DISARMframeworks/generated_pages/detections_index.md

DISARM Detections:

disarm_id	name	summary	metatechnique	tactic	responsetype
F00001	Analyse aborted / failed campaigns	Examine failed campaigns. How did they fail? Can we create useful activities that increase these failures?		TA01 Strategic Planning	D01
F00002	Analyse viral fizzle	We have no idea what this means. Is it something to do with the way a viral story spreads?		TA01 Strategic Planning	D01
F00003	Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors			TA01 Strategic Planning	D01
F00004	Recruit like-minded converts "people who used to be in-group"			TA01 Strategic Planning	D01
F00005	SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis of groups and audience segments.		TA01 Strategic Planning	D01
F00006	SWOT analysis of tech platforms			TA01 Strategic Planning	D01
F00007	Monitor account level activity in social networks			TA02 Objective Planning	D01
F00008	Detect abnormal amplification			TA03 Develop People	D01
F00009	Detect abnormal events			TA03 Develop People	D01
F00010	Detect abnormal groups			TA03 Develop People	D01
F00011	Detect abnormal pages			TA03 Develop People	D01
F00012	Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ people			TA03 Develop People	D01
F00013	Identify fake news sites			TA03 Develop People	D01
F00014	Trace connections	for e.g. fake news sites		TA03 Develop People	D01
F00015	Detect anomalies in membership growth patterns	I include Fake Experts as they may use funding campaigns such as Patreon to fund their operations and so these should be watched.		TA03 Develop People	D01
F00016	Identify fence-sitters	Note: In each case, depending on the platform there may be a way to identify a fence-sitter. For example, online polls may have a neutral option or a "somewhat this-or-that" option, and may reveal who voted for that to all visitors. This information could be of use to data analysts. In TA08-11, the engagement level of victims could be identified to detect and respond to increasing engagement.		TA03 Develop People	D01
F00017	Measure emotional valence			TA03 Develop People	D01
F00018	Follow the money	track funding sources		TA03 Develop People	D01
F00019	Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated)			TA04 Develop Networks	D01
F00020	Detect anomalous activity			TA04 Develop Networks	D01
F00021	AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planning			TA04 Develop Networks	D01
F00022	Digital authority - regulating body (united states)			TA04 Develop Networks	D01
F00023	Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account)			TA04 Develop Networks	D01
F00024	Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniors			TA04 Develop Networks	D01
F00025	Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detection			TA05 Microtargeting	D01
F00026	Language anomoly detection			TA05 Microtargeting	D01
F00027	Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topics			TA05 Microtargeting	D01
F00028	Associate a public key signature with government documents			TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00029	Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, Sputnik			TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00030	Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect content			TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00031	Educate on how to identify information pollution	Strategic planning included as innoculating population has strategic value.		TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00032	Educate on how to identify to pollution	DUPLICATE - DELETE		TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00033	Fake websites: add transparency on business model			TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00034	Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effort			TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00035	Identify repeated narrative DNA			TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00036	Looking for AB testing in unregulated channels			TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00037	News content provenance certification.	Original Comment: Shortcomings: intentional falsehood. Doesn't solve accuracy. Can't be mandatory. Technique should be in terms of "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news.		TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00038	Social capital as attack vector	Unsure I understood the original intention or what it applied to. Therefore the techniques listed (10, 39, 43, 57, 61) are under my interpretation - which is that we want to track ignorant agents who fall into the enemy's trap and show a cost to financing/reposting/helping the adversary via public shaming or other means.		TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00039	standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industry			TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00040	Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenance			TA06 Develop Content	D01
F00041	Bias detection	Not technically left of boom		TA07 Channel Selection	D01
F00042	Categorize polls by intent	Use T00029, but against the creators		TA07 Channel Selection	D01
F00043	Monitor for creation of fake known personas	Platform companies and some information security companies (e.g. ZeroFox) do this.		TA07 Channel Selection	D01
F00044	Forensic analysis	Can be used in all phases for all techniques.		TA08 Pump Priming	D01
F00045	Forensic linguistic analysis	Can be used in all phases for all techniques.		TA08 Pump Priming	D01
F00046	Pump priming analytics			TA08 Pump Priming	D01
F00047	trace involved parties			TA08 Pump Priming	D01
F00048	Trace known operations and connection			TA08 Pump Priming	D01
F00049	trace money			TA08 Pump Priming	D01
F00050	Web cache analytics			TA08 Pump Priming	D01
F00051	Challenge expertise			TA09 Exposure	D01
F00052	Discover sponsors	Discovering the sponsors behind a campaign, narrative, bot, a set of accounts, or a social media comment, or anything else is useful.		TA09 Exposure	D01
F00053	Government rumour control office (what can we learn?)			TA09 Exposure	D01
F00054	Restrict people who can @ you on social networks			TA09 Exposure	D01
F00055	Verify credentials			TA09 Exposure	D01
F00056	Verify organisation legitimacy			TA09 Exposure	D01
F00057	Verify personal credentials of experts			TA09 Exposure	D01
F00058	Deplatform (cancel culture)	*Deplatform People: This technique needs to be a bit more specific to distinguish it from "account removal" or DDOS and other techniques that get more specific when applied to content. For example, other ways of deplatforming people include attacking their sources of funds, their allies, their followers, etc.		TA10 Go Physical	D01
F00059	Identify susceptible demographics	All techniques provide or are susceptible to being countered by, or leveraged for, knowledge about user demographics.		TA10 Go Physical	D01
F00060	Identify susceptible influencers	I assume this was a transcript error. Otherwise, "Identify Susceptible Influences" as in the various methods of influences that may work against a victim could also be a technique. Nope, wasn't a transcript error: original note says influencers, as in find people of influence that might be targetted.		TA10 Go Physical	D01
F00061	Microtargeting			TA10 Go Physical	D01
F00062	Detect when Dormant account turns active			TA11 Persistence	D01
F00063	Linguistic change analysis			TA11 Persistence	D01
F00064	Monitor reports of account takeover			TA11 Persistence	D01
F00065	Sentiment change analysis			TA11 Persistence	D01
F00066	Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilities			TA11 Persistence	D01
F00067	Data forensics				D01
F00068	Resonance analysis	a developing methodology for identifying statistical differences in how social groups use language and quantifying how common those statistical differences are within a larger population. In essence, it hypothesizes how much affinity might exist for a specific group within a general population, based on the language its members employ			D01
F00069	Track Russian media and develop analytic methods.	To effectively counter Russian propaganda, it will be critical to track Russian influence efforts. The information requirements are varied and include the following: • Identify fake-news stories and their sources. • Understand narrative themes and content that pervade various Russian media sources. • Understand the broader Russian strategy that underlies tactical propaganda messaging.			D01
F00070	Full spectrum analytics			ALL	D01
F00071	Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers	Local influencers detected via Twitter networks are likely local influencers in other online and off-line channels as well. In addition, the content and themes gleaned from Russia and Russia-supporting populations, as well as anti-Russia activists, likely swirl in other online and off-line mediums as well.			D01
F00072	network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community.	It is possible that some of these are bots or trolls and could be flagged for suspension for violating Twitter’s terms of service.			D01
F00073	collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators	Players at the level of covert attribution, referred to as “black” in the grayscale of deniability, produce content on user-generated media, such as YouTube, but also add fear-mongering commentary to and amplify content produced by others and supply exploitable content to data dump websites. These activities are conducted by a network of trolls, bots, honeypots, and hackers.			D01
F00074	identify relevant fence-sitter communities	brand ambassador programs could be used with influencers across a variety of social media channels. It could also target other prominent experts, such as academics, business leaders, and other potentially prominent people. Authorities must ultimately take care in implementing such a program given the risk that contact with U.S. or NATO authorities might damage influencer reputations. Engagements must consequently be made with care, and, if possible, government interlocutors should work through local NGOs.			D01
F00075	leverage open-source information	significant amounts of quality open-source information are now available and should be leveraged to build products and analysis prior to problem prioritization in the areas of observation, attribution, and intent. Successfully distinguishing the gray zone campaign signal through the global noise requires action through the entirety of the national security community. Policy, process, and tools must all adapt and evolve to detect, discern, and act upon a new type of signal			D01
F00076	Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots”	Target audience connected to "useful idiots rather than the specific profiles because - The active presence of such sources complicates targeting of Russian propaganda, given that it is often difficult to discriminate between authentic views and opinions on the internet and those disseminated by the Russian state.			D01
F00077	Model for bot account behavior	Bot account: action based, people. Unsure which DISARM techniques.		TA03 Develop People	D01
F00078	Monitor account level activity in social networks	All techniques benefit from careful analysis and monitoring of activities on social network.		TA03 Develop People	D01
F00079	Network anomaly detection			TA05 Microtargeting	D01
F00080	Hack the polls/ content yourself	Two wrongs don't make a right? But if you hack your own polls, you do learn how it could be done, and learn what to look for		TA07 Channel Selection	D01
F00081	Need way for end user to report operations			TA09 Exposure	D01
F00082	Control the US "slang" translation boards			TA11 Persistence	D03
F00083	Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contents			TA11 Persistence	D05
F00084	Track individual bad actors			TA03 Develop People	D01
F00085	detection of a weak signal through global noise	Gray zone threats are challenging given that warning requires detection of a weak signal through global noise and across threat vectors and regional boundaries.Three interconnected gray zone elements characterize the nature of the activity: Temporality: The nature of gray zone threats truly requires a “big picture view” over long timescales and across regions and functional topics. Attribution: requiring an “almost certain” or “nearly certain analytic assessment before acting costs time and analytic effort Intent: judgement of adversarial intent to conduct gray zone activity. Indeed, the purpose of countering gray zone threats is to deter adversaries from fulfilling their intent to act. While attribution is one piece of the puzzle, closing the space around intent often means synthesizing multiple relevant indicators and warnings, including the state’s geopolitical ambitions, military ties, trade and investment, level of corruption, and media landscape, among others.
F00086	Outpace Competitor Intelligence Capabilities	Develop an intelligence-based understanding of foreign actors’ motivations, psychologies, and societal and geopolitical contexts. Leverage artificial intelligence to identify patterns and infer competitors’ intent		TA02 Objective planning	D01
F00087	Improve Indications and Warning	United States has not adequately adapted its information indicators and thresholds for warning policymakers to account for gray zone tactics. Competitors have undertaken a marked shift to slow-burn, deceptive, non-military, and indirect challenges to U.S. interests. Relative to traditional security indicators and warnings, these are more numerous and harder to detect and make it difficult for analysts to infer intent.			D01
F00088	Revitalize an “active measures working group,”	Recognize campaigns from weak signals, including rivals’ intent, capability, impact, interactive effects, and impact on U.S. interests... focus on adversarial covert action aspects of campaigning.			D01
F00089	target/name/flag "grey zone" website content	"Gray zone" is second level of content producers and circulators, composed of outlets with uncertain attribution. This category covers conspiracy websites, far-right or far-left websites, news aggregators, and data dump websites		TA04 Develop Networks	D01
F00090	Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements	Bring private sector and civil society into accord on U.S. interests		TA01 Strategic Planning	D01
F00091	Partner to develop analytic methods & tools	This might include working with relevant technology firms to ensure that contracted analytic support is available. Contracted support is reportedly valuable because technology to monitor social media data is continually evolving, and such firms can provide the expertise to help identify and analyze trends, and they can more effectively stay abreast of the changing systems and develop new models as they are required		TA01 Strategic Planning	D01
F00092	daylight	Warn social media companies about an ongoing campaign (e.g. antivax sites). Anyone with datasets or data summaries can help with this		TA09 Exposure	D01
F00093	S4d detection and re-allocation approaches	S4D is a way to separate out different speakers in text, audio.	M004 - friction	TA03 Develop People	D01
F00094	Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together		M003 - daylight	TA07 Channel Selection	D01
F00095	Fact checking	Process suspicious artifacts, narratives, and incidents		TA09 Exposure	D01