DISARMframeworks/generated_pages/techniques/T0139.002.md

Technique T0139.002: Silence

• Summary: Intimidate or incentivise target into remaining silent or prevent target from speaking out. A threat actor may cow a target into silence as a special case of deterrence. Or they may buy the target’s silence. Or they may repress or restrict the target’s speech.

• Belongs to tactic stage: TA02

Incident	Descriptions given for this incident
I00071 Russia-aligned hacktivists stir up anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Poland	“On August 16, 2022, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Joker DPR (Джокер ДНР) published a forged letter allegedly written by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. In the letter, Kuleba supposedly asked relevant Polish authorities to rename Belwederska Street in Warsaw — the location of the Russian embassy building — as Stepan Bandera Street, in honor of the far-right nationalist who led the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during WWII. [...] The letter is not dated, and Dmytro Kuleba’s signature seems to be copied from a publicly available letter signed by him in 2021.” In this example the Telegram channel Joker DPR published a forged letter (T0085.004: Develop Document) in which they impersonated the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs (T0097.111: Government Official Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona), using Ministry letterhead (T0097.206: Government Institution Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona)., “On August 16, 2022, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Joker DPR (Джокер ДНР) published a forged letter allegedly written by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. In the letter, Kuleba supposedly asked relevant Polish authorities to rename Belwederska Street in Warsaw — the location of the Russian embassy building — as Stepan Bandera Street, in honor of the far-right nationalist who led the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during WWII. [...] The letter is not dated, and Dmytro Kuleba’s signature seems to be copied from a publicly available letter signed by him in 2021.” In this example the Telegram channel Joker DPR published a forged letter (T0085.004: Develop Document) in which they impersonated the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs (T0097.111: Government Official Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona), using Ministry letterhead (T0097.206: Government Institution Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona)., “On August 16, 2022, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Joker DPR (Джокер ДНР) published a forged letter allegedly written by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. In the letter, Kuleba supposedly asked relevant Polish authorities to rename Belwederska Street in Warsaw — the location of the Russian embassy building — as Stepan Bandera Street, in honor of the far-right nationalist who led the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during WWII. [...] The letter is not dated, and Dmytro Kuleba’s signature seems to be copied from a publicly available letter signed by him in 2021.” In this example the Telegram channel Joker DPR published a forged letter (T0085.004: Develop Document) in which they impersonated the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs (T0097.111: Government Official Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona), using Ministry letterhead (T0097.206: Government Institution Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona)., “On August 16, 2022, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Joker DPR (Джокер ДНР) published a forged letter allegedly written by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. In the letter, Kuleba supposedly asked relevant Polish authorities to rename Belwederska Street in Warsaw — the location of the Russian embassy building — as Stepan Bandera Street, in honor of the far-right nationalist who led the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during WWII. [...] The letter is not dated, and Dmytro Kuleba’s signature seems to be copied from a publicly available letter signed by him in 2021.” In this example the Telegram channel Joker DPR published a forged letter (T0085.004: Develop Document) in which they impersonated the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs (T0097.111: Government Official Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona), using Ministry letterhead (T0097.206: Government Institution Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona).
I00075 How Russia Meddles Abroad for Profit: Cash, Trolls and a Cult Leader	"“In the campaign’s final weeks, Pastor Mailhol said, the team of Russians made a request: Drop out of the race and support Mr. Rajoelina. He refused. “The Russians made the same proposal to the history professor running for president, saying, “If you accept this deal you will have money” according to Ms. Rasamimanana, the professor’s campaign manager. When the professor refused, she said, the Russians created a fake Facebook page that mimicked his official page and posted an announcement on it that he was supporting Mr. Rajoelina.” In this example actors created online accounts styled to look like official pages to trick targets into thinking that the presidential candidate announced that they had dropped out of the election (T0097.110: Party Official Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona)", "“In the campaign’s final weeks, Pastor Mailhol said, the team of Russians made a request: Drop out of the race and support Mr. Rajoelina. He refused. “The Russians made the same proposal to the history professor running for president, saying, “If you accept this deal you will have money” according to Ms. Rasamimanana, the professor’s campaign manager. When the professor refused, she said, the Russians created a fake Facebook page that mimicked his official page and posted an announcement on it that he was supporting Mr. Rajoelina.” In this example actors created online accounts styled to look like official pages to trick targets into thinking that the presidential candidate announced that they had dropped out of the election (T0097.110: Party Official Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona)", "“But while Russia’s efforts [at election interference] in the United States fit Moscow’s campaign to upend Western democracy and rattle Mr. Putin’s geopolitical rivals, the undertaking in Madagascar often seemed to have a much simpler objective: profit. “Before the election, a Russian company that local officials and foreign diplomats say is controlled by Mr. Prigozhin acquired a major stake in a government-run company that mines chromium, a mineral valued for its use in stainless steel. The acquisition set off protests by workers complaining of unpaid wages, cancelledcanceled benefits and foreign intrusion into a sector that had been a source of national pride for Madagascar. “It repeated a pattern in which Russia has swooped into African nations, hoping to reshape their politics for material gain. In the Central African Republic, a former Russian intelligence officer is the top security adviser to the country’s president, while companies linked to Mr. Prigozhin have spread across the nation, snapping up diamonds in both legal and illegal ways, according to government officials, warlords in the diamond trade and registration documents showing Mr. Prigozhin’s growing military and commercial footprint. [...] “The [operation switched from supporting the incumbent candidate on realising he would lose the election]. After the Russians pirouetted to help Mr. Rajoelina — their former opponent — win the election, Mr. Prigozhin’s company was able to negotiate with the new government to keep control of the chromium mining operation, despite the worker protests, and Mr. Prigozhin’s political operatives remain stationed in the capital to this day.” This behaviour matches T0137: Make Money because analysts have asserted that the identified influence operation was in part motivated by a goal to generate profit", “Only three of the Russian operatives identified by local hires of the campaign responded to requests for comment. All acknowledged visiting Madagascar last year, but only one admitted working as a pollster on behalf of the president. “The others said they were simply tourists. Pyotr Korolyov, described as a sociologist on one spreadsheet, spent much of the summer of 2018 and fall hunched over a computer, deep in polling data at La Résidence Ankerana, a hotel the Russians used as their headquarters, until he was hospitalized with the measles, according to one person who worked with him. “In an email exchange, Mr. Korolyov confirmed that he had come down with the measles, but rejected playing a role in a Russian operation. He did defend the idea of one, though. ““Russia should influence elections around the world, the same way the United States influences elections,” he wrote. “Sooner or later Russia will return to global politics as a global player,” he added. “And the American establishment will just have to accept that.”” This behaviour matches T0129.006: Deny Involvement because the actors contacted by journalists denied that they had participated in election interference (in spite of the evidence to the contrary).
I00076 Network of Social Media Accounts Impersonates U.S. Political Candidates, Leverages U.S. and Israeli Media in Support of Iranian Interests	“Only three of the Russian operatives identified by local hires of the campaign responded to requests for comment. All acknowledged visiting Madagascar last year, but only one admitted working as a pollster on behalf of the president. “The others said they were simply tourists. Pyotr Korolyov, described as a sociologist on one spreadsheet, spent much of the summer of 2018 and fall hunched over a computer, deep in polling data at La Résidence Ankerana, a hotel the Russians used as their headquarters, until he was hospitalized with the measles, according to one person who worked with him. “In an email exchange, Mr. Korolyov confirmed that he had come down with the measles, but rejected playing a role in a Russian operation. He did defend the idea of one, though. ““Russia should influence elections around the world, the same way the United States influences elections,” he wrote. “Sooner or later Russia will return to global politics as a global player,” he added. “And the American establishment will just have to accept that.”” This behaviour matches T0129.006: Deny Involvement because the actors contacted by journalists denied that they had participated in election interference (in spite of the evidence to the contrary).“Some Twitter accounts in the network [of inauthentic accounts attributed to Iran] impersonated Republican political candidates that ran for House of Representatives seats in the 2018 U.S. congressional midterms. These accounts appropriated the candidates’ photographs and, in some cases, plagiarized tweets from the real individuals’ accounts. Aside from impersonating real U.S. political candidates, the behavior and activity of these accounts resembled that of the others in the network. “For example, the account @livengood_marla impersonated Marla Livengood, a 2018 candidate for California’s 9th Congressional District, using a photograph of Livengood and a campaign banner for its profile and background pictures. The account began tweeting on Sept. 24, 2018, with its first tweet plagiarizing one from Livengood’s official account earlier that month” [...] “In another example, the account @ButlerJineea impersonated Jineea Butler, a 2018 candidate for New York’s 13th Congressional District, using a photograph of Butler for its profile picture and incorporating her campaign slogans into its background picture, as well as claiming in its Twitter bio to be a “US House candidate, NY-13” and linking to Butler’s website, jineeabutlerforcongress[.]com.” In this example actors impersonated existing political candidates (T0097.110: Member of Political Party Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona), strengthening the impersonation by copying legitimate accounts’ imagery (T0145.001: Copy Account Imagery), and copying its previous posts (T0084.002: Plagiarise Content)., “Only three of the Russian operatives identified by local hires of the campaign responded to requests for comment. All acknowledged visiting Madagascar last year, but only one admitted working as a pollster on behalf of the president. “The others said they were simply tourists. Pyotr Korolyov, described as a sociologist on one spreadsheet, spent much of the summer of 2018 and fall hunched over a computer, deep in polling data at La Résidence Ankerana, a hotel the Russians used as their headquarters, until he was hospitalized with the measles, according to one person who worked with him. “In an email exchange, Mr. Korolyov confirmed that he had come down with the measles, but rejected playing a role in a Russian operation. He did defend the idea of one, though. ““Russia should influence elections around the world, the same way the United States influences elections,” he wrote. “Sooner or later Russia will return to global politics as a global player,” he added. “And the American establishment will just have to accept that.”” This behaviour matches T0129.006: Deny Involvement because the actors contacted by journalists denied that they had participated in election interference (in spite of the evidence to the contrary).“Some Twitter accounts in the network [of inauthentic accounts attributed to Iran] impersonated Republican political candidates that ran for House of Representatives seats in the 2018 U.S. congressional midterms. These accounts appropriated the candidates’ photographs and, in some cases, plagiarized tweets from the real individuals’ accounts. Aside from impersonating real U.S. political candidates, the behavior and activity of these accounts resembled that of the others in the network. “For example, the account @livengood_marla impersonated Marla Livengood, a 2018 candidate for California’s 9th Congressional District, using a photograph of Livengood and a campaign banner for its profile and background pictures. The account began tweeting on Sept. 24, 2018, with its first tweet plagiarizing one from Livengood’s official account earlier that month” [...] “In another example, the account @ButlerJineea impersonated Jineea Butler, a 2018 candidate for New York’s 13th Congressional District, using a photograph of Butler for its profile picture and incorporating her campaign slogans into its background picture, as well as claiming in its Twitter bio to be a “US House candidate, NY-13” and linking to Butler’s website, jineeabutlerforcongress[.]com.” In this example actors impersonated existing political candidates (T0097.110: Member of Political Party Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona), strengthening the impersonation by copying legitimate accounts’ imagery (T0145.001: Copy Account Imagery), and copying its previous posts (T0084.002: Plagiarise Content)., “Only three of the Russian operatives identified by local hires of the campaign responded to requests for comment. All acknowledged visiting Madagascar last year, but only one admitted working as a pollster on behalf of the president. “The others said they were simply tourists. Pyotr Korolyov, described as a sociologist on one spreadsheet, spent much of the summer of 2018 and fall hunched over a computer, deep in polling data at La Résidence Ankerana, a hotel the Russians used as their headquarters, until he was hospitalized with the measles, according to one person who worked with him. “In an email exchange, Mr. Korolyov confirmed that he had come down with the measles, but rejected playing a role in a Russian operation. He did defend the idea of one, though. ““Russia should influence elections around the world, the same way the United States influences elections,” he wrote. “Sooner or later Russia will return to global politics as a global player,” he added. “And the American establishment will just have to accept that.”” This behaviour matches T0129.006: Deny Involvement because the actors contacted by journalists denied that they had participated in election interference (in spite of the evidence to the contrary).“Some Twitter accounts in the network [of inauthentic accounts attributed to Iran] impersonated Republican political candidates that ran for House of Representatives seats in the 2018 U.S. congressional midterms. These accounts appropriated the candidates’ photographs and, in some cases, plagiarized tweets from the real individuals’ accounts. Aside from impersonating real U.S. political candidates, the behavior and activity of these accounts resembled that of the others in the network. “For example, the account @livengood_marla impersonated Marla Livengood, a 2018 candidate for California’s 9th Congressional District, using a photograph of Livengood and a campaign banner for its profile and background pictures. The account began tweeting on Sept. 24, 2018, with its first tweet plagiarizing one from Livengood’s official account earlier that month” [...] “In another example, the account @ButlerJineea impersonated Jineea Butler, a 2018 candidate for New York’s 13th Congressional District, using a photograph of Butler for its profile picture and incorporating her campaign slogans into its background picture, as well as claiming in its Twitter bio to be a “US House candidate, NY-13” and linking to Butler’s website, jineeabutlerforcongress[.]com.” In this example actors impersonated existing political candidates (T0097.110: Member of Political Party Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona), strengthening the impersonation by copying legitimate accounts’ imagery (T0145.001: Copy Account Imagery), and copying its previous posts (T0084.002: Plagiarise Content)., “Only three of the Russian operatives identified by local hires of the campaign responded to requests for comment. All acknowledged visiting Madagascar last year, but only one admitted working as a pollster on behalf of the president. “The others said they were simply tourists. Pyotr Korolyov, described as a sociologist on one spreadsheet, spent much of the summer of 2018 and fall hunched over a computer, deep in polling data at La Résidence Ankerana, a hotel the Russians used as their headquarters, until he was hospitalized with the measles, according to one person who worked with him. “In an email exchange, Mr. Korolyov confirmed that he had come down with the measles, but rejected playing a role in a Russian operation. He did defend the idea of one, though. ““Russia should influence elections around the world, the same way the United States influences elections,” he wrote. “Sooner or later Russia will return to global politics as a global player,” he added. “And the American establishment will just have to accept that.”” This behaviour matches T0129.006: Deny Involvement because the actors contacted by journalists denied that they had participated in election interference (in spite of the evidence to the contrary).“Some Twitter accounts in the network [of inauthentic accounts attributed to Iran] impersonated Republican political candidates that ran for House of Representatives seats in the 2018 U.S. congressional midterms. These accounts appropriated the candidates’ photographs and, in some cases, plagiarized tweets from the real individuals’ accounts. Aside from impersonating real U.S. political candidates, the behavior and activity of these accounts resembled that of the others in the network. “For example, the account @livengood_marla impersonated Marla Livengood, a 2018 candidate for California’s 9th Congressional District, using a photograph of Livengood and a campaign banner for its profile and background pictures. The account began tweeting on Sept. 24, 2018, with its first tweet plagiarizing one from Livengood’s official account earlier that month” [...] “In another example, the account @ButlerJineea impersonated Jineea Butler, a 2018 candidate for New York’s 13th Congressional District, using a photograph of Butler for its profile picture and incorporating her campaign slogans into its background picture, as well as claiming in its Twitter bio to be a “US House candidate, NY-13” and linking to Butler’s website, jineeabutlerforcongress[.]com.” In this example actors impersonated existing political candidates (T0097.110: Member of Political Party Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona), strengthening the impersonation by copying legitimate accounts’ imagery (T0145.001: Copy Account Imagery), and copying its previous posts (T0084.002: Plagiarise Content).
I00084 Russia turns its diplomats into disinformation warriors	“After the European Union banned Kremlin-backed media outlets and social media giants demoted their posts for peddling falsehoods about the war in Ukraine, Moscow has turned to its cadre of diplomats, government spokespeople and ministers — many of whom have extensive followings on social media — to promote disinformation about the conflict in Eastern Europe, according to four EU and United States officials.” In this example authentic Russian government officials used their own accounts to promote false narratives (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona). The use of accounts managed by authentic Government / Diplomats to spread false narratives makes it harder for platforms to enforce content moderation, because of the political ramifications they may face for censoring elected officials (T0131: Exploit TOS/Content Moderation). For example, Twitter previously argued that official channels of world leaders are not removed due to the high public interest associated with their activities., “After the European Union banned Kremlin-backed media outlets and social media giants demoted their posts for peddling falsehoods about the war in Ukraine, Moscow has turned to its cadre of diplomats, government spokespeople and ministers — many of whom have extensive followings on social media — to promote disinformation about the conflict in Eastern Europe, according to four EU and United States officials.” In this example authentic Russian government officials used their own accounts to promote false narratives (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona). The use of accounts managed by authentic Government / Diplomats to spread false narratives makes it harder for platforms to enforce content moderation, because of the political ramifications they may face for censoring elected officials (T0131: Exploit TOS/Content Moderation). For example, Twitter previously argued that official channels of world leaders are not removed due to the high public interest associated with their activities., “After the European Union banned Kremlin-backed media outlets and social media giants demoted their posts for peddling falsehoods about the war in Ukraine, Moscow has turned to its cadre of diplomats, government spokespeople and ministers — many of whom have extensive followings on social media — to promote disinformation about the conflict in Eastern Europe, according to four EU and United States officials.” In this example authentic Russian government officials used their own accounts to promote false narratives (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona). The use of accounts managed by authentic Government / Diplomats to spread false narratives makes it harder for platforms to enforce content moderation, because of the political ramifications they may face for censoring elected officials (T0131: Exploit TOS/Content Moderation). For example, Twitter previously argued that official channels of world leaders are not removed due to the high public interest associated with their activities.
I00085 China’s large-scale media push: Attempts to influence Swedish media	"“Four media companies – Svenska Dagbladet, Expressen, Sveriges Radio, and Sveriges Television – stated that they had been contacted by the Chinese embassy on several occasions, and that they, for instance, had been criticized on their publications, both by letters and e-mails. The media company Svenska Dagbladet, had been contacted on several occasions in the past two years, including via e-mails directly from the Chinese ambassador to Sweden. Several times, China and the Chinese ambassador had criticized the media company’s publications regarding the conditions in China. Individual reporters also reported having been subjected to criticism. The tabloid Expressen had received several letters and e-mails from the embassy, e-mails containing criticism and threatening formulations regarding the coverage of the Swedish book publisher Gui Minhai, who has been imprisoned in China since 2015. Formulations such as “media tyranny” could be found in the e-mails.” In this case, the Chinese ambassador is using their official role (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona) to try to influence Swedish press. A government official trying to interfere in other countries' media activities could be a violation of press freedom. In this specific case, the Chinese diplomats are trying to silence criticism against China (T0139.002: Silence).”", "“Four media companies – Svenska Dagbladet, Expressen, Sveriges Radio, and Sveriges Television – stated that they had been contacted by the Chinese embassy on several occasions, and that they, for instance, had been criticized on their publications, both by letters and e-mails. The media company Svenska Dagbladet, had been contacted on several occasions in the past two years, including via e-mails directly from the Chinese ambassador to Sweden. Several times, China and the Chinese ambassador had criticized the media company’s publications regarding the conditions in China. Individual reporters also reported having been subjected to criticism. The tabloid Expressen had received several letters and e-mails from the embassy, e-mails containing criticism and threatening formulations regarding the coverage of the Swedish book publisher Gui Minhai, who has been imprisoned in China since 2015. Formulations such as “media tyranny” could be found in the e-mails.” In this case, the Chinese ambassador is using their official role (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona) to try to influence Swedish press. A government official trying to interfere in other countries' media activities could be a violation of press freedom. In this specific case, the Chinese diplomats are trying to silence criticism against China (T0139.002: Silence).”", "“Four media companies – Svenska Dagbladet, Expressen, Sveriges Radio, and Sveriges Television – stated that they had been contacted by the Chinese embassy on several occasions, and that they, for instance, had been criticized on their publications, both by letters and e-mails. The media company Svenska Dagbladet, had been contacted on several occasions in the past two years, including via e-mails directly from the Chinese ambassador to Sweden. Several times, China and the Chinese ambassador had criticized the media company’s publications regarding the conditions in China. Individual reporters also reported having been subjected to criticism. The tabloid Expressen had received several letters and e-mails from the embassy, e-mails containing criticism and threatening formulations regarding the coverage of the Swedish book publisher Gui Minhai, who has been imprisoned in China since 2015. Formulations such as “media tyranny” could be found in the e-mails.” In this case, the Chinese ambassador is using their official role (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona) to try to influence Swedish press. A government official trying to interfere in other countries' media activities could be a violation of press freedom. In this specific case, the Chinese diplomats are trying to silence criticism against China (T0139.002: Silence).”"
I00093 China Falsely Denies Disinformation Campaign Targeting Canada’s Prime Minister	“On October 23, Canada’s Foreign Ministry said it had discovered a disinformation campaign, likely tied to China, aimed at discrediting dozens of Canadian politicians, including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. “The ministry said the campaign took place in August and September. It used new and hijacked social media accounts to bulk-post messages targeting Canadian politicians (T0141.001: Acquire Compromised Account). “A Chinese Embassy in Canada spokesperson dismissed Canada’s accusation as baseless. ““Canada was a downright liar and disseminator of false information… Beijing has never meddled in another nation’s domestic affairs.” “A Chinese Embassy in Canada spokesperson dismissed Canada’s accusation as baseless. “That is false. “The Canadian government's report is based on an investigation conducted by its Rapid Response Mechanism cyber intelligence unit in cooperation with the social media platforms. “The investigation exposed China’s disinformation campaign dubbed “Spamouflage” -- for its tactic of using “a network of new or hijacked social media accounts that posts and increases the number of propaganda messages across multiple social media platforms – including Facebook, X/Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Medium, Reddit, TikTok, and LinkedIn.”” In this case a network of accounts attributed to China were identified operating on multiple platforms. The report was dismissed as false information by an official in the Chinese Embassy in Canada (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona, T0129.006: Deny Involvement)., “On October 23, Canada’s Foreign Ministry said it had discovered a disinformation campaign, likely tied to China, aimed at discrediting dozens of Canadian politicians, including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. “The ministry said the campaign took place in August and September. It used new and hijacked social media accounts to bulk-post messages targeting Canadian politicians (T0141.001: Acquire Compromised Account). “A Chinese Embassy in Canada spokesperson dismissed Canada’s accusation as baseless. ““Canada was a downright liar and disseminator of false information… Beijing has never meddled in another nation’s domestic affairs.” “A Chinese Embassy in Canada spokesperson dismissed Canada’s accusation as baseless. “That is false. “The Canadian government's report is based on an investigation conducted by its Rapid Response Mechanism cyber intelligence unit in cooperation with the social media platforms. “The investigation exposed China’s disinformation campaign dubbed “Spamouflage” -- for its tactic of using “a network of new or hijacked social media accounts that posts and increases the number of propaganda messages across multiple social media platforms – including Facebook, X/Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Medium, Reddit, TikTok, and LinkedIn.”” In this case a network of accounts attributed to China were identified operating on multiple platforms. The report was dismissed as false information by an official in the Chinese Embassy in Canada (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona, T0129.006: Deny Involvement)., “On October 23, Canada’s Foreign Ministry said it had discovered a disinformation campaign, likely tied to China, aimed at discrediting dozens of Canadian politicians, including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. “The ministry said the campaign took place in August and September. It used new and hijacked social media accounts to bulk-post messages targeting Canadian politicians (T0141.001: Acquire Compromised Account). “A Chinese Embassy in Canada spokesperson dismissed Canada’s accusation as baseless. ““Canada was a downright liar and disseminator of false information… Beijing has never meddled in another nation’s domestic affairs.” “A Chinese Embassy in Canada spokesperson dismissed Canada’s accusation as baseless. “That is false. “The Canadian government's report is based on an investigation conducted by its Rapid Response Mechanism cyber intelligence unit in cooperation with the social media platforms. “The investigation exposed China’s disinformation campaign dubbed “Spamouflage” -- for its tactic of using “a network of new or hijacked social media accounts that posts and increases the number of propaganda messages across multiple social media platforms – including Facebook, X/Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Medium, Reddit, TikTok, and LinkedIn.”” In this case a network of accounts attributed to China were identified operating on multiple platforms. The report was dismissed as false information by an official in the Chinese Embassy in Canada (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona, T0129.006: Deny Involvement).

Counters	Response types

DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW