456,10 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_vectored_rw(int type, struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
+ ret = rw_verify_area(type, kiocb->ki_filp, &kiocb->ki_pos, ret);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
kiocb->ki_nr_segs = kiocb->ki_nbytes;
kiocb->ki_cur_seg = 0;
/* ki_nbytes/left now reflect bytes instead of segs */
@@ -1467,11 +1471,17 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(struct kiocb *kiocb)
+static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(int type, struct file * file, struct kiocb *kiocb)
{
+ int bytes;
+
+ bytes = rw_verify_area(type, file, &kiocb->ki_pos, kiocb->ki_left);
+ if (bytes < 0)
+ return bytes;
+
kiocb->ki_iovec = &kiocb->ki_inline_vec;
kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_base = kiocb->ki_buf;
- kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_len = kiocb->ki_left;
+ kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_len = bytes;
kiocb->ki_nr_segs = 1;
kiocb->ki_cur_seg = 0;
return 0;
@@ -1496,10 +1506,7 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_left)))
break;
- ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_READ);
- if (unlikely(ret))
- break;
- ret = aio_setup_single_vector(kiocb);
+ ret = aio_setup_single_vector(READ, file, kiocb);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -1514,10 +1521,7 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_left)))
break;
- ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE);
- if (unlikely(ret))
- break;
- ret = aio_setup_single_vector(kiocb);
+ ret = aio_setup_single_vector(WRITE, file, kiocb);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -1528,9 +1532,6 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)))
break;
- ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_READ);
- if (unlikely(ret))
- break;
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(READ, kiocb, compat);
if (ret)
break;
@@ -1542,9 +1543,6 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
break;
- ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE);
- if (unlikely(ret))
- break;
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(WRITE, kiocb, compat);
if (ret)
break;
--
cgit v1.1

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Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2012-6703/0.patch Normal file
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From b35cc8225845112a616e3a2266d2fde5ab13d3ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2012 15:32:18 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in
snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/core/compress_offload.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/core/compress_offload.c b/sound/core/compress_offload.c
index eb60cb8dbb8a6..68fe02c7400a2 100644
--- a/sound/core/compress_offload.c
+++ b/sound/core/compress_offload.c
@@ -407,6 +407,10 @@ static int snd_compr_allocate_buffer(struct snd_compr_stream *stream,
unsigned int buffer_size;
void *buffer;
+ if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
+ params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
buffer_size = params->buffer.fragment_size * params->buffer.fragments;
if (stream->ops->copy) {
buffer = NULL;

31
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2012-6703/1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 81ce573830e9d5531531b3ec778c58e6b9167bcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2012 15:32:18 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in
snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/core/compress_offload.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/core/compress_offload.c b/sound/core/compress_offload.c
index eb60cb8dbb8a6..68fe02c7400a2 100644
--- a/sound/core/compress_offload.c
+++ b/sound/core/compress_offload.c
@@ -407,6 +407,10 @@ static int snd_compr_allocate_buffer(struct snd_compr_stream *stream,
unsigned int buffer_size;
void *buffer;
+ if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
+ params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
buffer_size = params->buffer.fragment_size * params->buffer.fragments;
if (stream->ops->copy) {
buffer = NULL;

66
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2012-6703/2.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
From 4dc040a0b34890d2adc0d63da6e9bfb4eb791b19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2012 11:51:25 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: compress - move the buffer check
Commit ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
added a new error check for input params.
this add new routine for input checks and moves buffer overflow check to this
new routine. This allows the error value to be propogated to user space
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/core/compress_offload.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/compress_offload.c b/sound/core/compress_offload.c
index 68fe02c7400a2..bd7f28e892540 100644
--- a/sound/core/compress_offload.c
+++ b/sound/core/compress_offload.c
@@ -407,10 +407,6 @@ static int snd_compr_allocate_buffer(struct snd_compr_stream *stream,
unsigned int buffer_size;
void *buffer;
- if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
- params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
- return -EINVAL;
-
buffer_size = params->buffer.fragment_size * params->buffer.fragments;
if (stream->ops->copy) {
buffer = NULL;
@@ -429,6 +425,16 @@ static int snd_compr_allocate_buffer(struct snd_compr_stream *stream,
return 0;
}
+static int snd_compress_check_input(struct snd_compr_params *params)
+{
+ /* first let's check the buffer parameter's */
+ if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
+ params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int
snd_compr_set_params(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, unsigned long arg)
{
@@ -447,11 +453,17 @@ snd_compr_set_params(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, unsigned long arg)
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
+
+ retval = snd_compress_check_input(params);
+ if (retval)
+ goto out;
+
retval = snd_compr_allocate_buffer(stream, params);
if (retval) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
+
retval = stream->ops->set_params(stream, params);
if (retval)
goto out;

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From 82981930125abfd39d7c8378a9cfdf5e1be2002b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2012 20:07:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] net: cleanups in sock_setsockopt()
Use min_t()/max_t() macros, reformat two comments, use !!test_bit() to
match !!sock_flag()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/sock.c | 42 +++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 0431aaf7473a2..10605d2ec8606 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -577,23 +577,15 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
break;
case SO_SNDBUF:
/* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think
- about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
- play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
- are treated in BSD as hints */
-
- if (val > sysctl_wmem_max)
- val = sysctl_wmem_max;
+ * about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
+ * play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
+ * are treated in BSD as hints
+ */
+ val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_wmem_max);
set_sndbuf:
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_SNDBUF_LOCK;
- if ((val * 2) < SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF)
- sk->sk_sndbuf = SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF;
- else
- sk->sk_sndbuf = val * 2;
-
- /*
- * Wake up sending tasks if we
- * upped the value.
- */
+ sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);
+ /* Wake up sending tasks if we upped the value. */
sk->sk_write_space(sk);
break;
@@ -606,12 +598,11 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
case SO_RCVBUF:
/* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think
- about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
- play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
- are treated in BSD as hints */
-
- if (val > sysctl_rmem_max)
- val = sysctl_rmem_max;
+ * about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
+ * play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
+ * are treated in BSD as hints
+ */
+ val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_rmem_max);
set_rcvbuf:
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK;
/*
@@ -629,10 +620,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
* returning the value we actually used in getsockopt
* is the most desirable behavior.
*/
- if ((val * 2) < SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF)
- sk->sk_rcvbuf = SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF;
- else
- sk->sk_rcvbuf = val * 2;
+ sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);
break;
case SO_RCVBUFFORCE:
@@ -975,7 +963,7 @@ int sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
break;
case SO_PASSCRED:
- v.val = test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ? 1 : 0;
+ v.val = !!test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags);
break;
case SO_PEERCRED:
@@ -1010,7 +998,7 @@ int sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
break;
case SO_PASSSEC:
- v.val = test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags) ? 1 : 0;
+ v.val = !!test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
break;
case SO_PEERSEC:

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From 016a3592cc34fa349235b5a8b48af5cece2cbfeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 27 Dec 2012 01:42:50 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with
orphan list
commit 0e9a9a1ad619e7e987815d20262d36a2f95717ca upstream.
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
-js: This is a fix for CVE-2013-2015.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ext4/namei.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c
index 9fb3fae4898a..54ad9a54cd89 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -2054,7 +2054,8 @@ int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
int err = 0;
/* ext4_handle_valid() assumes a valid handle_t pointer */
- if (handle && !ext4_handle_valid(handle))
+ if (handle && !ext4_handle_valid(handle) &&
+ !(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_mount_state & EXT4_ORPHAN_FS))
return 0;
mutex_lock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);

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@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
From a5a6cf8c405e826ff7ed1308dde72560c0ed4854 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: willy tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 07:54:56 +0100
Subject: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
commit 712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593 upstream.
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.
This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[carnil: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
net/unix/af_unix.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
net/unix/garbage.c | 14 ++++++++++----
3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 9b9ac29..2bffa8a 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -709,6 +709,7 @@ struct user_struct {
unsigned long mq_bytes; /* How many bytes can be allocated to mqueue? */
#endif
unsigned long locked_shm; /* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */
+ unsigned long unix_inflight; /* How many files in flight in unix sockets */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct key *uid_keyring; /* UID specific keyring */
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 6cb363d..6798b3c 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1472,6 +1472,21 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
sock_wfree(skb);
}
+/*
+ * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
+ * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
+ * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
+ * it across threads. Tough.
+ */
+static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ struct user_struct *user = current_user();
+
+ if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
+ return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ return false;
+}
+
#define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4
static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1480,6 +1495,9 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
unsigned char max_level = 0;
int unix_sock_count = 0;
+ if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
+ return -ETOOMANYREFS;
+
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
@@ -1501,10 +1519,8 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (unix_sock_count) {
- for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
- }
+ for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index 00d3e56..fd1a840 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -125,9 +125,11 @@ struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
+
+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
@@ -135,22 +137,26 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
+ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
+
+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
list_del_init(&u->link);
unix_tot_inflight--;
- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
+ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *),
--
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From 5ea820046ee399214221c0bb817eb35d304c9604 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 02:11:03 +0100
Subject: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 upstream.
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 4 ++--
include/net/scm.h | 1 +
net/core/scm.c | 7 +++++++
net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 ++--
net/unix/garbage.c | 8 ++++----
5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index f4842f7..a69bfee 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
-extern void unix_inflight(struct file *fp);
-extern void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp);
+extern void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
+extern void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
extern void unix_gc(void);
extern void wait_for_unix_gc(void);
extern struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp);
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 5da0a7b..9822a68 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list {
struct list_head list;
short count;
short max;
+ struct user_struct *user;
struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
};
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 51b4d52..9adabed 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
*fplp = fpl;
fpl->count = 0;
fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
+ fpl->user = NULL;
}
fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
@@ -100,6 +101,10 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
*fpp++ = file;
fpl->count++;
}
+
+ if (!fpl->user)
+ fpl->user = get_uid(current_user());
+
return num;
}
@@ -124,6 +129,7 @@ void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
list_del(&fpl->list);
for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+ free_uid(fpl->user);
kfree(fpl);
}
@@ -342,6 +348,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
+ new_fpl->user = get_uid(fpl->user);
}
return new_fpl;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 6798b3c..390e079 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
}
static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1520,7 +1520,7 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index fd1a840..33a21260 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
* descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
*/
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
@@ -138,11 +138,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
}
- fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
+ user->unix_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
list_del_init(&u->link);
unix_tot_inflight--;
}
- fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
+ user->unix_inflight--;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
--
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From 712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: willy tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 07:54:56 +0100
Subject: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.
This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
net/unix/af_unix.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
net/unix/garbage.c | 13 ++++++++-----
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index edad7a4..fbf25f1 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -830,6 +830,7 @@ struct user_struct {
unsigned long mq_bytes; /* How many bytes can be allocated to mqueue? */
#endif
unsigned long locked_shm; /* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */
+ unsigned long unix_inflight; /* How many files in flight in unix sockets */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct key *uid_keyring; /* UID specific keyring */
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index ef05cd9..e3f85bc 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1513,6 +1513,21 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
sock_wfree(skb);
}
+/*
+ * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
+ * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
+ * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
+ * it across threads. Tough.
+ */
+static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ struct user_struct *user = current_user();
+
+ if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
+ return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ return false;
+}
+
#define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4
static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1521,6 +1536,9 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
unsigned char max_level = 0;
int unix_sock_count = 0;
+ if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
+ return -ETOOMANYREFS;
+
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
@@ -1542,10 +1560,8 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (unix_sock_count) {
- for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
- }
+ for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index a73a226..8fcdc22 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -120,11 +120,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
-
if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
@@ -132,25 +132,28 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
+ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
list_del_init(&u->link);
unix_tot_inflight--;
- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
+ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *),
--
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From 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 02:11:03 +0100
Subject: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 4 ++--
include/net/scm.h | 1 +
net/core/scm.c | 7 +++++++
net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 ++--
net/unix/garbage.c | 8 ++++----
5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index 2a91a05..9b4c418 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp);
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp);
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
void unix_gc(void);
void wait_for_unix_gc(void);
struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp);
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 262532d..59fa93c 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct scm_creds {
struct scm_fp_list {
short count;
short max;
+ struct user_struct *user;
struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
};
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 14596fb..2696aef 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
*fplp = fpl;
fpl->count = 0;
fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
+ fpl->user = NULL;
}
fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
@@ -107,6 +108,10 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
*fpp++ = file;
fpl->count++;
}
+
+ if (!fpl->user)
+ fpl->user = get_uid(current_user());
+
return num;
}
@@ -119,6 +124,7 @@ void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
scm->fp = NULL;
for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+ free_uid(fpl->user);
kfree(fpl);
}
}
@@ -336,6 +342,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
+ new_fpl->user = get_uid(fpl->user);
}
return new_fpl;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 49d5093..29be035 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
}
static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index 8fcdc22..6a0d485 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
* descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
*/
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
@@ -133,11 +133,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
}
- fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
+ user->unix_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
list_del_init(&u->link);
unix_tot_inflight--;
}
- fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
+ user->unix_inflight--;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
--
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From 4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Date: Sat, 3 May 2014 14:04:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/n_tty.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/n_tty.c b/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
index 41fe8a047d373..fe9d129c87351 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
@@ -2353,8 +2353,12 @@ static ssize_t n_tty_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
if (tty->ops->flush_chars)
tty->ops->flush_chars(tty);
} else {
+ struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
+
while (nr > 0) {
+ mutex_lock(&ldata->output_lock);
c = tty->ops->write(tty, b, nr);
+ mutex_unlock(&ldata->output_lock);
if (c < 0) {
retval = c;
goto break_out;

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@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
From 1e5099713cefc67aa562f6d8fe43444f41baf52d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Date: Sat, 3 May 2014 14:04:59 +0200
Subject: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
commit 4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00 upstream.
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: output_lock is a member of struct tty_struct]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/tty/n_tty.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/n_tty.c b/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
index 0f8a785..bac83d8 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
@@ -1997,7 +1997,9 @@ static ssize_t n_tty_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
tty->ops->flush_chars(tty);
} else {
while (nr > 0) {
+ mutex_lock(&tty->output_lock);
c = tty->ops->write(tty, b, nr);
+ mutex_unlock(&tty->output_lock);
if (c < 0) {
retval = c;
goto break_out;
--
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From 9aabfc9e7775abbbcf534cdecccc4f12ee423b27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 14:36:46 -0700
Subject: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I9e235db6ec2bb950f26bd8a23f6145dab5dc0a15
Git-commit: 4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Avijit Kanti Das <avijitnsec@codeaurora.org>
[rsiddoji@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar S <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/tty/n_tty.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/n_tty.c b/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
index 8eb5573..54c46c8 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/n_tty.c
@@ -1998,8 +1998,11 @@ static ssize_t n_tty_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
if (tty->ops->flush_chars)
tty->ops->flush_chars(tty);
} else {
+
while (nr > 0) {
+ mutex_lock(&tty->output_lock);
c = tty->ops->write(tty, b, nr);
+ mutex_unlock(&tty->output_lock);
if (c < 0) {
retval = c;
goto break_out;
--
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From d36db46c2cba973557eb6138d22210c4e0cf17d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 13:32:51 -0400
Subject: aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in
v3.10
commit edfbbf388f293d70bf4b7c0bc38774d05e6f711a upstream.
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
[jmoyer@redhat.com: backported to 3.10]
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/aio.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 8d2c997..ded94c4 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -717,6 +717,8 @@ static long aio_read_events_ring(struct kioctx *ctx,
if (head == ctx->tail)
goto out;
+ head %= ctx->nr_events;
+
while (ret < nr) {
long avail;
struct io_event *ev;
--
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From e6a623460e5fc960ac3ee9f946d3106233fd28d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Salva=20Peir=C3=B3?= <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 19:48:02 +0200
Subject: [media] media-device: fix infoleak in ioctl media_enum_entities()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This fixes CVE-2014-1739.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
---
drivers/media/media-device.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/media-device.c b/drivers/media/media-device.c
index d5a7a13..703560f 100644
--- a/drivers/media/media-device.c
+++ b/drivers/media/media-device.c
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static long media_device_enum_entities(struct media_device *mdev,
struct media_entity *ent;
struct media_entity_desc u_ent;
+ memset(&u_ent, 0, sizeof(u_ent));
if (copy_from_user(&u_ent.id, &uent->id, sizeof(u_ent.id)))
return -EFAULT;
--
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From b22f5126a24b3b2f15448c3f2a254fc10cbc2b92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:57:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: nf_conntrack_dccp: fix skb_header_pointer API
usages
Some occurences in the netfilter tree use skb_header_pointer() in
the following way ...
struct dccp_hdr _dh, *dh;
...
skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
... where dh itself is a pointer that is being passed as the copy
buffer. Instead, we need to use &_dh as the forth argument so that
we're copying the data into an actual buffer that sits on the stack.
Currently, we probably could overwrite memory on the stack (e.g.
with a possibly mal-formed DCCP packet), but unintentionally, as
we only want the buffer to be placed into _dh variable.
Fixes: 2bc780499aa3 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add DCCP protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_dccp.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_dccp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_dccp.c
index 38412684a8824..cb372f96f10dc 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_dccp.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_dccp.c
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static bool dccp_new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb,
const char *msg;
u_int8_t state;
- dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh);
BUG_ON(dh == NULL);
state = dccp_state_table[CT_DCCP_ROLE_CLIENT][dh->dccph_type][CT_DCCP_NONE];
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static int dccp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb,
u_int8_t type, old_state, new_state;
enum ct_dccp_roles role;
- dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh);
BUG_ON(dh == NULL);
type = dh->dccph_type;
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static int dccp_error(struct net *net, struct nf_conn *tmpl,
unsigned int cscov;
const char *msg;
- dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh);
if (dh == NULL) {
msg = "nf_ct_dccp: short packet ";
goto out_invalid;

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From 5b866eaa34e4ddc312c927030fde5f6a6184ddc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:57:54 +0100
Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack_dccp: fix skb_header_pointer API usages
commit b22f5126a24b3b2f15448c3f2a254fc10cbc2b92 upstream.
Some occurences in the netfilter tree use skb_header_pointer() in
the following way ...
struct dccp_hdr _dh, *dh;
...
skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
... where dh itself is a pointer that is being passed as the copy
buffer. Instead, we need to use &_dh as the forth argument so that
we're copying the data into an actual buffer that sits on the stack.
Currently, we probably could overwrite memory on the stack (e.g.
with a possibly mal-formed DCCP packet), but unintentionally, as
we only want the buffer to be placed into _dh variable.
Fixes: 2bc780499aa3 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add DCCP protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_dccp.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_dccp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_dccp.c
index 2e664a6..8aa94ee 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_dccp.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_dccp.c
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ static bool dccp_new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb,
const char *msg;
u_int8_t state;
- dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh);
BUG_ON(dh == NULL);
state = dccp_state_table[CT_DCCP_ROLE_CLIENT][dh->dccph_type][CT_DCCP_NONE];
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static int dccp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb,
u_int8_t type, old_state, new_state;
enum ct_dccp_roles role;
- dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh);
BUG_ON(dh == NULL);
type = dh->dccph_type;
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ static int dccp_error(struct net *net, struct nf_conn *tmpl,
unsigned int cscov;
const char *msg;
- dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh);
if (dh == NULL) {
msg = "nf_ct_dccp: short packet ";
goto out_invalid;
--
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From 1d147bfa64293b2723c4fec50922168658e613ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 09:22:11 +0200
Subject: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
---
net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 4 ++++
net/mac80211/sta_info.h | 7 +++----
net/mac80211/tx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
index decd30c..62a5f08 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
@@ -330,6 +330,7 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_lock_init(&sta->lock);
+ spin_lock_init(&sta->ps_lock);
INIT_WORK(&sta->drv_unblock_wk, sta_unblock);
INIT_WORK(&sta->ampdu_mlme.work, ieee80211_ba_session_work);
mutex_init(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx);
@@ -1109,6 +1110,8 @@ void ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup(struct sta_info *sta)
skb_queue_head_init(&pending);
+ /* sync with ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf */
+ spin_lock(&sta->ps_lock);
/* Send all buffered frames to the station */
for (ac = 0; ac < IEEE80211_NUM_ACS; ac++) {
int count = skb_queue_len(&pending), tmp;
@@ -1128,6 +1131,7 @@ void ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup(struct sta_info *sta)
}
ieee80211_add_pending_skbs_fn(local, &pending, clear_sta_ps_flags, sta);
+ spin_unlock(&sta->ps_lock);
/* This station just woke up and isn't aware of our SMPS state */
if (!ieee80211_smps_is_restrictive(sta->known_smps_mode,
diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
index d77ff70..d3a6d82 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ struct ieee80211_tx_latency_stat {
* @drv_unblock_wk: used for driver PS unblocking
* @listen_interval: listen interval of this station, when we're acting as AP
* @_flags: STA flags, see &enum ieee80211_sta_info_flags, do not use directly
+ * @ps_lock: used for powersave (when mac80211 is the AP) related locking
* @ps_tx_buf: buffers (per AC) of frames to transmit to this station
* when it leaves power saving state or polls
* @tx_filtered: buffers (per AC) of frames we already tried to
@@ -356,10 +357,8 @@ struct sta_info {
/* use the accessors defined below */
unsigned long _flags;
- /*
- * STA powersave frame queues, no more than the internal
- * locking required.
- */
+ /* STA powersave lock and frame queues */
+ spinlock_t ps_lock;
struct sk_buff_head ps_tx_buf[IEEE80211_NUM_ACS];
struct sk_buff_head tx_filtered[IEEE80211_NUM_ACS];
unsigned long driver_buffered_tids;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c
index 97a02d3..4080c61 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
@@ -478,6 +478,20 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
sta->sta.addr, sta->sta.aid, ac);
if (tx->local->total_ps_buffered >= TOTAL_MAX_TX_BUFFER)
purge_old_ps_buffers(tx->local);
+
+ /* sync with ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup */
+ spin_lock(&sta->ps_lock);
+ /*
+ * STA woke up the meantime and all the frames on ps_tx_buf have
+ * been queued to pending queue. No reordering can happen, go
+ * ahead and Tx the packet.
+ */
+ if (!test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_PS_STA) &&
+ !test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_PS_DRIVER)) {
+ spin_unlock(&sta->ps_lock);
+ return TX_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
if (skb_queue_len(&sta->ps_tx_buf[ac]) >= STA_MAX_TX_BUFFER) {
struct sk_buff *old = skb_dequeue(&sta->ps_tx_buf[ac]);
ps_dbg(tx->sdata,
@@ -492,6 +506,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
info->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_NEED_TXPROCESSING;
info->flags &= ~IEEE80211_TX_TEMPORARY_FLAGS;
skb_queue_tail(&sta->ps_tx_buf[ac], tx->skb);
+ spin_unlock(&sta->ps_lock);
if (!timer_pending(&local->sta_cleanup))
mod_timer(&local->sta_cleanup,
--
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From b04c46190219a4f845e46a459e3102137b7f6cac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Wang, Xiaoming" <xiaoming.wang@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2014 12:30:45 -0400
Subject: net: ipv4: current group_info should be put after using.
Plug a group_info refcount leak in ping_init.
group_info is only needed during initialization and
the code failed to release the reference on exit.
While here move grabbing the reference to a place
where it is actually needed.
Signed-off-by: Chuansheng Liu <chuansheng.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Dongxing <dongxing.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: xiaoming wang <xiaoming.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/ping.c | 15 +++++++++++----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
index f4b19e5..8210964 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
@@ -252,26 +252,33 @@ int ping_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
kgid_t group = current_egid();
- struct group_info *group_info = get_current_groups();
- int i, j, count = group_info->ngroups;
+ struct group_info *group_info;
+ int i, j, count;
kgid_t low, high;
+ int ret = 0;
inet_get_ping_group_range_net(net, &low, &high);
if (gid_lte(low, group) && gid_lte(group, high))
return 0;
+ group_info = get_current_groups();
+ count = group_info->ngroups;
for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
int cp_count = min_t(int, NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
for (j = 0; j < cp_count; j++) {
kgid_t gid = group_info->blocks[i][j];
if (gid_lte(low, gid) && gid_lte(gid, high))
- return 0;
+ goto out_release_group;
}
count -= cp_count;
}
- return -EACCES;
+ ret = -EACCES;
+
+out_release_group:
+ put_group_info(group_info);
+ return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ping_init_sock);
--
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From 05ab8f2647e4221cbdb3856dd7d32bd5407316b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2014 18:23:33 +0200
Subject: filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message
The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check
for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be
within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla
header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned --
allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the
netlink attribute.
The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is
also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore
calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the
message while looking for the netlink attribute.
The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to
a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3.
,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nla
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0)
| ld #0
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal
size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math
for the remainder calculation right.
Fixes: 4738c1db15 ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction")
Fixes: d214c7537b ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..")
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/filter.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index e08b382..0e0856f 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -600,6 +600,9 @@ static u64 __skb_get_nlattr(u64 ctx, u64 A, u64 X, u64 r4, u64 r5)
if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
return 0;
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nlattr))
+ return 0;
+
if (A > skb->len - sizeof(struct nlattr))
return 0;
@@ -618,11 +621,14 @@ static u64 __skb_get_nlattr_nest(u64 ctx, u64 A, u64 X, u64 r4, u64 r5)
if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
return 0;
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nlattr))
+ return 0;
+
if (A > skb->len - sizeof(struct nlattr))
return 0;
nla = (struct nlattr *) &skb->data[A];
- if (nla->nla_len > A - skb->len)
+ if (nla->nla_len > skb->len - A)
return 0;
nla = nla_find_nested(nla, X);
--
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From 314760e66c35c8ffa51b4c4ca6948d207e783079 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2014 18:23:33 +0200
Subject: filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message
[ Upstream commit 05ab8f2647e4221cbdb3856dd7d32bd5407316b3 ]
The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check
for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be
within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla
header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned --
allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the
netlink attribute.
The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is
also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore
calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the
message while looking for the netlink attribute.
The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to
a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3.
,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nla
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0)
| ld #0
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal
size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math
for the remainder calculation right.
Fixes: 4738c1db15 ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction")
Fixes: d214c7537b ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..")
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/core/filter.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 52f01229..c6c18d8 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ load_b:
if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
return 0;
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nlattr))
+ return 0;
if (A > skb->len - sizeof(struct nlattr))
return 0;
@@ -371,11 +373,13 @@ load_b:
if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
return 0;
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nlattr))
+ return 0;
if (A > skb->len - sizeof(struct nlattr))
return 0;
nla = (struct nlattr *)&skb->data[A];
- if (nla->nla_len > A - skb->len)
+ if (nla->nla_len > skb->len - A)
return 0;
nla = nla_find_nested(nla, X);
--
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@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
From d41eb74e53d94aba656ffda647d106808e636cd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2014 18:23:33 +0200
Subject: filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message
[ Upstream commit 05ab8f2647e4221cbdb3856dd7d32bd5407316b3 ]
The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check
for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be
within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla
header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned --
allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the
netlink attribute.
The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is
also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore
calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the
message while looking for the netlink attribute.
The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to
a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3.
,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nla
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0)
| ld #0
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal
size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math
for the remainder calculation right.
Fixes: 4738c1db15 ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction")
Fixes: d214c7537b ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..")
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Fix misplacement of the first check due to a bug in the patch program]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/core/filter.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 5dea452..9c88080 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -320,6 +320,8 @@ load_b:
if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
return 0;
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nlattr))
+ return 0;
if (A > skb->len - sizeof(struct nlattr))
return 0;
@@ -336,11 +338,13 @@ load_b:
if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
return 0;
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nlattr))
+ return 0;
if (A > skb->len - sizeof(struct nlattr))
return 0;
nla = (struct nlattr *)&skb->data[A];
- if (nla->nla_len > A - skb->len)
+ if (nla->nla_len > skb->len - A)
return 0;
nla = nla_find_nested(nla, X);
--
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@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
From 23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 12:45:42 -0700
Subject: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/attr.c | 8 ++++----
fs/inode.c | 10 +++++++---
fs/namei.c | 11 ++++++-----
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c | 2 +-
include/linux/capability.h | 2 +-
kernel/capability.c | 20 ++++++++------------
6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 5d4e59d..6530ced 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -50,14 +50,14 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
!uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
(!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
/* Also check the setgid bit! */
if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
inode->i_gid) &&
- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
}
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr)
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index 2feb9b6..6eecb7f 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -1839,14 +1839,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner);
* inode_owner_or_capable - check current task permissions to inode
* @inode: inode being checked
*
- * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER to the inode, or
- * owns the file.
+ * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the
+ * inode owner uid mapped, or owns the file.
*/
bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
{
+ struct user_namespace *ns;
+
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
return true;
- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER))
+
+ ns = current_user_ns();
+ if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid))
return true;
return false;
}
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 8016827..985c6f3 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -332,10 +332,11 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
/* DACs are overridable for directories */
- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
+ CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -345,7 +346,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
* at least one exec bit set.
*/
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
/*
@@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
*/
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
if (mask == MAY_READ)
- if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
@@ -2379,7 +2380,7 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
return 0;
if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
return 0;
- return !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
+ return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
}
/*
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
index 0b18776..6152cbe 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr(
* cleared upon successful return from chown()
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
- !inode_capable(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
ip->i_d.di_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index a6ee1f9..84b13ad 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 84b2bbf..a5cf13c 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -424,23 +424,19 @@ bool capable(int cap)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
/**
- * inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode
+ * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
* @inode: The inode in question
* @cap: The capability in question
*
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
- * targeted at it's own user namespace and that the given inode is owned
- * by the current user namespace or a child namespace.
- *
- * Currently we check to see if an inode is owned by the current
- * user namespace by seeing if the inode's owner maps into the
- * current user namespace.
- *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at
+ * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
+ * mapped into the current user namespace.
*/
-bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
+bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
- return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid);
+ return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
+ kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_capable);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);
--
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From 014fa8def84c62893fa016e873c12de1da498603 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: raghavendra ambadas <rambad@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 14:59:57 +0530
Subject: msm: mdp: Validate input arguments from user space
Fully verify the input arguments from user client are safe
to use.
Change-Id: Ie14332443b187951009c63ebfb78456dcd9ba60f
Signed-off-by: Raghavendra Ambadas <rambad@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/video/msm/mdp.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/video/msm/mdp.c b/drivers/video/msm/mdp.c
index 4ede0b52..c00bd78 100644
--- a/drivers/video/msm/mdp.c
+++ b/drivers/video/msm/mdp.c
@@ -485,6 +485,11 @@ static int mdp_lut_hw_update(struct fb_cmap *cmap)
c[1] = cmap->blue;
c[2] = cmap->red;
+ if (cmap->start > MDP_HIST_LUT_SIZE || cmap->len > MDP_HIST_LUT_SIZE ||
+ (cmap->start + cmap->len > MDP_HIST_LUT_SIZE)) {
+ pr_err("mdp_lut_hw_update invalid arguments\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < cmap->len; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&r, cmap->red++, sizeof(r)) ||
copy_from_user(&g, cmap->green++, sizeof(g)) ||
--
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From 82262a46627bebb0febcc26664746c25cef08563 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 13:32:32 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls
There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user
controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a
user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process
that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary
controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not
expect a control to be removed from under its feed.
The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the
user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is
increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows
userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace
a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be
added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit.
Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control
that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does
proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control
has been removed.
Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at
beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not
a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is
protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the
new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different
control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily
there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so
we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/core/control.c | 25 +++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c
index 00ab034f5fcbe..1f413c2865113 100644
--- a/sound/core/control.c
+++ b/sound/core/control.c
@@ -1154,8 +1154,6 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct user_element *ue;
int idx, err;
- if (!replace && card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
- return -ENOMEM;
if (info->count < 1)
return -EINVAL;
access = info->access == 0 ? SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE :
@@ -1164,21 +1162,16 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE));
info->id.numid = 0;
memset(&kctl, 0, sizeof(kctl));
- down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
- _kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &info->id);
- err = 0;
- if (_kctl) {
- if (replace)
- err = snd_ctl_remove(card, _kctl);
- else
- err = -EBUSY;
- } else {
- if (replace)
- err = -ENOENT;
+
+ if (replace) {
+ err = snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(file, &info->id);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
- up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
- if (err < 0)
- return err;
+
+ if (card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
memcpy(&kctl.id, &info->id, sizeof(info->id));
kctl.count = info->owner ? info->owner : 1;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_USER;

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@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
From 0e2e43eca302b31f64ebfe4734fd2cc7358c4555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 13:32:32 +0200
Subject: ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls
commit 82262a46627bebb0febcc26664746c25cef08563 upstream.
There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user
controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a
user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process
that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary
controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not
expect a control to be removed from under its feed.
The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the
user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is
increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows
userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace
a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be
added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit.
Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control
that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does
proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control
has been removed.
Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at
beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not
a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is
protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the
new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different
control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily
there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so
we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
sound/core/control.c | 25 +++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c
index 920ea56..caa949e 100644
--- a/sound/core/control.c
+++ b/sound/core/control.c
@@ -1151,8 +1151,6 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct user_element *ue;
int idx, err;
- if (!replace && card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
- return -ENOMEM;
if (info->count < 1)
return -EINVAL;
access = info->access == 0 ? SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE :
@@ -1161,21 +1159,16 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE));
info->id.numid = 0;
memset(&kctl, 0, sizeof(kctl));
- down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
- _kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &info->id);
- err = 0;
- if (_kctl) {
- if (replace)
- err = snd_ctl_remove(card, _kctl);
- else
- err = -EBUSY;
- } else {
- if (replace)
- err = -ENOENT;
+
+ if (replace) {
+ err = snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(file, &info->id);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
- up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
- if (err < 0)
- return err;
+
+ if (card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
memcpy(&kctl.id, &info->id, sizeof(info->id));
kctl.count = info->owner ? info->owner : 1;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_USER;
--
cgit v1.1

27
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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
From 08ede038a738f22c1b3425051175e1d627d8dd43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lu Guanqun <guanqun.lu@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 14:45:10 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: core: release the constraint check for replace ops
Suppose the ALSA card already has a number of MAX_USER_CONTROLS controls, and
the user wants to replace one, it should not fail at this condition check.
Signed-off-by: Lu Guanqun <guanqun.lu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/core/control.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c
index 7f2b3a7eabb2b..dc2a44048c850 100644
--- a/sound/core/control.c
+++ b/sound/core/control.c
@@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct user_element *ue;
int idx, err;
- if (card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
+ if (!replace && card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
return -ENOMEM;
if (info->count < 1)
return -EINVAL;

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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 883a1d49f0d77d30012f114b2e19fc141beb3e8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 13:32:35 +0200
Subject: ALSA: control: Make sure that id->index does not overflow
The ALSA control code expects that the range of assigned indices to a control is
continuous and does not overflow. Currently there are no checks to enforce this.
If a control with a overflowing index range is created that control becomes
effectively inaccessible and unremovable since snd_ctl_find_id() will not be
able to find it. This patch adds a check that makes sure that controls with a
overflowing index range can not be created.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/core/control.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c
index 8d6e4ba..f0b0e14 100644
--- a/sound/core/control.c
+++ b/sound/core/control.c
@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
+ if (id.index > UINT_MAX - kcontrol->count)
+ goto error;
+
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
--
cgit v1.1

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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From f7500568b7633324e7c4282bb8baa3ff3f17fd7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 13:32:35 +0200
Subject: ALSA: control: Make sure that id->index does not overflow
commit 883a1d49f0d77d30012f114b2e19fc141beb3e8e upstream.
The ALSA control code expects that the range of assigned indices to a control is
continuous and does not overflow. Currently there are no checks to enforce this.
If a control with a overflowing index range is created that control becomes
effectively inaccessible and unremovable since snd_ctl_find_id() will not be
able to find it. This patch adds a check that makes sure that controls with a
overflowing index range can not be created.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
sound/core/control.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c
index d3f17de..9210594 100644
--- a/sound/core/control.c
+++ b/sound/core/control.c
@@ -341,6 +341,9 @@ int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
+ if (id.index > UINT_MAX - kcontrol->count)
+ goto error;
+
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
--
cgit v1.1

51
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From 3cf521f7dc87c031617fd47e4b7aa2593c2f3daf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 17:02:31 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
index 950909f04ee6a..13752d96275e8 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
int err;
if (level != SOL_PPPOL2TP)
- return udp_prot.setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+ return -EINVAL;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
if (level != SOL_PPPOL2TP)
- return udp_prot.getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+ return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;

56
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@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From 1179c8f1caca90caf4ce0eec54b499de4f1551c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 17:02:31 -0700
Subject: net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt
commit 3cf521f7dc87c031617fd47e4b7aa2593c2f3daf upstream.
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
index e0f0934..437fb59 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c
@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
int err;
if (level != SOL_PPPOL2TP)
- return udp_prot.setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+ return -EINVAL;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
if (level != SOL_PPPOL2TP)
- return udp_prot.getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+ return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(len, (int __user *) optlen))
return -EFAULT;
--
cgit v1.1

52
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@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From a6138db815df5ee542d848318e5dae681590fccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 16:26:53 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io> discovered that by remounting a
read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the
MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user
to the remount a read-only mount read-write.
Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve
with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve
all others. This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and
remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags
simply won't change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
fs/namespace.c | 2 +-
include/linux/mount.h | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 7187d01329c35..cb40449ea0dfe 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1937,7 +1937,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
if (!err) {
lock_mount_hash();
- mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_PROPAGATION_MASK;
+ mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK;
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
touch_mnt_namespace(mnt->mnt_ns);
unlock_mount_hash();
diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
index 839bac2709048..b637a89e1faeb 100644
--- a/include/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
@@ -42,7 +42,9 @@ struct mnt_namespace;
* flag, consider how it interacts with shared mounts.
*/
#define MNT_SHARED_MASK (MNT_UNBINDABLE)
-#define MNT_PROPAGATION_MASK (MNT_SHARED | MNT_UNBINDABLE)
+#define MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK (MNT_NOSUID | MNT_NODEV | MNT_NOEXEC \
+ | MNT_NOATIME | MNT_NODIRATIME | MNT_RELATIME \
+ | MNT_READONLY)
#define MNT_INTERNAL_FLAGS (MNT_SHARED | MNT_WRITE_HOLD | MNT_INTERNAL | \
MNT_DOOMED | MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT | MNT_MARKED)

72
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@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
From 894c6350eaad7e613ae267504014a456e00a3e2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2015 02:50:33 +0000
Subject: splice: Apply generic position and size checks to each write
We need to check the position and size of file writes against various
limits, using generic_write_check(). This was not being done for
the splice write path. It was fixed upstream by commit 8d0207652cbe
("->splice_write() via ->write_iter()") but we can't apply that.
CVE-2014-7822
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
fs/ocfs2/file.c | 8 ++++++--
fs/splice.c | 8 ++++++--
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/file.c b/fs/ocfs2/file.c
index d20d64c..0de24a2 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c
@@ -2468,9 +2468,7 @@ static ssize_t ocfs2_file_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct address_space *mapping = out->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct splice_desc sd = {
- .total_len = len,
.flags = flags,
- .pos = *ppos,
.u.file = out,
};
@@ -2480,6 +2478,12 @@ static ssize_t ocfs2_file_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
out->f_path.dentry->d_name.len,
out->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, len);
+ ret = generic_write_checks(out, ppos, &len, 0);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ sd.total_len = len;
+ sd.pos = *ppos;
+
if (pipe->inode)
mutex_lock_nested(&pipe->inode->i_mutex, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c
index 714471d..34c2b2b 100644
--- a/fs/splice.c
+++ b/fs/splice.c
@@ -1013,13 +1013,17 @@ generic_file_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
struct address_space *mapping = out->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct splice_desc sd = {
- .total_len = len,
.flags = flags,
- .pos = *ppos,
.u.file = out,
};
ssize_t ret;
+ ret = generic_write_checks(out, ppos, &len, S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode));
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ sd.total_len = len;
+ sd.pos = *ppos;
+
pipe_lock(pipe);
splice_from_pipe_begin(&sd);
--
cgit v1.1

50
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 6f25b4e75a87fea8087b543f3d1298d301d24ad7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2012 18:14:14 +0100
Subject: tracing/syscalls: Fix perf syscall tracing when syscall_nr == -1
commit 60916a9382e88fbf5e54fd36a3e658efd7ab7bed upstream.
syscall_get_nr can return -1 in the case that the task is not executing
a system call.
This patch fixes perf_syscall_{enter,exit} to check that the syscall
number is valid before using it as an index into a bitmap.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1345137254-7377-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Wade Farnsworth <wade_farnsworth@mentor.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
index 7c75bbb..22a7c9b 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
@@ -519,6 +519,8 @@ static void perf_syscall_enter(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long id)
int size;
syscall_nr = syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
+ if (syscall_nr < 0)
+ return;
if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_perf_enter_syscalls))
return;
@@ -593,6 +595,8 @@ static void perf_syscall_exit(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long ret)
int size;
syscall_nr = syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
+ if (syscall_nr < 0)
+ return;
if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_perf_exit_syscalls))
return;
--
cgit v1.1

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@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
From 8043761416d5ae6d8fe5e95331d26465d52e8c6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 23:06:58 +0100
Subject: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
commit 086ba77a6db00ed858ff07451bedee197df868c9 upstream.
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
index 22a7c9b..1129062 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ void ftrace_syscall_enter(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long id)
int syscall_nr;
syscall_nr = syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
- if (syscall_nr < 0)
+ if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls)
return;
if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_enter_syscalls))
return;
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ void ftrace_syscall_exit(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long ret)
int syscall_nr;
syscall_nr = syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
- if (syscall_nr < 0)
+ if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls)
return;
if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_exit_syscalls))
return;
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ static void perf_syscall_enter(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long id)
int size;
syscall_nr = syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
- if (syscall_nr < 0)
+ if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls)
return;
if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_perf_enter_syscalls))
return;
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static void perf_syscall_exit(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long ret)
int size;
syscall_nr = syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
- if (syscall_nr < 0)
+ if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls)
return;
if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_perf_exit_syscalls))
return;
--
cgit v1.1

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@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
From 086ba77a6db00ed858ff07451bedee197df868c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 23:06:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
---
kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
index 4dc8b79c5f75d..29228c4d56969 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static void ftrace_syscall_enter(void *data, struct pt_regs *regs, long id)
int size;
syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs);
- if (syscall_nr < 0)
+ if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls)
return;
/* Here we're inside tp handler's rcu_read_lock_sched (__DO_TRACE) */
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ static void ftrace_syscall_exit(void *data, struct pt_regs *regs, long ret)
int syscall_nr;
syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs);
- if (syscall_nr < 0)
+ if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls)
return;
/* Here we're inside tp handler's rcu_read_lock_sched (__DO_TRACE()) */
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static void perf_syscall_enter(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long id)
int size;
syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs);
- if (syscall_nr < 0)
+ if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls)
return;
if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_perf_enter_syscalls))
return;
@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ static void perf_syscall_exit(void *ignore, struct pt_regs *regs, long ret)
int size;
syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs);
- if (syscall_nr < 0)
+ if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls)
return;
if (!test_bit(syscall_nr, enabled_perf_exit_syscalls))
return;

47
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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From 0d0826019e529f21c84687521d03f60cd241ca7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 10:42:27 -0700
Subject: mnt: Prevent pivot_root from creating a loop in the mount tree
Andy Lutomirski recently demonstrated that when chroot is used to set
the root path below the path for the new ``root'' passed to pivot_root
the pivot_root system call succeeds and leaks mounts.
In examining the code I see that starting with a new root that is
below the current root in the mount tree will result in a loop in the
mount tree after the mounts are detached and then reattached to one
another. Resulting in all kinds of ugliness including a leak of that
mounts involved in the leak of the mount loop.
Prevent this problem by ensuring that the new mount is reachable from
the current root of the mount tree.
[Added stable cc. Fixes CVE-2014-7970. --Andy]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87bnpmihks.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
fs/namespace.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index ef42d9b..74647c2 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2820,6 +2820,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
/* make sure we can reach put_old from new_root */
if (!is_path_reachable(old_mnt, old.dentry, &new))
goto out4;
+ /* make certain new is below the root */
+ if (!is_path_reachable(new_mnt, new.dentry, &root))
+ goto out4;
root_mp->m_count++; /* pin it so it won't go away */
lock_mount_hash();
detach_mnt(new_mnt, &parent_path);
--
cgit v1.1

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@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
From c88f7bbd8026761a615c9969d186ffa2a1a3da3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 17:49:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] mnt: Prevent pivot_root from creating a loop in the mount
tree
Andy Lutomirski recently demonstrated that when chroot is used to set
the root path below the path for the new ``root'' passed to pivot_root
the pivot_root system call succeeds and leaks mounts.
In examining the code I see that starting with a new root that is
below the current root in the mount tree will result in a loop in the
mount tree after the mounts are detached and then reattached to one
another. Resulting in all kinds of ugliness including a leak of that
mounts involved in the leak of the mount loop.
Prevent this problem by ensuring that the new mount is reachable from
the current root of the mount tree.
[Added stable cc. Fixes CVE-2014-7970. --Andy]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87bnpmihks.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
(backported from commit 0d0826019e529f21c84687521d03f60cd241ca7d)
CVE-2014-7970
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1383356
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Change-Id: I0fe1d090eeb4765cc49401784e44a430f9585498
---
fs/namespace.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 912d273d970..4f47629a4e0 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2618,6 +2618,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
goto out4;
} else if (!is_subdir(old.dentry, new.dentry))
goto out4;
+ /* make certain new is below the root */
+ if (!is_path_reachable(new.mnt, new.dentry, &root))
+ goto out4;
br_write_lock(vfsmount_lock);
detach_mnt(new.mnt, &parent_path);
detach_mnt(root.mnt, &root_parent);

50
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 9f7d53c09a1f87ebe228b55a83c1b8f952d76260 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 10:42:27 -0700
Subject: mnt: Prevent pivot_root from creating a loop in the mount tree
commit 0d0826019e529f21c84687521d03f60cd241ca7d upstream.
Andy Lutomirski recently demonstrated that when chroot is used to set
the root path below the path for the new ``root'' passed to pivot_root
the pivot_root system call succeeds and leaks mounts.
In examining the code I see that starting with a new root that is
below the current root in the mount tree will result in a loop in the
mount tree after the mounts are detached and then reattached to one
another. Resulting in all kinds of ugliness including a leak of that
mounts involved in the leak of the mount loop.
Prevent this problem by ensuring that the new mount is reachable from
the current root of the mount tree.
[Added stable cc. Fixes CVE-2014-7970. --Andy]
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87bnpmihks.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
[lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
---
fs/namespace.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index f0f2e06..f7be8d9 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2508,6 +2508,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
/* make sure we can reach put_old from new_root */
if (!is_path_reachable(real_mount(old.mnt), old.dentry, &new))
goto out4;
+ /* make certain new is below the root */
+ if (!is_path_reachable(new_mnt, new.dentry, &root))
+ goto out4;
br_write_lock(vfsmount_lock);
detach_mnt(new_mnt, &parent_path);
detach_mnt(root_mnt, &root_parent);
--
cgit v1.1

88
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@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
From db29a9508a9246e77087c5531e45b2c88ec6988b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:35:42 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known
protocols
Given following iptables ruleset:
-P FORWARD DROP
-A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80.
Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows
*all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT,
which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy
"generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since
conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established
state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the
'generic' entry.
Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol
tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more
suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in
tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction
information will still be preserved for others.
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c
index d25f293776482..957c1db666525 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c
@@ -14,6 +14,30 @@
static unsigned int nf_ct_generic_timeout __read_mostly = 600*HZ;
+static bool nf_generic_should_process(u8 proto)
+{
+ switch (proto) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_SCTP_MODULE
+ case IPPROTO_SCTP:
+ return false;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_DCCP_MODULE
+ case IPPROTO_DCCP:
+ return false;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_GRE_MODULE
+ case IPPROTO_GRE:
+ return false;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_UDPLITE_MODULE
+ case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
+ return false;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return true;
+ }
+}
+
static inline struct nf_generic_net *generic_pernet(struct net *net)
{
return &net->ct.nf_ct_proto.generic;
@@ -67,7 +91,7 @@ static int generic_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
static bool generic_new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int dataoff, unsigned int *timeouts)
{
- return true;
+ return nf_generic_should_process(nf_ct_protonum(ct));
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK_TIMEOUT)

94
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@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
From d7cde286daad20dd171247ea47fc5ff4868591f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:35:42 +0200
Subject: netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols
commit db29a9508a9246e77087c5531e45b2c88ec6988b upstream.
Given following iptables ruleset:
-P FORWARD DROP
-A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80.
Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows
*all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT,
which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy
"generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since
conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established
state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the
'generic' entry.
Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol
tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more
suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in
tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction
information will still be preserved for others.
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c
index e2091d0..53bf12a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c
@@ -14,6 +14,30 @@
static unsigned int nf_ct_generic_timeout __read_mostly = 600*HZ;
+static bool nf_generic_should_process(u8 proto)
+{
+ switch (proto) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_SCTP_MODULE
+ case IPPROTO_SCTP:
+ return false;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_DCCP_MODULE
+ case IPPROTO_DCCP:
+ return false;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_GRE_MODULE
+ case IPPROTO_GRE:
+ return false;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_UDPLITE_MODULE
+ case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
+ return false;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return true;
+ }
+}
+
static bool generic_pkt_to_tuple(const struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int dataoff,
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple)
@@ -56,7 +80,7 @@ static int packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
static bool new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int dataoff)
{
- return true;
+ return nf_generic_should_process(nf_ct_protonum(ct));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
--
cgit v1.1

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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From ee53664bda169f519ce3c6a22d378f0b946c8178 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 15:10:03 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mm: Fix NULL pointer dereference in madvise(MADV_WILLNEED)
support
Sasha Levin found a NULL pointer dereference that is due to a missing
page table lock, which in turn is due to the pmd entry in question being
a transparent huge-table entry.
The code - introduced in commit 1998cc048901 ("mm: make
madvise(MADV_WILLNEED) support swap file prefetch") - correctly checks
for this situation using pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(), but it
turns out that that function doesn't work correctly.
pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() expected that pmd_bad() would
trigger if the transparent hugepage bit was set, but it doesn't do that
if pmd_numa() is also set. Note that the NUMA bit only gets set on real
NUMA machines, so people trying to reproduce this on most normal
development systems would never actually trigger this.
Fix it by removing the very subtle (and subtly incorrect) expectation,
and instead just checking pmd_trans_huge() explicitly.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
[ Additionally remove the now stale test for pmd_trans_huge() inside the
pmd_bad() case - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index b12079afbd5f2..db09234589409 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -599,11 +599,10 @@ static inline int pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
barrier();
#endif
- if (pmd_none(pmdval))
+ if (pmd_none(pmdval) || pmd_trans_huge(pmdval))
return 1;
if (unlikely(pmd_bad(pmdval))) {
- if (!pmd_trans_huge(pmdval))
- pmd_clear_bad(pmd);
+ pmd_clear_bad(pmd);
return 1;
}
return 0;

53
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 338f977f4eb441e69bb9a46eaa0ac715c931a67f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2014 00:16:23 +0100
Subject: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
---
net/mac80211/tx.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c
index 27c990b..97a02d3 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ static int ieee80211_fragment(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
}
/* adjust first fragment's length */
- skb->len = hdrlen + per_fragm;
+ skb_trim(skb, hdrlen + per_fragm);
return 0;
}
--
cgit v1.1

56
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-8709/1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From c7b18cdf1887e8ce91e04342cfd2d8fe1630be92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2014 00:16:23 +0100
Subject: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
commit 338f977f4eb441e69bb9a46eaa0ac715c931a67f upstream.
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/mac80211/tx.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c
index 4ff35bf..5186f8b 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
@@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ static int ieee80211_fragment(struct ieee80211_local *local,
pos += fraglen;
}
- skb->len = hdrlen + per_fragm;
+ skb_trim(skb, hdrlen + per_fragm);
return 0;
}
--
cgit v1.1

52
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9420/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From f54e18f1b831c92f6512d2eedb224cd63d607d3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 14:22:46 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.
Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.
Reported-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
---
fs/isofs/rock.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/isofs/rock.c b/fs/isofs/rock.c
index f488bbae541ac..bb63254ed8486 100644
--- a/fs/isofs/rock.c
+++ b/fs/isofs/rock.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct rock_state {
int cont_size;
int cont_extent;
int cont_offset;
+ int cont_loops;
struct inode *inode;
};
@@ -73,6 +74,9 @@ static void init_rock_state(struct rock_state *rs, struct inode *inode)
rs->inode = inode;
}
+/* Maximum number of Rock Ridge continuation entries */
+#define RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES 32
+
/*
* Returns 0 if the caller should continue scanning, 1 if the scan must end
* and -ve on error.
@@ -105,6 +109,8 @@ static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs)
goto out;
}
ret = -EIO;
+ if (++rs->cont_loops >= RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES)
+ goto out;
bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
if (bh) {
memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,

57
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@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 212c4d33ca83e2144064fe9c2911607fbed5386f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 14:22:46 +0100
Subject: isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
commit f54e18f1b831c92f6512d2eedb224cd63d607d3d upstream.
Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.
Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.
Reported-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
fs/isofs/rock.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/isofs/rock.c b/fs/isofs/rock.c
index ee62cc0..26859de 100644
--- a/fs/isofs/rock.c
+++ b/fs/isofs/rock.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct rock_state {
int cont_size;
int cont_extent;
int cont_offset;
+ int cont_loops;
struct inode *inode;
};
@@ -73,6 +74,9 @@ static void init_rock_state(struct rock_state *rs, struct inode *inode)
rs->inode = inode;
}
+/* Maximum number of Rock Ridge continuation entries */
+#define RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES 32
+
/*
* Returns 0 if the caller should continue scanning, 1 if the scan must end
* and -ve on error.
@@ -105,6 +109,8 @@ static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs)
goto out;
}
ret = -EIO;
+ if (++rs->cont_loops >= RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES)
+ goto out;
bh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);
if (bh) {
memcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,
--
cgit v1.1

44
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9529/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From a3a8784454692dd72e5d5d34dcdab17b4420e74c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 09:39:01 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: close race between key lookup and freeing
When a key is being garbage collected, it's key->user would get put before
the ->destroy() callback is called, where the key is removed from it's
respective tracking structures.
This leaves a key hanging in a semi-invalid state which leaves a window open
for a different task to try an access key->user. An example is
find_keyring_by_name() which would dereference key->user for a key that is
in the process of being garbage collected (where key->user was freed but
->destroy() wasn't called yet - so it's still present in the linked list).
This would cause either a panic, or corrupt memory.
Fixes CVE-2014-9529.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
security/keys/gc.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 9609a7f0faea2..c7952375ac532 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -148,12 +148,12 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
- key_user_put(key->user);
-
/* now throw away the key memory */
if (key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
+ key_user_put(key->user);
+
kfree(key->description);
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING

51
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From dc4a2f40de419c01b538c87f6bdfc15d574d9f7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 09:39:01 -0500
Subject: KEYS: close race between key lookup and freeing
commit a3a8784454692dd72e5d5d34dcdab17b4420e74c upstream.
When a key is being garbage collected, it's key->user would get put before
the ->destroy() callback is called, where the key is removed from it's
respective tracking structures.
This leaves a key hanging in a semi-invalid state which leaves a window open
for a different task to try an access key->user. An example is
find_keyring_by_name() which would dereference key->user for a key that is
in the process of being garbage collected (where key->user was freed but
->destroy() wasn't called yet - so it's still present in the linked list).
This would cause either a panic, or corrupt memory.
Fixes CVE-2014-9529.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
security/keys/gc.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index bf4d8da..2e2395d 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -186,12 +186,12 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_key(struct key *key)
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
- key_user_put(key->user);
-
/* now throw away the key memory */
if (key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
+ key_user_put(key->user);
+
kfree(key->description);
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
--
cgit v1.1

32
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9683/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 09:09:16 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name
decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
---
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
index 2f6735dbf1a9d..31b148f3e7729 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
@@ -1917,7 +1917,6 @@ ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_size,
break;
case 2:
dst[dst_byte_offset++] |= (src_byte);
- dst[dst_byte_offset] = 0;
current_bit_offset = 0;
break;
}

37
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9683/1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From f2d130454e46c3989af1b4f882b6a666d24fa2e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 09:09:16 -0800
Subject: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode
routine
commit 942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc upstream.
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
index 68b19ab..dceedec 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
@@ -2038,7 +2038,6 @@ ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_size,
break;
case 2:
dst[dst_byte_offset++] |= (src_byte);
- dst[dst_byte_offset] = 0;
current_bit_offset = 0;
break;
}
--
cgit v1.1

50
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9715/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 223b02d923ecd7c84cf9780bb3686f455d279279 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 13:54:32 +0400
Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: nf_conntrack: reserve two bytes for nf_ct_ext->len
"len" contains sizeof(nf_ct_ext) and size of extensions. In a worst
case it can contain all extensions. Bellow you can find sizes for all
types of extensions. Their sum is definitely bigger than 256.
nf_ct_ext_types[0]->len = 24
nf_ct_ext_types[1]->len = 32
nf_ct_ext_types[2]->len = 24
nf_ct_ext_types[3]->len = 32
nf_ct_ext_types[4]->len = 152
nf_ct_ext_types[5]->len = 2
nf_ct_ext_types[6]->len = 16
nf_ct_ext_types[7]->len = 8
I have seen "len" up to 280 and my host has crashes w/o this patch.
The right way to fix this problem is reducing the size of the ecache
extension (4) and Florian is going to do this, but these changes will
be quite large to be appropriate for a stable tree.
Fixes: 5b423f6a40a0 (netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix racy timer handling with reliable)
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h
index 956b175523ffa..55d15049ab2fd 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ enum nf_ct_ext_id {
/* Extensions: optional stuff which isn't permanently in struct. */
struct nf_ct_ext {
struct rcu_head rcu;
- u8 offset[NF_CT_EXT_NUM];
- u8 len;
+ u16 offset[NF_CT_EXT_NUM];
+ u16 len;
char data[0];
};

56
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9715/1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From 33eedfe8ecbaabcdc38be63901cb2b79e3190fda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 13:54:32 +0400
Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack: reserve two bytes for nf_ct_ext->len
commit 223b02d923ecd7c84cf9780bb3686f455d279279 upstream.
"len" contains sizeof(nf_ct_ext) and size of extensions. In a worst
case it can contain all extensions. Bellow you can find sizes for all
types of extensions. Their sum is definitely bigger than 256.
nf_ct_ext_types[0]->len = 24
nf_ct_ext_types[1]->len = 32
nf_ct_ext_types[2]->len = 24
nf_ct_ext_types[3]->len = 32
nf_ct_ext_types[4]->len = 152
nf_ct_ext_types[5]->len = 2
nf_ct_ext_types[6]->len = 16
nf_ct_ext_types[7]->len = 8
I have seen "len" up to 280 and my host has crashes w/o this patch.
The right way to fix this problem is reducing the size of the ecache
extension (4) and Florian is going to do this, but these changes will
be quite large to be appropriate for a stable tree.
Fixes: 5b423f6a40a0 (netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix racy timer handling with reliable)
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h
index 2dcf317..d918074 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ enum nf_ct_ext_id {
/* Extensions: optional stuff which isn't permanently in struct. */
struct nf_ct_ext {
struct rcu_head rcu;
- u8 offset[NF_CT_EXT_NUM];
- u8 len;
+ u16 offset[NF_CT_EXT_NUM];
+ u16 len;
char data[0];
};
--
cgit v1.1

236
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9731/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
From 0e5cc9a40ada6046e6bc3bdfcd0c0d7e4b706b14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 22:37:50 +0100
Subject: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
---
fs/udf/dir.c | 3 ++-
fs/udf/namei.c | 3 ++-
fs/udf/symlink.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
fs/udf/udfdecl.h | 3 ++-
fs/udf/unicode.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/udf/dir.c b/fs/udf/dir.c
index a012c51..a7690b4 100644
--- a/fs/udf/dir.c
+++ b/fs/udf/dir.c
@@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ static int udf_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
continue;
}
- flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, fname, lfi);
+ flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, lfi, fname,
+ UDF_NAME_LEN);
if (!flen)
continue;
diff --git a/fs/udf/namei.c b/fs/udf/namei.c
index c12e260..6ff19b5 100644
--- a/fs/udf/namei.c
+++ b/fs/udf/namei.c
@@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ static struct fileIdentDesc *udf_find_entry(struct inode *dir,
if (!lfi)
continue;
- flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, fname, lfi);
+ flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, lfi, fname,
+ UDF_NAME_LEN);
if (flen && udf_match(flen, fname, child->len, child->name))
goto out_ok;
}
diff --git a/fs/udf/symlink.c b/fs/udf/symlink.c
index c3aa6fa..0f1b3a2 100644
--- a/fs/udf/symlink.c
+++ b/fs/udf/symlink.c
@@ -30,13 +30,16 @@
#include <linux/buffer_head.h>
#include "udf_i.h"
-static void udf_pc_to_char(struct super_block *sb, unsigned char *from,
- int fromlen, unsigned char *to)
+static int udf_pc_to_char(struct super_block *sb, unsigned char *from,
+ int fromlen, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
{
struct pathComponent *pc;
int elen = 0;
+ int comp_len;
unsigned char *p = to;
+ /* Reserve one byte for terminating \0 */
+ tolen--;
while (elen < fromlen) {
pc = (struct pathComponent *)(from + elen);
switch (pc->componentType) {
@@ -49,22 +52,37 @@ static void udf_pc_to_char(struct super_block *sb, unsigned char *from,
break;
/* Fall through */
case 2:
+ if (tolen == 0)
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
p = to;
*p++ = '/';
+ tolen--;
break;
case 3:
+ if (tolen < 3)
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
memcpy(p, "../", 3);
p += 3;
+ tolen -= 3;
break;
case 4:
+ if (tolen < 2)
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
memcpy(p, "./", 2);
p += 2;
+ tolen -= 2;
/* that would be . - just ignore */
break;
case 5:
- p += udf_get_filename(sb, pc->componentIdent, p,
- pc->lengthComponentIdent);
+ comp_len = udf_get_filename(sb, pc->componentIdent,
+ pc->lengthComponentIdent,
+ p, tolen);
+ p += comp_len;
+ tolen -= comp_len;
+ if (tolen == 0)
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
*p++ = '/';
+ tolen--;
break;
}
elen += sizeof(struct pathComponent) + pc->lengthComponentIdent;
@@ -73,6 +91,7 @@ static void udf_pc_to_char(struct super_block *sb, unsigned char *from,
p[-1] = '\0';
else
p[0] = '\0';
+ return 0;
}
static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
@@ -108,8 +127,10 @@ static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
symlink = bh->b_data;
}
- udf_pc_to_char(inode->i_sb, symlink, inode->i_size, p);
+ err = udf_pc_to_char(inode->i_sb, symlink, inode->i_size, p, PAGE_SIZE);
brelse(bh);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock_inode;
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageUptodate(page);
diff --git a/fs/udf/udfdecl.h b/fs/udf/udfdecl.h
index 1cc3c99..47bb3f5 100644
--- a/fs/udf/udfdecl.h
+++ b/fs/udf/udfdecl.h
@@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ udf_get_lb_pblock(struct super_block *sb, struct kernel_lb_addr *loc,
}
/* unicode.c */
-extern int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *, uint8_t *, uint8_t *, int);
+extern int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *, uint8_t *, int, uint8_t *,
+ int);
extern int udf_put_filename(struct super_block *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *,
int);
extern int udf_build_ustr(struct ustr *, dstring *, int);
diff --git a/fs/udf/unicode.c b/fs/udf/unicode.c
index afd470e..b84fee3 100644
--- a/fs/udf/unicode.c
+++ b/fs/udf/unicode.c
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
#include "udf_sb.h"
-static int udf_translate_to_linux(uint8_t *, uint8_t *, int, uint8_t *, int);
+static int udf_translate_to_linux(uint8_t *, int, uint8_t *, int, uint8_t *,
+ int);
static int udf_char_to_ustr(struct ustr *dest, const uint8_t *src, int strlen)
{
@@ -333,8 +334,8 @@ try_again:
return u_len + 1;
}
-int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *sname, uint8_t *dname,
- int flen)
+int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *sname, int slen,
+ uint8_t *dname, int dlen)
{
struct ustr *filename, *unifilename;
int len = 0;
@@ -347,7 +348,7 @@ int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *sname, uint8_t *dname,
if (!unifilename)
goto out1;
- if (udf_build_ustr_exact(unifilename, sname, flen))
+ if (udf_build_ustr_exact(unifilename, sname, slen))
goto out2;
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_UTF8)) {
@@ -366,7 +367,8 @@ int udf_get_filename(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *sname, uint8_t *dname,
} else
goto out2;
- len = udf_translate_to_linux(dname, filename->u_name, filename->u_len,
+ len = udf_translate_to_linux(dname, dlen,
+ filename->u_name, filename->u_len,
unifilename->u_name, unifilename->u_len);
out2:
kfree(unifilename);
@@ -403,10 +405,12 @@ int udf_put_filename(struct super_block *sb, const uint8_t *sname,
#define EXT_MARK '.'
#define CRC_MARK '#'
#define EXT_SIZE 5
+/* Number of chars we need to store generated CRC to make filename unique */
+#define CRC_LEN 5
-static int udf_translate_to_linux(uint8_t *newName, uint8_t *udfName,
- int udfLen, uint8_t *fidName,
- int fidNameLen)
+static int udf_translate_to_linux(uint8_t *newName, int newLen,
+ uint8_t *udfName, int udfLen,
+ uint8_t *fidName, int fidNameLen)
{
int index, newIndex = 0, needsCRC = 0;
int extIndex = 0, newExtIndex = 0, hasExt = 0;
@@ -439,7 +443,7 @@ static int udf_translate_to_linux(uint8_t *newName, uint8_t *udfName,
newExtIndex = newIndex;
}
}
- if (newIndex < 256)
+ if (newIndex < newLen)
newName[newIndex++] = curr;
else
needsCRC = 1;
@@ -467,13 +471,13 @@ static int udf_translate_to_linux(uint8_t *newName, uint8_t *udfName,
}
ext[localExtIndex++] = curr;
}
- maxFilenameLen = 250 - localExtIndex;
+ maxFilenameLen = newLen - CRC_LEN - localExtIndex;
if (newIndex > maxFilenameLen)
newIndex = maxFilenameLen;
else
newIndex = newExtIndex;
- } else if (newIndex > 250)
- newIndex = 250;
+ } else if (newIndex > newLen - CRC_LEN)
+ newIndex = newLen - CRC_LEN;
newName[newIndex++] = CRC_MARK;
valueCRC = crc_itu_t(0, fidName, fidNameLen);
newName[newIndex++] = hex_asc_upper_hi(valueCRC >> 8);
--
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@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From af85054aa6a1bcd38be2354921f2f80aef1440e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Pachika, Vikas Reddy" <vpachi@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 21:06:37 +0530
Subject: msm: vidc: Validate userspace buffer count
Makesure the number of buffers count is less than
the maximum limit to avoid structure overflow errors.
Change-Id: Icf3850de36325637ae43ac95f1c8f0f63e201d31
CRs-fixed: 563694
Signed-off-by: Pachika, Vikas Reddy <vpachi@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/dec/vdec.c | 6 ++++++
include/media/msm/vidc_init.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/dec/vdec.c b/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/dec/vdec.c
index a843889..b45100f 100644
--- a/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/dec/vdec.c
+++ b/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/dec/vdec.c
@@ -1201,6 +1201,12 @@ static u32 vid_dec_set_h264_mv_buffers(struct video_client_ctx *client_ctx,
vcd_h264_mv_buffer->pmem_fd = mv_data->pmem_fd;
vcd_h264_mv_buffer->offset = mv_data->offset;
+ if (mv_data->count > MAX_MV_BUFFERS) {
+ ERR("MV buffers maximum count reached, count = %d",
+ mv_data->count);
+ return false;
+ }
+
if (!vcd_get_ion_status()) {
if (get_pmem_file(vcd_h264_mv_buffer->pmem_fd,
(unsigned long *) (&(vcd_h264_mv_buffer->
diff --git a/include/media/msm/vidc_init.h b/include/media/msm/vidc_init.h
index c35f770..5df0c3e 100644
--- a/include/media/msm/vidc_init.h
+++ b/include/media/msm/vidc_init.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#define VIDC_MAX_NUM_CLIENTS 4
#define MAX_VIDEO_NUM_OF_BUFF 100
#define MAX_META_BUFFERS 32
+#define MAX_MV_BUFFERS 32
enum buffer_dir {
BUFFER_TYPE_INPUT,
--
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@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From af85054aa6a1bcd38be2354921f2f80aef1440e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Pachika, Vikas Reddy" <vpachi@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 21:06:37 +0530
Subject: msm: vidc: Validate userspace buffer count
Makesure the number of buffers count is less than
the maximum limit to avoid structure overflow errors.
Change-Id: Icf3850de36325637ae43ac95f1c8f0f63e201d31
CRs-fixed: 563694
Signed-off-by: Pachika, Vikas Reddy <vpachi@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/dec/vdec.c | 6 ++++++
include/media/msm/vidc_init.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/dec/vdec.c b/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/dec/vdec.c
index a843889..b45100f 100644
--- a/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/dec/vdec.c
+++ b/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/dec/vdec.c
@@ -1201,6 +1201,12 @@ static u32 vid_dec_set_h264_mv_buffers(struct video_client_ctx *client_ctx,
vcd_h264_mv_buffer->pmem_fd = mv_data->pmem_fd;
vcd_h264_mv_buffer->offset = mv_data->offset;
+ if (mv_data->count > MAX_MV_BUFFERS) {
+ ERR("MV buffers maximum count reached, count = %d",
+ mv_data->count);
+ return false;
+ }
+
if (!vcd_get_ion_status()) {
if (get_pmem_file(vcd_h264_mv_buffer->pmem_fd,
(unsigned long *) (&(vcd_h264_mv_buffer->
diff --git a/include/media/msm/vidc_init.h b/include/media/msm/vidc_init.h
index c35f770..5df0c3e 100644
--- a/include/media/msm/vidc_init.h
+++ b/include/media/msm/vidc_init.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#define VIDC_MAX_NUM_CLIENTS 4
#define MAX_VIDEO_NUM_OF_BUFF 100
#define MAX_META_BUFFERS 32
+#define MAX_MV_BUFFERS 32
enum buffer_dir {
BUFFER_TYPE_INPUT,
--
cgit v1.1

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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From b5bb13e1f738f90df11e0c17f843c73999a84a54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Terence Hampson <thampson@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2013 10:53:18 -0400
Subject: mdss: mdp3: Validate input from userspace
Fully verify that the values from client are safe to use.
Change-Id: I73d6839f5bccd53b8bc2d812dc7673b13735299c
Signed-off-by: Terence Hampson <thampson@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_ctrl.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_ctrl.c b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_ctrl.c
index ee51e92..1d6d437 100644
--- a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_ctrl.c
@@ -1218,7 +1218,8 @@ static int mdp3_ctrl_lut_update(struct msm_fb_data_type *mfd,
if (!mdp3_session->dma->config_lut)
return -EINVAL;
- if (cmap->start + cmap->len > MDP_LUT_SIZE) {
+ if (cmap->start > MDP_LUT_SIZE || cmap->len > MDP_LUT_SIZE ||
+ (cmap->start + cmap->len > MDP_LUT_SIZE)) {
pr_err("mdp3_ctrl_lut_update invalid arguments\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
--
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37
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9781/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From a2b5237ad265ec634489c8b296d870827b2a1b13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shalabh Jain <shalabhj@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2013 15:10:44 -0800
Subject: fbcmap: prevent memory overflow
Add bounds check before copying data to prevent
buffer overflow.
Change-Id: I47b9685b1ab13c4863fb6db62bbb9497a00b36da
Signed-off-by: Shalabh Jain <shalabhj@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/video/fbcmap.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/video/fbcmap.c b/drivers/video/fbcmap.c
index 31e93a5..f26570d 100644
--- a/drivers/video/fbcmap.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbcmap.c
@@ -203,11 +203,13 @@ int fb_cmap_to_user(const struct fb_cmap *from, struct fb_cmap_user *to)
fromoff = to->start - from->start;
else
tooff = from->start - to->start;
+ if ((to->len <= tooff) || (from->len <= fromoff))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
size = to->len - tooff;
+
if (size > (int) (from->len - fromoff))
size = from->len - fromoff;
- if (size <= 0)
- return -EINVAL;
size *= sizeof(u16);
if (from->red && to->red)
--
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@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
From 2e57a46ab2ba7299d99d9cdc1382bd1e612963fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hariram Purushothaman <hpurus@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 10:42:21 -0700
Subject: msm: camera: Fix various small issues in Actuator driver
Bound check and validate userspace parameters direction,
number of steps and direction sign. Also fix possible
memory leak in certain error cases.
CRs-Fixed: 511349
Change-Id: Icaa324468574494fb40f2de78e522090806744cb
Signed-off-by: Hariram Purushothaman <hpurus@codeaurora.org>
---
.../msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++---
include/media/msm_cam_sensor.h | 4 +++
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c
index 87178b7..fe2c16f 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c
@@ -245,6 +245,20 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_move_focus(
if (dest_step_pos == a_ctrl->curr_step_pos)
return rc;
+ if ((sign_dir > MSM_ACTUATOR_MOVE_SIGNED_NEAR) ||
+ (sign_dir < MSM_ACTUATOR_MOVE_SIGNED_FAR)) {
+ pr_err("Invalid sign_dir = %d\n", sign_dir);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ if ((dir > MOVE_FAR) || (dir < MOVE_NEAR)) {
+ pr_err("Invalid direction = %d\n", dir);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ if (dest_step_pos > a_ctrl->total_steps) {
+ pr_err("Step pos greater than total steps = %d\n",
+ dest_step_pos);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
curr_lens_pos = a_ctrl->step_position_table[a_ctrl->curr_step_pos];
a_ctrl->i2c_tbl_index = 0;
CDBG("curr_step_pos =%d dest_step_pos =%d curr_lens_pos=%d\n",
@@ -318,6 +332,12 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_init_step_table(struct msm_actuator_ctrl_t *a_ctrl,
kfree(a_ctrl->step_position_table);
a_ctrl->step_position_table = NULL;
+ if (set_info->af_tuning_params.total_steps
+ > MAX_ACTUATOR_AF_TOTAL_STEPS) {
+ pr_err("Max actuator totalsteps exceeded = %d\n",
+ set_info->af_tuning_params.total_steps);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
/* Fill step position table */
a_ctrl->step_position_table =
kmalloc(sizeof(uint16_t) *
@@ -409,12 +429,19 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_init(struct msm_actuator_ctrl_t *a_ctrl,
pr_err("Actuator function table not found\n");
return rc;
}
-
- a_ctrl->region_size = set_info->af_tuning_params.region_size;
- if (a_ctrl->region_size > MAX_ACTUATOR_REGION) {
+ if (set_info->af_tuning_params.total_steps
+ > MAX_ACTUATOR_AF_TOTAL_STEPS) {
+ pr_err("Max actuator totalsteps exceeded = %d\n",
+ set_info->af_tuning_params.total_steps);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ if (set_info->af_tuning_params.region_size
+ > MAX_ACTUATOR_REGION) {
pr_err("MAX_ACTUATOR_REGION is exceeded.\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
+
+ a_ctrl->region_size = set_info->af_tuning_params.region_size;
a_ctrl->pwd_step = set_info->af_tuning_params.pwd_step;
a_ctrl->total_steps = set_info->af_tuning_params.total_steps;
@@ -461,7 +488,9 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_init(struct msm_actuator_ctrl_t *a_ctrl,
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (set_info->actuator_params.init_setting_size) {
+ if (set_info->actuator_params.init_setting_size &&
+ set_info->actuator_params.init_setting_size
+ <= MAX_ACTUATOR_REG_TBL_SIZE) {
if (a_ctrl->func_tbl->actuator_init_focus) {
init_settings = kmalloc(sizeof(struct reg_settings_t) *
(set_info->actuator_params.init_setting_size),
@@ -793,6 +822,7 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_platform_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
&pdev->id);
CDBG("cell-index %d, rc %d\n", pdev->id, rc);
if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(msm_actuator_t);
pr_err("failed rc %d\n", rc);
return rc;
}
@@ -801,6 +831,7 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_platform_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
&msm_actuator_t->cci_master);
CDBG("qcom,cci-master %d, rc %d\n", msm_actuator_t->cci_master, rc);
if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(msm_actuator_t);
pr_err("failed rc %d\n", rc);
return rc;
}
@@ -817,6 +848,7 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_platform_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
msm_actuator_t->i2c_client.cci_client = kzalloc(sizeof(
struct msm_camera_cci_client), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msm_actuator_t->i2c_client.cci_client) {
+ kfree(msm_actuator_t);
pr_err("failed no memory\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
diff --git a/include/media/msm_cam_sensor.h b/include/media/msm_cam_sensor.h
index 326e8bf..08a2025 100644
--- a/include/media/msm_cam_sensor.h
+++ b/include/media/msm_cam_sensor.h
@@ -40,10 +40,14 @@
#define MAX_ACTUATOR_REGION 5
#define MAX_ACTUATOR_INIT_SET 12
#define MAX_ACTUATOR_REG_TBL_SIZE 8
+#define MAX_ACTUATOR_AF_TOTAL_STEPS 1024
#define MOVE_NEAR 0
#define MOVE_FAR 1
+#define MSM_ACTUATOR_MOVE_SIGNED_FAR -1
+#define MSM_ACTUATOR_MOVE_SIGNED_NEAR 1
+
#define MAX_EEPROM_NAME 32
#define MAX_AF_ITERATIONS 3
--
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@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
From 2b1050b49a9a5f7bb57006648d145e001a3eaa8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hariram Purushothaman <hpurus@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2013 14:30:36 -0700
Subject: msm: camera: Fix various small issues in cci driver
Remove some unused ioctl exposed, Also add
some bound checks for ioctl user params.
Change-Id: Ifdd441fdb25fd20b005c4e4e1ebe4e203f1216ac
CRs-Fixed: 511382
Signed-off-by: Hariram Purushothaman <hpurus@codeaurora.org>
---
.../platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/cci/msm_cci.c | 101 +++++++++++++--------
include/media/msm_cam_sensor.h | 2 +
2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/cci/msm_cci.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/cci/msm_cci.c
index 7f4f231..6beb92e 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/cci/msm_cci.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/cci/msm_cci.c
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@
/* Max bytes that can be read per CCI read transaction */
#define CCI_READ_MAX 12
+#define CCI_I2C_READ_MAX_RETRIES 3
+#define CCI_I2C_MAX_READ 8192
+#define CCI_I2C_MAX_WRITE 8192
static struct v4l2_subdev *g_cci_subdev;
@@ -87,36 +90,6 @@ static void msm_cci_set_clk_param(struct cci_device *cci_dev)
return;
}
-static int32_t msm_cci_i2c_config_sync_timer(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
- struct msm_camera_cci_ctrl *c_ctrl)
-{
- struct cci_device *cci_dev;
- cci_dev = v4l2_get_subdevdata(sd);
- msm_camera_io_w(c_ctrl->cci_info->cid, cci_dev->base +
- CCI_SET_CID_SYNC_TIMER_0_ADDR + (c_ctrl->cci_info->cid * 0x4));
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int32_t msm_cci_i2c_set_freq(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
- struct msm_camera_cci_ctrl *c_ctrl)
-{
- struct cci_device *cci_dev;
- uint32_t val;
- cci_dev = v4l2_get_subdevdata(sd);
- val = c_ctrl->cci_info->freq;
- msm_camera_io_w(val, cci_dev->base + CCI_I2C_M0_SCL_CTL_ADDR +
- c_ctrl->cci_info->cci_i2c_master*0x100);
- msm_camera_io_w(val, cci_dev->base + CCI_I2C_M0_SDA_CTL_0_ADDR +
- c_ctrl->cci_info->cci_i2c_master*0x100);
- msm_camera_io_w(val, cci_dev->base + CCI_I2C_M0_SDA_CTL_1_ADDR +
- c_ctrl->cci_info->cci_i2c_master*0x100);
- msm_camera_io_w(val, cci_dev->base + CCI_I2C_M0_SDA_CTL_2_ADDR +
- c_ctrl->cci_info->cci_i2c_master*0x100);
- msm_camera_io_w(val, cci_dev->base + CCI_I2C_M0_MISC_CTL_ADDR +
- c_ctrl->cci_info->cci_i2c_master*0x100);
- return 0;
-}
-
static void msm_cci_flush_queue(struct cci_device *cci_dev,
enum cci_i2c_master_t master)
{
@@ -213,8 +186,29 @@ static int32_t msm_cci_data_queue(struct cci_device *cci_dev,
uint16_t cmd_size = i2c_msg->size;
struct msm_camera_i2c_reg_conf *i2c_cmd = i2c_msg->reg_conf_tbl;
enum cci_i2c_master_t master = c_ctrl->cci_info->cci_i2c_master;
+
+ if (i2c_cmd == NULL) {
+ pr_err("%s:%d Failed line\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((!cmd_size) || (cmd_size > CCI_I2C_MAX_WRITE)) {
+ pr_err("%s:%d Failed line\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
CDBG("%s addr type %d data type %d\n", __func__,
i2c_msg->addr_type, i2c_msg->data_type);
+
+ if (i2c_msg->addr_type >= MSM_CAMERA_I2C_ADDR_TYPE_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s failed line %d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (i2c_msg->data_type >= MSM_CAMERA_I2C_DATA_TYPE_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s failed line %d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
/* assume total size within the max queue */
while (cmd_size) {
CDBG("%s cmd_size %d addr 0x%x data 0x%x", __func__,
@@ -321,6 +315,18 @@ static int32_t msm_cci_i2c_read(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
goto ERROR;
}
+ if (c_ctrl->cci_info->retries > CCI_I2C_READ_MAX_RETRIES) {
+ pr_err("%s:%d More than max retries\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__);
+ goto ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (read_cfg->data == NULL) {
+ pr_err("%s:%d Data ptr is NULL\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__);
+ goto ERROR;
+ }
+
CDBG("%s master %d, queue %d\n", __func__, master, queue);
CDBG("%s set param sid 0x%x retries %d id_map %d\n", __func__,
c_ctrl->cci_info->sid, c_ctrl->cci_info->retries,
@@ -341,6 +347,11 @@ static int32_t msm_cci_i2c_read(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
goto ERROR;
}
+ if (read_cfg->addr_type >= MSM_CAMERA_I2C_ADDR_TYPE_MAX) {
+ CDBG("%s failed line %d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+ goto ERROR;
+ }
+
if (read_cfg->addr_type == MSM_CAMERA_I2C_BYTE_ADDR)
val = CCI_I2C_WRITE_DISABLE_P_CMD | (read_cfg->addr_type << 4) |
((read_cfg->addr & 0xFF) << 8);
@@ -454,9 +465,14 @@ static int32_t msm_cci_i2c_read_bytes(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (c_ctrl->cci_info->cci_i2c_master > MASTER_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s:%d Invalid I2C master addr\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
master = c_ctrl->cci_info->cci_i2c_master;
read_cfg = &c_ctrl->cfg.cci_i2c_read_cfg;
- if (!read_cfg->num_byte) {
+ if ((!read_cfg->num_byte) || (read_cfg->num_byte > CCI_I2C_MAX_READ)) {
pr_err("%s:%d read num bytes 0\n", __func__, __LINE__);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto ERROR;
@@ -494,6 +510,10 @@ static int32_t msm_cci_i2c_write(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
enum cci_i2c_master_t master;
enum cci_i2c_queue_t queue = QUEUE_0;
cci_dev = v4l2_get_subdevdata(sd);
+ if (c_ctrl->cci_info->cci_i2c_master > MASTER_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s:%d Invalid I2C master addr\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
master = c_ctrl->cci_info->cci_i2c_master;
CDBG("%s master %d, queue %d\n", __func__, master, queue);
CDBG("%s set param sid 0x%x retries %d id_map %d\n", __func__,
@@ -514,6 +534,11 @@ static int32_t msm_cci_i2c_write(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
__LINE__, rc);
goto ERROR;
}
+ if (c_ctrl->cci_info->retries > CCI_I2C_READ_MAX_RETRIES) {
+ pr_err("%s:%d More than max retries\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__);
+ goto ERROR;
+ }
val = CCI_I2C_SET_PARAM_CMD | c_ctrl->cci_info->sid << 4 |
c_ctrl->cci_info->retries << 16 |
@@ -533,7 +558,11 @@ static int32_t msm_cci_i2c_write(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
goto ERROR;
}
- msm_cci_data_queue(cci_dev, c_ctrl, queue);
+ rc = msm_cci_data_queue(cci_dev, c_ctrl, queue);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ CDBG("%s failed line %d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+ goto ERROR;
+ }
val = CCI_I2C_UNLOCK_CMD;
CDBG("%s:%d CCI_I2C_UNLOCK_CMD\n", __func__, __LINE__);
rc = msm_cci_write_i2c_queue(cci_dev, val, master, queue);
@@ -703,14 +732,6 @@ static int32_t msm_cci_config(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
case MSM_CCI_RELEASE:
rc = msm_cci_release(sd);
break;
- case MSM_CCI_SET_SID:
- break;
- case MSM_CCI_SET_FREQ:
- rc = msm_cci_i2c_set_freq(sd, cci_ctrl);
- break;
- case MSM_CCI_SET_SYNC_CID:
- rc = msm_cci_i2c_config_sync_timer(sd, cci_ctrl);
- break;
case MSM_CCI_I2C_READ:
rc = msm_cci_i2c_read_bytes(sd, cci_ctrl);
break;
diff --git a/include/media/msm_cam_sensor.h b/include/media/msm_cam_sensor.h
index 2805401..da16bb8 100644
--- a/include/media/msm_cam_sensor.h
+++ b/include/media/msm_cam_sensor.h
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ enum msm_camera_i2c_reg_addr_type {
MSM_CAMERA_I2C_BYTE_ADDR = 1,
MSM_CAMERA_I2C_WORD_ADDR,
MSM_CAMERA_I2C_3B_ADDR,
+ MSM_CAMERA_I2C_ADDR_TYPE_MAX,
};
enum msm_camera_i2c_data_type {
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ enum msm_camera_i2c_data_type {
MSM_CAMERA_I2C_SET_WORD_MASK,
MSM_CAMERA_I2C_UNSET_WORD_MASK,
MSM_CAMERA_I2C_SET_BYTE_WRITE_MASK_DATA,
+ MSM_CAMERA_I2C_DATA_TYPE_MAX,
};
enum msm_sensor_power_seq_type_t {
--
cgit v1.1

203
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@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
From 36503d639cedcc73880974ed92132247576e72ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sreelakshmi Gownipalli <sgownipa@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2014 16:54:46 -0800
Subject: diag: Fix for diag debugfs buffer overflow
Diag debugfs buffer has potential buffer overflow scenario which can cause
memory corruption. Added safeguard to prevent this.
Crs-fixed: 585147
Change-Id: Ie1f099bb4bb626adff99ae225966aef70c1bc15e
Signed-off-by: Sreelakshmi Gownipalli <sgownipa@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/char/diag/diag_debugfs.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diag_debugfs.c b/drivers/char/diag/diag_debugfs.c
index d63d34b..96c0fa0 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diag_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diag_debugfs.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2011-2013, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
+/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 and
@@ -33,14 +33,14 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_status(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
{
char *buf;
int ret;
-
+ unsigned int buf_size;
buf = kzalloc(sizeof(char) * DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
pr_err("diag: %s, Error allocating memory\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
-
- ret = scnprintf(buf, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE,
+ buf_size = ksize(buf);
+ ret = scnprintf(buf, buf_size,
"modem ch: 0x%p\n"
"lpass ch: 0x%p\n"
"riva ch: 0x%p\n"
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_status(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
driver->real_time_mode);
#ifdef CONFIG_DIAG_OVER_USB
- ret += scnprintf(buf+ret, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE,
+ ret += scnprintf(buf+ret, buf_size-ret,
"usb_connected: %d\n",
driver->usb_connected);
#endif
@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_dcistats(struct file *file,
unsigned int bytes_remaining, bytes_written = 0;
unsigned int bytes_in_buf = 0, i = 0;
struct diag_dci_data_info *temp_data = dci_data_smd;
- int buf_size = (DEBUG_BUF_SIZE < count) ? DEBUG_BUF_SIZE : count;
+ unsigned int buf_size;
+ buf_size = (DEBUG_BUF_SIZE < count) ? DEBUG_BUF_SIZE : count;
if (diag_dbgfs_dci_finished) {
diag_dbgfs_dci_finished = 0;
@@ -213,6 +214,7 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_dcistats(struct file *file,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ buf_size = ksize(buf);
bytes_remaining = buf_size;
if (diag_dbgfs_dci_data_index == 0) {
@@ -281,6 +283,7 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_workpending(struct file *file,
{
char *buf;
int ret;
+ unsigned int buf_size;
buf = kzalloc(sizeof(char) * DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
@@ -288,7 +291,8 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_workpending(struct file *file,
return -ENOMEM;
}
- ret = scnprintf(buf, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE,
+ buf_size = ksize(buf);
+ ret = scnprintf(buf, buf_size,
"Pending status for work_stucts:\n"
"diag_drain_work: %d\n"
"Modem data diag_read_smd_work: %d\n"
@@ -336,7 +340,7 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_workpending(struct file *file,
diag_notify_update_smd_work)));
#ifdef CONFIG_DIAG_OVER_USB
- ret += scnprintf(buf+ret, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE,
+ ret += scnprintf(buf+ret, buf_size-ret,
"diag_proc_hdlc_work: %d\n"
"diag_read_work: %d\n",
work_pending(&(driver->diag_proc_hdlc_work)),
@@ -357,7 +361,8 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_table(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
unsigned int bytes_remaining;
unsigned int bytes_in_buffer = 0;
unsigned int bytes_written;
- int buf_size = (DEBUG_BUF_SIZE < count) ? DEBUG_BUF_SIZE : count;
+ unsigned int buf_size;
+ buf_size = (DEBUG_BUF_SIZE < count) ? DEBUG_BUF_SIZE : count;
if (diag_dbgfs_table_index >= diag_max_reg) {
/* Done. Reset to prepare for future requests */
@@ -370,7 +375,7 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_table(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
pr_err("diag: %s, Error allocating memory\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
-
+ buf_size = ksize(buf);
bytes_remaining = buf_size;
if (diag_dbgfs_table_index == 0) {
@@ -379,6 +384,7 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_table(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
"WCNSS: %d, APPS: %d\n",
MODEM_DATA, LPASS_DATA, WCNSS_DATA, APPS_DATA);
bytes_in_buffer += bytes_written;
+ bytes_remaining -= bytes_written;
}
for (i = diag_dbgfs_table_index; i < diag_max_reg; i++) {
@@ -422,14 +428,15 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_mempool(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
{
char *buf = NULL;
int ret = 0, i = 0;
-
+ unsigned int buf_size;
buf = kzalloc(sizeof(char) * DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(buf)) {
pr_err("diag: %s, Error allocating memory\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ buf_size = ksize(buf);
- ret = scnprintf(buf, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE,
+ ret = scnprintf(buf, buf_size,
"POOL_TYPE_COPY: [0x%p : 0x%p] count = %d\n"
"POOL_TYPE_HDLC: [0x%p : 0x%p] count = %d\n"
"POOL_TYPE_USER: [0x%p : 0x%p] count = %d\n"
@@ -454,7 +461,7 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_mempool(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_HSIC_CH; i++) {
if (!diag_hsic[i].hsic_inited)
continue;
- ret += scnprintf(buf+ret, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE-ret,
+ ret += scnprintf(buf+ret, buf_size-ret,
"POOL_TYPE_HSIC_%d: [0x%p : 0x%p] count = %d\n",
i+1,
diag_hsic[i].diag_hsic_pool,
@@ -465,7 +472,7 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_mempool(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_HSIC_CH; i++) {
if (!diag_hsic[i].hsic_inited)
continue;
- ret += scnprintf(buf+ret, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE-ret,
+ ret += scnprintf(buf+ret, buf_size-ret,
"POOL_TYPE_HSIC_%d_WRITE: [0x%p : 0x%p] count = %d\n",
i+1,
diag_hsic[i].diag_hsic_write_pool,
@@ -484,6 +491,7 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_mempool(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
{
char *buf = NULL;
int ret = 0;
+ unsigned int buf_size;
buf = kzalloc(sizeof(char) * DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(buf)) {
@@ -491,7 +499,8 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_mempool(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
return -ENOMEM;
}
- ret = scnprintf(buf, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE,
+ buf_size = ksize(buf);
+ ret = scnprintf(buf, buf_size,
"POOL_TYPE_COPY: [0x%p : 0x%p] count = %d\n"
"POOL_TYPE_HDLC: [0x%p : 0x%p] count = %d\n"
"POOL_TYPE_USER: [0x%p : 0x%p] count = %d\n"
@@ -530,10 +539,12 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_bridge(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
unsigned int bytes_remaining;
unsigned int bytes_in_buffer = 0;
unsigned int bytes_written;
- int buf_size = (DEBUG_BUF_SIZE < count) ? DEBUG_BUF_SIZE : count;
+ unsigned int buf_size;
int bytes_hsic_inited = 45;
int bytes_hsic_not_inited = 410;
+ buf_size = (DEBUG_BUF_SIZE < count) ? DEBUG_BUF_SIZE : count;
+
if (diag_dbgfs_finished) {
diag_dbgfs_finished = 0;
return 0;
@@ -545,6 +556,7 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_bridge(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ buf_size = ksize(buf);
bytes_remaining = buf_size;
/* Only one smux for now */
--
cgit v1.1

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Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9785/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
From b4338420db61f029ca6713a89c41b3a5852b20ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hariprasad Dhalinarasimha <hnamgund@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 18:25:21 -0700
Subject: qseecom: Change __copy_from_user to copy_from_user
__copy_from_user does not do address check, so use
copy_from_user instead.
Change-Id: I575c0f3c44b55a521c0d42828988c518c0640a29
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Dhalinarasimha <hnamgund@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/misc/qseecom.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
index 04fe140..8e9731f 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ static int qseecom_set_client_mem_param(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
uint32_t len;
/* Copy the relevant information needed for loading the image */
- if (__copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)argp, sizeof(req)))
+ if (copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)argp, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Get the handle of the shared fd */
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static int qseecom_load_app(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data, void __user *argp)
struct qseecom_load_app_ireq load_req;
/* Copy the relevant information needed for loading the image */
- if (__copy_from_user(&load_img_req,
+ if (copy_from_user(&load_img_req,
(void __user *)argp,
sizeof(struct qseecom_load_img_req))) {
pr_err("copy_from_user failed\n");
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ static int qseecom_send_service_cmd(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
struct qseecom_send_svc_cmd_req req;
/*struct qseecom_command_scm_resp resp;*/
- if (__copy_from_user(&req,
+ if (copy_from_user(&req,
(void __user *)argp,
sizeof(req))) {
pr_err("copy_from_user failed\n");
@@ -2086,7 +2086,7 @@ static int qseecom_load_external_elf(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
struct qseecom_command_scm_resp resp;
/* Copy the relevant information needed for loading the image */
- if (__copy_from_user(&load_img_req,
+ if (copy_from_user(&load_img_req,
(void __user *)argp,
sizeof(struct qseecom_load_img_req))) {
pr_err("copy_from_user failed\n");
@@ -2248,7 +2248,7 @@ static int qseecom_query_app_loaded(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
unsigned long flags = 0;
/* Copy the relevant information needed for loading the image */
- if (__copy_from_user(&query_req,
+ if (copy_from_user(&query_req,
(void __user *)argp,
sizeof(struct qseecom_qseos_app_load_query))) {
pr_err("copy_from_user failed\n");
--
cgit v1.1

48
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9786/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 2fb303d9c6ca080f253b10ed9384293ca69ad32b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vasko Kalanoski <vaskok@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2013 10:50:32 -0700
Subject: msm: actuator: fix to prevent kernel heap buffer overflow
fix to prevent kernel heap buffer overflow allows user
controlled data to be written to the heap via the
msm_camera actuator IOCTLs
Change-Id: I4458831e28e0081fb2f5ae55506be866100e1b4f
Signed-off-by: Vasko Kalanoski <vaskok@codeaurora.org>
---
.../platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c
index baa2db8..e605326 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ static void msm_actuator_parse_i2c_params(struct msm_actuator_ctrl_t *a_ctrl,
struct msm_camera_i2c_reg_array *i2c_tbl = a_ctrl->i2c_reg_tbl;
CDBG("Enter\n");
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ /* check that the index into i2c_tbl cannot grow larger that
+ the allocated size of i2c_tbl */
+ if ((a_ctrl->total_steps + 1) < (a_ctrl->i2c_tbl_index)) {
+ break;
+ }
if (write_arr[i].reg_write_type == MSM_ACTUATOR_WRITE_DAC) {
value = (next_lens_position <<
write_arr[i].data_shift) |
@@ -464,8 +469,11 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_init(struct msm_actuator_ctrl_t *a_ctrl,
a_ctrl->i2c_data_type = set_info->actuator_params.i2c_data_type;
a_ctrl->i2c_client.addr_type = set_info->actuator_params.i2c_addr_type;
- a_ctrl->reg_tbl_size = set_info->actuator_params.reg_tbl_size;
- if (a_ctrl->reg_tbl_size > MAX_ACTUATOR_REG_TBL_SIZE) {
+ if (set_info->actuator_params.reg_tbl_size <=
+ MAX_ACTUATOR_REG_TBL_SIZE) {
+ a_ctrl->reg_tbl_size = set_info->actuator_params.reg_tbl_size;
+ } else {
+ a_ctrl->reg_tbl_size = 0;
pr_err("MAX_ACTUATOR_REG_TBL_SIZE is exceeded.\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
--
cgit v1.1

43
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9787/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From 528400ae4cba715f6c9ff4a2657dafd913f30b8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hariprasad Dhalinarasimha <hnamgund@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2013 16:43:39 -0700
Subject: qseecom: Validate the incoming length from user space
Check if there is no integer overflow before using req_len and
resp_len (received from user space). If an overflow is detected
then exit the operation.
Change-Id: I0459a6992bb3b280db42be63a275c55fa6105b1c
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Dhalinarasimha <hnamgund@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/misc/qseecom.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
index 58703cf..1452908 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
@@ -961,6 +961,11 @@ static int __qseecom_send_cmd(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (req->cmd_req_len > UINT_MAX - req->resp_len) {
+ pr_err("Integer overflow detected in req_len & rsp_len, exiting now\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
reqd_len_sb_in = req->cmd_req_len + req->resp_len;
if (reqd_len_sb_in > data->client.sb_length) {
pr_debug("Not enough memory to fit cmd_buf and "
@@ -980,7 +985,7 @@ static int __qseecom_send_cmd(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
msm_ion_do_cache_op(qseecom.ion_clnt, data->client.ihandle,
data->client.sb_virt,
- (req->cmd_req_len + req->resp_len),
+ reqd_len_sb_in,
ION_IOC_CLEAN_INV_CACHES);
ret = scm_call(SCM_SVC_TZSCHEDULER, 1, (const void *) &send_data_req,
--
cgit v1.1

194
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9788/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
From 73bfc22aa70cc0b7e6709381125a0a42aa72a4f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shiv Maliyappanahalli <smaliyap@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 17:00:30 -0700
Subject: ASoC: msm: qdsp6v2: Fix buffer overflow in voice driver
Userspace registers calibration data with acdb driver
through ioctls. Voice driver registers the calibration
data with CVD by querying acdb data from acdb driver and
copies the calibration data in apr message.
The size of the calibration data can be controlled by userspace
and can result in buffer overflow if the calibration size is
greater than the destination buffer size.
Reject acdb data if the size is greater than the size of
destination buffer.
CRs-Fixed: 548872
Change-Id: I4cd23a38c90b745226ddbc28656c82ff7c10432b
Signed-off-by: Shiv Maliyappanahalli <smaliyap@codeaurora.org>
---
sound/soc/msm/qdsp6/q6voice.c | 9 ++++---
sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6voice.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6/q6voice.c b/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6/q6voice.c
index 0e53c64..7294350 100644
--- a/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6/q6voice.c
+++ b/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6/q6voice.c
@@ -1519,7 +1519,8 @@ static int voice_send_cvs_register_cal_cmd(struct voice_data *v)
/* get the cvs cal data */
get_all_vocstrm_cal(&cal_block);
- if (cal_block.cal_size == 0)
+ if (cal_block.cal_size == 0 ||
+ cal_block.cal_size > CVS_CAL_SIZE)
goto fail;
if (v == NULL) {
@@ -1928,7 +1929,8 @@ static int voice_send_cvp_register_cal_cmd(struct voice_data *v)
/* get the cvp cal data */
get_all_vocproc_cal(&cal_block);
- if (cal_block.cal_size == 0)
+ if (cal_block.cal_size == 0 ||
+ cal_block.cal_size > CVP_CAL_SIZE)
goto fail;
if (v == NULL) {
@@ -2063,7 +2065,8 @@ static int voice_send_cvp_register_vol_cal_table_cmd(struct voice_data *v)
get_all_vocvol_cal(&vol_block);
get_all_vocproc_cal(&voc_block);
- if (vol_block.cal_size == 0)
+ if (vol_block.cal_size == 0 ||
+ vol_block.cal_size > CVP_CAL_SIZE)
goto fail;
if (v == NULL) {
diff --git a/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6voice.c b/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6voice.c
index 079cc4d..622fae1 100644
--- a/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6voice.c
+++ b/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6voice.c
@@ -1955,20 +1955,22 @@ static int voice_send_cvs_register_cal_cmd(struct voice_data *v)
if (!common.apr_q6_cvs) {
pr_err("%s: apr_cvs is NULL\n", __func__);
- ret = -EPERM;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
if (!common.cal_mem_handle) {
pr_err("%s: Cal mem handle is NULL\n", __func__);
- ret = -EPERM;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
get_vocstrm_cal(&cal_block);
if (cal_block.cal_size == 0) {
pr_err("%s: CVS cal size is 0\n", __func__);
- ret = -EPERM;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
@@ -1989,6 +1991,15 @@ static int voice_send_cvs_register_cal_cmd(struct voice_data *v)
/* Get the column info corresponding to CVS cal from ACDB. */
get_voice_col_data(VOCSTRM_CAL, &cal_block);
+ if (cal_block.cal_size == 0 ||
+ cal_block.cal_size >
+ sizeof(cvs_reg_cal_cmd.cvs_cal_data.column_info)) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid VOCSTRM_CAL size %d\n",
+ __func__, cal_block.cal_size);
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
memcpy(&cvs_reg_cal_cmd.cvs_cal_data.column_info[0],
(void *) cal_block.cal_kvaddr,
cal_block.cal_size);
@@ -2227,20 +2238,22 @@ static int voice_send_cvp_register_cal_cmd(struct voice_data *v)
if (!common.apr_q6_cvp) {
pr_err("%s: apr_cvp is NULL\n", __func__);
- ret = -EPERM;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
if (!common.cal_mem_handle) {
pr_err("%s: Cal mem handle is NULL\n", __func__);
- ret = -EPERM;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
get_vocproc_cal(&cal_block);
if (cal_block.cal_size == 0) {
pr_err("%s: CVP cal size is 0\n", __func__);
- ret = -EPERM;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
@@ -2261,6 +2274,16 @@ static int voice_send_cvp_register_cal_cmd(struct voice_data *v)
/* Get the column info corresponding to CVP cal from ACDB. */
get_voice_col_data(VOCPROC_CAL, &cal_block);
+ if (cal_block.cal_size == 0 ||
+ cal_block.cal_size >
+ sizeof(cvp_reg_cal_cmd.cvp_cal_data.column_info)) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid VOCPROC_CAL size %d\n",
+ __func__, cal_block.cal_size);
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
memcpy(&cvp_reg_cal_cmd.cvp_cal_data.column_info[0],
(void *) cal_block.cal_kvaddr,
cal_block.cal_size);
@@ -2363,20 +2386,22 @@ static int voice_send_cvp_register_vol_cal_cmd(struct voice_data *v)
if (!common.apr_q6_cvp) {
pr_err("%s: apr_cvp is NULL\n", __func__);
- ret = -EPERM;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
if (!common.cal_mem_handle) {
pr_err("%s: Cal mem handle is NULL\n", __func__);
- ret = -EPERM;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
get_vocvol_cal(&cal_block);
if (cal_block.cal_size == 0) {
pr_err("%s: CVP vol cal size is 0\n", __func__);
- ret = -EPERM;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
@@ -2399,6 +2424,16 @@ static int voice_send_cvp_register_vol_cal_cmd(struct voice_data *v)
/* Get the column info corresponding to CVP volume cal from ACDB. */
get_voice_col_data(VOCVOL_CAL, &cal_block);
+ if (cal_block.cal_size == 0 ||
+ cal_block.cal_size >
+ sizeof(cvp_reg_vol_cal_cmd.cvp_vol_cal_data.column_info)) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid VOCVOL_CAL size %d\n",
+ __func__, cal_block.cal_size);
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
memcpy(&cvp_reg_vol_cal_cmd.cvp_vol_cal_data.column_info[0],
(void *) cal_block.cal_kvaddr,
cal_block.cal_size);
--
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From 5720ed5c3a786e3ba0a2428ac45da5d7ec996b4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gopikrishnaiah Anandan <agopik@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 17:34:21 -0400
Subject: Soc: msm: qdsp6v2: Fix invalid params handling
Alloc and free apis should sanity check all input params.
If allocation fails set client and ion handle to NULL.
Change-Id: Ide3bd782eb90ee8b033e39de232929a1ca7174b7
Signed-off-by: Gopikrishnaiah Anandan <agopik@codeaurora.org>
---
arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/msm_audio_ion.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/msm_audio_ion.c b/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/msm_audio_ion.c
index 0c71659..f9e9d6d 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/msm_audio_ion.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/msm_audio_ion.c
@@ -53,7 +53,11 @@ int msm_audio_ion_alloc(const char *name, struct ion_client **client,
pr_debug("%s:probe is not done, deferred\n", __func__);
return -EPROBE_DEFER;
}
-
+ if (!name || !client || !handle || !paddr || !vaddr
+ || !bufsz || !pa_len) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid params\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
*client = msm_audio_ion_client_create(UINT_MAX, name);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL((void *)(*client))) {
pr_err("%s: ION create client for AUDIO failed\n", __func__);
@@ -102,9 +106,9 @@ int msm_audio_ion_alloc(const char *name, struct ion_client **client,
err_ion_handle:
ion_free(*client, *handle);
- *handle = NULL;
err_ion_client:
msm_audio_ion_client_destroy(*client);
+ *handle = NULL;
*client = NULL;
err:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -116,10 +120,17 @@ int msm_audio_ion_import(const char *name, struct ion_client **client,
ion_phys_addr_t *paddr, size_t *pa_len, void **vaddr)
{
int rc = 0;
+ if (!name || !client || !handle || !ionflag || !paddr || !vaddr
+ || !bufsz || !pa_len) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid params\n", __func__);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
*client = msm_audio_ion_client_create(UINT_MAX, name);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL((void *)(*client))) {
pr_err("%s: ION create client for AUDIO failed\n", __func__);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
@@ -132,8 +143,9 @@ int msm_audio_ion_import(const char *name, struct ion_client **client,
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL((void *) (*handle))) {
pr_err("%s: ion import dma buffer failed\n",
__func__);
- goto err_ion_handle;
- }
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_destroy_client;
+ }
if (ionflag != NULL) {
rc = ion_handle_get_flags(*client, *handle, ionflag);
@@ -154,6 +166,7 @@ int msm_audio_ion_import(const char *name, struct ion_client **client,
*vaddr = ion_map_kernel(*client, *handle);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL((void *)*vaddr)) {
pr_err("%s: ION memory mapping for AUDIO failed\n", __func__);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err_ion_handle;
}
pr_debug("%s: mapped address = %p, size=%d\n", __func__, *vaddr, bufsz);
@@ -162,13 +175,20 @@ int msm_audio_ion_import(const char *name, struct ion_client **client,
err_ion_handle:
ion_free(*client, *handle);
+err_destroy_client:
msm_audio_ion_client_destroy(*client);
+ *client = NULL;
+ *handle = NULL;
err:
- return -EINVAL;
+ return rc;
}
int msm_audio_ion_free(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle)
{
+ if (!client || !handle) {
+ pr_err("%s Invalid params\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
if (msm_audio_ion_data.smmu_enabled) {
/* Need to populate book kept infomation */
pr_debug("client=%p, domain=%p, domain_id=%d, group=%p",
--
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From 6ed921bda8cbb505e8654dfc1095185b0bccc38e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Raviv Shvili <rshvili@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 17:18:29 +0300
Subject: mmc: core : fix arbitrary read/write to user space
In the MMC card debug_fs the read and write handlers use the strlcat
and sscanf, without checking the pointer given.
Since the pointer is not checked it is possible to write
everywhere (ring 0 or 3).
In order to fix it, an access_ok function is being used to verify
the buffer's pointer supplied by user is valid.
CRs-fixed: 545716
Change-Id: Ia710b6af5a95974fc930ca902e8ff18afa4e17ba
Signed-off-by: Raviv Shvili <rshvili@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/mmc/core/debugfs.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/mmc/core/debugfs.c b/drivers/mmc/core/debugfs.c
index 903decf..9897f9f 100644
--- a/drivers/mmc/core/debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/core/debugfs.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/fault-inject.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/mmc/card.h>
#include <linux/mmc/host.h>
@@ -392,6 +393,9 @@ static ssize_t mmc_wr_pack_stats_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
if (!card)
return cnt;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ubuf, cnt))
+ return cnt;
+
if (!card->wr_pack_stats.print_in_read)
return 0;
@@ -532,6 +536,9 @@ static ssize_t mmc_wr_pack_stats_write(struct file *filp,
if (!card)
return cnt;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, ubuf, cnt))
+ return cnt;
+
sscanf(ubuf, "%d", &value);
if (value) {
mmc_blk_init_packed_statistics(card);
@@ -571,6 +578,9 @@ static ssize_t mmc_bkops_stats_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
if (!card)
return cnt;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ubuf, cnt))
+ return cnt;
+
bkops_stats = &card->bkops_info.bkops_stats;
if (!bkops_stats->print_stats)
--
cgit v1.1

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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From a3e3dd9fc0a2699ae053ffd3efb52cdc73ad94cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zaheerulla Meer <zmeer@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2013 18:18:35 +0530
Subject: msm: ipc: Possible memory corruption due to Sign Conversion
msm_ipc_router_skb_to_buf() takes an unsigned argument and assigns the
same to a signed local variable. This might cause issues when the value
of the argument is too high.
Change the datatype of the local variable to unsigned.
CRs-Fixed: 550606
Change-Id: I257a095681dd82fba05367fd6faf25820e95c719
Signed-off-by: Zaheerulla Meer <zmeer@codeaurora.org>
---
arch/arm/mach-msm/ipc_router.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-msm/ipc_router.c b/arch/arm/mach-msm/ipc_router.c
index 9cdad6a1..cb9ad4c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-msm/ipc_router.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-msm/ipc_router.c
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static void *msm_ipc_router_skb_to_buf(struct sk_buff_head *skb_head,
unsigned int len)
{
struct sk_buff *temp;
- int offset = 0, buf_len = 0, copy_len;
+ unsigned int offset = 0, buf_len = 0, copy_len;
void *buf;
if (!skb_head) {
--
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@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
From 5a0fdfada3a2aa50d7b947a2e958bf00cbe0d830 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Date: Fri, 16 May 2014 16:44:32 +0100
Subject: Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
(limited to 'arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h')
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index e4c60d6..aa150ed 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -86,13 +86,12 @@ extern void __pgd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val);
#define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
#define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN)
#define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
-#define PAGE_EXECONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
#define __P000 PAGE_NONE
#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY
#define __P010 PAGE_COPY
#define __P011 PAGE_COPY
-#define __P100 PAGE_EXECONLY
+#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __P110 PAGE_COPY_EXEC
#define __P111 PAGE_COPY_EXEC
@@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ extern void __pgd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val);
#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY
#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED
-#define __S100 PAGE_EXECONLY
+#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
#define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
@@ -137,8 +136,8 @@ extern struct page *empty_zero_page;
#define pte_write(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_WRITE))
#define pte_exec(pte) (!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_UXN))
-#define pte_valid_ng(pte) \
- ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_NG)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_NG))
+#define pte_valid_user(pte) \
+ ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER))
static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)
{
@@ -192,7 +191,7 @@ extern void __sync_icache_dcache(pte_t pteval, unsigned long addr);
static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
{
- if (pte_valid_ng(pte)) {
+ if (pte_valid_user(pte)) {
if (!pte_special(pte) && pte_exec(pte))
__sync_icache_dcache(pte, addr);
if (pte_dirty(pte) && pte_write(pte))
--
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From 75eac48a48562f819f50eeff8369b296d89102d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2013 17:46:29 +0530
Subject: diag: Safeguard for bound checks and integer underflow
At certain point in diag driver there can be integer underflow
and thus can lead to memory leak. Bound checks are placed to
ensure correct behavior of condition statements.
Change-Id: I47e02f764c2c7412db6f90fd42192fee32a761d3
CRs-fixed: 549470
Signed-off-by: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/char/diag/diag_debugfs.c | 15 ++++++++-------
drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
drivers/char/diag/diagchar_hdlc.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diag_debugfs.c b/drivers/char/diag/diag_debugfs.c
index 4bbe948..d63d34b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diag_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diag_debugfs.c
@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_dcistats(struct file *file,
char __user *ubuf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *buf = NULL;
- int bytes_remaining, bytes_written = 0, bytes_in_buf = 0, i = 0;
+ unsigned int bytes_remaining, bytes_written = 0;
+ unsigned int bytes_in_buf = 0, i = 0;
struct diag_dci_data_info *temp_data = dci_data_smd;
int buf_size = (DEBUG_BUF_SIZE < count) ? DEBUG_BUF_SIZE : count;
@@ -353,9 +354,9 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_table(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
char *buf;
int ret = 0;
int i;
- int bytes_remaining;
- int bytes_in_buffer = 0;
- int bytes_written;
+ unsigned int bytes_remaining;
+ unsigned int bytes_in_buffer = 0;
+ unsigned int bytes_written;
int buf_size = (DEBUG_BUF_SIZE < count) ? DEBUG_BUF_SIZE : count;
if (diag_dbgfs_table_index >= diag_max_reg) {
@@ -526,9 +527,9 @@ static ssize_t diag_dbgfs_read_bridge(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
char *buf;
int ret;
int i;
- int bytes_remaining;
- int bytes_in_buffer = 0;
- int bytes_written;
+ unsigned int bytes_remaining;
+ unsigned int bytes_in_buffer = 0;
+ unsigned int bytes_written;
int buf_size = (DEBUG_BUF_SIZE < count) ? DEBUG_BUF_SIZE : count;
int bytes_hsic_inited = 45;
int bytes_hsic_not_inited = 410;
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c b/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c
index 38ca47b..ab68902 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Diag Char Driver");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
MODULE_VERSION("1.0");
+#define MIN_SIZ_ALLOW 4
#define INIT 1
#define EXIT -1
struct diagchar_dev *driver;
@@ -1461,6 +1462,10 @@ static ssize_t diagchar_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
index = 0;
/* Get the packet type F3/log/event/Pkt response */
err = copy_from_user((&pkt_type), buf, 4);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_alert("diag: copy failed for pkt_type\n");
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
/* First 4 bytes indicate the type of payload - ignore these */
if (count < 4) {
pr_err("diag: Client sending short data\n");
@@ -1504,8 +1509,9 @@ static ssize_t diagchar_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return err;
}
if (pkt_type == CALLBACK_DATA_TYPE) {
- if (payload_size > driver->itemsize) {
- pr_err("diag: Dropping packet, packet payload size crosses 4KB limit. Current payload size %d\n",
+ if (payload_size > driver->itemsize ||
+ payload_size <= MIN_SIZ_ALLOW) {
+ pr_err("diag: Dropping packet, invalid packet size. Current payload size %d\n",
payload_size);
driver->dropped_count++;
return -EBADMSG;
@@ -1639,6 +1645,11 @@ static ssize_t diagchar_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
diag_get_remote(*(int *)driver->user_space_data_buf);
if (remote_proc) {
+ if (payload_size <= MIN_SIZ_ALLOW) {
+ pr_err("diag: Integer underflow in %s, payload size: %d",
+ __func__, payload_size);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
token_offset = 4;
payload_size -= 4;
buf += 4;
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_hdlc.c b/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_hdlc.c
index d5ba452..39f1f44 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_hdlc.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_hdlc.c
@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ int diag_hdlc_decode(struct diag_hdlc_decode_type *hdlc)
int msg_start;
if (hdlc && hdlc->src_ptr && hdlc->dest_ptr &&
- (hdlc->src_size - hdlc->src_idx > 0) &&
- (hdlc->dest_size - hdlc->dest_idx > 0)) {
+ (hdlc->src_size > hdlc->src_idx) &&
+ (hdlc->dest_size > hdlc->dest_idx)) {
msg_start = (hdlc->src_idx == 0) ? 1 : 0;
--
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@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
From a1124defc680055e2f2a8c8e3da4a94ca2ec842e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mona Hossain <mhossain@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 13:41:09 -0700
Subject: qseecom: Add checks for API called in IOCTL
Validate the caller is the right type for the IOCTL being
issued and inputs are valid.
Change-Id: Iad71f0f5ed4d53c5d011bd55cdf74ec053d09af5
Signed-off-by: Mona Hossain <mhossain@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Dhalinarasimha <hnamgund@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/misc/qseecom.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 159 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
index 7cc1c9f..51f0228 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
@@ -434,6 +434,12 @@ static int qseecom_set_client_mem_param(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
if (copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)argp, sizeof(req)))
return -EFAULT;
+ if ((req.ifd_data_fd <= 0) || (req.virt_sb_base == 0) ||
+ (req.sb_len == 0)) {
+ pr_err("Inavlid input(s)ion_fd(%d), sb_len(%d), vaddr(0x%x)\n",
+ req.ifd_data_fd, req.sb_len, req.virt_sb_base);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
/* Get the handle of the shared fd */
data->client.ihandle = ion_import_dma_buf(qseecom.ion_clnt,
req.ifd_data_fd);
@@ -2680,6 +2686,12 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
switch (cmd) {
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_REGISTER_LISTENER_REQ: {
+ if (data->type != QSEECOM_GENERIC) {
+ pr_err("reg lstnr req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
pr_debug("ioctl register_listener_req()\n");
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
data->type = QSEECOM_LISTENER_SERVICE;
@@ -2691,6 +2703,13 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_UNREGISTER_LISTENER_REQ: {
+ if ((data->listener.id == 0) ||
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_LISTENER_SERVICE)) {
+ pr_err("unreg lstnr req: invalid handle (%d) lid(%d)\n",
+ data->type, data->listener.id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
pr_debug("ioctl unregister_listener_req()\n");
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
ret = qseecom_unregister_listener(data);
@@ -2701,6 +2720,13 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_CMD_REQ: {
+ if ((data->client.app_id == 0) ||
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP)) {
+ pr_err("send cmd req: invalid handle (%d) app_id(%d)\n",
+ data->type, data->client.app_id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
/* Only one client allowed here at a time */
mutex_lock(&app_access_lock);
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
@@ -2713,6 +2739,13 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_MODFD_CMD_REQ: {
+ if ((data->client.app_id == 0) ||
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP)) {
+ pr_err("send mdfd cmd: invalid handle (%d) appid(%d)\n",
+ data->type, data->client.app_id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
/* Only one client allowed here at a time */
mutex_lock(&app_access_lock);
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
@@ -2725,6 +2758,13 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_RECEIVE_REQ: {
+ if ((data->listener.id == 0) ||
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_LISTENER_SERVICE)) {
+ pr_err("receive req: invalid handle (%d), lid(%d)\n",
+ data->type, data->listener.id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
ret = qseecom_receive_req(data);
atomic_dec(&data->ioctl_count);
@@ -2734,6 +2774,13 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_RESP_REQ: {
+ if ((data->listener.id == 0) ||
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_LISTENER_SERVICE)) {
+ pr_err("send resp req: invalid handle (%d), lid(%d)\n",
+ data->type, data->listener.id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
ret = qseecom_send_resp();
atomic_dec(&data->ioctl_count);
@@ -2743,7 +2790,14 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_SET_MEM_PARAM_REQ: {
- data->type = QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP;
+ if ((data->type != QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP) &&
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_GENERIC) &&
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_SECURE_SERVICE)) {
+ pr_err("set mem param req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
pr_debug("SET_MEM_PARAM: qseecom addr = 0x%x\n", (u32)data);
ret = qseecom_set_client_mem_param(data, argp);
if (ret)
@@ -2752,6 +2806,13 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_LOAD_APP_REQ: {
+ if ((data->type != QSEECOM_GENERIC) &&
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP)) {
+ pr_err("load app req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
data->type = QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP;
pr_debug("LOAD_APP_REQ: qseecom_addr = 0x%x\n", (u32)data);
mutex_lock(&app_access_lock);
@@ -2772,6 +2833,13 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_UNLOAD_APP_REQ: {
+ if ((data->client.app_id == 0) ||
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP)) {
+ pr_err("unload app req:invalid handle(%d) app_id(%d)\n",
+ data->type, data->client.app_id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
pr_debug("UNLOAD_APP: qseecom_addr = 0x%x\n", (u32)data);
mutex_lock(&app_access_lock);
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
@@ -2791,6 +2859,20 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_PERF_ENABLE_REQ:{
+ if ((data->type != QSEECOM_GENERIC) &&
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP)) {
+ pr_err("perf enable req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((data->type == QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP) &&
+ (data->client.app_id == 0)) {
+ pr_err("perf enable req:invalid handle(%d) appid(%d)\n",
+ data->type, data->client.app_id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
ret = qsee_vote_for_clock(data, CLK_DFAB);
if (ret)
@@ -2802,13 +2884,33 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_PERF_DISABLE_REQ:{
+ if ((data->type != QSEECOM_SECURE_SERVICE) &&
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP)) {
+ pr_err("perf disable req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((data->type == QSEECOM_CLIENT_APP) &&
+ (data->client.app_id == 0)) {
+ pr_err("perf disable: invalid handle (%d)app_id(%d)\n",
+ data->type, data->client.app_id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
- qsee_disable_clock_vote(data, CLK_DFAB);
- qsee_disable_clock_vote(data, CLK_SFPB);
+ qsee_disable_clock_vote(data, CLK_DFAB);
+ qsee_disable_clock_vote(data, CLK_SFPB);
atomic_dec(&data->ioctl_count);
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ELF_REQ: {
+ if (data->type != QSEECOM_GENERIC) {
+ pr_err("load ext elf req: invalid client handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
data->type = QSEECOM_UNAVAILABLE_CLIENT_APP;
data->released = true;
mutex_lock(&app_access_lock);
@@ -2821,6 +2923,12 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_UNLOAD_EXTERNAL_ELF_REQ: {
+ if (data->type != QSEECOM_UNAVAILABLE_CLIENT_APP) {
+ pr_err("unload ext elf req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
data->released = true;
mutex_lock(&app_access_lock);
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
@@ -2842,9 +2950,15 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_CMD_SERVICE_REQ: {
+ if (data->type != QSEECOM_GENERIC) {
+ pr_err("send cmd svc req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
data->type = QSEECOM_SECURE_SERVICE;
if (qseecom.qsee_version < QSEE_VERSION_03) {
- pr_err("SEND_CMD_SERVICE_REQ: Invalid qsee version %u\n",
+ pr_err("SEND_CMD_SERVICE_REQ: Invalid qsee ver %u\n",
qseecom.qsee_version);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2856,8 +2970,14 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_CREATE_KEY_REQ: {
+ if (data->type != QSEECOM_GENERIC) {
+ pr_err("create key req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
if (qseecom.qsee_version < QSEE_VERSION_05) {
- pr_err("Create Key feature not supported in qsee version %u\n",
+ pr_err("Create Key feature unsupported: qsee ver %u\n",
qseecom.qsee_version);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2873,8 +2993,14 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_WIPE_KEY_REQ: {
+ if (data->type != QSEECOM_GENERIC) {
+ pr_err("wipe key req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
if (qseecom.qsee_version < QSEE_VERSION_05) {
- pr_err("Wipe Key feature not supported in qsee version %u\n",
+ pr_err("Wipe Key feature unsupported in qsee ver %u\n",
qseecom.qsee_version);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2889,6 +3015,12 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_SAVE_PARTITION_HASH_REQ: {
+ if (data->type != QSEECOM_GENERIC) {
+ pr_err("save part hash req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
data->released = true;
mutex_lock(&app_access_lock);
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
@@ -2898,6 +3030,12 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_IS_ES_ACTIVATED_REQ: {
+ if (data->type != QSEECOM_GENERIC) {
+ pr_err("ES activated req: invalid handle (%d)\n",
+ data->type);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
data->released = true;
mutex_lock(&app_access_lock);
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
@@ -2907,6 +3045,13 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_SEND_MODFD_RESP: {
+ if ((data->listener.id == 0) ||
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_LISTENER_SERVICE)) {
+ pr_err("receive req: invalid handle (%d), lid(%d)\n",
+ data->type, data->listener.id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
/* Only one client allowed here at a time */
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
ret = qseecom_send_modfd_resp(data, argp);
@@ -2917,6 +3062,13 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
case QSEECOM_IOCTL_UNPROTECT_BUF: {
+ if ((data->listener.id == 0) ||
+ (data->type != QSEECOM_LISTENER_SERVICE)) {
+ pr_err("receive req: invalid handle (%d), lid(%d)\n",
+ data->type, data->listener.id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
/* Only one client allowed here at a time */
atomic_inc(&data->ioctl_count);
ret = qseecom_unprotect_buffer(argp);
@@ -2927,6 +3079,7 @@ static long qseecom_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
break;
}
default:
+ pr_err("Invalid IOCTL: %d\n", cmd);
return -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
--
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@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
From e65a876a155de945e306f2726f3a557415e6044e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mona Hossain <mhossain@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 14:08:20 -0700
Subject: qseecom: Validate inputs from user space
Validate send_cmd, send_modfd_cmd and send_mdfd_resp
input parameters: cmd and response pointers and buffer
lengths and offsets issued to modify data.
Change-Id: I381836d08aaa48357486fbdc6a122eb5b42bfa0b
Signed-off-by: Mona Hossain <mhossain@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/misc/qseecom.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
index 4c1943b..97f3362 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
@@ -1134,9 +1134,22 @@ static int __qseecom_send_cmd(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
pr_err("cmd buffer or response buffer is null\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (((uint32_t)req->cmd_req_buf < data->client.user_virt_sb_base) ||
+ ((uint32_t)req->cmd_req_buf >= (data->client.user_virt_sb_base +
+ data->client.sb_length))) {
+ pr_err("cmd buffer address not within shared bufffer\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+
+ if (((uint32_t)req->resp_buf < data->client.user_virt_sb_base) ||
+ ((uint32_t)req->resp_buf >= (data->client.user_virt_sb_base +
+ data->client.sb_length))){
+ pr_err("response buffer address not within shared bufffer\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- if (req->cmd_req_len <= 0 ||
- req->resp_len <= 0 ||
+ if ((req->cmd_req_len == 0) || (req->resp_len == 0) ||
req->cmd_req_len > data->client.sb_length ||
req->resp_len > data->client.sb_length) {
pr_err("cmd buffer length or "
@@ -1371,6 +1384,7 @@ static int qseecom_send_modfd_cmd(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
void __user *argp)
{
int ret = 0;
+ int i;
struct qseecom_send_modfd_cmd_req req;
struct qseecom_send_cmd_req send_cmd_req;
@@ -1384,6 +1398,14 @@ static int qseecom_send_modfd_cmd(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
send_cmd_req.resp_buf = req.resp_buf;
send_cmd_req.resp_len = req.resp_len;
+ /* validate offsets */
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_ION_FD; i++) {
+ if (req.ifd_data[i].cmd_buf_offset >= req.cmd_req_len) {
+ pr_err("Invalid offset %d = 0x%x\n",
+ i, req.ifd_data[i].cmd_buf_offset);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
ret = __qseecom_update_cmd_buf(&req, false, data, false);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -2001,11 +2023,20 @@ static int qseecom_send_modfd_resp(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
void __user *argp)
{
struct qseecom_send_modfd_listener_resp resp;
+ int i;
if (copy_from_user(&resp, argp, sizeof(resp))) {
pr_err("copy_from_user failed");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* validate offsets */
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_ION_FD; i++) {
+ if (resp.ifd_data[i].cmd_buf_offset >= resp.resp_len) {
+ pr_err("Invalid offset %d = 0x%x\n",
+ i, resp.ifd_data[i].cmd_buf_offset);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
__qseecom_update_cmd_buf(&resp, false, data, true);
qseecom.send_resp_flag = 1;
wake_up_interruptible(&qseecom.send_resp_wq);
--
cgit v1.1

45
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9866/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From 8e6daae70422ad35146a87700e6634a747d1ff5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hariram Purushothaman <hpurus@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2013 11:23:47 -0700
Subject: msm: camera: Bound check num_cid from userspace in csid driver
Upper and lower bound checks are enforced for num_cid
which is passed from userspace with lower as 1 and
max of 16.
Change-Id: Ic5456289cb2f2b4ea17610a7672eb2c5225b7954
Signed-off-by: Hariram Purushothaman <hpurus@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/csid/msm_csid.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/csid/msm_csid.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/csid/msm_csid.c
index 9aca234..229fdb2 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/csid/msm_csid.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/csid/msm_csid.c
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static long msm_csid_cmd(struct csid_device *csid_dev, void *arg)
case CSID_CFG: {
struct msm_camera_csid_params csid_params;
struct msm_camera_csid_vc_cfg *vc_cfg = NULL;
- int32_t i = 0;
+ int8_t i = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&csid_params,
(void *)cdata->cfg.csid_params,
sizeof(struct msm_camera_csid_params))) {
@@ -448,6 +448,13 @@ static long msm_csid_cmd(struct csid_device *csid_dev, void *arg)
rc = -EFAULT;
break;
}
+ if (csid_params.lut_params.num_cid < 1 ||
+ csid_params.lut_params.num_cid > 16) {
+ pr_err("%s: %d num_cid outside range\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < csid_params.lut_params.num_cid; i++) {
vc_cfg = kzalloc(csid_params.lut_params.num_cid *
sizeof(struct msm_camera_csid_vc_cfg),
--
cgit v1.1

108
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9867/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
From 322c518689a7f820165ca4c5d6b750b02ac34665 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jim Rasche <jrasche@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2013 15:03:50 -0700
Subject: msm:camera: Fix multiple bounds check
Added bounds check to user input num_streams at several location,
without checking a position outside array could be dereferenced
Change-Id: I6e82d8b51e4ec6772316c7daef243240c029db96
Signed-off-by: Jim Rasche <jrasche@codeaurora.org>
---
.../platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
index 5b7658d..746425b 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
@@ -300,7 +300,16 @@ int msm_isp_axi_check_stream_state(
struct msm_vfe_axi_stream *stream_info;
enum msm_vfe_axi_state valid_state =
(stream_cfg_cmd->cmd == START_STREAM) ? INACTIVE : ACTIVE;
+
+ if (stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams > MAX_NUM_STREAM) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams; i++) {
+ if (HANDLE_TO_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i])
+ > MAX_NUM_STREAM) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
stream_info = &axi_data->stream_info[
HANDLE_TO_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i])];
spin_lock_irqsave(&stream_info->lock, flags);
@@ -840,7 +849,16 @@ static void msm_isp_update_camif_output_count(
int i;
struct msm_vfe_axi_stream *stream_info;
struct msm_vfe_axi_shared_data *axi_data = &vfe_dev->axi_data;
+
+ if (stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams > MAX_NUM_STREAM) {
+ return;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams; i++) {
+ if (HANDLE_TO_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i])
+ > MAX_NUM_STREAM) {
+ return;
+ }
stream_info =
&axi_data->stream_info[
HANDLE_TO_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i])];
@@ -1020,7 +1038,16 @@ static int msm_isp_start_axi_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
uint32_t wm_reload_mask = 0x0;
struct msm_vfe_axi_stream *stream_info;
struct msm_vfe_axi_shared_data *axi_data = &vfe_dev->axi_data;
+
+ if (stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams > MAX_NUM_STREAM) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams; i++) {
+ if (HANDLE_TO_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i])
+ > MAX_NUM_STREAM) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
stream_info = &axi_data->stream_info[
HANDLE_TO_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i])];
src_state = axi_data->src_info[
@@ -1073,7 +1100,16 @@ static int msm_isp_stop_axi_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
uint8_t wait_for_complete = 0;
struct msm_vfe_axi_stream *stream_info;
struct msm_vfe_axi_shared_data *axi_data = &vfe_dev->axi_data;
+
+ if (stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams > MAX_NUM_STREAM) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams; i++) {
+ if (HANDLE_TO_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i])
+ > MAX_NUM_STREAM) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
stream_info = &axi_data->stream_info[
HANDLE_TO_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i])];
@@ -1158,8 +1194,18 @@ int msm_isp_update_axi_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
return -EBUSY;
}
+ /*num_stream is uint32 and update_info[] bound by MAX_NUM_STREAM*/
+ if (update_cmd->num_streams > MAX_NUM_STREAM) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < update_cmd->num_streams; i++) {
update_info = &update_cmd->update_info[i];
+ /*check array reference bounds*/
+ if (HANDLE_TO_IDX(update_info->stream_handle)
+ > MAX_NUM_STREAM) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
stream_info = &axi_data->stream_info[
HANDLE_TO_IDX(update_info->stream_handle)];
if (stream_info->state != ACTIVE &&
--
cgit v1.1

60
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@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
From 1f274b74c00187ba1c379971503f51944148b22f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lakshmi Narayana Kalavala <lkalaval@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2013 15:55:03 -0700
Subject: msm: camera: Fix possible out of bound writes in csi driver
The value csi_lane_mask which is uint16_t is controllable from userspace.
The while loop can loop for 2^16 - 1, Hence extract the required
bit combination from the userspace argument, used it for further
processing.
CRs-Fixed: 511976
Change-Id: I80b0fe7ac273352503d9705510f05debe6cbb10a
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Narayana Kalavala <lkalaval@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/csiphy/msm_csiphy.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/csiphy/msm_csiphy.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/csiphy/msm_csiphy.c
index 21b9cdc..32cf0d3 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/csiphy/msm_csiphy.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/csiphy/msm_csiphy.c
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static int msm_csiphy_release(struct csiphy_device *csiphy_dev, void *arg)
__LINE__, csi_lane_params);
return -EINVAL;
}
- csi_lane_mask = csi_lane_params->csi_lane_mask;
+ csi_lane_mask = (csi_lane_params->csi_lane_mask & 0x1F);
CDBG("%s csiphy_params, lane assign %x mask = %x\n",
__func__,
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static int msm_csiphy_release(struct csiphy_device *csiphy_dev, void *arg)
csiphy_dev->lane_mask[csiphy_dev->pdev->id] &=
~(csi_lane_mask);
i = 0;
- while (csi_lane_mask & 0x1F) {
+ while (csi_lane_mask) {
if (csi_lane_mask & 0x1) {
msm_camera_io_w(0x0, csiphy_dev->base +
MIPI_CSIPHY_LNn_CFG2_ADDR + 0x40*i);
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static int msm_csiphy_release(struct csiphy_device *csiphy_dev, void *arg)
__LINE__, csi_lane_params);
return -EINVAL;
}
- csi_lane_mask = csi_lane_params->csi_lane_mask;
+ csi_lane_mask = (csi_lane_params->csi_lane_mask & 0x1F);
CDBG("%s csiphy_params, lane assign %x mask = %x\n",
__func__,
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static int msm_csiphy_release(struct csiphy_device *csiphy_dev, void *arg)
csiphy_dev->lane_mask[csiphy_dev->pdev->id] &=
~(csi_lane_mask);
i = 0;
- while (csi_lane_mask & 0x1F) {
+ while (csi_lane_mask) {
if (csi_lane_mask & 0x1) {
msm_camera_io_w(0x0, csiphy_dev->base +
MIPI_CSIPHY_LNn_CFG2_ADDR + 0x40*i);
--
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From 8d1f7531ff379befc129a6447642061e87562bca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hariram Purushothaman <hpurus@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 15:39:09 -0700
Subject: msm: camera: Check stats index MAX in ISP driver
Add a check for the stats index MAX using
MSM_ISP_STATS_MAX before accessing stream info
using that index to avoid any invalid memory access.
Change-Id: Iaade2af5d0e3e073e9519961a0f84a93038284bf
CRs-Fixed: 514711
Signed-off-by: Hariram Purushothaman <hpurus@codeaurora.org>
---
.../msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c
index d857a14..33f63b3 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c
@@ -150,6 +150,12 @@ int msm_isp_stats_create_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
stats_idx = vfe_dev->hw_info->vfe_ops.stats_ops.
get_stats_idx(stream_req_cmd->stats_type);
+ if ((stats_idx > MSM_ISP_STATS_MAX) ||
+ (stats_idx == -EINVAL)) {
+ pr_err("%s: Stats idx Error\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
stream_info = &stats_data->stream_info[stats_idx];
if (stream_info->state != STATS_AVALIABLE) {
pr_err("%s: Stats already requested\n", __func__);
@@ -188,7 +194,7 @@ int msm_isp_stats_create_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
int msm_isp_request_stats_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
{
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc = -1;
struct msm_vfe_stats_stream_request_cmd *stream_req_cmd = arg;
struct msm_vfe_stats_stream *stream_info = NULL;
struct msm_vfe_stats_shared_data *stats_data = &vfe_dev->stats_data;
@@ -202,6 +208,11 @@ int msm_isp_request_stats_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
}
stats_idx = STATS_IDX(stream_req_cmd->stream_handle);
+ if (stats_idx > MSM_ISP_STATS_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s: Stats idx Error\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
stream_info = &stats_data->stream_info[stats_idx];
framedrop_period = msm_isp_get_framedrop_period(
@@ -228,9 +239,14 @@ int msm_isp_release_stats_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
struct msm_vfe_stats_stream_release_cmd *stream_release_cmd = arg;
struct msm_vfe_stats_shared_data *stats_data = &vfe_dev->stats_data;
int stats_idx = STATS_IDX(stream_release_cmd->stream_handle);
- struct msm_vfe_stats_stream *stream_info =
- &stats_data->stream_info[stats_idx];
+ struct msm_vfe_stats_stream *stream_info = NULL;
+
+ if (stats_idx > MSM_ISP_STATS_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s: Stats idx Error\n", __func__);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ stream_info = &stats_data->stream_info[stats_idx];
if (stream_info->state == STATS_AVALIABLE) {
pr_err("%s: stream already release\n", __func__);
return rc;
--
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From 7a26934e4196b4aa61944081989189d59b108768 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petar Sivenov <psiven@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 10:12:39 -0700
Subject: msm: camera: isp: Bound check for number stats registers
The index of used stats register is derived from a stream handle least
significant byte and thus can be up to 255. However the stats registers
are up to 8 depending of the target. Thus a bound check is done before
use of the received stats register index value.
Change-Id: Ic008918f4263f57a5b8aabd34266ac1ba3612a9c
Signed-off-by: Petar Sivenov <psiven@codeaurora.org>
---
.../msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++------
.../platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.c | 4 +-
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c
index 0840e30..b479857 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c
@@ -23,8 +23,16 @@ static int msm_isp_stats_cfg_ping_pong_address(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
struct msm_isp_buffer *buf;
uint32_t pingpong_bit = 0;
uint32_t bufq_handle = stream_info->bufq_handle;
- uint32_t stats_pingpong_offset =
- STATS_IDX(stream_info->stream_handle) +
+ uint32_t stats_pingpong_offset;
+
+ if (STATS_IDX(stream_info->stream_handle) >=
+ vfe_dev->hw_info->stats_hw_info->num_stats_type) {
+ pr_err("%s Invalid stats index %d", __func__,
+ STATS_IDX(stream_info->stream_handle));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ stats_pingpong_offset = STATS_IDX(stream_info->stream_handle) +
vfe_dev->hw_info->stats_hw_info->stats_ping_pong_offset;
pingpong_bit = (~(pingpong_status >> stats_pingpong_offset) & 0x1);
@@ -151,10 +159,9 @@ int msm_isp_stats_create_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
stats_idx = vfe_dev->hw_info->vfe_ops.stats_ops.
get_stats_idx(stream_req_cmd->stats_type);
- if ((stats_idx > MSM_ISP_STATS_MAX) ||
- (stats_idx == -EINVAL)) {
- pr_err("%s: Stats idx Error\n", __func__);
- return rc;
+ if (stats_idx >= vfe_dev->hw_info->stats_hw_info->num_stats_type) {
+ pr_err("%s Invalid stats index %d", __func__, stats_idx);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
stream_info = &stats_data->stream_info[stats_idx];
@@ -209,9 +216,10 @@ int msm_isp_request_stats_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
}
stats_idx = STATS_IDX(stream_req_cmd->stream_handle);
- if (stats_idx > MSM_ISP_STATS_MAX) {
- pr_err("%s: Stats idx Error\n", __func__);
- return rc;
+
+ if (stats_idx >= vfe_dev->hw_info->stats_hw_info->num_stats_type) {
+ pr_err("%s Invalid stats index %d", __func__, stats_idx);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
stream_info = &stats_data->stream_info[stats_idx];
@@ -242,9 +250,9 @@ int msm_isp_release_stats_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
int stats_idx = STATS_IDX(stream_release_cmd->stream_handle);
struct msm_vfe_stats_stream *stream_info = NULL;
- if (stats_idx > MSM_ISP_STATS_MAX) {
- pr_err("%s: Stats idx Error\n", __func__);
- return rc;
+ if (stats_idx >= vfe_dev->hw_info->stats_hw_info->num_stats_type) {
+ pr_err("%s Invalid stats index %d", __func__, stats_idx);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
stream_info = &stats_data->stream_info[stats_idx];
@@ -379,6 +387,12 @@ static int msm_isp_start_stats_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
struct msm_vfe_stats_shared_data *stats_data = &vfe_dev->stats_data;
for (i = 0; i < stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams; i++) {
idx = STATS_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i]);
+
+ if (idx >= vfe_dev->hw_info->stats_hw_info->num_stats_type) {
+ pr_err("%s Invalid stats index %d", __func__, idx);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
stream_info = &stats_data->stream_info[idx];
if (stream_info->stream_handle !=
stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i]) {
@@ -423,6 +437,12 @@ static int msm_isp_stop_stats_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
struct msm_vfe_stats_shared_data *stats_data = &vfe_dev->stats_data;
for (i = 0; i < stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams; i++) {
idx = STATS_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i]);
+
+ if (idx >= vfe_dev->hw_info->stats_hw_info->num_stats_type) {
+ pr_err("%s Invalid stats index %d", __func__, idx);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
stream_info = &stats_data->stream_info[idx];
if (stream_info->stream_handle !=
stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i]) {
@@ -453,6 +473,12 @@ static int msm_isp_stop_stats_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
for (i = 0; i < stream_cfg_cmd->num_streams; i++) {
idx = STATS_IDX(stream_cfg_cmd->stream_handle[i]);
+
+ if (idx >= vfe_dev->hw_info->stats_hw_info->num_stats_type) {
+ pr_err("%s Invalid stats index %d", __func__, idx);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
stream_info = &stats_data->stream_info[idx];
msm_isp_deinit_stats_ping_pong_reg(vfe_dev, stream_info);
}
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.c
index fcdf34e..6dba4153 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.c
@@ -768,6 +768,8 @@ void msm_isp_update_error_frame_count(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev)
void msm_isp_process_error_info(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev)
{
int i;
+ uint8_t num_stats_type =
+ vfe_dev->hw_info->stats_hw_info->num_stats_type;
struct msm_vfe_error_info *error_info = &vfe_dev->error_info;
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(rs,
DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
@@ -791,7 +793,7 @@ void msm_isp_process_error_info(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev)
error_info->stream_framedrop_count[i] = 0;
}
}
- for (i = 0; i < MSM_ISP_STATS_MAX; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num_stats_type; i++) {
if (error_info->stats_framedrop_count[i] != 0 &&
__ratelimit(&rs_stats)) {
pr_err("%s: Stats stream[%d]: dropped %d frames\n",
--
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From 4f57652fcd2dce7741f1ac6dc0417e2f265cd1de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Hentschel?= <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2013 23:23:26 +0100
Subject: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context
switch and fork
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Change-Id: Ib1e25be7b9faa846ba5335aad2574e21a1246066
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Git-commit: a4780adeefd042482f624f5e0d577bf9cdcbb760
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
[joonwoop@codeaurora.org: fixed merge conflict]
CRs-fixed: 561044
Signed-off-by: Joonwoo Park <joonwoop@codeaurora.org>
---
arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 +-
arch/arm/include/asm/tls.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S | 5 +++--
arch/arm/kernel/process.c | 4 +++-
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +-
arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | 4 ++--
6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 67d6443..2eb0c2c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct thread_info {
struct cpu_context_save cpu_context; /* cpu context */
__u32 syscall; /* syscall number */
__u8 used_cp[16]; /* thread used copro */
- unsigned long tp_value;
+ unsigned long tp_value[2]; /* TLS registers */
struct crunch_state crunchstate;
union fp_state fpstate __attribute__((aligned(8)));
union vfp_state vfpstate;
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/tls.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/tls.h
index 73409e6..83259b8 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/tls.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/tls.h
@@ -2,27 +2,30 @@
#define __ASMARM_TLS_H
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
- .macro set_tls_none, tp, tmp1, tmp2
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+ .macro switch_tls_none, base, tp, tpuser, tmp1, tmp2
.endm
- .macro set_tls_v6k, tp, tmp1, tmp2
+ .macro switch_tls_v6k, base, tp, tpuser, tmp1, tmp2
+ mrc p15, 0, \tmp2, c13, c0, 2 @ get the user r/w register
mcr p15, 0, \tp, c13, c0, 3 @ set TLS register
- mov \tmp1, #0
- mcr p15, 0, \tmp1, c13, c0, 2 @ clear user r/w TLS register
+ mcr p15, 0, \tpuser, c13, c0, 2 @ and the user r/w register
+ str \tmp2, [\base, #TI_TP_VALUE + 4] @ save it
.endm
- .macro set_tls_v6, tp, tmp1, tmp2
+ .macro switch_tls_v6, base, tp, tpuser, tmp1, tmp2
ldr \tmp1, =elf_hwcap
ldr \tmp1, [\tmp1, #0]
mov \tmp2, #0xffff0fff
tst \tmp1, #HWCAP_TLS @ hardware TLS available?
- mcrne p15, 0, \tp, c13, c0, 3 @ yes, set TLS register
- movne \tmp1, #0
- mcrne p15, 0, \tmp1, c13, c0, 2 @ clear user r/w TLS register
streq \tp, [\tmp2, #-15] @ set TLS value at 0xffff0ff0
+ mrcne p15, 0, \tmp2, c13, c0, 2 @ get the user r/w register
+ mcrne p15, 0, \tp, c13, c0, 3 @ yes, set TLS register
+ mcrne p15, 0, \tpuser, c13, c0, 2 @ set user r/w register
+ strne \tmp2, [\base, #TI_TP_VALUE + 4] @ save it
.endm
- .macro set_tls_software, tp, tmp1, tmp2
+ .macro switch_tls_software, base, tp, tpuser, tmp1, tmp2
mov \tmp1, #0xffff0fff
str \tp, [\tmp1, #-15] @ set TLS value at 0xffff0ff0
.endm
@@ -31,19 +34,30 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_REG_EMUL
#define tls_emu 1
#define has_tls_reg 1
-#define set_tls set_tls_none
+#define switch_tls switch_tls_none
#elif defined(CONFIG_CPU_V6)
#define tls_emu 0
#define has_tls_reg (elf_hwcap & HWCAP_TLS)
-#define set_tls set_tls_v6
+#define switch_tls switch_tls_v6
#elif defined(CONFIG_CPU_32v6K)
#define tls_emu 0
#define has_tls_reg 1
-#define set_tls set_tls_v6k
+#define switch_tls switch_tls_v6k
#else
#define tls_emu 0
#define has_tls_reg 0
-#define set_tls set_tls_software
+#define switch_tls switch_tls_software
#endif
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+static inline unsigned long get_tpuser(void)
+{
+ unsigned long reg = 0;
+
+ if (has_tls_reg && !tls_emu)
+ __asm__("mrc p15, 0, %0, c13, c0, 2" : "=r" (reg));
+
+ return reg;
+}
+#endif
#endif /* __ASMARM_TLS_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S
index 7a8c2d6..0bdba55 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S
@@ -698,15 +698,16 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to)
UNWIND(.fnstart )
UNWIND(.cantunwind )
add ip, r1, #TI_CPU_SAVE
- ldr r3, [r2, #TI_TP_VALUE]
ARM( stmia ip!, {r4 - sl, fp, sp, lr} ) @ Store most regs on stack
THUMB( stmia ip!, {r4 - sl, fp} ) @ Store most regs on stack
THUMB( str sp, [ip], #4 )
THUMB( str lr, [ip], #4 )
+ ldr r4, [r2, #TI_TP_VALUE]
+ ldr r5, [r2, #TI_TP_VALUE + 4]
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS
ldr r6, [r2, #TI_CPU_DOMAIN]
#endif
- set_tls r3, r4, r5
+ switch_tls r1, r4, r5, r3, r7
#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP)
ldr r7, [r2, #TI_TASK]
ldr r8, =__stack_chk_guard
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm/kernel/process.c
index 0ff45bd..18e92f6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/process.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <asm/thread_notify.h>
#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
#include <asm/mach/time.h>
+#include <asm/tls.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
#include <linux/stackprotector.h>
@@ -558,7 +559,8 @@ copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
clear_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(p);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
- thread->tp_value = regs->ARM_r3;
+ thread->tp_value[0] = childregs->ARM_r3;
+ thread->tp_value[1] = get_tpuser();
thread_notify(THREAD_NOTIFY_COPY, thread);
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
index 9650c14..c6c6be7 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
#endif
case PTRACE_GET_THREAD_AREA:
- ret = put_user(task_thread_info(child)->tp_value,
+ ret = put_user(task_thread_info(child)->tp_value[0],
datap);
break;
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
index 12e6fcb..e0a066b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ asmlinkage int arm_syscall(int no, struct pt_regs *regs)
return regs->ARM_r0;
case NR(set_tls):
- thread->tp_value = regs->ARM_r0;
+ thread->tp_value[0] = regs->ARM_r0;
if (tls_emu)
return 0;
if (has_tls_reg) {
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static int get_tp_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
int reg = (instr >> 12) & 15;
if (reg == 15)
return 1;
- regs->uregs[reg] = current_thread_info()->tp_value;
+ regs->uregs[reg] = current_thread_info()->tp_value[0];
regs->ARM_pc += 4;
return 0;
}
--
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From f615e40c706708f74cd826d5b19c63025f54c041 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Seemanta Dutta <seemanta@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 15:52:22 -0700
Subject: msm: camera: Fix potential memory overflow errors
Fix potential memory overflow errors in msm_isp_util.c which happen
under certain rare conditions.
CRs-fixed: 514717
Change-Id: I8c70e089df9bf1e7a364c5c8264b782c9c23bf0b
Signed-off-by: Seemanta Dutta <seemanta@codeaurora.org>
---
.../platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++---
.../platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.c
index 3806213..9b9c5a3 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.c
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ long msm_isp_ioctl(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
break;
case VIDIOC_MSM_ISP_SET_SRC_STATE:
mutex_lock(&vfe_dev->core_mutex);
- msm_isp_set_src_state(vfe_dev, arg);
+ rc = msm_isp_set_src_state(vfe_dev, arg);
mutex_unlock(&vfe_dev->core_mutex);
break;
case VIDIOC_MSM_ISP_REQUEST_STATS_STREAM:
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static int msm_isp_send_hw_cmd(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
if (resource_size(vfe_dev->vfe_mem) <
(reg_cfg_cmd->u.rw_info.reg_offset +
reg_cfg_cmd->u.rw_info.len)) {
- pr_err("%s: Invalid length\n", __func__);
+ pr_err("%s: VFE_WRITE: Invalid length\n", __func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
msm_camera_io_memcpy(vfe_dev->vfe_base +
@@ -422,16 +422,37 @@ static int msm_isp_send_hw_cmd(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
case VFE_WRITE_MB: {
uint32_t *data_ptr = cfg_data +
reg_cfg_cmd->u.rw_info.cmd_data_offset/4;
+
+ if ((UINT_MAX - sizeof(*data_ptr) <
+ reg_cfg_cmd->u.rw_info.reg_offset) ||
+ (resource_size(vfe_dev->vfe_mem) <
+ reg_cfg_cmd->u.rw_info.reg_offset +
+ sizeof(*data_ptr))) {
+ pr_err("%s: VFE_WRITE_MB: Invalid length\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
msm_camera_io_w_mb(*data_ptr, vfe_dev->vfe_base +
reg_cfg_cmd->u.rw_info.reg_offset);
break;
}
case VFE_CFG_MASK: {
uint32_t temp;
+ if (resource_size(vfe_dev->vfe_mem) <
+ reg_cfg_cmd->u.mask_info.reg_offset)
+ return -EINVAL;
temp = msm_camera_io_r(vfe_dev->vfe_base +
reg_cfg_cmd->u.mask_info.reg_offset);
+
temp &= ~reg_cfg_cmd->u.mask_info.mask;
temp |= reg_cfg_cmd->u.mask_info.val;
+ if ((UINT_MAX - sizeof(temp) <
+ reg_cfg_cmd->u.mask_info.reg_offset) ||
+ (resource_size(vfe_dev->vfe_mem) <
+ reg_cfg_cmd->u.mask_info.reg_offset +
+ sizeof(temp))) {
+ pr_err("%s: VFE_CFG_MASK: Invalid length\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
msm_camera_io_w(temp, vfe_dev->vfe_base +
reg_cfg_cmd->u.mask_info.reg_offset);
break;
@@ -443,8 +464,10 @@ static int msm_isp_send_hw_cmd(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
uint32_t *hi_tbl_ptr = NULL, *lo_tbl_ptr = NULL;
uint32_t hi_val, lo_val, lo_val1;
if (reg_cfg_cmd->cmd_type == VFE_WRITE_DMI_64BIT) {
- if (reg_cfg_cmd->u.dmi_info.hi_tbl_offset +
- reg_cfg_cmd->u.dmi_info.len > cmd_len) {
+ if ((UINT_MAX - reg_cfg_cmd->u.dmi_info.hi_tbl_offset <
+ reg_cfg_cmd->u.dmi_info.len) ||
+ (reg_cfg_cmd->u.dmi_info.hi_tbl_offset +
+ reg_cfg_cmd->u.dmi_info.len > cmd_len)) {
pr_err("Invalid Hi Table out of bounds\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -528,6 +551,12 @@ static int msm_isp_send_hw_cmd(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev,
uint32_t *data_ptr = cfg_data +
reg_cfg_cmd->u.rw_info.cmd_data_offset/4;
for (i = 0; i < reg_cfg_cmd->u.rw_info.len/4; i++) {
+ if ((data_ptr < cfg_data) ||
+ (UINT_MAX / sizeof(*data_ptr) <
+ (data_ptr - cfg_data)) ||
+ (sizeof(*data_ptr) * (data_ptr - cfg_data) >
+ cmd_len))
+ return -EINVAL;
*data_ptr++ = msm_camera_io_r(vfe_dev->vfe_base +
reg_cfg_cmd->u.rw_info.reg_offset);
reg_cfg_cmd->u.rw_info.reg_offset += 4;
@@ -545,6 +574,11 @@ int msm_isp_proc_cmd(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
struct msm_vfe_reg_cfg_cmd *reg_cfg_cmd;
uint32_t *cfg_data;
+ if (!proc_cmd->num_cfg) {
+ pr_err("%s: Passed num_cfg as 0\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
reg_cfg_cmd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msm_vfe_reg_cfg_cmd)*
proc_cmd->num_cfg, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!reg_cfg_cmd) {
@@ -856,11 +890,14 @@ void msm_isp_do_tasklet(unsigned long data)
}
}
-void msm_isp_set_src_state(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
+int msm_isp_set_src_state(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
{
struct msm_vfe_axi_src_state *src_state = arg;
+ if (src_state->input_src >= VFE_SRC_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
vfe_dev->axi_data.src_info[src_state->input_src].active =
src_state->src_active;
+ return 0;
}
int msm_isp_open_node(struct v4l2_subdev *sd, struct v4l2_subdev_fh *fh)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.h b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.h
index 34b9859..9d9558a 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.h
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_util.h
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int msm_isp_cal_word_per_line(uint32_t output_format,
uint32_t pixel_per_line);
int msm_isp_get_bit_per_pixel(uint32_t output_format);
irqreturn_t msm_isp_process_irq(int irq_num, void *data);
-void msm_isp_set_src_state(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg);
+int msm_isp_set_src_state(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg);
void msm_isp_do_tasklet(unsigned long data);
void msm_isp_update_error_frame_count(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev);
void msm_isp_process_error_info(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev);
--
cgit v1.1

99
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9872/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
From fc787ebd71fa231cc7dd2a0d5f2208da0527096a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2014 12:00:37 +0530
Subject: diag: dci: Index DCI client table by client id
Diag driver maintains a table of all DCI clients. This table
is currently indexed by the PID of the clients. Make changes
to index the table base on an unique client id.
Change-Id: I57bfab9eae1381882b8eb6270d7ac212e0aaf271
CRs-fixed: 590721
Signed-off-by: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.h | 4 ++++
drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c | 4 +++-
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
index 37c236d..0edfdad 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
@@ -847,6 +847,22 @@ int diag_process_dci_transaction(unsigned char *buf, int len)
return ret;
}
+int diag_dci_find_client_index_health(int client_id)
+{
+ int i, ret = DCI_CLIENT_INDEX_INVALID;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_DCI_CLIENTS; i++) {
+ if (driver->dci_client_tbl[i].client != NULL) {
+ if (driver->dci_client_tbl[i].client_id ==
+ client_id) {
+ ret = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
int diag_dci_find_client_index(int client_id)
{
int i, ret = DCI_CLIENT_INDEX_INVALID;
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.h b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.h
index 2ab8a36..870b0f3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.h
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.h
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct dci_pkt_req_entry_t {
} __packed;
struct diag_dci_client_tbl {
+ uint32_t client_id;
struct task_struct *client;
uint16_t list; /* bit mask */
int signal_type;
@@ -74,6 +75,7 @@ struct diag_dci_client_tbl {
/* This is used for DCI health stats */
struct diag_dci_health_stats {
+ int client_id;
int dropped_logs;
int dropped_events;
int received_logs;
@@ -119,6 +121,8 @@ int diag_process_smd_dci_read_data(struct diag_smd_info *smd_info, void *buf,
int recd_bytes);
int diag_process_dci_transaction(unsigned char *buf, int len);
void extract_dci_pkt_rsp(struct diag_smd_info *smd_info, unsigned char *buf);
+
+int diag_dci_find_client_index_health(int client_id);
int diag_dci_find_client_index(int client_id);
/* DCI Log streaming functions */
void create_dci_log_mask_tbl(unsigned char *tbl_buf);
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c b/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c
index 9a4e108..0e475c9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c
@@ -943,6 +943,8 @@ long diagchar_ioctl(struct file *filp,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_DCI_CLIENTS; i++) {
if (driver->dci_client_tbl[i].client == NULL) {
driver->dci_client_tbl[i].client = current;
+ driver->dci_client_tbl[i].client_id =
+ driver->dci_client_id;
driver->dci_client_tbl[i].list =
dci_params->list;
driver->dci_client_tbl[i].signal_type =
@@ -1043,7 +1045,7 @@ long diagchar_ioctl(struct file *filp,
sizeof(struct diag_dci_health_stats)))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&dci_health_mutex);
- i = diag_dci_find_client_index(current->tgid);
+ i = diag_dci_find_client_index_health(stats.client_id);
if (i != DCI_CLIENT_INDEX_INVALID) {
dci_params = &(driver->dci_client_tbl[i]);
stats.dropped_logs = dci_params->dropped_logs;
--
cgit v1.1

35
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9873/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From ef29ae1d40536fef7fb95e4d5bb5b6b57bdf9420 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2013 13:36:15 +0530
Subject: diag: dci: Safeguard to prevent Integer Underflow and Memory Leak
At certain point in diag driver there can be integer underflow
thus can lead to memory leak. Added a safeguard for that.
Change-Id: I2a0304f5b9888fe12ca9ef5fbaa9a68ee4ab9c15
Crs-fixed: 556860
Signed-off-by: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
index 7772ebe..414207f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
@@ -216,7 +216,11 @@ void extract_dci_pkt_rsp(struct diag_smd_info *smd_info, unsigned char *buf)
if (recv_pkt_cmd_code != DCI_PKT_RSP_CODE)
cmd_code_len = 4; /* delayed response */
write_len = (int)(*(uint16_t *)(buf+2)) - cmd_code_len;
-
+ if (write_len <= 0) {
+ pr_err("diag: Invalid length in %s, write_len: %d",
+ __func__, write_len);
+ return;
+ }
pr_debug("diag: len = %d\n", write_len);
tag = (int *)(buf + (4 + cmd_code_len)); /* Retrieve the Tag field */
req_entry = diag_dci_get_request_entry(*tag);
--
cgit v1.1

64
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9874/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From 56ff68b1f93eaf22e5e0284648fd862dc08c9236 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mohammad Johny Shaik <mjshai@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2013 14:26:42 +0530
Subject: Asoc:msm:Added Buffer overflow check
The overflow check is required to ensure that user space data
in kernel may not go beyond buffer boundary.
Change-Id: I79b7e5f875fadcaeceb05f9163ae3666d4b6b7e1
CRs-Fixed: 563086
Signed-off-by: Mohammad Johny Shaik <mjshai@codeaurora.org>
---
arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/audio_utils.c | 6 ++++++
sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6asm.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/audio_utils.c b/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/audio_utils.c
index 2a245f8..b8e55f9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/audio_utils.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/audio_utils.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <asm/ioctls.h>
#include "audio_utils.h"
+#define FRAME_SIZE (1 + ((1536+sizeof(struct meta_out_dsp)) * 5))
static int audio_in_pause(struct q6audio_in *audio)
{
int rc;
@@ -258,6 +259,11 @@ long audio_in_ioctl(struct file *file,
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
}
+ if ((cfg.buffer_size > FRAME_SIZE) ||
+ (cfg.buffer_count != FRAME_NUM)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
audio->str_cfg.buffer_size = cfg.buffer_size;
audio->str_cfg.buffer_count = cfg.buffer_count;
rc = q6asm_audio_client_buf_alloc(OUT, audio->ac,
diff --git a/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6asm.c b/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6asm.c
index 82b92aa9..09c40d6 100644
--- a/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6asm.c
+++ b/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6asm.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
#define READDONE_IDX_FLAGS 8
#define READDONE_IDX_NUMFRAMES 9
#define READDONE_IDX_SEQ_ID 10
+#define FRAME_NUM (8)
/* TODO, combine them together */
static DEFINE_MUTEX(session_lock);
@@ -608,6 +609,8 @@ int q6asm_audio_client_buf_alloc(unsigned int dir,
pr_debug("%s: buffer already allocated\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
+ if (bufcnt != FRAME_NUM)
+ goto fail;
mutex_lock(&ac->cmd_lock);
buf = kzalloc(((sizeof(struct audio_buffer))*bufcnt),
GFP_KERNEL);
--
cgit v1.1

44
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9874/1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 6b7b66961934660a91fb035e6e4223689a2500da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Masaki Sato <ams087@motorola.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2014 13:23:17 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "(CR): Asoc:msm:Added Buffer overflow check"
This change was only meant for A-family and causes EVRC encoder
buffer allocation failure on B-family.
This reverts commit fdd50cb69df64e8eef0933c9ee9bccb1eeae69ca.
Change-Id: I2ce76602ef396a2939de05626c43ad4e87737418
Signed-off-by: Masaki Sato <ams087@motorola.com>
Reviewed-on: http://gerrit.mot.com/629216
Submit-Approved: Jira Key <jirakey@motorola.com>
Tested-by: Jira Key <jirakey@motorola.com>
SLTApproved: Slta Waiver <sltawvr@motorola.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Carlyle <jeff.carlyle@motorola.com>
Reviewed-by: Sriram Divakar <sriramhd@motorola.com>
Reviewed-by: Yin-Jun Chen <a7301c@motorola.com>
---
sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6asm.c | 3 ---
1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6asm.c b/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6asm.c
index e09af8b48ba..77736150a60 100644
--- a/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6asm.c
+++ b/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/q6asm.c
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@
#define TRUE 0x01
#define FALSE 0x00
-#define FRAME_NUM (8)
/* TODO, combine them together */
static DEFINE_MUTEX(session_lock);
@@ -924,8 +923,6 @@ int q6asm_audio_client_buf_alloc(unsigned int dir,
pr_debug("%s: buffer already allocated\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
- if (bufcnt != FRAME_NUM)
- goto fail;
mutex_lock(&ac->cmd_lock);
buf = kzalloc(((sizeof(struct audio_buffer))*bufcnt),
GFP_KERNEL);

246
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9875/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
From b77c694b88a994d077316c157168c710696f8805 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ravi Aravamudhan <aravamud@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2013 10:10:11 -0700
Subject: diag: dci: Check for request pkt length being lesser than minimum
length
Added checks for DCI request packets to be greater than the minimum
packet length. We would drop the request and print an error otherwise.
CRs-Fixed: 483310
Change-Id: I0d89ded58ee97a08ebe6b06b411ac17d2fcb11df
Signed-off-by: Ravi Aravamudhan <aravamud@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.h | 3 ++
2 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
index 9b404c6..fa0e9d7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
@@ -375,16 +375,23 @@ void diag_dci_notify_client(int peripheral_mask, int data)
int diag_send_dci_pkt(struct diag_master_table entry, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int index)
{
- int i;
- int status = 0;
+ int i, status = 0;
+ unsigned int read_len = 0;
- /* remove UID from user space pkt before sending to peripheral */
- buf = buf + 4;
+ /* The first 4 bytes is the uid tag and the next four bytes is
+ the minmum packet length of a request packet */
+ if (len < DCI_PKT_REQ_MIN_LEN) {
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid pkt len %d in %s\n", len, __func__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
if (len > APPS_BUF_SIZE - 10) {
- pr_err("diag: dci: buffer overwrite possible since payload bigger than buf size\n");
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid payload length in %s\n", __func__);
return -EIO;
}
- len = len - 4;
+ /* remove UID from user space pkt before sending to peripheral*/
+ buf = buf + sizeof(int);
+ read_len += sizeof(int);
+ len = len - sizeof(int);
mutex_lock(&driver->dci_mutex);
/* prepare DCI packet */
driver->apps_dci_buf[0] = CONTROL_CHAR; /* start */
@@ -395,7 +402,13 @@ int diag_send_dci_pkt(struct diag_master_table entry, unsigned char *buf,
driver->req_tracking_tbl[index].tag;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
driver->apps_dci_buf[i+9] = *(buf+i);
+ read_len += len;
driver->apps_dci_buf[9+len] = CONTROL_CHAR; /* end */
+ if ((read_len + 9) >= USER_SPACE_DATA) {
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid length while forming dci pkt in %s",
+ __func__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < NUM_SMD_DCI_CHANNELS; i++) {
struct diag_smd_info *smd_info = driver->separate_cmdrsp[i] ?
@@ -449,10 +462,10 @@ int diag_process_dci_transaction(unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
unsigned char *temp = buf;
uint16_t subsys_cmd_code, log_code, item_num;
- int subsys_id, cmd_code, ret = -1, index = -1, found = 0, read_len = 0;
+ int subsys_id, cmd_code, ret = -1, index = -1, found = 0;
struct diag_master_table entry;
int count, set_mask, num_codes, bit_index, event_id, offset = 0, i;
- unsigned int byte_index;
+ unsigned int byte_index, read_len = 0;
uint8_t equip_id, *log_mask_ptr, *head_log_mask_ptr, byte_mask;
uint8_t *event_mask_ptr;
@@ -462,15 +475,24 @@ int diag_process_dci_transaction(unsigned char *buf, int len)
return DIAG_DCI_SEND_DATA_FAIL;
}
+ if (!temp) {
+ pr_err("diag: Invalid buffer in %s\n", __func__);
+ }
+
/* This is Pkt request/response transaction */
if (*(int *)temp > 0) {
+ if (len < DCI_PKT_REQ_MIN_LEN || len > USER_SPACE_DATA) {
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid length %d len in %s", len,
+ __func__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
/* enter this UID into kernel table and return index */
index = diag_register_dci_transaction(*(int *)temp);
if (index < 0) {
pr_alert("diag: registering new DCI transaction failed\n");
return DIAG_DCI_NO_REG;
}
- temp += 4;
+ temp += sizeof(int);
/*
* Check for registered peripheral and fwd pkt to
* appropriate proc
@@ -480,7 +502,12 @@ int diag_process_dci_transaction(unsigned char *buf, int len)
subsys_id = (int)(*(char *)temp);
temp++;
subsys_cmd_code = *(uint16_t *)temp;
- temp += 2;
+ temp += sizeof(uint16_t);
+ read_len += sizeof(int) + 2 + sizeof(uint16_t);
+ if (read_len >= USER_SPACE_DATA) {
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid length in %s\n", __func__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
pr_debug("diag: %d %d %d", cmd_code, subsys_id,
subsys_cmd_code);
for (i = 0; i < diag_max_reg; i++) {
@@ -514,6 +541,12 @@ int diag_process_dci_transaction(unsigned char *buf, int len)
}
}
} else if (*(int *)temp == DCI_LOG_TYPE) {
+ /* Minimum length of a log mask config is 12 + 2 bytes for
+ atleast one log code to be set or reset */
+ if (len < DCI_LOG_CON_MIN_LEN || len > USER_SPACE_DATA) {
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid length in %s\n", __func__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
/* find client id and table */
i = diag_dci_find_client_index(current->tgid);
if (i == DCI_CLIENT_INDEX_INVALID) {
@@ -521,21 +554,33 @@ int diag_process_dci_transaction(unsigned char *buf, int len)
return ret;
}
/* Extract each log code and put in client table */
- temp += 4;
- read_len += 4;
+ temp += sizeof(int);
+ read_len += sizeof(int);
set_mask = *(int *)temp;
- temp += 4;
- read_len += 4;
+ temp += sizeof(int);
+ read_len += sizeof(int);
num_codes = *(int *)temp;
- temp += 4;
- read_len += 4;
+ temp += sizeof(int);
+ read_len += sizeof(int);
+
+ if (num_codes == 0 || (num_codes >= (USER_SPACE_DATA - 8)/2)) {
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid number of log codes %d\n",
+ num_codes);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
head_log_mask_ptr = driver->dci_client_tbl[i].dci_log_mask;
+ if (!head_log_mask_ptr) {
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid Log mask pointer in %s\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
pr_debug("diag: head of dci log mask %p\n", head_log_mask_ptr);
count = 0; /* iterator for extracting log codes */
while (count < num_codes) {
if (read_len >= USER_SPACE_DATA) {
- pr_err("diag: dci: Log type, possible buffer overflow\n");
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid length for log type in %s",
+ __func__);
return -EIO;
}
log_code = *(uint16_t *)temp;
@@ -589,6 +634,12 @@ int diag_process_dci_transaction(unsigned char *buf, int len)
/* send updated mask to peripherals */
ret = diag_send_dci_log_mask(driver->smd_cntl[MODEM_DATA].ch);
} else if (*(int *)temp == DCI_EVENT_TYPE) {
+ /* Minimum length of a event mask config is 12 + 4 bytes for
+ atleast one event id to be set or reset. */
+ if (len < DCI_EVENT_CON_MIN_LEN || len > USER_SPACE_DATA) {
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid length in %s\n", __func__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
/* find client id and table */
i = diag_dci_find_client_index(current->tgid);
if (i == DCI_CLIENT_INDEX_INVALID) {
@@ -596,21 +647,36 @@ int diag_process_dci_transaction(unsigned char *buf, int len)
return ret;
}
/* Extract each log code and put in client table */
- temp += 4;
- read_len += 4;
+ temp += sizeof(int);
+ read_len += sizeof(int);
set_mask = *(int *)temp;
- temp += 4;
- read_len += 4;
+ temp += sizeof(int);
+ read_len += sizeof(int);
num_codes = *(int *)temp;
- temp += 4;
- read_len += 4;
+ temp += sizeof(int);
+ read_len += sizeof(int);
+
+ /* Check for positive number of event ids. Also, the number of
+ event ids should fit in the buffer along with set_mask and
+ num_codes which are 4 bytes each */
+ if (num_codes == 0 || (num_codes >= (USER_SPACE_DATA - 8)/2)) {
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid number of event ids %d\n",
+ num_codes);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
event_mask_ptr = driver->dci_client_tbl[i].dci_event_mask;
+ if (!event_mask_ptr) {
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid event mask pointer in %s\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
pr_debug("diag: head of dci event mask %p\n", event_mask_ptr);
count = 0; /* iterator for extracting log codes */
while (count < num_codes) {
if (read_len >= USER_SPACE_DATA) {
- pr_err("diag: dci: Event type, possible buffer overflow\n");
+ pr_err("diag: dci: Invalid length for event type in %s",
+ __func__);
return -EIO;
}
event_id = *(int *)temp;
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.h b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.h
index 4dc1bfc..d530de9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.h
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.h
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
#define DISABLE_LOG_MASK 0
#define MAX_EVENT_SIZE 512
#define DCI_CLIENT_INDEX_INVALID -1
+#define DCI_PKT_REQ_MIN_LEN 8
+#define DCI_LOG_CON_MIN_LEN 14
+#define DCI_EVENT_CON_MIN_LEN 16
/* 16 log code categories, each has:
--
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From 7efd393ca08ac74b2e3d2639b0ad77da139e9139 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mohit Aggarwal <maggarwa@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 30 May 2013 11:12:39 +0530
Subject: diag: Fix possible underflow/overflow issues
Add check in order to fix possible integer underflow
during HDLC encoding which may lead to buffer
overflow. Also added check for packet length to
avoid buffer overflow.
Change-Id: I72858e7625764652571aee3154e3c2eb61655168
CRs-Fixed: 483400
CRs-Fixed: 483408
Signed-off-by: Mohit Aggarwal <maggarwa@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c b/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c
index 05b2872..baa0a83 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ do { \
} while (0)
#define CHK_OVERFLOW(bufStart, start, end, length) \
-((bufStart <= start) && (end - start >= length)) ? 1 : 0
+((bufStart <= start) && (end - start >= length) && (length > 0)) ? 1 : 0
/* Determine if this device uses a device tree */
#ifdef CONFIG_OF
@@ -1604,8 +1604,15 @@ void diag_process_hdlc(void *data, unsigned len)
ret = diag_hdlc_decode(&hdlc);
+ /*
+ * If the message is 3 bytes or less in length then the message is
+ * too short. A message will need 4 bytes minimum, since there are
+ * 2 bytes for the CRC and 1 byte for the ending 0x7e for the hdlc
+ * encoding
+ */
if (hdlc.dest_idx < 4) {
- pr_err("diag: Integer underflow in hdlc processing\n");
+ pr_err_ratelimited("diag: In %s, message is too short, len: %d,"
+ " dest len: %d\n", __func__, len, hdlc.dest_idx);
return;
}
if (ret) {
--
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From 794cd44fe8e32a4afe31a2f9f6a4499aaa874a48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mohit Aggarwal <maggarwa@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2016 18:02:29 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] diag: Fix possible underflow/overflow issues
Add check in order to fix possible integer underflow
during HDLC encoding which may lead to buffer
overflow. Also added check for packet length to
avoid buffer overflow.
Bug: 28767796
Change-Id: Ifbac719a7db73aab121cb00c2090edf1bf1094bb
Signed-off-by: Yuan Lin <yualin@google.com>
---
drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.h b/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.h
index c6e1273dc585c..9c514e629fb4c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.h
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.h
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
#define RESET_AND_QUEUE 1
#define CHK_OVERFLOW(bufStart, start, end, length) \
- ((((bufStart) <= (start)) && ((end) - (start) >= (length))) ? 1 : 0)
+ ((((bufStart) <= (start)) && ((end) - (start) >= (length)) && ((length) > 0)) ? 1 : 0)
void diagfwd_init(void);
void diagfwd_exit(void);

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From f0c0112a6189747a3f24f20210157f9974477e03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vasko Kalanoski <vaskok@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 15:28:34 +0300
Subject: msm: actuator: fix to prevent untrusted pointer to lead DoS
fix to prevent untrusted userspace pointer in actuator kernel
driver to lead DoS
Change-Id: I1b64270deb494530d268539e7b420be5ec79b658
Signed-off-by: Vasko Kalanoski <vaskok@codeaurora.org>
---
.../msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c
index baa2db8..201a011 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/actuator/msm_actuator.c
@@ -196,11 +196,19 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_piezo_move_focus(
struct msm_actuator_move_params_t *move_params)
{
int32_t dest_step_position = move_params->dest_step_pos;
+ struct damping_params_t ringing_params_kernel;
int32_t rc = 0;
int32_t num_steps = move_params->num_steps;
struct msm_camera_i2c_reg_setting reg_setting;
CDBG("Enter\n");
+ if (copy_from_user(&ringing_params_kernel,
+ &(move_params->ringing_params[0]),
+ sizeof(struct damping_params_t))) {
+ pr_err("copy_from_user failed\n");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
if (num_steps == 0)
return rc;
@@ -208,7 +216,7 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_piezo_move_focus(
a_ctrl->func_tbl->actuator_parse_i2c_params(a_ctrl,
(num_steps *
a_ctrl->region_params[0].code_per_step),
- move_params->ringing_params[0].hw_params, 0);
+ ringing_params_kernel.hw_params, 0);
reg_setting.reg_setting = a_ctrl->i2c_reg_tbl;
reg_setting.data_type = a_ctrl->i2c_data_type;
@@ -230,6 +238,7 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_move_focus(
struct msm_actuator_move_params_t *move_params)
{
int32_t rc = 0;
+ struct damping_params_t ringing_params_kernel;
int8_t sign_dir = move_params->sign_dir;
uint16_t step_boundary = 0;
uint16_t target_step_pos = 0;
@@ -240,6 +249,14 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_move_focus(
int32_t num_steps = move_params->num_steps;
struct msm_camera_i2c_reg_setting reg_setting;
+ if (copy_from_user(&ringing_params_kernel,
+ &(move_params->ringing_params[a_ctrl->curr_region_index]),
+ sizeof(struct damping_params_t))) {
+ pr_err("copy_from_user failed\n");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+
CDBG("called, dir %d, num_steps %d\n", dir, num_steps);
if (dest_step_pos == a_ctrl->curr_step_pos)
@@ -276,9 +293,7 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_move_focus(
a_ctrl->step_position_table[target_step_pos];
a_ctrl->func_tbl->actuator_write_focus(a_ctrl,
curr_lens_pos,
- &(move_params->
- ringing_params[a_ctrl->
- curr_region_index]),
+ &ringing_params_kernel,
sign_dir,
target_lens_pos);
curr_lens_pos = target_lens_pos;
@@ -289,8 +304,7 @@ static int32_t msm_actuator_move_focus(
a_ctrl->step_position_table[target_step_pos];
a_ctrl->func_tbl->actuator_write_focus(a_ctrl,
curr_lens_pos,
- &(move_params->ringing_params[a_ctrl->
- curr_region_index]),
+ &ringing_params_kernel,
sign_dir,
target_lens_pos);
curr_lens_pos = target_lens_pos;
--
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From 96a62c1de93a44e6ca69514411baf4b3d67f6dee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lee Susman <lsusman@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2013 08:53:40 +0200
Subject: mmc: card: fix arbitrary write via read handler in mmc_block_test
In mmc_block_test, the debug_fs based read function handlers write to an
arbitrary buffer which is given by any user. We add an access_ok check
to verify that the address pointed by *buffer is not in kernel space.
Only if the buffer is valid, do we continue the read handler.
Change-Id: I35fe9bb70df8de92cb4d3b15c851aa9131a0e8d9
Signed-off-by: Lee Susman <lsusman@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/mmc/card/mmc_block_test.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/mmc/card/mmc_block_test.c b/drivers/mmc/card/mmc_block_test.c
index ea73352..b24c367 100644
--- a/drivers/mmc/card/mmc_block_test.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/card/mmc_block_test.c
@@ -2219,6 +2219,9 @@ static ssize_t send_write_packing_test_read(struct file *file,
size_t count,
loff_t *offset)
{
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, count))
+ return count;
+
memset((void *)buffer, 0, count);
snprintf(buffer, count,
@@ -2317,6 +2320,9 @@ static ssize_t err_check_test_read(struct file *file,
size_t count,
loff_t *offset)
{
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, count))
+ return count;
+
memset((void *)buffer, 0, count);
snprintf(buffer, count,
@@ -2425,6 +2431,9 @@ static ssize_t send_invalid_packed_test_read(struct file *file,
size_t count,
loff_t *offset)
{
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, count))
+ return count;
+
memset((void *)buffer, 0, count);
snprintf(buffer, count,
@@ -2539,6 +2548,9 @@ static ssize_t write_packing_control_test_read(struct file *file,
size_t count,
loff_t *offset)
{
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, count))
+ return count;
+
memset((void *)buffer, 0, count);
snprintf(buffer, count,
@@ -2621,6 +2633,9 @@ static ssize_t bkops_test_read(struct file *file,
size_t count,
loff_t *offset)
{
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, count))
+ return count;
+
memset((void *)buffer, 0, count);
snprintf(buffer, count,
@@ -2709,6 +2724,9 @@ static ssize_t long_sequential_read_test_read(struct file *file,
size_t count,
loff_t *offset)
{
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, count))
+ return count;
+
memset((void *)buffer, 0, count);
snprintf(buffer, count,
@@ -2869,6 +2887,9 @@ static ssize_t long_sequential_write_test_read(struct file *file,
size_t count,
loff_t *offset)
{
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, count))
+ return count;
+
memset((void *)buffer, 0, count);
snprintf(buffer, count,
@@ -2942,6 +2963,9 @@ static ssize_t new_req_notification_test_read(struct file *file,
size_t count,
loff_t *offset)
{
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, count))
+ return count;
+
memset((void *)buffer, 0, count);
snprintf(buffer, count,
--
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From ecc8116e1befb3a764109f47ba0389434ddabbe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Terence Hampson <thampson@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 16:54:51 -0400
Subject: mdss: mdp3: validate histogram data passed in
Data passed in from userspace should be validated to be within
the appropriate ranges.
Change-Id: I50ff818a2b03c1fff55f44403f0f1b67c26d9f0e
Signed-off-by: Terence Hampson <thampson@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_ctrl.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_dma.c | 2 +-
drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_dma.h | 6 +++
3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_ctrl.c b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_ctrl.c
index 74e6983c..31aae26 100644
--- a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_ctrl.c
@@ -775,6 +775,64 @@ static int mdp3_get_metadata(struct msm_fb_data_type *mfd,
return ret;
}
+int mdp3_validate_start_req(struct mdp_histogram_start_req *req)
+{
+ if (req->frame_cnt >= MDP_HISTOGRAM_FRAME_COUNT_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s invalid req frame_cnt\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (req->bit_mask >= MDP_HISTOGRAM_BIT_MASK_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s invalid req bit mask\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (req->block != MDP_BLOCK_DMA_P ||
+ req->num_bins != MDP_HISTOGRAM_BIN_NUM) {
+ pr_err("mdp3_histogram_start invalid request\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mdp3_validate_scale_config(struct mdp_bl_scale_data *data)
+{
+ if (data->scale > MDP_HISTOGRAM_BL_SCALE_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s invalid bl_scale\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (data->min_lvl > MDP_HISTOGRAM_BL_LEVEL_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s invalid bl_min_lvl\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mdp3_validate_csc_data(struct mdp_csc_cfg_data *data)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) {
+ if (data->csc_data.csc_mv[i] >=
+ MDP_HISTOGRAM_CSC_MATRIX_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ if (data->csc_data.csc_pre_bv[i] >=
+ MDP_HISTOGRAM_CSC_VECTOR_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (data->csc_data.csc_post_bv[i] >=
+ MDP_HISTOGRAM_CSC_VECTOR_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+ if (data->csc_data.csc_pre_lv[i] >=
+ MDP_HISTOGRAM_CSC_VECTOR_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (data->csc_data.csc_post_lv[i] >=
+ MDP_HISTOGRAM_CSC_VECTOR_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int mdp3_histogram_start(struct mdp3_session_data *session,
struct mdp_histogram_start_req *req)
{
@@ -782,11 +840,10 @@ static int mdp3_histogram_start(struct mdp3_session_data *session,
struct mdp3_dma_histogram_config histo_config;
pr_debug("mdp3_histogram_start\n");
- if (req->block != MDP_BLOCK_DMA_P ||
- req->num_bins != MDP_HISTOGRAM_BIN_NUM) {
- pr_err("mdp3_histogram_start invalid request\n");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+
+ ret = mdp3_validate_start_req(req);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (!session->dma->histo_op ||
!session->dma->config_histo) {
@@ -986,10 +1043,20 @@ static int mdp3_pp_ioctl(struct msm_fb_data_type *mfd,
switch (mdp_pp.op) {
case mdp_bl_scale_cfg:
+ ret = mdp3_validate_scale_config(&mdp_pp.data.bl_scale_data);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("%s: invalid scale config\n", __func__);
+ break;
+ }
ret = mdp3_bl_scale_config(mfd, (struct mdp_bl_scale_data *)
&mdp_pp.data.bl_scale_data);
break;
case mdp_op_csc_cfg:
+ ret = mdp3_validate_csc_data(&(mdp_pp.data.csc_cfg_data));
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("%s: invalid csc data\n", __func__);
+ break;
+ }
ret = mdp3_csc_config(mdp3_session,
&(mdp_pp.data.csc_cfg_data));
break;
diff --git a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_dma.c b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_dma.c
index 3e1bf5d..d3f1538 100644
--- a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_dma.c
+++ b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_dma.c
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static int mdp3_dmap_histo_config(struct mdp3_dma *dma,
struct mdp3_dma_histogram_config *histo_config)
{
unsigned long flag;
- u32 histo_bit_mask, histo_control;
+ u32 histo_bit_mask = 0, histo_control = 0;
u32 histo_isr_mask = MDP3_DMA_P_HIST_INTR_HIST_DONE_BIT |
MDP3_DMA_P_HIST_INTR_RESET_DONE_BIT;
diff --git a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_dma.h b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_dma.h
index e4a28dc..7dd6ba7 100644
--- a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_dma.h
+++ b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdp3_dma.h
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#define MDP_HISTOGRAM_BL_SCALE_MAX 1024
+#define MDP_HISTOGRAM_BL_LEVEL_MAX 255
+#define MDP_HISTOGRAM_FRAME_COUNT_MAX 0x20
+#define MDP_HISTOGRAM_BIT_MASK_MAX 0x4
+#define MDP_HISTOGRAM_CSC_MATRIX_MAX 0x2000
+#define MDP_HISTOGRAM_CSC_VECTOR_MAX 0x200
#define MDP_HISTOGRAM_BIN_NUM 32
#define MDP_LUT_SIZE 256
--
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From f2a3f5e63e15e97a66e8f5a300457378bcb89d9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Deepak Verma <dverma@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2013 17:37:11 +0530
Subject: msm: vidc: Check validity of userspace address
Before writing to a userspace address, verification
of the validity of user space address is required.
Change-Id: I9141e44a6c11aaf3f4d57c08bb0dd26a7b214f34
CRs-fixed: 556356
Signed-off-by: Deepak Verma <dverma@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/enc/venc.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/enc/venc.c b/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/enc/venc.c
index 1801461..707d948 100644
--- a/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/enc/venc.c
+++ b/drivers/video/msm/vidc/common/enc/venc.c
@@ -1414,6 +1414,12 @@ static long vid_enc_ioctl(struct file *file,
return -EFAULT;
DBG("VEN_IOCTL_GET_SEQUENCE_HDR\n");
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, seq_header.hdrbufptr,
+ seq_header.bufsize)) {
+ ERR("VEN_IOCTL_GET_SEQUENCE_HDR:"\
+ " Userspace address verification failed.\n");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
result = vid_enc_get_sequence_header(client_ctx,
&seq_header);
if (!result) {
--
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From ba3f404a10b3bb7e9c20440837df3cd35c5d0c4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ayaz Ahmad <aahmad@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 19:08:05 +0530
Subject: radio: iris: Prevent probable overflow
casting a unsigned int into an integer, integer to
unsigned int may cause buffer overflow.
Change-Id: I54be4d4c5470616a59a772c587fe6d5f32575c32
CRs-Fixed: 539008
Signed-off-by: Ayaz Ahmad <aahmad@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c b/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c
index bfb1088..12fd7cf 100644
--- a/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c
+++ b/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c
@@ -3032,7 +3032,7 @@ static int iris_vidioc_s_ext_ctrls(struct file *file, void *priv,
struct v4l2_ext_controls *ctrl)
{
int retval = 0;
- int bytes_to_copy;
+ size_t bytes_to_copy;
struct hci_fm_tx_ps tx_ps;
struct hci_fm_tx_rt tx_rt;
struct hci_fm_def_data_wr_req default_data;
@@ -3041,14 +3041,20 @@ static int iris_vidioc_s_ext_ctrls(struct file *file, void *priv,
struct iris_device *radio = video_get_drvdata(video_devdata(file));
char *data = NULL;
+ if ((ctrl == NULL) || (ctrl->controls == NULL)
+ || (ctrl->count == 0)) {
+ retval = -EINVAL;
+ return retval;
+ }
+
switch ((ctrl->controls[0]).id) {
case V4L2_CID_RDS_TX_PS_NAME:
FMDBG("In V4L2_CID_RDS_TX_PS_NAME\n");
/*Pass a sample PS string */
memset(tx_ps.ps_data, 0, MAX_PS_LENGTH);
- bytes_to_copy = min((int)(ctrl->controls[0]).size,
- MAX_PS_LENGTH);
+ bytes_to_copy = min_t(size_t, ctrl->controls[0].size,
+ MAX_PS_LENGTH);
data = (ctrl->controls[0]).string;
if (copy_from_user(tx_ps.ps_data,
@@ -3065,7 +3071,7 @@ static int iris_vidioc_s_ext_ctrls(struct file *file, void *priv,
break;
case V4L2_CID_RDS_TX_RADIO_TEXT:
bytes_to_copy =
- min((int)(ctrl->controls[0]).size, MAX_RT_LENGTH);
+ min_t(size_t, (ctrl->controls[0]).size, MAX_RT_LENGTH);
data = (ctrl->controls[0]).string;
memset(tx_rt.rt_data, 0, MAX_RT_LENGTH);
--
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From 3a4ebaac557a9e3fbcbab4561650abac8298a4d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Satish Kodishala <skodisha@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 15:44:11 +0530
Subject: radio: iris: Checking if driver's buffer is large enough.
Checking if driver's buffer is large enough to copy
the data from user space.
Change-Id: I7b4eed81cf77ce2973669ce18ccd95a5df397d82
CRs-fixed: 552329
Signed-off-by: Satish Kodishala <skodisha@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c b/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c
index 5e056be..a9e25bd 100644
--- a/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c
+++ b/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c
@@ -3472,13 +3472,26 @@ static int iris_vidioc_s_ctrl(struct file *file, void *priv,
radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.start_addr = ctrl->value;
break;
case V4L2_CID_PRIVATE_IRIS_RIVA_ACCS_LEN:
- radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.length = ctrl->value;
+ if ((ctrl->value > 0) &&
+ (ctrl->value <= MAX_RIVA_PEEK_RSP_SIZE)) {
+ radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.length = ctrl->value;
+ } else {
+ FMDERR("Length %d is more than the buffer size %d\n",
+ ctrl->value, MAX_RIVA_PEEK_RSP_SIZE);
+ retval = -EINVAL;
+ }
break;
case V4L2_CID_PRIVATE_IRIS_RIVA_POKE:
- memcpy(radio->riva_data_req.data, (void *)ctrl->value,
- radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.length);
- radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.subopcode = RIVA_POKE_OPCODE;
- retval = hci_poke_data(&radio->riva_data_req , radio->fm_hdev);
+ if (radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.length <= MAX_RIVA_PEEK_RSP_SIZE) {
+ memcpy(radio->riva_data_req.data, (void *)ctrl->value,
+ radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.length);
+ radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.subopcode = RIVA_POKE_OPCODE;
+ retval = hci_poke_data(&radio->riva_data_req , radio->fm_hdev);
+ } else {
+ FMDERR("Can not copy into driver's buffer. Length %d is more than"
+ "the buffer size %d\n", ctrl->value, MAX_RIVA_PEEK_RSP_SIZE);
+ retval = -EINVAL;
+ }
break;
case V4L2_CID_PRIVATE_IRIS_SSBI_ACCS_ADDR:
radio->ssbi_data_accs.start_addr = ctrl->value;
--
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From 0f6afe815b1b3f920f3502be654c848bdfe5ef38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ayaz Ahmad <aahmad@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2013 15:56:04 +0530
Subject: radio: iris: Use kernel API to copy data from user space
Use copy_from_user kernel api to copy any data from user space
to kernel space.
Change-Id: Ia3b7bb0f98180bd8792c1c18e930cb5609b8dc82
CRs-Fixed: 540320
Signed-off-by: Ayaz Ahmad <aahmad@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c b/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c
index a554749..3bac006 100644
--- a/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c
+++ b/drivers/media/radio/radio-iris.c
@@ -3623,13 +3623,21 @@ static int iris_vidioc_s_ctrl(struct file *file, void *priv,
break;
case V4L2_CID_PRIVATE_IRIS_RIVA_POKE:
if (radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.length <= MAX_RIVA_PEEK_RSP_SIZE) {
- memcpy(radio->riva_data_req.data, (void *)ctrl->value,
+ retval = copy_from_user(radio->riva_data_req.data,
+ (void *)ctrl->value,
radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.length);
- radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.subopcode = RIVA_POKE_OPCODE;
- retval = hci_poke_data(&radio->riva_data_req , radio->fm_hdev);
+ if (retval == 0) {
+ radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.subopcode =
+ RIVA_POKE_OPCODE;
+ retval = hci_poke_data(&radio->riva_data_req,
+ radio->fm_hdev);
+ } else {
+ retval = -EINVAL;
+ }
} else {
FMDERR("Can not copy into driver's buffer. Length %d is more than"
- "the buffer size %d\n", ctrl->value, MAX_RIVA_PEEK_RSP_SIZE);
+ "the buffer size %d\n", radio->riva_data_req.cmd_params.length,
+ MAX_RIVA_PEEK_RSP_SIZE);
retval = -EINVAL;
}
break;
--
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From cbf79a67348e48557c0d0bb9bc58391b3f84bc46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2013 14:11:41 +0530
Subject: diag: dci: Safeguard to prevent integer overflow
At certain point in diag driver there can be integer overflow
thus can lead to memory leak. Added a safegaurd for it.
Change-Id: I9347405d8f1f95ed42fe0abf35cbf4c362281bdf
CRs-fixed: 565160
Signed-off-by: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
index 2dbb2f5..7772ebe 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diag_dci.c
@@ -383,17 +383,23 @@ void extract_dci_events(unsigned char *buf)
void extract_dci_log(unsigned char *buf)
{
- uint16_t log_code, item_num;
+ uint16_t log_code, item_num, log_length;
uint8_t equip_id, *log_mask_ptr, byte_mask;
unsigned int i, byte_index, byte_offset = 0;
struct diag_dci_client_tbl *entry;
+ log_length = *(uint16_t *)(buf + 2);
log_code = *(uint16_t *)(buf + 6);
equip_id = LOG_GET_EQUIP_ID(log_code);
item_num = LOG_GET_ITEM_NUM(log_code);
byte_index = item_num/8 + 2;
byte_mask = 0x01 << (item_num % 8);
+ if (log_length > USHRT_MAX - 4) {
+ pr_err("diag: Integer overflow in %s, log_len:%d",
+ __func__, log_length);
+ return;
+ }
byte_offset = (equip_id * 514) + byte_index;
if (byte_offset >= DCI_LOG_MASK_SIZE) {
pr_err("diag: Invalid byte_offset %d in dci log\n",
@@ -430,8 +436,8 @@ void extract_dci_log(unsigned char *buf)
*(int *)(entry->dci_data+entry->data_len) =
DCI_LOG_TYPE;
memcpy(entry->dci_data + entry->data_len + 4,
- buf + 4, *(uint16_t *)(buf + 2));
- entry->data_len += 4 + *(uint16_t *)(buf + 2);
+ buf + 4, log_length);
+ entry->data_len += 4 + log_length;
}
mutex_unlock(&entry->data_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&dci_health_mutex);
--
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From f4948193c46f75e16d4382c4472485ab12b7bd17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2013 13:05:35 -0800
Subject: qseecom: Add checks for user space buffer pointers
Validate pointers send from user space and pointers
embedded within the mesasge sent from user space.
Change-Id: I1be54924ef3d301908af6e8d4e6506f2aa7f6428
Signed-off-by: Mona Hossain <mhossain@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/misc/qseecom.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
index 0bc18fb..c5c0ce8 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(clk_access_lock);
struct qseecom_registered_listener_list {
struct list_head list;
struct qseecom_register_listener_req svc;
- u8 *sb_reg_req;
+ uint32_t user_virt_sb_base;
u8 *sb_virt;
s32 sb_phys;
size_t sb_length;
@@ -319,6 +319,10 @@ static int qseecom_register_listener(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
pr_err("copy_from_user failed\n");
return ret;
}
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (void __user *)rcvd_lstnr.virt_sb_base,
+ rcvd_lstnr.sb_size))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
data->listener.id = 0;
if (!__qseecom_is_svc_unique(data, &rcvd_lstnr)) {
pr_err("Service is not unique and is already registered\n");
@@ -336,6 +340,7 @@ static int qseecom_register_listener(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
new_entry->svc.listener_id = rcvd_lstnr.listener_id;
new_entry->sb_length = rcvd_lstnr.sb_size;
+ new_entry->user_virt_sb_base = rcvd_lstnr.virt_sb_base;
if (__qseecom_set_sb_memory(new_entry, data, &rcvd_lstnr)) {
pr_err("qseecom_set_sb_memoryfailed\n");
kzfree(new_entry);
@@ -446,6 +451,10 @@ static int qseecom_set_client_mem_param(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
req.ifd_data_fd, req.sb_len, req.virt_sb_base);
return -EFAULT;
}
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (void __user *)req.virt_sb_base,
+ req.sb_len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
/* Get the handle of the shared fd */
data->client.ihandle = ion_import_dma_buf(qseecom.ion_clnt,
req.ifd_data_fd);
@@ -861,6 +870,13 @@ static uint32_t __qseecom_uvirt_to_kphys(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
return data->client.sb_phys + (virt - data->client.user_virt_sb_base);
}
+static uint32_t __qseecom_uvirt_to_kvirt(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
+ uint32_t virt)
+{
+ return (uint32_t)data->client.sb_virt +
+ (virt - data->client.user_virt_sb_base);
+}
+
int __qseecom_process_rpmb_svc_cmd(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data_ptr,
struct qseecom_send_svc_cmd_req *req_ptr,
struct qseecom_client_send_service_ireq *send_svc_ireq_ptr)
@@ -1269,6 +1285,24 @@ static int qseecom_send_modfd_cmd(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
pr_err("copy_from_user failed\n");
return ret;
}
+
+ if (req.cmd_req_buf == NULL || req.resp_buf == NULL) {
+ pr_err("cmd buffer or response buffer is null\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (((uint32_t)req.cmd_req_buf < data->client.user_virt_sb_base) ||
+ ((uint32_t)req.cmd_req_buf >= (data->client.user_virt_sb_base +
+ data->client.sb_length))) {
+ pr_err("cmd buffer address not within shared bufffer\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (((uint32_t)req.resp_buf < data->client.user_virt_sb_base) ||
+ ((uint32_t)req.resp_buf >= (data->client.user_virt_sb_base +
+ data->client.sb_length))){
+ pr_err("response buffer address not within shared bufffer\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
send_cmd_req.cmd_req_buf = req.cmd_req_buf;
send_cmd_req.cmd_req_len = req.cmd_req_len;
send_cmd_req.resp_buf = req.resp_buf;
@@ -1282,6 +1316,11 @@ static int qseecom_send_modfd_cmd(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
return -EINVAL;
}
}
+ req.cmd_req_buf = (void *)__qseecom_uvirt_to_kvirt(data,
+ (uint32_t)req.cmd_req_buf);
+ req.resp_buf = (void *)__qseecom_uvirt_to_kvirt(data,
+ (uint32_t)req.resp_buf);
+
ret = __qseecom_update_cmd_buf(&req, false, data, false);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -1877,11 +1916,20 @@ static int qseecom_send_modfd_resp(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
{
struct qseecom_send_modfd_listener_resp resp;
int i;
+ struct qseecom_registered_listener_list *this_lstnr = NULL;
if (copy_from_user(&resp, argp, sizeof(resp))) {
pr_err("copy_from_user failed");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ this_lstnr = __qseecom_find_svc(data->listener.id);
+ if (this_lstnr == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (resp.resp_buf_ptr == NULL) {
+ pr_err("Invalid resp_buf_ptr\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
/* validate offsets */
for (i = 0; i < MAX_ION_FD; i++) {
if (resp.ifd_data[i].cmd_buf_offset >= resp.resp_len) {
@@ -1890,6 +1938,17 @@ static int qseecom_send_modfd_resp(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
return -EINVAL;
}
}
+
+ if (((uint32_t)resp.resp_buf_ptr <
+ this_lstnr->user_virt_sb_base)
+ || ((uint32_t)resp.resp_buf_ptr >=
+ (this_lstnr->user_virt_sb_base +
+ this_lstnr->sb_length))) {
+ pr_err("resp_buf_ptr address not within shared buffer\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ resp.resp_buf_ptr = (uint32_t)this_lstnr->sb_virt +
+ (resp.resp_buf_ptr - this_lstnr->user_virt_sb_base);
__qseecom_update_cmd_buf(&resp, false, data, true);
qseecom.send_resp_flag = 1;
wake_up_interruptible(&qseecom.send_resp_wq);
--
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From a1d5a4cbd5aa8656bc23b40c7cc43941e10f89c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dipen Parmar <dipenp@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 15:53:36 +0530
Subject: thermal: qpnp-adc-tm: Fix format specifier in snprintf
Add format specifier in snprintf to avoid security
vulnerability issues.
Change-Id: I6ea67633348341267e0646912a6b428709410c78
Signed-off-by: Dipen Parmar <dipenp@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/thermal/qpnp-adc-tm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/thermal/qpnp-adc-tm.c b/drivers/thermal/qpnp-adc-tm.c
index a90a042..b203ae3 100644
--- a/drivers/thermal/qpnp-adc-tm.c
+++ b/drivers/thermal/qpnp-adc-tm.c
@@ -1886,7 +1886,7 @@ static int qpnp_adc_tm_probe(struct spmi_device *spmi)
pr_debug("thermal node%x\n", btm_channel_num);
chip->sensor[sen_idx].mode = THERMAL_DEVICE_DISABLED;
chip->sensor[sen_idx].thermal_node = true;
- snprintf(name, sizeof(name),
+ snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s",
chip->adc->adc_channels[sen_idx].name);
chip->sensor[sen_idx].meas_interval =
QPNP_ADC_TM_MEAS_INTERVAL;
--
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From 80be0e249c906704085d13d4ae446f73913fc225 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Baruch Eruchimovitch <baruche@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2013 15:49:41 +0300
Subject: msm: ultrasound: add verifications of some input parameters
Some security vulnerabilities were found.
To fix them, additional verifications of some input parameters
are required.
CRs-Fixed: 554575, 554560, 555030
Change-Id: Ie87a433bcda89c3e462cfd511c168e8306056020
Signed-off-by: Baruch Eruchimovitch <baruche@codeaurora.org>
---
arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/ultrasound/usf.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/ultrasound/usf.c b/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/ultrasound/usf.c
index 1ea213a..01fcfd9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/ultrasound/usf.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-msm/qdsp6v2/ultrasound/usf.c
@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@
#define Y_IND 1
#define Z_IND 2
+/* Shared memory limits */
+/* max_buf_size = (port_size(65535*2) * port_num(8) * group_size(3) */
+#define USF_MAX_BUF_SIZE 3145680
+#define USF_MAX_BUF_NUM 32
+
/* Place for opreation result, received from QDSP6 */
#define APR_RESULT_IND 1
@@ -436,6 +441,15 @@ static int config_xx(struct usf_xx_type *usf_xx, struct us_xx_info_type *config)
(config == NULL))
return -EINVAL;
+ if ((config->buf_size == 0) ||
+ (config->buf_size > USF_MAX_BUF_SIZE) ||
+ (config->buf_num == 0) ||
+ (config->buf_num > USF_MAX_BUF_NUM)) {
+ pr_err("%s: wrong params: buf_size=%d; buf_num=%d\n",
+ __func__, config->buf_size, config->buf_num);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
data_map_size = sizeof(usf_xx->encdec_cfg.cfg_common.data_map);
min_map_size = min(data_map_size, config->port_cnt);
@@ -748,6 +762,7 @@ static int usf_set_us_detection(struct usf_type *usf, unsigned long arg)
{
uint32_t timeout = 0;
struct us_detect_info_type detect_info;
+ struct usm_session_cmd_detect_info *p_allocated_memory = NULL;
struct usm_session_cmd_detect_info usm_detect_info;
struct usm_session_cmd_detect_info *p_usm_detect_info =
&usm_detect_info;
@@ -774,12 +789,13 @@ static int usf_set_us_detection(struct usf_type *usf, unsigned long arg)
uint8_t *p_data = NULL;
detect_info_size += detect_info.params_data_size;
- p_usm_detect_info = kzalloc(detect_info_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (p_usm_detect_info == NULL) {
+ p_allocated_memory = kzalloc(detect_info_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (p_allocated_memory == NULL) {
pr_err("%s: detect_info[%d] allocation failed\n",
__func__, detect_info_size);
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ p_usm_detect_info = p_allocated_memory;
p_data = (uint8_t *)p_usm_detect_info +
sizeof(struct usm_session_cmd_detect_info);
@@ -789,7 +805,7 @@ static int usf_set_us_detection(struct usf_type *usf, unsigned long arg)
if (rc) {
pr_err("%s: copy params from user; rc=%d\n",
__func__, rc);
- kfree(p_usm_detect_info);
+ kfree(p_allocated_memory);
return -EFAULT;
}
p_usm_detect_info->algorithm_cfg_size =
@@ -806,9 +822,7 @@ static int usf_set_us_detection(struct usf_type *usf, unsigned long arg)
p_usm_detect_info,
detect_info_size);
if (rc || (detect_info.detect_timeout == USF_NO_WAIT_TIMEOUT)) {
- if (detect_info_size >
- sizeof(struct usm_session_cmd_detect_info))
- kfree(p_usm_detect_info);
+ kfree(p_allocated_memory);
return rc;
}
@@ -828,25 +842,24 @@ static int usf_set_us_detection(struct usf_type *usf, unsigned long arg)
USF_US_DETECT_UNDEF),
timeout);
/* In the case of timeout, "no US" is assumed */
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc < 0)
pr_err("%s: Getting US detection failed rc[%d]\n",
__func__, rc);
- return rc;
- }
-
- usf->usf_rx.us_detect_type = usf->usf_tx.us_detect_type;
- detect_info.is_us = (usf_xx->us_detect_type == USF_US_DETECT_YES);
- rc = copy_to_user((void __user *)arg,
- &detect_info,
- sizeof(detect_info));
- if (rc) {
- pr_err("%s: copy detect_info to user; rc=%d\n",
- __func__, rc);
- rc = -EFAULT;
+ else {
+ usf->usf_rx.us_detect_type = usf->usf_tx.us_detect_type;
+ detect_info.is_us =
+ (usf_xx->us_detect_type == USF_US_DETECT_YES);
+ rc = copy_to_user((void __user *)arg,
+ &detect_info,
+ sizeof(detect_info));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("%s: copy detect_info to user; rc=%d\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ }
}
- if (detect_info_size > sizeof(struct usm_session_cmd_detect_info))
- kfree(p_usm_detect_info);
+ kfree(p_allocated_memory);
return rc;
} /* usf_set_us_detection */
@@ -947,16 +960,14 @@ static int usf_set_rx_info(struct usf_type *usf, unsigned long arg)
if (rc)
return rc;
- if (usf_xx->buffer_size && usf_xx->buffer_count) {
- rc = q6usm_us_client_buf_alloc(
- IN,
- usf_xx->usc,
- usf_xx->buffer_size,
- usf_xx->buffer_count);
- if (rc) {
- (void)q6usm_cmd(usf_xx->usc, CMD_CLOSE);
- return rc;
- }
+ rc = q6usm_us_client_buf_alloc(
+ IN,
+ usf_xx->usc,
+ usf_xx->buffer_size,
+ usf_xx->buffer_count);
+ if (rc) {
+ (void)q6usm_cmd(usf_xx->usc, CMD_CLOSE);
+ return rc;
}
rc = q6usm_dec_cfg_blk(usf_xx->usc,
@@ -1175,10 +1186,15 @@ static int usf_get_version(unsigned long arg)
return -EFAULT;
}
- /* version_info.buf is pointer to place for the version string */
+ if (version_info.buf_size < sizeof(DRV_VERSION)) {
+ pr_err("%s: buf_size (%d) < version string size (%d)\n",
+ __func__, version_info.buf_size, sizeof(DRV_VERSION));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
rc = copy_to_user(version_info.pbuf,
DRV_VERSION,
- version_info.buf_size);
+ sizeof(DRV_VERSION));
if (rc) {
pr_err("%s: copy to version_info.pbuf; rc=%d\n",
__func__, rc);
--
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Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9887/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From b1bc773cf61265e0e3871b2e52bd6b3270ffc6c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 12:44:15 -0700
Subject: qseecom: Validate pointer offset in qseecom_send_modfd_cmd
Validate cmd_req_buf pointer offset in qseecom_send_modfy_cmd, and
make sure cmd buffer address to be within shared bufffer.
Change-Id: I431511a92ab2cccbc2daebc0cf76cc3872689a97
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/misc/qseecom.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
index 5d2b64c..bce4994 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/qseecom.c
@@ -1635,6 +1635,13 @@ static int qseecom_send_modfd_cmd(struct qseecom_dev_handle *data,
pr_err("response buffer address not within shared bufffer\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
+
+ if (req.cmd_req_len == 0 || req.cmd_req_len > data->client.sb_length ||
+ req.resp_len > data->client.sb_length) {
+ pr_err("cmd or response buffer length not valid\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
send_cmd_req.cmd_req_buf = req.cmd_req_buf;
send_cmd_req.cmd_req_len = req.cmd_req_len;
send_cmd_req.resp_buf = req.resp_buf;
--
cgit v1.1

37
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9888/0.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 0ea1ec713f04bdfac343c9702b21cd3a7c711826 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 16:14:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked
executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
---
arch/arm/mm/dma-mapping.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/dma-mapping.c b/arch/arm/mm/dma-mapping.c
index f5e1a8471714c..57438506d5246 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/dma-mapping.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/dma-mapping.c
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ static void *__dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *handle,
void *arm_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *handle,
gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
- pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
+ pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, PAGE_KERNEL);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ void *arm_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *handle,
static void *arm_coherent_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
dma_addr_t *handle, gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
- pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
+ pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, PAGE_KERNEL);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))

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