DISARMframeworks/generated_pages/incidents/I00069.md

Incident I00069: Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations

• Summary: “APT42, an Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor, is using enhanced social engineering schemes to gain access to victim networks, including cloud environments. The actor is targeting Western and Middle Eastern NGOs, media organizations, academia, legal services and activists. Mandiant assesses APT42 operates on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO).
  
  “APT42 was observed posing as journalists and event organizers to build trust with their victims through ongoing correspondence, and to deliver invitations to conferences or legitimate documents. These social engineering schemes enabled APT42 to harvest credentials and use them to gain initial access to cloud environments. Subsequently, the threat actor covertly exfiltrated data of strategic interest to Iran, while relying on built-in features and open-source tools to avoid detection.”

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Reference	Pub Date	Authors	Org	Archive
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations	2024/05/01	Ofir Rozmann, Asli Koksal, Adrian Hernandez, Sarah Bock, Jonathan Leathery	Mandiant	https://web.archive.org/web/20240619195456/https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations/

Technique	Description given for this incident
T0097.100 Individual Persona	IT00000231 “[Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor] APT42 cloud operations attack lifecycle can be described in details as follows: - “Social engineering schemes involving decoys and trust building, which includes masquerading as legitimate NGOs and conducting ongoing correspondence with the target, sometimes lasting several weeks. - The threat actor masqueraded as well-known international organizations in the legal and NGO fields and sent emails from domains typosquatting the original NGO domains, for example aspenlnstitute[.]org. - The Aspen Institute became aware of this spoofed domain and collaborated with industry partners, including blocking it in SafeBrowsing, thus protecting users of Google Chrome and additional browsers. - To increase their credibility, APT42 impersonated high-ranking personnel working at the aforementioned organizations when creating the email personas. - APT42 enhanced their campaign credibility by using decoy material inviting targets to legitimate and relevant events and conferences. In one instance, the decoy material was hosted on an attacker-controlled SharePoint folder, accessible only after the victim entered their credentials. Mandiant did not identify malicious elements in the files, suggesting they were used solely to gain the victim’s trust.” In this example APT42, an Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor, created a domain impersonating the existing NGO The Aspen Institute (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.207: NGO Persona). They increased the perceived legitimacy of the impersonation by also impersonating high-ranking employees of the NGO (T0097.100: Individual Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona).
T0097.103 Activist Persona	IT00000227 “In March 2023, [Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor] APT42 sent a spear-phishing email with a fake Google Meet invitation, allegedly sent on behalf of Mona Louri, a likely fake persona leveraged by APT42, claiming to be a human rights activist and researcher. Upon entry, the user was presented with a fake Google Meet page and asked to enter their credentials, which were subsequently sent to the attackers.” In this example APT42, an Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor, created an account which presented as a human rights activist (T0097.103: Activist Persona) and researcher (T0097.107: Researcher Persona). The analysts assert that it was likely the persona was fabricated (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona)
T0097.107 Researcher Persona	IT00000228 “In March 2023, [Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor] APT42 sent a spear-phishing email with a fake Google Meet invitation, allegedly sent on behalf of Mona Louri, a likely fake persona leveraged by APT42, claiming to be a human rights activist and researcher. Upon entry, the user was presented with a fake Google Meet page and asked to enter their credentials, which were subsequently sent to the attackers.” In this example APT42, an Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor, created an account which presented as a human rights activist (T0097.103: Activist Persona) and researcher (T0097.107: Researcher Persona). The analysts assert that it was likely the persona was fabricated (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona)
T0097.202 News Outlet Persona	IT00000223 “Mandiant identified at least three clusters of infrastructure used by [Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor] APT42 to harvest credentials from targets in the policy and government sectors, media organizations and journalists, and NGOs and activists. The three clusters employ similar tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to target victim credentials (spear-phishing emails), but use slightly varied domains, masquerading patterns, decoys, and themes. Cluster A: Posing as News Outlets and NGOs: - Suspected Targeting: credentials of journalists, researchers, and geopolitical entities in regions of interest to Iran. - Masquerading as: The Washington Post (U.S.), The Economist (UK), The Jerusalem Post (IL), Khaleej Times (UAE), Azadliq (Azerbaijan), and more news outlets and NGOs. This often involves the use of typosquatted domains like washinqtonpost[.]press. “Mandiant did not observe APT42 target or compromise these organizations, but rather impersonate them.” In this example APT42, an Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor, impersonated existing news organisations and NGOs (T0097.202 News Outlet Persona, T0097.207: NGO Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona) in attempts to steal credentials from targets (T0141.001: Acquire Compromised Account), using elements of influence operations to facilitate their cyber attacks.
T0097.207 NGO Persona	IT00000232 “[Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor] APT42 cloud operations attack lifecycle can be described in details as follows: - “Social engineering schemes involving decoys and trust building, which includes masquerading as legitimate NGOs and conducting ongoing correspondence with the target, sometimes lasting several weeks. - The threat actor masqueraded as well-known international organizations in the legal and NGO fields and sent emails from domains typosquatting the original NGO domains, for example aspenlnstitute[.]org. - The Aspen Institute became aware of this spoofed domain and collaborated with industry partners, including blocking it in SafeBrowsing, thus protecting users of Google Chrome and additional browsers. - To increase their credibility, APT42 impersonated high-ranking personnel working at the aforementioned organizations when creating the email personas. - APT42 enhanced their campaign credibility by using decoy material inviting targets to legitimate and relevant events and conferences. In one instance, the decoy material was hosted on an attacker-controlled SharePoint folder, accessible only after the victim entered their credentials. Mandiant did not identify malicious elements in the files, suggesting they were used solely to gain the victim’s trust.” In this example APT42, an Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor, created a domain impersonating the existing NGO The Aspen Institute (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.207: NGO Persona). They increased the perceived legitimacy of the impersonation by also impersonating high-ranking employees of the NGO (T0097.100: Individual Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona).
T0141.001 Acquire Compromised Account	IT00000226 “Mandiant identified at least three clusters of infrastructure used by [Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor] APT42 to harvest credentials from targets in the policy and government sectors, media organizations and journalists, and NGOs and activists. The three clusters employ similar tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to target victim credentials (spear-phishing emails), but use slightly varied domains, masquerading patterns, decoys, and themes. Cluster A: Posing as News Outlets and NGOs: - Suspected Targeting: credentials of journalists, researchers, and geopolitical entities in regions of interest to Iran. - Masquerading as: The Washington Post (U.S.), The Economist (UK), The Jerusalem Post (IL), Khaleej Times (UAE), Azadliq (Azerbaijan), and more news outlets and NGOs. This often involves the use of typosquatted domains like washinqtonpost[.]press. “Mandiant did not observe APT42 target or compromise these organizations, but rather impersonate them.” In this example APT42, an Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor, impersonated existing news organisations and NGOs (T0097.202 News Outlet Persona, T0097.207: NGO Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona) in attempts to steal credentials from targets (T0141.001: Acquire Compromised Account), using elements of influence operations to facilitate their cyber attacks.
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000229 “In March 2023, [Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor] APT42 sent a spear-phishing email with a fake Google Meet invitation, allegedly sent on behalf of Mona Louri, a likely fake persona leveraged by APT42, claiming to be a human rights activist and researcher. Upon entry, the user was presented with a fake Google Meet page and asked to enter their credentials, which were subsequently sent to the attackers.” In this example APT42, an Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor, created an account which presented as a human rights activist (T0097.103: Activist Persona) and researcher (T0097.107: Researcher Persona). The analysts assert that it was likely the persona was fabricated (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona)
T0143.003 Impersonated Persona	IT00000230 “[Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor] APT42 cloud operations attack lifecycle can be described in details as follows: - “Social engineering schemes involving decoys and trust building, which includes masquerading as legitimate NGOs and conducting ongoing correspondence with the target, sometimes lasting several weeks. - The threat actor masqueraded as well-known international organizations in the legal and NGO fields and sent emails from domains typosquatting the original NGO domains, for example aspenlnstitute[.]org. - The Aspen Institute became aware of this spoofed domain and collaborated with industry partners, including blocking it in SafeBrowsing, thus protecting users of Google Chrome and additional browsers. - To increase their credibility, APT42 impersonated high-ranking personnel working at the aforementioned organizations when creating the email personas. - APT42 enhanced their campaign credibility by using decoy material inviting targets to legitimate and relevant events and conferences. In one instance, the decoy material was hosted on an attacker-controlled SharePoint folder, accessible only after the victim entered their credentials. Mandiant did not identify malicious elements in the files, suggesting they were used solely to gain the victim’s trust.” In this example APT42, an Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage actor, created a domain impersonating the existing NGO The Aspen Institute (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.207: NGO Persona). They increased the perceived legitimacy of the impersonation by also impersonating high-ranking employees of the NGO (T0097.100: Individual Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona).

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