DISARMframeworks/generated_pages/incidents/I00128.md

Incident I00128: #TrollTracker: Outward Influence Operation From Iran

• Summary: Facebook removed 783 assets — pages, groups, and accounts — that the company assessed to be associated with an Iran-based network for “coordinated inauthentic behavior.” The network targeted users in more than a dozen countries and posted content in at least eight different languages.
  
  All but 97 pages were previously removed by a mixture of automated systems, spam detectors, or varied platform integrity team. Before the takedown, Facebook shared the remaining 97 active pages with @DFRLab.

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Reference	Pub Date	Authors	Org	Archive
https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8d	2019/01/31	Kanishk Karan, Donara Barojan, Melissa Hall, Graham Brookie	DFRLab	https://web.archive.org/web/20240618014243/https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8d

Technique	Description given for this incident
T0097.208 Social Cause Persona	IT00000534 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership. The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK. Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEK’s movement in Iran in the mid-1990’s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the page’s images. In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code Asset), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website Asset).
T0122 Direct Users to Alternative Platforms	IT00000537 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership. The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK. Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEK’s movement in Iran in the mid-1990’s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the page’s images. In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code Asset), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website Asset).
T0151.001 Social Media Platform	IT00000535 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership. The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK. Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEK’s movement in Iran in the mid-1990’s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the page’s images. In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code Asset), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website Asset).
T0151.002 Online Community Group	IT00000536 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership. The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK. Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEK’s movement in Iran in the mid-1990’s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the page’s images. In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code Asset), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website Asset).
T0152.004 Website Asset	IT00000539 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership. The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK. Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEK’s movement in Iran in the mid-1990’s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the page’s images. In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code Asset), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website Asset).
T0153.004 QR Code Asset	IT00000538 [Meta removed a network of assets for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. One page] in the network, @StopMEK, was promoting views against the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), the largest and most active political opposition group against the Islamic Republic of Iran Leadership. The content on the page drew narratives showing parallels between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the MEK. Apart from images and memes, the @StopMEK page shared a link to an archived report on how the United States was monitoring the MEK’s movement in Iran in the mid-1990’s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the page’s images. In this example a Facebook page presented itself as focusing on a political cause (T0097.208: Social Cause Persona, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group). Within the page it embedded a QR code (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms, T0153.004: QR Code Asset), which took users to a document hosted on another website (T0152.004: Website Asset).

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