DISARMframeworks/DISARM_MASTER_DATA/countermeasures.csv

1	disarm_id	name	metatechnique	summary	how_found	references	incident_ids	tactic	responsetype	notes	tags	longname
2	C00022	Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety	M001 - resilience	Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks	2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D04		narrative	C00022 - Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety
3	C00006	Charge for social media	M004 - friction	Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information. There are examples of this not working, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc.	2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D02		action	C00006 - Charge for social media
4	C00008	Create shared fact-checking database	M006 - scoring	Share fact-checking resources - tips, responses, countermessages, across respose groups.	2019-11-workshop 2019-11-search		I00049,I00050	TA01 Strategic Planning	D04		information	C00008 - Create shared fact-checking database
5	C00009	Educate high profile influencers on best practices	M001 - resilience	Find online influencers. Provide training in the mechanisms of disinformation, how to spot campaigns, and/or how to contribute to responses by countermessaging, boosting information sites etc.	2019-11-workshop			TA02 Objective Planning	D02		education	C00009 - Educate high profile influencers on best practices
6	C00010	Enhanced privacy regulation for social media	M004 - friction	Implement stronger privacy standards, to reduce the ability to microtarget community members.	2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D02		regulation	C00010 - Enhanced privacy regulation for social media
7	C00011	Media literacy. Games to identify fake news	M001 - resilience	Create and use games to show people the mechanics of disinformation, and how to counter them.	2019-11-workshop			TA02 Objective Planning	D02		education	C00011 - Media literacy. Games to identify fake news
8	C00012	Platform regulation	M007 - metatechnique	Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy. Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media. The U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media	2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search	Hicks19		TA01 Strategic Planning	D02		regulation	C00012 - Platform regulation
9	C00013	Rating framework for news	M006 - scoring	This is "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body. Include full transcripts, link source, add items.	2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D02		information	C00013 - Rating framework for news
10	C00014	Real-time updates to fact-checking database	M006 - scoring	Update fact-checking databases and resources in real time. Especially import for time-limited events like natural disasters.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D04		information	C00014 - Real-time updates to fact-checking database
11	C00016	Censorship	M005 - removal	Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of information controlled by disinformation creators. Not recommended.	grugq	Taylor81		TA01 Strategic Planning	D02		action	C00016 - Censorship
12	C00017	Repair broken social connections	M010 - countermessaging	For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen.	2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00017 - Repair broken social connections
13	C00019	Reduce effect of division-enablers	M003 - daylight	includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers	2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00019 - Reduce effect of division-enablers
14	C00021	Encourage in-person communication	M001 - resilience	Encourage offline communication	2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D04		action	C00021 - Encourage in-person communication
15	C00024	Promote healthy narratives	M001 - resilience	Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA). Includes promoting identity neutral narratives.	2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D04		narrative	C00024 - Promote healthy narratives
16	C00026	Shore up democracy based messages	M010 - countermessaging	Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy	2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search	Hicks19		TA01 Strategic Planning	D04		narrative	C00026 - Shore up democracy based messages
17	C00027	Create culture of civility	M001 - resilience	This is passive. Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend.	2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D07		narrative	C00027 - Create culture of civility
18	C00029	Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise	M002 - diversion	Create websites in disinformation voids - spaces where people are looking for known disinformation.	2019-11-workshop			TA02 Objective Planning	D03		narrative	C00029 - Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise
19	C00028	Make information provenance available	M011 - verification	Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments. Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted. This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria.	2019-11-workshop			TA02 Objective Planning	D03		information	C00028 - Make information provenance available
20	C00030	Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)	M002 - diversion		2019-11-workshop			TA02 Objective Planning	D03		narrative	C00030 - Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)
21	C00031	Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify	M009 - dilution	Create competing narratives. Included "Facilitate State Propaganda" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.	2019-11-workshop			TA02 Objective Planning	D03	CAVEAT: some element of disinformation is simply filling the information space with so much data that it overwhelms people and they shutdown. Any swarm-counter-narrative needs to be cautious of this outcome.	narrative	C00031 - Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify
22	C00042	Address truth contained in narratives	M010 - countermessaging	Focus on and boost truths in misinformation narratives, removing misinformation from them.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 Establish Social Assets	D04		narrative	C00042 - Address truth contained in narratives
23	C00032	Hijack content and link to truth- based info	M002 - diversion	Link to platform	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D03		information	C00032 - Hijack content and link to truth- based info
24	C00034	Create more friction at account creation	M004 - friction	Counters fake account	2019-11-workshop			TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D04		action	C00034 - Create more friction at account creation
25	C00036	Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)	M013 - targeting	All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02		action	C00036 - Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)
26	C00040	third party verification for people	M011 - verification	counters fake experts	2019-11-workshop			TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02		information	C00040 - third party verification for people
27	C00067	Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)	M013 - targeting	Reduce the credibility of groups behind misinformation-linked funding campaigns.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 Establish Social Assets	D03		narrative	C00067 - Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)
28	C00044	Keep people from posting to social media immediately	M004 - friction	Platforms can introduce friction to slow down activities, force a small delay between posts, or replies to posts.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D03		action	C00044 - Keep people from posting to social media immediately
29	C00046	Marginalise and discredit extremist groups	M013 - targeting	Reduce the credibility of extremist groups posting misinformation.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D04		action	C00046 - Marginalise and discredit extremist groups
30	C00047	Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics	M008 - data pollution	Flood disinformation spaces with obviously fake content, to dilute core misinformation narratives in them.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 Establish Social Assets	D05		action	C00047 - Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics
31	C00048	Name and Shame Influencers	M003 - daylight	Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account. Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts. Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.	2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search	Rand2237 and Dalton19		TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D07		information	C00048 - Name and Shame Influencers
32	C00051	Counter social engineering training	M001 - resilience	Includes anti-elicitation training, phishing prevention education.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02		education	C00051 - Counter social engineering training
33	C00052	Infiltrate platforms	M013 - targeting	Detect and degrade	2019-11-workshop			TA15 Establish Social Assets	D04		action	C00052 - Infiltrate platforms
34	C00053	Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts	M012 - cleaning	remove or remove access to (e.g. stop the ability to update) old social media accounts, to reduce the pool of accounts available for takeover, botnets etc.	2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search		I00004	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D04		action	C00053 - Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts
35	C00056	Encourage people to leave social media	M004 - friction	Encourage people to leave spcial media. We don't expect this to work	2019-11-workshop			TA15 Establish Social Assets	D02		action	C00056 - Encourage people to leave social media
36	C00058	Report crowdfunder as violator	M005 - removal	counters crowdfunding. Includes ‘Expose online funding as fake”.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02		information	C00058 - Report crowdfunder as violator
37	C00059	Verification of project before posting fund requests	M011 - verification	third-party verification of projects posting funding campaigns before those campaigns can be posted.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 Establish Social Assets	D02		information	C00059 - Verification of project before posting fund requests
38	C00060	Legal action against for-profit engagement factories	M013 - targeting	Take legal action against for-profit "factories" creating misinformation.	2019-11-workshop			TA02 Objective Planning	D03		regulation	C00060 - Legal action against for-profit engagement factories
39	C00062	Free open library sources worldwide	M010 - countermessaging	Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as DISARM can be created to counter the adversarial efforts.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 Establish Social Assets	D04		information	C00062 - Free open library sources worldwide
40	C00065	Reduce political targeting	M005 - removal	Includes “ban political micro targeting” and “ban political ads”	2019-11-workshop			TA05 Microtargeting	D03		action	C00065 - Reduce political targeting
41	C00066	Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)	M009 - dilution	Flood a disinformation-related hashtag with other content.	2019-11-workshop			TA05 Microtargeting	D03		information	C00066 - Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)
42	C00080	Create competing narrative	M002 - diversion	Create counternarratives, or narratives that compete in the same spaces as misinformation narratives. Could also be degrade	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D03		narrative	C00080 - Create competing narrative
43	C00070	Block access to disinformation resources	M005 - removal	Resources = accounts, channels etc. Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. TA02*: DDOS at the critical time, to deny an adversary's time-bound objective. T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy. Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag. T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as "blocking access to a platform".	2019-11-workshop			TA02 Objective Planning	D02		action	C00070 - Block access to disinformation resources
44	C00071	Block source of pollution	M005 - removal	Block websites, accounts, groups etc connected to misinformation and other information pollution.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D02		action	C00071 - Block source of pollution
45	C00072	Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended	M005 - removal	Check special-interest groups (e.g. medical, knitting) for unrelated and misinformation-linked content, and remove it.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D02		action	C00072 - Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended
46	C00073	Inoculate populations through media literacy training	M001 - resilience	Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade.	2019-11-workshop,2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA01 Strategic Planning	D02		education	C00073 - Inoculate populations through media literacy training
47	C00074	Identify and delete or rate limit identical content	M012 - cleaning	C00000	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D02		action	C00074 - Identify and delete or rate limit identical content
48	C00075	normalise language	M010 - countermessaging	normalise the language around disinformation and misinformation; give people the words for artifact and effect types.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D02		information	C00075 - normalise language
49	C00076	Prohibit images in political discourse channels	M005 - removal	Make political discussion channels text-only.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D02		action	C00076 - Prohibit images in political discourse channels
50	C00077	Active defence: run TA15 "develop people” - not recommended	M013 - targeting	Develop networks of communities and influencers around counter-misinformation. Match them to misinformation creators	2019-11-workshop			TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D03		action	C00077 - Active defence: run TA15 "develop people” - not recommended
51	C00078	Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content	M002 - diversion	Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side”	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D03		action	C00078 - Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content
52	C00084	Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them	M002 - diversion	Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”. Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with "far-up/down/left/right" actors. "Long Game" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations. Can also replay technique T0003.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D03		narrative	C00084 - Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them
53	C00081	Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations	M003 - daylight	Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise"	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D03		information	C00081 - Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations
54	C00082	Ground truthing as automated response to pollution	M010 - countermessaging	Also inoculation.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D03		information	C00082 - Ground truthing as automated response to pollution
55	C00087	Make more noise than the disinformation	M009 - dilution		2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D04		narrative	C00087 - Make more noise than the disinformation
56	C00085	Mute content	M003 - daylight	Rate-limit disinformation content. Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns. Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D03		action	C00085 - Mute content
57	C00086	Distract from noise with addictive content	M002 - diversion	Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a "conversion rate" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's "information bubble" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D04		information	C00086 - Distract from noise with addictive content
58	C00112	"Prove they are not an op!"	M004 - friction	Challenge misinformation creators to prove they're not an information operation.	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D02		narrative	C00112 - "Prove they are not an op!"
59	C00090	Fake engagement system	M002 - diversion	Create honeypots for misinformation creators to engage with, and reduce the resources they have available for misinformation campaigns.	2019-11-workshop			TA07 Channel Selection	D05		action	C00090 - Fake engagement system
60	C00091	Honeypot social community	M002 - diversion	Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D05		action	C00091 - Honeypot social community
61	C00092	Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers	M006 - scoring	Includes "Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”. Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers.	2019-11-workshop			TA02 Objective Planning	D07		information	C00092 - Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers
62	C00093	Influencer code of conduct	M001 - resilience	Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers. Can be platform code of conduct; can also be community code.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D07		information	C00093 - Influencer code of conduct
63	C00094	Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research	M003 - daylight	Accountability move: make sure research is published with its funding sources.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D04		information	C00094 - Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research
64	C00096	Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers	M006 - scoring	Increase credibility, visibility, and reach of positive influencers in the information space.	2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D07		information	C00096 - Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers
65	C00097	Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment	M004 - friction	Reduce poll flooding by online taking comments or poll entries from verified accounts.	2019-11-workshop			TA07 Channel Selection	D02		information	C00097 - Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment
66	C00098	Revocation of allowlisted or "verified" status	M004 - friction	remove blue checkmarks etc from known misinformation accounts.	2019-11-workshop			TA07 Channel Selection	D02		action	C00098 - Revocation of allowlisted or "verified" status
67	C00099	Strengthen verification methods	M004 - friction	Improve content veerification methods available to groups, individuals etc.	2019-11-workshop			TA07 Channel Selection	D02		information	C00099 - Strengthen verification methods
68	C00100	Hashtag jacking	M002 - diversion	Post large volumes of unrelated content on known misinformation hashtags	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D03		information	C00100 - Hashtag jacking
69	C00101	Create friction by rate-limiting engagement	M004 - friction	Create participant friction. Includes Make repeat voting hard, and throttle number of forwards.	2019-11-workshop			TA07 Channel Selection	D04		action	C00101 - Create friction by rate-limiting engagement
70	C00103	Create a bot that engages / distract trolls	M002 - diversion	This is reactive, not active measure (honeypots are active). It's a platform controlled measure.	2019-11-workshop			TA07 Channel Selection	D05		action	C00103 - Create a bot that engages / distract trolls
71	C00105	Buy more advertising than misinformation creators	M009 - dilution	Shift influence and algorithms by posting more adverts into spaces than misinformation creators.	2019-11-workshop			TA07 Channel Selection	D03		information	C00105 - Buy more advertising than misinformation creators
72	C00106	Click-bait centrist content	M002 - diversion	Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D03		information	C00106 - Click-bait centrist content
73	C00107	Content moderation	M006 - scoring, M005 - removal	includes social media content take-downs, e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs	2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search		I00005,I00009,I00056	TA06 Develop Content	D02		action	C00107 - Content moderation
74	C00109	Dampen Emotional Reaction	M001 - resilience	Reduce emotional responses to misinformation through calming messages, etc.	2019-11-workshop			TA09 Exposure	D03		information	C00109 - Dampen Emotional Reaction
75	C00111	Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views	M001 - resilience		2019-11-workshop			TA01 Strategic Planning	D04		information	C00111 - Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views
76	C00118	Repurpose images with new text	M010 - countermessaging	Add countermessage text to iamges used in misinformation incidents.	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D04		narrative	C00118 - Repurpose images with new text
77	C00113	Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.	M003 - daylight	Debunk fake experts, their credentials, and potentially also their audience quality	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D02		information	C00113 - Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.
78	C00114	Don't engage with payloads	M004 - friction	Stop passing on misinformation	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D02		information	C00114 - Don't engage with payloads
79	C00115	Expose actor and intentions	M003 - daylight	Debunk misinformation creators and posters.	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D02		information	C00115 - Expose actor and intentions
80	C00116	Provide proof of involvement	M003 - daylight	Build and post information about groups etc's involvement in misinformation incidents.	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D02		information	C00116 - Provide proof of involvement
81	C00117	Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people	M010 - countermessaging	Label promote counter to disinformation	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D04		information	C00117 - Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people
82	C00125	Prebunking	M001 - resilience	Produce material in advance of misinformation incidents, by anticipating the narratives used in them, and debunking them.	2019-11-workshop			TA09 Exposure	D03		narrative	C00125 - Prebunking
83	C00119	Engage payload and debunk.	M010 - countermessaging	debunk misinformation content. Provide link to facts.	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D07		information	C00119 - Engage payload and debunk.
84	C00120	Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes	M007 - metatechnique	Redesign platforms and algorithms to reduce the effectiveness of disinformation	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D07		action	C00120 - Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes
85	C00121	Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow.	M001 - resilience	Make algorithms in platforms explainable, and visible to people using those platforms.	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D07		information	C00121 - Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow.
86	C00122	Content moderation	M004 - friction	Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship.	2019-11-workshop			TA09 Exposure	D02		action	C00122 - Content moderation
87	C00123	Remove or rate limit botnets	M004 - friction	reduce the visibility of known botnets online.	2019-11-workshop			TA09 Exposure	D03		action	C00123 - Remove or rate limit botnets
88	C00124	Don't feed the trolls	M004 - friction	Don't engage with individuals relaying misinformation.	2019-11-workshop			TA09 Exposure	D03		action	C00124 - Don't feed the trolls
89	C00211	Use humorous counter-narratives	M010 - countermessaging		2019-11-search		I00004	TA09 Exposure	D03		narrative	C00211 - Use humorous counter-narratives
90	C00126	Social media amber alert	M003 - daylight	Create an alert system around disinformation and misinformation artifacts, narratives, and incidents	2019-11-workshop			TA09 Exposure	D03		information	C00126 - Social media amber alert
91	C00128	Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants"	M009 - dilution	Repost or comment on misinformation artifacts, using ridicule or other content to reduce the likelihood of reposting.	2019-11-workshop			TA09 Exposure	D03		information	C00128 - Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants"
92	C00129	Use banking to cut off access	M014 - reduce resources	fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism	2019-11-workshop			TA09 Exposure	D02		action	C00129 - Use banking to cut off access
93	C00130	Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.	M001 - resilience	Train local influencers in countering misinformation.	2019-11-workshop			TA05 Microtargeting	D07		education	C00130 - Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.
94	C00131	Seize and analyse botnet servers	M005 - removal	Take botnet servers offline by seizing them.	2019-11-workshop			TA11 Persistence	D02		action	C00131 - Seize and analyse botnet servers
95	C00133	Deplatform Account*	M005 - removal	Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D03		action	C00133 - Deplatform Account*
96	C00135	Deplatform message groups and/or message boards	M005 - removal	Merged two rows here.	2019-11-workshop			TA15 Establish Social Assets	D03		action	C00135 - Deplatform message groups and/or message boards
97	C00136	Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages	M010 - countermessaging	Find communities likely to be targetted by misinformation campaigns, and send them countermessages or pointers to information sources.	2019-11-workshop			TA08 Pump Priming	D03		information	C00136 - Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages
98	C00138	Spam domestic actors with lawsuits	M014 - reduce resources	File multiple lawsuits against known misinformation creators and posters, to distract them from disinformation creation.	2019-11-workshop			TA11 Persistence	D03		regulation	C00138 - Spam domestic actors with lawsuits
99	C00139	Weaponise youtube content matrices	M004 - friction	God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out.	2019-11-workshop			TA11 Persistence	D03		information	C00139 - Weaponise youtube content matrices
100	C00140	"Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls	M008 - data pollution	Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except "T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics	2019-11-workshop			TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D03		action	C00140 - "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls
101	C00142	Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content	M004 - friction	Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “"Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice. Includes “mark clickbait visually”.	2019-11-workshop			TA06 Develop Content	D04		information	C00142 - Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content
102	C00143	(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time	M013 - targeting	Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc.	2019-11-workshop			TA11 Persistence	D04		regulation	C00143 - (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time
103	C00144	Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs	M014 - reduce resources	Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days. Not recommended	2019-11-workshop			TA02 Objective Planning	D04		action	C00144 - Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs
104	C00147	Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)	M004 - friction	Stop new community activity (likes, comments) on old social media posts.	2019-11-workshop			TA09 Exposure	D03		action	C00147 - Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)
105	C00148	Add random links to network graphs	M008 - data pollution	If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which DISARM techniques.	2019-11-workshop			TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D04		action	C00148 - Add random links to network graphs
106	C00149	Poison the monitoring & evaluation data	M008 - data pollution	Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.	2019-11-workshop			TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D04		action	C00149 - Poison the monitoring & evaluation data
107	C00153	Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure	M013 - targeting	Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate.	2019-11-search	Dalton19		TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00153 - Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure
108	C00154	Ask media not to report false information	M005 - removal	Train media to spot and respond to misinformation, and ask them not to post or transmit misinformation they've found.	2019-11-search		I00022	TA08 Pump Priming	D02		information	C00154 - Ask media not to report false information
109	C00155	Ban incident actors from funding sites	M005 - removal	Ban misinformation creators and posters from funding sites	2019-11-search		I00002	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02		action	C00155 - Ban incident actors from funding sites
110	C00156	Better tell your country or organization story	M010 - countermessaging	Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission.	2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA02 Objective Planning	D03		information	C00156 - Better tell your country or organization story
111	C00159	Have a disinformation response plan	M007 - metatechnique	e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict.	2019-11-search	Hicks19		TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00159 - Have a disinformation response plan
112	C00160	find and train influencers	M001 - resilience	Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources.	2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02		education	C00160 - find and train influencers
113	C00161	Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements	M007 - metatechnique	Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad.	2019-11-search	Dalton19		TA01 Strategic Planning	D07		action	C00161 - Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements
114	C00162	Unravel/target the Potemkin villages	M013 - targeting	Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year.	2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA15 Establish Social Assets	D03		information	C00162 - Unravel/target the Potemkin villages
115	C00164	compatriot policy	M013 - targeting	protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors	2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA02 Objective Planning	D03		action	C00164 - compatriot policy
116	C00165	Ensure integrity of official documents	M004 - friction	e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions	2019-11-search		I00015	TA06 Develop Content	D02		information	C00165 - Ensure integrity of official documents
117	C00169	develop a creative content hub	M010 - countermessaging	international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.	2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA02 Objective Planning	D03		action	C00169 - develop a creative content hub
118	C00170	elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft	M007 - metatechnique	Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly.	2019-11-search	Dalton19		TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00170 - elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft
119	C00172	social media source removal	M005 - removal	Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal	2019-11-search		I00035	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D02		action	C00172 - social media source removal
120	C00174	Create a healthier news environment	M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion	Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle. includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.	2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search	Hicks19, p143 of Corker18, Rand2237		TA01 Strategic Planning	D02		action	C00174 - Create a healthier news environment
121	C00176	Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private	M007 - metatechnique	Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations.	2019-11-search	Dalton19		TA01 Strategic Planning	D07		action	C00176 - Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private
122	C00178	Fill information voids with non-disinformation content	M009 - dilution, M008 - data pollution	1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation.	2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA05 Microtargeting	D04		information	C00178 - Fill information voids with non-disinformation content
123	C00182	Redirection / malware detection/ remediation	M005 - removal	Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete.	2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA09 Exposure	D02		action	C00182 - Redirection / malware detection/ remediation
124	C00184	Media exposure	M003 - daylight	highlight misinformation activities and actors in media	2019-11-search		I00010,I00015,I00032,I00044	TA08 Pump Priming	D04		information	C00184 - Media exposure
125	C00188	Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves	M001 - resilience	Includes SEO influence. Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community. Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets.	2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA08 Pump Priming	D03		education	C00188 - Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves
126	C00189	Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts	M003 - daylight	Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles. Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal	2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D06		action	C00189 - Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts
127	C00190	open engagement with civil society	M001 - resilience	Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.	2019-11-search	Dalton19, Hicks19		TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00190 - open engagement with civil society
128	C00195	Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content	M002 - diversion	Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or propaganda themes. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content.	2019-11-workshop, 2019-11-search	Rand2237		TA07 Channel Selection	D02		information	C00195 - Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content
129	C00197	remove suspicious accounts	M005 - removal	Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues). Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners.	2019-11-search, 2019-11-workshop		I00022	TA15 - Establish Social Assets	D02		action	C00197 - remove suspicious accounts
130	C00200	Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo	M010 - countermessaging	FIXIT: standardize language used for influencer/ respected figure.	2019-11-search		I00044	TA09 Exposure	D03		information	C00200 - Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo
131	C00202	Set data 'honeytraps'	M002 - diversion	Set honeytraps in content likely to be accessed for disinformation.	2019-11-search		I00004,I00022	TA06 Develop Content	D02		action	C00202 - Set data 'honeytraps'
132	C00203	Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets	M004 - friction	Remove access to official press events from known misinformation actors.	2019-11-search		I00022	TA15 Establish Social Assets	D03		action	C00203 - Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets
133	C00205	strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting	M007 - metatechnique	Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms.	2019-11-search	Hicks19		TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00205 - strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting
134	C00207	Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended	M013 - targeting		2019-11-search		I00042	TA02 Objective Planning	D07		action	C00207 - Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended
135	C00212	build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant	M001 - resilience	Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education.	2019-11-search	Hicks19		TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00212 - build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant
136	C00216	Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors	M014 - reduce resources	Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains	2019-11-workshop			TA05 Microtargeting	D02		action	C00216 - Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors
137	C00219	Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators	M003 - daylight	Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc.	grugq			TA06 Develop Content	D04		information	C00219 - Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators
138	C00220	Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan	M007 - metatechnique	Create a plan for misinformation and disinformation response, before it's needed. Include connections / contacts needed, expected counteremessages etc.	Counters cleanup			TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00220 - Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan
139	C00221	Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors	M007 - metatechnique	Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency	Counters cleanup			TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00221 - Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors
140	C00222	Tabletop simulations	M007 - metatechnique	Simulate misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and responses to them, before campaigns happen.				TA02 Objective Planning	D03		education	C00222 - Tabletop simulations
141	C00223	Strengthen Trust in social media platforms	M001 - resilience	Improve trust in the misinformation responses from social media and other platforms. Examples include creating greater transparancy on their actions and algorithms.				TA01 Strategic Planning	D03		action	C00223 - Strengthen Trust in social media platforms