DISARMframeworks/generated_pages/counters_index.md

DISARM Counters:

disarm_id	name	summary	metatechnique	tactic	responsetype
C00006	Charge for social media	Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information. There are examples of this not working, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc.	M004 - friction	TA01 Strategic Planning	D02
C00008	Create shared fact-checking database	Share fact-checking resources - tips, responses, countermessages, across respose groups.	M006 - scoring	TA01 Strategic Planning	D04
C00009	Educate high profile influencers on best practices	Find online influencers. Provide training in the mechanisms of disinformation, how to spot campaigns, and/or how to contribute to responses by countermessaging, boosting information sites etc.	M001 - resilience	TA02 Objective Planning	D02
C00010	Enhanced privacy regulation for social media	Implement stronger privacy standards, to reduce the ability to microtarget community members.	M004 - friction	TA01 Strategic Planning	D02
C00011	Media literacy. Games to identify fake news	Create and use games to show people the mechanics of disinformation, and how to counter them.	M001 - resilience	TA02 Objective Planning	D02
C00012	Platform regulation	Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy. Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media. The U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D02
C00013	Rating framework for news	This is "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body. Include full transcripts, link source, add items.	M006 - scoring	TA01 Strategic Planning	D02
C00014	Real-time updates to fact-checking database	Update fact-checking databases and resources in real time. Especially import for time-limited events like natural disasters.	M006 - scoring	TA06 Develop Content	D04
C00016	Censorship	Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of information controlled by disinformation creators. Not recommended.	M005 - removal	TA01 Strategic Planning	D02
C00017	Repair broken social connections	For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen.	M010 - countermessaging	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03
C00019	Reduce effect of division-enablers	includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers	M003 - daylight	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03
C00021	Encourage in-person communication	Encourage offline communication	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D04
C00022	Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety	Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D04
C00024	Promote healthy narratives	Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA). Includes promoting identity neutral narratives.	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D04
C00026	Shore up democracy based messages	Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy	M010 - countermessaging	TA01 Strategic Planning	D04
C00027	Create culture of civility	This is passive. Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend.	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D07
C00028	Make information provenance available	Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments. Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted. This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria.	M011 - verification	TA02 Objective Planning	D03
C00029	Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise	Create websites in disinformation voids - spaces where people are looking for known disinformation.	M002 - diversion	TA02 Objective Planning	D03
C00030	Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)		M002 - diversion	TA02 Objective Planning	D03
C00031	Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify	Create competing narratives. Included "Facilitate State Propaganda" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.	M009 - dilution	TA02 Objective Planning	D03
C00032	Hijack content and link to truth- based info	Link to platform	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D03
C00034	Create more friction at account creation	Counters fake account	M004 - friction	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D04
C00036	Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)	All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration.	M013 - targeting	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02
C00040	third party verification for people	counters fake experts	M011 - verification	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02
C00042	Address truth contained in narratives	Focus on and boost truths in misinformation narratives, removing misinformation from them.	M010 - countermessaging	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D04
C00044	Keep people from posting to social media immediately	Platforms can introduce friction to slow down activities, force a small delay between posts, or replies to posts.	M004 - friction	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D03
C00046	Marginalise and discredit extremist groups	Reduce the credibility of extremist groups posting misinformation.	M013 - targeting	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D04
C00047	Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics	Flood disinformation spaces with obviously fake content, to dilute core misinformation narratives in them.	M008 - data pollution	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D05
C00048	Name and Shame Influencers	Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account. Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts. Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.	M003 - daylight	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D07
C00051	Counter social engineering training	Includes anti-elicitation training, phishing prevention education.	M001 - resilience	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02
C00052	Infiltrate platforms	Detect and degrade	M013 - targeting	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D04
C00053	Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts	remove or remove access to (e.g. stop the ability to update) old social media accounts, to reduce the pool of accounts available for takeover, botnets etc.	M012 - cleaning	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D04
C00056	Encourage people to leave social media	Encourage people to leave spcial media. We don't expect this to work	M004 - friction	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D02
C00058	Report crowdfunder as violator	counters crowdfunding. Includes ‘Expose online funding as fake”.	M005 - removal	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02
C00059	Verification of project before posting fund requests	third-party verification of projects posting funding campaigns before those campaigns can be posted.	M011 - verification	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D02
C00060	Legal action against for-profit engagement factories	Take legal action against for-profit "factories" creating misinformation.	M013 - targeting	TA02 Objective Planning	D03
C00062	Free open library sources worldwide	Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as DISARM can be created to counter the adversarial efforts.	M010 - countermessaging	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D04
C00065	Reduce political targeting	Includes “ban political micro targeting” and “ban political ads”	M005 - removal	TA05 Microtargeting	D03
C00066	Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)	Flood a disinformation-related hashtag with other content.	M009 - dilution	TA05 Microtargeting	D03
C00067	Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)	Reduce the credibility of groups behind misinformation-linked funding campaigns.	M013 - targeting	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D03
C00070	Block access to disinformation resources	Resources = accounts, channels etc. Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. TA02*: DDOS at the critical time, to deny an adversary's time-bound objective. T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy. Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag. T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as "blocking access to a platform".	M005 - removal	TA02 Objective Planning	D02
C00071	Block source of pollution	Block websites, accounts, groups etc connected to misinformation and other information pollution.	M005 - removal	TA06 Develop Content	D02
C00072	Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended	Check special-interest groups (e.g. medical, knitting) for unrelated and misinformation-linked content, and remove it.	M005 - removal	TA06 Develop Content	D02
C00073	Inoculate populations through media literacy training	Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade.	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D02
C00074	Identify and delete or rate limit identical content	C00000	M012 - cleaning	TA06 Develop Content	D02
C00075	normalise language	normalise the language around disinformation and misinformation; give people the words for artifact and effect types.	M010 - countermessaging	TA06 Develop Content	D02
C00076	Prohibit images in political discourse channels	Make political discussion channels text-only.	M005 - removal	TA06 Develop Content	D02
C00077	Active defence: run TA15 "develop people” - not recommended	Develop networks of communities and influencers around counter-misinformation. Match them to misinformation creators	M013 - targeting	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D03
C00078	Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content	Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side”	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D03
C00080	Create competing narrative	Create counternarratives, or narratives that compete in the same spaces as misinformation narratives. Could also be degrade	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D03
C00081	Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations	Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise"	M003 - daylight	TA06 Develop Content	D03
C00082	Ground truthing as automated response to pollution	Also inoculation.	M010 - countermessaging	TA06 Develop Content	D03
C00084	Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them	Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”. Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with "far-up/down/left/right" actors. "Long Game" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations. Can also replay technique T0003.	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D03
C00085	Mute content	Rate-limit disinformation content. Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns. Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors.	M003 - daylight	TA06 Develop Content	D03
C00086	Distract from noise with addictive content	Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a "conversion rate" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's "information bubble" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content.	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D04
C00087	Make more noise than the disinformation		M009 - dilution	TA06 Develop Content	D04
C00090	Fake engagement system	Create honeypots for misinformation creators to engage with, and reduce the resources they have available for misinformation campaigns.	M002 - diversion	TA07 Channel Selection	D05
C00091	Honeypot social community	Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation.	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D05
C00092	Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers	Includes "Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”. Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers.	M006 - scoring	TA02 Objective Planning	D07
C00093	Influencer code of conduct	Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers. Can be platform code of conduct; can also be community code.	M001 - resilience	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D07
C00094	Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research	Accountability move: make sure research is published with its funding sources.	M003 - daylight	TA06 Develop Content	D04
C00096	Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers	Increase credibility, visibility, and reach of positive influencers in the information space.	M006 - scoring	TA01 Strategic Planning	D07
C00097	Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment	Reduce poll flooding by online taking comments or poll entries from verified accounts.	M004 - friction	TA07 Channel Selection	D02
C00098	Revocation of allowlisted or "verified" status	remove blue checkmarks etc from known misinformation accounts.	M004 - friction	TA07 Channel Selection	D02
C00099	Strengthen verification methods	Improve content veerification methods available to groups, individuals etc.	M004 - friction	TA07 Channel Selection	D02
C00100	Hashtag jacking	Post large volumes of unrelated content on known misinformation hashtags	M002 - diversion	TA08 Pump Priming	D03
C00101	Create friction by rate-limiting engagement	Create participant friction. Includes Make repeat voting hard, and throttle number of forwards.	M004 - friction	TA07 Channel Selection	D04
C00103	Create a bot that engages / distract trolls	This is reactive, not active measure (honeypots are active). It's a platform controlled measure.	M002 - diversion	TA07 Channel Selection	D05
C00105	Buy more advertising than misinformation creators	Shift influence and algorithms by posting more adverts into spaces than misinformation creators.	M009 - dilution	TA07 Channel Selection	D03
C00106	Click-bait centrist content	Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D03
C00107	Content moderation	includes social media content take-downs, e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs	M006 - scoring, M005 - removal	TA06 Develop Content	D02
C00109	Dampen Emotional Reaction	Reduce emotional responses to misinformation through calming messages, etc.	M001 - resilience	TA09 Exposure	D03
C00111	Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views		M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D04
C00112	"Prove they are not an op!"	Challenge misinformation creators to prove they're not an information operation.	M004 - friction	TA08 Pump Priming	D02
C00113	Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.	Debunk fake experts, their credentials, and potentially also their audience quality	M003 - daylight	TA08 Pump Priming	D02
C00114	Don't engage with payloads	Stop passing on misinformation	M004 - friction	TA08 Pump Priming	D02
C00115	Expose actor and intentions	Debunk misinformation creators and posters.	M003 - daylight	TA08 Pump Priming	D02
C00116	Provide proof of involvement	Build and post information about groups etc's involvement in misinformation incidents.	M003 - daylight	TA08 Pump Priming	D02
C00117	Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people	Label promote counter to disinformation	M010 - countermessaging	TA08 Pump Priming	D04
C00118	Repurpose images with new text	Add countermessage text to iamges used in misinformation incidents.	M010 - countermessaging	TA08 Pump Priming	D04
C00119	Engage payload and debunk.	debunk misinformation content. Provide link to facts.	M010 - countermessaging	TA08 Pump Priming	D07
C00120	Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes	Redesign platforms and algorithms to reduce the effectiveness of disinformation	M007 - metatechnique	TA08 Pump Priming	D07
C00121	Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow.	Make algorithms in platforms explainable, and visible to people using those platforms.	M001 - resilience	TA08 Pump Priming	D07
C00122	Content moderation	Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship.	M004 - friction	TA09 Exposure	D02
C00123	Remove or rate limit botnets	reduce the visibility of known botnets online.	M004 - friction	TA09 Exposure	D03
C00124	Don't feed the trolls	Don't engage with individuals relaying misinformation.	M004 - friction	TA09 Exposure	D03
C00125	Prebunking	Produce material in advance of misinformation incidents, by anticipating the narratives used in them, and debunking them.	M001 - resilience	TA09 Exposure	D03
C00126	Social media amber alert	Create an alert system around disinformation and misinformation artifacts, narratives, and incidents	M003 - daylight	TA09 Exposure	D03
C00128	Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants"	Repost or comment on misinformation artifacts, using ridicule or other content to reduce the likelihood of reposting.	M009 - dilution	TA09 Exposure	D03
C00129	Use banking to cut off access	fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism	M014 - reduce resources	TA09 Exposure	D02
C00130	Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.	Train local influencers in countering misinformation.	M001 - resilience	TA05 Microtargeting	D07
C00131	Seize and analyse botnet servers	Take botnet servers offline by seizing them.	M005 - removal	TA11 Persistence	D02
C00133	Deplatform Account*	Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left.	M005 - removal	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D03
C00135	Deplatform message groups and/or message boards	Merged two rows here.	M005 - removal	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D03
C00136	Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages	Find communities likely to be targetted by misinformation campaigns, and send them countermessages or pointers to information sources.	M010 - countermessaging	TA08 Pump Priming	D03
C00138	Spam domestic actors with lawsuits	File multiple lawsuits against known misinformation creators and posters, to distract them from disinformation creation.	M014 - reduce resources	TA11 Persistence	D03
C00139	Weaponise youtube content matrices	God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out.	M004 - friction	TA11 Persistence	D03
C00140	"Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls	Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except "T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics	M008 - data pollution	TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D03
C00142	Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content	Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “"Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice. Includes “mark clickbait visually”.	M004 - friction	TA06 Develop Content	D04
C00143	(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time	Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc.	M013 - targeting	TA11 Persistence	D04
C00144	Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs	Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days. Not recommended	M014 - reduce resources	TA02 Objective Planning	D04
C00147	Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)	Stop new community activity (likes, comments) on old social media posts.	M004 - friction	TA09 Exposure	D03
C00148	Add random links to network graphs	If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which DISARM techniques.	M008 - data pollution	TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D04
C00149	Poison the monitoring & evaluation data	Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.	M008 - data pollution	TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D04
C00153	Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure	Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate.	M013 - targeting	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03
C00154	Ask media not to report false information	Train media to spot and respond to misinformation, and ask them not to post or transmit misinformation they've found.	M005 - removal	TA08 Pump Priming	D02
C00155	Ban incident actors from funding sites	Ban misinformation creators and posters from funding sites	M005 - removal	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02
C00156	Better tell your country or organization story	Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission.	M010 - countermessaging	TA02 Objective Planning	D03
C00159	Have a disinformation response plan	e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03
C00160	find and train influencers	Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources.	M001 - resilience	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02
C00161	Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements	Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D07
C00162	Unravel/target the Potemkin villages	Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year.	M013 - targeting	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D03
C00164	compatriot policy	protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors	M013 - targeting	TA02 Objective Planning	D03
C00165	Ensure integrity of official documents	e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions	M004 - friction	TA06 Develop Content	D02
C00169	develop a creative content hub	international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.	M010 - countermessaging	TA02 Objective Planning	D03
C00170	elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft	Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03
C00172	social media source removal	Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal	M005 - removal	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D02
C00174	Create a healthier news environment	Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle. includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.	M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion	TA01 Strategic Planning	D02
C00176	Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private	Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D07
C00178	Fill information voids with non-disinformation content	1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation.	M009 - dilution, M008 - data pollution	TA05 Microtargeting	D04
C00182	Redirection / malware detection/ remediation	Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete.	M005 - removal	TA09 Exposure	D02
C00184	Media exposure	highlight misinformation activities and actors in media	M003 - daylight	TA08 Pump Priming	D04
C00188	Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves	Includes SEO influence. Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community. Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets.	M001 - resilience	TA08 Pump Priming	D03
C00189	Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts	Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles. Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal	M003 - daylight	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D06
C00190	open engagement with civil society	Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03
C00195	Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content	Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or propaganda themes. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content.	M002 - diversion	TA07 Channel Selection	D02
C00197	remove suspicious accounts	Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues). Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners.	M005 - removal	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02
C00200	Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo	FIXIT: standardize language used for influencer/ respected figure.	M010 - countermessaging	TA09 Exposure	D03
C00202	Set data 'honeytraps'	Set honeytraps in content likely to be accessed for disinformation.	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D02
C00203	Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets	Remove access to official press events from known misinformation actors.	M004 - friction	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D03
C00205	strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting	Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03
C00207	Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended		M013 - targeting	TA02 Objective Planning	D07
C00211	Use humorous counter-narratives		M010 - countermessaging	TA09 Exposure	D03
C00212	build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant	Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education.	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03
C00216	Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors	Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains	M014 - reduce resources	TA05 Microtargeting	D02
C00219	Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators	Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc.	M003 - daylight	TA06 Develop Content	D04
C00220	Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan	Create a plan for misinformation and disinformation response, before it's needed. Include connections / contacts needed, expected counteremessages etc.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03
C00221	Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors	Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03
C00222	Tabletop simulations	Simulate misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and responses to them, before campaigns happen.	M007 - metatechnique	TA02 Objective Planning	D03
C00223	Strengthen Trust in social media platforms	Improve trust in the misinformation responses from social media and other platforms. Examples include creating greater transparancy on their actions and algorithms.	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D03