DISARMframeworks/generated_pages/incidents/I00128.md

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Incident I00128: #TrollTracker: Outward Influence Operation From Iran

  • Summary: Facebook removed 783 assets — pages, groups, and accounts — that the company assessed to be associated with an Iran-based network for “coordinated inauthentic behavior.” The network targeted users in more than a dozen countries and posted content in at least eight different languages.

    All but 97 pages were previously removed by a mixture of automated systems, spam detectors, or varied platform integrity team. Before the takedown, Facebook shared the remaining 97 active pages with @DFRLab.

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Reference Pub Date Authors Org Archive
Technique Description given for this incident
T0097.208 Social Cause Persona  IT00000534 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the Peoples Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership.

The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK.

Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEKs movement in Iran in the mid-1990s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the pages images.


In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website).
T0122 Direct Users to Alternative Platforms  IT00000537 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the Peoples Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership.

The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK.

Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEKs movement in Iran in the mid-1990s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the pages images.


In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website).
T0151.001 Social Media Platform  IT00000535 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the Peoples Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership.

The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK.

Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEKs movement in Iran in the mid-1990s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the pages images.


In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website).
T0151.002 Online Community Group  IT00000536 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the Peoples Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership.

The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK.

Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEKs movement in Iran in the mid-1990s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the pages images.


In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website).
T0152.004 Website  IT00000539 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the Peoples Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership.

The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK.

Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEKs movement in Iran in the mid-1990s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the pages images.


In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website).
T0153.004 QR Code  IT00000538 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the Peoples Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership.

The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK.

Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEKs movement in Iran in the mid-1990s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the pages images.


In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website).

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