22abaf93d8
Took a copy of the current AMITT github repository - we'll be updating this and merging the SPICE branch back in Rebranded to DISARM Moved generated pages to their own folder, to make looking at the repository less confusing
2.7 KiB
Counter C00048: Name and Shame Influencers
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Summary: Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account. Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”. Note that USAID operations were at a different level. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations. Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts. Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.
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Playbooks:
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Metatechnique: M003 - daylight
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Resources needed:
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Belongs to tactic stage: TA03
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