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Incident I00113: Inside the Shadowy World of Disinformation for Hire in Kenya
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Summary: This research examines how Kenyan journalists, judges, and other members of civil society are facing coordinated disinformation and harassment campaigns on Twitter — and that Twitter is doing very little to stop it. The research provides a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya.
We conducted the research over the course of three months using tools like Sprinklr, Gephi and Trendinalia. We also interviewed influencers who participated in the campaigns, and collected a vast trove of screenshots, memes, and other evidence. In total, our research uncovered at least nine different disinformation campaigns consisting of over 23,000 tweets and 3,700 participating accounts. -
incident type:
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| Technique | Description given for this incident |
|---|---|
| T0121 Manipulate Platform Algorithm | IT00000459 Researchers at Mozilla examined influence operations targeting Kenyan citizens on Twitter in 2021, providing “a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya”, and giving insight into operations’ operationalisation: In our interviews with one of the influencers, they informed us of the agile tactics they use to organize and avoid detection. For example, when it’s time to carry out the campaign the influencers would be added to a Whatsapp group. Here, they received direction about what to post, the hashtags to use, which tweets to engage with and who to target. Synchronizing the tweets was also incredibly important for them. It’s what enables them to achieve their goal of trending on Twitter and gain amplification. [...] They revealed to us that those participating in the exercise are paid roughly between $10 and $15 to participate in three campaigns per day. Each campaign execution involves tweeting about the hashtags of the day until it appears on the trending section of Twitter. Additionally, some individuals have managed to reach retainer level and get paid about $250 per month. Their job is to make sure the campaigns are executed on a day-by-day basis with different hashtags. An M-PESA account (T0148.002: Bank Account Asset, T0148.001: Online Banking Platform) was used to pay campaign participants. Participants were organised in WhatsApp groups (T0129.005: Coordinate on Encrypted/Closed Networks T0151.007: Chat Broadcast Group, T0151.004: Chat Platform), in which they planned how to get campaign content trending on Twitter (T0121: Manipulate Platform Algorithm, T0151.008: Microblogging Platform). |
| T0129.005 Coordinate on Encrypted/Closed Networks | IT00000456 Researchers at Mozilla examined influence operations targeting Kenyan citizens on Twitter in 2021, providing “a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya”, and giving insight into operations’ operationalisation: In our interviews with one of the influencers, they informed us of the agile tactics they use to organize and avoid detection. For example, when it’s time to carry out the campaign the influencers would be added to a Whatsapp group. Here, they received direction about what to post, the hashtags to use, which tweets to engage with and who to target. Synchronizing the tweets was also incredibly important for them. It’s what enables them to achieve their goal of trending on Twitter and gain amplification. [...] They revealed to us that those participating in the exercise are paid roughly between $10 and $15 to participate in three campaigns per day. Each campaign execution involves tweeting about the hashtags of the day until it appears on the trending section of Twitter. Additionally, some individuals have managed to reach retainer level and get paid about $250 per month. Their job is to make sure the campaigns are executed on a day-by-day basis with different hashtags. An M-PESA account (T0148.002: Bank Account Asset, T0148.001: Online Banking Platform) was used to pay campaign participants. Participants were organised in WhatsApp groups (T0129.005: Coordinate on Encrypted/Closed Networks, T0151.007: Chat Broadcast Group, T0151.004: Chat Platform), in which they planned how to get campaign content trending on Twitter (T0121: Manipulate Platform Algorithm, T0151.008: Microblogging Platform). |
| T0146.003 Verified Account Asset | IT00000461 Researchers at Mozilla examined influence operations targeting Kenyan citizens on Twitter in 2021, providing “a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya”. The report touches upon how actors gained access to twitter accounts, and what personas they presented: Verified accounts are complicit. One influencer we spoke to mentioned that the people who own coveted “blue check” accounts will often rent them out for disinformation campaigns. These verified accounts can improve the campaign’s chances of trending. Says one interviewee: “The owner of the account usually receives a cut of the campaign loot”. [...] Many of the accounts we examined appear to give an aura of authenticity, but in reality they are not authentic. Simply looking at their date of creation won’t give you a hint as to their purpose. We had to dig deeper. The profile pictures and content of some of the accounts gave us the answers we were looking for. A common tactic these accounts utilize is using suggestive pictures of women to bait men into following them, or at least pay attention. In terms of content, many of these accounts tweeted off the same hashtags for days on end and will constantly retweet a specific set of accounts. Actors participating in this operation rented out verified Twitter accounts (in 2021 a checkmark on Twitter verified a user’s identity), which were repurposed and used updated account imagery (T0146.003: Verified Account Asset, T0150.007: Rented Asset, T0150.004: Repurposed Asset, T00145.006: Attractive Person Account Imagery). |
| T0148.001 Online Banking Platform | IT00000455 Researchers at Mozilla examined influence operations targeting Kenyan citizens on Twitter in 2021, providing “a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya”, and giving insight into operations’ operationalisation: In our interviews with one of the influencers, they informed us of the agile tactics they use to organize and avoid detection. For example, when it’s time to carry out the campaign the influencers would be added to a Whatsapp group. Here, they received direction about what to post, the hashtags to use, which tweets to engage with and who to target. Synchronizing the tweets was also incredibly important for them. It’s what enables them to achieve their goal of trending on Twitter and gain amplification. [...] They revealed to us that those participating in the exercise are paid roughly between $10 and $15 to participate in three campaigns per day. Each campaign execution involves tweeting about the hashtags of the day until it appears on the trending section of Twitter. Additionally, some individuals have managed to reach retainer level and get paid about $250 per month. Their job is to make sure the campaigns are executed on a day-by-day basis with different hashtags. An M-PESA account (T0148.002: Bank Account Asset, T0148.001: Online Banking Platform) was used to pay campaign participants. Participants were organised in WhatsApp groups (T0129.005: Coordinate on Encrypted/Closed Networks, T0151.007: Chat Broadcast Group, T0151.004: Chat Platform), in which they planned how to get campaign content trending on Twitter (T0121: Manipulate Platform Algorithm, T0151.008: Microblogging Platform). |
| T0148.002 Bank Account Asset | IT00000454 Researchers at Mozilla examined influence operations targeting Kenyan citizens on Twitter in 2021, providing “a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya”, and giving insight into operations’ operationalisation: In our interviews with one of the influencers, they informed us of the agile tactics they use to organize and avoid detection. For example, when it’s time to carry out the campaign the influencers would be added to a Whatsapp group. Here, they received direction about what to post, the hashtags to use, which tweets to engage with and who to target. Synchronizing the tweets was also incredibly important for them. It’s what enables them to achieve their goal of trending on Twitter and gain amplification. [...] They revealed to us that those participating in the exercise are paid roughly between $10 and $15 to participate in three campaigns per day. Each campaign execution involves tweeting about the hashtags of the day until it appears on the trending section of Twitter. Additionally, some individuals have managed to reach retainer level and get paid about $250 per month. Their job is to make sure the campaigns are executed on a day-by-day basis with different hashtags. An M-PESA account (T0148.002: Bank Account Asset, T0148.001: Online Banking Platform) was used to pay campaign participants. Participants were organised in WhatsApp groups (T0129.005: Coordinate on Encrypted/Closed Networks, T0151.007: Chat Broadcast Group, T0151.004: Chat Platform), in which they planned how to get campaign content trending on Twitter (T0121: Manipulate Platform Algorithm, T0151.008: Microblogging Platform). |
| T0150.004 Repurposed Asset | IT00000463 Researchers at Mozilla examined influence operations targeting Kenyan citizens on Twitter in 2021, providing “a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya”. The report touches upon how actors gained access to twitter accounts, and what personas they presented: Verified accounts are complicit. One influencer we spoke to mentioned that the people who own coveted “blue check” accounts will often rent them out for disinformation campaigns. These verified accounts can improve the campaign’s chances of trending. Says one interviewee: “The owner of the account usually receives a cut of the campaign loot”. [...] Many of the accounts we examined appear to give an aura of authenticity, but in reality they are not authentic. Simply looking at their date of creation won’t give you a hint as to their purpose. We had to dig deeper. The profile pictures and content of some of the accounts gave us the answers we were looking for. A common tactic these accounts utilize is using suggestive pictures of women to bait men into following them, or at least pay attention. In terms of content, many of these accounts tweeted off the same hashtags for days on end and will constantly retweet a specific set of accounts. Actors participating in this operation rented out verified Twitter accounts (in 2021 a checkmark on Twitter verified a user’s identity), which were repurposed and used updated account imagery (T0146.003: Verified Account Asset, T0150.007: Rented Asset, T0150.004: Repurposed Asset, T00145.006: Attractive Person Account Imagery). |
| T0150.007 Rented Asset | IT00000462 Researchers at Mozilla examined influence operations targeting Kenyan citizens on Twitter in 2021, providing “a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya”. The report touches upon how actors gained access to twitter accounts, and what personas they presented: Verified accounts are complicit. One influencer we spoke to mentioned that the people who own coveted “blue check” accounts will often rent them out for disinformation campaigns. These verified accounts can improve the campaign’s chances of trending. Says one interviewee: “The owner of the account usually receives a cut of the campaign loot”. [...] Many of the accounts we examined appear to give an aura of authenticity, but in reality they are not authentic. Simply looking at their date of creation won’t give you a hint as to their purpose. We had to dig deeper. The profile pictures and content of some of the accounts gave us the answers we were looking for. A common tactic these accounts utilize is using suggestive pictures of women to bait men into following them, or at least pay attention. In terms of content, many of these accounts tweeted off the same hashtags for days on end and will constantly retweet a specific set of accounts. Actors participating in this operation rented out verified Twitter accounts (in 2021 a checkmark on Twitter verified a user’s identity), which were repurposed and used updated account imagery (T0146.003: Verified Account Asset, T0150.007: Rented Asset, T0150.004: Repurposed Asset, T00145.006: Attractive Person Account Imagery). |
| T0151.004 Chat Platform | IT00000458 Researchers at Mozilla examined influence operations targeting Kenyan citizens on Twitter in 2021, providing “a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya”, and giving insight into operations’ operationalisation: In our interviews with one of the influencers, they informed us of the agile tactics they use to organize and avoid detection. For example, when it’s time to carry out the campaign the influencers would be added to a Whatsapp group. Here, they received direction about what to post, the hashtags to use, which tweets to engage with and who to target. Synchronizing the tweets was also incredibly important for them. It’s what enables them to achieve their goal of trending on Twitter and gain amplification. [...] They revealed to us that those participating in the exercise are paid roughly between $10 and $15 to participate in three campaigns per day. Each campaign execution involves tweeting about the hashtags of the day until it appears on the trending section of Twitter. Additionally, some individuals have managed to reach retainer level and get paid about $250 per month. Their job is to make sure the campaigns are executed on a day-by-day basis with different hashtags. An M-PESA account (T0148.002: Bank Account Asset, T0148.001: Online Banking Platform) was used to pay campaign participants. Participants were organised in WhatsApp groups (T0129.005: Coordinate on Encrypted/Closed Networks, T0151.007: Chat Broadcast Group, T0151.004: Chat Platform), in which they planned how to get campaign content trending on Twitter (T0121: Manipulate Platform Algorithm, T0151.008: Microblogging Platform). |
| T0151.007 Chat Broadcast Group | IT00000457 Researchers at Mozilla examined influence operations targeting Kenyan citizens on Twitter in 2021, providing “a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya”, and giving insight into operations’ operationalisation: In our interviews with one of the influencers, they informed us of the agile tactics they use to organize and avoid detection. For example, when it’s time to carry out the campaign the influencers would be added to a Whatsapp group. Here, they received direction about what to post, the hashtags to use, which tweets to engage with and who to target. Synchronizing the tweets was also incredibly important for them. It’s what enables them to achieve their goal of trending on Twitter and gain amplification. [...] They revealed to us that those participating in the exercise are paid roughly between $10 and $15 to participate in three campaigns per day. Each campaign execution involves tweeting about the hashtags of the day until it appears on the trending section of Twitter. Additionally, some individuals have managed to reach retainer level and get paid about $250 per month. Their job is to make sure the campaigns are executed on a day-by-day basis with different hashtags. An M-PESA account (T0148.002: Bank Account Asset, T0148.001: Online Banking Platform) was used to pay campaign participants. Participants were organised in WhatsApp groups (T0129.005: Coordinate on Encrypted/Closed Networks, T0151.007: Chat Broadcast Group, T0151.004: Chat Platform), in which they planned how to get campaign content trending on Twitter (T0121: Manipulate Platform Algorithm, T0151.008: Microblogging Platform). |
| T0151.008 Microblogging Platform | IT00000460 Researchers at Mozilla examined influence operations targeting Kenyan citizens on Twitter in 2021, providing “a grim window into the booming and shadowy industry of Twitter influencers for political hire here in Kenya”, and giving insight into operations’ operationalisation: In our interviews with one of the influencers, they informed us of the agile tactics they use to organize and avoid detection. For example, when it’s time to carry out the campaign the influencers would be added to a Whatsapp group. Here, they received direction about what to post, the hashtags to use, which tweets to engage with and who to target. Synchronizing the tweets was also incredibly important for them. It’s what enables them to achieve their goal of trending on Twitter and gain amplification. [...] They revealed to us that those participating in the exercise are paid roughly between $10 and $15 to participate in three campaigns per day. Each campaign execution involves tweeting about the hashtags of the day until it appears on the trending section of Twitter. Additionally, some individuals have managed to reach retainer level and get paid about $250 per month. Their job is to make sure the campaigns are executed on a day-by-day basis with different hashtags. An M-PESA account (T0148.002: Bank Account Asset, T0148.001: Online Banking Platform) was used to pay campaign participants. Participants were organised in WhatsApp groups (T0129.005: Coordinate on Encrypted/Closed Networks, T0151.007: Chat Broadcast Group, T0151.004: Chat Platform), in which they planned how to get campaign content trending on Twitter (T0121: Manipulate Platform Algorithm, T0151.008: Microblogging Platform). |
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