DISARMframeworks/generated_pages/techniques/T0097.111.md

# Technique T0097.111: Government Official Persona

* **Summary**: A person who presents as an active or previous government official has the government official persona. These are officials serving in government, such as heads of government departments, leaders of countries, and members of government selected to represent constituents.<br><br> Presenting as a government official is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, however threat actors may fabricate individuals who work in government to add credibility to their narratives (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona). They may also impersonate existing members of government (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona).<br><br> Legitimate government officials could use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona). For example, a government official could take money for using their position to provide legitimacy to a false narrative, or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.<br><br> <b>Associated Techniques and Sub-techniques</b><br> <b>T0097.110: Party Official Persona:</b> Analysts should use this sub-technique to catalogue cases where an individual is presenting as a member of a political party. <br><br> Not all government officials are political party officials (such as outside experts brought into government) and not all political party officials are government officials (such as people standing for office who are not yet working in government).<br><br> <b>T0097.206: Government Institution Persona:</b> People presenting as members of a government may also represent a government institution which they are associated with.<br><br> <b>T0097.112: Government Employee Persona:</b> Analysts should use this sub-technique to document people presenting as professionals hired to serve in government institutions and departments, not officials selected to represent constituents, or assigned official roles in government (such as heads of departments).

* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16


| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00071 Russia-aligned hacktivists stir up anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Poland](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00071.md) | <i>“On August 16, 2022, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Joker DPR (Джокер ДНР) published a forged letter allegedly written by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. In the letter, Kuleba supposedly asked relevant Polish authorities to rename Belwederska Street in Warsaw — the location of the Russian embassy building — as Stepan Bandera Street, in honor of the far-right nationalist who led the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during WWII.<br><br> [...]<br><br> The letter is not dated, and Dmytro Kuleba’s signature seems to be copied from a publicly available letter signed by him in 2021.”</i><br><br> In this example the Telegram channel Joker DPR published a forged letter (T0085.004: Develop Document) in which they impersonated the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs (T0097.111: Government Official Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona), using Ministry letterhead (T0097.206: Government Institution Persona,  T0143.003: Impersonated Persona). |
| [I00084 Russia turns its diplomats into disinformation warriors](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00084.md) | <i>“After the European Union banned Kremlin-backed media outlets and social media giants demoted their posts for peddling falsehoods about the war in Ukraine, Moscow has turned to its cadre of diplomats, government spokespeople and ministers — many of whom have extensive followings on social media — to promote disinformation about the conflict in Eastern Europe, according to four EU and United States officials.”</i><br><br>In this example authentic Russian government officials used their own accounts to promote false narratives (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona).<br><br>The use of accounts managed by authentic Government / Diplomats to spread false narratives makes it harder for platforms to enforce content moderation, because of the political ramifications they may face for censoring elected officials (T0131: Exploit TOS/Content Moderation). For example, Twitter previously argued that official channels of world leaders are not removed due to the high public interest associated with their activities. |
| [I00085 China’s large-scale media push: Attempts to influence Swedish media](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00085.md) | <i>“Four media companies – Svenska Dagbladet, Expressen, Sveriges Radio, and Sveriges Television – stated that they had been contacted by the Chinese embassy on several occasions, and that they, for instance, had been criticized on their publications, both by letters and e-mails.<br><br> The media company Svenska Dagbladet, had been contacted on several occasions in the past two years, including via e-mails directly from the Chinese ambassador to Sweden. Several times, China and the Chinese ambassador had criticized the media company’s publications regarding the conditions in China. Individual reporters also reported having been subjected to criticism.<br><br> The tabloid Expressen had received several letters and e-mails from the embassy, e-mails containing criticism and threatening formulations regarding the coverage of the Swedish book publisher Gui Minhai, who has been imprisoned in China since 2015. Formulations such as “media tyranny” could be found in the e-mails.”</i><br><br> In this case, the Chinese ambassador is using their official role (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona) to try to influence Swedish press. A government official trying to interfere in other countries' media activities could be a violation of press freedom. In this specific case, the Chinese diplomats are trying to silence criticism against China (T0139.002: Silence).” |
| [I00093 China Falsely Denies Disinformation Campaign Targeting Canada’s Prime Minister](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00093.md) | <i>“On October 23, Canada’s Foreign Ministry said it had discovered a disinformation campaign, likely tied to China, aimed at discrediting dozens of Canadian politicians, including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.<br><br> “The ministry said the campaign took place in August and September. It used new and hijacked social media accounts to bulk-post messages targeting Canadian politicians (T0146: Account Asset, T0150.001: Newly Created Asset, T0150.005: Compromised Asset).<br><br> “A Chinese Embassy in Canada spokesperson dismissed Canada’s accusation as baseless.<br><br> ““Canada was a downright liar and disseminator of false information… Beijing has never meddled in another nation’s domestic affairs.”<br><br> “A Chinese Embassy in Canada spokesperson dismissed Canada’s accusation as baseless.<br><br> “That is false.<br><br> “The Canadian government's report is based on an investigation conducted by its Rapid Response Mechanism cyber intelligence unit in cooperation with the social media platforms.<br><br> “The investigation exposed China’s disinformation campaign dubbed “Spamouflage” -- for its tactic of using “a network of new or hijacked social media accounts that posts and increases the number of propaganda messages across multiple social media platforms – including Facebook, X/Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Medium, Reddit, TikTok, and LinkedIn.””</i><br><br> In this case a network of accounts attributed to China were identified operating on multiple platforms. The report was dismissed as false information by an official in the Chinese Embassy in Canada (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona, T0129.006: Deny Involvement). |



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