DISARMframeworks/CODE/DISARM Merged (Internal) - DISARM Framework Merged.csv

1		DISARM Phase	DISARM Tactic	DISARM Technique	DISARM Subtechnique	Description	DISARM ID	Feedback from EEAS	Action to Do	Action Taken	Where did it come from?	Where from more info
2	1	Plan	n/a	n/a	n/a	Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effective ways of achieving it. Communicate the vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on expected results.	P01				AMITT
3	36	Prepare	n/a	n/a	n/a	Activities conducted before execution to improve the ability to conduct the action. Examples include: development of the ecosystem needed to support the action: people, network, channels, content etc.	P02
4	126	Execute	n/a	n/a	n/a	Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-up and/or maintaining presence etc.	P03
5	263	Assess	n/a	n/a	n/a	Assess effectiveness of action, for use in future plans	P04
6	7	Plan	Plan Objectives	Dismiss	Discredit Credible Sources	Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.	ST0001				AMITT	T0067 Plan to Discredit Credible Sources
7	16	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Map Target Audience Information Environment	Monitor Social Media Analytics	An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics.	ST0002				SPICE
8	17	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Map Target Audience Information Environment	Evaluate Media Surveys	An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.	ST0003				SPICE
9	18	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Map Target Audience Information Environment	Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags	An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralized page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity.	ST0004				SPICE
10	19	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Map Target Audience Information Environment	Conduct Web Traffic Analysis	An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.	ST0005				SPICE
11	20	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Map Target Audience Information Environment	Assess Degree/Type of Media Access	An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties.	ST0006				SPICE
12	22	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities	Find Echo Chambers	Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with.	ST0007				AMITT
13	23	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities	Identify Data Voids	A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.	ST0008				SPICE
14	24	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities	Identify Existing Prejudices	An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarize its target audience from the rest of the public.	ST0009				SPICE
15	25	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities	Identify Existing Fissures	An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides.	ST0010
16	26	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities	Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions	An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives.	ST0011				SPICE
17	27	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities	Identify Wedge Issues	A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarizing the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions.	ST0012				SPICE
18	28	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities	Identify Target Audience Adversaries	An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to center operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view.	ST0013				SPICE
19	29	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities	Identify Media System Vulnerabilities	An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content.	ST0014				SPICE
20	31	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Segment Audiences	Geographic Segmentation	An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localized Content (see: Establish Legitimacy).	ST0015				SPICE
21	32	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Segment Audiences	Demographic Segmentation	An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age.	ST0016				SPICE
22	33	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Segment Audiences	Economic Segmentation	An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division.	ST0017				SPICE
23	34	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Segment Audiences	Psychographic Segmentation	An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes.	ST0018				SPICE
24	35	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Segment Audiences	Political Segmentation	An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.	ST0019				SPICE
25	42	Prepare	Develop Narratives	Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives	Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narrative		ST0020
26	43	Prepare	Develop Narratives	Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives	Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives		ST0021
27	49	Prepare	Develop Content	Reuse Existing Content	Use Copypasta	Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text.	ST0022
28	50	Prepare	Develop Content	Reuse Existing Content	Plagiarize Content		ST0023
29	51	Prepare	Develop Content	Reuse Existing Content	Deceptively Labeled or Translated		ST0024
30	52	Prepare	Develop Content	Reuse Existing Content	Appropriate Content		ST0025
31	54	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Text-based Content	Develop AI-Generated Text	AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.	ST0026
32	55	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Text-based Content	Develop False or Altered Documents		ST0027
33	56	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Text-based Content	Develop Inauthentic News Articles		ST0028
34	58	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Image-based Content	Develop Memes	Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.	ST0029					T0021 Develop Memes (AMITT)
35	59	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Image-based Content	Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)	Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.	ST0030
36	60	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Image-based Content	Deceptively Edit Image (Cheap fakes)	Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.	ST0031
37	61	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Image-based Content	Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages	image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan)	ST0032
38	63	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Video-based Content	Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes)	Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.	ST0033
39	64	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Video-based Content	Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes)	Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.	ST0034
40	66	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Audio-based Content	Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes)	Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.	ST0035
41	67	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Audio-based Content	Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes)	Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.	ST0036
42	69	Prepare	Develop Content	Generate information pollution	Create fake research	Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx	ST0037					T0026 Create fake research (AMITT)
43	70	Prepare	Develop Content	Generate information pollution	Hijack Hashtags		ST0038
44	72	Prepare	Develop Content	Distort facts	Reframe Context	Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions.	ST0039
45	73	Prepare	Develop Content	Distort facts	Edit Open-Source Content	An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets.	ST0040
46	76	Prepare	Develop Content	Obtain Private Documents	Leak Authentic Documents		ST0041
47	77	Prepare	Develop Content	Obtain Private Documents	Leak False Documents		ST0042
48	78	Prepare	Develop Content	Obtain Private Documents	Leak Altered Documents	Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then alter and release, possibly among factual documents/sources.	ST0043					T0025 Leak altered documents (AMITT)
49	81	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Create Inauthentic Accounts	Create Anonymous Accounts	Anonymous accounts or anonymous users refer to users that access network resources without providing a username or password. An influence operation may use anonymous accounts to spread content without direct attribution to the operation.	ST0044				SPICE
50	82	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Create Inauthentic Accounts	Create Cyborg Accounts	Cyborg accounts refer to partly manned, partly automated social media accounts. Cyborg accounts primarily act as bots, but a human operator periodically takes control of the account to engage with real social media users by responding to comments and posting original content. Influence operations may use cyborg accounts to reduce the amount of direct human input required to maintain a regular account but increase the apparent legitimacy of the cyborg account by occasionally breaking its bot-like behavior with human interaction.	ST0045				SPICE
51	83	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Create Inauthentic Accounts	Create Bot Accounts	Bots refer to autonomous internet users that interact with systems or other users while imitating traditional human behavior. Bots use a variety of tools to stay active without direct human operation, including artificial intelligence and big data analytics. For example, an individual may program a Twitter bot to retweet a tweet every time it contains a certain keyword or hashtag. An influence operation may use bots to increase its exposure and artificially promote its content across the internet without dedicating additional time or human resources. Amplifier bots promote operation content through reposts, shares, and likes to increase the content’s online popularity. Hacker bots are traditionally covert bots running on computer scripts that rarely engage with users and work primarily as agents of larger cyberattacks, such as a Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Spammer bots are programmed to post content on social media or in comment sections, usually as a supplementary tool. Impersonator bots102 pose as real people by mimicking human behavior, complicating their detection.	ST0046				SPICE
52	84	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Create Inauthentic Accounts	Create Sockpuppet Accounts	Sockpuppet accounts refer to falsified accounts that either promote the influence operation’s own material or attack critics of the material online. Individuals who control sockpuppet accounts also man at least one other user account.67 Sockpuppet accounts help legitimize operation narratives by providing an appearance of external support for the material and discrediting opponents of the operation.	ST0047				SPICE
53	86	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Recruit bad actors	Recruit Contractors		ST0048
54	87	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Recruit bad actors	Recruit Partisans		ST0049
55	88	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Recruit bad actors	Enlist Troll Accounts	An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate. Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organization, and post content with a specific ideological goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalized or less organized and work for a single individual.	ST0050
56	91	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Build Network	Create Organizations	Influence operations may establish organizations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities.	ST0051
57	92	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Build Network	Follow Trains		ST0052
58	93	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Build Network	Create Community or Sub-group		ST0053
59	95	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Acquire/ recruit Network	Fund Proxies	An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including: - Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution - Reducing the workload for direct operation assets	ST0054
60	96	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Acquire/ recruit Network	Botnets		ST0055
61	98	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Infiltrate Existing Networks	Identify susceptible targets in networks		ST0056					TK0016 Identify susceptible targets in networks (AMITT)
62	99	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Infiltrate Existing Networks	Utilize Butterfly Attack	Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organizations, and media campaigns.	ST0057
63	105	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Prepare fundraising campaigns	From bad actors		ST0058
64	106	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Prepare fundraising campaigns	From ignorant agents		ST0059
65	108	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Leverage Content Farm	Create a Content Farm		ST0060
66	109	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Leverage Content Farm	Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations	An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organization that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed organizations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content farms for high volumes of targeted media.	ST0061
67	113	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Create fake experts	Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications		ST0062
68	115	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Create personas	Backstop personas	Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability	ST0063					T0030 Backstop personas (AMITT)
69	117	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Establish Inauthentic News Sites	Create Inauthentic News Sites		ST0064					T0008 Create fake or imposter news sites (AMITT)
70	118	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Establish Inauthentic News Sites	Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites	An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct.	ST0065
71	120	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities	Astroturfing	Astroturfing occurs when an influence operation disguises itself as grassroots movement or organization that supports operation narratives. Unlike butterfly attacks, astroturfing aims to increase the appearance of popular support for the operation cause and does not infiltrate existing groups to discredit their objectives.	ST0066
72	121	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities	Spoof/parody account/site		ST0067
73	123	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Co-opt Trusted Sources	Co-Opt Trusted Individuals		ST0068
74	124	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Co-opt Trusted Sources	Co-Opt Grassroots Groups		ST0069
75	125	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Co-opt Trusted Sources	Co-opt Influencers		ST0070					TK0013 Find Influencers (AMITT)
76	132	Execute	Microtarget	Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles	Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles		ST0071
77	133	Execute	Microtarget	Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles	Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles		ST0072
78	134	Execute	Microtarget	Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles	Exploit Data Voids	A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.	ST0073
79	137	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Chat apps	Use Encrypted Chat Apps		ST0074
80	138	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Chat apps	Use Unencrypted Chats Apps		ST0075
81	140	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Livestream	Video Livestream		ST0076
82	141	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Livestream	Audio Livestream		ST0077
83	143	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Social Networks	Mainstream Social Networks	Examples include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, VK,	ST0078
84	144	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Social Networks	Dating Apps		ST0079
85	145	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Social Networks	Private/Closed Social Networks		ST0080
86	146	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Social Networks	Interest-Based Networks	Examples include smaller and niche networks including Gettr, Truth Social, Parler, etc.	ST0081
87	147	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Social Networks	Use hashtags	Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident.	ST0082					T0055 Use hashtags (AMITT)
88	148	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Social Networks	Create dedicated hashtag	Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag.	ST0083
89	150	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Media Sharing Networks	Photo Sharing	Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, Flickr, etc	ST0084
90	151	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Media Sharing Networks	Video Sharing	Examples include Youtube, TikTok, ShareChat, Rumble, etc	ST0085
91	152	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Media Sharing Networks	Audio sharing	Examples include podcasting apps, Soundcloud, etc.	ST0086
92	154	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Discussion Forums	Anonymous Message Boards	Examples include the Chans	ST0087
93	161	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Traditional Media	TV		ST0088
94	162	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Traditional Media	Newspaper		ST0089
95	163	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Traditional Media	Radio		ST0090
96	175	Execute	Deliver Content	Deliver Ads	Social media		ST0091
97	176	Execute	Deliver Content	Deliver Ads	Traditional Media	Examples include TV, Radio, Newspaper, billboards	ST0092
98	178	Execute	Deliver Content	Post Content	Share Memes	Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.	ST0093
99	179	Execute	Deliver Content	Post Content	Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash		ST0094
100	180	Execute	Deliver Content	Post Content	One-Way Direct Posting	Direct posting refers to a method of posting content via a one-way messaging service, where the recipient cannot directly respond to the poster’s messaging. An influence operation may post directly to promote operation narratives to the target audience without allowing opportunities for fact-checking or disagreement, creating a false sense of support for the narrative.	ST0095
101	182	Execute	Deliver Content	Comment or Reply on Content	Post inauthentic social media comment	Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums.	ST0096					T0051 Fabricate social media comment (AMITT)
102	186	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Flooding the Information Space	Trolls amplify and manipulate	Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).	ST0097					T0053 Trolls amplify and manipulate (AMITT)
103	187	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Flooding the Information Space	Hijack existing hashtag	Take over an existing hashtag to drive exposure.	ST0098
104	188	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Flooding the Information Space	Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting	Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.	ST0099
105	189	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Flooding the Information Space	Utilize Spamoflauge	Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, "you've w0n our jackp0t!". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging.	ST0100
106	190	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Flooding the Information Space	Conduct Swarming	Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centers exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach.	ST0101
107	191	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Flooding the Information Space	Conduct Keyword Squatting	Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term.	ST0102
108	192	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Flooding the Information Space	Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives	Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.	ST0103
109	195	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Cross-Posting	Post Across Groups		ST0104
110	196	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Cross-Posting	Post Across Platform		ST0105
111	197	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Cross-Posting	Post Across Disciplines		ST0106
112	199	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Incentivize Sharing	Use Affiliate Marketing Programs		ST0107
113	200	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Incentivize Sharing	Use Contests and Prizes		ST0108
114	202	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Manipulate Platform Algorithm	Bypass Content Blocking	Bypassing content blocking refers to actions taken to circumvent network security measures that prevent users from accessing certain servers, resources, or other online spheres. An influence operation may bypass content blocking to proliferate its content on restricted areas of the internet. Common strategies for bypassing content blocking include: - Altering IP addresses to avoid IP filtering - Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to avoid IP filtering - Using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to avoid IP filtering - Enabling encryption to bypass packet inspection blocking - Manipulating text to avoid filtering by keywords - Posting content on multiple platforms to avoid platform-specific removals - Using local facilities or modified DNS servers to avoid DNS filtering	ST0109
115	206	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Harass	Boycott/"Cancel" Opponents	Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organization, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasizing an adversary’s problematic or disputed behavior and presenting its own content as an alternative.	ST0110
116	207	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Harass	Harass People Based on Identities	Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.	ST0111
117	208	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Harass	Threaten to Dox	Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.	ST0112
118	209	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Harass	Dox	Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.	ST0113
119	212	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations	Delete Opposing Content	Deleting opposing content refers to the removal of content that conflicts with operational narratives from selected platforms. An influence operation may delete opposing content to censor contradictory information from the target audience, allowing operation narratives to take priority in the information space.	ST0114
120	213	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations	Block Content	Content blocking refers to actions taken to restrict internet access or render certain areas of the internet inaccessible. An influence operation may restrict content based on both network and content attributes.	ST0115
121	214	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations	Destroy Information Generation Capabilities	Destroying information generation capabilities refers to actions taken to limit, degrade, or otherwise incapacitate an actor’s ability to generate conflicting information. An influence operation may destroy an actor’s information generation capabilities by physically dismantling the information infrastructure, disconnecting resources needed for information generation, or redirecting information generation personnel. An operation may destroy an adversary’s information generation capabilities to limit conflicting content exposure to the target audience and crowd the information space with its own narratives.	ST0116
122	215	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations	Conduct Server Redirect	A server redirect, also known as a URL redirect, occurs when a server automatically forwards a user from one URL to another using server-side scripting languages. An influence operation may conduct a server redirect to divert target audience members from one website to another without their knowledge. The redirected website may pose as a legitimate source, host malware, or otherwise aid operation objectives.	ST0117
123	217	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Suppress Opposition	Report Non-Violative Opposing Content	Reporting opposing content refers to notifying and providing an instance of a violation of a platform’s guidelines and policies for conduct on the platform. In addition to simply reporting the content, an operation may leverage copyright regulations to trick social media and web platforms into removing opposing content by manipulating the content to appear in violation of copyright laws. Reporting opposing content facilitates the suppression of contradictory information and allows operation narratives to take priority in the information space.	ST0118
124	218	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Suppress Opposition	Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself)	Goad people into actions that violate terms of service or will lead to having their content or accounts taken down.	ST0119
125	219	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Suppress Opposition	Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation		ST0120
126	223	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Encourage Attendance at Events	Call to action to attend		ST0121
127	224	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Encourage Attendance at Events	Facilitate logistics or support for attendance	Facilitate logistics or support for travel, food, housing, etc.	ST0122
128	226	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Organize Events	Pay for Physical Action	Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest.	ST0123
129	227	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Organize Events	Conduct Symbolic Action	Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signaling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space.	ST0124
130	229	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Conduct fundraising	Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns		ST0125
131	231	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Physical Violence	Conduct Physical Violence		ST0126
132	232	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Physical Violence	Encourage Physical Violence		ST0127
133	234	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Merchandising/ Advertising	Sell Merchandise	Selling merchandise refers to the sale of often branded items to the target audience. An influence operation may sell merchandise to raise funds and promote its messaging in the physical information space, for example, by selling t-shirts with operational messaging displayed on the clothing.	ST0128
134	237	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal People	Use Pseudonyms	An operation may use pseudonyms, or fake names, to mask the identity of operation accounts, publish anonymous content, or otherwise use falsified personas to conceal identity of the operation. An operation may coordinate pseudonyms across multiple platforms, for example, by writing an article under a pseudonym and then posting a link to the article on social media on an account with the same falsified name.	ST0129
135	238	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal People	Conceal Network Identity	Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization.	ST0130
136	239	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal People	Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation	Distancing reputable individuals from the operation occurs when enlisted individuals, such as celebrities or subject matter experts, actively disengage themselves from operation activities and messaging. Individuals may distance themselves from the operation by deleting old posts or statements, unfollowing operation information assets, or otherwise detaching themselves from the operation’s timeline. An influence operation may want reputable individuals to distance themselves from the operation to reduce operation exposure, particularly if the operation aims to remove all evidence.	ST0131
137	240	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal People	Launder Accounts	Account laundering occurs when an influence operation acquires control of previously legitimate online accounts from third parties through sale or exchange and often in contravention of terms of use. Influence operations use laundered accounts to reach target audience members from an existing information channel and complicate attribution.	ST0132
138	241	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal People	Change Names of Accounts	Changing names of accounts occurs when an operation changes the name of an existing social media account. An operation may change the names of its accounts throughout an operation to avoid detection or alter the names of newly acquired or repurposed accounts to fit operational narratives.	ST0133
139	243	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	Conceal Network Identity	Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization.	ST0134
140	244	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative	An influence operation may mix its own operation content with legitimate news or external unrelated content to disguise operational objectives, narratives, or existence. For example, an operation may generate "lifestyle" or "cuisine" content alongside regular operation content.	ST0135
141	245	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	Break Association with Content	Breaking association with content occurs when an influence operation actively separates itself from its own content. An influence operation may break association with content by unfollowing, unliking, or unsharing its content, removing attribution from its content, or otherwise taking actions that distance the operation from its messaging. An influence operation may break association with its content to complicate attribution or regain credibility for a new operation.	ST0136
142	246	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	Delete URLs	URL deletion occurs when an influence operation completely removes its website registration, rendering the URL inaccessible. An influence operation may delete its URLs to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred.	ST0137
143	247	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	Coordinate on encrypted/ closed networks		ST0138
144	248	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	Deny involvement	Without "smoking gun" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in "Demand insurmountable proof", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a "firehose of misinformation" environment.	ST0139					T0041 Deny involvement (AMITT)
145	249	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	Delete Accounts/Account Activity	Deleting accounts and account activity occurs when an influence operation removes its online social media assets, including social media accounts, posts, likes, comments, and other online artifacts. An influence operation may delete its accounts and account activity to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred.	ST0140
146	250	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	Redirect URLs	An influence operation may redirect its falsified or typosquatted URLs to legitimate websites to increase the operation's appearance of legitimacy, complicate attribution, and avoid detection.	ST0141
147	251	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	Remove Post Origins	Removing post origins refers to the elimination of evidence that indicates the initial source of operation content, often to complicate attribution. An influence operation may remove post origins by deleting watermarks, renaming files, or removing embedded links in its content.	ST0142
148	252	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	Misattribute Activity	Misattributed activity refers to incorrectly attributed operation activity. For example, a state sponsored influence operation may conduct operation activity in a way that mimics another state so that external entities misattribute activity to the incorrect state. An operation may misattribute their activities to complicate attribution, avoid detection, or frame an adversary for negative behavior.	ST0143
149	253	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Infrastructure	Conceal Sponsorship	Concealing sponsorship aims to mislead or obscure the identity of the hidden sponsor behind an operation rather than entity publicly running the operation. Operations that conceal sponsorship may maintain visible falsified groups, news outlets, non-profits, or other organizations, but seek to mislead or obscure the identity sponsoring, funding, or otherwise supporting these entities. Influence operations may use a variety of techniques to mask the location of their social media accounts to complicate attribution and conceal evidence of foreign interference. Operation accounts may set their location to a false place, often the location of the operation’s target audience, and post in the region’s language	ST0144
150	255	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Infrastructure	Utilize Bulletproof Hosting	Hosting refers to services through which storage and computing resources are provided to an individual or organization for the accommodation and maintenance of one or more websites and related services. Services may include web hosting, file sharing, and email distribution. Bulletproof hosting refers to services provided by an entity, such as a domain hosting or web hosting firm, that allows its customer considerable leniency in use of the service. An influence operation may utilize bulletproof hosting to maintain continuity of service for suspicious, illegal, or disruptive operation activities that stricter hosting services would limit, report, or suspend.	ST0145
151	256	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Infrastructure	Use Shell Organizations		ST0146
152	257	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Infrastructure	Use Cryptocurrency		ST0147
153	258	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Infrastructure	Obfuscate Payment		ST0148
154	260	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Exploit TOS/Content Moderation	Legacy web content	Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.	ST0149
155	261	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Exploit TOS/Content Moderation	Post Borderline Content		ST0150
156	266	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Performance	People Focused		ST0151
157	267	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Performance	Content Focused		ST0152
158	268	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Performance	View Focused		ST0153
159	270	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Effectiveness	Behavior changes	Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from misinformation incidents.	ST0154					T0062 Behaviour changes (AMITT)
160	271	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Effectiveness	Content		ST0155
161	272	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Effectiveness	Awareness		ST0156
162	273	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Effectiveness	Knowledge		ST0157
163	274	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Effectiveness	Action/attitude		ST0158
164	276	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)	Message reach	Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinformation incidents.	ST0159					T0063 Message reach (AMITT)
165	277	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)	Social media engagement	Monitor and evaluate social media engagement in misinformation incidents.	ST0160					T0064 Social media engagement (AMITT)
166	3	Plan	Plan Strategy	Determine Target Audiences	n/a		T0001				DISARM Revision Process
167	4	Plan	Plan Strategy	Determine Strategic Ends	n/a		T0002				DISARM Revision Process
168	6	Plan	Plan Objectives	Dismiss	n/a	Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.	T0003
169	8	Plan	Plan Objectives	Distort	n/a	Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.	T0004				AMITT	T0001 5Ds
170	9	Plan	Plan Objectives	Distract	n/a	Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).	T0005				AMITT	T0001 5Ds
171	10	Plan	Plan Objectives	Dismay	n/a	Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.	T0006				AMITT	T0001 5Ds
172	11	Plan	Plan Objectives	Divide	n/a	Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community	T0007				AMITT	T0001 5Ds
173	12	Plan	Plan Objectives	Degrade Adversary	n/a	Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.	T0008				AMITT	T0066 Degrade Adversary
174	13	Plan	Plan Objectives	Facilitate State Propaganda	n/a	Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.	T0009				AMITT	T0002 Facilitate State Propaganda
175	15	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Map Target Audience Information Environment	n/a	Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.	T0010				SPICE	TA04 Map Target Audience Information Environment
176	21	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities	n/a	Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives.	T0011				SPICE
177	30	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	Segment Audiences	n/a	Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics.	T0012				AMITT
178	38	Prepare	Develop Narratives	Develop New Narratives	n/a		T0013
179	39	Prepare	Develop Narratives	Leverage Existing Narratives	n/a	Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices.	T0014				AMITT	T0003 Leverage Existing Narratives (AMITT)
180	40	Prepare	Develop Narratives	Develop Competing Narratives	n/a	Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.	T0015				AMITT	T0004 Develop Competing Narratives (AMITT)
181	41	Prepare	Develop Narratives	Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives	n/a	"Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model.	T0016				AMITT	T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory narratives (AMITT)
182	44	Prepare	Develop Narratives	Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative	n/a	An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.	T0017
183	45	Prepare	Develop Narratives	Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis	n/a	Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation.	T0018
184	46	Prepare	Develop Narratives	Demand insurmountable proof	n/a	Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.	T0019					T0040 Demand insurmountable proof (AMITT)
185	48	Prepare	Develop Content	Reuse Existing Content	n/a	When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content.	T0020
186	53	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Text-based Content	n/a		T0021
187	57	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Image-based Content	n/a		T0022
188	62	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Video-based Content	n/a		T0023
189	65	Prepare	Develop Content	Develop Audio-based Content	n/a		T0024
190	68	Prepare	Develop Content	Generate information pollution	n/a	Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign.	T0025					T0019 Generate information pollution
191	71	Prepare	Develop Content	Distort facts	n/a	Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content	T0026					T0023 Distort facts (AMITT)
192	74	Prepare	Develop Content	Create hashtags and search artifacts	n/a	Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites).	T0027					T0015 Create hashtags and search artifacts (AMITT)
193	75	Prepare	Develop Content	Obtain Private Documents	n/a		T0028
194	80	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Create Inauthentic Accounts	n/a		T0029
195	85	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Recruit bad actors	n/a		T0030
196	89	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Cultivate ignorant agents	n/a	Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".	T0031					T0010 Cultivate ignorant agents (AMITT)
197	90	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Build Network	n/a		T0032					TK0014 Build Network (AMITT)
198	94	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Acquire/ recruit Network	n/a		T0033
199	97	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Infiltrate Existing Networks	n/a		T0034
200	100	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups	n/a	Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.	T0035
201	101	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Create inauthentic websites	n/a	Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.	T0036					T0013 Create fake websites  (AMITT)
202	102	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities	n/a	Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).	T0037					T0065 Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities (AMITT)
203	103	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Develop Owned Media Assets	n/a	An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites, blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and organization of content.	T0038
204	104	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Prepare fundraising campaigns	n/a	Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.	T0039					T0014 Prepare fundraising campaigns (AMITT)
205	107	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	Leverage Content Farm	n/a		T0040
206	111	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Compromise legitimate accounts	n/a	Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.	T0041					T0011 Compromise legitimate accounts (AMITT)
207	112	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Create fake experts	n/a	Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself.	T0042					T0009 Create fake experts (AMITT)
208	114	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Create personas	n/a		T0043					TK0010 Create personas (AMITT)
209	116	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Establish Inauthentic News Sites	n/a	Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.	T0044
210	119	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities	n/a	An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct.	T0045
211	122	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	Co-opt Trusted Sources	n/a	An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include: - National or local new outlets - Research or academic publications - Online blogs or websites	T0046
212	128	Execute	Microtarget	Create Clickbait	n/a	Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.	T0047					T0016 Create Clickbait (AMITT)
213	129	Execute	Microtarget	Purchase Targeted Advertisements	n/a	Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations	T0048					T0018 Purchase Targeted Advertisements (AMITT)
214	130	Execute	Microtarget	Create Localized Content	n/a	Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.	T0049
215	131	Execute	Microtarget	Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles	n/a	An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members.	T0050
216	136	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Chat apps	n/a	Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.	T0051					T0043 Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps (AMITT)
217	139	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Livestream	n/a		T0052
218	142	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Social Networks	n/a		T0053
219	149	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Media Sharing Networks	n/a	Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.	T0054
220	153	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Discussion Forums	n/a	Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.	T0055
221	155	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Bookmarking and Content Curation	n/a	Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc.	T0056
222	156	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Blogging and Publishing Networks	n/a	Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc.	T0057
223	157	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Consumer Review Networks	n/a	Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc. Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.	T0058
224	158	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Online polls	n/a	Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well	T0059					T0029 Manipulate online polls (AMITT)
225	159	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Formal Diplomatic Channels	n/a		T0060
226	160	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Traditional Media	n/a	Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.	T0061
227	164	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	Email	n/a		T0062
228	166	Execute	Conduct Pump Priming	Trial content	n/a	Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates	T0063				AMITT	T0020 Trial content (AMITT)
229	167	Execute	Conduct Pump Priming	Bait legitimate influencers	n/a	Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.	T0064				AMITT	T0039 Bait legitimate influencers (AMITT)
230	168	Execute	Conduct Pump Priming	Seed Kernel of truth	n/a	Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.	T0065				AMITT	T0042 Seed Kernel of truth (AMITT)
231	169	Execute	Conduct Pump Priming	Seed distortions	n/a	Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression.	T0066				AMITT	T0044 Seed distortions (AMITT)
232	170	Execute	Conduct Pump Priming	Use fake experts	n/a	Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias	T0067				AMITT	T0045 Use fake experts (AMITT)
233	171	Execute	Conduct Pump Priming	Use Search Engine Optimization	n/a	Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO"	T0068				AMITT	T0046 Search Engine Optimization (AMITT)
234	172	Execute	Conduct Pump Priming	Employ Commercial Analytic Firms	n/a	Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences.	T0069				SPICE	Employ Commercial Analytic Firms
235	174	Execute	Deliver Content	Deliver Ads	n/a	Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.	T0070
236	177	Execute	Deliver Content	Post Content	n/a	Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls).	T0071
237	181	Execute	Deliver Content	Comment or Reply on Content	n/a	Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls).	T0072
238	183	Execute	Deliver Content	Attract Traditional Media	n/a	Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media).	T0073
239	185	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Flooding the Information Space	n/a	Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.	T0074					T0049 Flooding
240	193	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Amplify Existing Narrative	n/a	An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives.	T0075
241	194	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Cross-Posting	n/a	Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience.	T0076
242	198	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Incentivize Sharing	n/a	Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.	T0077
243	201	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Manipulate Platform Algorithm	n/a	Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines.	T0078
244	203	Execute	Maximize Exposure	Direct Users to Alternative Platforms	n/a	Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content.	T0079
245	205	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Harass	n/a	Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.	T0080
246	210	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Censor social media as a political force	n/a	Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).	T0081					T0047 Censor social media as a political force (AMITT)
247	211	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations	n/a	Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.	T0082
248	216	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Suppress Opposition	n/a		T0083
249	220	Execute	Drive Online Harms	Platform Filtering	n/a	Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation)	T0084
250	222	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Encourage Attendance at Events	n/a	Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.	T0085
251	225	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Organize Events	n/a	Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.	T0086					T0057 Organise remote rallies and events (AMITT)
252	228	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Conduct fundraising	n/a	Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.	T0087
253	230	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Physical Violence	n/a	Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value.	T0088
254	233	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	Merchandising/ Advertising	n/a	Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world	T0089
255	236	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal People	n/a	Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.	T0090
256	242	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Operational Activity	n/a		T0091
257	254	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Conceal Infrastructure	n/a		T0092
258	259	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Exploit TOS/Content Moderation	n/a		T0093
259	262	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	Play the long game	n/a	Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.	T0094					T0059 Play the long game
260	265	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Performance	n/a		T0095
261	269	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Effectiveness	n/a		T0096
262	275	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)	n/a		T0097
263	2	Plan	Plan Strategy	n/a	n/a	Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all objectives.	TA01				AMITT	TA01: Strategic Planning
264	5	Plan	Plan Objectives	n/a	n/a	Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievable objectives. Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the desired end state. There are four primary considerations: - Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives - The effect should be measurable - The objective statement should not specify the way and means of accomplishment - The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task.	TA02				AMITT	TA02: Objective Planning
265	14	Plan	Target Audience Analysis	n/a	n/a	Identifying and analyzing the target audience examines target audience member locations, political affiliations, financial situations, and other attributes that an influence operation may incorporate into its messaging strategy. During this tactic, influence operations may also identify existing similarities and differences between target audience members to unite like groups and divide opposing groups. Identifying and analyzing target audience members allows influence operations to tailor operation strategy and content to their analysis.	TA03				SPICE and AMITT	T0005 Center of Gravity Analysis
266	37	Prepare	Develop Narratives	n/a	n/a	The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a "whole of society" perspective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion constitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level. Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline.	TA04
267	47	Prepare	Develop Content	n/a	n/a		TA05
268	79	Prepare	Establish Social Assets	n/a	n/a	Establishing information assets generates messaging tools, including social media accounts, operation personnel, and organizations, including directly and indirectly managed assets. For assets under their direct control, the operation can add, change, or remove these assets at will. Establishing information assets allows an influence operation to promote messaging directly to the target audience without navigating through external entities. Many online influence operations create or compromise social media accounts as a primary vector of information dissemination.	TA06
269	110	Prepare	Establish Legitimacy	n/a	n/a		TA07
270	127	Execute	Microtarget	n/a	n/a	Target very specific populations of people	TA08					TA05 "Microtargeting"
271	135	Execute	Select Channels and Affordances	n/a	n/a	Selecting platforms and affordances assesses which online or offline platforms and their associated affordances maximize an influence operation’s ability to reach its target audience. To select the most appropriate platform(s), an operation may assess the technological affordances including platform algorithms, terms of service, permitted content types, or other attributes that determine platform usability and accessibility. Selecting platforms includes both choosing platforms on which the operation will publish its own content and platforms on which the operation will attempt to restrict adversarial content.	TA09
272	165	Execute	Conduct Pump Priming	n/a	n/a	Release content on a targetted small scale, prior to general release, including releasing seed. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing.	TA10
273	173	Execute	Deliver Content	n/a	n/a	Release content to general public or larger population	TA11
274	184	Execute	Maximize Exposure	n/a	n/a	Maximize exposure of the target audience to incident/campaign content via flooding, amplifying, and cross-posting.	TA12
275	204	Execute	Drive Online Harms	n/a	n/a	Actions taken by an influence operation to harm their opponents in online spaces through harassment, suppression, releasing private information, and controlling the information space through offensive cyberspace operations.	TA13
276	221	Execute	Drive Offline Activity	n/a	n/a	Move incident/campaign from online to offline. Encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage in the physical information space or offline world. This may include operation-aligned rallies or protests, radio, newspaper, or billboards. An influence operation may drive to physical forums to diversify its information channels and facilitate spaces where the target audience can engage with both operation content and like-minded individuals offline.	TA14
277	235	Execute	Persist in the Information Space	n/a	n/a	Persist in the Information Space refers to taking measures that allow an operation to maintain its presence and avoid takedown by an external entity. Techniques in Persist in the Information Space help campaigns operate without detection and appear legitimate to the target audience and platform monitoring services. Influence operations on social media often persist online by varying the type of information assets and platforms used throughout the campaign.	TA15
278	264	Assess	Assess Effectiveness	n/a	n/a		TA16